G.R. No.
150758 February 18, 2004 without the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there
VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
We are called on to decide the novel issue concerning the effect of the
judicial declaration of the nullity of a second or subsequent marriage, on the
ground of psychological incapacity, on an individuals criminal liability for
bigamy. We hold that the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity does not retroact to the
date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the Philippines penal laws
are concerned. As such, an individual who contracts a second or subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable for
bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the second
marriage is void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with private
complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two were wed by Judge
Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro and
Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter
part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously
married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro
showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and
Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the
conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to
cohabit with Villareyes.1
On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one
with a certain Nilda Villegas, before Judge German Lee, Jr. of the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 15.2 When Ancajas learned of this third
marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married
to petitioner. In a handwritten letter,3 Villareyes confirmed that petitioner,
Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. 4 The
Information,5 which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 013095-L, reads:
That on the 10th day of April 1990, in the City of Lapu-lapu, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the aforenamed accused,
having been previously united in lawful marriage with Hilda Villareyes, and
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with LETICIA
ANCAJAS, which second or subsequent marriage of the accused has all the
essential requisites for validity were it not for the subsisting first marriage.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty".6
During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with Villareyes from
1984-1988, with whom he sired two children. However, he denied that he
and Villareyes were validly married to each other, claiming that no marriage
ceremony took place to solemnize their union.7 He alleged that he signed a
marriage contract merely to enable her to get the allotment from his office in
connection with his work as a seaman.8 He further testified that he requested
his brother to verify from the Civil Register in Manila whether there was any
marriage at all between him and Villareyes, but there was no record of said
marriage.9
On November 10, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, Branch
54, rendered a decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and
sentencing him to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional,
as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum.10 On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
court. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant petition for review on the following assignment of errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED,
AND THIS ERROR IS CORRECTIBLE IN THIS APPEAL WHEN IT
AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT A
QUOCONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF
BIGAMY, DESPITE THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THE FIRST
MARRIAGE AND INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.
II. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic)
THE CRIME OF BIGAMY DESPITE CLEAR PROOF THAT THE
MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE ACCUSED AND PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT HAD BEEN DECLARED NULL AND VOID AB
INITIO AND WITHOUT LEGAL FORCE AND EFFECT.11
After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent reason to
disturb the assailed judgment.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the crime of
Bigamy are:
(1) that the offender has been legally married;
(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case
his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be
presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity.12
Petitioners assignment of errors presents a two-tiered defense, in which he
(1) denies the existence of his first marriage to Villareyes, and (2) argues that
the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity, which is an alleged indicator that his marriage to
Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity, retroacts to the date on
which the second marriage was celebrated.13 Hence, petitioner argues that
all four of the elements of the crime of bigamy are absent, and prays for his
acquittal.14
Petitioners defense must fail on both counts.
First, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both documentary and
oral, to prove the existence of the first marriage between petitioner and
Villareyes. Documentary evidence presented was in the form of: (1) a copy of
a marriage contract between Tenebro and Villareyes, dated November 10,
1986, which, as seen on the document, was solemnized at the Manila City
Hall before Rev. Julieto Torres, a Minister of the Gospel, and certified to by
the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila;15 and (2) a handwritten letter from
Villareyes to Ancajas dated July 12, 1994, informing Ancajas that Villareyes
and Tenebro were legally married.16
To assail the veracity of the marriage contract, petitioner presented (1) a
certification issued by the National Statistics Office dated October 7,
1995;17 and (2) a certification issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila,
dated February 3, 1997.18 Both these documents attest that the respective
issuing offices have no record of a marriage celebrated between Veronico B.
Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986.
To our mind, the documents presented by the defense cannot adequately
assail the marriage contract, which in itself would already have been
sufficient to establish the existence of a marriage between Tenebro and
Villareyes.
All three of these documents fall in the category of public documents, and the
Rules of Court provisions relevant to public documents are applicable to all.
Pertinent to the marriage contract, Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court reads as follows:
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record.
When the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy
issued by the public officer in custody thereof (Emphasis ours).
This being the case, the certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by a
public officer in custody thereof, was admissible as the best evidence of its
contents. The marriage contract plainly indicates that a marriage was
celebrated between petitioner and Villareyes on November 10, 1986, and it
should be accorded the full faith and credence given to public documents.
Moreover, an examination of the wordings of the certification issued by the
National Statistics Office on October 7, 1995 and that issued by the City Civil
Registry of Manila on February 3, 1997 would plainly show that neither
document attests as a positive fact that there was no marriage celebrated
between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10,
1986. Rather, the documents merely attest that the respective issuing offices
have no record of such a marriage. Documentary evidence as to the absence
of a record is quite different from documentary evidence as to the absence of
a marriage ceremony, or documentary evidence as to the invalidity of the
marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.
The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as positive
evidence as to the existence of the marriage between Tenebro and
Villareyes, which should be given greater credence than documents testifying
merely as to absence of any record of the marriage, especially considering
that there is absolutely no requirement in the law that a marriage contract
needs to be submitted to the civil registrar as a condition precedent for the
validity of a marriage. The mere fact that no record of a marriage exists does
not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are
present.19 There is no evidence presented by the defense that would indicate
that the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes lacked any requisite for
validity, apart from the self-serving testimony of the accused himself.
Balanced against this testimony are Villareyes letter, Ancajas testimony that
petitioner informed her of the existence of the valid first marriage, and
petitioners own conduct, which would all tend to indicate that the first
marriage had all the requisites for validity.
Finally, although the accused claims that he took steps to verify the non-
existence of the first marriage to Villareyes by requesting his brother to
validate such purported non-existence, it is significant to note that the
certifications issued by the National Statistics Office and the City Civil
Registry of Manila are dated October 7, 1995 and February 3, 1997,
respectively. Both documents, therefore, are dated after the accuseds
marriage to his second wife, private respondent in this case.
As such, this Court rules that there was sufficient evidence presented by the
prosecution to prove the first and second requisites for the crime of bigamy.
The second tier of petitioners defense hinges on the effects of the
subsequent judicial declaration20 of the nullity of the second marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner argues that this subsequent judicial declaration retroacts to the
date of the celebration of the marriage to Ancajas. As such, he argues that,
since his marriage to Ancajas was subsequently declared void ab initio, the
crime of bigamy was not committed.21
This argument is not impressed with merit.
Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of the second
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, invoking Article 36 of the
Family Code. What petitioner fails to realize is that a declaration of the nullity
of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of
absolutely no moment insofar as the States penal laws are concerned.
As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of
petitioners valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioners marriage to Ancajas
would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioners
psychological capacity or incapacity.22 Since a marriage contracted during
the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this
second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal
liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code
criminalizes "any person who shall contract a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before
the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings". A plain reading of the law,
therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of
contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a
valid marriage.
Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April
10, 1990, during the subsistence of the valid first marriage, the crime of
bigamy had already been consummated. To our mind, there is no cogent
reason for distinguishing between a subsequent marriage that is null and
void purely because it is a second or subsequent marriage, and a
subsequent marriage that is null and void on the ground of psychological
incapacity, at least insofar as criminal liability for bigamy is concerned. The
States penal laws protecting the institution of marriage are in recognition of
the sacrosanct character of this special contract between spouses, and
punish an individuals deliberate disregard of the permanent character of the
special bond between spouses, which petitioner has undoubtedly done.
Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground
of psychological incapacity is not an indicator that petitioners marriage to
Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity. The requisites for the
validity of a marriage are classified by the Family Code into essential (legal
capacity of the contracting parties and their consent freely given in the
presence of the solemnizing officer)23 and formal (authority of the
solemnizing officer, marriage license, and marriage ceremony wherein the
parties personally declare their agreement to marry before the solemnizing
officer in the presence of at least two witnesses).24 Under Article 5 of the
Family Code, any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards
not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 3725 and 3826 may
contract marriage.27
In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of marriage
were satisfied by petitioner and Ancajas. Both were over eighteen years of
age, and they voluntarily contracted the second marriage with the required
license before Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu
City, in the presence of at least two witnesses.
Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the
marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is
significant to note that said marriage is not without legal effects. Among
these effects is that children conceived or born before the judgment of
absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered legitimate.28 There is
therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage,
although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these
legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold
otherwise would render the States penal laws on bigamy completely
nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital
contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of
contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women
with the promise of futurity and commitment.
As such, we rule that the third and fourth requisites for the crime of bigamy
are present in this case, and affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on record, petitioner
contracted marriage a third time, while his marriages to Villareyes and
Ancajas were both still subsisting. Although this is irrelevant in the
determination of the accuseds guilt for purposes of this particular case, the
act of the accused displays a deliberate disregard for the sanctity of
marriage, and the State does not look kindly on such activities. Marriage is a
special contract, the key characteristic of which is its permanence. When an
individual manifests a deliberate pattern of flouting the foundation of the
States basic social institution, the States criminal laws on bigamy step in.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for
the crime of bigamy is prision mayor, which has a duration of six (6) years
and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. There being neither aggravating nor
mitigating circumstance, the same shall be imposed in its medium period.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner shall be entitled to a
minimum term, to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision
correccional which has a duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6)
years. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the decision of the trial
court which sentenced petitioner to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for review is
DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
21636, convicting petitioner Veronico Tenebro of the crime of Bigamy and
sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two
(2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 167746 August 28, 2007
RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARA, Petitioner,
vs.
ROSITA A. ALCANTARA and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner
Restituto Alcantara assailing the Decision1of the Court of Appeals dated 30
September 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 66724 denying petitioners appeal and
affirming the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City,
Branch 143, in Civil Case No. 97-1325 dated 14 February 2000, dismissing
his petition for annulment of marriage.
The antecedent facts are:
A petition for annulment of marriage3 was filed by petitioner against
respondent Rosita A. Alcantara alleging that on 8 December 1982 he and
respondent, without securing the required marriage license, went to the
Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a
marriage for them. They met a person who, for a fee, arranged their wedding
before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC
BR Chapel.4They got married on the same day, 8 December 1982. Petitioner
and respondent went through another marriage ceremony at the San Jose de
Manuguit Church in Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage was
likewise celebrated without the parties securing a marriage license. The
alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the
marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident of Carmona,
and they never went to Carmona to apply for a license with the local civil
registrar of the said place. On 14 October 1985, respondent gave birth to
their child Rose Ann Alcantara. In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate
lives. Petitioner prayed that after due hearing, judgment be issued declaring
their marriage void and ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel the
corresponding marriage contract5 and its entry on file.6
Answering petitioners petition for annulment of marriage, respondent asserts
the validity of their marriage and maintains that there was a marriage license
issued as evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil Registry of
Carmona, Cavite. Contrary to petitioners representation, respondent gave
birth to their first child named Rose Ann Alcantara on 14 October 1985 and to
another daughter named Rachel Ann Alcantara on 27 October
1992.7 Petitioner has a mistress with whom he has three children. 8 Petitioner
only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade prosecution for
concubinage.9 Respondent, in fact, has filed a case for concubinage against
petitioner before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch
60.10 Respondent prays that the petition for annulment of marriage be denied
for lack of merit.
On 14 February 2000, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 143, rendered its
Decision disposing as follows:
The foregoing considered, judgment is rendered as follows:
1. The Petition is dismissed for lack of merit;
 2. Petitioner is ordered to pay respondent the sum of twenty
thousand pesos (20,000.00) per month as support for their two (2)
children on the first five (5) days of each month; and
3. To pay the costs.11
As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the
petitioners appeal. His Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied in a
resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 6 April 2005. 12
The Court of Appeals held that the marriage license of the parties is
presumed to be regularly issued and petitioner had not presented any
evidence to overcome the presumption. Moreover, the parties marriage
contract being a public document is a prima facie proof of the questioned
marriage under Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.13
In his Petition before this Court, petitioner raises the following issues for
resolution:
a. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error
when it ruled that the Petition for Annulment has no legal and factual
basis despite the evidence on record that there was no marriage
license at the precise moment of the solemnization of the marriage.
b. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error
when it gave weight to the Marriage License No. 7054133 despite
the fact that the same was not identified and offered as evidence
during the trial, and was not the Marriage license number appearing
on the face of the marriage contract.
c. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error
when it failed to apply the ruling laid down by this Honorable Court in
the case of Sy vs. Court of Appeals. (G.R. No. 127263, 12 April 2000
[330 SCRA 550]).
d. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error
when it failed to relax the observance of procedural rules to protect
and promote the substantial rights of the party litigants.14
We deny the petition.
Petitioner submits that at the precise time that his marriage with the
respondent was celebrated, there was no marriage license because he and
respondent just went to the Manila City Hall and dealt with a "fixer" who
arranged everything for them.15 The wedding took place at the stairs in
Manila City Hall and not in CDCC BR Chapel where Rev. Aquilino Navarro
who solemnized the marriage belongs.16 He and respondent did not go to
Carmona, Cavite, to apply for a marriage license. Assuming a marriage
license from Carmona, Cavite, was issued to them, neither he nor the
respondent was a resident of the place. The certification of the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, cannot be given weight because the
certification states that "Marriage License number 7054133 was issued in
favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario" 17 but their marriage
contract bears the number 7054033 for their marriage license number.
The marriage involved herein having been solemnized on 8 December 1982,
or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law to determine
its validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its
celebration.
A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil
Code, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to
Article 80(3)18 in relation to Article 58 of the same Code.19
Article 53 of the Civil Code20 which was the law applicable at the time of the
marriage of the parties states:
Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are
complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.
The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the States
demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the
maintenance of which the general public is interested.21
Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn the
validity of his marriage. The cases where the court considered the absence
of a marriage license as a ground for considering the marriage void are clear-
cut.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,22 the Local Civil Registrar
issued a certification of due search and inability to find a record or entry to
the effect that Marriage License No. 3196182 was issued to the parties. The
Court held that the certification of "due search and inability to find" a record
or entry as to the purported marriage license, issued by the Civil Registrar of
Pasig, enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to
keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Based
on said certification, the Court held that there is absence of a marriage
license that would render the marriage void ab initio.
In Cario v. Cario,23 the Court considered the marriage of therein petitioner
Susan Nicdao and the deceased Santiago S. Carino as void ab initio. The
records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased
bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such
marriage license. The court held that the certification issued by the local civil
registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of the marriage license. Their
marriage having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license
and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license
requirement, the marriage of the petitioner and the deceased is undoubtedly
void ab initio.
In Sy v. Court of Appeals,24 the marriage license was issued on 17
September 1974, almost one year after the ceremony took place on 15
November 1973. The Court held that the ineluctable conclusion is that the
marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage license.
In all these cases, there was clearly an absence of a marriage license which
rendered the marriage void.
Clearly, from these cases, it can be deduced that to be considered void on
the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the
absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage
contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil
registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties. In this case,
the marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a
marriage license number. A certification to this effect was also issued by the
local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite.25 The certification moreover is precise
in that it specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license was
issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further validating the
fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein.
The certification of Municipal Civil Registrar Macrino L. Diaz of Carmona,
Cavite, reads:
This is to certify that as per the registry Records of Marriage filed in this
office, Marriage License No. 7054133 was issued in favor of Mr. Restituto
Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario on December 8, 1982.
This Certification is being issued upon the request of Mrs. Rosita A.
Alcantara for whatever legal purpose or intents it may serve.26
This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed and the issuance of the marriage license was done in the regular
conduct of official business.27 The presumption of regularity of official acts
may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a
duty. However, the presumption prevails until it is overcome by no less than
clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption
is rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be
made in support of the presumption and, in case of doubt as to an officers
act being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its
lawfulness.28 Significantly, apart from these, petitioner, by counsel, admitted
that a marriage license was, indeed, issued in Carmona, Cavite.29
Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the marriage
license, claims that neither he nor respondent is a resident of Carmona,
Cavite. Even then, we still hold that there is no sufficient basis to annul
petitioner and respondents marriage. Issuance of a marriage license in a city
or municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and
issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior to
the completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered mere
irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage.30 An irregularity in
any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the
party or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and
administratively liable.31
Again, petitioner harps on the discrepancy between the marriage license
number in the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar, which states that
the marriage license issued to the parties is No. 7054133, while the marriage
contract states that the marriage license number of the parties is number
7054033. Once more, this argument fails to sway us. It is not impossible to
assume that the same is a mere a typographical error, as a closer scrutiny of
the marriage contract reveals the overlapping of the numbers 0 and 1, such
that the marriage license may read either as 7054133 or 7054033. It
therefore does not detract from our conclusion regarding the existence and
issuance of said marriage license to the parties.
Under the principle that he who comes to court must come with clean
hands,32 petitioner cannot pretend that he was not responsible or a party to
the marriage celebration which he now insists took place without the requisite
marriage license. Petitioner admitted that the civil marriage took place
because he "initiated it."33 Petitioner is an educated person. He is a
mechanical engineer by profession. He knowingly and voluntarily went to the
Manila City Hall and likewise, knowingly and voluntarily, went through a
marriage ceremony. He cannot benefit from his action and be allowed to
extricate himself from the marriage bond at his mere say-so when the
situation is no longer palatable to his taste or suited to his lifestyle. We
cannot countenance such effrontery. His attempt to make a mockery of the
institution of marriage betrays his bad faith.34
Petitioner and respondent went through a marriage ceremony twice in a span
of less than one year utilizing the same marriage license. There is no claim
that he went through the second wedding ceremony in church under duress
or with a gun to his head. Everything was executed without nary a whimper
on the part of the petitioner.lavvphi1
In fact, for the second wedding of petitioner and respondent, they presented
to the San Jose de Manuguit Church the marriage contract executed during
the previous wedding ceremony before the Manila City Hall. This is
confirmed in petitioners testimony as follows
WITNESS
As I remember your honor, they asked us to get the necessary document
prior to the wedding.
COURT
What particular document did the church asked you to produce? I am
referring to the San Jose de Manuguit church.
WITNESS
I dont remember your honor.
COURT
Were you asked by the church to present a Marriage License?
WITNESS
I think they asked us for documents and I said we have already a Marriage
Contract and I dont know if it is good enough for the marriage and they
accepted it your honor.
COURT
In other words, you represented to the San Jose de Manuguit church that
you have with you already a Marriage Contract?
WITNESS
Yes your honor.
COURT
That is why the San Jose de Manuguit church copied the same marriage
License in the Marriage Contract issued which Marriage License is Number
7054033.
WITNESS
Yes your honor.35
The logical conclusion is that petitioner was amenable and a willing
participant to all that took place at that time. Obviously, the church ceremony
was confirmatory of their civil marriage, thereby cleansing whatever
irregularity or defect attended the civil wedding.36
Likewise, the issue raised by petitioner -- that they appeared before a "fixer"
who arranged everything for them and who facilitated the ceremony before a
certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC Br
Chapel -- will not strengthen his posture. The authority of the officer or
clergyman shown to have performed a marriage ceremony will be presumed
in the absence of any showing to the contrary.37 Moreover, the solemnizing
officer is not duty-bound to investigate whether or not a marriage license has
been duly and regularly issued by the local civil registrar. All the solemnizing
officer needs to know is that the license has been issued by the competent
official, and it may be presumed from the issuance of the license that said
official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the contracting parties had
fulfilled the requirements of law.38
Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in favor of
the validity of the marriage.39 Every intendment of the law or fact leans
toward the validity of the marriage bonds. The Courts look upon this
presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary,
the presumption is of great weight.
Wherefore, premises considered, the instant Petition is Denied for lack of
merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004
affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 143 of Makati City,
dated 14 February 2000, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 150677 June 5, 2009
RENATO REYES SO, Petitioner,
vs.
LORNA VALERA, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
For our review is the Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed by petitioner
Renato Reyes So (petitioner) against the Decision dated July 4, 2001 2 and
the Resolution dated October 18, 20013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 65273. The challenged decision reversed the decision 4 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 143, Makati City declaring the marriage
of the petitioner and respondent Lorna Valera (respondent) null and void on
the ground of the latters psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code. The assailed resolution denied the petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
ANTECEDENT FACTS
The petitioner and the respondent first met at a party in 1973 after being
introduced to each other by a common friend. The petitioner at that time was
a 17-year old high school student; the respondent was a 21-year old college
student. Their meeting led to courtship and to a 19-year common-law
relationship,5 culminating in the exchange of marital vows at the Caloocan
City Hall on December 10, 1991.6 They had three (3) children (Jeffrey,
Renelee, and Loni)7 in their relationship and subsequent marriage.
On May 14, 1996, the petitioner filed with the RTC a petition for the
declaration of the nullity of his marriage with the respondent. 8 The case was
docketed as JDRC Case No. 96-674. He alleged that their marriage was null
and void for want of the essential and formal requisites. He also claimed that
the respondent was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential
obligations of marriage, as shown by the following circumstances: the
respondent failed and refused to cohabit and make love with him; did not
love and respect him; did not remain faithful to him; did not give him
emotional, spiritual, physical, and psychological help and support; failed and
refused to have a family domicile; and failed and refused to enter into a
permanent union and establish conjugal and family life with him.9
The petitioner presented testimonial and documentary evidence to
substantiate his charges.
The petitioner testified that he and the respondent eloped two (2) months
after meeting at a party.10 Thereafter, they lived at the house of his mothers
friend in Bulacan, and then transferred to his parents house in Caloocan
City. They stayed there for two (2) months before transferring to Muntinlupa
City.11
The petitioner likewise related that respondent asked him to sign a blank
marriage application form and marriage contract sometime in 1986. He
signed these documents on the condition that these documents would only
be used if they decide to get married. He admitted not knowing what
happened to these documents, and maintained that no marriage ceremony
took place in 1991.12 As noted below, the petitioner, however, submitted a
certified true copy of their marriage contract as part of his documentary
evidence.
The petitioner further alleged that the respondent did not want to practice her
profession after passing the dental board exam; and that she sold the dental
equipment he bought for her.13 He also claimed that when he started his own
communication company, the respondent disagreed with many of his
business decisions; her interference eventually led to many failed
transactions with prospective clients.14
The petitioner narrated that he often slept in the car because the respondent
locked him out of the house when he came home late. He felt embarrassed
when his employees would wake him up inside the car. When he confronted
the respondent the next morning, she simply ignored him. He also claimed
that respondent did not care for their children, and was very strict with clients.
Moreover, the respondent went out with his employees to gamble whenever
there were no clients.
Lastly, he testified that sometime in 1990, he found all his things outside their
house when he came home late after closing a deal with a client. He left their
house and stayed at a friends house for two (2) months. He tried to go back
to their house, but the respondent prevented him from entering. The
respondent also told him she did not love him anymore. He attempted to
reconcile with her for the sake of their children, but she refused to accept him
back.15
Summons was served on the respondent on July 17, 1996, but she failed to
file an answer. The RTC ordered the public prosecutor to investigate if there
had been collusion between the parties and to intervene for the State to see
to it that evidence was not fabricated. Prosecutor Andres N. Marcos
manifested that he was unable to make a ruling on the issue of collusion
since the respondent failed to appear before him. 16
Aside from his testimony, the petitioner also presented certified true copies of
the birth certificate of their three children;17 certified true copy of their
marriage contract;18 and the testimony, original curriculum vitae,19 and
psychological report20 of clinical psychologist Dr. Cristina Rosello-Gates (Dr.
Gates).
In her Psychological Report, Dr. Gates noted as follows:
xxx
PARTICULARS
- Parties met in a party when Petitioner was 17 years and
Respondent was 21 years old; both were studying but Petitioner was
also working in his fathers business;
- During the first time they met, Respondent hugged Petitioner and
stayed close to him; she also taught him how to smoke marijuana;
after their first meeting, Respondent would fetch petitioner from
school, and they would go out together;
- Within the next two months, Respondent dropped out of school
without informing her parents; she applied for a job and was
purportedly raped by her employer;
- When Respondents parents found out that she quit school, she
sought petitioners help to look for a place to stay; Renato brought
her to his friends house in Bulacan but her hosts did not like her
frequent outings and parties; Respondent then asked Petitioner to
live with her in a rented apartment; she told him to execute an
Affidavit of Loss so he can withdraw his savings with a new
bankbook without the knowledge of his father;
- Parties were fetched by Petitioners parents to live with them in
Caloocan; petitioner sent Respondent to school to wean her away
from her friends; when she passed the Dentistry Board
Examinations, he put up a dental clinic for her; after 2 months, she
quit her dental practice and joined Petitioner in his communications
business;
- Respondent had problems dealing with Petitioners clients; she
interfered with his decisions, and resented his dealings with clients
which would, at times, last till late at night; one incident in 1990,
Respondent locked Petitioner out of house prompting the latter to
sleep in the car; other similar incidents followed where employees
would wake up Petitioner when they report for work; one night,
Petitioner found all his things thrown out of the house by
Respondent;
- Respondent was not the one who took care of their children; the
second child, for instance, cries whenever said child sees
Respondent as the latter is not familiar with the former;
- While parties lived together since 1973, they applied for a marriage
license only in 1986; Respondent asked Petitioner to sign both
license and marriage contract without any public appearance at City
Hall; their marriage was registered in 1991 after the couple
separated.21
and concluded that:
An examination of the parties respective family background and upbringing,
as well as the events prior to their marriage point to psychological impairment
on the part of Respondent Lorna Valera.
From a simple existence in the province, Lorna Valera was thrust in the big
city for her college education. It was in Sampaloc, Manila where she lived
and groped, and eventually found herself in bad company. Thus, her so-
called "culture shock" was abated by pot sessions lasting several days at a
time making her temporarily forget the harsh reality in the metropolis. Her
escapist and regressive tendencies stunted her psychological growth and
prevented her from fully functioning as a responsible adult.
Based on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM IV), the international
standards of psychological disorders, Respondent Lorna Valera is plagued
with an Adjustment Disorder as manifested in her impulsiveness, lack of
restraint, lack of civility and a sense of decency in the conduct of her life.
Compulsive Behavior Patterns are also evident in her marijuana habit,
gambling and habitual squandering of Petitioners money. Lorna Valeras
Adjustment Disorder and Compulsive Behavior Patterns were already
existing prior to her marriage to Petitioner Renato So. Continuing up to the
present, the same appears to be irreversible.22
The RTC Ruling
The RTC nullified the marriage of petitioner and respondent in its decision of
November 8, 1999. The decision, a relatively short one at four (4) pages,
single-spaced, including the heading and the signature pages, made a short
summary of the "testimonies of the witness" with the statements that
Petitioner and respondent became common law husband and wife from 1973
to 1991. Out of this relationship were born three children, namely Jeffrey,
Renelee and Lino all surnamed Varela.
Sometime in 1987 petitioner was induced by respondent to sign a blank
Marriage Contract and a blank application for marriage license. The
petitioner freely signed the documents with the belief that the documents will
be signed only when they get married.23
Thereafter, the RTC decision wholly dwelt on the question of the
respondents psychological incapacity based on the testimony of the
petitioner and Dr. Gates, his expert witness. The decisions concluding
paragraphs stated:
Based on the foregoing, the Court is convinced that respondent Lorna Valera
is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligation of marriage, which incapacity existed at the time of the celebration
thereof (Art. 36 F.C.).
It should be borne in mind that marriage is a special contract of permanent
union and the foundation of the Family. The husband and the wife are
obliged to live together, observe mutual help and support (Art. 68 F.C.). It
includes the giving of love and affection, advice and counsel, companionship
and understanding (Art. 230 F.C.). Respondent failed to observe all these
things.24
The dispositive portion of the decision that immediately followed reads:
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of petitioner and against
respondent:
1. Declaring respondent psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations under Art. 36 of the Family Code;
2. Declaring the marriage contracted by Renato Reyes So and Lorna
Valero on December 10, 1991, null and void ab initio;
3. Dissolving the conjugal partnership between the spouses in
accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Family Code;
4. Awarding the custody of the minor children to petitioner.
xxx
SO ORDERED.25
The CA Decision
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor
General, appealed the RTC decision to the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
65273. The CA, in its Decision dated July 4, 2001, reversed and set aside
the RTC decision and dismissed the petition for lack of merit.26
The CA ruled that the petitioner failed to prove the respondents
psychological incapacity. According to the CA, the respondents character,
faults, and defects did not constitute psychological incapacity warranting the
nullity of the parties marriage. The CA reasoned out that "while respondent
appears to be a less than ideal mother to her children, and loving wife to her
husband," these flaws were not physical manifestations of psychological
illness. The CA further added that although the respondents condition was
clinically identified by an expert witness to be an "Adjustment Disorder," it
was not established that such disorder was the root cause of her incapacity
to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The prosecution also failed to
establish that respondents disorder was incurable and permanent in such a
way as to disable and/or incapacitate respondent from complying with
obligations essential to marriage.
The CA likewise held that the respondents hostile attitude towards the
petitioner when the latter came home late was "a normal reaction of an
ordinary housewife under a similar situation"; and her subsequent refusal to
cohabit with him was not due to any psychological condition, but due to the
fact that she no longer loved him.
Finally, the CA concluded that the declaration of nullity of a marriage was not
proper when the psychological disorder does not meet the guidelines set
forth in the case of Molina.
The petitioner moved to reconsider the decision, but the CA denied his
motion in its resolution27 dated October 18, 2001.
The Petition and Issues
The petitioner argues in the present petition that the CA seriously erred28
1. in reversing the RTC decision without ruling on the trial courts
factual and conclusive finding that the marriage between petitioner
and respondent was null and void ab initio;
2. in departing from the accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings that factual findings of the trial courts are entitled to
great weight and respect and are not disturbed on appeal; and
3. in totally disregarding the undisputed fact that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital
obligations.29
The Republic, as intervenor-appellee, alleged in its comment that: (a) the trial
court never made a definitive ruling on the issue of the absence of the formal
and essential requisites of the parties marriage; and (b) petitioner was not
able to discharge the burden of evidence required in Molina.30
The petitioner filed a reply;31 thereafter, both parties filed their respective
memoranda reiterating their arguments. Other than the issue of the absence
of the essential and formal requisites of marriage, the basic issue before us
is whether there exists sufficient ground to declare the marriage of petitioner
and respondent null and void.
THE COURTS RULING
We deny the petition for lack of merit, and hold that no sufficient basis exists
to annul the marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. No case of
lack of essential and formal requisites of marriage has been proven or validly
ruled upon by the trial court.
1. The CA did not err in not ruling on the alleged lack
of the essential and formal requisites of marriage
The petitioner cites as ground for this appeal the position that the CA
reversed and set aside the RTC decision without touching on the trial courts
ruling that there was absence of the essential and formal requisites of
marriage.
We find this argument baseless and misplaced for three basic reasons.
First. The argument stems from the mistaken premise that the RTC
definitively ruled that petitioners marriage to respondent was null and void
due to the absence of the essential and formal requisites of marriage.
A careful examination of the RTC decision shows that the trial court did not
discuss, much less rule on, the absence of the formal and essential
requisites of marriage; it simply recited the claim that "[S]ometime in 1987
petitioner was induced by respondent to sign a blank Marriage Contract and
a blank application for marriage license. The petitioner freely signed the
documents with the belief that the documents will be signed only when they
get married." The trial court did not even mention the certified true copy of
the Marriage Contract signed by the officiating minister and registered in the
Civil Registry of Kalookan City. The petitioner introduced and marked this
copy as his Exhibit "D" to prove that there is a marriage contract registered in
the Civil Registry of Kalookan City between petitioner and respondent. 32
Out of this void came the dispositive portion "[D]eclaring the marriage
contracted by Renato Reyes So and Lorna Valera on December 10, 1991
null and void."33 Faced with an RTC decision of this tenor, the CA could not
have ruled on the validity of the marriage for essential and formal
deficiencies, since there was no evidence and no RTC ruling on this point to
evaluate and rule upon on appeal. Even if it had been a valid issue before
the CA, the RTCs declaration of nullity should be void for violation of the
constitutional rule that "[No] decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based."34
Second. The same examination of the RTC decision shows that it concerned
itself wholly with the declaration of the nullity of the marriage based on Article
36 of the Family Code. After its recital of the "testimonies of witnesses," part
of which are the facts relied upon to support the claimed psychological
incapacity, the decision dwelt on the evidence of Dr. Gates, the expert
witness, and, from there, proceeded to its conclusion that psychological
incapacity existed. In this light, the dispositive portion declaring "the
marriage...on December 10, 1991, [is] null and void," must be based on
psychological incapacity as found by the trial court, not on the absence of the
essential and formal requisites of marriage.
Third. We note that the petitioner himself offered the Marriage Contract as
evidence that it is registered with the Civil Registry of Kalookan City. 35 As a
duly registered document, it is a public document, and is prima facie
evidence of the facts it contains, namely, the marriage of the petitioner with
the respondent. To contradict these facts and the presumption of regularity in
the documents favor, the petitioners contrary evidence must be clear,
convincing, and more than merely preponderant.36 To be sure, a married
couple cannot simply nullify their marriage through the non-appearance of
one spouse and the uncorroborated declaration by the other spouse that the
marriage did not really take place. If the biased and interested testimony of a
witness is deemed sufficient to overcome a public instrument, drawn up with
all the formalities prescribed by the law, then there will have been
established a very dangerous doctrine that would throw the door wide open
to fraud.37 At the very least, the declaration that the marriage did not take
place must be supported by independent evidence showing a physical
impossibility, a forgery, or the disavowal by the supposed participants, to
name a few possible reasons.
2. Petitioner failed to establish respondents psychological incapacity
As the CA did, we hold that the totality of evidence presented by petitioner
failed to establish the respondents psychological incapacity to perform the
essential marital obligations.
The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on Article 36 of
the Family Code which provides that "a marriage contracted by any party
who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,38 the Court first declared that psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence;
and (c) incurability. It should refer to "no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage." It must be confined to "the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability
to give meaning and significance to the marriage."39
More definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of
the Family Code of the Philippines were handed down by this Court in
Republic v. Court of Appeals40 (the Molina case) as follows:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to
the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence
and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our
laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus,
our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing
it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the
state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and
the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and
solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the
court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill
to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given
valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity
need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause
must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness
was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but
the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity
must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not
necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. x x x
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of
the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
 (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and
wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard
to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included
in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision
shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may
be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15)
days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of
the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,41 further clarified that there is no requirement
that the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a
physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of
nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Accordingly, it is no
longer necessary to introduce expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of
the Family Code if the totality of evidence shows that psychological
incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can be
duly established.42
The factual background of this case covers at least 18 years. The petitioner
and the respondent first met in 1973 and lived together as husband and wife,
without the benefit of marriage, before they got married in 1991. In the
course of their relationship, they had three (3) children; established a
business, and even incurred indebtedness amounting to 4 million; had
differences due to what the CA described as "character faults and defects";
and had a well-described quarrel which the CA observed to be the "common
reaction of an ordinary housewife in a similar situation." Thus, unlike the
usual Article 36 cases this Court encountered in the past, where marriage,
cohabitation, and perception of psychological incapacity took place in that
order, the present case poses a situation where there had been a lengthy
period of cohabitation before the marriage took place. To be sure, this factual
unique situation does not change the requirement that psychological
incapacity must be present at the time of the celebration of the marriage. It
does, however, raise novel and unavoidable questions because of the lapse
of time the couple has been together and their intimate knowledge of each
other at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Specifically, how do
these factors affect the claim of psychological incapacity that should exist at
the time of the marriage, considering that marriage came near or at the end
of the parties relationship?
Ideally, the best results in the determination of psychological incapacity are
achieved if the respondent herself is actually examined. This opportunity,
however, did not arise in the present case because the respondent simply
failed to respond to the court summons and to cooperate in the proceedings.
Thus, only an indirect psychological examination took place through the
transcript of stenographic notes of the hearings and clinical interviews of the
petitioner which lasted for about three (3) hours.43 In light of the differences in
the appreciation of the psychologists testimony and conclusions between the
trial court and the appellate court, we deem it necessary to examine the
records ourselves, as the factual allegations and the expert opinion vitally
affect the issues submitted for resolution.
Our own examination of the psychologists testimony and conclusions leads
us to conclude that they are not sufficiently in-depth and comprehensive to
warrant the conclusion that a psychological incapacity existed that prevented
the respondent from complying with the essential marital obligations of
marriage. In the first place, the facts on which the psychologist based her
conclusions were all derived from statements by the petitioner whose bias in
favor of his cause cannot be doubted. It does not appear to us that the
psychologist read and interpreted the facts related to her with the awareness
that these facts could be slanted. In this sense, we say her reading may not
at all be completely fair in its assessment. We say this while fully aware that
the psychologist appeared at the petitioners bidding and the arrangement
between them was not pro bono.44 While this circumstance does not
disqualify the psychologist for reasons of bias, her reading of the facts, her
testimony, and her conclusions must be read carefully with this circumstance
and the source of the facts in mind.
In examining the psychologists Report, we find the "Particulars" and the
"Psychological Conclusions" disproportionate with one another; the
conclusions appear to be exaggerated extrapolations, derived as they are
from isolated incidents, rather than from continuing patterns. The
"particulars" are, as it were, snapshots, rather than a running account of the
respondents life from which her whole life is totally judged. Thus, we do not
see her psychological assessment to be comprehensive enough to be
reliable.
For example, the psychologists statements about the parties sexual
relationship appear to us to be rash, given that no parallel examination of the
petitioners own pattern of sexual behavior has been made. Sex with a
partner is a two-way affair and while one partner can be more aggressive
than the other, aggressiveness is not per se an aberrant behavior and may
depend on the dynamics of the partners relationship. To infer prior sexual
experience because the respondent allegedly initiated intimate behavior, and
to cite an unverified incident of a previous rape to characterize the
respondents sexual behavior, are totally uncalled for. That the respondent
did pass her Dental Board Exam was glossed over and unverified unsavory
incidents related to her exam were highlighted. Her alleged failure to practice
was stressed, without emphasizing, however, that "she quit her dental
practice and joined petitioner in his communications business."
The respondents business behavior is a matter that needed full inquiry, as
there could be reasons for her interference. With respect to employees, while
the petitioner charged the respondent with being strict, he, at the same time,
alleged that she gambled with the employees when there were no clients.
The psychologist did not pursue these lines and, significantly, the petitioners
testimonies on this point are uncorroborated. The respondents reaction to
her husbands nights out was singled out and slanted to indicate negative
traits. It took the CA to observe that her hostile attitude when the petitioner
stayed out late at night "is merely a usual common reaction of an ordinary
housewife in a similar situation." To further quote the CA citing the
transcripts, "[I]n fact, petitioner-appellee admitted that the reason respondent
got angry and threw his things outside is because he came home late and
drunk, which petitioner-appellee had done several times already on the
pretext of closing business deals, which sometimes included going out night-
clubbing with clients."45 Why and how the couple incurred indebtedness of
about 4 million may be usual in the communications business, but is
certainly a matter that the psychologist should have further inquired into in
relation with her alleged strictness in business affairs.1avvphi1
As against the negatives in viewing the respondent, we note that she lived
with the petitioner for 18 years and begot children with him born in 1975,
1978 and 1984 developments that show a fair level of stability in the
relationship and a healthy degree of intimacy between the parties for some
eleven (11) years. She finished her Dentistry and joined her husband in the
communications business traits that do not at all indicate an irresponsible
attitude, especially when read with the comment that she had been strict with
employees and in business affairs. The petitioners Memorandum 46 itself is
very revealing when, in arguing that the Marriage Contract was a sham, the
petitioner interestingly alleged that (referring to 1987) "[S]ince at that time,
the relationship between the petitioner and respondent was going well, and
future marriage between the two was not an impossibility, the petitioner
signed these documents."
More than all these, the psychologists testimony itself glaringly failed to
show that the respondents behavioral disorder was medically or clinically
permanent or incurable as established jurisprudence requires. Neither did the
psychologist testify that the disorder was grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. To
directly quote from the records:
ATTY. RODOLFO BRITANICO
Q: All right, what was basically your conclusion in your qualitative
research with regards to the psychological incapacity of the
respondent to comply with the marital obligation?
DR. CRISTINA R. GATES
A: There is a strong indication that the respondent was not able to
carry out her marital obligation her marital duties and
responsibilities. And going through the TSN, it is evident that in their
conjugal relation, it was petitioner who was responsible, but he in
fact gave her opportunity to develop and to become responsible
herself. [sic]
For instance, he sent her back to school to take Dentistry, he supported her
during that time and during the exam and after that he built her a clinic. In all
these, the respondent proved to be irresponsible. [sic]
When she was taking pre-dental, most of the time she was out of the house,
and in one instance petitioner discovered that respondent was having an
extra-marital affair with her classmate. And in her board exam she failed the
first time. And even if it is questionable, petitioner approached one of the
commissioners and through his efforts the respondent was able to pass the
second time around. [sic]
And in the matter of dental clinic, after merely two months respondent
refused to practice, she not only refused and without the knowledge of the
petitioner sold all the dental equipments at a loss. [sic]
Q: How about their relationship?
A: From the start respondent is older, she had, like, prior sexual
experience, and she was the one who introduced to him the use of
marijuana. x x x x
Q: How about respondent. How would the respondent compliment
the responsibility?
A: There is no mutuality, because if she run away and asked for
petitioner to rent an apartment for them to live together, petitioner
continued to work and study and went home to her in the evening,
but respondent on the other hand she quit schooling and she did
push through with working, and worst she allowed her friend to live
with them, allegedly in that apartment, and respondent and friend
would engage in pot sessions. [sic]
Q: What did you find out with regards to the duty of respondent to
live together with the petitioner? [sic]
A: She was frequently out, in [sic] her friends. .
Q: How about love and respect?
A: Love is rather complicated. Because she made love to him in her
own will. [sic]
Q: But did they show respect?
A: No, because she had extra-marital affair, and demanding lot of
money.
Q: How about to render emotional, spiritual and physical help? How
would respondent comply?
A: She was not able to comply, except maybe for the sexual
obligation, but in terms of physical and emotional support she was
not there for him. When she quit, she hang out with him on their
business, but instead of helping him, she would quarrel him, interfere
in his decisions, she would embarrass petitioner in front of his clients
and employees, and if petitioner would have a deal with his clients
and sometimes would come home late, she would refuse to listen to
his explanation and would lock him out and shout at him. [sic]
Q: And in your Psychological findings, when did this [incapacity] of
the respondent start, her incapacity to comply with the marriage
obligation?
A: In the testimony of the petitioner, I think he did mention that she
came to Manila for her studies, and during the interview I found out
that upon arrival in Manila she was alone, by herself, she had
difficulty adjusting to city life, because all her life were spent in the
province with her parents and siblings, and she lived in Sampaloc
where she got herself in the company of bad friends like going into
marijuana and frequent parties and pot sessions, [which] would last
for 3 to 4 days, and in effect disallowed her from going to school
regularly.
Q: In clinical psychologist [sic], what is the effect?
A: It is traumatic for her, because there is a separation of her
parents, and not only that she was thrown to a situation of her being
alone, at that time she had no guidance, it would assume that she
would just study[sic]
Q: In your conclusion of your Psychological Report, you stated here
and I quote: "Based on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM
IV), the international standards of psychological disorders,
Respondent Lorna is plagued with an Adjustment Disorder as
manifested in her impulsiveness, lack of restraint, lack of civility and
a sense of decency in the conduct of her life." Can you please
explain to us.
A: Lorna Valera is like a person who is not in control of herself,
impulsive. x x x
Q: How about lack of restraint?
A: Impulses. Like for example, when the husband comes home late,
instead of looking means and ways to rationalize, she would just
shout and lock him out.
Q: And what about lack of civility, what is your basis?
A: She did not consider the welfare of her children, her frequent
outings, like she would conduct her extra marital affairs through
phone calls. When they separated, I understand that she was always
out of the house, gambling at night. In fact, petitioner in one of his
visits to respondent and children intercepted the letter of a younger
child asking for an appointment to see the mother because the
childs report is that he hardly sees the mother.
xxxx
Q: You mentioned also in your psychological conclusion that
Adjustment Disorder and Compulsive Behavior of Lorna Valera
 existed prior and continuous up to the present, can you please
explain?
A: If Lorna Valera somewhere in her life changes all of a sudden,
then the psychological incapacity is not obtaining but in mal-adopting
behavior, like you remove the stimulus of the petitioner in her life.
Then the same behavior pattern as I learned from the children, then
the incapacity is irreversible because it is there.47[sic]
These statements, lopsided as they are as we observed above, merely testify
to the respondents impulsiveness, lack of restraint, and lack of civility and
decency in the conduct of her life. The psychologist, however, failed to
sufficiently prove that all these emanated from a behavioral disorder so grave
and serious that the respondent would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in a marriage; that it was rooted in the respondents
medical or psychological history before her marriage; and that a cure was
beyond the respondents capacity to achieve.
Speaking of the root of the alleged disorder, the psychologist could only trace
this to the time the respondent came to Manila; the psychologist concluded
that the disorder was due to her separation from her parents and lack of
guidance. Will common human experience, available through the thousands
of students who over the years trooped from the provinces to Manila, accept
the conclusion that this experience alone can lead to a disorder that can
affect their capacity to marry?
In terms of incurability, the psychologist could only cryptically say -
A. If Lorna Valera somewhere in her life changes all of a sudden, then the
psychological incapacity is not obtaining but in mal-adopting behavior, like
you remove the stimulus of the petitioner in her life. Then the same behavior
pattern as I learned from the children, then the incapacity is irreversible
because it is there.48
Does this convoluted statement mean that Lorna Valera can still change, and
that change can happen if the "stimulus of the petitioner" is removed from her
life? In other words, is the incapacity relative and reversible?
In Molina, we ruled that "mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes
and occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as indicative of
psychological incapacity. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity
or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other
words, the root cause should be a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage." In the present case,
the psychologist simply narrated adverse "snapshots" of the respondents life
showing her alleged failure to meet her marital duties, but did not
convincingly prove her permanent incapacity to meet her marital duties and
responsibilities; the root or psychological illness that gave rise to this
incapacity; and that this psychological illness and consequent incapacity
existed at the time the marriage was celebrated.
In light of the wide gaps in the facts the psychologist considered and of the
patent deficiencies of her testimony tested under the standards of
established jurisprudence, we cannot accord full credence and accept the
psychologists Report as basis for the declaration of annulment of the parties
marriage under Article 36. In the absence of any contradictory statements
from the respondent, the fairer approach is to read between the lines of this
Report and discern what indeed happened between the parties based on
common human experience between married couples who have lived
together in the way the parties did. From this perspective, we have no
problem in accepting the CA decision as a fairer assessment of the
respondents alleged psychological incapacity, and for being a more realistic
appreciation of the evidence adduced in light of the requirements of Article
36:
Such character faults and defects, We believe, do not constitute
psychological incapacity as a ground for the declaration of marriage between
petitioner-appellee and respondent. While she appears to be less than ideal
mother to her children and loving wife to her husband, herein petitioner-
appellee, the same are not physical manifestations of a psychological illness
as described in Molina. Although the expert witness had clinically identified
respondents condition as "Adjustment Disorder," allegedly resulting from
respondents separation from her parents when she studied in Manila before
she met petitioner-appellee, it was not established that such disorder or
illness allegedly manifested in her carefree and outgoing behavior as a
means of coping with her emotional and psychological stresses, was the root
cause of her incapacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations. Moreover,
such alleged disorder was not shown to be of a serious nature, "a
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effective incapacitates" the respondent from "really
accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage."
The clinical findings on respondents alleged Adjustment Disorder have not
established such illness to be grave enough to bring about the disability of
the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. And, as pointed
out by the Solicitor General, although the Psychological Report stated that
respondents condition "appears to be irreversible," the expert witness did not
substantiate her conclusion that respondents condition was indeed incurable
or permanent. Nowhere in the testimony of petitioner-appellee was it shown
that respondents allegedly carefree ways (and smoking of marijuana) while
she was younger and had no children yet, continued throughout their
marriage until their separation in 1990. On the contrary, her strict attitude
towards the clients and employees is a clear indication that she takes their
business concerns seriously, such attitude being a reflection of a mature and
responsible personality.49
Shorn of any reference to psychology, we conclude that we have a case here
of parties who have very human faults and frailties; who have been together
for some time; and who are now tired of each other. If in fact the respondent
does not want to provide the support expected of a wife, the cause is not
necessarily a grave and incurable psychological malady whose effects go as
far as to affect her capacity to provide marital support promised and
expected when the marital knot was tied. To be tired and to give up on ones
situation and on ones husband are not necessarily signs of psychological
illness; neither can falling out of love be so labeled. When these happen, the
remedy for some is to cut the marital knot to allow the parties to go their
separate ways. This simple remedy, however, is not available to us under our
laws. Ours is still a limited remedy that addresses only a very specific
situation a relationship where no marriage could have validly been
concluded because the parties, or one of them, by reason of a grave and
incurable psychological illness existing when the marriage was celebrated,
did not appreciate the obligations of marital life and, thus, could not have
validly entered into a marriage. Outside of this situation, this Court is
powerless to provide any permanent remedy. To use the words of Navales v.
Navales:501avvphi1
Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance
of and to assume basic marital obligations. Mere "difficulty," "refusal" or
"neglect" in the performance of marital obligations or "ill will" on the part of
the spouse is different from "incapacity" rooted on some debilitating
psychological condition or illness. Indeed, irreconcilable differences, sexual
infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like,
do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under
Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person's refusal or
unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage and not due to
some psychological illness that is contemplated by said rule. 51 [Emphasis
ours]
WHEREFORE, in view of these considerations, we DENY the petition and
AFFIRM the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated July 4,
2001 and October 18, 2001, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 65273. Costs
against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 183896 January 30, 2013
SYED AZHAR ABBAS, Petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA GOO ABBAS, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, questioning the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
dated March 11, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760, which reversed the
Decision2 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM dated October 5, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 109, Pasay City, and the CA Resolution
dated July 24, 2008, denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the
CA Decision.
The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas
(Syed) for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas
(Gloria) with the RTC of Pasay City, docketed as Civil Case No. 03-0382-
CFM, and raffled to RTC Branch 109. Syed alleged the absence of a
marriage license, as provided for in Article 4, Chapter I, Title 1 of Executive
Order No. 269, otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines, as a
ground for the annulment of his marriage to Gloria.
In the Marriage Contract3 of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that Marriage
License No. 9969967, issued at Carmona, Cavite on January 8, 1993, was
presented to the solemnizing officer. It is this information that is crucial to the
resolution of this case.
At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a
Filipino citizen, in Taiwan in 1991, and they were married on August 9, 1992
at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan.4 He arrived in the Philippines in December
of 1992. On January 9, 1993, at around 5 oclock in the afternoon, he was at
his mother-in-laws residence, located at 2676 F. Muoz St., Malate, Manila,
when his mother-in-law arrived with two men. He testified that he was told
that he was going to undergo some ceremony, one of the requirements for
his stay in the Philippines, but was not told of the nature of said ceremony.
During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a document. He claimed that he
did not know that the ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told him later. He
further testified that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage
license, and that he had never resided in that area. In July of 2003, he went
to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to check on their
marriage license, and was asked to show a copy of their marriage contract
wherein the marriage license number could be found.5 The Municipal Civil
Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a certification on July 11, 2003
to the effect that the marriage license number appearing in the marriage
contract he submitted, Marriage License No. 9969967, was the number of
another marriage license issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra
Mabilangan.6 Said certification reads as follows:
11 July 2003
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify as per Registry Records of Marriage License filed in this
office, Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued in favor of MR. ARLINDO
GETALADO and MISS MYRA MABILANGAN on January 19, 1993.
No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been issued to MR. SYED AZHAR
ABBAS and MISS GLORIA F. GOO on January 8, 1993.
This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed Azhar Abbas for whatever legal
purpose or intents it may serve.7
On cross-examination, Syed testified that Gloria had filed bigamy cases
against him in 2001 and 2002, and that he had gone to the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite to get certification on whether or not there was
a marriage license on advice of his counsel.8
Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic), an employee of the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite. Bagsic appeared under a letter
of authority from the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, and
brought documents pertaining to Marriage License No. 9969967, which was
issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 20, 1993. 9
Bagsic testified that their office issues serial numbers for marriage licenses
and that the numbers are issued chronologically.10 He testified that the
certification dated July 11, 2003, was issued and signed by Leodivina
Encarnacion, Registrar of the Municipality of Carmona, Cavite, certifying that
Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued for Arlindo Getalado and Myra
Mabilangan on January 19, 1993, and that their office had not issued any
other license of the same serial number, namely 9969967, to any other
person.11
For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and presented Reverend
Mario Dauz, Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez, Felicitas Goo and May Ann Ceriola.
Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that he was a minister of the
Gospel and a barangay captain, and that he is authorized to solemnize
marriages within the Philippines.12 He testified that he solemnized the
marriage of Syed Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo at the residence of the bride
on January 9, 1993.13 He stated that the witnesses were Atty. Lorenzo
Sanchez (Atty. Sanchez) and Mary Ann Ceriola.14 He testified that he had
been solemnizing marriages since 1982, and that he is familiar with the
requirements.15 Rev. Dauz further testified that Atty. Sanchez gave him the
marriage license the day before the actual wedding, and that the marriage
contract was prepared by his secretary. 16 After the solemnization of the
marriage, it was registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and Rev.
Dauz submitted the marriage contract and copy of the marriage license with
that office.17
Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the sponsor of the wedding of
Syed Abbas and Gloria Goo by the mother of the bride, Felicitas Goo. 18 He
testified that he requested a certain Qualin to secure the marriage license for
the couple, and that this Qualin secured the license and gave the same to
him on January 8, 1993.19 He further testified that he did not know where the
marriage license was obtained.20 He attended the wedding ceremony on
January 9, 1993, signed the marriage contract as sponsor, and witnessed the
signing of the marriage contract by the couple, the solemnizing officer and
the other witness, Mary Ann Ceriola.21
Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her daughter and Syed Azhar Abbas
is her son-in-law, and that she was present at the wedding ceremony held on
January 9, 1993 at her house.22 She testified that she sought the help of Atty.
Sanchez at the Manila City Hall in securing the marriage license, and that a
week before the marriage was to take place, a male person went to their
house with the application for marriage license.23 Three days later, the same
person went back to their house, showed her the marriage license before
returning it to Atty. Sanchez who then gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing
officer.24 She further testified that she did not read all of the contents of the
marriage license, and that she was told that the marriage license was
obtained from Carmona.25 She also testified that a bigamy case had been
filed by Gloria against Syed at the Regional Trial Court of Manila, evidenced
by an information for Bigamy dated January 10, 2003, pending before Branch
47 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.26
As to Mary Ann Ceriolas testimony, the counsels for both parties stipulated
that: (a) she is one of the sponsors at the wedding of Gloria Goo and Syed
Abbas on January 9, 1993; (b) she was seen in the wedding photos and she
could identify all the persons depicted in said photos; and (c) her testimony
corroborates that of Felicitas Goo and Atty. Sanchez.
The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her husband, and presented the
marriage contract bearing their signatures as proof.27 She and her mother
sought the help of Atty. Sanchez in securing a marriage license, and asked
him to be one of the sponsors. A certain Qualin went to their house and said
that he will get the marriage license for them, and after several days returned
with an application for marriage license for them to sign, which she and Syed
did. After Qualin returned with the marriage license, they gave the license to
Atty. Sanchez who gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer. Gloria
testified that she and Syed were married on January 9, 1993 at their
residence.28
Gloria further testified that she has a daughter with Syed, born on June 15,
1993.29
Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case against Syed, who had
married a certain Maria Corazon Buenaventura during the existence of the
previous marriage, and that the case was docketed as Criminal Case No.
02A-03408, with the RTC of Manila.30
Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been married on August 9, 1992
in Taiwan, but that she did not know if said marriage had been celebrated
under Muslim rites, because the one who celebrated their marriage was
Chinese, and those around them at the time were Chinese.31
The Ruling of the RTC
In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid
marriage license was issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona,
Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed, as Marriage License No. 9969967 had
been issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan, and the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite had certified that no marriage license had
been issued for Gloria and Syed.32 It also took into account the fact that
neither party was a resident of Carmona, Cavite, the place where Marriage
License No. 9969967 was issued, in violation of Article 9 of the Family
Code.33 As the marriage was not one of those exempt from the license
requirement, and that the lack of a valid marriage license is an absence of a
formal requisite, the marriage of Gloria and Syed on January 9, 1993 was
void ab initio.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner, and
against the respondent declaring as follows:
1. The marriage on January 9, 1993 between petitioner Syed Azhar
Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas is hereby annulled;
2. Terminating the community of property relations between the
petitioner and the respondent even if no property was acquired
during their cohabitation by reason of the nullity of the marriage of
the parties.
3. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the Civil Registrar General,
National Statistics Office, are hereby ordered to cancel from their
respective civil registries the marriage contracted by petitioner Syed
Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas on January 9, 1993
in Manila.
SO ORDERED.34
Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 7, 2005, but the
RTC denied the same, prompting her to appeal the questioned decision to
the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the CA
In her appeal to the CA, Gloria submitted the following assignment of errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE
BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT AS NULL AND
VOID DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF A MARRIAGE LICENSE
DESPITE EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWING THAT THERE WAS
ONE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING, AS A
REQUISITE OF A VALID MARRIAGE, THE OVERWHELMING
EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT A MARRIAGE CEREMONY TOOK
PLACE WITH THE APPEARANCE OF THE CONTRACTING
PARTIES BEFORE THE SOLEMNIZING OFFICER AND THEIR
PERSONAL DECLARATION THAT THEY TOOK EACH OTHER AS
HUSBAND AND WIFE IN THE PRESENCE OF NOT LESS THAN
TWO WITNESSES OF LEGAL AGE.
III
 THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE ISSUE OF
ESTOPPEL BY LACHES ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONER, AN
ISSUE TIMELY RAISED IN THE COURT BELOW.35
The CA gave credence to Glorias arguments, and granted her appeal. It held
that the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to categorically
state that a diligent search for the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was
conducted, and thus held that said certification could not be accorded
probative value.36 The CA ruled that there was sufficient testimonial and
documentary evidence that Gloria and Syed had been validly married and
that there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by law. 37
It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to having signed the
marriage contract. The CA also considered that the parties had comported
themselves as husband and wife, and that Syed only instituted his petition
after Gloria had filed a case against him for bigamy.38
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision
dated 05 October 2005 and Order dated 27 January 2006 of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109, in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage is DISMISSED. The marriage between Shed [sic] Azhar Abbas and
Gloria Goo Abbas contracted on 09 January 1993 remains valid and
subsisting. No costs.
SO ORDERED.39
Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1, 200840 but the
same was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated July 24, 2008. 41
Hence, this petition.
Grounds in Support of Petition
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS
ERROR OF LAW IN CITING REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS
AS THE SAME IS DIAMETRICALLY INCONSISTENT AND
CONTRARY TO THE COURTS OWN FINDINGS AND
CONCLUSIONS IN THIS CASE.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE, WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL
AND LEGAL BASIS, THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT GRANTING THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.42
The Ruling of this Court
The petition is meritorious.
As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January 9, 1993,
Executive Order No. 209, or the Family Code of the Philippines, is the
applicable law. The pertinent provisions that would apply to this particular
case are Articles 3, 4 and 35(3), which read as follows:
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in
Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of
the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their
personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife
in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render
the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable
as provided in Article 45.
An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the
marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be
civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxxx
(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the
preceding Chapter.
There is no issue with the essential requisites under Art. 2 of the Family
Code, nor with the formal requisites of the authority of the solemnizing officer
and the conduct of the marriage ceremony. Nor is the marriage one that is
exempt from the requirement of a valid marriage license under Chapter 2,
Title I of the Family Code. The resolution of this case, thus, hinges on
whether or not a valid marriage license had been issued for the couple. The
RTC held that no valid marriage license had been issued. The CA held that
there was a valid marriage license.
We find the RTC to be correct in this instance.
Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy
thereof, and relied on the marriage contract as well as the testimonies of her
witnesses to prove the existence of said license. To prove that no such
license was issued, Syed turned to the office of the Municipal Civil Registrar
of Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly issued said license. It was there that
he requested certification that no such license was issued. In the case of
Republic v. Court of Appeals43 such certification was allowed, as permitted
by Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed by an officer
having the custody of an official record or by his deputy that after diligent
search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records
of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible
as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or entry.
In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification of the Civil Registrar of
Pasig to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license, the Court held:
The above Rule authorized the custodian of the documents to certify that
despite diligent search, a particular document does not exist in his office or
that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register.
As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged
with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are
required to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the names
of the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and such other
relevant data.44
The Court held in that case that the certification issued by the civil registrar
enjoyed probative value, as his duty was to maintain records of data relative
to the issuance of a marriage license.
The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage license
of Gloria and Syed was allegedly issued, issued a certification to the effect
that no such marriage license for Gloria and Syed was issued, and that the
serial number of the marriage license pertained to another couple, Arlindo
Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A certified machine copy of Marriage
License No. 9969967 was presented, which was issued in Carmona, Cavite,
and indeed, the names of Gloria and Syed do not appear in the document.
In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the wording of the certification,
stating that it did not comply with Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
The CA deduced that from the absence of the words "despite diligent search"
in the certification, and since the certification used stated that no marriage
license appears to have been issued, no diligent search had been conducted
and thus the certification could not be given probative value.
To justify that deduction, the CA cited the case of Republic v. Court of
Appeals.45 It is worth noting that in that particular case, the Court, in
sustaining the finding of the lower court that a marriage license was lacking,
relied on the Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, which merely
stated that the alleged marriage license could not be located as the same did
not appear in their records. Nowhere in the Certification was it categorically
stated that the officer involved conducted a diligent search, nor is a
categorical declaration absolutely necessary for Sec. 28, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court to apply.
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable
presumption that an official duty has been regularly performed, absent
contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We held, "The presumption of
regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
irregularity or failure to perform a duty."46 No such affirmative evidence was
shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in performing her duty of
checking the records of their office, thus the presumption must stand. In fact,
proof does exist of a diligent search having been conducted, as Marriage
License No. 996967 was indeed located and submitted to the court. The fact
that the names in said license do not correspond to those of Gloria and Syed
does not overturn the presumption that the registrar conducted a diligent
search of the records of her office.
It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy
thereof to the court. She failed to explain why the marriage license was
secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location where, admittedly, neither party
resided. She took no pains to apply for the license, so she is not the best
witness to testify to the validity and existence of said license. Neither could
the other witnesses she presented prove the existence of the marriage
license, as none of them applied for the license in Carmona, Cavite. Her
mother, Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as to the contents of the license,
having admitted to not reading all of its contents. Atty. Sanchez, one of the
sponsors, whom Gloria and Felicitas Goo approached for assistance in
securing the license, admitted not knowing where the license came from. The
task of applying for the license was delegated to a certain Qualin, who could
have testified as to how the license was secured and thus impeached the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar as well as the testimony of her
representative. As Gloria failed to present this Qualin, the certification of the
Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys probative value.
It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the marriage contract
and a copy of the marriage license were submitted to the Local Civil
Registrar of Manila. Thus, a copy of the marriage license could have simply
been secured from that office and submitted to the court. However, Gloria
inexplicably failed to do so, further weakening her claim that there was a
valid marriage license issued for her and Syed.
In the case of Cario v. Cario,47 following the case of Republic,48 it was held
that the certification of the Local Civil Registrar that their office had no record
of a marriage license was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said
license. The case of Cario further held that the presumed validity of the
marriage of the parties had been overcome, and that it became the burden of
the party alleging a valid marriage to prove that the marriage was valid, and
that the required marriage license had been secured.49 Gloria has failed to
discharge that burden, and the only conclusion that can be reached is that no
valid marriage license was issued. It cannot be said that there was a simple
irregularity in the marriage license that would not affect the validity of the
marriage, as no license was presented by the respondent. No marriage
license was proven to have been issued to Gloria and Syed, based on the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite and Glorias
failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage license.
To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other evidence to support its conclusion
that Gloria and Syed were validly married. To quote the CA:
Moreover, the record is replete with evidence, testimonial and documentary,
that appellant and appellee have been validly married and there was
compliance with all the requisites laid down by law. Both parties are legally
capacitated to marry. A certificate of legal capacity was even issued by the
Embassy of Pakistan in favor of appellee. The parties herein gave their
consent freely. Appellee admitted that the signature above his name in the
marriage contract was his. Several pictures were presented showing
appellant and appellee, before the solemnizing officer, the witnesses and
other members of appellants family, taken during the marriage ceremony, as
well as in the restaurant where the lunch was held after the marriage
ceremony. Most telling of all is Exhibit "5-C" which shows appellee signing
the Marriage Contract.
xxxx
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and has [sic]
one offspring, Aliea Fatima Goo Abbas, who was born on 15 June 1993. It
took appellee more than ten (10) years before he filed on 01 August 2003 his
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 4 of the Family
Code. We take serious note that said Petition appears to have been
instituted by him only after an Information for Bigamy (Exhibit "1") dated 10
January 2003 was filed against him for contracting a second or subsequent
marriage with one Ma. Corazon (Maryam) T. Buenaventura. We are not
ready to reward (appellee) by declaring the nullity of his marriage and give
him his freedom and in the process allow him to profit from his own deceit
and perfidy.50
All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was
conducted and a marriage contract was signed does not operate to cure the
absence of a valid marriage license. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear
when it says, "The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall
render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2)." Article
35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a marriage solemnized without a
license is void from the beginning, except those exempt from the license
requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same
Code.51 Again, this marriage cannot be characterized as among the
exemptions, and thus, having been solemnized without a marriage license, is
void ab initio.1wphi1
As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it may
well be that his motives are less than pure, that he seeks to evade a bigamy
suit. Be that as it may, the same does not make up for the failure of the
respondent to prove that they had a valid marriage license, given the weight
of evidence presented by petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage license
cannot be attributed to him, as it was Gloria who took steps to procure the
same. The law must be applied. As the marriage license, a formal requisite,
is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED.
The assailed Decision dated March 11, 2008 and Resolution dated July 24,
2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 109, Pasay City dated October 5, 2005 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-
CFM annulling the marriage of petitioner with respondent on January 9, 1993
is hereby REINSTATED. No costs. SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 182438 July 2, 2014
RENE RONULO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Fr.
Rene Ronulo challenging the April 3, 2008 decision2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31028 which affirmed the decision of
the Regional Trial Court, (RTC) Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos Norte.
The Factual Antecedents
The presented evidence showed that3 Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen
were scheduled to marry each other on March 29, 2003 at the Sta. Rosa
Catholic Parish Church of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. However, on the day
of the wedding, the supposed officiating priest, Fr. Mario Ragaza, refused
to solemnize the marriage upon learning that the couple failed to secure
a marriage license. As a recourse, Joey, who was then dressed in barong
tagalong,and Claire, clad in a wedding gown, together with their parents,
sponsors and guests, proceeded to the Independent Church of Filipino
Christians, also known as the Aglipayan Church. They requested the
petitioner, an Aglipayan priest, to perform a ceremony to which the latter
agreed despite having been informed by the couple that they had no
marriage certificate.
The petitioner prepared his choir and scheduled a mass for the couple on
the same date. He conducted the ceremony in the presence of the
groom, the bride, their parents, the principal and secondary sponsors and
the rest of their invited guests.4
An information for violation of Article 352 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), as amended, was filed against the petitioner before the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Batac, Ilocos Norte for allegedly performing an illegal
marriage ceremony.5
The petitioner entered the plea of "not guilty" to the crime charged on
arraignment.
The prosecutions witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne Yere, testified on
the incidents of the ceremony. Joseph was the veil sponsor while Mary
Anne was the cord sponsor in the wedding. Mary Anne testified that she
saw the bride walk down the aisle. She also saw the couple exchange
their wedding rings, kiss each other, and sign a document.6She heard the
petitioner instructing the principal sponsors to sign the marriage contract.
Thereafter, they went to the reception, had lunch and took pictures. She
saw the petitioner there. She also identified the wedding invitation given
to her by Joey.7
Florida Umadac, the mother of Joey, testified that she heard the couple
declare during the ceremony that they take each other as husband and
wife.8 Days after the wedding, she went to the municipal local civil
registrar of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte with Atty. Mariano R. Nalupta Jr.
where she was given a certificate that no marriage license was issued to
the couple.9
The petitioner, while admitting that he conducted a ceremony, denied that
his act of blessing the couple was tantamount to a solemnization of the
marriage as contemplated by law.10
The MTC Judgment
The MTC found the petitioner guilty of violation of Article 352 of the RPC,
as amended, and imposed on him a 200.00 fine pursuant to Section 44
of Act No. 3613. It held that the petitioners act of giving a blessing
constitutes a marriage ceremony as he made an official church
recognition of the cohabitation of the couple as husband and wife.11 It
further ruled that in performing a marriage ceremony without the couples
marriage license, the petitioner violated Article 352 of the RPC which
imposes the penalty provided under Act No. 3613 or the Marriage Law.
The MTC applied Section 44 of the Marriage Law which pertinently states
that a violation of any of its provisions that is not specifically penalized or
of the regulations to be promulgated, shall be punished by a fine of not
more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment of not more than one
month, or both, in the discretion of the court.
The RPC is a law subsequent to the Marriage Law, and provides the
penalty for violation of the latter law. Applying these laws, the MTC
imposed the penalty of a fine in the amount of 200.00.12
The RTC Ruling
The RTC affirmed the findings of the MTC and added that the
circumstances surrounding the act of the petitioner in "blessing" the
couple unmistakably show that a marriage ceremony had transpired. It
further ruled that the positive declarations of the prosecution witnesses
deserve more credence than the petitioners negative statements.13 The
RTC, however, ruled that the basis of the fine should be Section 39,
instead of Section 44, of the Marriage Law.
The CA Decision
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs ruling. The CA observed that
although there is no prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization
of marriage, the law provides minimum standards in determining whether
a marriage ceremony has been conducted, viz.: (1) the contracting
parties must appear personally before the solemnizing officer; and (2)
they should declare that they take each other as husband and wife in the
presence of at least two witnesses of legal age.14 According to the CA, the
prosecution duly proved these requirements. It added that the presence
of a marriage certificate is not a requirement in a marriage ceremony.15
The CA additionally ruled that the petitioners criminal liability under
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, is not dependent on whether Joey
or Claire were charged or found guilty under Article 350 of the same
Code.16
The CA agreed with the MTC that the legal basis for the imposition of the
fine is Section 44 of the Marriage Law since it covers violation of
regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities such as the RPC.
The Petition
The petitioner argues that the CA erred on the following grounds: First,
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, is vague and does not define what
constitutes "an illegal marriage ceremony." Assuming that a marriage
ceremony principally constitutes those enunciated in Article 55 of the Civil
Code and Article 6 of the Family Code, these provisions require the
verbal declaration that the couple take each other as husband and wife,
and a marriage certificate containing the declaration in writing which is
duly signed by the contracting parties and attested to by the solemnizing
officer.17 The petitioner likewise maintains that the prosecution failed to
prove that the contracting parties personally declared that they take each
other as husband and wife.18 Second, under the principle of separation of
church and State, the State cannot interfere in ecclesiastical affairs such
as the administration of matrimony. Therefore, the State cannot convert
the "blessing" into a "marriage ceremony."19
Third, the petitioner had no criminal intent as he conducted the "blessing"
in good faith for purposes of giving moral guidance to the couple.20
Fourth, the non-filing of a criminal case against the couple in violating
Article 350 of the RPC, as amended, should preclude the filing of the
present case against him.21
Finally, Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not provide for a
penalty. The present case is not covered by Section 44 of the Marriage
Law as the petitioner was not found violating its provisions nor a
regulation promulgated thereafter.22
THE COURTS RULING:
We find the petition unmeritorious.
The elements of the crime punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended, were proven by the prosecution
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, penalizes an authorized
solemnizing officer who shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage
ceremony. The elements of this crime are as follows: (1) authority of the
solemnizing officer; and (2) his performance of an illegal marriage
ceremony. In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he has
authority to solemnize a marriage. Hence, the only issue to be resolved is
whether the alleged "blessing" by the petitioner is tantamount to the
performance of an "illegal marriage ceremony" which is punishable under
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.
While Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not specifically define a
"marriage ceremony" and what constitutes its "illegal" performance,
Articles 3(3) and 6 of the Family Code are clear on these matters. These
provisions were taken from Article 5523 of the New Civil Code which, in
turn, was copied from Section 324 of the Marriage Law with no substantial
amendments. Article 625 of the Family Code provides that "[n]o prescribed
form or religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. It
shall be necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear
personally before the solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of
not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as
husband and wife."26 Pertinently, Article 3(3)27 mirrors Article 6 of the
Family Code and particularly defines a marriage ceremony as that which
takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the
solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each
other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses
of legal age.
Even prior to the date of the enactment of Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended, the rule was clear that no prescribed form of religious rite for
the solemnization of the marriage is required. However, as correctly
found by the CA, the law sets the minimum requirements constituting a
marriage ceremony: first, there should be the personal appearance of the
contracting parties before a solemnizing officer; and second, heir
declaration in the presence of not less than two witnesses that they take
each other as husband and wife.
As to the first requirement, the petitioner admitted that the parties
appeared before him and this fact was testified to by witnesses. On the
second requirement, we find that, contrary to the petitioners allegation,
the prosecution has proven, through the testimony of Florida, that the
contracting parties personally declared that they take each other as
husband and wife.
The petitioners allegation that the court asked insinuating and leading
questions to Florida fails to persuadeus. A judge may examine or cross-
examine a witness. He may propound clarificatory questions to test the
credibility of the witness and to extract the truth. He may seek to draw out
relevant and material testimony though that testimony may tend to
support or rebut the position taken by one or the other party. It cannot be
taken against him if the clarificatory questions he propounds happen to
reveal certain truths that tend to destroy the theory of one party.28
At any rate, if the defense found the line of questioning of the judge
objectionable, its failure to timely register this bars it from belatedly
invoking any irregularity.
In addition, the testimonies of Joseph and Mary Anne, and even the
petitioners admission regarding the circumstances of the ceremony,
support Floridas testimony that there had indeed been the declaration by
the couple that they take each other as husband and wife. The testimony
of Joey disowning their declaration as husband and wife cannot
overcome these clear and convincing pieces of evidence. Notably, the
defense failed to show that the prosecution witnesses, Joseph and Mary
Anne, had any ill-motive to testify against the petitioner.
We also do not agree with the petitioner that the principle of separation of
church and State precludes the State from qualifying the church
"blessing" into a marriage ceremony. Contrary to the petitioners
allegation, this principle has been duly preserved by Article 6 of the
Family Code when it provides that no prescribed form or religious rite for
the solemnization of marriage is required. This pronouncement gives any
religion or sect the freedom or latitude in conducting its respective marital
rites, subject only to the requirement that the core requirements of law be
observed.
We emphasize at this point that Article 1529 of the Constitution recognizes
marriage as an inviolable social institution and that our family law is
based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social
institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State has
paramount interest in the enforcement of its constitutional policies and
the preservation of the sanctity of marriage. To this end, it is within its
power to enact laws and regulations, such as Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended, which penalize the commission of acts resulting in the
disintegration and mockery of marriage.
From these perspectives, we find it clear that what the petitioner
conducted was a marriage ceremony, as the minimum requirements set
by law were complied with. While the petitioner may view this merely as a
"blessing," the presence of the requirements of the law constitutive of a
marriage ceremony qualified this "blessing" into a "marriage ceremony"
as contemplated by Article 3(3) of the Family Code and Article 352 of the
RPC, as amended.
We come now to the issue of whether the solemnization by the petitioner
of this marriage ceremony was illegal.
Under Article 3(3) of the Family Code, one of the essential requisites of
marriage is the presence of a valid marriage certificate. In the present
case, the petitioner admitted that he knew that the couple had no
marriage license, yet he conducted the "blessing" of their relationship.
Undoubtedly, the petitioner conducted the marriage ceremony despite
knowledge that the essential and formal requirements of marriage set by
law were lacking. The marriage ceremony, therefore, was illegal. The
petitioners knowledge of the absence of these requirements negates his
defense of good faith.
We also do not agree with the petitioner that the lack of a marriage
certificate negates his criminal liability in the present case. For purposes
of determining if a marriage ceremony has been conducted, a marriage
certificate is not included in the requirements provided by Article 3(3) of
the Family Code, as discussed above.
Neither does the non-filing of a criminal complaint against the couple
negate criminal liability of the petitioner. Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended, does not make this an element of the crime. The penalty
imposed is proper
On the issue on the penalty for violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended, this provision clearly provides that it shall be imposed in
accordance with the provision of the Marriage Law. The penalty
provisions of the Marriage Law are Sections 39 and 44 which provide as
follows: Section 39 of the Marriage Law provides that:
Section 39. Illegal Solemnization of Marriage Any priest or minister
solemnizing marriage without being authorized by the Director of the
Philippine National Library or who, upon solemnizing marriage, refuses to
exhibit the authorization in force when called upon to do so by the parties
or parents, grandparents, guardians, or persons having charge and any
bishop or officer, priest, or minister of any church, religion or sect the
regulations and practices whereof require banns or publications previous
to the solemnization of a marriage in accordance with section ten, who
authorized the immediate solemnization of a marriage that is
subsequently declared illegal; or any officer, priest or minister
solemnizing marriage in violation of this act, shall be punished by
imprisonment for not less than one month nor more than two years, or by
a fine of not less than two hundred pesos nor more than two thousand
pesos. [emphasis ours]
On the other hand, Section 44 of the Marriage Law states that:
Section 44. General Penal Clause Any violation of any provision of this
Act not specifically penalized, or of the regulations to be promulgated by
the proper authorities, shall be punished by a fine of not more than two
hundred pesos or by imprisonment for not more than one month, or both,
in the discretion of the court. [emphasis ours]
From a reading of the provisions cited above, we find merit in the ruling of
the CA and the MTC that the penalty imposable in the present case is
that covered under Section 44, and not Section 39, of the Marriage Law.
The penalized acts under Section 39 of Act No. 3613 do not include the
present case. As correctly found by the MTC, the petitioner was not
1wphi 1
found violating the provisions of the Marriage Law but Article 352 of the
RPC, as amended. It is only the imposition of the penalty for the violation
of this provision which is referred to the Marriage Law. On this point,
Article 352 falls squarely under the provision of Section 44 of Act No.
3613 which provides for the penalty for any violation of the regulations to
be promulgated by the proper authorities; Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended, which was enacted after the Marriage Law, is one of such
regulations.
Therefore, the CA did not err in imposing the penalty of fine of 200.00
pursuant to Section 44 of the Marriage Law.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and affirm the decision of the Court
of Appeals dated April 3, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31028.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088 July 19, 1996
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY, respondent.
ROMERO, J.:p
The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa,
Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro. He has submitted evidence in relation
to two specific acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court
Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct
as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law.
First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding
between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that
the groom is merely separated from his first wife.
Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between
Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's
jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Respondent judge holds office and has
jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao
del Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the respondent judge's residence
in the municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his jurisdictional area of
the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45
kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.
In his letter-comment to the office of the Court Administrator, respondent
judge avers that the office and name of the Municipal Mayor of Dapa have
been used by someone else, who, as the mayor's "lackey," is overly
concerned with his actuations both as judge and as a private person. The
same person had earlier filed Administrative Matter No 94-980-MTC, which
was dismissed for lack of merit on September 15, 1994, and Administrative
Matter No. OCA-IPI-95-16, "Antonio Adapon v. Judge Hernando C.
Domagtoy," which is still pending.
In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation
from his act of having solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a
married man separated from his wife, and Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he
merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey,
Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen
each other for almost seven years. 1 With respect to the second charge, he
maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and del
Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code which
states that: "Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of
the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;" and that article 8 thereof applies
to the case in question.
The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since the
pleadings submitted were considered sufficient for a resolution of the case. 2
Since the countercharges of sinister motives and fraud on the part of
complainant have not been sufficiently proven, they will not be dwelt upon.
The acts complained of and respondent judge's answer thereto will suffice
and can be objectively assessed by themselves to prove the latter's
malfeasance.
The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Gaspar Tagadan
and Arlyn Borga states that Tagadan's civil status is "separated." Despite this
declaration, the wedding ceremony was solemnized by respondent judge. He
presented in evidence a joint affidavit by Maurecio A. Labado, Sr. and
Eugenio Bullecer, subscribed and sworn to before Judge Demosthenes C.
Duquilla, Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar. 3 The affidavit was not
issued by the latter judge, as claimed by respondent judge, but merely
acknowledged before him. In their affidavit, the affiants stated that they knew
Gaspar Tagadan to have been civilly married to Ida D. Pearanda in
September 1983; that after thirteen years of cohabitation and having borne
five children, Ida Pearanda left the conjugal dwelling in Valencia, Bukidnon
and that she has not returned nor been heard of for almost seven years,
thereby giving rise to the presumption that she is already dead.
In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint affidavit is
sufficient proof of Ida Pearanda's presumptive death, and ample reason for
him to proceed with the marriage ceremony. We do not agree.
Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:
A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence
of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before
the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse
had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse
present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse
was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is
danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the
provisions of Articles 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of
only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage
under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must
institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for
the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee,
without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse. (Emphasis added.)
There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In
fact, the law is clear and simple. Even if the spouse present has a well-
founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead, a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to
contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement which has been
precisely incorporated into the Family Code to discourage subsequent
marriages where it is not proven that the previous marriage has been
dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead, in
accordance with pertinent provisions of law.
In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding
for the declaration of his first wife's presumptive death. Absent this judicial
declaration, he remains married to Ida Pearanda. Whether wittingly or
unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent judge to have
accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or
ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void,
marriage. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, " The following marriage shall
be void from the beginning: (4) Those bigamous . . . marriages not falling
under Article 41."
The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony outside
the court's jurisdiction, covered by Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code, thus:
Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by :
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's
jurisdiction;
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied.)
Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the
chambers the judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or
temple, or in the office of the consul-general, consul or vice-
consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in
cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or in
remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or
where both parties request the solemnizing officer in writing
in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or
place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.
Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justification for
his having solemnized the marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma
del Rosario outside of his court's jurisdiction. As the aforequoted provision
states, a marriage can be held outside of the judge's chambers or courtroom
only in the following instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in remote places
in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in
a sworn statement to this effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or
del Rosario was at the point of death or in the remote place. Moreover, the
written request presented addressed to the respondent judge was made by
only one party, Gemma del Rosario. 4
More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the
authority of the solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal
requisites of marriage is the "authority of the solemnizing officer." Under
Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, "any incumbent
member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a
directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and
does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in
the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the
marriage.
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the
faithful, is authorized to do so only within the area of the diocese or place
allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court
has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages,
regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied
with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may
officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge
solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant
irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may
not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to
administrative liability. 5
Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta.
Monica and Burgos, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a
marriage in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8
and the exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced
authority, respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of understanding of
the basic principles of civil law.
Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of
the law. The legal principles applicable in the cases brought to our attention
are elementary and uncomplicated, prompting us to conclude that
respondent's failure to apply them is due to a lack of comprehension of the
law.
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at
least, proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary
laymen. They should be skilled and competent in understanding and applying
the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles like
the ones involved in instant case. 6 It is not too much to expect them to know
and apply the law intelligently. 7 Otherwise, the system of justice rests on a
shaky foundation indeed, compounded by the errors committed by those not
learned in the law. While magistrates may at times make mistakes in
judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited
ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly
prejudiced the status of married persons.
The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered
bigamous and void, there being a subsisting marriage between Gaspar
Tagadan and Ida Pearanda.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum to the
Court, a six-month suspension and a stern warning that a repetition of the
same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Considering that one of
the marriages in question resulted in a bigamous union and therefore void,
and the other lacked the necessary authority of respondent judge, the Court
adopts said recommendation. Respondent is advised to be more circumspect
in applying the law and to cultivate a deeper understanding of the law.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy
is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months and given a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.
G.R. No. 133778 March 14, 2000
ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors
BABYLINE NIAL, INGRID NIAL, ARCHIE NIAL & PEPITO NIAL,
JR., petitioners,
vs.
NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity
of his marriage after his death?
Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out
of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito
resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or
on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married
without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an
affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing
a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident.
After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for
lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the
validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner's
successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons
who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the
Family Code.
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu,
Branch 59, dismissed the petition after finding that the Family Code is "rather
silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the following issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant
in asking for the declaration of the nullity of marriage of their
deceased father, Pepito G. Nial, with her specially so when at the
time of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Nial is
already dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased father
with defendant is null and void ab initio;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity
of the second marriage after it was dissolved due to their father's
death. 1
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to
declare null and void their father's marriage to respondent before his death,
applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates the time
and the persons who could initiate an action for annulment of
marriage. 2 Hence, this petition for review with this Court grounded on a pure
question of law.
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11,
Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and because "the verification
failed to state the basis of petitioner's averment that the allegations in the
petition are "true and correct"." It was thus treated as an unsigned pleading
which produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997
Rules. 3 However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the
dismissal and reinstated the petition for review. 4
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their
validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their
celebration. 5 A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article
53 of the Civil Code, 6 the absence of which renders the marriage void ab
initio pursuant to Article 80(3) 7 in relation to Article 58. 8 The requirement and
issuance of marriage license is the State's demonstration of its involvement
and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general
public is interested. 9 This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate
that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording protection
to the family as a basic "autonomous social institution." 10 Specifically, the
Constitution considers marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and is the
foundation of family life which shall be protected by the State. 11 This is why
the Family Code considers marriage as "a special contract of permanent
union" 12 and case law considers it "not just an adventure but a lifetime
commitment." 13
However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a
marriage license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article
76, 14 referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived
together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a
continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage.
The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the
parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the
scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the
publication of every applicant's name for a marriage license. The publicity
attending the marriage license may discourage such persons from
legitimizing their status. 15 To preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping
and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of gossip
arising from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to
preserve their privacy and exempt them from that requirement.
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father to respondent
Norma was celebrated without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they
executed an affidavit stating that "they have attained the age of majority, and,
being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years, and that we now desire to marry each other." 16 The only issue that
needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is contemplated
under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five year
period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage
license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to
marry each other during the entire five-year continuous period or should it be
a cohabitation wherein both parties have lived together and exclusively with
each other as husband and wife during the entire five-year continuous period
regardless of whether there is a legal impediment to their being lawfully
married, which impediment may have either disappeared or intervened
sometime during the cohabitation period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as
husband and wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year
period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and
wife" where the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to
validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation
period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage,
should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the
marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day
of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by
exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at anytime within the 5
years and continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year
cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties
were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the
law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have
common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those
who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship
must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed.
The presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband
and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The
parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single
requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived
escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from
securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the
ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to
notify the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and
that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union
of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar. 17 The Civil Code
provides:
Art. 63: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of
any impediment to the marriage to advice the local civil registrar
thereof. . . .
Art. 64: Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the
marriage, the local civil registrar shall forthwith make an
investigation, examining persons under oath. . . .
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Art. 17 provides in part: . . . This notice shall request all persons
having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advise the
local civil registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 18 reads in part: . . . In case of any impediment known to the
local civil registrar or brought to his attention, he shall note down the
particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the application for a
marriage license. . . .
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely
prohibited the concurrence of multiple marriages by the same person during
the same period. Thus, any marriage subsequently contracted during the
lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void, 18 subject only to the
exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or
annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in that the
contracting of two or more marriages and the having of extramarital affairs
are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and adultery. 19 The
law sanctions monogamy.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be
said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five
years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito's first marriage was
dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty
months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had
separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started
living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains
that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated
by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law
but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito
had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with
respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had
already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of
the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial
companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either
spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife".
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not
covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is
void ab initio because of the absence of such element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a
petition to declare their father's marriage void after his death?
Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code 20 cannot
be applied even by analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage.
The second ground for annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial court,
which allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at anytime before
the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds,
periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration
of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to
declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not
identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the
court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never
to have taken place 21 and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be
generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the
other can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed
collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can be
attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even
after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only
during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case
the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly
valid. 22 That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike
voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a
voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a
void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by
law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-
ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution, 23 and its effect on
the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation
to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On
the contrary, the property regime governing voidable marriages is generally
conjugal partnership and the children conceived before its annulment are
legitimate.
Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of petitioner's father extinguished
the alleged marital bond between him and respondent. The conclusion is
erroneous and proceeds from a wrong premise that there was a marriage
bond that was dissolved between the two. It should be noted that their
marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all and the
death of either extinguished nothing.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is
necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage. 24 "A void marriage
does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights
or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be
absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for
the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the
marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of
competent jurisdiction." 25 "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void
marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is
as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for
no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which
the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil
court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of
either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts
rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-
existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be
collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime
of the parties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be
impeached, and is made good ab initio. 26 But Article 40 of the Family Code
expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a
previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second
marriage 27 and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment
to that effect. 28 For the same reason, the law makes either the action or
defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
imprescriptible. 29 Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish the
cause of action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be
considered imprescriptible.
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is
necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity.1wphi1 For other
purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or
a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of
marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as
it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to
any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final
judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other
than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such
final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional

Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered
REINSTATED.1wphi1.nt

SO ORDERED.