OH CHO vs.

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS

FACTS:

The Director of Lands opposed on the judgment decreeing the registration of a

residential lot located in the Province of Tayabas in the name of applicant (Oh Cho)
in the basis that he lacks the title of the land and that he is an alien which
disqualifies him from acquiring lands of public domain.

The Solicitor General reiterates the second objection of the opponent and adds that
the lower court committed an error in not declaring null and void the sale of the lot
to the applicant.

Oh Cho, who is an alien, and his predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the lot from 1880 to filing of the
application for registration on January 17, 1940.

Oh Cho invokes the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496), or should it not be
applicable to the case, then he would apply for the benefits of the Public Land Act
(C.A. No. 141).

The applicant failed to show that he has title to the lot that may be confirmed under
the Land Registration Act. He failed to show that he or any of his predecessors in
interest had acquired the lot from the Government, either by purchase or by grant,
under the laws, orders and decrease promulgated by the Spanish Government in
the Philippines, or by possessory information under the Mortgaged Law (section 19,
Act 496).

ISSUE:

Whether he is entitled to decree or registration under the provisions of Public Land

Act (C.A. No. 141)?

HELD:

No, applicant Oh Cho is not entitled for the benefits of the Public Land Act for he is
an alien disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain as provided in
Section 48 and 49 in the said Act. The sale of the land to the applicant should have
been null and void.

As the applicant failed to show the title to the lot, and has invoked the provisions of
the Public Land Act, it seems unnecessary to make pronouncement in this case on
the nature or classifications of the sought to be registered. The applicant's
immediate predecessors in interest failed to apply for the registration of the land of
which they had been in possession at least since July 26, 1894. They did not have
any vested right in the lot amounting to the title which was transmissible to the
applicant. The only right is their possession of the lot which may be availed of by a
qualified person to apply for its registration but not by a person as the applicant
who is disqualified.

It is urged that the sale of the lot to the applicant should have been declared null
and void. In a suit between vendor and vendee for the annulment of the sale, such
pronouncement would be necessary, if the court were of the opinion that it is void. It
is not necessary in this case where the vendors do not even object to the
application filed by the vendee.

Accordingly, judgment is reversed and the application for registration dismissed,

without costs.
THE DIRECTOR, LANDS MGT. BUREAU vs. C.A. and AQUILINO L. CARIO

FACTS:

On May 15, 1975, the private respondent (Aquilino Cario) filed with the CFI of
Laguna, a petition for registration of Lot No. 6, a sugar land in Barrio Sala, Cabuyao,
Laguna. Private respondent declared that subject land was originally owned by his
mother (Teresa), who died on February 15, 1911, and later administered by him in
behalf of his five brothers and sisters, after the death of their father in 1934.

In 1949, private respondent and his brother (Severino) became co-owners of Lot No.
6 by virtue of an extra-judicial partition of the land among the heirs of Teresa
Lauchangco. On July 26, 1963, through another deed of extrajudicial settlement,
sole ownership of Lot No. 6 was adjudicated to the private respondent.

Pertinent report of the Land Investigator of the Bureau of Lands was disclosed. With
the private respondent as lone witness for his petition, and the Director of Lands as
the only oppositor, the proceedings below ended.

On February 5, 1990, on the basis of the evidence on record, the trial court granted
private respondent's petition.

From the aforesaid decision, petitioner went to the Court of Appeals, which, on
November 11, 1993, affirmed the decision appealed from.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent established proof of his monument of title to merit
registration of land in his favor?

HELD:

No. The petition for land registration at bar is under the Land Registration
Act. Pursuant to said Act, he who alleges in his petition or application, ownership in
fee simple, must present muniments of title since the Spanish times and, in the
case under consideration, the private respondents has not produced a single
muniment of title substantiate his claim of ownership.

The respondent only traced his own possession in the land in 1949 by virtue of
extrajudicial settlement and order and at the same time he files his application for
registration in 1975 thus he was in possession of said land only for 26 years,
Carinos mere allegation that his mother was in possession of the land since 1911 is
self-serving and hearsay and inadmissible as evidence.

The tax receipts and tax declaration he offered as evidence do not substantiate
clear proof of ownership, thus, with his failure to prove that his predecessor-in-
interest occupied the land under the condition laid down by law, he can only
establish his possession of the land from 1949.

Respondent failed to prove his monument of title for the registration of the under
the Registration Act with failure to present convincing and positive proof of his
continuous, open, uninterrupted and notorious occupation of the lot in the concept
of an owner for at least 30 years.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DELA PAZ

FACTS:

On November 13, 2003, respondents Avelino, Arsenio, Jose, and Glicerio (all
surnamed Dela Paz), represented by Jose R. Dela Paz (Jose), filed with the RTC of
Pasig an application for registration of land under P.D. # 1529 otherwise known as
the Property Registration Decree. The application covered a parcel of land with an
area of 25,825 square meters, situated at Taguig, Metro Manila.

Together with their application for registration, respondents submitted documents to

support their claim.

Respondents alleged that they acquired the subject property by virtue of Salaysay
ng Pagkakaloob dated June 18, 1987, executed by their parents, who earlier
acquired the said property from their deceased parent by virtue of a "Sinumpaang
Pahayag sa Paglilipat sa Sarili ng mga Pag-aari ng Namatay dated March 10, 1979.

Respondents claimed that they are co-owners of the subject parcel of land and they
have been in continuous, uninterrupted, open, public, adverse possession of the
same, in the concept of owner since they acquired it in 1987. They maintained that
the subject property is classified as alienable and disposable land of the public
domain.

The case was set for initial hearing on April 30, 2004. Petitioner (Republic), through
the (OSG), opposed the application for registration on the grounds that neither the
applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question for a
period of not less than thirty (30) years, that the evidence presented do not
constitute competent and sufficient evidence of bona fide acquisition of the land
applied for; and that the parcel of land applied for is a portion of public domain
belonging to the Republic not subject to private appropriation.

The RTC granted respondents' application for registration of the subject property.

The CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:

1. WON the continuous, uninterrupted, open, public and adverse possession was
sufficiently established by evidence? NO.

2. WON the land is part of the alienable part of public domain? NO.

HELD:

NO.

In accordance to Section 14 (1) of PD 1529, otherwise known as the Property

Registration Decree, respondents need to prove that:

1. The land forms part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain;
and

2. They, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in

open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership from June 12, 1945 or
earlier. These the respondents must prove by no less than clear, positive and
convincing evidence.

Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of
the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to
any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership
are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have
been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land, or alienated to a private
person by the State, remain part of the inalienable public domain. 14 The burden of
proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of
the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming
ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is
alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence
must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or
disposable.15

Evidently, since respondents failed to prove that (1) the subject property was
classified as part of the disposable and alienable land of the public domain; and (2)
they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation thereof under a bonafide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier, their application for confirmation and
registration of the subject property under PD 1529 should be denied.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals,

affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 167,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application for registration and confirmation of
title filed by respondents is DENIED.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT) vs.

C.A. (Dela Rosa)
BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC., vs. C.A. (Dela Rosa)

ATOK-BIG WEDGE MINING COMPANY, vs. C.A. (Dela Rosa)

FACTS:

These cases arose from the application for registration of a parcel of land filed on
February 11, 1965, by Jose de la Rosa on his own behalf and on behalf of his three
children. The land was divided into 9 lots. According to Dela Rosa, Lots 1-5 were
sold to him and Lots 6-9 to his children by Mamaya Balbalio and Jaime Alberto in
1964.

The application was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc., Atok Big
Wedge Corporation, and by the Republic of the Philippines, through the Bureau of
Forestry Development.

In support of the application, both sellers testified that they had acquired the
subject land by virtue of prescription. Both sellers even presented their tax
declaration and the realty tax receipts.

Benguet opposed on the ground that the June Bug mineral claim covering Lots 1-5
was sold to it on September 22, 1934, by the successors-in-interest of James Kelly.
From the date of its purchase, Benguet had been in actual, continuous and exclusive
possession of the land in concept of owner, and even presented evidences to
support such.

For its part, Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9 were covered
by the Emma and Fredia mineral claims. These claims were purchased from these
locators on November 2, 1931, by Atok, which has since then been in open,
continuous and exclusive possession of the said lots and even presented evidences
to support such.

The RTC denied the application, holding that the applicants had failed to prove their
claim of possession and ownership of the land sought to be registered.

The C.A. affirmed the surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land while at the
same time reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of their
mining claims.

Both Benguet and Atok have appealed to this Court, invoking their superior right of
ownership.

The Republic has filed its own petition for review and reiterates its argument that
neither the private respondents nor the two mining companies have any valid claim
to the land because it is not alienable and registerable, invoking Art. XIII, Sec. 1 of
the Commonwealth Constitution.

However, the method invoked by the de la Rosas is not available in the case at bar,
for two reasons.

First, the trial court found that the evidence of open, continuous, adverse and
exclusive possession submitted by the applicants was insufficient to support their
claim of ownership.
Second, even if it be assumed that the predecessors-in-interest of the de la Rosas
had really been in possession of the subject property, their possession was not in
the concept of owner of the mining claim but of the property as agricultural land,
which it was not.

The Court of Appeals justified this by saying there is "no conflict of interest"
between the owners of the surface rights and the owners of the sub-surface rights.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not land can be agricultural and mineral at the same time? NO.

2. Who has the best claim over the land? BCI and Atok Corp.

1. NO. The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land
itself cannot be half agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be
categorical; the land must be either completely mineral or completely agricultural.
In the instant case, as already observed, the land which was originally classified as
forest land ceased to be so and became mineral and completely mineral once
the mining claims were perfected.

Commonwealth Act No. 137, providing as follows:

Sec. 3. All mineral lands of the public domain and minerals belong to
the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development or
utilization, shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to
corporations, or associations, at least 60% of the capital of which is
owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease or
concession at the time of the inauguration of government established
under the Constitution.

SEC. 4. The ownership of, and the right to the use of land for
agricultural, industrial, commercial, residential, or for any purpose
other than mining does not include the ownership of, nor the right to
extract or utilize, the minerals which may be found on or under the
surface.

SEC. 5. The ownership of, and the right to extract and utilize, the
minerals included within all areas for which public agricultural land
patents are granted are excluded and excepted from all such patents.

SEC. 6. The ownership of, and the right to extract and utilize, the
minerals included within all areas for which Torrens titles are granted
are excluded and excepted from all such titles.

This is an application of the Regalian doctrine which, as its name implies, is

intended for the benefit of the State, not of private persons. The rule simply
reserves to the State all minerals that may be found in public and even private land
devoted to "agricultural, industrial, commercial, residential or (for) any purpose
other than mining." Thus, if a person is the owner of agricultural land in which
minerals are discovered, his ownership of such land does not give him the right to
extract or utilize the said minerals without the permission of the State to which such
minerals belong.
2. Our holding is that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in
question by virtue of their respective mining claims which they validly acquired
before the Constitution of 1935 prohibited the alienation of all lands of the public
domain except agricultural lands, subject to vested rights existing at the time of its
adoption. The land was not and could not have been transferred to the respondents
by virtue of acquisitive prescription, nor could its use be shared simultaneously by
them and the mining companies for agricultural and mineral purposes.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent court dated April 30, 1976, is SET
ASIDE and that of the trial court dated March 11, 1969, is REINSTATED, without
any pronouncement as to costs.