Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs.

Civil Aeronautics Board

(270 SCRA 538)

Facts: Grand Air applied for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity with
the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB). The Chief Hearing Officer issued a notice of hearing
directing Grand Air to serve a copy of the application and notice to all scheduled
Philippine Domestic operators. Grand Air filed its compliance and requested for a
Temporary Operating Permit (TOP). PAL filed an opposition to the application on the
ground that the CAB had no jurisdiction to hear the application until Grand Air first
obtains a franchise to operate from Congress. The Chief Hearing Officer denied the
opposition and the CAB approved the issuance of the TOP for a period of 3 months.
The opposition for the TOP was likewise denied. The CAB justified its assumption of
jurisdiction over Grand Airs application on the basis of Republic Act 776 which gives
it the specific power to issue any TOP or Certificate of Public Convenience and
Necessity.

Issue: Whether or not the CAB can issue a Certificate of Public Convenience and
Necessity or TOP even though the prospective operator does not have a legislative
franchise?

Held: Yes, as mentioned by the CAB, it is duly authorized to do so under Republic

Act 776 and a legislative franchise is not necessary before it may do so, since
Congress has delegated the authority to authorize the operation of domestic air
transport services to the CAB, an administrative agency. The delegation of such
authority is not without limits since Congress had set specific standard and limitations
on how such authority should be exercised.

Public convenience and necessity exists when the proposed facility will meet a
reasonable want of the public and supply a need which the existing facilities do not
adequately afford.

Thus, the Board should be allowed to continue hearing the application, since it has
jurisdiction over it provided that the applicant meets all the requirements of the law.

The Iloilo Ice and Cold Storage Company v. Public Utility Board (G.R. No. L-
19857)

Facts:

Petitioner maintains and operates a plant for the manufacture and sale of ice in the
City of Iloilo. The business of petitioner has been carried on with selected customers
only. Sec of Public Utility Commission upon investigation reported that petitioner
should be considered a public utility. Petitioner alleges that it is and has always been
operating as a private enterprise.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is a public utility.

Ruling: NO.

The criterion by which to judge of the character of the use is whether the public may
enjoy it by right or only by permission. The essential feature of a public use is that it
is not confined to privileged individuals, but is open to the indefinite public. The use
is public if all persons have the right to the use under the same circumstances. If the
company did in truth sell ice to all persons seeking its service, it would be a public
utility. But if on the other hand, it was organized solely for particular persons under
strictly private contracts, and never was devoted by its owners to public use, it could
not be held to be a public utility without violating the due process of law clause of
the Constitution. And the apparent and continued purpose of the Iloilo Ice and
Storage Company has been, and is, to remain a private enterprise and to avoid
submitting to the Public Utility law.

Public use means the same as use by the public. The essential feature of the
public use is that it is not confined to privileged individuals, but is open to the
indefinite public. It is this indefinite or unrestricted quality that gives it its public
character. In determining whether a use is public, we must look not only to the
character of the business to be done, but also to the proposed mode of doing it. If
the use is merely optional with the owners, or the public benefit is merely incidental,
it is not a public use, authorizing the exercise of the jurisdiction of the public utility
commission. There must be, in general, a right which the law compels the owner to
give to the general public. It is not enough that the general prosperity of the public
is promoted. Public use is not synonymous with public interest. The true criterion by
which to judge of the character of the use is whether the public may enjoy it by right
or only by permission.

Spouses Teodoro and Nanette Perea vs Spouses Nicolas and Teresita

Zarate

Civil Law Common Carrier Private School Transport are Common Carriers
Torts and Damages Heirs of a high school student may be awarded damages for
loss income

In June 1996, Nicolas and Teresita Zarate contracted Teodoro and Nanette Perea
to transport their (Zarates) son, Aaron Zarate, to and from school. The Pereas
were owners of a van being used for private school transport.

At about 6:45am of August 22, 1996, the driver of the said private van, Clemente
Alfaro, while the children were on board including Aaron, decided to take a short
cut in order to avoid traffic. The usual short cut was a railroad crossing of the
Philippine National Railway (PNR).

Alfaro saw that the barandilla (the pole used to block vehicles crossing the railway)
was up which means it was okay to cross. He then tried to overtake a bus.
However, there was in fact an oncoming train but Alfaro no longer saw the train as
his view was already blocked by the bus he was trying to overtake. The bus was
able to cross unscathed but the vans rear end was hit. During the collision, Aaron,
was thrown off the van. His body hit the railroad tracks and his head was severed.
He was only 15 years old.

It turns out that Alfaro was not able to hear the train honking from 50 meters away
before the collision because the vans stereo was playing loudly.

The Zarates sued PNR and the Pereas (Alfaro became at-large). Their cause of
action against PNR was based on quasi-delict. Their cause of action against the
Pereas was based on breach of contract of common carriage.

In their defense, the Pereas invoked that as private carriers they were not
negligent in selecting Alfaro as their driver as they made sure that he had a drivers
license and that he was not involved in any accident prior to his being hired. In
short, they observed the diligence of a good father in selecting their employee.

PNR also disclaimed liability as they insist that the railroad crossing they placed
there was not meant for railroad crossing (really, thats their defense!).

The RTC ruled in favor of the Zarates. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC. In
the decision of the RTC and the CA, they awarded damages in favor of the Zarates
for the loss of earning capacity of their dead son.

The Pereas appealed. They argued that the award was improper as Aaron was
merely a high school student, hence, the award of such damages was merely
speculative. They cited the case of People vs Teehankee where the Supreme Court
did not award damages for the loss of earning capacity despite the fact that the
victim there was enrolled in a pilot school.

ISSUES: Whether or not the defense of due diligence of a good father by the
Pereas is untenable. Whether or not the award of damages for loss of income is
proper.

HELD: Yes, in both issues.

Defense of Due Diligence of a Good Father

This defense is not tenable in this case. The Pereas are common carriers. They are
not merely private carriers. (Prior to this case, the status of private transport for
school services or school buses is not well settled as to whether or not they are
private or common carriers but they were generally regarded as private carriers).
Private transport for schools are common carriers. The Pereas, as the operators of
a school bus service were: (a) engaged in transporting passengers generally as a
business, not just as a casual occupation; (b) undertaking to carry passengers over
established roads by the method by which the business was conducted; and (c)
transporting students for a fee. Despite catering to a limited clientle, the Pereas
operated as a common carrier because they held themselves out as a ready
transportation indiscriminately to the students of a particular school living within or
near where they operated the service and for a fee.

Being a common carrier, what is required of the Pereas is not mere diligence of a
good father. What is specifically required from them by law is extraordinary
diligence a fact which they failed to prove in court. Verily, their obligation as
common carriers did not cease upon their exercise of diligently choosing Alfaro as
their employee.

(It is recommended that you read the full text, the Supreme Court made an
elaborate and extensive definition of common and private carriers as well as their
distinctions.)

Award of Damages for Aarons loss of earning capacity despite he being a high
school student at the time of his death

The award is proper. Aaron was enrolled in a reputable school (Don Bosco). He was
of normal health and was an able-bodied person. Further, the basis of the
computation of his earning capacity was not on what he would have become. It was
based on the current minimum wage. The minimum wage was validly used because
with his circumstances at the time of his death, it is most certain that had he lived,
he would at least be a minimum wage earner by the time he starts working. This is
not being speculative at all.

The Teehankee case was different because in that case, the reason why no
damages were awarded for loss of earning capacity was that the defendants there
were already assuming that the victim would indeed become a pilot hence, that
made the assumption speculative. But in the case of Aaron, there was no
speculation as to what he might be but whatever hell become, it is certain that
he will at the least be earning minimum wage.

Gatchalian v. Delim
Facts:

On July 11, 1973, petitioner Reynalda Gatchalian boarded as paying passenger a

minibus owned by respondents. While the bus was running along the highway, a
snapping sound was heard, and after a short while, the bus bumped a cement
flower pot, turned turtle and fell into a ditch. The passengers were confined in the
hospital, and their bills were paid by respondents spouse on July 14. Before Mrs.
Delim left, she had the injured passengers sign an already prepared affidavit waiving
their claims against respondents. Petitioner was among those who signed.
Notwithstanding the said document, petitioner filed a claim to recover actual and
moral damages for loss of employment opportunities, mental suffering and inferiority
complex caused by the scar on her forehead. Respondents raised in defense force
majeure and the waiver signed by petitioner. The trial court upheld the validity of the
waiver and dismissed the complaint. The appellate court ruled that the waiver was
invalid, but also that the petitioner is not entitled to damages.
Issues:

(1) Whether there was a valid waiver

(2) Whether the respondent was negligent
(3) Whether the petitioner is entitled to actual and moral damages

Held:

(1) We agree with the majority of the Court of Appeals who held that no valid waiver
of her cause of action had been made by petitioner. A waiver, to be valid and
effective, must in the first place be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which
leave no doubt as to the intention of a person to give up a right or benefit which
legally pertains to him. A waiver may not casually be attributed to a person when the
terms thereof do not explicitly and clearly evidence an intent to abandon a right
vested in such person.

The circumstances under which the Joint Affidavit was signed by petitioner Gatchalian
need to be considered. Petitioner testified that she was still reeling from the effects
of the vehicular accident when the purported waiver in the form of the Joint Affidavit
was presented to her for signing; that while reading the same, she experienced
dizziness but that, seeing the other passengers who had also suffered injuries sign
the document, she too signed without bothering to read the Joint Affidavit in its
entirety. Considering these circumstances, there appears substantial doubt whether
petitioner understood fully the import of the Joint Affidavit (prepared by or at the
instance of private respondent) she signed and whether she actually intended thereby
to waive any right of action against private respondent.

Finally, because what is involved here is the liability of a common carrier for injuries
sustained by passengers in respect of whose safety a common carrier must exercise
extraordinary diligence, we must construe any such purported waiver most strictly
against the common carrier. To uphold a supposed waiver of any right to claim
damages by an injured passenger, under circumstances like those exhibited in this
case, would be to dilute and weaken the standard of extraordinary diligence exacted
by the law from common carriers and hence to render that standard unenforceable.
We believe such a purported waiver is offensive to public policy.

(2) In case of death or injuries to passengers, a statutory presumption arises that

the common carrier was at fault or had acted negligently "unless it proves that it
[had] observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755." To
overcome this presumption, the common carrier must show to the court that it had
exercised extraordinary diligence to present the injuries. The standard of
extraordinary diligence imposed upon common carriers is considerably more
demanding than the standard of ordinary diligence. A common carrier is bound to
carry its passengers safely "as far as human care and foresight can provide, using
the utmost diligence of a very cautious person, with due regard to all the
circumstances".
The records before the Court are bereft of any evidence showing that respondent had
exercised the extraordinary diligence required by law. The obvious continued failure
of respondent to look after the roadworthiness and safety of the bus, coupled with
the driver's refusal or neglect to stop the mini-bus after he had heard once again the
"snapping sound" and the cry of alarm from one of the passengers, constituted
wanton disregard of the physical safety of the passengers, and hence gross
negligence on the part of respondent and his driver.

(3) At the time of the accident, she was no longer employed in a public school. Her
employment as a substitute teacher was occasional and episodic, contingent upon
the availability of vacancies for substitute teachers. She could not be said to have in
fact lost any employment after and by reason of the accident. She may not be
awarded damages on the basis of speculation or conjecture.

Petitioner's claim for the cost of plastic surgery for removal of the scar on her
forehead, is another matter. A person is entitled to the physical integrity of his or her
body; if that integrity is violated or diminished, actual injury is suffered for which
actual or compensatory damages are due and assessable. Petitioner Gatchalian is
entitled to be placed as nearly as possible in the condition that she was before the
mishap. A scar, especially one on the face of the woman, resulting from the infliction
of injury upon her, is a violation of bodily integrity, giving raise to a legitimate claim
for restoration to her conditio ante.

Moral damages may be awarded where gross negligence on the part of the common
carrier is shown. Considering the extent of pain and anxiety which petitioner must
have suffered as a result of her physical injuries including the permanent scar on her
forehead, we believe that the amount of P30,000.00 would be a reasonable award.
Petitioner's claim for P1,000.00 as attorney's fees is in fact even more modest.

Aboitiz Shipping Corporation vs. Court of Appeals (188 SCRA 387 )

Post under case digests, Civil Law at Thursday, February 23, 2012 Posted by
Schizophrenic Mind

Facts: Anacleto Viana was a passenger of M/V Antonia bound for Manila which was
owned by defendant Aboitiz. After the said vessel has landed, the Pioneer Stevedoring
Corp., as the arrastre operator, took over the exclusive control of the cargoes loaded
on it. One hour after the passengers had disembarked, Pioneer Stevedoring started
operation by unloading the cargoes using its crane. Viana who had already
disembarked remembered that some of his cargoes were still inside the vessel. While
pointing to the crew of the vessel the place where his cargoes were, the crane hit
him, pinning him between the side of the vessel and the crane which resulted to his
death. Vianas wife filed a complaint for damages against Aboitiz for breach of
contract f carriage. Aboitiz, however filed a third party complaint against Pioneer
since it had control completely over the vessel during the incident. Furthermore,
petitioner contends that one hour has already elapsed from the time Viana
disembarked, thus he has already ceased to be a passenger.
Issue: Whether or not Aboitiz is liable for the death of Viana.

Held: The Supreme Court held that the failure of Aboitiz to exercise extraordinary
diligence for the safety of its passengers makes Aboitiz liable. It has been recognized
as a rule that the relation of the carrier and passenger does not cease the moment
the passenger alights from the carriers vehicle, but continues until the passenger
has had a reasonable time or a reasonable opportunity to leave the carriers premises.
A reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all
the circumstances. The primary factor to be considered is the existence of a
reasonable cause as will justify the presence of the victim on or near the petitioners
vessel. In the case at bar, such justifiable cause exists because he had to come back
for his cargo. Aboitiz has failed to safeguard its passenger with extraordinary
diligence in requiring or seeing to it that precautionary measures were strictly and
actually enforced to subserve their purpose of preventing entry into a forbidden area.