Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
Expectedly, Siason filed a manifestation stating that he In his answer to the complaint, Siason alleged that the validity of
purchased Lots 773-A, 773-B and 658, not Lots 773 and 823, "in his titles to Lots 773-A and 773-B, having been passed upon by
good faith and for a valuable consideration without any the court in its order of September 4, 1965, had become res
knowledge of any lien or encumbrances against said properties"; judicata and the Yaneses were estopped from questioning said
that the decision in the cadastral proceeding 19 could not be order. 26 On their part, the Alvarez stated in their answer that the
enforced against him as he was not a party thereto; and that the Yaneses' cause of action had been "barred by res judicata, statute of
decision in Civil Case No. 5022 could neither be enforced against limitation and estoppel." 27
him not only because he was not a party-litigant therein but also
because it had long become final and executory. 20 Finding said In its decision of July 8, 1974, the lower court found that Rodolfo
manifestation to be well-founded, the cadastral court, in its order of Siason, who purchased the properties in question thru an agent
September 4, 1965, nullified its previous order requiring Siason to as he was then in Mexico pursuing further medical studies, was a
surrender the certificates of title mentioned therein. 21 buyer in good faith for a valuable consideration. Although the
Yaneses were negligent in their failure to place a notice of lis
In 1968, the Yaneses filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of pendens "before the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental in
an alias writ of execution in Civil Case No. 5022. Siason opposed order to protect their rights over the property in question" in Civil
it. 22 In its order of September 28, 1968 in Civil Case No. 5022, the Case No. 5022, equity demanded that they recover the actual
lower court, noting that the Yaneses had instituted another action for value of the land because the sale thereof executed between
the recovery of the land in question, ruled that at the judgment Alvarez and Siason was without court approval. 28 The dispositive
therein could not be enforced against Siason as he was not a party portion of the decision states:
in the case. 23
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING
The action filed by the Yaneses on February 21, 1968 was for CONSIDERATION, judgment is hereby rendered
recovery of real property with damages. 24 Named defendants in the following manner:
therein were Dr. Rodolfo Siason, Laura Alvarez, Flora Alvarez,
Raymundo Alvarez and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental. A. The case against the defendant Dr. Rodolfo
The Yaneses prayed for the cancellation of TCT Nos. T-19291 and Siason and the Register of Deeds are (sic) hereby
19292 issued to Siason (sic) for being null and void; the issuance of
dismmissed,
a new certificate of title in the name of the Yaneses "in accordance
with the sheriffs return of service dated October 20, 1965;" Siason's
delivery of possession of Lot 773 to the Yaneses; and if, delivery B. The defendants, Laura, Flora and Raymundo,
thereof could not be effected, or, if the issuance of a new title could all surnamed Alvarez being the legitimate children
of the deceased Rosendo Alvarez are hereby Negros Occidental, and is reversed insofar as it
ordered to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs awarded the sums of P2,000.00, P5,000.00 and
the sum of P20,000.00 representing the actual P2,000.00 as actual damages, moral damages
value of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of Murcia and attorney's fees, respectively. No costs.
Cadastre, Negros Occidental; the sum of
P2,000.00 as actual damages suffered by the SO ORDERED. 32
plaintiff; the sum of P5,000.00 representing moral
damages and the sum of P2.000 as attorney's Finding no cogent reason to grant appellants motion for
fees, all with legal rate of interest from date of the reconsideration, said appellate court denied the same.
filing of this complaint up to final payment.
Hence, the instant petition. ln their memorandum petitioners
C. The cross-claim filed by the defendant Dr. raised the following issues:
Rodolfo Siason against the defendants, Laura,
Flora and Raymundo, all surnamed Alvarez is
1. Whethere or not the defense of prescription
hereby dismissed.
and estoppel had been timely and properly
invoked and raised by the petitioners in the lower
D. Defendants, Laura, Flora and Raymundo, all court.
surnamed Alvarez are hereby ordered to pay the
costs of this suit.
2. Whether or not the cause and/or causes of
action of the private respondents, if ever there are
SO ORDERED. 29 any, as alleged in their complaint dated February
21, 1968 which has been docketed in the trial
The Alvarez appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court court as Civil Case No. 8474 supra, are forever
which in its decision of August 31, 1983 30 affirmed the lower barred by statute of limitation and/or prescription
court's decision "insofar as it ordered defendants-appellants to pay of action and estoppel.
jointly and severally the plaintiffs-appellees the sum of P20,000.00
representing the actual value of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of the
3. Whether or not the late Rosendo Alvarez, a
cadastral survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental, and is reversed
defendant in Civil Case No. 5022, supra and
insofar as it awarded the sums of P2,000.00, P5,000.00 and
P2,000.00 as actual damages, moral damages and attorney's fees, father of the petitioners become a privy and/or
respectively." 31 The dispositive portion of said decision reads: party to the waiver (Exhibit 4-defendant Siason) in
Civil Case No. 8474, supra where the private
respondents had unqualifiedly and absolutely
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is
waived, renounced and quitclaimed all their
affirmed insofar as it ordered defendants-
alleged rights and interests, if ever there is any,
appellants to pay jointly and severally the
on Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of Murcia Cadastre
plaintiffs- appellees the sum of P20,000.00
as appearing in their written manifestation dated
representing the actual value of Lots Nos. 773-A
November 6, 1962 (Exhibits "4" Siason) which
and 773-B of the cadastral survey of Murcia,
had not been controverted or even impliedly or No. 5022. As found by the lower court, from the uncontroverted
indirectly denied by them. evidence presented, the Yaneses have been illegally deprived of
ownership and possession of the lots in question. 37 In fact, Civil
4. Whether or not the liability or liabilities of Case No. 8474 now under review, arose from the failure to execute
Rosendo Alvarez arising from the sale of Lots Civil Case No. 5022, as subject lots can no longer be reconveyed to
Nos. 773-A and 773-B of Murcia Cadastre to Dr. private respondents Yaneses, the same having been sold during the
Rodolfo Siason, if ever there is any, could be pendency of the case by the petitioners' father to Dr. Siason who did
legally passed or transmitted by operations (sic) not know about the controversy, there being no lis pendens
annotated on the titles. Hence, it was also settled beyond question
of law to the petitioners without violation of law
that Dr. Siason is a purchaser in good faith.
and due process . 33
Under the circumstances, the trial court did not annul the sale
The petition is devoid of merit.
executed by Alvarez in favor of Dr. Siason on November 11, 1961
but in fact sustained it. The trial court ordered the heirs of
As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, it is powerless and for Rosendo Alvarez who lost in Civil Case No. 5022 to pay the
that matter so is the Supreme Court, to review the decision in plaintiffs (private respondents herein) the amount of P20,000.00
Civil Case No. 5022 ordering Alvarez to reconvey the lots in representing the actual value of the subdivided lots in dispute. It
dispute to herein private respondents. Said decision had long did not order defendant Siason to pay said amount. 38
become final and executory and with the possible exception of Dr.
Siason, who was not a party to said case, the decision in Civil
As to the propriety of the present case, it has long been
Case No. 5022 is the law of the case between the parties thereto.
established that the sole remedy of the landowner whose
It ended when Alvarez or his heirs failed to appeal the decision
property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in
against them. 34
another's name is to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court
of justice for reconveyance or, if the property has passed into the
Thus, it is axiomatic that when a right or fact has been judicially hands of an innocent purchaser for value, for damages. 39 "It is
tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long one thing to protect an innocent third party; it is entirely a different
as it remains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties matter and one devoid of justification if deceit would be rewarded by
and those in privity with them in law or estate. 35 As consistently allowing the perpetrator to enjoy the fruits of his nefarious decided
ruled by this Court, every litigation must come to an end. Access to As clearly revealed by the undeviating line of decisions coming from
the court is guaranteed. But there must be a limit to it. Once a this Court, such an undesirable eventuality is precisely sought to be
litigant's right has been adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a guarded against." 40
competent court, he should not be granted an unbridled license to
return for another try. The prevailing party should not be harassed by
The issue on the right to the properties in litigation having been
subsequent suits. For, if endless litigation were to be allowed,
finally adjudicated in Civil Case No. 5022 in favor of private
unscrupulous litigations will multiply in number to the detriment of the
administration of justice. 36
respondents, it cannot now be reopened in the instant case on
the pretext that the defenses of prescription and estoppel have
not been properly considered by the lower court. Petitioners could
There is no dispute that the rights of the Yaneses to the have appealed in the former case but they did not. They have
properties in question have been finally adjudicated in Civil Case
therefore foreclosed their rights, if any, and they cannot now be The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of
heard to complain in another case in order to defeat the the deceased party is not altered by the provision
enforcement of a judgment which has longing become final and of our Rules of Court that money debts of a
executory. deceased must be liquidated and paid from his
estate before the residue is distributed among
Petitioners further contend that the liability arising from the sale of said heirs (Rule 89). The reason is that whatever
Lots No. 773-A and 773-B made by Rosendo Alvarez to Dr. payment is thus made from the state is ultimately
Rodolfo Siason should be the sole liability of the late Rosendo a payment by the heirs or distributees, since the
Alvarez or of his estate, after his death. amount of the paid claim in fact diminishes or
reduces the shares that the heirs would have
Such contention is untenable for it overlooks the doctrine been entitled to receive.
obtaining in this jurisdiction on the general transmissibility of the
rights and obligations of the deceased to his legitimate children Under our law, therefore. the general rule is that a
and heirs. Thus, the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code state: party's contractual rights and obligations are
transmissible to the successors.
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by
virtue of which the property, rights and obligations The rule is a consequence of the progressive
to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a "depersonalization" of patrimonial rights and
person are transmitted through his death to duties that, as observed by Victorio Polacco has
another or others either by his will or by operation characterized the history of these institutions.
of law. From the Roman concept of a relation from
person to person, the obligation has evolved into
Art. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, a relation from patrimony to patrimony with the
rights and obligations of a person which are not persons occupying only a representative position,
extinguished by his death. barring those rare cases where the obligation is
strictly personal, i.e., is contracted intuitu
personae, in consideration of its performance by a
Art. 1311. Contract stake effect only between the
specific person and by no other.
parties, their assigns and heirs except in case
where the rights and obligations arising from the
contract are not transmissible by their nature, or xxx xxx xxx
by stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is
not liable beyond the value of the property Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they
received from the decedent. cannot escape the legal consequences of their father's
transaction, which gave rise to the present claim for damages.
As explained by this Court through Associate Justice J.B.L. That petitioners did not inherit the property involved herein is of
Reyes in the case of Estate of Hemady vs. Luzon Surety Co., no moment because by legal fiction, the monetary equivalent
Inc. 41 thereof devolved into the mass of their father's hereditary estate,
and we have ruled that the hereditary assets are always liable in Republic of the Philippines
their totality for the payment of the debts of the estate. 42 SUPREME COURT
Manila
It must, however, be made clear that petitioners are liable only to
the extent of the value of their inheritance. With this clarification SECOND DIVISION
and considering petitioners' admission that there are other
properties left by the deceased which are sufficient to cover the G.R. No. 77029 August 30, 1990
amount adjudged in favor of private respondents, we see no
cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions of the Court BIENVENIDO, ESTELITA, MACARIO, LUIS, ADELAIDE,
of Appeals. ENRIQUITA and CLAUDIO, all surnamed,
GEVERO, petitioners,
WHEREFORE, subject to the clarification herein above stated, vs.
the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and DEL MONTE
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
Lot Nos. 2476-H, 2476-I and 2476 G to Petitioners maintain that the deed of sale is entirely
defendant spouses Enrique Abada and Lilia invalid citing alleged flaws thereto, such as that: 1) the signature
Alvarez Abada. of Ricardo was forged without his knowledge of such fact; 2)
Lancero had recognized the fatal defect of the 1952 deed of sale
when he signed the document in 1968 entitled "Settlement to
No adjudication can be made with respect to Lot
Avoid the Litigation"; 3) Ricardo's children remained in the
No. 2476-A considering that the said lot is the
property notwithstanding the sale to Lancero; 4) the designated
subject of a civil case between the Heirs of Maria
Lot No. is 2470 instead of the correct number being Lot No. 2476;
Gevero on one hand and the spouses Daniel
5) the deed of sale included the share of Eustaquio Gevero
Borkingkito and Ursula Gevero on the other hand,
without his authority; 6) T.C.T. No. 1183 of Lancero segregated
which case is now pending appeal before the
the area of 20,119 square meters from the bigger area (OCT No.
Court of Appeals. No pronouncement as to costs,
7616) without the consent of the other co-owners; 7) Lancero
caused the 1952 Subdivision survey without the consent of the
SO ORDERED. (Decision, Record on Appeal, p. Geveros' to bring about the segregation of the 20,119 square
203; Rollo, pp. 21-22) meters lot from the mother lot 2476 which brought about the
issuance of his title T-1183 and to DELCOR's title T4320, both of
From said decision, defendant heirs of Ricardo Gevero which were illegally issued; and 8) the area sold as per document
(petitioners herein) appealed to the IAC (now Court of Appeals) is 20,649 square meters whereas the segregated area covered
which subsequently, on March 20, 1986, affirmed the decision by TCT No. T-1183 of Lancero turned out to be 20,119 square
appealed from. meters (Petitioners Memorandum, pp. 62-78).
Petitioners, on March 31, 1986, filed a motion for reconsideration As to petitioners' claim that the signature of Ricardo in the 1952
(Rollo, p. 28) but was denied on April 21, 1986. deed of sale in favor of Lancero was forged without Ricardo's
knowledge of such fact (Rollo, p. 71) it will be observed that the
Hence, the present petition. deed of sale in question was executed with all the legal
formalities of a public document. The 1952 deed was duly
This petition is devoid of merit. acknowledged by both parties before the notary public, yet
petitioners did not bother to rebut the legal presumption of the
regularity of the notarized document (Dy v. Sacay, 165 SCRA 473
[1988]); Nuguid v. C.A., G.R. No. 77423, March 13, 1989). In fact Contrary to the allegations of the appellants, the
it has long been settled that a public document executed and trial court found that Luis Lancero had taken
attested through the intervention of the notary public is evidence possession of the land upon proper investigation
of the facts in clear, unequivocal manner therein expressed. It by plaintiff the latter learned that it was indeed
has the presumption of regularity and to contradict all these, Luis Lancero who was the owner and possessor
evidence must be clear, convincing and more than merely of Lot 2476 D. . . . (Decision, C.A., p. 6).
preponderant (Rebuleda v. I.A.C., 155 SCRA 520-521 [1987]).
Forgery cannot be presumed, it must be proven (Siasat v. IAC, As a finding of fact, it is binding upon this Court (De Gola-Sison v.
No. 67889, October 10, 1985). Likewise, petitioners allegation of Manalo, 8 SCRA 595 [1963]; Gaduco vs. C.A., 14 SCRA 282
absence of consideration of the deed was not substantiated. [1965]; Ramos v. Pepsi-Cola, 19 SCRA 289 [1967]; Tan v. C.A.,
Under Art. 1354 of the Civil Code, consideration is presumed 20 SCRA 54 [1967]; Ramirez Tel. Co. v. Bank of America, 33
unless the contrary is proven. SCRA 737 [1970]; Lucero v. Loot, 25 SCRA 687 [1968]; Guerrero
v. C.A., 142 SCRA 130 [1986]).
As to petitioners' contention that Lancero had recognized the fatal
defect of the 1952 deed when he signed the document in 1968 Suffice it to say that the other flaws claimed by the petitioners
entitled "Settlement to Avoid Litigation" (Rollo, p. 71), it is a basic which allegedly invalidated the 1952 deed of sale have not been
rule of evidence that the right of a party cannot be prejudiced by raised before the trial court nor before the appellate court. It is
an act, declaration, or omission of another (Sec. 28. Rule 130, settled jurisprudence that an issue which was neither averred in
Rules of Court). This particular rule is embodied in the the complaint nor raised during the trial in the court below cannot
maxim "res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet." Under be raised for the first time on appeal as it would be offensive to
Section 31, Rule 130, Rules of Court "where one derives title to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process. (Matienzo v.
property from another, the act, declaration, or omission of the Servidad, 107 SCRA 276 [1981]; Dela Santa v. C.A., 140 SCRA
latter, while holding the title, in relation to the property is evidence 44 [1985]; Dihiansan v. C.A., 157 SCRA 434 [1987]; Anchuelo v.
against the former." It is however stressed that the admission of IAC, 147 SCRA 434 [1987]; Dulos Realty and Development
the former owner of a property must have been made while he Corporation v. C.A., 157 SCRA [1988]; Kamos v. IAC, G.R. No.
was the owner thereof in order that such admission may be 78282, July 5, 1989).
binding upon the present owner (City of Manila v. del Rosario, 5
Phil. 227 [1905]; Medel v. Avecilla, 15 Phil. 465 [1910]). Hence, Petitioners aver that the 1/2 share of interest of Teodorica
Lanceros' declaration or acts of executing the 1968 document (mother of Ricardo) in Lot 2476 under OCT No. 7610 was not
have no binding effect on DELCOR, the ownership of the land included in the deed of sale as it was intended to limit solely to
having passed to DELCOR in 1964. Ricardos' proportionate share out of the undivided 1/2 of the area
pertaining to the six (6) brothers and sisters listed in the Title and
Petitioners' claim that they remained in the property, that the Deed did not include the share of Ricardo, as inheritance
notwithstanding the alleged sale by Ricardo to Lancero (Rollo, p. from Teodorica, because the Deed did not recite that she was
71) involves a question of fact already raised and passed upon by deceased at the time it was executed (Rollo, pp. 67-68).
both the trial and appellate courts. Said the Court of Appeals:
The hereditary share in a decedents' estate is transmitted or
vested immediately from the moment of the death of the
"causante" or predecessor in interest (Civil Code of the An instrument notarized by a notary public as in the case at bar is
Philippines, Art. 777), and there is no legal bar to a successor a public instrument (Eacnio v. Baens, 5 Phil. 742). The execution
(with requisite contracting capacity) disposing of his hereditary of a public instrument is equivalent to the delivery of the thing
share immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of (Art. 1498, 1st Par., Civil Code) and is deemed legal delivery.
such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of Hence, its execution was considered a sufficient delivery of the
the estate (De Borja v. Vda. de Borja, 46 SCRA 577 [1972]). property (Buencamino v. Viceo, 13 Phil. 97; [1906]; Puato v.
Mendoza, 64 Phil. 457 [1937]; Vda. de Sarmiento v. Lesaca, 108
Teodorica Babangha died long before World War II, hence, the Phil. 900 [1960]; Phil. Suburban Development Corp. v. Auditor
rights to the succession were transmitted from the moment of her Gen., 63 SCRA 397 (1975]).
death. It is therefore incorrect to state that it was only in 1966, the
date of extrajudicial partition, when Ricardo received his share in Besides, the property sold is a registered land. It is the act of
the lot as inheritance from his mother Teodorica. Thus, when registration that transfers the ownership of the land sold. (GSIS v.
Ricardo sold his share over lot 2476 that share which he inherited C.A., G.R. No. 42278, January 20, 1989). If the property is a
from Teodorica was also included unless expressly excluded in registered land, the purchaser in good, faith has a right to rely on
the deed of sale. the certificate of title and is under no duty to go behind it to look
for flaws (Mallorca v. De Ocampo, No. L-26852, March 25, 1970;
Petitioners contend that Ricardo's share from Teodorica was Unchuan v. C.A., 161 SCRA 710 [1988]; Nuguid v. CA-G.R. No.
excluded in the sale considering that a paragraph of the 77427, March 13, 1989).
aforementioned deed refers merely to the shares of Ricardo and
Eustaquio (Rollo, p. 67-68). Under the established principles of land registration law, the
person dealing with registered land may generally rely on the
It is well settled that laws and contracts shall be so construed as correctness of its certificate of title and the law will in no way
to harmonize and give effect to the different provisions thereof oblige him to go behind the certificate to determine the condition
(Reparations Commission v. Northern Lines, Inc., 34 SCRA 203 of the property (Tiongco v. de la Merced, L-2446, July 25, 1974;
[1970]), to ascertain the meaning of the provisions of a contract, Lopez vs. CA., G.R. No. 49739, January 20, 1989; Davao Grains
its entirety must be taken into account (Ruiz v. Sheriff of Manila, Inc. vs. IAC, 171 SCRA 612 [1989]). This notwithstanding,
34 SCRA 83 [1970]). The interpretation insisted upon by the DELCOR did more than that. It did not only rely on the certificate
petitioners, by citing only one paragraph of the deed of sale, of title. The Court of Appeals found that it had first investigated
would not only create contradictions but also, render meaningless and checked the title (T.C.T. No. T-1183) in the name of Luis
and set at naught the entire provisions thereof. Lancero. It likewise inquired into the Subdivision Plan, the
corresponding technical description and the deed of sale
Petitioners claim that DELCOR's action is barred by laches executed by Ricardo Gevero in favor of Luis Lancero and found
considering that the petitioners have remained in the actual, everything in order. It even went to the premises and found Luis
open, uninterrupted and adverse possession thereof until at Lancero to be in possession of the land to the exclusion of any
present (Rollo, p. 17). other person. DELCOR had therefore acted in good faith in
purchasing the land in question.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 89783 February 19, 1992
NARVASA, C.J.:
The petition was initially denied due course and dismissed by this
Court. It was however reinstated upon a second motion for
reconsideration filed by the petitioners, and the respondents were Mariano Locsin executed a Last Will and Testament instituting his
required to comment thereon. The petition was thereafter given wife, Catalina, as the sole and universal heir of all his
due course and the parties were directed to submit their properties. 3 The will was drawn up by his wife's nephew and trusted
memorandums. These, together with the evidence, having been legal adviser, Attorney Salvador Lorayes. Attorney Lorayes disclosed
carefully considered, the Court now decides the case. that the spouses being childless, they had agreed that their
properties, after both of them shall have died should revert to their
First, the facts as the Court sees them in light of the evidence on respective sides of the family, i.e., Mariano's properties would go to
record: his "Locsin relatives" (i.e., brothers and sisters or nephews and
nieces), and those of Catalina to her "Jaucian relatives." 4
The late Getulio Locsin had three children named Mariano, Julian
Don Mariano Locsin died of cancer on September 14, 1948 after
and Magdalena, all surnamed Locsin. He owned extensive
residential and agricultural properties in the provinces of Albay a lingering illness. In due time, his will was probated in Special
Proceedings No. 138, CFI of Albay without any opposition from
and Sorsogon. After his death, his estate was divided among his
both sides of the family. As directed in his will, Doa Catalina was
three (3) children as follows:
appointed executrix of his estate. Her lawyer in the probate
proceeding was Attorney Lorayes. In the inventory of her
(a) the coconut lands of some 700 hectares in Bual, Pilar, husband's estate 5 which she submitted to the probate court for
Sorsogon, were adjudicated to his daughter, Magdalena Locsin; approval, 6Catalina declared that "all items mentioned from Nos. 1 to
33 are the private properties of the deceased and form part of his
(b) 106 hectares of coconut lands were given to Julian Locsin, capital at the time of the marriage with the surviving spouse, while
father of the petitioners Julian, Mariano, Jose, Salvador, Matilde, items Nos. 34 to 42 are conjugal." 7
and Aurea, all surnamed Locsin;
Among her own and Don Mariano's relatives, Doa Catalina was
(c) more than forty (40) hectares of coconut lands in Bogtong, closest to her nephew, Attorney Salvador Lorayes, her nieces,
eighteen (18) hectares of riceland in Daraga, and the residential Elena Jaucian, Maria Lorayes-Cornelio and Maria Olbes-Velasco,
lots in Daraga, Albay and in Legazpi City went to his son Mariano, and the husbands of the last two: Hostilio Cornelio and Fernando
which Mariano brought into his marriage to Catalina Jaucian in Velasco. 8 Her trust in Hostilio Cornelio was such that she made him custodian of all the
1908. Catalina, for her part, brought into the marriage untitled titles of her properties; and before she disposed of any of them, she unfailingly consulted
her lawyer-nephew, Attorney Salvador Lorayes. It was Atty. Lorayes who prepared the legal
properties which she had inherited from her parents, Balbino documents and, more often than not, the witnesses to the transactions were her niece
Jaucian and Simona Anson. These were augmented by other Elena Jaucian, Maria Lorayes-Cornelio, Maria Olbes-Velasco, or their husbands. Her niece,
Elena Jaucian, was her life-long companion in her house.
properties acquired by the spouses in the course of their
union, 1 which however was not blessed with children.
Don Mariano relied on Doa Catalina to carry out the terms of
Eventually, the properties of Mariano and Catalina were brought their compact, hence, nine (9) years after his death, as if in
under the Torrens System. Those that Mariano inherited from his obedience to his voice from the grave, and fully cognizant that
father, Getulio Locsin, were surveyed cadastrally and registered she was also advancing in years, Doa Catalina began
in the name of "Mariano Locsin, married to Catalina Jaucian.'' 2 transferring, by sale, donation or assignment, Don Mariano's as
well as her own, properties to their respective nephews and
nieces. She made the following sales and donation of properties
which she had received from her husband's estate, to his Locsin 6 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,237 P 5,720 - ditto -
nephews and nieces: favor of Aurea B. Locsin
EXHIBIT DATE PARTICULARS AREA/SQ.M. PRICE 7 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,404 P 4,050 - ditto -
WITNESSES favor of Aurea B. Locsin
23 Jan. 26, 1957 Deed of Absolute Sale in 962 P 481 15 Nov. 26, 1975 Deed of Sale in favor of 261 P 4,930 - ditto -
favor of Mariano Locsin Aurea Locsin
1-JRL Apr. 7, 1966 Deed of Sale in favor of 430,203 P 20,000 16 Oct. 17, 1975 Deed of Sale in favor of 533 P 2,000 Delfina
Jose R. Locsin Anson
Aurea Locsin M. Acabado
1-JJL Mar. 22, 1967 Deed of Sale in favor of 5,000 P 1,000
Hostilio Cornello 17 Nov. 26, 1975 Deed of Sale in favor of 373 P 1,000 Leonor
Julian Locsin (Lot 2020) Helen M. Jaucian Satuito
Aurea Locsin Mariano B. Locsin
1 Nov. 29, 1974 Deed of Donation in 26,509
favor Aurea Locsin, 19 Sept. 1, 1975 Conditional Donation in 1,130 P 3,000 - ditto -
Matilde L. Cordero favor of Mariano Locsin
and Salvador Locsin
1-MVRJ Dec. 29, 1972 Deed of Reconveyance 1,5110.66 P
2 Feb. 4, 1975 Deed of Donation in 34,045 1,000 Delfina Anson
favor Aurea Locsin, in favor of Manuel V. del (Lot 2155) Antonio Illegible
Matilde L. Cordero Rosario whose maternal
and Salvador Locsin grandfather was Getulio
Locsin
3 Sept. 9, 1975 Deed of Donation in (Lot 2059)
favor Aurea Locsin, 2-MVRJ June 30, 1973 Deed of Reconveyance 319.34 P 500
Matilde L. Cordero Antonio Illegible
and Salvador Locsin in favor of Manuel V. del (Lot 2155) Salvador Nical
Rosario but the rentals
4 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,424 Hostilio Cornelio from bigger portion of
favor of Aurea B. Locsin Fernando Velasco Lot 2155 leased to Filoil
Refinery were assigned to
5 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,456 P 5,750 Hostilio Maria Jaucian Lorayes
Cornelio Cornelio
favor of Aurea B. Locsin Elena Jaucian
Of her own properties, Doa Catalina conveyed the following to 25 Dec. 28, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 250 P 2,500
her own nephews and nieces and others: of Rogelio Marticio
EXHIBIT DATE PARTICULARS AREA/SQ.M. PRICE Doa Catalina died on July 6, 1977.
2-JJL July 16, 1964 Deed of Sale in favor 5,000 P 1,000 Four years before her death, she had made a will on October 22,
Vicente Jaucian (lot 2020) 1973 affirming and ratifying the transfers she had made during
(6,825 sqm. when her lifetime in favor of her husband's, and her own, relatives. After
resurveyed) the reading of her will, all the relatives agreed that there was no
need to submit it to the court for probate because the properties
24 Feb. 12, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale 100 P 1,000 devised to them under the will had already been conveyed to
in favor of Francisco M. them by the deceased when she was still alive, except some
Maquiniana legacies which the executor of her will or estate, Attorney
Salvador Lorayes, proceeded to distribute.
26 July 15, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 130 P 1,300
favor of Francisco In 1989, or six (6) years after Doa Catalina's demise, some of
Maquiniana her Jaucian nephews and nieces who had already received their
legacies and hereditary shares from her estate, filed action in the
27 May 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 100 P 1,000 Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City (Branch VIII, Civil Case No.
favor of Ireneo Mamia 7152) to recover the properties which she had conveyed to the
Locsins during her lifetime, alleging that the conveyances were
inofficious, without consideration, and intended solely to
28 May 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 75 P 750
circumvent the laws on succession. Those who were closest to
favor of Zenaida Buiza
Doa Catalina did not join the action.
29 May 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 150 P 1,500
After the trial, judgment was rendered on July 8, l985 in favor of
favor of Felisa Morjella
the plaintiffs (Jaucian), and against the Locsin defendants, the
dispositive part of which reads:
30 Apr. 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 31 P 1,000
favor of Inocentes Motocinos
WHEREFORE, this Court renders judgment for
the plaintiffs and against the defendants:
31 Feb. 12, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 150 P 1,500
favor of Casimiro Mondevil
(1) declaring the, plaintiffs, except the heirs of
Josefina J. Borja and Eduardo Jaucian, who
32 Mar. 1, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 112 P 1,200 withdrew, the rightful heirs and entitled to the
favor of Juan Saballa entire estate, in equal portions, of Catalina
Jaucian Vda. de Locsin, being the nearest
collateral heirs by right of representation of Juan (6) ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs
and Gregorio, both surnamed Jaucian, and full- attorney's fees and litigation expenses, in the
blood brothers of Catalina; amount of P30,000.00 without prejudice to any
contract between plaintiffs and counsel.
(2) declaring the deeds of sale, donations,
reconveyance and exchange and all other Costs against the defendants. 9
instruments conveying any part of the estate of
Catalina J. Vda. de Locsin including, but not The Locsins appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. CV-
limited to those in the inventory of known 11186) which rendered its now appealed judgment on March 14,
properties (Annex B of the complaint) as null and 1989, affirming the trial court's decision.
void ab-initio;
The petition has merit and should be granted.
(3) ordering the Register of Deeds of Albay and/or
Legazpi City to cancel all certificates of title and The trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the
other transfers of the real properties, subject of private respondents, nephews and nieces of Doa Catalina J.
this case, in the name of defendants, and Vda. de Locsin, entitled to inherit the properties which she had
derivatives therefrom, and issue new ones to the already disposed of more than ten (10) years before her death.
plaintiffs; For those properties did not form part of her hereditary
estate, i.e., "the property and transmissible rights and
(4) ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, obligations existing at the time of (the decedent's) death and
to reconvey ownership and possession of all such those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the
properties to the plaintiffs, together with all succession." 10 The rights to a person's succession are transmitted
muniments of title properly endorsed and from the moment of his death, and do not vest in his heirs until such
delivered, and all the fruits and incomes received time. 11 Property which Doa Catalina had transferred or conveyed to
by the defendants from the estate of Catalina, other persons during her lifetime no longer formed part of her estate
with legal interest from the filing of this action; and at the time of her death to which her heirs may lay claim. Had she
where reconveyance and delivery cannot be died intestate, only the property that remained in her estate at the
effected for reasons that might have intervened time of her death devolved to her legal heirs; and even if those
and prevent the same, defendants shall pay for transfers were, one and all, treated as donations, the right arising
the value of such properties, fruits and incomes under certain circumstances to impugn and compel the reduction or
received by them, also with legal interest from the revocation of a decedent's gifts inter vivos does not inure to the
filing, of this case respondents since neither they nor the donees are compulsory (or
forced) heirs. 12
(5) ordering each of the defendants to pay the
plaintiffs the amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary There is thus no basis for assuming an intention on the part of
damages; and the further sum of P20,000.00 Doa Catalina, in transferring the properties she had received
each as moral damages; and from her late husband to his nephews and nieces, an intent to
circumvent the law in violation of the private respondents' rights
to her succession. Said respondents are not her compulsory On March 27, 1967, Lot 2020 16 was partitioned by and among
heirs, and it is not pretended that she had any such, hence there Doa Catalina, Julian Locsin, Vicente Jaucian and Agapito
were no legitimes that could conceivably be impaired by any Lorete. 17 At least Vicente Jaucian, among the other respondents in
transfer of her property during her lifetime. All that the this case, is estopped from assailing the genuineness and due
respondents had was an expectancy that in nowise restricted her execution of the sale of portions of Lot 2020 to himself, Julian Locsin,
freedom to dispose of even her entire estate subject only to the and Agapito Lorete, and the partition agreement that he (Vicente)
limitation set forth in Art. 750, Civil Code which, even if it were concluded with the other co-owners of Lot 2020.
breached, the respondents may not invoke:
Among Doa, Catalina's last transactions before she died in 1977
Art. 750. The donation may comprehend all the were the sales of property which she made in favor of Aurea
present property of the donor or part thereof, Locsin and Mariano Locsin in 1975. 18
provided he reserves, in full ownership or in
usufruct, sufficient means for the support of There is not the slightest suggestion in the record that Doa
himself, and of all relatives who, at the time of the Catalina was mentally incompetent when she made those
acceptance of the donation, are by law entitled to dispositions. Indeed, how can any such suggestion be made in
be supported by the donor. Without such light of the fact that even as she was transferring properties to the
reservation, the donation shall be reduced on Locsins, she was also contemporaneously disposing of her other
petition of any person affected. (634a) properties in favor of the Jaucians? She sold to her nephew,
Vicente Jaucian, on July 16, 1964 (21 years before her death)
The lower court capitalized on the fact that Doa Catalina was one-half (or 5,000 sq.m.) of Lot 2020. Three years later, or on
already 90 years old when she died on July 6, 1977. It insinuated March 22, 1967, she sold another 5000 sq.m. of the same lot to
that because of her advanced years she may have been imposed Julian Locsin. 19
upon, or unduly influenced and morally pressured by her
husband's nephews and nieces (the petitioners) to transfer to From 1972 to 1973 she made several other transfers of her
them the properties which she had inherited from Don Mariano's properties to her relatives and other persons, namely: Francisco
estate. The records do not support that conjecture. Maquiniana, Ireneo Mamia, Zenaida Buiza, Feliza Morjella,
Inocentes Motocinos, Casimiro Mondevil, Juan Saballa and
For as early as 1957, or twenty-eight (28) years before her death, Rogelio Marticio. 20 None of those transactions was impugned by
Doa Catalina had already begun transferring to her Locsin the private respondents.
nephews and nieces the properties which she received from Don
Mariano. She sold a 962-sq.m. lot on January 26, 1957 to his In 1975, or two years before her death, Doa Catalina sold some
nephew and namesake Mariano Locsin II. 13 On April 7, 1966, or lots not only to Don Mariano's niece, Aurea Locsin, and his
19 years before she passed away, she also sold a 43 hectare land to nephew, Mariano Locsin
another Locsin nephew, Jose R. Locsin. 14 The next year, or on II, 21 but also to her niece, Mercedes Jaucian Arboleda. 22 If she was
March 22, 1967, she sold a 5,000-sq.m. portion of Lot 2020 to Julian competent to make that conveyance to Mercedes, how can there be
Locsin. 15 any doubt that she was equally competent to transfer her other
pieces of property to Aurea and Mariano II?
The trial court's belief that Don Mariano Locsin bequeathed his made the conveyances in favor of the petitioners. In fact,
entire estate to his wife, from a "consciousness of its real origin" considering their closeness to Doa Catalina it would have been
which carries the implication that said estate consisted of well-nigh impossible for the petitioners to employ "fraud, undue
properties which his wife had inherited from her parents, flies in pressure, and subtle manipulations" on her to make her sell or
the teeth of Doa Catalina's admission in her inventory of that donate her properties to them. Doa Catalina's niece, Elena
estate, that "items 1 to 33 are the private properties of the Jaucian, daughter of her brother, Eduardo Jaucian, lived with her
deceased (Don Mariano) and forms (sic) part of his capital at the in her house. Her nephew-in-law, Hostilio Cornelio, was the
time of the marriage with the surviving spouse, while items 34 to custodian of the titles of her properties. The sales and donations
42 are conjugal properties, acquired during the marriage." She which she signed in favor of the petitioners were prepared by her
would have known better than anyone else whether the listing trusted legal adviser and nephew, Attorney Salvador Lorayes.
included any of her paraphernal property so it is safe to assume The (1) deed of donation dated November 19,
that none was in fact included. The inventory was signed by her 1974 23 in favor of Aurea Locsin, (2) another deed of donation dated
under oath, and was approved by the probate court in Special February 4, 1975 24 in favor of Matilde Cordero, and (3) still another
Proceeding No. 138 of the Court of First Instance of Albay. It was deed dated September 9, 1975 25 in favor of Salvador Lorayes, were
prepared with the assistance of her own nephew and counsel, all witnessed by Hostilio Cornelio (who is married to Doa Catalina's
Atty. Salvador Lorayes, who surely would not have prepared a niece, Maria Lorayes) and Fernando Velasco who is married to
false inventory that would have been prejudicial to his aunt's another niece, Maria Olbes. 26The sales which she made in favor of
interest and to his own, since he stood to inherit from her Aurea Locsin on July 15, 1974 27 were witnessed by Hostilio Cornelio
eventually. and Elena Jaucian. Given those circumstances, said transactions
could not have been anything but free and voluntary acts on her part.
This Court finds no reason to disbelieve Attorney Lorayes'
testimony that before Don Mariano died, he and his wife (Doa Apart from the foregoing considerations, the trial court and the
Catalina), being childless, had agreed that their respective Court of Appeals erred in not dismissing this action for annulment
properties should eventually revert to their respective lineal and reconveyance on the ground of prescription. Commenced
relatives. As the trusted legal adviser of the spouses and a full- decades after the transactions had been consummated, and six
blood nephew of Doa Catalina, he would not have spun a tale (6) years after Doa Catalina's death, it prescribed four (4) years
out of thin air that would also prejudice his own interest. after the subject transactions were recorded in the Registry of
Property, 28 whether considered an action based on fraud, or one to
redress an injury to the rights of the plaintiffs. The private
Little significance, it seems, has been attached to the fact that respondents may not feign ignorance of said transactions because
among Doa Catalina's nephews and nieces, those closest to the registration of the deeds was constructive notice thereof to them
her: (a) her lawyer-nephew Attorney Salvador Lorayes; (b) her and the whole world. 29
niece and companion Elena Jaucian: (c) her nieces Maria Olbes-
Velasco and Maria Lorayes-Cornelio and their respective
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted. The decision
husbands, Fernando Velasco and Hostilio Cornelio, did not join dated March 14, 1989 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
the suit to annul and undo the dispositions of property which she 11186 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The private respondents'
made in favor of the Locsins, although it would have been to their complaint for annulment of contracts and reconveyance of
advantage to do so. Their desistance persuasively demonstrates properties in Civil Case No. 7152 of the Regional Trial Court,
that Doa Catalina acted as a completely free agent when she
Branch VIII of Legazpi City, is DISMISSED, with costs against the Republic of the Philippines
private respondents, plaintiffs therein. SUPREME COURT
Manila
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
vs.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
This is the main question raised in this petition for review before
us, assailing the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2in CA-GR CV
No. 41994 promulgated on February 6, 1996 and its
Resolution 3 dated July 19, 1996. The challenged Decision disposed
as follows:
(a) Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by I command, in this my addition (Codicil) that the Lot No. 1392, in
Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10942), which is the event that the one to whom I have left and bequeathed, and
registered in my name according to the records of the his heir shall later sell, lease, mortgage this said Lot, the buyer,
Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental. lessee, mortgagee, shall have also the obligation to respect and
deliver yearly ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar to Maria
(b) That should Jorge Rabadilla die ahead of me, the Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, on each month of December,
aforementioned property and the rights which I shall set SEVENTY FIVE (75) piculs of Export and TWENTY FIVE (25)
forth hereinbelow, shall be inherited and acknowledged piculs of Domestic, until Maria Marlina shall die, lastly should the
by the children and spouse of Jorge Rabadilla. buyer, lessee or the mortgagee of this lot, not have respected my
command in this my addition (Codicil), Maria Marlina Coscolluela
xxx y Belleza, shall immediately seize this Lot No. 1392 from my heir
and the latter's heirs, and shall turn it over to my near
desendants, (sic) and the latter shall then have the obligation to
FOURTH
give the ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar until Maria Marlina
shall die. I further command in this my addition (Codicil) that my
(a)....It is also my command, in this my addition (Codicil), that heir and his heirs of this Lot No. 1392, that they will obey and
should I die and Jorge Rabadilla shall have already received the follow that should they decide to sell, lease, mortgage, they
ownership of the said Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, cannot negotiate with others than my near descendants and my
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10942), and sister."4
also at the time that the lease of Balbinito G. Guanzon of the said
lot shall expire, Jorge Rabadilla shall have the obligation until he
Pursuant to the same Codicil, Lot No. 1392 was transferred to the
dies, every year to give to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza,
deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and Transfer Certificate of Title
Seventy (75) (sic) piculs of Export sugar and Twenty Five (25)
No. 44498 thereto issued in his name.
piculs of Domestic sugar, until the said Maria Marlina Coscolluela
y Belleza dies.
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife
Rufina and children Johnny (petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and
FIFTH
Zenaida, all surnamed Rabadilla.
(a) Should Jorge Rabadilla die, his heir to whom he shall give Lot
On August 21, 1989, Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza
No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer
Villacarlos brought a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 5588,
Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10492), shall have the obligation
before Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City,
to still give yearly, the sugar as specified in the Fourth paragraph
against the above-mentioned heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to
enforce the provisions of subject Codicil. The Complaint alleged On November 15, 1998, the plaintiff (private respondent) and a
that the defendant-heirs violated the conditions of the Codicil, in certain Alan Azurin, son-in-law of the herein petitioner who was
that: lessee of the property and acting as attorney-in-fact of defendant-
heirs, arrived at an amicable settlement and entered into a
1. Lot No. 1392 was mortgaged to the Philippine National Memorandum of Agreement on the obligation to deliver one
Bank and the Republic Planters Bank in disregard of the hundred piculs of sugar, to the following effect:
testatrix's specific instruction to sell, lease, or mortgage
only to the near descendants and sister of the testatrix. "That for crop year 1988-89, the annuity mentioned in Entry No.
49074 of TCT No. 44489 will be delivered not later than January
2. Defendant-heirs failed to comply with their obligation to of 1989, more specifically, to wit:
deliver one hundred (100) piculs of sugar (75 piculs
export sugar and 25 piculs domestic sugar) to plaintiff 75 piculs of 'A' sugar, and 25 piculs of 'B' sugar, or then existing
Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza from sugar crop in any of our names, Mary Rose Rabadilla y Azurin or Alan
years 1985 up to the filing of the complaint as mandated Azurin, during December of each sugar crop year, in Azucar
by the Codicil, despite repeated demands for compliance. Sugar Central; and, this is considered compliance of the annuity
as mentioned, and in the same manner will compliance of the
3. The banks failed to comply with the 6th paragraph of annuity be in the next succeeding crop years.
the Codicil which provided that in case of the sale, lease,
or mortgage of the property, the buyer, lessee, or That the annuity above stated for crop year 1985-86, 1986-87,
mortgagee shall likewise have the obligation to deliver and 1987-88, will be complied in cash equivalent of the number of
100 piculs of sugar per crop year to herein private piculs as mentioned therein and which is as herein agreed upon,
respondent. taking into consideration the composite price of sugar during each
sugar crop year, which is in the total amount of ONE HUNDRED
The plaintiff then prayed that judgment be rendered ordering FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P105,000.00).
defendant-heirs to reconvey/return-Lot No. 1392 to the surviving
heirs of the late Aleja Belleza, the cancellation of TCT No. 44498 That the above-mentioned amount will be paid or delivered on a
in the name of the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and the staggered cash installment, payable on or before the end of
issuance of a new certificate of title in the names of the surviving December of every sugar crop year, to wit:
heirs of the late Aleja Belleza.
For 1985-86, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY
On February 26, 1990, the defendant-heirs were declared in (P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or before December of crop year
default but on March 28, 1990 the Order of Default was lifted, with 1988-89;
respect to defendant Johnny S. Rabadilla, who filed his Answer,
accordingly. For 1986-87, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY
(P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or before December of crop year
During the pre-trial, the parties admitted that: 1989-90;
For 1987-88, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY "Therefore, the evidence on record having established plaintiff-
(P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or before December of crop year appellant's right to receive 100 piculs of sugar annually out of the
1990-91; and produce of Lot No. 1392; defendants-appellee's obligation under
Aleja Belleza's codicil, as heirs of the modal heir, Jorge Rabadilla,
For 1988-89, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY to deliver such amount of sugar to plaintiff-appellant; defendants-
(P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or before December of crop year appellee's admitted non-compliance with said obligation since
1991-92."5 1985; and, the punitive consequences enjoined by both the
codicil and the Civil Code, of seizure of Lot No. 1392 and its
However, there was no compliance with the aforesaid reversion to the estate of Aleja Belleza in case of such non-
Memorandum of Agreement except for a partial delivery of 50.80 compliance, this Court deems it proper to order the reconveyance
piculs of sugar corresponding to sugar crop year 1988 -1989. of title over Lot No. 1392 from the estates of Jorge Rabadilla to
the estate of Aleja Belleza. However, plaintiff-appellant must
institute separate proceedings to re-open Aleja Belleza's estate,
On July 22, 1991, the Regional Trial Court came out with a
secure the appointment of an administrator, and distribute Lot No.
decision, dismissing the complaint and disposing as follows:
1392 to Aleja Belleza's legal heirs in order to enforce her right,
reserved to her by the codicil, to receive her legacy of 100 piculs
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the aforegoing findings, the Court of sugar per year out of the produce of Lot No. 1392 until she
finds that the action is prematurely filed as no cause of action dies.
against the defendants has as yet arose in favor of plaintiff. While
there maybe the non-performance of the command as mandated
Accordingly, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE and
exaction from them simply because they are the children of Jorge
another one entered ordering defendants-appellees, as heirs of
Rabadilla, the title holder/owner of the lot in question, does not
Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey title over Lot No. 1392, together with
warrant the filing of the present complaint. The remedy at bar
its fruits and interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza.
must fall. Incidentally, being in the category as creditor of the left
estate, it is opined that plaintiff may initiate the intestate
proceedings, if only to establish the heirs of Jorge Rabadilla and SO ORDERED."7
in order to give full meaning and semblance to her claim under
the Codicil. Dissatisfied with the aforesaid disposition by the Court of
Appeals, petitioner found his way to this Court via the present
In the light of the aforegoing findings, the Complaint being petition, contending that the Court of Appeals erred in ordering
prematurely filed is DISMISSED without prejudice. the reversion of Lot 1392 to the estate of the testatrix Aleja
Belleza on the basis of paragraph 6 of the Codicil, and in ruling
that the testamentary institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla is a modal
SO ORDERED."6
institution within the purview of Article 882 of the New Civil Code.
On appeal by plaintiff, the First Division of the Court of Appeals
The petition is not impressed with merit.
reversed the decision of the trial court; ratiocinating and ordering
thus:
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in resolving as compulsory heirs of the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,
the appeal in accordance with Article 882 of the New Civil Code succeeded the latter by operation of law, without need of further
on modal institutions and in deviating from the sole issue raised proceedings, and the successional rights were transmitted to
which is the absence or prematurity of the cause of action. them from the moment of death of the decedent, Dr. Jorge
Petitioner maintains that Article 882 does not find application as Rabadilla.
there was no modal institution and the testatrix intended a mere
simple substitution - i.e. the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all
was to be substituted by the testatrix's "near descendants" should the property, rights and obligations of a person, not extinguished
the obligation to deliver the fruits to herein private respondent be by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla
not complied with. And since the testatrix died single and without had by virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced
issue, there can be no valid substitution and such testamentary heirs, at the time of his death. And since obligations not
provision cannot be given any effect. extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the
decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Codicil on
The petitioner theorizes further that there can be no valid the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to
substitution for the reason that the substituted heirs are not his compulsory heirs upon his death.
definite, as the substituted heirs are merely referred to as "near
descendants" without a definite identity or reference as to who In the said Codicil, testatrix Aleja Belleza devised Lot No. 1392 to
are the "near descendants" and therefore, under Articles Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, subject to the condition that the usufruct
8438 and 8459 of the New Civil Code, the substitution should be thereof would be delivered to the herein private respondent every
deemed as not written. year. Upon the death of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his compulsory heirs
succeeded to his rights and title over the said property, and they
The contentions of petitioner are untenable. Contrary to his also assumed his (decedent's) obligation to deliver the fruits of
supposition that the Court of Appeals deviated from the issue the lot involved to herein private respondent. Such obligation of
posed before it, which was the propriety of the dismissal of the the instituted heir reciprocally corresponds to the right of private
complaint on the ground of prematurity of cause of action, there respondent over the usufruct, the fulfillment or performance of
was no such deviation. The Court of Appeals found that the which is now being demanded by the latter through the institution
private respondent had a cause of action against the petitioner. of the case at bar. Therefore, private respondent has a cause of
The disquisition made on modal institution was, precisely, to action against petitioner and the trial court erred in dismissing the
stress that the private respondent had a legally demandable right complaint below.
against the petitioner pursuant to subject Codicil; on which issue
the Court of Appeals ruled in accordance with law. Petitioner also theorizes that Article 882 of the New Civil Code on
modal institutions is not applicable because what the testatrix
It is a general rule under the law on succession that successional intended was a substitution - Dr. Jorge Rabadilla was to be
rights are transmitted from the moment of death of the substituted by the testatrix's near descendants should there be
decedent10 and compulsory heirs are called to succeed by noncompliance with the obligation to deliver the piculs of sugar to
operation of law. The legitimate children and descendants, in private respondent.
relation to their legitimate parents, and the widow or widower, are
compulsory heirs.11 Thus, the petitioner, his mother and sisters, Again, the contention is without merit.
Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or Another important element of a fideicommissary substitution is
persons to take the place of the heir or heirs first instituted. Under also missing here. Under Article 863, the second heir or the
substitutions in general, the testator may either (1) provide for the fideicommissary to whom the property is transmitted must not be
designation of another heir to whom the property shall pass in beyond one degree from the first heir or the fiduciary. A
case the original heir should die before him/her, renounce the fideicommissary substitution is therefore, void if the first heir is not
inheritance or be incapacitated to inherit, as in a simple related by first degree to the second heir.17 In the case under
substitution,12 or (2) leave his/her property to one person with the scrutiny, the near descendants are not at all related to the
express charge that it be transmitted subsequently to another or instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
others, as in a fideicommissary substitution.13 The Codicil sued
upon contemplates neither of the two. The Court of Appeals erred not in ruling that the institution of Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is in the nature of a modal
In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in institution and therefore, Article 882 of the New Civil Code is the
default of the first heir by reason of incapacity, predecease or provision of law in point. Articles 882 and 883 of the New Civil
renunciation.14 In the case under consideration, the provisions of Code provide:
subject Codicil do not provide that should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla
default due to predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the Art. 882. The statement of the object of the institution or the
testatrix's near descendants would substitute him. What the application of the property left by the testator, or the charge
Codicil provides is that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs imposed on him, shall not be considered as a condition unless it
not fulfill the conditions imposed in the Codicil, the property appears that such was his intention.
referred to shall be seized and turned over to the testatrix's near
descendants. That which has been left in this manner may be claimed at once
provided that the instituted heir or his heirs give security for
Neither is there a fideicommissary substitution here and on this compliance with the wishes of the testator and for the return of
point, petitioner is correct. In a fideicommissary substitution, the anything he or they may receive, together with its fruits and
first heir is strictly mandated to preserve the property and to interests, if he or they should disregard this obligation.
transmit the same later to the second heir.15 In the case under
consideration, the instituted heir is in fact allowed under the Art. 883. When without the fault of the heir, an institution referred
Codicil to alienate the property provided the negotiation is with to in the preceding article cannot take effect in the exact manner
the near descendants or the sister of the testatrix. Thus, a very stated by the testator, it shall be complied with in a manner most
important element of a fideicommissary substitution is lacking; the analogous to and in conformity with his wishes.
obligation clearly imposing upon the first heir the preservation of
the property and its transmission to the second heir. "Without this
The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is
obligation to preserve clearly imposed by the testator in his will,
what is known in the law of succession as an institucion sub
there is no fideicommissary substitution."16 Also, the near
modo or a modal institution. In a modal institution, the testator
descendants' right to inherit from the testatrix is not definite. The
states (1) the object of the institution, (2) the purpose or
property will only pass to them should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his
application of the property left by the testator, or (3) the charge
heirs not fulfill the obligation to deliver part of the usufruct to
imposed by the testator upon the heir.18 A "mode" imposes an
private respondent.
obligation upon the heir or legatee but it does not affect the In the interpretation of Wills, when an uncertainty arises on the
efficacy of his rights to the succession.19 On the other hand, in a face of the Will, as to the application of any of its provisions, the
conditional testamentary disposition, the condition must happen testator's intention is to be ascertained from the words of the Will,
or be fulfilled in order for the heir to be entitled to succeed the taking into consideration the circumstances under which it was
testator. The condition suspends but does not obligate; and the made.23 Such construction as will sustain and uphold the Will in
mode obligates but does not suspend.20 To some extent, it is all its parts must be adopted.24
similar to a resolutory condition.21
Subject Codicil provides that the instituted heir is under obligation
From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it can be to deliver One Hundred (100) piculs of sugar yearly to Marlena
gleaned unerringly that the testatrix intended that subject property Belleza Coscuella. Such obligation is imposed on the instituted
be inherited by Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. It is likewise clearly worded heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his heirs, and their buyer, lessee, or
that the testatrix imposed an obligation on the said instituted heir mortgagee should they sell, lease, mortgage or otherwise
and his successors-in-interest to deliver one hundred piculs of negotiate the property involved. The Codicil further provides that
sugar to the herein private respondent, Marlena Coscolluela in the event that the obligation to deliver the sugar is not
Belleza, during the lifetime of the latter. However, the testatrix did respected, Marlena Belleza Coscuella shall seize the property
not make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla's inheritance and the effectivity of and turn it over to the testatrix's near descendants. The non-
his institution as a devisee, dependent on the performance of the performance of the said obligation is thus with the sanction of
said obligation. It is clear, though, that should the obligation be seizure of the property and reversion thereof to the testatrix's
not complied with, the property shall be turned over to the near descendants. Since the said obligation is clearly imposed by
testatrix's near descendants. The manner of institution of Dr. the testatrix, not only on the instituted heir but also on his
Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is evidently modal in nature successors-in-interest, the sanction imposed by the testatrix in
because it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir without, case of non-fulfillment of said obligation should equally apply to
however, affecting the efficacy of such institution. the instituted heir and his successors-in-interest.
Then too, since testamentary dispositions are generally acts of Similarly unsustainable is petitioner's submission that by virtue of
liberality, an obligation imposed upon the heir should not be the amicable settlement, the said obligation imposed by the
considered a condition unless it clearly appears from the Will Codicil has been assumed by the lessee, and whatever obligation
itself that such was the intention of the testator. In case of doubt, petitioner had become the obligation of the lessee; that petitioner
the institution should be considered as modal and not is deemed to have made a substantial and constructive
conditional.22 compliance of his obligation through the consummated settlement
between the lessee and the private respondent, and having
Neither is there tenability in the other contention of petitioner that consummated a settlement with the petitioner, the recourse of the
the private respondent has only a right of usufruct but not the private respondent is the fulfillment of the obligation under the
right to seize the property itself from the instituted heir because amicable settlement and not the seizure of subject property.
the right to seize was expressly limited to violations by the buyer,
lessee or mortgagee. Suffice it to state that a Will is a personal, solemn, revocable and
free act by which a person disposes of his property, to take effect
after his death.25 Since the Will expresses the manner in which a
person intends how his properties be disposed, the wishes and Republic of the Philippines
desires of the testator must be strictly followed. Thus, a Will SUPREME COURT
cannot be the subject of a compromise agreement which would Manila
thereby defeat the very purpose of making a Will.
THIRD DIVISION
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the
decision of the Court of Appeals, dated December 23, 1993, in G.R. No. 104482 January 22, 1996
CA-G.R. No. CV-35555 AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to
costs BELINDA TAEDO, for herself and in representation of her
brothers and sisters, and TEOFILA CORPUZ TAEDO,
SO ORDERED. representing her minor daughter VERNA
TAEDO, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES RICARDO M. TAEDO
AND TERESITA BARERA TAEDO,respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
1. Is the sale of a future inheritance valid? Consequently, said contract made in 1962 is not valid and cannot
be the source of any right nor the creator of any obligation
2. Was the subsequent execution on January 13, 1981 between the parties.
(and registration with the Registry of Property) of a deed
of sale covering the same property to the same buyers Hence, the "affidavit of conformity" dated February 28, 1980,
valid? insofar as it sought to validate or ratify the 1962 sale, is also
useless and, in the words of the respondent Court, "suffers from
3. May this Court review the findings of the respondent the same infirmity." Even private respondents in their
Court (a) holding that the buyers acted in good faith in memorandum4 concede this.
registering the said subsequent deed of sale and (b) in
"failing to consider petitioners' evidence"? Are the However, the documents that are critical to the resolution of this
conclusions of the respondent Court "illogical and off- case are: (a) the deed of sale of January 13, 1981 in favor of
tangent"? private respondents covering Lazaro's undivided inheritance of
one-twelfth (1/12) share in Lot No. 191, which was subsequently possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person
registered on June 7, 1982; and (b) the deed of sale dated who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.
December 29, 1980 in favor of petitioners covering the same
property. These two documents were executed after the death of The property in question is land, an immovable, and following the
Matias (and his spouse) and after a deed of extra-judicial above-quoted law, ownership shall belong to the buyer who in
settlement of his (Matias') estate was executed, thus vesting in good faith registers it first in the registry of property. Thus,
Lazaro actual title over said property. In other words, these although the deed of sale in favor of private respondents was
dispositions, though conflicting, were no longer infected with the later than the one in favor of petitioners, ownership would vest in
infirmities of the 1962 sale. the former because of the undisputed fact of registration. On the
other hand, petitioners have not registered the sale to them at all.
Petitioners contend that what was sold on January 13, 1981 was
only one-half hectare out of Lot No. 191, citing as authority the Petitioners contend that they were in possession of the property
trial court's decision. As earlier pointed out, what is on review in and that private respondents never took possession thereof. As
these proceedings by this Court is the Court of Appeals' decision between two purchasers, the one who registered the sale in his
which correctly identified the subject matter of the January 13, favor has a preferred right over the other who has not registered
1981 sale to be the entire undivided 1/12 share of Lazaro in Lot his title, even if the latter is in actual possession of the immovable
No. 191 and which is the same property disposed of on property.5
December 29, 1980 in favor of petitioners.
As to third issue, while petitioners conceded the fact of
Critical in determining which of these two deeds should be given registration, they nevertheless contended that it was done in bad
effect is the registration of the sale in favor of private respondents faith. On this issue, the respondent Court ruled;
with the register of deeds on June 7, 1982.
Under the second assignment of error, plaintiffs-
Article 1544 of the Civil Code governs the preferential rights of appellants contend that defendants-appellees acted in
vendees in cases of multiple sales, as follows: bad faith when they registered the Deed of Sale in their
favor as appellee Ricardo already knew of the execution
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to of the deed of sale in favor of the plaintiffs; appellants cite
different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the testimony of plaintiff Belinda Taedo to the effect that
the person who may have first taken possession thereof defendant Ricardo Taedo called her up on January 4 or
in good faith, if it should be movable property. 5, 1981 to tell her that he was already the owner of the
land in question "but the contract of sale between our
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall father and us were (sic) already consumated" (pp. 9-10,
belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first tsn, January 6, 1984). This testimony is obviously self-
recorded it in the Registry of Property. serving, and because it was a telephone conversation,
the deed of sale dated December 29, 1980 was not
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain shown; Belinda merely told her uncle that there was
to the person who in good faith was first in the already a document showing that plaintiffs are the owners
(p. 80). Ricardo Taedo controverted this and testified
that he learned for the first time of the deed of sale Taedo . . ." and that respondent Ricardo Taedo
executed by Lazaro in favor of his children "about a "exercised moral ascendancy over his younger brother he
month or sometime in February 1981" (p. 111, tsn, Nov. being the eldest brother and who reached fourth year
28, 1984). . . .6 college of law and at one time a former Vice-Governor of
Tarlac, while his younger brother only attained first year
The respondent Court, reviewing the trial court's findings, refused high school . . . ;
to overturn the latter's assessment of the testimonial evidence, as
follows; 5. The respondent Court erred in not giving credence to
petitioners' evidence, especially Lazaro
We are not prepared to set aside the finding of the lower Taedo's Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 27, 1982
court upholding Ricardo Taedo's testimony, as it stating that Ricardo Taedo deceived the former in
involves a matter of credibility of witnesses which the trial executing the deed of sale in favor of private respondents.
judge, who presided at the hearing, was in a better
position to resolve. (Court of Appeals' Decision, p. 6.) To be sure, there are indeed many conflicting documents and
testimonies as well as arguments over their probative value and
In this connection, we note the tenacious allegations made by significance. Suffice it to say, however, that all the above
petitioners, both in their basic petition and in their memorandum, contentions involve questions of fact, appreciation of evidence
as follows: and credibility of witnesses, which are not proper in this review. It
is well-settled that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. In
1. The respondent Court allegedly ignored the claimed petitions for review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court,
fact that respondent Ricardo "by fraud and deceit and with only questions of law may be raised and passed upon. Absent
foreknowledge" that the property in question had already any whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment, and unless the
been sold to petitioners, made Lazaro execute the deed lack of any basis for the conclusions made by the lower courts be
of January 13, 1981; amply demonstrated, the Supreme Court will not disturb their
findings. At most, it appears that petitioners have shown that their
evidence was not believed by both the trial and the appellate
2. There is allegedly adequate evidence to show that only
courts, and that the said courts tended to give more credence to
1/2 of the purchase price of P10,000.00 was paid at the
the evidence presented by private respondents. But this in itself is
time of the execution of the deed of sale, contrary to the
not a reason for setting aside such findings. We are far from
written acknowledgment, thus showing bad faith;
convinced that both courts gravely abused their respective
authorities and judicial prerogatives.
3. There is allegedly sufficient evidence showing that the
deed of revocation of the sale in favor of petitioners "was
As held in the recent case of Chua Tiong Tay vs. Court of
tainted with fraud or deceit."
Appeals and Goldrock Construction and Development Corp.7
4. There is allegedly enough evidence to show that
The Court has consistently held that the factual findings of the
private respondents "took undue advantage over the
trial court, as well as the Court of Appeals, are final and
weakness and unschooled and pitiful situation of Lazaro
conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal. Among the
exceptional circumstances where a reassessment of facts found Republic of the Philippines
by the lower courts is allowed are when the conclusion is a SUPREME COURT
finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; Manila
when the inference made is manifestly absurd, mistaken or
impossible; when there is grave abuse of discretion in the THIRD DIVISION
appreciation of facts; when the judgment is premised on a
misapprehension of facts; when the findings went beyond the G.R. No. 169129 March 28, 2007
issues of the case and the same are contrary to the admissions of
both appellant and appellee. After a careful study of the case at
SPS. VIRGILIO F. SANTOS & ESPERANZA LATI SANTOS,
bench, we find none of the above grounds present to justify the
SPS.VICTORINO F. SANTOS, & LAGRIMAS SANTOS,
re-evaluation of the findings of fact made by the courts below.
ERNESTO F. SANTOS, and TADEO F. SANTOS, Petitioners,
vs.
In the same vein, the ruling in the recent case of South Sea SPS. JOSE LUMBAO and PROSERFINA
Surety and Insurance Company, Inc. vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, LUMBAO, Respondents.
et al.8 is equally applicable to the present case:
DECISION
We see no valid reason to discard the factual conclusions
of the appellate court. . . . (I)t is not the function of this
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Court to assess and evaluate all over again the evidence,
testimonial and documentary, adduced by the parties,
particularly where, such as here, the findings of both the Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
trial court and the appellate court on the matter coincide. 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to annul
(emphasis supplied) and set aside the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60450 entitled, Spouses Jose
Lumbao and Proserfina Lumbao v. Spouses Virgilio F. Santos
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision
and Esperanza Lati, Spouses Victorino F. Santos and Lagrimas
of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. No Costs.
F. Santos, Ernesto F. Santos and Tadeo F. Santos, dated 8 June
2005 and 29 July 2005, respectively, which granted the appeal
SO ORDERED. filed by herein respondents Spouses Jose Lumbao and
Proserfina Lumbao (Spouses Lumbao) and ordered herein
petitioners Spouses Virgilio F. Santos and Esperanza Lati,
Spouses Victorino F. Santos and Lagrimas F. Santos, Ernesto F.
Santos and Tadeo F. Santos to reconvey to respondents
Spouses Lumbao the subject property and to pay the latter
attorneys fees and litigation expenses, thus, reversing the
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, dated
17 June 1998 which dismissed the Complaint for Reconveyance
with Damages filed by respondents Spouses Lumbao for lack of effect the issuance of a separate title in favor of respondents
merit. Spouses Lumbao insofar as the subject property is concerned.
Respondents Spouses Lumbao alleged that prior to her death,
Herein petitioners Virgilio, Victorino, Ernesto and Tadeo, all Rita informed respondent Proserfina Lumbao she could not
surnamed Santos, are the legitimate and surviving heirs of the deliver the title to the subject property because the entire property
late Rita Catoc Santos (Rita), who died on 20 October 1985. The inherited by her and her co-heirs from Maria had not yet been
other petitioners Esperanza Lati and Lagrimas Santos are the partitioned.
daughters-in-law of Rita.
On 2 May 1986, the Spouses Lumbao claimed that petitioners,
Herein respondents Spouses Jose Lumbao and Proserfina acting fraudulently and in conspiracy with one another, executed
Lumbao are the alleged owners of the 107-square meter lot a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement,6 adjudicating and partitioning
(subject property), which they purportedly bought from Rita during among themselves and the other heirs, the estate left by Maria,
her lifetime. which included the subject property already sold to respondents
Spouses Lumbao and now covered by TCT No. 817297 of the
The facts of the present case are as follows: Registry of Deeds of Pasig City.
On two separate occasions during her lifetime, Rita sold to On 15 June 1992, respondents Spouses Lumbao, through
respondents Spouses Lumbao the subject property which is a counsel, sent a formal demand letter8 to petitioners but despite
part of her share in the estate of her deceased mother, Maria receipt of such demand letter, petitioners still failed and refused to
Catoc (Maria), who died intestate on 19 September 1978. On the reconvey the subject property to the respondents Spouses
first occasion, Rita sold 100 square meters of her inchoate share Lumbao. Consequently, the latter filed a Complaint for
in her mothers estate through a document denominated as Reconveyance with Damages9 before the RTC of Pasig City.
"Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979.4 Respondents Spouses
Lumbao claimed the execution of the aforesaid document was Petitioners filed their Answer denying the allegations that the
witnessed by petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo, as shown by their subject property had been sold to the respondents Spouses
signatures affixed therein. On the second occasion, an additional Lumbao. They likewise denied that the Deed of Extrajudicial
seven square meters was added to the land as evidenced by a Settlement had been fraudulently executed because the same
document also denominated as "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 9 was duly published as required by law. On the contrary, they
January 1981.5 prayed for the dismissal of the Complaint for lack of cause of
action because respondents Spouses Lumbao failed to comply
After acquiring the subject property, respondents Spouses with the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law under Republic
Lumbao took actual possession thereof and erected thereon a Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of
house which they have been occupying as exclusive owners up 1991, which repealed Presidential Decree No. 150810 requiring
to the present. As the exclusive owners of the subject property, first resort to barangay conciliation.
respondents Spouses Lumbao made several verbal demands
upon Rita, during her lifetime, and thereafter upon herein Respondents Spouses Lumbao, with leave of court, amended
petitioners, for them to execute the necessary documents to their Complaint because they discovered that on 16 February
1990, without their knowledge, petitioners executed a Deed of
Real Estate Mortgage in favor of Julieta S. Esplana for the sum to pay to [respondents spouses Lumbao] the sum of P30,000.00
of P30,000.00. The said Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was for attorneys fees and litigation expenses.
annotated at the back of TCT No. PT-81729 on 26 April 1991.
Also, in answer to the allegation of the petitioners that they failed No pronouncement as to costs.12
to comply with the mandate of the Revised Katarungang
Pambarangay Law, respondents Spouses Lumbao said that the Dissatisfied, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Complaint was filed directly in court in order that prescription or aforesaid Decision but it was denied in the Resolution of the
the Statute of Limitations may not set in. appellate court dated 29 July 2005 for lack of merit.
During the trial, respondents Spouses Lumbao presented Hence, this Petition.
Proserfina Lumbao and Carolina Morales as their witnesses,
while the petitioners presented only the testimony of petitioner
The grounds relied upon by the petitioners are the following:
Virgilio.
I. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE
The trial court rendered a Decision on 17 June 1998, the
ERROR IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
COURT, THEREBY CREATING A VARIANCE ON THE
FINDINGS OF FACTS OF TWO COURTS.
Premises considered, the instant complaint is hereby denied for
lack of merit.
II. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN ORDERING THE PETITIONERS TO RECONVEY
Considering that [petitioners] have incurred expenses in order to THE SUBJECT [PROPERTY] TO THE RESPONDENTS
protect their interest, [respondents spouses Lumbao] are hereby [SPOUSES LUMBAO] AND IN NOT RULING THAT THEY ARE
directed to pay [petitioners], to wit: 1) the amount of P30,000.00 GUILTY OF LACHES, HENCE THEY CANNOT RECOVER THE
as attorneys fees and litigation expenses, and 2) costs of the LOT ALLEGEDLY SOLD TO THEM.
suit.11
III. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE
Aggrieved, respondents Spouses Lumbao appealed to the Court ERROR IN NOT FINDING HEREIN PETITIONER[S] TO BE IN
of Appeals. On 8 June 2005, the appellate court rendered a GOOD FAITH IN EXECUTING THE "DEED OF EXTRAJUDICIAL
Decision, thus: SETTLEMENT" DATED [2 MAY 1986].
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is IV. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE
hereby GRANTED. The appealed Decision dated June 17, 1998 ERROR IN NOT FINDING THAT PETITIONERS ARE NOT
of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 69 in Civil Case LEGALLY BOUND TO COMPLY WITH THE SUPPOSED
No. 62175 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new BILIHAN NG LUPA DATED [17 AUGUST 1979] AND [9
judgment is hereby entered ordering [petitioners] to reconvey 107 JANUARY 1981] THAT WERE SUPPOSEDLY EXECUTED BY
square meters of the subject [property] covered by TCT No. PT- THE LATE RITA CATOC.
81729 of the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City, Metro Manila, and
V. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE Lumbaos witness, Carolina Morales, testified that neither
ERROR IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS [SPOUSES petitioner Virgilio nor petitioner Tadeo was present during the
LUMBAOS] ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE WITH DAMAGES execution of the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979 and 9
CANNOT BE SUPPORTED WITH AN UNENFORCEABLE January 1981. Petitioners affirm that the Deed of Extrajudicial
DOCUMENTS, SUCH AS THE BILIHAN NG LUPA DATED [17 Settlement was published in a newspaper of general circulation to
AUGUST 1979] AND [9 JANUARY 1981]. give notice to all creditors of the estate subject of partition to
contest the same within the period prescribed by law. Since no
VI. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE claimant appeared to interpose a claim within the period allowed
ERROR IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS [SPOUSES by law, a title to the subject property was then issued in favor of
LUMBAOS] COMPLAINT FOR RECONVEYANCE IS the petitioners; hence, they are considered as holders in good
DISMISSABLE (SIC) FOR NON COMPLIANCE OF THE faith and therefore cannot be barred from entering into any
MANDATE OF [P.D. NO.] 1508, AS AMENDED BY Republic Act subsequent transactions involving the subject property.
No. 7160.
Petitioners also contend that they are not bound by the
VII. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE documents denominated as "Bilihan ng Lupa" because the same
ERROR IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS [SPOUSES were null and void for the following reasons: 1) for being falsified
LUMBAO] SHOULD BE HELD LIABLE FOR PETITIONERS documents because one of those documents made it appear that
CLAIM FOR DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY[]S FEES. petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo were witnesses to its execution and
that they appeared personally before the notary public, when in
Petitioners ask this Court to scrutinize the evidence presented in truth and in fact they did not; 2) the identities of the properties in
this case, because they claim that the factual findings of the trial the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981
court and the appellate court are conflicting. They allege that the in relation to the subject property in litigation were not established
findings of fact by the trial court revealed that petitioners Virgilio by the evidence presented by the respondents Spouses Lumbao;
and Tadeo did not witness the execution of the documents known 3) the right of the respondents Spouses Lumbao to lay their claim
as "Bilihan ng Lupa"; hence, this finding runs counter to the over the subject property had already been barred through
conclusion made by the appellate court. And even assuming that estoppel by laches; and 4) the respondents Spouses Lumbaos
they were witnesses to the aforesaid documents, still, claim over the subject property had already prescribed.
respondents Spouses Lumbao were not entitled to the
reconveyance of the subject property because they were guilty of Finally, petitioners claim that the Complaint for Reconveyance
laches for their failure to assert their rights for an unreasonable with Damages filed by respondents Spouses Lumbao was
length of time. Since respondents Spouses Lumbao had slept on dismissible because they failed to comply with the mandate of
their rights for a period of more than 12 years reckoned from the Presidential Decree No. 1508, as amended by Republic Act No.
date of execution of the second "Bilihan ng Lupa," it would be 7160, particularly Section 412 of Republic Act No. 7160.
unjust and unfair to the petitioners if the respondents will be
allowed to recover the subject property. Given the foregoing, the issues presented by the petitioners may
be restated as follows:
Petitioners allege they are in good faith in executing the Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement because even respondents Spouses
I. Whether or not the Complaint for Reconveyance with in the same city or municipality are subject to barangay
Damages filed by respondents spouses Lumbao is conciliation. A prior recourse thereto is a pre-condition before
dismissible for their failure to comply with the mandate of filing a complaint in court or any government offices. Non-
the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law under R.A. compliance with the said condition precedent could affect the
No. 7160. sufficiency of the plaintiffs cause of action and make his
complaint vulnerable to dismissal on ground of lack of cause of
II. Whether or not the documents known as "Bilihan ng action or prematurity; but the same would not prevent a court of
Lupa" are valid and enforceable, thus, they can be the competent jurisdiction from exercising its power of adjudication
bases of the respondents spouses Lumbaos action for over the case before it, where the defendants failed to object to
reconveyance with damages. such exercise of jurisdiction.16
III. Whether or not herein petitioners are legally bound to While it is true that the present case should first be referred to the
comply with the "Bilihan ng Lupa" dated 17 August 1979 Barangay Lupon for conciliation because the parties involved
and 9 January 1981 and consequently, reconvey the herein actually reside in the same city (Pasig City) and the
subject property to herein respondents spouses Lumbao. dispute between them involves a real property, hence, the said
dispute should have been brought in the city in which the real
It is well-settled that in the exercise of the Supreme Courts power property, subject matter of the controversy, is located, which
of review, the court is not a trier of facts and does not normally happens to be the same city where the contending parties reside.
undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the In the event that respondents Spouses Lumbao failed to comply
contending parties during the trial of the case considering that the with the said condition precedent, their Complaint for
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding Reconveyance with Damages can be dismissed. In this case,
on the Court.13 But, the rule is not without exceptions. There are however, respondents Spouses Lumbaos non-compliance with
several recognized exceptions14 in which factual issues may be the aforesaid condition precedent cannot be considered fatal.
resolved by this Court. One of these exceptions is when the Although petitioners alleged in their answer that the Complaint for
findings of the appellate court are contrary to those of the trial Reconveyance with Damages filed by respondents spouses
court. This exception is present in the case at bar. Lumbao should be dismissed for their failure to comply with the
condition precedent, which in effect, made the complaint
prematurely instituted and the trial court acquired no jurisdiction
Going to the first issue presented in this case, it is the argument
to hear the case, yet, they did not file a Motion to Dismiss the said
of the petitioners that the Complaint for Reconveyance with
complaint.
Damages filed by respondents Spouses Lumbao should be
dismissed for failure to comply with the barangay conciliation
proceedings as mandated by the Revised Katarungang Emphasis must be given to the fact that the petitioners could
Pambarangay Law under Republic Act No. 7160. This argument have prevented the trial court from exercising jurisdiction over the
cannot be sustained. case had they filed a Motion to Dismiss. However, instead of
doing so, they invoked the very same jurisdiction by filing an
answer seeking an affirmative relief from it. Worse, petitioners
Section 408 of the aforesaid law and Administrative Circular No.
actively participated in the trial of the case by presenting their
14-9315 provide that all disputes between parties actually residing
own witness and by cross-examining the witnesses presented by
the respondents Spouses Lumbao. It is elementary that the active Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages, both petitioners
participation of a party in a case pending against him before a Virgilio and Tadeo made an admission that indeed they acted as
court is tantamount to recognition of that courts jurisdiction and a witnesses in the execution of the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17
willingness to abide by the resolution of the case which will bar August 1979.19 However, in order to avoid their obligations in the
said party from later on impugning the courts jurisdiction.17 It is said "Bilihan ng Lupa," petitioner Virgilio, in his cross-
also well-settled that the non-referral of a case for barangay examination, denied having knowledge of the sale transaction
conciliation when so required under the law is not jurisdictional in and claimed that he could not remember the same as well as his
nature and may therefore be deemed waived if not raised appearance before the notary public due to the length of time that
seasonably in a motion to dismiss.18 Hence, herein petitioners had passed. Noticeably, petitioner Virgilio did not categorically
can no longer raise the defense of non-compliance with the deny having signed the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979
barangay conciliation proceedings to seek the dismissal of the and in support thereof, his testimony in the cross-examination
complaint filed by the respondents Spouses Lumbao, because propounded by the counsel of the respondents Spouses Lumbao
they already waived the said defense when they failed to file a is quoted hereunder:
Motion to Dismiss.
ATTY. CHIU:
As regards the second issue, petitioners maintain that the "Bilihan
ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981 are null and Q. Now, you said, Mr. WitnessVirgilio Santos, that you dont
void for being falsified documents as it is made to appear that know about this document which was marked as Exhibit "A" for
petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo were present in the execution of the the [respondents spouses Lumbao]?
said documents and that the identities of the properties in those
documents in relation to the subject property has not been ATTY. BUGARING:
established by the evidence of the respondents Spouses
Lumbao. Petitioners also claim that the enforceability of those
The question is misleading, your Honor. Counsel premised the
documents is barred by prescription of action and laches.
question that he does not have any knowledge but not that he
does not know.
It is the petitioners incessant barking that the "Bilihan ng Lupa"
documents dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981 were
ATTY. CHIU:
falsified because it was made to appear that petitioners Virgilio
and Tadeo were present in the executions thereof, and their
allegation that even respondents Spouses Lumbaos witness Q. Being you are one of the witnesses of this document? [I]s it
Carolina Morales proved that said petitioners were not present not?
during the execution of the aforementioned documents. This is
specious. WITNESS:
Upon examination of the aforesaid documents, this Court finds A. No, sir.
that in the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979, the
signatures of petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo appeared thereon.
Moreover, in petitioners Answer and Amended Answer to the
Q. I am showing to you this document, there is a signature at the [T]he trial court gave singular focus on her reply to a question
left hand margin of this document Virgilio Santos, will you please during cross-examination if the [petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo]
go over the same and tell the court whose signature is this? were not with her and the vendor [Rita] during the transaction. It
must be pointed out that earlier in the direct examination of said
A. I dont remember, sir, because of the length of time that had witness, she confirmed that [respondents spouses Lumbao]
passed. actually bought the lot from [Rita] ("nagkabilihan"). Said witness
positively identified and confirmed the two (2) documents
Q. But that is your signature? evidencing the sale in favor of [respondents spouse Lumbao].
Thus, her subsequent statement that the [petitioners Virgilio and
Tadeo] were not with them during the transaction does not
A. I dont have eyeglasses My signature is different.
automatically imply that [petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo] did not at
any time sign as witnesses as to the deed of sale attesting to their
Q. You never appeared before this notary public Apolinario mothers voluntary act of selling a portion of her share in her
Mangahas? deceased mothers property. The rule is that testimony of a
witness must be considered and calibrated in its entirety and not
A. I dont remember.20 by truncated portions thereof or isolated passages therein.24
As a general rule, facts alleged in a partys pleading are deemed Furthermore, both "Bilihan ng Lupa" documents dated 17 August
admissions of that party and are binding upon him, but this is not 1979 and 9 January 1981 were duly notarized before a notary
an absolute and inflexible rule. An answer is a mere statement of public. It is well-settled that a document acknowledged before a
fact which the party filing it expects to prove, but it is not notary public is a public document25that enjoys the presumption of
evidence.21 And in spite of the presence of judicial admissions in regularity. It is a prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts
a partys pleading, the trial court is still given leeway to consider stated therein and a conclusive presumption of its existence and
other evidence presented.22 However, in the case at bar, as the due execution.26 To overcome this presumption, there must be
Court of Appeals mentioned in its Decision, "[herein petitioners] presented evidence that is clear and convincing. Absent such
had not adduced any other evidence to override the admission evidence, the presumption must be upheld.27 In addition, one who
made in their [A]nswer that [petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo] denies the due execution of a deed where ones signature
actually signed the [Bilihan ng Lupa dated 17 August 1979] appears has the burden of proving that contrary to the recital in
except that they were just misled as to the purpose of the the jurat, one never appeared before the notary public and
document, x x x."23 Virgilios answers were unsure and quibbled. acknowledged the deed to be a voluntary act. Nonetheless, in the
Hence, the general rule that the admissions made by a party in a present case petitioners denials without clear and convincing
pleading are binding and conclusive upon him applies in this evidence to support their claim of fraud and falsity were not
case. sufficient to overthrow the above-mentioned presumption; hence,
the authenticity, due execution and the truth of the facts stated in
On the testimony of respondents Spouses Lumbaos witness the aforesaid "Bilihan ng Lupa" are upheld.
Carolina Morales, this Court adopts the findings made by the
appellate court. Thus - The defense of petitioners that the identities of the properties
described in the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979 and 9
January 1981 in relation to the subject property were not Likewise, the fact that the property mentioned in the two "Bilihan
established by respondents Spouses Lumbaos evidence is ng Lupa" documents was described as "a portion of a parcel of
likewise not acceptable. land covered in Tax Declarations No. A-018-01674," while the
subject matter of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement was the
It is noteworthy that at the time of the execution of the documents property described in Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 3216
denominated as "Bilihan ng Lupa," the entire property owned by of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Rizal in the name of
Maria, the mother of Rita, was not yet divided among her and her Maria is of no moment because in the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17
co-heirs and so the description of the entire estate is the only August 1979 and 9 January 1981, it is clear that there was only
description that can be placed in the "Bilihan ng Lupa, dated 17 one estate left by Maria upon her death. And this fact was not
August 1979 and 9 January 1981" because the exact metes and refuted by the petitioners. Besides, the property described in Tax
bounds of the subject property sold to respondents Spouses Declaration No. A-018-01674 and the property mentioned in TCT
Lumbao could not be possibly determined at that time. No. 3216 are both located in Barrio Rosario, Municipality of
Nevertheless, that does not make the contract of sale between Pasig, Province of Rizal, and almost have the same boundaries.
Rita and respondents Spouses Lumbao invalid because both the It is, thus, safe to state that the property mentioned in Tax
law and jurisprudence have categorically held that even while an Declaration No. A-018-01674 and in TCT No. 3216 are one and
estate remains undivided, co-owners have each full ownership of the same.
their respective aliquots or undivided shares and may therefore
alienate, assign or mortgage them.28 The co-owner, however, has The defense of prescription of action and laches is likewise
no right to sell or alienate a specific or determinate part of the unjustifiable. In an action for reconveyance, the decree of
thing owned in common, because such right over the thing is registration is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought
represented by an aliquot or ideal portion without any physical instead is the transfer of the property or its title which has been
division. In any case, the mere fact that the deed purports to wrongfully or erroneously registered in another persons name to
transfer a concrete portion does not per se render the sale void. its rightful or legal owner, or to the one with a better right. It is,
The sale is valid, but only with respect to the aliquot share of the indeed, true that the right to seek reconveyance of registered
selling co-owner. Furthermore, the sale is subject to the results of property is not absolute because it is subject to extinctive
the partition upon the termination of the co-ownership.29 prescription. However, when the plaintiff is in possession of the
land to be reconveyed, prescription cannot set in. Such an
In the case at bar, when the estate left by Maria had been exception is based on the theory that registration proceedings
partitioned on 2 May 1986 by virtue of a Deed of Extrajudicial could not be used as a shield for fraud or for enriching a person
Settlement, the 107- square meter lot sold by the mother of the at the expense of another.30
petitioners to respondents Spouses Lumbao should be deducted
from the total lot, inherited by them in representation of their In the case at bar, the right of the respondents Spouses Lumbao
deceased mother, which in this case measures 467 square to seek reconveyance does not prescribe because the latter have
meters. The 107-square meter lot already sold to respondents been and are still in actual possession and occupation as owners
Spouses Lumbao can no longer be inherited by the petitioners of the property sought to be reconveyed, which fact has not been
because the same was no longer part of their inheritance as it refuted nor denied by the petitioners. Furthermore, respondents
was already sold during the lifetime of their mother. Spouses Lumbao cannot be held guilty of laches because from
the very start that they bought the 107-square meter lot from the
mother of the petitioners, they have constantly asked for the consequence of a transaction entered into by their predecessor-
transfer of the certificate of title into their names but Rita, during in-interest because they have inherited the property subject to the
her lifetime, and the petitioners, after the death of Rita, failed to liability affecting their common ancestor. Being heirs, there is
do so on the flimsy excuse that the lot had not been partitioned privity of interest between them and their deceased mother. They
yet. Inexplicably, after the partition of the entire estate of Maria, only succeed to what rights their mother had and what is valid
petitioners still included the 107-square meter lot in their and binding against her is also valid and binding as against them.
inheritance which they divided among themselves despite their The death of a party does not excuse nonperformance of a
knowledge of the contracts of sale between their mother and the contract which involves a property right and the rights and
respondents Spouses Lumbao. obligations thereunder pass to the personal representatives of the
deceased. Similarly, nonperformance is not excused by the death
Under the above premises, this Court holds that the "Bilihan ng of the party when the other party has a property interest in the
Lupa" documents dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981 are subject matter of the contract.34
valid and enforceable and can be made the basis of the
respondents Spouses Lumbaos action for reconveyance. The In the end, despite the death of the petitioners mother, they are
failure of respondents Spouses Lumbao to have the said still bound to comply with the provisions of the "Bilihan ng Lupa,"
documents registered does not affect its validity and dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981. Consequently, they
enforceability. It must be remembered that registration is not a must reconvey to herein respondents Spouses Lumbao the 107-
requirement for validity of the contract as between the parties, for square meter lot which they bought from Rita, petitioners mother.
the effect of registration serves chiefly to bind third persons. The And as correctly ruled by the appellate court, petitioners must pay
principal purpose of registration is merely to notify other persons respondents Spouses Lumbao attorneys fees and litigation
not parties to a contract that a transaction involving the property expenses for having been compelled to litigate and incur
had been entered into. Where the party has knowledge of a prior expenses to protect their interest.35 On this matter, we do not find
existing interest which is unregistered at the time he acquired a reasons to reverse the said findings.
right to the same land, his knowledge of that prior unregistered
interest has the effect of registration as to him.31 Hence, the WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is
"Bilihan ng Lupa" documents dated 17 August 1979 and 9 hereby DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of
January 1981, being valid and enforceable, herein petitioners are Appeals dated 8 June 2005 and 29 July 2005, respectively, are
bound to comply with their provisions. In short, such documents hereby AFFIRMED. Herein petitioners are ordered to reconvey to
are absolutely valid between and among the parties thereto. respondents Spouses Lumbao the subject property and to pay
the latter attorneys fees and litigation expenses. Costs against
Finally, the general rule that heirs are bound by contracts entered petitioners.
into by their predecessors-in-interest applies in the present case.
Article 131132 of the NCC is the basis of this rule. It is clear from SO ORDERED.
the said provision that whatever rights and obligations the
decedent have over the property were transmitted to the heirs by
way of succession, a mode of acquiring the property, rights and
obligations of the decedent to the extent of the value of the
inheritance of the heirs.33 Thus, the heirs cannot escape the legal
Republic of the Philippines Margarita Herrera passed away on October 27, 1971.3
SUPREME COURT
Manila On August 22, 1974, Francisca Herrera, the remaining child of
the late Margarita Herrera executed a Deed of Self-Adjudication
FIRST DIVISION claiming that she is the only remaining relative, being the sole
surviving daughter of the deceased. She also claimed to be the
G.R. No. 162784 June 22, 2007 exclusive legal heir of the late Margarita Herrera.
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, petitioner, The Deed of Self-Adjudication was based on a Sinumpaang
vs. Salaysay dated October 7, 1960, allegedly executed by Margarita
SEGUNDA ALMEIDA, COURT OF APPEALS, and RTC of SAN Herrera. The pertinent portions of which are as follows:
PEDRO, LAGUNA, BR. 31, respondents.
SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY
DECISION
SA SINO MAN KINAUUKULAN;
PUNO, C.J.:
Akong si MARGARITA HERRERA, Filipina, may 83 taong
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 filed by gulang, balo, kasalukuyang naninirahan at tumatanggap
the National Housing Authority (NHA) against the Court of ng sulat sa Nayon ng San Vicente, San Pedro Laguna, sa
Appeals, the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro Laguna, Branch ilalim ng panunumpa ay malaya at kusang loob kong
31, and private respondent Segunda Almeida. isinasaysay at pinagtitibay itong mga sumusunod:
On June 28, 1959, the Land Tenure Administration (LTA) 1. Na ako ay may tinatangkilik na isang lagay na lupang
awarded to Margarita Herrera several portions of land which are tirikan (SOLAR), tumatayo sa Nayon ng San Vicente, San
part of the Tunasan Estate in San Pedro, Laguna. The award is Pedro, Laguna, mayroong PITONG DAAN AT
evidenced by an Agreement to Sell No. 3787.1 By virtue of PITUMPU'T ISANG (771) METRONG PARISUKAT ang
Republic Act No. 3488, the LTA was succeeded by the laki, humigit kumulang, at makikilala sa tawag na Lote 17,
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). On July 31, 1975, the Bloke 55, at pag-aari ng Land Tenure Administration;
DAR was succeeded by the NHA by virtue of Presidential Decree
No. 757.2 NHA as the successor agency of LTA is the petitioner in 2. Na ang nasabing lote ay aking binibile, sa
this case. pamamagitan ng paghuhulog sa Land Tenure
Administration, at noong ika 30 ng Julio, 1959, ang
The records show that Margarita Herrera had two children: Kasunduang sa Pagbibile (AGREEMENT TO SELL No.
Beatriz Herrera-Mercado (the mother of private respondent) and 3787) ay ginawa at pinagtibay sa Lungsod ng Maynila, sa
Francisca Herrera. Beatriz Herrera-Mercado predeceased her harap ng Notario Publico na si G. Jose C. Tolosa, at
mother and left heirs. lumalabas sa kaniyang Libro Notarial bilang Documento
No. 13, Pagina No. 4; Libro No. IV, Serie ng 1959;
3. Na dahilan sa ako'y matanda na at walang ano mang Regional Trial Court Branch 25). The case for annulment was
hanap buhay, ako ay nakatira at pinagsisilbihan nang docketed as Civil Case No. B-1263.6
aking anak na si Francisca Herrera, at ang tinitirikan o
solar na nasasabi sa unahan ay binabayaran ng kaniyang On December 29, 1980, a Decision in Civil Case No. B-1263
sariling cuarta sa Land Tenure Administration; (questioning the Deed of Self-Adjudication) was rendered and the
deed was declared null and void.7
4. Na alang-alang sa nasasaysay sa unahan nito,
sakaling ako'y bawian na ng Dios ng aking buhay, ang During trial on the merits of the case assailing the Deed of Self-
lupang nasasabi sa unahan ay aking ipinagkakaloob sa Adjudication, Francisca Herrera filed an application with the NHA
nasabi kong anak na FRANCISCA HERRERA, Filipina, to purchase the same lots submitting therewith a copy of the
nasa katamtamang gulang, kasal kay Macario Berroya, "Sinumpaang Salaysay" executed by her mother. Private
kasalukuyang naninirahan at tumatanggap ng sulat sa respondent Almeida, as heir of Beatriz Herrera-Mercado,
Nayong ng San Vicente, San Pedro Laguna, o sa protested the application.
kaniyang mga tagapagmana at;
In a Resolution8 dated February 5, 1986, the NHA granted the
5. Na HINIHILING KO sa sino man kinauukulan, na application made by Francisca Herrera, holding that:
sakaling ako nga ay bawian na ng Dios ng aking buhay
ay KILALANIN, IGALANG at PAGTIBAYIN ang nilalaman From the evidence of the parties and the records of the
sa pangalan ng aking anak na si Francisca Herrera ang lots in question, we gathered the following facts: the lots
loteng nasasabi sa unahan. in question are portions of the lot awarded and sold to the
late Margarita Herrera on July 28, 1959 by the defunct
SA KATUNAYAN NG LAHAT, ako ay nag-didiit ng Land Tenure Administration; protestant is the daughter of
hinlalaki ng kanan kong kamay sa ibaba nito at sa the late Beatriz Herrera Mercado who was the sister of
kaliwang gilid ng unang dahon, dito sa Lungsod ng the protestee; protestee and Beatriz are children of the
Maynila, ngayong ika 7 ng Octubre, 1960.4 late Margarita Herrera; Beatriz was the transferee from
Margarita of Lot Nos. 45, 46, 47, 48 and 49, Block 50; one
The said document was signed by two witnesses and notarized. of the lots transferred to Beatriz, e.g. Lot 47, with an area
The witnesses signed at the left-hand side of both pages of the of 148 square meters is in the name of the protestant;
document with the said document having 2 pages in total. protestant occupied the lots in question with the
Margarita Herrera placed her thumbmark5above her name in the permission of the protestee; protestee is a resident of the
second page and at the left-hand margin of the first page of the Tunasan Homesite since birth; protestee was born on the
document. lots in question; protestee left the place only after
marriage but resided in a lot situated in the same
The surviving heirs of Beatriz Herrera-Mercado filed a case for Tunasan Homesite; her (protestee) son Roberto Herrera
annulment of the Deed of Self-Adjudication before the then Court has been occupying the lots in question; he has been
of First Instance of Laguna, Branch 1 in Binan, Laguna (now, there even before the death of the late Margarita
Herrera; on October 7, 1960, Margarita Herrera
executed a "Sinumpaang Salaysay" whereby she
waived or transferred all her rights and interest over that Francisca Herrera paid for the property with the use of her
the lots in question in favor of the protestee; and own money.15 Further, they argued that plaintiff's occupation of
protestee had paid the lots in question in full on March 8, the property was by mere tolerance and that they had been
1966 with the defunct Land Tenure Administration. paying taxes thereon.16
This Office finds that protestee has a better preferential right to The Regional Trial Court issued an Order dated June 14, 1988
purchase the lots in question.9 dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.17 The Court of Appeals
in a Decision dated June 26, 1989 reversed and held that the
Private respondent Almeida appealed to the Office of the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction to hear and decide the case
President.10 The NHA Resolution was affirmed by the Office of involving "title and possession to real property within its
the President in a Decision dated January 23, 1987.11 jurisdiction."18 The case was then remanded for further
proceedings on the merits.
On February 1, 1987, Francisca Herrera died. Her heirs executed
an extrajudicial settlement of her estate which they submitted to A pre-trial was set after which trial ensued.
the NHA. Said transfer of rights was approved by the NHA.12 The
NHA executed several deeds of sale in favor of the heirs of On March 9, 1998, the Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision
Francisca Herrera and titles were issued in their setting aside the resolution of the NHA and the decision of the
favor.13 Thereafter, the heirs of Francisca Herrera directed Office of the President awarding the subject lots in favor of
Segunda Mercado-Almeida to leave the premises that she was Francisca Herrera. It declared the deeds of sale executed by
occupying. NHA in favor of Herrera's heirs null and void. The Register of
Deeds of Laguna, Calamba Branch was ordered to cancel the
Feeling aggrieved by the decision of the Office of the President Transfer Certificate of Title issued. Attorney's fees were also
and the resolution of the NHA, private respondent Segunda awarded to private respondent.
Mercado-Almeida sought the cancellation of the titles issued in
favor of the heirs of Francisca. She filed a Complaint on February The Regional Trial Court ruled that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay"
8, 1988, for "Nullification of Government Lot's Award," with the was not an assignment of rights but a disposition of property
Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31. which shall take effect upon death. It then held that the said
document must first be submitted to probate before it can transfer
In her complaint, private respondent Almeida invoked her forty- property.
year occupation of the disputed properties, and re-raised the fact
that Francisca Herrera's declaration of self-adjudication has been Both the NHA and the heirs of Francisca Herrera filed their
adjudged as a nullity because the other heirs were disregarded. respective motions for reconsideration which were both denied on
The defendant heirs of Francisca Herrera alleged that the July 21, 1998 for lack of merit. They both appealed to the Court of
complaint was barred by laches and that the decision of the Appeals. The brief for the heirs of Francisca Herrera was denied
Office of the President was already final and executory.14 They admission by the appellate court in a Resolution dated June 14,
also contended that the transfer of purchase of the subject lots is 2002 for being a "carbon copy" of the brief submitted by the NHA
perfectly valid as the same was supported by a consideration and and for being filed seventy-nine (79) days late.
On August 28, 2003, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision The Court of Appeals ruled that the NHA acted arbitrarily in
of the Regional Trial Court, viz: awarding the lots to the heirs of Francisca Herrera. It upheld the
trial court ruling that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" was not an
There is no dispute that the right to repurchase the assignment of rights but one that involved disposition of property
subject lots was awarded to Margarita Herrera in 1959. which shall take effect upon death. The issue of whether it was a
There is also no dispute that Margarita executed a valid will must first be determined by probate.
"Sinumpaang Salaysay" on October 7, 1960. Defendant
NHA claims that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" is, in effect, Petitioner NHA elevated the case to this Court.
a waiver or transfer of rights and interest over the subject
lots in favor of Francisca Herrera. This Court is disposed Petitioner NHA raised the following issues:
to believe otherwise. After a perusal of the "Sinumpaang
Salaysay" of Margarita Herrera, it can be ascertained A. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESOLUTION OF THE
from its wordings taken in their ordinary and grammatical NHA AND THE DECISION OF THE OFFICE OF THE
sense that the document is a simple disposition of her PRESIDENT HAVE ATTAINED FINALITY, AND IF SO,
estate to take effect after her death. Clearly the Court WHETHER OR NOT THE PRINCIPLE OF
finds that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" is a will of ADMINISTRATIVE RES JUDICATA BARS THE COURT
Margarita Herrera. Evidently, if the intention of Margarita FROM FURTHER DETERMINING WHO BETWEEN THE
Herrera was to merely assign her right over the lots to her PARTIES HAS PREFERENTIAL RIGHTS FOR AWARD
daughter Francisca Herrera, she should have given her OVER THE SUBJECT LOTS;
"Sinumpaang Salaysay" to the defendant NHA or to
Francisca Herrera for submission to the defendant NHA
B. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT HAS
after the full payment of the purchase price of the lots or
JURISDICTION TO MAKE THE AWARD ON THE
even prior thereto but she did not. Hence it is apparent
SUBJECT LOTS; AND
that she intended the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" to be her
last will and not an assignment of rights as what the NHA
in its resolution would want to make it appear. The C. WHETHER OR NOT THE AWARD OF THE SUBJECT
intention of Margarita Herrera was shared no less by LOTS BY THE NHA IS ARBITRARY.
Francisca Herrera who after the former's demise
executed on August 22, 1974 a Deed of Self-Adjudication We rule for the respondents.
claiming that she is her sole and legal heir. It was only
when said deed was questioned in court by the surviving Res judicata is a concept applied in review of lower court
heirs of Margarita Herrera's other daughter, Beatriz decisions in accordance with the hierarchy of courts. But
Mercado, that Francisca Herrera filed an application to jurisprudence has also recognized the rule of administrative res
purchase the subject lots and presented the "Sinumpaang judicata: "the rule which forbids the reopening of a matter once
Salaysay" stating that it is a deed of assignment of judicially determined by competent authority applies as well to the
rights.19 judicial and quasi-judicial facts of public, executive or
administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction
as to the judgments of courts having general judicial powers . . . It
has been declared that whenever final adjudication of persons Government."24 Courts have an expanded role under the 1987
invested with power to decide on the property and rights of the Constitution in the resolution of societal conflicts under the grave
citizen is examinable by the Supreme Court, upon a writ of error abuse clause of Article VIII which includes that duty to check
or a certiorari, such final adjudication may be pleaded as res whether the other branches of government committed an act that
judicata."20 To be sure, early jurisprudence were already mindful falls under the category of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
that the doctrine of res judicata cannot be said to apply lack or excess of jurisdiction.25
exclusively to decisions rendered by what are usually understood
as courts without unreasonably circumscribing the scope thereof Next, petitioner cites Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 or the Judiciary
and that the more equitable attitude is to allow extension of the Reorganization Act of 198026 where it is therein provided that the
defense to decisions of bodies upon whom judicial powers have Intermediate Appellate Court (now, Court of Appeals) shall
been conferred. exercise the "exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final
judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards, of the
In Ipekdjian Merchandising Co., Inc. v. Court of Tax Regional Trial Courts and Quasi-Judicial agencies,
Appeals,21 the Court held that the rule prescribing that instrumentalities, boards or commissions, except those falling
"administrative orders cannot be enforced in the courts in the within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with
absence of an express statutory provision for that purpose" was the Constitution"27 and contends that the Regional Trial Court
relaxed in favor of quasi-judicial agencies. has no jurisdiction to rule over awards made by the NHA.
In fine, it should be remembered that quasi-judicial powers will Well-within its jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals, in its decision of
always be subject to true judicial powerthat which is held by the August 28, 2003, already ruled that the issue of the trial court's
courts. Quasi-judicial power is defined as that power of authority to hear and decide the instant case has already been
adjudication of an administrative agency for the "formulation of a settled in the decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 26,
final order."22 This function applies to the actions, discretion and 1989 (which has become final and executory on August 20, 1989
similar acts of public administrative officers or bodies who are as per entry of judgment dated October 10, 1989).28 We find no
required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, reason to disturb this ruling. Courts are duty-bound to put an end
hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for to controversies. The system of judicial review should not be
their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial misused and abused to evade the operation of a final and
nature.23 However, administrative agencies are not considered executory judgment.29 The appellate court's decision becomes the
courts, in their strict sense. The doctrine of separation of powers law of the case which must be adhered to by the parties by
reposes the three great powers into its three (3) branchesthe reason of policy.30
legislative, the executive, and the judiciary. Each department is
co-equal and coordinate, and supreme in its own sphere. Next, petitioner NHA contends that its resolution was grounded
Accordingly, the executive department may not, by its own fiat, on meritorious grounds when it considered the application for the
impose the judgment of one of its agencies, upon the judiciary. purchase of lots. Petitioner argues that it was the daughter
Indeed, under the expanded jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, it Francisca Herrera who filed her application on the subject lot; that
is empowered to "determine whether or not there has been grave it considered the respective application and inquired whether she
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on had all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications of a
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the possible awardee. It is the position of the petitioner that private
respondent possessed all the qualifications and none of the them later to her heirsin accordance with a will or by operation
disqualifications for lot award and hence the award was not done of law.
arbitrarily.
The death of Margarita Herrera does not extinguish her interest
The petitioner further argues that assuming that the "Sinumpaang over the property. Margarita Herrera had an existing Contract to
Salaysay" was a will, it could not bind the NHA.31That, "insofar as Sell36 with NHA as the seller. Upon Margarita Herrera's demise,
[the] NHA is concerned, it is an evidence that the subject lots this Contract to Sell was neither nullified nor revoked. This
were indeed transferred by Margarita Herrera, the original Contract to Sell was an obligation on both partiesMargarita
awardee, to Francisca Herrera was then applying to purchase the Herrera and NHA. Obligations are transmissible.37 Margarita
same before it."32 Herrera's obligation to pay became transmissible at the time of
her death either by will or by operation of law.
We are not impressed. When the petitioner received the
"Sinumpaang Salaysay," it should have noted that the effectivity If we sustain the position of the NHA that this document is not a
of the said document commences at the time of death of the will, then the interests of the decedent should transfer by virtue of
author of the instrument; in her words "sakaling ako'y bawian na an operation of law and not by virtue of a resolution by the NHA.
ng Dios ng aking buhay" Hence, in such period, all the interests For as it stands, NHA cannot make another contract to sell to
of the person should cease to be hers and shall be in the other parties of a property already initially paid for by the
possession of her estate until they are transferred to her heirs by decedent. Such would be an act contrary to the law on
virtue of Article 774 of the Civil Code which provides that: succession and the law on sales and obligations.38
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of When the original buyer died, the NHA should have considered
which the property, rights and obligations to the extent the estate of the decedent as the next "person"39likely to stand in
of the value of the inheritance, of a person are to fulfill the obligation to pay the rest of the purchase price. The
transmitted through his death to another or others opposition of other heirs to the repurchase by Francisca Herrera
either by his will or by operation of law.33 should have put the NHA on guard as to the award of the lots.
Further, the Decision in the said Civil Case No. B-1263
By considering the document, petitioner NHA should have noted (questioning the Deed of Self-Adjudication) which rendered the
that the original applicant has already passed away. Margarita deed therein null and void40 should have alerted the NHA that
Herrera passed away on October 27, 1971.34 The NHA issued its there are other heirs to the interests and properties of the
resolution35 on February 5, 1986. The NHA gave due course to decedent who may claim the property after a testate or intestate
the application made by Francisca Herrera without considering proceeding is concluded. The NHA therefore acted arbitrarily in
that the initial applicant's death would transfer all her property, the award of the lots.
rights and obligations to the estate including whatever interest
she has or may have had over the disputed properties. To the We need not delve into the validity of the will. The issue is for the
extent of the interest that the original owner had over the probate court to determine. We affirm the Court of Appeals and
property, the same should go to her estate. Margarita Herrera the Regional Trial Court which noted that it has an element of
had an interest in the property and that interest should go to her testamentary disposition where (1) it devolved and transferred
estate upon her demise so as to be able to properly distribute
property; (2) the effect of which shall transpire upon the death of Republic of the Philippines
the instrument maker.41 SUPREME COURT
Manila
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition of the National Housing
Authority is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA- FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 68370 dated August 28, 2003, affirming the decision of
the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna in Civil Case No. G.R. No. 84450 February 4, 1991
B-2780 dated March 9, 1998, is hereby AFFIRMED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
No cost. vs.
GLORIA UMALI y AMADO AND SUZETH UMALI y
SO ORDERED. AMADO, defendants-appellants.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
Hence, this appeal from the lower court's decision with the THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
following assignment of errors: FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED DID
NOT PASS THE TEST OF MORAL CERTAINTY. (Rollo,
I p. 49)
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING The antecedent facts of this case as recounted by the trial court
WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE BIASED are as follows:
TESTIMONY OF FRANCISCO MANALO
On April 27, 1985 Pierre Pangan a minor was investigated by Pat.
II Felino Noguerra for drug dependency and for an alleged crime of
robbery. In the course of the investigation, the policemen
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING discovered that Pierre Pangan was capable of committing crime
THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE WHICH WERE against property, only if under the influence of drug (sic). As
OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF ACCUSED'S Pierre Pangan is a minor, the police investigators sought the
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AGAINST ILLEGAL presence of his parents. Leopoldo Pangan, father of the minor
SEARCH AND SEIZURE was invited to the police headquarters and was informed about
the problem of his son. Mr. Pangan asked the police investigators
if something could be done to determine the source of the operatives, went to the house of Gloria Umali and served the
marijuana which has not only socially affected his son, but other search warrant on her. Confiscated from the person of Gloria
minors in the community. Previous to the case of Pierre Pangan Umali were the four P5.00 bills with serial numbers BA26943,
was the case of Francisco Manalo, who was likewise investigated DT388005, CC582000 and EW69873, respectively as reflected in
by operatives of the Tiaong, Quezon Police Department and for the police blotter. Likewise, present in the four (4) P5.00 bills
which a case for violation of the Dangerous Drug Act was filed were the letters T which were placed by the police investigators to
against him, covered by Criminal Case No. 85-516 before Branch further identify the marked four (4) P5.00 bills. The searched (sic)
60 of the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City. Aside from said in the house was made in the presence of Brgy. Capt. Punzalan.
case, accused Francisco Manalo was likewise facing other The search resulted in the confiscation of a can of milo,
charges such as concealment of deadly weapon and other crimes containing sixteen (16) foils of dried marijuana leaves which were
against property. Pat. Felino Noguerra went to the Tiaong placed in a tupperware and kept in the kitchen where rice was
Municipal Jail, and sought the help of Francisco Manalo and told being stored. The return of the search warrant reads as follows:
him the social and pernicious effect of prohibited drugs like
marijuana being peddled to minors of Tiaong, Quezon. Manalo DATE: 22 April 1985
although a detention prisoner was touched by the appeal made to
him by the policeman and agreed to help in the identification of WHAT: "RAID"
the source of the marijuana. In return he asked the policeman to
help him in some cases pending against him. He did not
WHERE: Residence of Dr. Emiliano Umali
negotiate his case for violating the dangerous drug act, as he has
Poblacion, Tiaong, Quezon
entered a plea of guilty to the charged (sic) before the sala of
Judge Eriberto Rosario.
WHO: MBRS. OF TIAONG INP
With the consent of Francisco Manalo, Pfc. Sarmiento, Chief of
the Investigation Division gave him four (4) marked P5.00 bills to TIME STARTED/ARRIVED AT SAID PLACE:
buy marijuana from sources known to him. The serial numbers of 221410H Apr '85
the money was entered in the police blotter. The instruction was
(sic) for Manalo to bring back the prohibited drug purchased by SERVED TO: MRS. GLORIA UMALI
him to the police headquarters. Few minutes there after (sic), MR. EMILIANO UMALI
Manalo returned with two (2) foils of dried marijuana which lie
allegedly bought from the accused Gloria Umali. Thereafter, he PERSON APPREHENDED/PROPERTY
was asked by the police investigators to give a statement on the SEIZED/RECOVERED
manner and circumstances of how he was able to purchase two
(2) marijuana foils from accused Gloria Umali. With the affidavit of Mrs. Gloria Umali 16 Aluminum Foils of
Francisco Manalo, supported by the two (2) foils of marijuana. the
Chief of the Investigation Division petitioned the Court for the Mr. Emiliano Umali Suspected Marijuana leaves
issuance of a search warrant as a justification for them to search
the house of Gloria Umali located at Rector (sic) Street. TIME/DATE LEFT SAID PLACE: 221450H Apr '85
Poblacion, Tiaong, Quezon. After securing the same, the police
WITNESSES (sic) BY: of Prision Mayor and to pay a fine of Six
Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00). Let the period of
1. (Sgd) Reynaldo S. Pasumbal detention of the accused be credited to his
sentence.
2. (Sgd) Luisabel P. Punzalan
Accused never disputed the claim of Francisco Manalo
3. (Sgd) Arnulfo C. Veneracion that the marijuana found in his possession on April 5,
1985 in the municipality of Tiaong, Quezon was sold to
him by the accused Gloria Umali. The defense also did
4. (Sgd) Isidro C. Capino
not dispute the claim of the prosecution that in the
investigation of Pierre Pangan, the police investigator
Samples of the marijuana leaves confiscated were came to know that Gloria Umali was the source of the
submitted to the PC Came Laboratory for examination. marijuana leaves which he used and smoked resulting in
Capt. Rosalinda Royales of the PC crime Laboratory took his present drug dependency. (Rollo, pp. 22-27)
the witness stand, testified and identified the marijuana
submitted to her and in a written report which was marked
The appellant vehemently denied the findings of the lower court
as Exhibit "G" she gave the following findings:
and insisted that said court committed reversible errors in
convicting her. She alleged that witness Francisco Manalo is not
Qualitative examination conducted on the reputed to be trustworthy and reliable and that his words should
specimen mentioned above gave POSITIVE not be taken on its face value. Furthermore, he stressed that said
result to the tests fur marijuana. witness has several charges in court and because of his desire to
have some of his cases dismissed, he was likely to tell falsehood.
In Criminal Case No. 85-516, Francisco Manalo was
charged of having in his possession Indian Hemp on April However, the plaintiff-appellee through the Solicitor General said
5, 1985, in violation of Section 8, Article 11 of Republic that even if Francisco Manalo was then facing several criminal
Act 6425 as amended, otherwise as the Dangerous Drugs charges when he testified, such fact did not in any way disqualify
Act of 1972. The Court in rendering against him disposed him as a witness. "His testimony is not only reasonable and
the case as follows: probable but more so, it was also corroborated in its material
respect by the other prosecution witnesses, especially the police
In view of the foregoing, the Court hereby finds officers." (Rollo, pp. 83-84)
the accused Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of illegal possession of "Indian Hemp" The appellant also claimed that the marked money as well as the
penalized under Sec. 8 of Article 6425 (sic); as marijuana were confiscated for no other purpose than using them
amended otherwise known as the Dangerous as evidence against the accused in the proceeding for violation of
Drugs Act of 1972 and the Court hereby Dangerous Drugs Act and therefore the search warrant issued is
sentences him to suffer an imprisonment of two illegal from the very beginning. She stressed that there can be no
(2) years and four (4) months of prision other plausible explanation other than that she was a victim of a
correccional to six (6) years and one (1) day frame-up.
In relation to this contention, the Solicitor General noted that it is facts, said factual findings are entitled to great weight, and indeed
not true that the evidences submitted by the prosecution were are binding even on this Court.
obtained in violation of her constitutional right against illegal
search and seizure. Rule 130, Section 20 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that:
Furthermore, the appellant contended that the essential elements Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all
of the crime of which she was charged were never established by persons who can perceive, and perceiving can make
clear and convincing evidence to warrant the findings of the known their perception to others may be witnesses.
court a quo. She also stressed that the court's verdict of
conviction is merely based on surmises and conjectures. Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the
case, or conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided
However, the Solicitor General noted that the positive and by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification.
categorical testimonies of the prosecution witnesses who had
personal knowledge of the happening together with the physical The phrase "conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by
evidence submitted clearly prove the guilt beyond reasonable law" takes into account Article 821 of the Civil Code which states
doubt of accused-appellant for violation of the Dangerous Drugs that persons 91 convicted of falsification of a document, perjury or
Act. false testimony" are disqualified from being witnesses to a will."
(Paras, RULES OF COURT ANNOTATED, Vol. IV First Ed., p.
Time and again, it is stressed that this Court is enjoined from 44)
casually modifying or rejecting the trial court's factual findings.
Such factual findings, particularly the trial judge's assessment of Since the witness Francisco Manalo is not convicted of any of the
the credibility of the testimony of the witnesses are accorded with above-mentioned crimes to disqualify him as a witness and this
great respect on appeal for the trial judge enjoys the advantage of case does not involve the probate of a will, We rule that the fact
directly and at first hand observing and examining the testimonial that said witness is facing several criminal charges when he
and other proofs as they are presented at the trial and is therefore testified did not in any way disqualify him as a witness.
better situated to form accurate impressions and conclusions on
the basis thereof (See People v. Bravo, G.R. No. 68422, 29
The testimony of a witness should be given full faith and credit, in
December, 1989,180 SCRA 694,699). The findings of the trial
the absence of evidence that he was actuated by improper motive
court are entitled to great weight, and should not be disturbed on
(People v. Melgar, G.R. No. 75268,29 January 1988, 157 SCRA
appeal unless it is shown that the trial court had overlooked
718). Hence, in the absence of any evidence that witness
certain facts of weight and importance, it being acknowledged
Francisco Manalo was actuated by improper motive, his
that the court below, having seen and heard the witnesses during
testimony must be accorded full credence.
the trial, is in a better position to evaluate their testimonies
(People v. Alverez y Soriano, G.R. No. 70831, 29 July 1988, 163
SCRA 745, 249; People v. Dorado, G.R. No. L-23464, October Appellant's contention that she was a victim of a "frame-up" is
31, 1969, 30 SCRA 53; People v. Espejo, G.R. No. L-27708, devoid of merit. "Courts must be vigilant. A handy defense in
1wphi1
December 19, 1970, 36 SCRA 400). Hence, in the absence of such cases is that it is a frame-up and that the police attempted to
any showing that the trial court had overlooked certain substantial extort from the accused. Extreme caution must be exercised in
appreciating such defense. It is just as easy to concoct as a Manalo for which she was given and received four (4) marked five
frame-up. At all times the police, the prosecution and the Courts peso (P5.00) bills, and fully supports conviction for drug pushing
must be always on guard against these hazards in the in violation of Section 4 Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
administration of criminal justice." (People v. Rojo, G.R. No.
82737, 5 July 1989, 175 SCRA 119) Thus, the Court has no option but to declare that the trial court did
not err in finding, on the basis of the evidence on record, that the
The appellant's allegation that the search warrant is illegal cannot accused-appellant Gloria Umali violated Section 4, Article II of the
also be given any merit. "Where marked peso bills were seized Dangerous Drugs Act.
by the police as a result of the search made on the appellant, the
admissibility of these marked peso bills hinges on the legality of Pursuant to recent jurisprudence and law, the case is covered by
the arrest and search on the person of the appellant" (People v. Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425 as amended by Presidential
Paco, G.R. No. 76893, 27 February 1989, 170 SCRA 681). Since Decree No. 1675, effective February 17, 1980, which raised the
the search is predicated on a valid search warrant, absent any penalty for selling prohibited drugs from life imprisonment to
showing that such was procured maliciously the things seized are death and a fine ranging from twenty to thirty thousand pesos
admissible in evidence. (People v. Adriano, G.R. No. 65349, October 31, 1984, 133
SCRA 132) Thus, the trial court correctly imposed the penalty of
Appellant argues that the lower court's verdict is based on life imprisonment but failed to impose a fine.
surmises and conjectures, hence the essential elements of the
crime were never established by clear and convincing evidence. ACCORDINGLY, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with the
modification that a fine of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) be
Conviction cannot be predicated on a presumption or speculation. imposed, as it is hereby imposed, on the accused-appellant.
A conviction for a criminal offense must be based on clear and
positive evidence and not on mere presumptions (Gaerlan v. SO ORDERED.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 57876, 6 November 1989, 179 SCRA
20). The prosecution's evidence consisted of the testimony of Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.
witness Manalo and the law enforcers as well as the physical
evidence consisting of the seized marked peso bills, the two (2)
foils of marijuana purchased and the can containing sixteen (16)
aluminum foils of dried marijuana.