Kawayan, Biliran and the house was leased
Magdua
to third parties. ADCEcI
Petitioners further alleged that the
signature of Juanita in the Affidavit is highly
questionable because on 15 May 1978
Juanita executed a written instrument
stating that she would be leaving behind to
her children the land which she had
inherited from her parents.
Dominador filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction since the
assessed value of the land was within the
jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of
Tanauan, Leyte.
In an Order dated 20 February 2006, the
RTC dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction. The RTC explained that the
assessed value of the land in the amount of
P590.00 was less than the amount
cognizable by the RTC to acquire
jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration. Petitioners argued that the
action was not merely for recovery of
ownership and possession, partition and
damages but also for annulment of deed of
sale. Since actions to annul contracts are
actions beyond pecuniary estimation, the
case was well within the jurisdiction of the
RTC.
Dominador filed another motion to dismiss
on the ground of prescription.
In an Order dated 8 September 2006, the
RTC reconsidered its previous stand and
took cognizance of the case. Nonetheless,
the RTC denied the motion for
reconsideration and dismissed the case on
the ground of prescription pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court. The
RTC ruled that the case was filed only in
2001 or more than 30 years since the
Affidavit was executed in 1966. The RTC
explained that while the right of an heir to
his inheritance is imprescriptible, yet when
one of the co-heirs appropriates the
property as his own to the exclusion of all
other heirs, then prescription can set in.
The RTC added that since prescription had
set in to question the transfer of the land
under the Affidavit, it would seem logical
that no action could also be taken against
the deed of sale executed by Ricardo's
daughters in favor of Dominador. The
dispositive portion of the order states:
G.R. No. 176858 | Heirs of Padilla v.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 176858. September 15, 2010.]
HEIRS OF JUANITA PADILLA,
represented by CLAUDIO PADILLA,
petitioners, vs. DOMINADOR MAGDUA,
respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J p:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review on
certiorari assailing th e Orders dated 8
September 2006 and 13 February 2007 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban
City, Branch 34, in Civil Case No. 2001-10-
161.
The Facts
Juanita Padilla (Juanita), the mother of
petitioners, owned a piece of land located
in San Roque, Tanauan, Leyte. After
Juanita's death on 23 March 1989,
petitioners, as legal heirs of Juanita, sought
to have the land partitioned. Petitioners
sent word to their eldest brother Ricardo
Bahia (Ricardo) regarding their plans for the
partition of the land. In a letter dated 5 June
1998 written by Ricardo addressed to them,
petitioners were surprised to find out that
Ricardo had declared the land for himself,
prejudicing their rights as co-heirs. It was
then discovered that Juanita had allegedly
executed a notarized Affidavit of Transfer of
Real Property (Affidavit) in favor of Ricardo
on 4 June 1966 making him the sole owner
of the land. The records do not show that
the land was registered under the Torrens
system.
On 26 October 2001, petitioners filed an
action with the RTC of Tacloban City, Branch
34, for recovery of ownership, possession,
partition and damages. Petitioners sought
to declare void the sale of the land by
Ricardo's daughters, Josephine Bahia and
Virginia Bahia-Abas, to respondent
Dominador Magdua (Dominador). The sale
was made during the lifetime of Ricardo.
Petitioners alleged that Ricardo, through
misrepresentation, had the land transferred
in his name without the consent and
knowledge of his co-heirs. Petitioners also
stated that prior to 1966, Ricardo had a
house constructed on the land. However,
when Ricardo and his wife Zosima
separated, Ricardo left for Inasuyan,
until the filing of the case in 2001. As a
buyer in good faith, Dominador invokes the
defense of acquisitive prescription against
petitioners.
At the outset, only questions of law may be
raised in a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The
factual findings of the lower courts are final
and conclusive and may not be reviewed on
appeal except under any of the following
circumstances: (1) the conclusion is
grounded on speculations, surmises or
conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is
grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment
is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5)
the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) there
is no citation of specific evidence on which
the factual findings are based; (7) the
finding of absence of facts is contradicted
by the presence of evidence on record; (8)
the findings of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to those of the trial court; (9) the
Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked
certain relevant and undisputed facts that,
if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion; (10) the findings of the
Court of Appeals are beyond the issues of
the case; and (11) such findings are
contrary to the admissions of both parties.
We find that the conclusion of the RTC in
dismissing the case on the ground of
prescription based solely on the Affidavit
executed by Juanita in favor of Ricardo, the
alleged seller of the property from whom
Dominador asserts his ownership, is
speculative. Thus, a review of the case is
necessary.
Here, the RTC granted the motion to
dismiss filed by Dominador based on
Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court
which states:
Section 1. Defenses and objections not
pleaded. Defenses and objections not
pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in
the answer are deemed waived. However,
when it appears from the pleadings or the
evidence on record that the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter, that
there is another action pending between
the same parties for the same cause, or
that the action is barred by a prior
judgment or by statute of limitations,
the court shall dismiss the case. (Emphasis
supplied)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
order of the Court is reconsidered in so far
as the pronouncement of the Court that it
has no jurisdiction over the nature of the
action. The dismissal of the action,
however, is maintained not by reason of
lack of jurisdiction but by reason of
prescription.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners filed another motion for
reconsideration which the RTC denied in an
Order dated 13 February 2007 since
petitioners raised no new issue.
Hence, this petition.
The Issue
The main issue is whether the present
action is already barred by prescription.
The Court's Ruling
Petitioners submit that the RTC erred in
dismissing the complaint on the ground of
prescription. Petitioners insist that the
Affidavit executed in 1966 does not
conform with the requirement of sufficient
repudiation of co-ownership by Ricardo
against his co-heirs in accordance with
Article 494 of the Civil Code. Petitioners
assert that the Affidavit became part of
public records only because it was kept by
the Provincial Assessor's office for real
property tax declaration purposes.
However, such cannot be contemplated by
law as a record or registration affecting real
properties. Petitioners insist that the
Affidavit is not an act of appropriation
sufficient to be deemed as constructive
notice to an adverse claim of ownership
absent a clear showing that petitioners, as
co-heirs, were notified or had knowledge of
the Affidavit issued by their mother in
Ricardo's favor. ICESTA
Respondent Dominador, on the other hand,
maintains that Juanita, during her lifetime,
never renounced her signature on the
Affidavit or interposed objections to
Ricardo's possession of the land, which was
open, absolute and in the concept of an
owner. Dominador contends that the
alleged written instrument dated 15 May
1978 executed by Juanita years before she
died was only made known lately and
conveys the possibility of being fabricated.
Dominador adds that the alleged 'highly
questionable signature' of Juanita on the
Affidavit was only made an issue after 35
years from the date of the transfer in 1966
however, whether Ricardo had any
intention to go back to the land or whether
Ricardo's family ever lived there.
Further, Dominador failed to show that
Ricardo had the land declared in his name
for taxation purposes from 1966 after the
Affidavit was executed until 2001 when the
case was filed. Although a tax declaration
does not prove ownership, it is evidence of
claim to possession of the land.
Moreover, Ricardo and petitioners are co-
heirs or co-owners of the land. Co-heirs or
co-owners cannot acquire by acquisitive
prescription the share of the other co-heirs
or co-owners absent a clear repudiation of
the co-ownership, as expressed in Article
494 of the Civil Code which states:
Art. 494. . . . No prescription shall run in
favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his
co-owners or co-heirs as long as he
expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-
ownership.
Since possession of co-owners is like that of
a trustee, in order that a co-owner's
possession may be deemed adverse to the
cestui que trust or other co-owners, the
following requisites must concur: (1) that he
has performed unequivocal acts of
repudiation amounting to an ouster of the
cestui que trust or other co-owners, (2) that
such positive acts of repudiation have been
made known to the cestui que trust or other
co-owners, and (3) that the evidence
thereon must be clear and convincing.
In the present case, all three requisites
have been met. After Juanita's death in
1989, petitioners sought for the partition of
their mother's land. The heirs, including
Ricardo, were notified about the plan.
Ricardo, through a letter dated 5 June 1998,
notified petitioners, as his co-heirs, that he
adjudicated the land solely for himself.
Accordingly, Ricardo's interest in the land
had now become adverse to the claim of his
co-heirs after repudiating their claim of
entitlement to the land. In Generosa v.
Prangan-Valera, we held that in order that
title may prescribe in favor of one of the co-
owners, it must be clearly shown that he
had repudiated the claims of the others,
and that they were apprised of his claim of
adverse and exclusive ownership, before
the prescriptive period begins to run.
AaSTIH
The RTC explained that prescription had
already set in since the Affidavit was
executed on 31 May 1966 and petitioners
filed the present case only on 26 October
2001, a lapse of more than 30 years. No
action could be taken against the deed of
sale made in favor of Dominador without
assailing the Affidavit, and the action to
question the Affidavit had already
prescribed.
After a perusal of the records, we find that
the RTC incorrectly relied on the Affidavit
alone in order to dismiss the case without
considering petitioners' evidence. The facts
show that the land was sold to Dominador
by Ricardo's daughters, namely Josephine
Bahia and Virginia Bahia-Abas, during the
lifetime of Ricardo. However, the alleged
deed of sale was not presented as evidence
and neither was it shown that Ricardo's
daughters had any authority from Ricardo
to dispose of the land. No cogent evidence
was ever presented that Ricardo gave his
consent to, acquiesced in, or ratified the
sale made by his daughters to Dominador.
In its 8 September 2006 Order, the RTC
hastily concluded that Ricardo's daughters
had legal personality to sell the property:
ScaEIT
On the allegation of the plaintiffs
(petitioners) that Josephine Bahia and
Virginia Bahia-Abas had no legal personality
or right to [sell] the subject property is of
no moment in this case. It should be
Ricardo Bahia who has a cause of action
against [his] daughters and not the herein
plaintiffs. After all, Ricardo Bahia might
have already consented to or ratified the
alleged deed of sale.
Also, aside from the Affidavit, Dominador
did not present any proof to show that
Ricardo's possession of the land had been
open, continuous and exclusive for more
than 30 years in order to establish
extraordinary acquisitive prescription.
Dominador merely assumed that Ricardo
had been in possession of the land for 30
years based on the Affidavit submitted to
the RTC. The petitioners, on the other hand,
in their pleading filed with the RTC for
recovery of ownership, possession, partition
and damages, alleged that Ricardo left the
land after he separated from his wife
sometime after 1966 and moved to another
place. The records do not mention,
"(1) In all civil actions in which the subject
of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation;
"(2) In all civil actions which involve the title
to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein, where the assessed value
of the property involved exceeds Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil
actions in Metro Manila, where such value
exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00)
except actions for forcible entry into and
unlawful detainer of lands or buildings,
original jurisdiction over which is conferred
upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts; . . . cDEICH
On the other hand, Section 3 of RA 7691
expanded the jurisdiction of the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
over all civil actions which involve title to or
possession of real property, or any interest,
outside Metro Manila where the assessed
value does not exceed Twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00). The provision states:
Section 3. Section 33 of the same law is
hereby amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases.
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Trial Circuit Trial
Courts shall exercise:
xxx xxx xxx
"(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil
actions which involve title to, or possession
of, real property, or any interest therein
where the assessed value of the property or
interest therein does not exceed Twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil
actions in Metro Manila, where such
assessed value does not exceed Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of
interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses and
costs: Provided, That in cases of land not
declared for taxation purposes, the value of
such property shall be determined by the
assessed value of the adjacent lots."
In the present case, the records show that
the assessed value of the land was P590.00
according to the Declaration of Property as
of 23 March 2000 filed with the RTC. Based
on the value alone, being way below
P20,000.00, the MTC has jurisdiction over
However, in the present case, the
prescriptive period began to run only from 5
June 1998, the date petitioners received
notice of Ricardo's repudiation of their
claims to the land. Since petitioners filed an
action for recovery of ownership and
possession, partition and damages with the
RTC on 26 October 2001, only a mere three
years had lapsed. This three-year period
falls short of the 10-year or 30-year
acquisitive prescription period required by
law in order to be entitled to claim legal
ownership over the land. Thus, Dominador
cannot invoke acquisitive prescription.
Further, Dominador's argument that
prescription began to commence in 1966,
after the Affidavit was executed, is
erroneous. Dominador merely relied on the
Affidavit submitted to the RTC that Ricardo
had been in possession of the land for more
than 30 years. Dominador did not submit
any other corroborative evidence to
establish Ricardo's alleged possession since
1966. In Heirs of Maningding v. Court of
Appeals, we held that the evidence relative
to the possession, as a fact, upon which the
alleged prescription is based, must be clear,
complete and conclusive in order to
establish the prescription. Here, Dominador
failed to present any other competent
evidence to prove the alleged extraordinary
acquisitive prescription of Ricardo over the
land. Since the property is an unregistered
land, Dominador bought the land at his own
risk, being aware as buyer that no title had
been issued over the land. As a
consequence, Dominador is not afforded
protection unless he can manifestly prove
his legal entitlement to his claim.
With regard to the issue of the jurisdiction
of the RTC, we hold that the RTC did not err
in taking cognizance of the case.
Under Section 1 of Republic Act No. 7691
(RA 7691), amending Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, the RTC shall exercise exclusive
jurisdiction on the following actions:
Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, otherwise known as the "Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980", is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.
Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction.
prescription, insufficiently established
Dominador's rightful claim of ownership to
the land. Thus, we direct the RTC to try the
case on the merits to determine who
among the parties are legally entitled to the
land.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We
REVERSE AND SET ASIDE the Orders
dated 8 September 2006 and 13 February
2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban
City, Branch 34 in Civil Case No. 2001-10-
161.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., Peralta, Bersamin and Abad, JJ.,
concur.
the case. However, petitioners argued that
the action was not merely for recovery of
ownership and possession, partition and
damages but also for annulment of deed of
sale. Since annulment of contracts are
actions incapable of pecuniary estimation,
the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioners are correct. In Singson v. Isabela
Sawmill, we held that:
In determining whether an action is one the
subject matter of which is not capable of
pecuniary estimation this Court has
adopted the criterion of first ascertaining
the nature of the principal action or remedy
sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a
sum of money, the claim is considered
capable of pecuniary estimation, and
whether jurisdiction is in the municipal
courts or in the courts of first instance
would depend on the amount of the claim.
However, where the basic issue is
something other than the right to recover a
sum of money, where the money claim is
purely incidental to, or a consequence of,
the principal relief sought, this Court has
considered such actions as cases where the
subject of the litigation may not be
estimated in terms of money, and are
cognizable by courts of first instance (now
Regional Trial Courts). aCTHEA
When petitioners filed the action with the
RTC they sought to recover ownership and
possession of the land by questioning (1)
the due execution and authenticity of the
Affidavit executed by Juanita in favor of
Ricardo which caused Ricardo to be the sole
owner of the land to the exclusion of
petitioners who also claim to be legal heirs
and entitled to the land, and (2) the validity
of the deed of sale executed between
Ricardo's daughters and Dominador. Since
the principal action sought here is
something other than the recovery of a sum
of money, the action is incapable of
pecuniary estimation and thus cognizable
by the RTC. Well-entrenched is the rule that
jurisdiction over the subject matter of a
case is conferred by law and is determined
by the allegations in the complaint and the
character of the relief sought, irrespective
of whether the party is entitled to all or
some of the claims asserted.
In sum, we find that the Affidavit, as the
principal evidence relied upon by the RTC to
dismiss the case on the ground of
After almost two (2) decades of marriage,
ATTY. LUNA and EUGENIA eventually agreed
to live apart from each other in February
1966 and agreed to separation of property,
to which end, they entered into a written
agreement entitled "AGREEMENT FOR
SEPARATION AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT"
dated November 12, 1975, whereby they
agreed to live separately and to dissolve
and liquidate their conjugal partnership of
property. CAHaST
On January 12, 1977, ATTY. LUNA obtained a
divorce decree of his marriage with
EUGENIA from the Civil and Commercial
Chamber of the First Circumscription of the
Court of First Instance of Sto. Domingo,
Dominican Republic. Also in Sto. Domingo,
Dominican Republic, on the same date,
ATTY. LUNA contracted another marriage,
this time with SOLEDAD. Thereafter, ATTY.
LUNA and SOLEDAD returned to the
Philippines and lived together as husband
and wife until 1987.
Sometime in 1977, ATTY. LUNA organized a
new law firm named: Luna, Puruganan,
Sison and Ongkiko (LUPSICON) where ATTY.
LUNA was the managing partner.
On February 14, 1978, LUPSICON through
ATTY. LUNA purchased from Tandang Sora
Development Corporation the 6th Floor of
Kalaw-Ledesma Condominium Project
(condominium unit) at Gamboa St., Makati
City, consisting of 517.52 square meters,
for P1,449,056.00, to be paid on installment
basis for 36 months starting on April 15,
1978. Said condominium unit was to be
used as law office of LUPSICON. After full
payment, the Deed of Absolute Sale over
the condominium unit was executed on July
15, 1983, and CCT No. 4779 was issued on
August 10, 1983, which was registered
bearing the following names:
"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L.
Luna (46/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married
to Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (25/100); GREGORIO
R. PURUGANAN, married to Paz A.
Puruganan (17/100); and TERESITA CRUZ
SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison
(12/100) . . ."
Subsequently, 8/100 share of ATTY. LUNA
and 17/100 share of Atty. Gregorio R.
Puruganan in the condominium unit was
sold to Atty. Mario E. Ongkiko, for which a
new CCT No. 21761 was issued on February
7, 1992 in the following names:
G.R. No. 171914 | Lavadia v. Heirs of Luna
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 171914. July 23, 2014.]
SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA, petitioner, vs.
HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA,
represented by GREGORIO Z. LUNA
and EUGENIA ZABALLERO-LUNA,
respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J p:
Divorce between Filipinos is void and
ineffectual under the nationality rule
adopted by Philippine law. Hence, any
settlement of property between the parties
of the first marriage involving Filipinos
submitted as an incident of a divorce
obtained in a foreign country lacks
competent judicial approval, and cannot be
enforceable against the assets of the
husband who contracts a subsequent
marriage.
The Case
The petitioner, the second wife of the late
Atty. Juan Luces Luna, appeals the adverse
decision promulgated on November 11,
2005, whereby the Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed with modification the decision
rendered on August 27, 2001 by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 138, in
Makati City. The CA thereby denied her right
in the 25/100 pro indiviso share of the
husband in a condominium unit, and in the
law books of the husband acquired during
the second marriage.
Antecedents
The antecedent facts were summarized by
the CA as follows:
ATTY. LUNA, a practicing lawyer, was at first
a name partner in the prestigious law firm
Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo, Hernandez &
Feliciano Law Offices at that time when he
was living with his first wife, herein
intervenor-appellant Eugenia Zaballero-
Luna (EUGENIA), whom he initially married
in a civil ceremony conducted by the Justice
of the Peace of Paraaque, Rizal on
September 10, 1947 and later solemnized
in a church ceremony at the Pro-Cathedral
in San Miguel, Bulacan on September 12,
1948. In ATTY. LUNA's marriage to EUGENIA,
they begot seven (7) children, namely:
Regina Maria L. Nadal, Juan Luis Luna,
Araceli Victoria L. Arellano, Ana Maria L.
Tabunda, Gregorio Macario Luna, Carolina
Linda L. Tapia, and Cesar Antonio Luna.
to the share of SOLEDAD be conducted;
that a receiver be appointed to preserve
and administer the subject properties; and
that the heirs of ATTY. LUNA be ordered to
pay attorney's fees and costs of the suit to
SOLEDAD. EIaDHS
Ruling of the RTC
On August 27, 2001, the RTC rendered its
decision after trial upon the aforementioned
facts, disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as
follows:
(a) The 24/100 pro-indiviso share in the
condominium unit located at the SIXTH
FLOOR of the KALAW LEDESMA
CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by
Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761
consisting of FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTEEN
(517/100) SQUARE METERS is adjudged to
have been acquired by Juan Luces Luna
through his sole industry;
(b) Plaintiff has no right as owner or under
any other concept over the condominium
unit, hence the entry in Condominium
Certificate of Title No. 21761 of the Registry
of Deeds of Makati with respect to the civil
status of Juan Luces Luna should be
changed from "JUAN LUCES LUNA married
to Soledad L. Luna" to "JUAN LUCES LUNA
married to Eugenia Zaballero Luna";
(c) Plaintiff is declared to be the owner of
the books Corpus Juris, Fletcher on
Corporation, American Jurisprudence and
Federal Supreme Court Reports found in the
condominium unit and defendants are
ordered to deliver them to the plaintiff as
soon as appropriate arrangements have
been made for transport and storage.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Decision of the CA
Both parties appealed to the CA.
On her part, the petitioner assigned the
following errors to the RTC namely:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING
THAT THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT WAS
ACQUIRED THRU THE SOLE INDUSTRY OF
ATTY. JUAN LUCES LUNA;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING
THAT PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT DID NOT
CONTRIBUTE MONEY FOR THE ACQUISITION
OF THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT;
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING
CREDENCE TO PORTIONS OF THE
TESTIMONY OF GREGORIO LUNA, WHO HAS
"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L.
Luna (38/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married
to Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (50/100); TERESITA
CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison
(12/100) . . ."
Sometime in 1992, LUPSICON was dissolved
and the condominium unit was partitioned
by the partners but the same was still
registered in common under CCT No.
21716. The parties stipulated that the
interest of ATTY. LUNA over the
condominium unit would be 25/100 share.
ATTY. LUNA thereafter established and
headed another law firm with Atty. Renato
G. De la Cruz and used a portion of the
office condominium unit as their office. The
said law firm lasted until the death of ATTY.
JUAN on July 12, 1997.
After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in
the condominium unit including the
lawbooks, office furniture and equipment
found therein were taken over by Gregorio
Z. Luna, ATTY. LUNA's son of the first
marriage. Gregorio Z. Luna then leased out
the 25/100 portion of the condominium unit
belonging to his father to Atty. Renato G. De
la Cruz who established his own law firm
named Renato G. De la Cruz & Associates.
The 25/100 pro-indiviso share of ATTY. Luna
in the condominium unit as well as the law
books, office furniture and equipment
became the subject of the complaint filed
by SOLEDAD against the heirs of ATTY. JUAN
with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 138, on
September 10, 1999, docketed as Civil Case
No. 99-1644. The complaint alleged that the
subject properties were acquired during the
existence of the marriage between ATTY.
LUNA and SOLEDAD through their joint
efforts that since they had no children,
SOLEDAD became co-owner of the said
properties upon the death of ATTY. LUNA to
the extent of 3/4 pro-indiviso share
consisting of her 1/2 share in the said
properties plus her 1/2 share in the net
estate of ATTY. LUNA which was bequeathed
to her in the latter's last will and testament;
and that the heirs of ATTY. LUNA through
Gregorio Z. Luna excluded SOLEDAD from
her share in the subject properties. The
complaint prayed that SOLEDAD be
declared the owner of the 1/2 portion of the
subject properties; that the same be
partitioned; that an accounting of the
rentals on the condominium unit pertaining
On November 11, 2005, the CA
promulgated its assailed modified decision,
holding and ruling:
EUGENIA, the first wife, was the legitimate
wife of ATTY. LUNA until the latter's death
on July 12, 1997. The absolute divorce
decree obtained by ATTY. LUNA in the
Dominican Republic did not terminate his
prior marriage with EUGENIA because
foreign divorce between Filipino citizens is
not recognized in our jurisdiction. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
assailed August 27, 2001 Decision of the
RTC of Makati City, Branch 138, is hereby
MODIFIED as follows:
(a) The 25/100 pro-indiviso share in the
condominium unit at the SIXTH FLOOR of
the KALAW LEDESMA CONDOMINIUM
PROJECT covered by Condominium
Certificate of Title No. 21761 consisting of
FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTEEN (517/100) (sic)
SQUARE METERS is hereby adjudged to
defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan
Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Lung
(first marriage), having been acquired from
the sole funds and sole industry of Juan
Luces Luna while marriage of Juan Luces
Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (first
marriage) was still subsisting and valid;
(b) Plaintiff-appellant Soledad Lavadia has
no right as owner or under any other
concept over the condominium unit, hence
the entry in Condominium Certificate of
Title No. 21761 of the Registry of Deeds of
Makati with respect to the civil status of
Juan Luces Luna should be changed from
"JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Soledad L.
Luna" to "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to
Eugenia Zaballero Luna"; SHaATC
(c) Defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan
Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna
(first marriage) are hereby declared to be
the owner of the books Corpus Juris,
Fletcher on Corporation, American
Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court
Reports found in the condominium unit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
On March 13, 2006, the CA denied the
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Issues
In this appeal, the petitioner avers in her
petition for review on certiorari that:
NO ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE
ACQUISITION OF THE UNIT, BUT IGNORED
OTHER PORTIONS OF HIS TESTIMONY
FAVORABLE TO THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;
IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
GIVING SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FACT THAT
THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN
LUNA AND INTERVENOR-APPELLANT WAS
ALREADY DISSOLVED AND LIQUIDATED
PRIOR TO THE UNION OF PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT AND LUNA;
V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING
UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO THE ABSENCE OF
THE DISPOSITION OF THE CONDOMINIUM
UNIT IN THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL OF THE
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;
VI. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING
UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FACT THAT
THE NAME OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT DID
NOT APPEAR IN THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE
SALE EXECUTED BY TANDANG SORA
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OVER THE
CONDOMINIUM UNIT; cAaDHT
VII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING
THAT NEITHER ARTICLE 148 OF THE FAMILY
CODE NOR ARTICLE 144 OF THE CIVIL CODE
OF THE PHILIPPINES ARE APPLICABLE;
VIII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
RULING THAT THE CAUSE OF ACTION OF
THE INTERVENOR-APPELLANT HAS BEEN
BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION AND LACHES;
and
IX. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
EXPUNGING/DISMISSING THE
INTERVENTION FOR FAILURE OF
INTERVENOR-APPELLANT TO PAY FILING
FEE.
In contrast, the respondents attributed the
following errors to the trial court, to wit:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT CERTAIN FOREIGN LAW BOOKS IN THE
LAW OFFICE OF ATTY. LUNA WERE BOUGHT
WITH THE USE OF PLAINTIFF'S MONEY;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT PLAINTIFF PROVED BY
PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE (HER CLAIM
OVER) THE SPECIFIED FOREIGN LAW BOOKS
FOUND IN ATTY. LUNA'S LAW OFFICE; and
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
HOLDING THAT, ASSUMING PLAINTIFF PAID
FOR THE SAID FOREIGN LAW BOOKS, THE
RIGHT TO RECOVER THEM HAD
PRESCRIBED AND BARRED BY LACHES AND
ESTOPPEL.
Filipinos until the death of Atty. Luna on July
12, 1997 terminated their marriage.
From the time of the celebration of the first
marriage on September 10, 1947 until the
present, absolute divorce between Filipino
spouses has not been recognized in the
Philippines. The non-recognition of absolute
divorce between Filipinos has remained
even under the Family Code, even if either
or both of the spouses are residing abroad.
Indeed, the only two types of defective
marital unions under our laws have been
the void and the voidable marriages. As
such, the remedies against such defective
marriages have been limited to the
declaration of nullity of the marriage and
the annulment of the marriage. DHIcET
It is true that on January 12, 1976, the
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sto. Domingo
in the Dominican Republic issued the
Divorce Decree dissolving the first marriage
of Atty. Luna and Eugenia. Conformably
with the nationality rule, however, the
divorce, even if voluntarily obtained abroad,
did not dissolve the marriage between Atty.
Luna and Eugenia, which subsisted up to
the time of his death on July 12, 1997. This
finding conforms to the Constitution, which
characterizes marriage as an inviolable
social institution, and regards it as a special
contract of permanent union between a
man and a woman for the establishment of
a conjugal and family life. The non-
recognition of absolute divorce in the
Philippines is a manifestation of the respect
for the sanctity of the marital union
especially among Filipino citizens. It affirms
that the extinguishment of a valid marriage
must be grounded only upon the death of
either spouse, or upon a ground expressly
provided by law. For as long as this public
policy on marriage between Filipinos exists,
no divorce decree dissolving the marriage
between them can ever be given legal or
judicial recognition and enforcement in this
jurisdiction.
2.
The Agreement for Separation and
Property Settlement
was void for lack of court approval
The petitioner insists that the Agreement
for Separation and Property Settlement
(Agreement) that the late Atty. Luna and
Eugenia had entered into and executed in
connection with the divorce proceedings
A. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in
ruling that the Agreement for Separation
and Property Settlement executed by Luna
and Respondent Eugenia was
unenforceable; hence, their conjugal
partnership was not dissolved and
liquidated;
B. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in
not recognizing the Dominican Republic
court's approval of the Agreement;
C. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in
ruling that Petitioner Failed to adduce
sufficient proof of actual contribution to the
acquisition of purchase of the subject
condominium unit; and
D. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in
ruling that Petitioner was not entitled to the
subject law books.
The decisive question to be resolved is who
among the contending parties should be
entitled to the 25/100 pro indiviso share in
the condominium unit; and to the law books
(i.e., Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation,
American Jurisprudence and Federal
Supreme Court Reports).
The resolution of the decisive question
requires the Court to ascertain the law that
should determine, firstly, whether the
divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia
Zaballero-Luna (Eugenia) had validly
dissolved the first marriage; and, secondly,
whether the second marriage entered into
by the late Atty. Luna and the petitioner
entitled the latter to any rights in property.
Ruling of the Court
We affirm the modified decision of the CA.
1.
Atty. Luna's first marriage with
Eugenia
subsisted up to the time of his death
The first marriage between Atty. Luna. and
Eugenia, both Filipinos, was solemnized in
the Philippines on September 10, 1947. The
law in force at the time of the solemnization
was the Spanish Civil Code, which adopted
the nationality rule. The Civil Code
continued to follow the nationality rule, to
the effect that Philippine laws relating to
family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons
were binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, although living abroad.
Pursuant to the nationality rule, Philippine
laws governed this case by virtue of both
Atty. Luna and Eugenia having remained
(4) In case of judicial separation of
property under Article 191.
The mere execution of the Agreement by
Atty. Luna and Eugenia did not per se
dissolve and liquidate their conjugal
partnership of gains. The approval of the
Agreement by a competent court was still
required under Article 190 and Article 191
of the Civil Code, as follows:
Article 190. In the absence of an express
declaration in the marriage settlements, the
separation of property between spouses
during the marriage shall not take place
save in virtue of a judicial order.
(1432a) cCaSHA
Article 191. The husband or the wife may
ask for the separation of property, and it
shall be decreed when the spouse of the
petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty
which carries with it civil interdiction, or has
been declared absent, or when legal
separation has been granted.
xxx xxx xxx
The husband and the wife may agree upon
the dissolution of the conjugal partnership
during the marriage, subject to judicial
approval. All the creditors of the husband
and of the wife, as well as of the conjugal
partnership shall be notified of any petition
for judicial approval or the voluntary
dissolution of the conjugal partnership, so
that any such creditors may appear at the
hearing to safeguard his interests. Upon
approval of the petition for dissolution of
the conjugal partnership, the court shall
take such measures as may protect the
creditors and other third persons.
After dissolution of the conjugal
partnership, the provisions of articles 214
and 215 shall apply. The provisions of this
Code concerning the effect of partition
stated in articles 498 to 501 shall be
applicable. (1433a)
But was not the approval of the Agreement
by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the
Dominican Republic sufficient in dissolving
and liquidating the conjugal partnership of
gains between the late Atty. Luna and
Eugenia?
The query is answered in the negative.
There is no question that the approval took
place only as an incident of the action for
divorce instituted by Atty. Luna and
Eugenia, for, indeed, the justifications for
their execution of the Agreement were
before the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the
Dominican Republic to dissolve and
liquidate their conjugal partnership was
enforceable against Eugenia. Hence, the CA
committed reversible error in decreeing
otherwise.
The insistence of the petitioner was
unwarranted.
Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia
had not entered into any marriage
settlement prior to their marriage on
September 10, 1947, the system of relative
community or conjugal partnership of gains
governed their property relations. This is
because the Spanish Civil Code, the law
then in force at the time of their marriage,
did not specify the property regime of the
spouses in the event that they had not
entered into any marriage settlement
before or at the time of the marriage.
Article 119 of the Civil Code clearly so
provides, to wit:
Article 119. The future spouses may in the
marriage settlements agree upon absolute
or relative community of property, or upon
complete separation of property, or upon
any other regime. In the absence of
marriage settlements, or when the
same are void, the system of relative
community or conjugal partnership of
gains as established in this Code, shall
govern the property relations between
husband and wife.
Article 142 of the Civil Code has defined a
conjugal partnership of gains thusly:
Article 142. By means of the conjugal
partnership of gains the husband and wife
place in a common fund the fruits of their
separate property and the income from
their work or industry, and divide equally,
upon the dissolution of the marriage or of
the partnership, the net gains or benefits
obtained indiscriminately by either spouse
during the marriage.
The conjugal partnership of gains subsists
until terminated for any of various causes
of termination enumerated in Article 175 of
the Civil Code,viz.:
Article 175. The conjugal partnership of
gains terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal
separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled;
marriage were governed by the rules on co-
ownership, conformably with Article 144 of
the Civil Code, viz.:
Article 144. When a man and a woman live
together as husband and wife, but they are
not married, or their marriage is void from
the beginning, the property acquired by
either or both of them through their work or
industry or their wages and salaries shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership.(n)
In such a situation, whoever alleges co-
ownership carried the burden of proof to
confirm such fact. To establish co-
ownership, therefore, it became imperative
for the petitioner to offer proof of her actual
contributions in the acquisition of property.
Her mere allegation of co-ownership,
without sufficient and competent evidence,
would warrant no relief in her favor. As the
Court explained in Saguid v. Court of
Appeals:
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and
Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the
issue of co-ownership of properties
acquired by the parties to a bigamous
marriage and an adulterous relationship,
respectively, we ruled that proof of actual
contribution in the acquisition of the
property is essential. The claim of co-
ownership of the petitioners therein who
were parties to the bigamous and
adulterous union is without basis because
they failed to substantiate their allegation
that they contributed money in the
purchase of the disputed properties. Also in
Adriano v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that
the fact that the controverted property was
titled in the name of the parties to an
adulterous relationship is not sufficient
proof of co-ownership absent evidence of
actual contribution in the acquisition of the
property.
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof
rests upon the party who, as determined by
the pleadings or the nature of the case,
asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions
must be proved by competent evidence and
reliance must be had on the strength of the
party's own evidence and not upon the
weakness of the opponent's defense. This
applies with more vigor where, as in the
instant case, the plaintiff was allowed to
present evidence ex parte. The plaintiff is
not automatically entitled to the relief
prayed for. The law gives the defendant
identical to the grounds raised in the action
for divorce. With the divorce not being itself
valid and enforceable under Philippine law
for being contrary to Philippine public policy
and public law, the approval of the
Agreement was not also legally valid and
enforceable under Philippine law.
Consequently, the conjugal partnership of
gains of Atty. Luna and Eugenia subsisted in
the lifetime of their marriage.
3.
Atty. Luna's marriage with Soledad,
being bigamous,
was void; properties acquired during
their marriage
were governed by the rules on co-
ownership
What law governed the property relations of
the second marriage between Atty. Luna
and Soledad?
The CA expressly declared that Atty. Luna's
subsequent marriage to Soledad on January
12, 1976 was void for being bigamous, on
the ground that the marriage between Atty.
Luna and Eugenia had not been dissolved
by the Divorce Decree rendered by the CFI
of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic
but had subsisted until the death of Atty.
Luna on July 12, 1997.
The Court concurs with the CA.
In the Philippines, marriages that are
bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous are
void. Article 71 of the Civil Code clearly
states:
Article 71. All marriages performed outside
the Philippines in accordance with the laws
in force in the country where they were
performed, and valid there as such, shall
also be valid in this country, except
bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous
marriages as determined by Philippine
law.
Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by
contracting a second or subsequent
marriage before the first marriage has been
legally dissolved, or before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively
dead by means of a judgment rendered in
the proper proceedings. A bigamous
marriage is considered void ab initio.
cDTCIA
Due to the second marriage between Atty.
Luna and the petitioner being void ab initio
by virtue of its being bigamous, the
properties acquired during the bigamous
incapacitated or were without impediment
to marry each other (for it would be absurd
to create a co-ownership where there still
exists a prior conjugal partnership or
absolute community between the man and
his lawful wife). This void was filled upon
adoption of the Family Code. Article 148
provided that: only the property acquired
by both of the parties through their actual
joint contribution of money, property or
industry shall be owned in common and in
proportion to their respective contributions.
Such contributions and corresponding
shares were prima facie presumed to be
equal. However, for this presumption to
arise, proof of actual contribution was
required. The same rule and presumption
was to apply to joint deposits of money and
evidence of credit. If one of the parties was
validly married to another, his or her share
in the co-ownership accrued to the absolute
community or conjugal partnership existing
in such valid marriage. If the party who
acted in bad faith was not validly married to
another, his or her share shall be forfeited
in the manner provided in the last
paragraph of the Article 147. The rules on
forfeiture applied even if both parties were
in bad faith. SDTIHA
Co-ownership was the exception while
conjugal partnership of gains was the strict
rule whereby marriage was an inviolable
social institution and divorce decrees are
not recognized in the Philippines, as was
held by the Supreme Court in the case of
Tenchavez vs. Escao, G.R. No. L-19671,
November 29, 1965, 15 SCRA 355, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
As to the 25/100 pro-indiviso share of ATTY.
LUNA in the condominium unit, SOLEDAD
failed to prove that she made an actual
contribution to purchase the said property.
She failed to establish that the four (4)
checks that she presented were indeed
used for the acquisition of the share of
ATTY. LUNA in the condominium unit. This
was aptly explained in the Decision of the
trial court, viz.:
". . . The first check, Exhibit "M" for
P55,000.00 payable to Atty. Teresita Cruz
Sison was issued on January 27, 1977,
which was thirteen (13) months before the
Memorandum of Agreement, Exhibit "7"
was signed. Another check issued on April
29, 1978 in the amount of P97,588.89,
some measure of protection as the plaintiff
must still prove the allegations in the
complaint. Favorable relief can be granted
only after the court is convinced that the
facts proven by the plaintiff warrant such
relief. Indeed, the party alleging a fact has
the burden of proving it and a mere
allegation is not evidence.
The petitioner asserts herein that she
sufficiently proved her actual contributions
in the purchase of the condominium unit in
the aggregate amount of at least
P306,572.00, consisting in direct
contributions of P159,072.00, and in
repaying the loans Atty. Luna had obtained
from Premex Financing and Banco Filipino
totaling P146,825.30; and that such
aggregate contributions of P306,572.00
corresponded to almost the entire share of
Atty. Luna in the purchase of the
condominium unit amounting to
P362,264.00 of the unit's purchase price of
P1,449,056.00.
The petitioner further asserts that the
lawbooks were paid for solely out of her
personal funds, proof of which Atty. Luna
had even sent her a "thank you" note; that
she had the financial capacity to make the
contributions and purchases; and that Atty.
Luna could not acquire the properties on his
own due to the meagerness of the income
derived from his law practice.
Did the petitioner discharge her burden of
proof on the co-ownership?
In resolving the question, the CA entirely
debunked the petitioner's assertions on her
actual contributions through the following
findings and conclusions, namely:
SOLEDAD was not able to prove by
preponderance of evidence that her own
independent funds were used to buy the
law office condominium and the law books
subject matter in contention in this case
proof that was required for Article 144 of
the New Civil Code and Article 148 of the
Family Code to apply as to cases where
properties were acquired by a man and a
woman living together as husband and wife
but not married, or under a marriage which
was void ab initio. Under Article 144 of the
New Civil Code, the rules on co-ownership
would govern. But this was not readily
applicable to many situations and thus it
created a void at first because it applied
only if the parties were not in any way
LUNA who bought the law office space and
the law books from his earnings from his
practice of law rather than embarrassingly
beg or ask from SOLEDAD money for use of
the law firm that he headed. STcEaI
The Court upholds the foregoing findings
and conclusions by the CA both because
they were substantiated by the records and
because we have not been shown any
reason to revisit and undo them. Indeed,
the petitioner, as the party claiming the co-
ownership, did not discharge her burden of
proof. Her mere allegations on her
contributions, not being evidence, did not
serve the purpose. In contrast, given the
subsistence of the first marriage between
Atty. Luna and Eugenia, the presumption
that Atty. Luna acquired the properties out
of his own personal funds and effort
remained. It should then be justly
concluded that the properties in litis legally
pertained to their conjugal partnership of
gains as of the time of his death.
Consequently, the sole ownership of the
25/100 pro indiviso share of Atty. Luna in
the condominium unit, and of the lawbooks
pertained to the respondents as the lawful
heirs of Atty. Luna.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the
decision promulgated on November 11,
2005; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay
the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-de Castro, Villarama,
Jr. and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Exhibit "P" was payable to Banco Filipino.
According to the plaintiff, this was in
payment of the loan of Atty. Luna. The third
check which was for P49,236.00 payable to
PREMEX was dated May 19, 1979, also for
payment of the loan of Atty. Luna. The
fourth check, Exhibit "M", for P4,072.00 was
dated December 17, 1980. None of the
foregoing prove that the amounts delivered
by plaintiff to the payees were for the
acquisition of the subject condominium
unit. The connection was simply not
established. . . ."
SOLEDAD's claim that she made a cash
contribution of P100,000.00 is
unsubstantiated. Clearly, there is no basis
for SOLEDAD's claim of co-ownership over
the 25/100 portion of the condominium unit
and the trial court correctly found that the
same was acquired through the sole
industry of ATTY. LUNA, thus:
"The Deed of Absolute Sale, Exhibit "9",
covering the condominium unit was in the
name of Atty. Luna, together with his
partners in the law firm. The name of the
plaintiff does not appear as vendee or as
the spouse of Atty. Luna. The same was
acquired for the use of the Law firm of Atty.
Luna. The loans from Allied Banking
Corporation and Far East Bank and Trust
Company were loans of Atty. Luna and his
partners and plaintiff does not have
evidence to show that she paid for them
fully or partially. . . ."
The fact that CCT No. 4779 and
subsequently, CCT No. 21761 were in the
name of "JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to
Soledad L. Luna" was no proof that
SOLEDAD was a co-owner of the
condominium unit. Acquisition of title and
registration thereof are two different acts. It
is well settled that registration does not
confer title but merely confirms one already
existing. The phrase "married to" preceding
"Soledad L. Luna" is merely descriptive of
the civil status of ATTY. LUNA.
SOLEDAD, the second wife, was not even a
lawyer. So it is but logical that SOLEDAD
had no participation in the law firm or in the
purchase of books for the law firm.
SOLEDAD failed to prove that she had
anything to contribute and that she actually
purchased or paid for the law office
amortization and for the law books. It is
more logical to presume that it was ATTY.
Nos. 24790, 24791 and 24792 over the
properties were issued in respondent's
name alone.
Jambrich also formally adopted
respondent's two sons in Sp. Proc. No. 39-
MAN, and per Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Mandaue City dated May 5, 1988.
However, the idyll lasted only until April
1991. By then, respondent found a new
boyfriend while Jambrich began to live with
another woman in Danao City. Jambrich
supported respondent's sons for only two
months after the break up.
Jambrich met petitioner Camilo F. Borromeo
sometime in 1986. Petitioner was engaged
in the real estate business. He also built
and repaired speedboats as a hobby. In
1989, Jambrich purchased an engine and
some accessories for his boat from
petitioner, for which he became indebted to
the latter for about P150,000.00. To pay for
his debt, he sold his rights and interests in
the Agro-Macro properties to petitioner for
P250,000, as evidenced by a "Deed of
Absolute Sale/Assignment". On July 26,
1991, when petitioner sought to register
the deed of assignment, he discovered that
titles to the three lots have been
transferred in the name of respondent, and
that the subject property has already been
mortgaged.
On August 2, 1991, petitioner filed a
complaint against respondent for recovery
of real property before the Regional Trial
Court of Mandaue City. Petitioner alleged
that the Contracts to Sell dated November
18, 1985 and March 10, 1986 and the Deed
of Absolute Sale dated November 16, 1987
over the properties which identified both
Jambrich and respondent as buyers do not
reflect the true agreement of the parties
since respondent did not pay a single
centavo of the purchase price and was not
in fact a buyer; that it was Jambrich alone
who paid for the properties using his
exclusive funds; that Jambrich was the real
and absolute owner of the properties; and,
that petitioner acquired absolute ownership
by virtue of the Deed of Absolute
Sale/Assignment dated July 11, 1991 which
Jambrich executed in his favor. IcSEAH
In her Answer, respondent belied the
allegation that she did not pay a single
centavo of the purchase price. On the
contrary, she claimed that she "solely and
G.R. No. 159310 | Borromeo v. Descallar
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 159310. February 24, 2009.]
CAMILO F. BORROMEO,
petitioner,vs.ANTONIETTA O.
DESCALLAR, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, C.J p:
What are the rights of an alien (and his
successor-in-interest) who acquired real
properties in the country as against his
former Filipina girlfriend in whose sole
name the properties were registered under
the Torrens system? CaAIES
The facts are as follows:
Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, arrived in
the Philippines in 1983 after he was
assigned by his employer, Simmering-Graz
Panker A.G.,an Austrian company, to work
at a project in Mindoro. In 1984, he
transferred to Cebu and worked at the Naga
II Project of the National Power Corporation.
There, he met respondent Antonietta
Opalla-Descallar, a separated mother of two
boys who was working as a waitress at St.
Moritz Hotel. Jambrich befriended
respondent and asked her to tutor him in
English. In dire need of additional income to
support her children, respondent agreed.
The tutorials were held in Antonietta's
residence at a squatters' area in Gorordo
Avenue.
Jambrich and respondent fell in love and
decided to live together in a rented house
in Hernan Cortes, Mandaue City. Later, they
transferred to their own house and lots at
Agro-Macro Subdivision, Cabancalan,
Mandaue City. In the Contracts to Sell dated
November 18, 1985 and March 10, 1986
covering the properties, Jambrich and
respondent were referred to as the buyers.
A Deed of Absolute Sale dated November
16, 1987 was likewise issued in their favor.
However, when the Deed of Absolute Sale
was presented for registration before the
Register of Deeds, registration was refused
on the ground that Jambrich was an alien
and could not acquire alienable lands of the
public domain. Consequently, Jambrich's
name was erased from the document. But it
could be noted that his signature remained
on the left hand margin of page 1, beside
respondent's signature as buyer on page 3,
and at the bottom of page 4 which is the
last page. Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
she is not only an extravagant but also an
expensive person and not thrifty as she
wanted to impress this Court in order to
have a big saving as clearly shown by her
actuation when she was already cohabiting
and living with Jambrich that according to
her ...the allowance given ...by him in the
amount of $500.00 a month is not enough
to maintain the education and maintenance
of her children. IDAESH
This being the case, it is highly
improbable and impossible that she
could acquire the properties under
litigation or could contribute any
amount for their acquisition which
according to her is worth more than
P700,000.00 when while she was
working as [a] waitress at St. Moritz
Hotel earning P1,000.00 a month as
salary and tips of more or less
P2,000.00 she could not even provide
[for] the daily needs of her family so
much so that it is safe to conclude that
she was really in financial distress
when she met and accepted the offer
of Jambrich to come and live with him
because that was a big financial
opportunity for her and her children
who were already abandoned by her
husband.
xxx xxx xxx
The only probable and possible reason why
her name appeared and was included in
[the contracts to sell dated November 18,
1985 and March 10, 1986 and finally, the
deed of absolute sale dated November 16,
1987] as buyer is because as observed by
the Court, she being a scheming and
exploitive woman, she has taken advantage
of the goodness of Jambrich who at that
time was still bewitched by her beauty,
sweetness, and good attitude shown by her
to him since he could still very well provide
for everything she needs, he being earning
(sic) much yet at that time. In fact, as
observed by this Court, the acquisition of
these properties under litigation was at the
time when their relationship was still going
smoothly and harmoniously. [Emphasis
supplied.]
The dispositive portion of the Decision
states:
WHEREFORE, ...Decision is hereby rendered
in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant Antoniet[t]a Opalla by:
exclusively used her own personal funds to
defray and pay for the purchase price of the
subject lots in question",and that Jambrich,
being an alien, was prohibited to acquire or
own real property in the Philippines.
At the trial, respondent presented evidence
showing her alleged financial capacity to
buy the disputed property with money from
a supposed copra business. Petitioner, in
turn, presented Jambrich as his witness and
documentary evidence showing the
substantial salaries which Jambrich received
while still employed by the Austrian
company, Simmering-Graz Panker A.G.
In its decision, the court a quo found
Evidence on hand clearly show that at the
time of the purchase and acquisition of
[the] properties under litigation that
Wilhelm Jambrich was still working and
earning much. This fact of Jambrich earning
much is not only supported by documentary
evidence but also by the admission made
by the defendant Antoniet[t]a Opalla. So
that, Jambrich's financial capacity to
acquire and purchase the
properties ...is not disputed.
xxx xxx xxx
On the other hand, evidence ...clearly show
that before defendant met Jambrich
sometime in the latter part of 1984, she
was only working as a waitress at the St.
Moritz Hotel with an income of P1,000.00 a
month and was ...renting and living only
in ...[a] room at ...[a] squatter area at
Gorordo Ave.,Cebu City; that Jambrich took
pity of her and the situation of her children
that he offered her a better life which she
readily accepted. In fact, this miserable
financial situation of hers and her two
children ...are all stated and reflected in the
Child Study Report dated April 20, 1983
(Exhs. "G" and "G-1") which facts she
supplied to the Social Worker who prepared
the same when she was personally
interviewed by her in connection with the
adoption of her two children by Wilhelm
Jambrich. So that, if such facts were not
true because these are now denied by
her ...and if it was also true that during this
time she was already earning as much as
P8,000.00 to P9,000.00 as profit per month
from her copra business, it would be highly
unbelievable and impossible for her to be
living only in such a miserable condition
since it is the observation of this Court that

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was
denied.
Hence, this petition for review.
Petitioner assigns the following errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DISREGARDING
RESPONDENT'S JUDICIAL ADMISSION AND
OTHER OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE
ESTABLISHING JAMBRICH'S PARTICIPATION,
INTEREST AND OWNERSHIP OF THE
PROPERTIES IN QUESTION AS FOUND BY
THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
JAMBRICH HAS NO TITLE TO THE
PROPERTIES IN QUESTION AND MAY NOT
THEREFORE TRANSFER AND ASSIGN ANY
RIGHTS AND INTERESTS IN FAVOR OF
PETITIONER.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
SERIOUSLY ERRED IN REVERSING THE
WELL-REASONED DECISION OF THE TRIAL
COURT AND IN IMPOSING DOUBLE COSTS
AGAINST HEREIN PETITIONER (THEN,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE). HTScEI
First, who purchased the subject properties?
The evidence clearly shows, as pointed out
by the trial court, who between respondent
and Jambrich possesses the financial
capacity to acquire the properties in
dispute. At the time of the acquisition of the
properties in 1985 to 1986, Jambrich was
gainfully employed at Simmering-Graz
Panker A.G.,an Austrian company. He was
earning an estimated monthly salary of
P50,000.00. Then, Jambrich was assigned to
Syria for almost one year where his monthly
salary was approximately P90,000.00.
On the other hand, respondent was
employed as a waitress from 1984 to 1985
with a monthly salary of not more than
P1,000.00. In 1986, when the parcels of
land were acquired, she was unemployed,
as admitted by her during the pre-trial
conference. Her allegations of income from
a copra business were unsubstantiated. The
supposed copra business was actually the
business of her mother and their family,
with ten siblings. She has no license to sell
copra, and had not filed any income tax
return. All the motorized bancas of her
mother were lost to fire, and the last one
left standing was already scrap. Further, the
Child Study Report submitted by the
1) Declaring plaintiff as the owner in fee
simple over the residential house of strong
materials and three parcels of land
designated as Lot Nos. 1, 3 and 5 which are
covered by TCT Nos. 24790, 24791 and
24792 issued by the Register of Deeds of
Mandaue City;
2) Declaring as null and void TCT Nos.
24790, 24791 and 24792 issued in the
name of defendant Antoniet[t]a Descallar
by the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City;
3) Ordering the Register of Deeds of
Mandaue City to cancel TCT Nos. 24790,
24791 and 24792 in the name of defendant
Antoniet[t]a Descallar and to issue new
ones in the name of plaintiff Camilo F.
Borromeo;
4) Declaring the contracts now marked as
Exhibits "I","K" and "L" as avoided insofar
as they appear to convey rights and
interests over the properties in question to
the defendant Antoniet[t]a Descallar;
ATSIED
5) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff
attorney's fees in the amount of P25,000.00
and litigation expenses in the amount of
P10,000.00; and,
6) To pay the costs.
Respondent appealed to the Court of
Appeals. In a Decision dated April 10, 2002,
the appellate court reversed the decision of
the trial court. In ruling for the respondent,
the Court of Appeals held:
We disagree with the lower court's
conclusion. The circumstances involved in
the case cited by the lower court and
similar cases decided on by the Supreme
Court which upheld the validity of the title
of the subsequent Filipino purchasers are
absent in the case at bar. It should be noted
that in said cases, the title to the subject
property has been issued in the name of
the alien transferee (Godinez et al. vs. Fong
Pak Luen et al.,120 SCRA 223 citing
Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds of Manila,79
Phils. 461; United Church Board for World
Ministries vs. Sebastian,159 SCRA 446,
citing the case of Sarsosa Vda. De Barsobia
vs. Cuenco,113 SCRA 547; Tejido vs.
Zamacoma,138 SCRA 78).In the case at
bar, the title of the subject property is not
in the name of Jambrich but in the name of
defendant-appellant. Thus, Jambrich could
not have transferred a property he has no
title thereto.
constraints. Nonetheless, his signature
remained in the deed of sale, where he
signed as buyer.
(2) The money used to pay the subject
parcels of land in installments was in
postdated checks issued by Jambrich.
Respondent has never opened any account
with any bank. Receipts of the installment
payments were also in the name of
Jambrich and respondent.
(3) In 1986-1987, respondent lived in Syria
with Jambrich and her two children for ten
months, where she was completely under
the support of Jambrich.
(4) Jambrich executed a Last Will and
Testament, where he, as owner,
bequeathed the subject properties to
respondent.
Thus, Jambrich has all authority to transfer
all his rights, interests and participation
over the subject properties to petitioner by
virtue of the Deed of Assignment he
executed on July 11, 1991.
Well-settled is the rule that this Court is not
a trier of facts. The findings of fact of the
trial court are accorded great weight and
respect, if not finality by this Court, subject
to a number of exceptions. In the instant
case, we find no reason to disturb the
factual findings of the trial court. Even the
appellate court did not controvert the
factual findings of the trial court. They
differed only in their conclusions of law.
Further, the fact that the disputed
properties were acquired during the
couple's cohabitation also does not help
respondent. The rule that co-ownership
applies to a man and a woman living
exclusively with each other as husband and
wife without the benefit of marriage, but
are otherwise capacitated to marry each
other, does not apply. In the instant case,
respondent was still legally married to
another when she and Jambrich lived
together. In such an adulterous relationship,
no co-ownership exists between the parties.
It is necessary for each of the partners to
prove his or her actual contribution to the
acquisition of property in order to be able to
lay claim to any portion of it. Presumptions
of co-ownership and equal contribution do
not apply. DcaCSE
Second, we dispose of the issue of
registration of the properties in the name of
respondent alone. Having found that the
Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD) in the adoption
proceedings of respondent's two sons by
Jambrich disclosed that:
Antonietta tried all types of job to support
the children until she was accepted as a
waitress at St. Moritz Restaurant in 1984. At
first she had no problem with money
because most of the customers of St. Moritz
are (sic) foreigners and they gave good tips
but towards the end of 1984 there were no
more foreigners coming because of the
situation in the Philippines at that time. Her
financial problem started then. She was
even renting a small room in a squatters
area in Gorordo Ave.,Cebu City. It was
during her time of great financial distress
that she met Wilhelm Jambrich who later
offered her a decent place for herself and
her children.
The DSWD Home Study Report further
disclosed that:
[Jambrich] was then at the Restaurant of St.
Moritz when he saw Antonietta Descallar,
one of the waitresses of the said
Restaurants. He made friends with the girl
and asked her to tutor him in [the] English
language. Antonietta accepted the offer
because she was in need of additional
income to support [her] 2 young children
who were abandoned by their father. Their
session was agreed to be scheduled every
afternoon at the residence of Antonietta in
the squatters area in Gorordo Avenue, Cebu
City. The Austrian was observing the
situation of the family particularly the
children who were malnourished. After a
few months sessions, Mr. Jambrich offered
to transfer the family into a decent place.
He told Antonietta that the place is not
good for the children. Antonietta who was
miserable and financially distressed at that
time accepted the offer for the sake of the
children. aSTECA
Further, the following additional pieces of
evidence point to Jambrich as the source of
fund used to purchase the three parcels of
land, and to construct the house thereon:
(1) Respondent Descallar herself affirmed
under oath, during her re-direct
examination and during the proceedings for
the adoption of her minor children, that
Jambrich was the owner of the properties in
question, but that his name was deleted in
the Deed of Absolute Sale because of legal
would have been declared invalid if
challenged, had not Jambrich conveyed the
properties to petitioner who is a Filipino
citizen. In United Church Board for
World Ministries v. Sebastian, the Court
reiterated the consistent ruling in a number
of cases that if land is invalidly transferred
to an alien who subsequently becomes a
Filipino citizen or transfers it to a Filipino,
the flaw in the original transaction is
considered cured and the title of the
transferee is rendered valid. Applying
United Church Board for World
Ministries,the trial court ruled in favor of
petitioner, viz.:
[W]hile the acquisition and the purchase of
(sic) Wilhelm Jambrich of the properties
under litigation [were] void ab initio since
[they were] contrary to the Constitution of
the Philippines, he being a foreigner, yet,
the acquisition of these properties by
plaintiff who is a Filipino citizen from him,
has cured the flaw in the original
transaction and the title of the transferee is
valid.
The trial court upheld the sale by Jambrich
in favor of petitioner and ordered the
cancellation of the TCTs in the name of
respondent. It declared petitioner as owner
in fee simple of the residential house of
strong materials and three parcels of land
designated as Lot Nos. 1, 3 and 5, and
ordered the Register of Deeds of Mandaue
City to issue new certificates of title in his
name. The trial court likewise ordered
respondent to pay petitioner P25,000 as
attorney's fees and P10,000 as litigation
expenses, as well as the costs of suit.
DScTaC
We affirm the Regional Trial Court.
The rationale behind the Court's ruling in
United Church Board for World
Ministries, as reiterated in subsequent
cases, is this since the ban on aliens is
intended to preserve the nation's land for
future generations of Filipinos, that aim is
achieved by making lawful the acquisition
of real estate by aliens who became Filipino
citizens by naturalization or those transfers
made by aliens to Filipino citizens. As the
property in dispute is already in the hands
of a qualified person, a Filipino citizen, there
would be no more public policy to be
protected. The objective of the
true buyer of the disputed house and lots
was the Austrian Wilhelm Jambrich, what
now is the effect of registration of the
properties in the name of respondent?
It is settled that registration is not a mode
of acquiring ownership. It is only a means of
confirming the fact of its existence with
notice to the world at large. Certificates of
title are not a source of right. The mere
possession of a title does not make one the
true owner of the property. Thus, the mere
fact that respondent has the titles of the
disputed properties in her name does not
necessarily, conclusively and absolutely
make her the owner. The rule on
indefeasibility of title likewise does not
apply to respondent. A certificate of title
implies that the title is quiet, and that it is
perfect, absolute and indefeasible.
However, there are well-defined exceptions
to this rule, as when the transferee is not a
holder in good faith and did not acquire the
subject properties for a valuable
consideration. This is the situation in the
instant case. Respondent did not contribute
a single centavo in the acquisition of the
properties. She had no income of her own
at that time, nor did she have any savings.
She and her two sons were then fully
supported by Jambrich.
Respondent argued that aliens are
prohibited from acquiring private land. This
is embodied in Section 7, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution, which is basically a
reproduction of Section 5, Article XIII of the
1935 Constitution, and Section 14, Article
XIV of the 1973 Constitution. The capacity
to acquire private land is dependent on the
capacity "to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain." Private land may be
transferred only to individuals or entities
"qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain". Only Filipino citizens or
corporations at least 60% of the capital of
which is owned by Filipinos are qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Thus, as the rule now stands, the
fundamental law explicitly prohibits non-
Filipinos from acquiring or holding title to
private lands, except only by way of legal
succession or if the acquisition was made
by a former natural-born citizen.
Therefore, in the instant case, the transfer
of land from Agro-Macro Development
Corporation to Jambrich, who is an Austrian,
constitutional provision to keep our lands in
Filipino hands has been achieved.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is
GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No. 42929 dated
April 10, 2002 and its Resolution dated July
8, 2003 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Mandaue City in Civil Case No. MAN-1148 is
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Corona, Leonardo-de Castro and
Brion, JJ., concur.
juridical meaning. The distinguishing
feature between the one and the other, as
stated in the case of Mette vs. Feltgen (148
Ill., 357, 371), is that the surviving coowner
in joint tenancy is subrogated in the rights
of the deceased coowner immediately upon
the death of the latter, by the mere fact of
said death, but this does not take place in
cases of tenancy in common which
corresponds to what is known in our law as
community of property (articles 392 et seq.
of the Civil Code). For this reason, according
to American jurisprudence, a coowner in
joint tenancy can not dispose of his share or
interest in the property which is the subject
matter of the joint tenancy, without the
consent of the other coowner because in so
doing he prejudices the other's rights and
interests.
4. ID.; ID.; PURPOSE OF THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS. The purpose of the statute
of limitations is no other than to protect the
diligent and vigilant, not the person who
sleeps on his rights, forgetting them and
taking no trouble of exercising them one
way or another to show that he truly has
such rights.
5. ID.; ID.; SECTIONS 40, 41 AND 42 OF ACT
NO. 190. The law provides that in
whatever way the occupancy by a person
claiming to be the owner of a real property
may have commenced, if said occupancy is
under claim of title and is furthermore
open, continuous for ten years and adverse,
it constitutes sufficient title for the
occupant thereof (sections 40 and 41 of Act
No. 190), and there can be no other
exception to this rule than the disability of
persons who are entitled to said property,
by reason of age, some mental defect, or
imprisonment, for whom the same law
provides the exceptions contained in its
section 42.
6. ID.; ID.; INDEMNITY. It being clear that
R. T.'s action is barred it should be
understood that only the plaintiffs S. T. and
B. T. are entitled to compel the defendants
to pay to them the value of two-thirds of
the 1,000 cavans of palay produced in the
land in question, at the rate of P3 a cavan.
Occeo & Alba for appellants M. Garcia, R.
Garcia and D. Rufino.
DECISION
DIAZ, J p:
G.R. No. 40064 | Tagarao v. Garcia
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 40064. December 4, 1934.]
RESURRECTION TAGARAO,
BUENAVENTURA TAGARAO and
SERAFIN TAGARAO, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs. MARCOS GARCIA ET AL., defendants.
MARGARITA GARCIA, ROSARIO GARCIA,
DOLORES RUFINO, and ELEUTERIO
RUFINO, appellants.
Vicente T. Remitio for appellant E. Rufino.
Rafael P. Guerrero for appellees.
SYLLABUS
1. PRESCRIPTION OF ACTION; DISABILITY OF
A COOWNER DOES NOT SAVE ANOTHER
COOWNER WHO IS "SUI JURIS" FROM THE
EFFECTS OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
The disability which protects an heir from
the effects of prescription is no protection
to co-heirs, or in other words, using the
same language of the author of the
footnotes on the decision rendered in the
case of Moore vs. Armstrong, reported in 36
Am. Dec., 63, 78, wherein the Supreme
Court of the State of Ohio from which
section 42 of Act No. 190 was taken,
sustained said point of view, "where the
rights of the parties are not joint, the cases
are uniform, and hold that the disability of
one will prevent the operation of the statute
as to him, but that those who are not under
a disability will be barred."
2. ID.; ID. The Supreme Court of Ohio
correctly stated in a similar case that
whatever doubt might once have been
entertained on this subject it was
conclusively settled both in Great Britain
and in the United States that the statute is
saved in favor only of the person laboring
under the alleged disability and this is
precisely the rule with respect to
coparceners and tenants in common.
3. ID.; ID.; JOINT TENANCY AND TENANCY IN
COMMON. What particularly distinguishes
the case at bar from that of Sturges and
Anderson vs. Longworth and Horne (1 Ohio
St., 545) and the other cases wherein it was
established that when the rights are joint
the exception which saves one of the
interested parties also inures to the benefit
of the others, is that it was assumed in the
latter cases that the rights and interests
involved therein pertained to joint tenancy,
not tenancy in common, which are two
distinct relations, each having its own
jurisdiction to try the case by reason of the
subject matter involved and the lower court
overruled said demurrer ordering them to
answer within the reglementary period. In
compliance therewith, the defendants on
October 28, 1992, filed their answer
wherein the first two defendants, or the
spouses Marcos Garcia and Paula
Tabifranca, alleged that although they
formerly were the absolute and exclusive
owners of the land in question they already
ceased to be so at that time, having sold
the half belonging to Paula Tabifranca to the
defendants Margarita Garcia, Rosario Garcia
and Dolores Rufino, and the other half
belonging to Marcos Garcia to Eleuterio
Rufino. On June 9, 1931, said two
defendants filed a petition of even date
stating that they had no more interest in
the case, having sold their respective
participations to the two Garcias and two
Rufinos and praying in succession that they
be absolved from the complaint.
A few days later, or on July 15, 1931, said
two defendants Marcos Garcia and Paula
Tabifranca filed a motion to include
Eleuterio Rufino among the defendants and
on the following day the lower court,
granting the motion, ordered the inclusion
of Eleuterio Rufino in the case as one of the
defendants. For this purpose the plaintiffs
filed their said amended complaint of July
29, 1931, which they reamended with a
slight addition on March 8, 1932.
The defendants Marcos Garcia and Paula
Tabifranca did not answer the plaintiffs' last
amended complaint but Margarita Garcia,
Rosario Garcia and Dolores Rufino jointly
entered a general denial of all the
allegations contained therein, alleging as a
special defense (1) that they are the
exclusive owners of one-half of the land in
question; (2) that the plaintiffs have already
lost their right of action because such right,
if they ever had any, has already
prescribed; and (3) said plaintiffs cannot
invoke the decision rendered in civil case
No. 4091 because with respect to them it
does not constitute res judicata.
The defendant Eleuterio Rufino, answering
said plaintiffs' last amended complaint,
stated in his pleading of November 19,
1931, that he denied each and every
allegation contained therein, alleging as a
special defense that one half of the land in
This action was brought by the brothers and
sisters Resurreccion Tagarao, Buenaventura
Tagarao, and Serafin Tagarao, children of
the deceased Merced Garcia, daughter of
the deceased Buenaventura Garcia who
was a brother of the defendant Marcos
Garcia, against the latter and the other
defendants named Paula Tabifranca,
Margarita Garcia, Rosario Garcia, Dolores
Rufino and Eleuterio Rufino, praying that
judgment be rendered against the
defendants ordering them to deliver to the
plaintiffs, after executing the necessary
deeds of transfer, one-fourth of the land
known as lot No. 510 of cadastral case No.
11 of the municipality of Isabela, Occidental
Negros (G. L. R. O. Cad. Record No. 100),
which was formerly covered, first by
original certificate of title No. 10009
(Exhibit M), later by transfer certificate of
title No. 3001 (Exhibit 3), and at present by
transfer certificate of title No. 8782 (Exhibit
7), all of the office of the register of deeds
of said Province of Occidental Negros.
In their amended complaint of July 29,
1931, which was reamended on March 8,
1932, said plaintiffs prayed that should the
defendants fail to deliver to them the
required portion of the land in question, the
latter be ordered to pay them the value
thereof based on the assessed value of the
whole property, and that they furthermore
be indemnified for the value of 1,407
cavans of palay at the rate of P4 a cavan,
alleging that said 1,407 cavans represented
their share in the products of said land from
the time the defendants took exclusive
possession thereof.
Before the plaintiffs filed their amended
complaint on the date above stated, the
defendants Marcos Garcia, Paula Tabifranca,
Margarita Garcia, Rosario Garcia and
Dolores Rufino filed a demurrer to said
plaintiffs' original complaint, alleging that it
did not state sufficient facts to constitute a
cause of action and was furthermore
ambiguous, unintelligible and uncertain.
The lower court sustained said demurrer
and ordered the plaintiffs to amend their
complaint within the reglementary period.
When the plaintiffs amended their
complaint in the sense expressed in their
pleading of February 13, 1929, said five
defendants again filed another demurrer
alleging this time that the lower court lack
"5. The lower court erred in condemning
the defendants-appellants Margarita Garcia,
Rosario Garcia and Dolores Rufino, jointly
and severally with the other defendants to
return to the plaintiffs one-fourth (1/4) of lot
No. 510 of the cadastral survey of Isabela,
or in its place, to indemnify the plaintiffs
the sum of P3,882, value of said portion.
"6. The lower court erred in condemning
the defendants-appellants Margarita Garcia,
Rosario Garcia and Dolores Rufino, jointly
and severally with the other defendants, to
pay the plaintiffs one thousand cavanes of
palay or its value at P3 per cavan.
"7. The lower court erred in holding that the
right of the plaintiffs to present this action
to recover a portion of lot No. 510 of the
cadastral survey of Isabela has not
prescribed.
"8. The lower court erred in denying the
petition for a new trial of the defendants-
appellants Margarita Garcia, Rosario Garcia
and Dolores Rufino."
The appellant Eleuterio Rufino also
contends that said court in rendering its
judgment in question committed the four
alleged errors relied upon in his brief, which
read as follows:
"1. The lower court erred in admitting over
the defendant's objection oral as well as
documentary evidence of the plaintiffs
tending to attack the stability of original
certificate of title No. 10009 (Exhibit 5) in
the name of the defendants Marcos Garcia
and Paula Tabifranca, relative to alleged
facts that took place prior to the issuance of
said title.
"2. The lower court erred in ordering the
defendant Eleuterio Rufino, jointly with his
codefendants, to deliver to the plaintiffs
one-fourth (1/4) of said lot No. 510, or in
lieu thereof to indemnify them in the sum of
P3,882 representing the value of said
portion.
"3. The lower court erred in holding in its
judgment that the deed (Exhibit 8) is
fictitious and fraudulent and declaring it
null and void.
"4. The lower court erred in not absolving
the defendant and appellant Eleuterio
Rufino from the complaint and in denying
his motion for a new trial."
Without losing sight of the purpose of the
complaint of the plaintiffs and appellees as
expressed in the prayer of their pleadings
question was sold by Marcos Garcia and
purchased by him in good faith, paying the
corresponding price therefor.
After due trial the lower court rendered
judgment ordering the defendants to
deliver to the plaintiffs one fourth of the
land in question after executing the
necessary deeds of transfer in favor of said
plaintiffs or, in lieu thereof, to indemnify
them in the sum of P3,882 plus the value of
1,000 cavans of palay at P3 a cavan, with
costs. In said judgment said court "declared
the deeds of sale executed by Marcos
Garcia in favor of the defendant Eleuterio
Rufino and by Paula Tabifranca in favor of
the defendants Margarita Garcia, Rosario
Garcia and Dolores Rufino, null and void."
The defendants Margarita Garcia, Rosario
Garcia, Dolores Rufino and Eleuterio Rufino
appealed but Marcos Garcia and Paula
Tabifranca did not.
In support of their appeal, the defendants
Margarita Garcia, Rosario Garcia, and
Dolores Rufino contend that the lower court
committed the eight alleged errors
assigned in their brief as follows:
"1. The lower court erred in not sustaining
the demurrer of the defendants-appellants
Margarita Garcia, Rosario Garcia and
Dolores Rufino to the second amended
complaint of the plaintiffs.
"2. The lower court erred in admitting,
under objections of the defendants-
appellants, oral and documentary evidence
tending to attack original certificate of title
No. 10009 in the name of the spouses
Marcos Garcia and Paula Tabifranca issued
on May 17, 1918.
"3. The lower court erred in holding that the
deed of sale made and executed by Paula
Tabifranca with respect to her undivided
one- half (1/2) share of lot No. 510 of the
cadastral survey of Isabela in favor of
Margarita Garcia, Rosario Garcia and
Dolores Rufino, was made without
consideration and declaring same null and
void being fictitious.
"4. The lower court erred in holding that the
transaction made by Paula Tabifranca in
favor of Margarita Garcia, Rosario Garcia
and Dolores Rufino had no other purpose
than to deprive the plaintiffs of their shares
in lot No. 510, as legitimate heirs of Ventura
Garcia and Merced Garcia.
was brought on October 14, 1928,
Resurreccion Tagarao was more than 24
years of age; Serafin was then only 23
years, 1 month and 1 day, and
Buenaventura, 18 years, 4 months and 3
days.
With the plaintiffs' grandfather, Ventura
Garcia, and their mother, Merced Garcia,
already dead, the defendant Marcos Garcia
claimed the land in question in cadastral
case No. 11 of the municipality of Isabela of
the Province of Occidental Negros (G. L. R.
O. Cadastral Record No. 100), known in said
case as lot No. 510, alleging in the pleading
presented by him to that effect (Exhibit I)
that he had acquired it on July 20, 1904,
when he was yet unmarried to his
codefendant Paula Tabifranca. Before the
original certificate of title acknowledging
him to be the owner of the land in question
was issued to him, and during the period
within which any person could ask for the
revision of the decree issued to that effect,
Marcos Garcia, fearing that Claro Garcia,
brother of the plaintiffs' mother, might
frustrate his designs by asking for said
revision, executed in favor of Claro Garcia a
document binding himself to give to the
latter four hectares of said land upon the
issuance to him of the corresponding
certificate of title. In view thereof, Claro did
not ask for the revision of the decree but he
later brought an action ase No. 4091 of the
Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros,
against Marcos Garcia to recover from him
four hectares of said land, lot No. 510 of the
cadastre of Isabela, basing his claim on the
document which Marcos Garcia executed in
his favor in order to promise and bind
himself to give Claro said four hectares,
because after Marcos Garcia had obtained
his certificate of title he refused to comply
with his promise; and as a result said court,
on October 10, 1927, rendered judgment
against Marcos Garcia ordering him to
segregate four hectares of said land to be
delivered to Claro Garcia and furthermore
to pay to the latter as indemnity 90 cavans
of palay, or the value thereof in the sum of
P360.
In the certificate of title which was issued in
favor of Marcos Garcia on May 17, 1918
(original certificate of title No. 10009), by
virtue of his claim presented in said
cadastral case No. 11 of the municipality of
or last amended complaints, it is clear that
the first assignment of alleged error
attributed to the lower court by the
appellants is unfounded on the ground that
its purpose is not to attack the validity of
the decree by virtue of which original
certificate of title No. 10009 was issued in
favor of Marcos Garcia and Paula
Tabifranca, or that under which transfer
certificates of title Nos. 3001 and 8782,
were issued later, but to compel the
defendants to give them one- fourth of the
land described in said certificates and to
pay them the indemnity referred to therein.
The facts which have been clearly
established at the trial, according to the
record and the evidence before us, may be
briefly stated as follows:
The land in question has an area of 31
hectares, 3 ares and 65 centares. It was
originally purchased with pacto de retro by
the defendant Marcos Garcia and his
brother Ventura Garcia from Vidal Saravia
on July 20, 1900. As the latter failed to
exercise his right of repurchase the two
brothers became the absolute owners of
said land and it was so held by the Court of
First Instance of Occidental Negros in case
No. 274 which was instituted by Pedro
Saravia, against said two brothers to
compel the latter to resell it to him (Exhibit
L). When the two brothers purchased said
land, the defendant Marcos Garcia was yet
single because he had not even been
married to his former wife, as the defendant
Paula Tabifranca is only his wife by a second
marriage. Marcos Garcia had by his first
wife three children who are the defendants
Margarita Garcia, Rosario Garcia and the
deceased Catalina Garcia, mother of the
defendant Dolores Rufino. Ventura Garcia,
now deceased, also had two children:
Merced Garcia who was married to Rafael
Tagarao, and Claro Garcia.
While Merced Garcia was still living, or at
least until June, 1914, the defendant Marcos
Garcia had been delivering to her and her
brother Claro Garcia their share of the
products harvested from the land in
question. Merced Garcia who, as stated,
died about the year 1914 and was followed
years later by her husband Rafael Tagarao,
had three children, the herein plaintiffs
Resurreccion Tagarao, Serafin Tagarao and
Buenaventura Tagarao. When this action
Exhibit 8 whereby he sold to the latter his
half of the land described in the above
stated certificate of title No. 10009 (Exhibit
M), he and his daughters and
granddaughter jointly with the defendant
Eleuterio Rufino succeeded in having said
transfer certificate of title No. 3001 (Exhibit
3) cancelled to be substituted, as it was in
fact substituted, by transfer certificate of
title No. 8782 (Exhibit 7).
The transfer made by Paula Tabifranca in
favor of her stepdaughters Margarita and
Rosario Garcia and her husband's
granddaughter Dolores Rufino, and that
made by Marcos Garcia in favor of Eleuterio
Rufino, stated in said deeds Exhibits N and
8, are fictitious and feigned in view of the
following reasons inferable from the
evidence of record:
Notwithstanding the fact that in the original
certificate of title No. 10009 Paula
Tabifranca's right to one half of the property
therein described has been acknowledged,
she was conscious that she was not entitled
thereto because it belonged exclusively to
her husband or, at least, he had acquired it
long before he married her. This explains
the ease with which she parted with her
alleged right for a sum disproportionate to
the true value of the land sold by her. The
alleged purchasers Margarita Garcia,
Rosario Garcia and Dolores Rufino were not
in a financial position to pay her the alleged
purchase price which, according to Exhibit
N, amounted to P1,500; and Dolores Rufino,
being then of tender age, could not have
taken part in said contract of sale,
notwithstanding that it was stated in said
document that she was represented by her
father Lope Rufino, because it does not
appear that the latter was then the
guardian of her property and it is a fact that
minors can not give consent to any
contract.
Neither was Eleuterio Rufino in a financial
position to pay what he allegedly paid to
the defendant Marcos Garcia for the latter's
share in the land in question on the ground
that the amount of six thousand five
hundred sixty-seven pesos (P6,567) which
is the price allegedly paid by him to Marcos
Garcia is a fortune greater than the income
he could have had for several years,
because his means of livelihood, according
Isabela, Occidental Negros, it was stated, as
in the decree ordering the issuance thereof,
that one-half of the land therein described
belonged to him, and that the other half to
his wife by a second marriage, Paula
Tabifranca.
A few years after the issuance of said
certificate of title, the defendant Paula
Tabifranca, second wife of the defendant
Marcos Garcia, sold her rights to the
defendants Margarita Garcia, Rosario Garcia
and Dolores Rufino, her husband's
daughters and granddaughter, respectively,
by his first marriage, executing the deed
Exhibit N dated December 31, 1921, while
the alleged purchaser Dolores Rufino was
yet a minor. This was agreed upon between
her and her husband Marcos Garcia to
prevent the land, part of which belonged to
her under said certificate of title, from ever
passing to her son by her first marriage
named Juan Tabigui, as she was already a
widow when she contracted marriage with
said Marcos Garcia.
In the meantime the plaintiff Resurreccion
Tagarao was informed that her uncle Claro
Garcia had succeeded in obtaining his share
of the land in question and, desiring to
protect her rights and those of her brothers
and coplaintiffs, she negotiated with Marcos
Garcia so that he might give them their
corresponding share. Marcos Garcia at first
entertained her with promises that he
would see to it that she got what she
wanted but later, at her back, he sold his
share of the land to the defendant Eleuterio
Rufino, brother of his son-in-law Lope
Rufino, husband of the defendant Rosario
Garcia, executing in favor of Eleuterio
Rufino the deed Exhibit 8 wherein it was
made to appear that the price paid to him
for only one-half of the land, lot No. 510,
was P6,567.
Twelve days after Paula Tabifranca had
executed said deed of transfer Exhibit N in
favor of her stepdaughters Margarita Garcia
and Rosario Garcia and of her husband
Marcos Garcia's granddaughter named
Dolores Rufino, said three defendants
together with Marcos Garcia obtained
transfer certificate of title No. 3001, after
the cancellation of original certificate of
title No. 10009, and two days after Marcos
Garcia had executed in favor of the
defendant Eleuterio Rufino the deed of sale
land, Exhibit 8, Macario Torilla and Lope
Rufino, as Marcos Garcia's attorneys-in-fact,
the latter having executed in their favor the
power of attorney, Exhibit O-1, by virtue of
which they mortgaged the land in question
in the name of their principal to Candido
Montilla on July 7, 1928, Exhibit O, paid to
Montilla the sum of P514.25 as interest on
the loan secured by the mortgage above
stated (Exhibit 4). This last fact convinces
us more that said deed of transfer Exhibit 8
is fictitious because if it were genuine,
there being as in fact there is in said
document a stipulation that the purchaser
Eleuterio Rufino assumed all the lien on
said property, Eleuterio Rufino, not Marcos
Garcia, personally, nor through his sons-in-
law Macario Torilla and Lope Rufino, should
have paid said interest.
The foregoing proves to our satisfaction
that errors 2, 3 and 4 relied upon by the
appellants Margarita Garcia, Rosario Garcia
and Dolores Rufino in their brief are
absolutely unfounded, and so is alleged
error No. 3 attributed to the lower court by
the appellant Eleuterio Rufino.
It follows from the foregoing conclusions
and considerations that errors 5 and 2
attributed to said court by the defendants
Garcia and Eleuterio Rufino, respectively,
are likewise unfounded. If the transfers
made under the deeds which later made
possible the issuance to the interested
parties of certificates of title Nos. 3001 and
8782 (Exhibits 3 and 7) are fraudulent, it is
but proper, being in accordance with law,
that the defendants execute the deeds of
transfer prayed for by the plaintiffs in their
complaint in order to give them what is
theirs; and this is undoubtedly one fourth of
the entire land because if one half belonged
to the defendants' predecessor in interest,
the other half belonged to the plaintiffs'
grandfather who, as already stated, had
only two children: Claro Garcia, the
plaintiffs' uncle, and Merced Garcia, their
mother.
But the question now arises whether or not
the three plaintiffs are entitled to what they
jointly pray for in their complaint. There is
no doubt but that the plaintiffs Serafin
Tagarao and Buenaventura Tagarao are
entitled thereto on the ground that the
former was only 23 years, 1 month and 1
day, when this action was brought, and
to his own testimony, consisted simply of
extracting tuba from about 200 coconut
trees leased from different persons and in
retailing fresh fish bought by him for a lump
sum in order to obtain a small profit. He is a
brother of the defendant Rosario Garcia's
husband, and notwithstanding that the
deed Exhibit 8 was executed in his favor,
the land continues until now to be
registered for taxation purposes in the
name of Marcos Garcia; and
notwithstanding the alleged deed of
transfer Exhibit 8 the land in question
continues to be under the Isabela Sugar
Company Inc., of Occidental Negros, as
property of Marcos Garcia, although it is
divided into three portions named "THREE
SISTERS A," "THREE SISTERS B," and
"HACIENDA GARCIA," the first portion being
under the management of Macario Torilla,
husband of the defendant Margarita Garcia;
the second under the management of Lope
Rufino, husband of the defendant Rosario
Garcia; and the third under that of Claro
Garcia, uncle of the plaintiffs (Exhibit D). In
addition to these reasons, it may and
should be stated that Eleuterio Rufino's
testimony explaining how the transaction
between him and Marcos Garcia was
effected, does not agree with the text of the
deed of transfer Exhibit 8. It is expressly
stated in said document that the price paid
by him for the land in question was P6,567
and that he also assumed the lien in the
form of a mortgage constituted on said land
to secure the payment to Candido Montilla
of a loan in the sum of P4,675 from which it
may be inferred that the total price paid by
him for said land was really P11,242.
Notwithstanding this, he testified that he
paid only P1,892 to the defendant Marcos
Garcia. It should be stated furthermore that
on December 1, 1928, or scarcely two and a
half months from the time he bought said
land from Marcos Garcia, Eleuterio Rufino
leased it, according to Exhibit 9, to Marcos
Garcia's sons-in-law and husbands of the
defendants Margarita Garcia and Rosario
Garcia, when it is natural that as he was
poor and his business of tapping tuba and
reselling fishes was not lucrative, he should
have personally taken charge of the
cultivation and exploitation of the land
bought by him. Furthermore, on January 10,
1930, long after the alleged transfer of said
at bar than those of Sturges and Anderson,
vs. Longworth and Horne, and Wilkins, vs.
Philips cited in case of Velazquez vs.
Teodoro, supra. The question for
determination in the former case was
whether or not the period of prescription
runs not only against the heir who is
laboring under disability but also against his
coheirs who are sui juris. The plaintiffs, to
all appearances, were the heirs of one
Furgus Moore and the heiress who seemed
to be laboring under disability was a
married woman named Mrs. Fleming. The
Supreme Court of Ohio decided the
question in the negative with the remark
that whatever doubt might once have been
entertained on this subject, it was
conclusively settled both in Great Britain
and in the United States that the statute is
saved in favor only of the person laboring
under the alleged disability, adding in
succession that this is precisely the rule
with respect both to coparceners and
tenants in common.
It cannot be argued that the separation of
rights among the plaintiffs was not
practicable in the sense that one of them
could not have disposed of or alienate his
legal portion of the thing possessed in
common without the consent of the others,
because the law provides otherwise. It says:
"Every part owner shall have the absolute
ownership of his part, and of the fruits and
benefits derived therefrom, and he may,
therefore, sell, assign, or mortgage it, and
even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, unless personal rights are
involved, but the effect of the sale or
mortgage, with respect to the other
participants, shall be limited to the share
which may be allotted him in the partition
upon the dissolution of the community."
Furthermore, whosoever among said
plaintiffs should have desired the partition
of the property of which he was a coowner,
could have demanded such partition
inasmuch as the law then allowed and still
allows such act (article 400, Civil Code; and
section 181, Act No. 190). What particularly
distinguishes the case at bar from that of
Sturges and Anderson vs. Longworth and
Horne, supra and the other cases wherein it
was established that when the rights are
joint the exception which saves one of the
interested parties also inures to the benefit
therefore the three years exception granted
by the provisions of section 42 of Act No.
190 had not yet elapsed as to him, and
because Buenaventura Tagarao, then being
only 18 years, 4 months and 3 days of age,
was yet a minor and the period of
prescription as to him is extended to three
years after he has attained majority.
The plaintiff Resurreccion Tagarao,
notwithstanding that she was of legal age
when this action was brought, contends
that neither has her right to seek the same
relief prayed for by her brothers and
coplaintiffs prescribed, and cites in support
of her contention the ruling laid down in the
case of Velasquez vs. Teodoro (46 Phil.,
757). It was truly stated in said case, citing
with approval a doctrine laid down by the
Supreme Court of the State of Ohio in the
case of Sturges and Anderson vs.
Longworth and Horne (1 Ohio St., 545),
that:
"Where the interests of two defendants are
joint and inseparable, and the rights of one
are saved under the provision of the statute
of limitations, on account of his disability,
such saving inures to the benefit of the
other defendant, although laboring under
no disability."
As may be seen, this ruling refers to cases
in which the rights of the defendants are
joint and inseparable because when they
are not so, that is, when they are joint and
several at the same time, as is the case of
the plaintiffs whose rights are joint and
several, the rule according to said court,
interpreting the section from which section
42 of Act No. 190 was copied, is different;
and said court stated that in said cases the
disability which protects an heir from the
effects of prescription is no protection to
coheirs, or in other words, using the same
language of the author of the footnotes on
the decision rendered in the case of Moore
vs. Armstrong, reported in 36 Am. Dec., 63,
78, wherein the same Supreme Court of the
State of Ohio sustained the latter point of
view, "where the rights of the parties are
not joint, the cases are uniform, and hold
that the disability of one will prevent the
operation of the statute as to him, but that
those who are not under a disability will be
barred."
The case of Moore vs. Armstrong, supra,
has more points in common with the case
contrary, she allowed said spouses to
perform acts of ownership on the land
covered by said certificate, publicly,
peacefully, uninterruptedly and adversely
to the whole world including herself, and
from that time until the filing of her first
complaint more than ten years had
elapsed. It is for this reason why it cannot
be sustained that the defendants Marcos
Garcia and Paula Tabifranca, after it has
been shown that the transfers made by
them are null and void, being fictitious and
false, hold the land in question in trust,
because if they ever held it in said capacity
it had been during the lifetime of the
plaintiffs' mother to whom said defendants
used to give part of the fruits thereof. But
after she had died, their possession was
under the circumstances above stated and
the law provides that in whatever way the
occupancy by a person claiming to be the
owner of a real property may have
commenced, if said occupancy is under
claim of title and is furthermore open,
continuous for ten years and adverse, it
constitutes sufficient title for the occupant
thereof (sections 40 and 41 of Act No. 190),
and there can be no other exception to this
rule than the disability of persons who are
entitled to said property, by reason of age,
some mental defect, or imprisonment, for
whom the same law provides the
exceptions contained in its section 42.
It having been established by the evidence
for both the plaintiffs and the defendants
that Candido Montilla holds a lien on the
land in question, which is noted at the back
of transfer certificates of title Nos. 3001
and 8782 (Exhibits 3 and 7) for a loan in the
sum of P4,675 which he granted to Marcos
Garcia in the honest belief that the latter
was the true owner of the land described in
certificates of title Nos. 10009 (Exhibit M),
3001 (Exhibit 3), and 8782 (Exhibit 7), it is
but just that said lien be acknowledged by
the plaintiffs Serafin Tagarao and
Buenaventura Tagarao, with the necessary
reservations in favor of said two plaintiffs.
It should be stated in passing that the land
in question, lot No. 510 of cadastral case
No. 11 of Isabela, Occidental Negros, is
assessed at P15,530, and therefore one-
twelfth (1/12) thereof is worth P1,294.17 on
that basis.
of the others, is that it was assumed in the
latter cases that the rights and interests
involved therein pertained to joint tenancy,
not tenancy in common, which are two
distinct relations, each having its own
juridical meaning. The distinguishing
feature between the one and the other, as
stated in the case of Mette vs. Feltgen (148
Ill., 357, 371), is that the surviving coowner
in joint tenancy is subrogated in the rights
of the deceased coowner immediately upon
the death of the latter, by the mere fact of
said death, but this does not take place in
cases of tenancy in common which
corresponds to what is known in our law as
community of property (articles 392 et seq.
of the Civil Code). For this reason, according
to American jurisprudence, a coowner in
joint tenancy can not dispose of his share or
interest in the property which is the subject
matter of the joint tenancy, without the
consent of the other coowner because in so
doing he prejudices the other's rights and
interests.
That the separation of rights and interests
among the plaintiffs was practicable is
further evidenced by the fact that Claro
Garcia with whom they were entitled to
one-half of the land in question could
recover his legal portion thereof from
Marcos Garcia, although certainly not in its
entirety, having failed to assert his rights.
This being so, and it being known as it is in
fact known that the purpose of the statute
of limitations is no other than to protect the
diligent and vigilant, not the person who
sleeps on his rights, forgetting them and
taking no trouble of exercising them one
way or another to show that he truly has
such rights, it is logical to conclude that the
right of action of the plaintiff Resurreccion
Tagarao is barred, and the fact that that of
her brothers and coplaintiffs Serafin and
Buenaventura Tagarao still subsists does
not inure to her benefit.
Although Resurreccion Tagarao could have
enforced the right which she exercised in
this case on May 17, 1918, when Marcos
Garcia and Paula Tabifranca obtained
original certificate of title No. 10009
(Exhibit M) or shortly afterwards, or long
before, that is, from the death of her
mother Merced Garcia in 1914 or 1915, she
did nothing to protect her rights. On the
followed. The judgment of the trial court
should be affirmed.
GODDARD, J., concurring:
I concur with this opinion of Justice
Malcolm.
VILLA-REAL, J., concurring and dissenting:
I agree with the majority opinion in so far as
it favors the plaintiffs Serafin Tagarao and
Buenaventura Tagarao, but I regret having
to dissent therefrom in so far as it declares
that Resurreccion Tagarao's right of action
is barred.
After a lengthy disquisition during which
American and English jurisprudence was
examined, the majority lays down the
general rule that in all actions involving
community of property or tenancy in
common, the disability of a cotenant or a
coowner to bring an action does not benefit
those who are sui juris.
The rulings in the various supreme courts of
the American Union on this point are stated
in 37 Corpus Juris, page 1031, paragraph
441, as follows:
"Disability of one of several parties. The
authorities are not in harmony upon the
question of the effect of the disability of
one or more of several parties when one or
more are sui juris. Thus it has been held
that if one cotenant is a minor the disability
will save the interests of his cotenant from
the operation of limitations in actions for
land, and this rule is extended to tenants in
common as well as joint tenants, the
latter being a somewhat anomalous
doctrine, although in personal actions it
is held otherwise, and one plaintiff may be
barred while another is saved. On the other
hand it is held that, where the right is joint
so that all must sue, all must have the right
to sue when the suit is brought, and if one
is barred at that time all are barred,
although some may have labored under
disability. Perhaps the rule which is best
supported by the authorities is that if the
right is joint and several the disability of
one will save him but will not avail another
who is not under disability, and that if the
right is joint so that the suit cannot be
brought except by the parties jointly then
the rights of all are saved if any is under
disability; and one of coheirs or tenants in
common is saved by his own disability
notwithstanding his cotenant is sui juris and
barred, and the saving as to the former will
As to the indemnity which the plaintiffs
claim from the defendants, the conclusion
arrived at by the lower court in its decision
and judgment is supported by the evidence,
that is, the plaintiffs' share of the crops
from 1918 to 1929, including that of
Resurreccion Tagarao, should be 1,000
cavans of palay. However, it being clear
that Resurreccion Tagarao's action is
barred, it should be understood that only
the plaintiffs Serafin Tagarao and
Buenaventura Tagarao are entitled to
compel the defendants to pay to them the
value of two-thirds of the 1,000 cavans of
palay at the rate of P3 a cavan.
For all the foregoing, the judgment
appealed from is affirmed in so far as it
favors the plaintiffs Serafin Tagarao and
Buenaventura Tagarao, and said defendants
are hereby ordered to execute in favor of
said Tagarao brothers the deed or deeds
necessary to transfer to them, by virtue of
this judgment, two-twelfths (2/12) of the
entire lot No. 510 of the cadastre of Isabela,
Occidental Negros, including the portion
transferred to Claro Garcia (G. L. R. O. Cad.
Record No. 100); to indemnify each of them
in a sum equal to what he may pay to the
mortgage creditor Candido Montilla to free
his said portion from the lien thereon in
favor of said Montilla; or likewise to pay to
each of them, upon failure of the
defendants to deliver said portion and
execute the necessary deed of transfer, the
sum of P1,294.17; and furthermore to pay,
as indemnity, the value of two-thirds of
1,000 cavans of palay, at the rate of P3 a
cavan, with costs against the defendants.
Said judgment is reversed as to the plaintiff
Resurreccion Tagarao. So ordered.
Street, Abad Santos, Hull, Vickers, Imperial
and Butte, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
MALCOLM, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur with the opinion of Justice Villa-
Real, but in addition desire to append the
following observations: The case at bar is
permeated with fraud. To do justice to the
parties, all three of the plaintiffs should be
permitted to enforce their equitable rights.
This can be done if the rule announced in
the case of Velazquez vs. Teodoro ([1923],
46 Phil., 757), be accepted as stating a rule
of property and practice which should be
those having a like interest, he may be
made a defendant, the fact of his interest
and refusal to join being stated in the
complaint. Were the courts to permit an
action in ejectment to be maintained by a
person owning merely an undivided interest
in any given tract of land, a judgment in
favor of the defendant would not be
conclusive as against the other coowners
not parties to the suit, and thus the
defendant in possession of the property
might be harassed by as many succeeding
actions of ejectment, as there might be
coowners of the title asserted against him.
The evident purpose of section 114 is to
prevent the multiplicity of suits by requiring
the person asserting a right against the
defendant to include with him, either as
coplaintiffs or as codefendants, all persons
standing in the same position, so that the
whole matter in dispute may be determined
once and for all in one litigation."
We have not examined, nor do we need to
do so, the procedural laws of the State of
Ohio to the doctrine of the Supreme Court
of which the majority unconditionally
adheres, inasmuch as we have our own civil
procedural law section 114 of which, taken
from the Code of Civil Procedure of
California, enumerates those who should be
joined as plaintiffs as well as those who
should be joined as defendants in an action.
I agree that American jurisprudence should
be followed as persuasive authority in all
that which is in accord with our laws,
customs and social condition, particularly if
the legal provision to be interpreted or
construed has been copied from some law
of the State the Supreme Court of which
has rendered the decision invoked. But in
the case at bar we have our own law on
civil procedure regulating the form and
manner of bringing actions and the persons
who should bring them and against whom
they should be brought. If section 114 of
our Code of Civil Procedure, as interpreted
by this court, does not allow the bringing of
an action for the recovery of a common
property, as the one in question, by any
cotenant or coowner without the consent of
the others, and if under the American
decision on which the majority opinion is
based "if the right is joint so that the suit
cannot be brought except by the parties
not save the latter, upon the principle that
each may sue for his own share severally.
This general rule is subject to qualifications,
however, and while it is held that if the
cause accrues to two jointly who are under
disability, the statute will not run until the
disability is removed as to both, the
application of the rule is confined to cases
where all the parties are under disability
when the cause accrues and if one is not
under disability the statute will run against
all; and this latter branch of the rule is
confined in some cases to actions other
than for the recovery of land in which the
rule is applied that as each may sue for is
own share, even though all may join, the
bar as to one will not operate against the
other who is under disability."
It is inferred from the foregoing that one of
the best rules laid down by the authorities
on the matter is that if the right is joint so
that the suit cannot be brought except by
the parties jointly, the rights of all are
saved if any is under disability. It will be
seen that the rule that when a cotenant or
coowner is sui juris, the fact that his
cotenants or coowners are laboring under
disability does not save him from the
prescription of the right of action if it is not
exercised in due time, is not absolute. The
rule is applicable only when a cotenant or
coowner may exercise his right of action
independently of his coowners or
cotenants; but not when the action
necessarily has to be brought jointly by all
the coowners or cotenants.
In the case of Palarca vs. Baguisi (38 Phil.,
177, 180, 181), this court through Justice
Fisher, interpreting section 114 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, stated as follows:
". . . We hold that a coowner cannot
maintain an action in ejectment without
joining all other persons interested. Section
114 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires
that every action must be prosecuted in the
name of the real party in interest, and that
any person who has an interest in this
subject matter and who is a necessary
party to a complete determination of the
questions involved should be made a party
to the proceeding. The same article
provides, in its last paragraph, that if any
person having an interest in the subject of
the action, and in obtaining the relief
demanded, refuses to join as plaintiff with
jointly then the rights of all are saved if any
is under disability," then the appealed
judgment should be affirmed in all its parts.
For the foregoing considerations, I am of
the humble opinion that inasmuch as
Resurreccion Tagarao, independently of her
coowners Buenaventura Tagarao and
Serafin Tagarao, could not bring the present
action for the recovery of their undivided
portion of lot No. 510 of cadastral case No.
11 of Isabela, Occidental Negros, G. L. R. O.
Cadastral Record No. 100, in question,
which belongs to the plaintiffs and
defendants in common and undivided
shares, the disability of her minor brothers
saves her, and her fate follows theirs.
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in
part.
1.That the plaintiffs, the defendants and the
intervenor are the pro-indiviso co-owners of
the properties cited and described in the
complaint;
2.That six and nine tenth (6-9/10) hectares
of the land covered by TCT No. T-1319;
approximately twelve (12) hectares of that
covered by TCT No. T-1320; and the entire
parcel of covered by TCT No. T-1321, are
subject of expropriation proceedings
instituted by the National Housing Authority
(NHA) now pending before this Court in Civil
Case Nos. TG-392, TG-396 and TG-417;
3.That based on the evidence presented by
the herein parties in the aforecited
expropriation cases, the current valuation
of the land and the improvements thereon
is at P95,132.00 per hectare;
4.That on 16 April 1980, the plaintiffs
received a written notice from the
defendants and the intervenor that the
VOLCANO SECURITIES TRADERS AND AGRI-
BUSINESS CORPORATION had offered to buy
the latter's share in the properties listed in
the complaint subject to the following
terms:
"1.The selling price shall be net at TWELVE
& 50/100 (P12.50) PESOS per square meter,
or a total price of NINE MILLION
(P9,000,000.00) PESOS for a total area of
SEVENTY TWO (72) HECTARES ONLY;
"2.A downpayment equivalent to THIRTY
(30%) PERCENT of the selling price, or a
minimum downpayment of TWO MILLION
SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND
(P2,700,000.00) PESOS;
"3.The balance of the purchase price to be
payable within THREE (3) YEARS from the
date of downpayment in THREE (3) EQUAL
ANNUAL PAYMENTS with interest at the
legal rate prevailing at the time of
payment;
"4.The balance shall be covered by a BANK
GUARANTEE of payments and shall not be
governed by Art. 1250 of the Civil Code."
(Cf Annexes 1, 2 and 3, Answer)
5.That in said letters (Annexes 1, 2 and 3,
Answer), the plaintiffs were requested:
a)To exercise their pre-emptive right to
purchase defendants' and intervenor's
shares under the above-quoted terms; or
b)To agree to a physical partition of the
properties; or
c)To sell their shares, jointly with the
defendants and the intervenor, to the
G.R. No. 56550 | Reyes v. Concepcion
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 56550. October 1, 1990.]
MARINA Z. REYES, AUGUSTO M.
ZABALLERO and SOCORRO Z.
FRANCISCO, petitioners, vs. THE
HONORABLE ALFREDO B. CONCEPCION,
Presiding Judge, CFI of Cavite,
Tagaytay, Br. IV, SOCORRO MARQUEZ
VDA. DE ZABALLERO, EUGENIA Z.
LUNA, LEONARDO M. ZABALLERO, and
ELENA FRONDA ZABALLERO,
respondents.
Law Firm of Raymundo A. Armovit for
petitioners.
Leonardo M. Zaballero for private
respondents.
DECISION
CORTES, J p:
On March 13, 1980, petitioners filed with
the CFI a complaint for injunction and
damages, docketed as Civil Case No. TG-
572, seeking to enjoin private respondents
Socorro Marquez Vda. De Zaballero,
Eugenia Z. Luna and Leonardo M. Zaballero
from selling to a third party their pro-
indiviso shares as co-owners in eight
parcels of registered land (covered by TCT
Nos. A-1316 to A-1322) located in the
province of Cavite, with an aggregate area
of about 96 hectares. Petitioner claimed
that under Article 1620 of the new Civil
Code, they, as co-owners, had a
preferential right to purchase these shares
from private respondents for a reasonable
price. cdll
On March 17, 1980, respondent trial judge
denied the ex parte application for a writ of
preliminary injunction, on the ground that
petitioners' registered notice of lis pendens
was ample protection of their rights.
On April 24, 1980, private respondents
received the summons and copies of the
complaint. Private respondents then filed
their answer with counterclaim, praying for
the partition of the subject properties.
Private respondent Elena Fronda Zaballero
filed a motion for intervention dated April
29, 1980, adopting therein her co-
respondents answer with counterclaim.
At the pre-trial hearing, the parties agreed
on the following stipulation of facts:
xxx xxx xxx
Based on the foregoing, respondent trial
judge rendered a pre-trial order dated July
9, 1980 granting petitioners a period of ten
days from receipt of the subdivision plan to
be prepared by a competent geodetic
engineer within which to express their
approval or disapproval of the said plan, or
to submit within the same period, if they so
desire, an alternative subdivision plan.
On July 16, 1980, counsel for private
respondents sent to the counsel for
petitioners a letter enclosed with a
subdivision plan.
On August 4, 1980, petitioners filed their
comment to the pre-trial order, contending
that the question of reasonable value of the
subject properties remains a contentious
issue of fact ascertainable only after a full
trial. Petitioners likewise insisted on their
pre-emptive right to purchase private
respondents' shares in the co-ownership
after due determination of the reasonable
price thereof.
Thereafter, counsel for private respondents
sent the counsel for petitioners another
subdivision plan prepared by a geodetic
engineer. Still, no definite communication
was sent by petitioners signifying their
approval or disapproval to the subdivision
plans.
In order to settle once and for all the
controversy between the parties, private
respondents filed a motion dated December
16, 1980 requesting that petitioners be
required to formally specify which of the
two options under Article 498 of the New
Civil Code they wished to avail of: that
petitioners' shares in the subject properties
be sold to private respondents, at the rate
of P12.50 per square meter; or that the
subject properties be sold to a third party,
VOLCANO LAKEVIEW RESORTS, INC.
(claimed to have been erroneously referred
to in the pre-trial as VOLCANO SECURITIES
TRADERS AND AGRI-BUSINESS
CORPORATION) and its proceeds thereof
distributed among the parties.
Finding merit in the private respondents'
request, and for the purpose of determining
the applicability of Article 498 of the New
Civil Code, respondent trial judge issued an
order dated February 4, 1981 which
directed the parties to signify whether or
not they agree to the scheme of allotting
the subject properties to one of the co-
VOLCANO SECURITIES TRADERS AND AGRI-
BUSINESS CORPORATION at the price and
under the terms aforequoted.
6.That the VOLCANO SECURITIES TRADERS
AND AGRI-BUSINESS CORPORATION is
ready, willing and able to purchase not only
the aliquot shares of the defendants and
the intervenor, but also that of the
plaintiffs, in and to all the properties subject
of this case, for and in consideration of the
net amount of TWELVE and 50/100 (P12.50)
PESOS per square meter and under the
afore-quoted terms;
xxx xxx xxx
[Annex "C" of the Petition, pp. 1-2, Rollo,
pp. 43-44.]
The parties laid down their respective
positions, as follows:
PLAINTIFFS
1.That the subject properties are incapable
of physical partition;
2.That the price of P12.50 per square meter
is grossly excessive;
3.That they are willing to exercise their pre-
emptive right for an amount of not more
that P95,132.00 per hectare, which is the
fair and reasonable value of said properties;
4.That the statutory period for exercising
their pre-emptive right was suspended
upon the filing of the complaint;.
DEFENDANTS AND INTERVENOR
1.That the reasonable price of the subject
properties is P12.50 per square meter;
2.That plaintiffs' right of legal pre-emption
had lapsed upon their failure to exercise the
same within the period prescribed in Art.
1623 of the Civil Code of the Philippines;
3.That, assuming the soundness of
plaintiffs' claim that the price of P12.50 per
square meter is grossly excessive, it would
be to the best interest of the plaintiffs to
sell their shares to the VOLCANO
SECURITIES TRADERS AND AGRI-BUSINESS
CORPORATION, whose sincerity, capacity
and good faith is beyond question, as the
same was admitted by the parties herein;
4.That the subject properties consisting
approximately 95 hectares may be
physically partitioned without difficulty in
the manner suggested by them to plaintiffs,
and as graphically represented in the
subdivision plan, which will be furnished in
due course to plaintiffs' counsel.
[Annex "C" of the Petition, pp. 2-3; Rollo,
pp. 44-45.]
possess a pre-emptive right to purchase
private respondents' shares in the co-
ownership. Thus, finding that the subject
properties were essentially indivisible,
respondent trial judge ordered the holding
of a public sale of the subject properties
pursuant to Article 498 of the New Civil
Code. A notice of sale was issued setting
the date of public bidding for the subject
properties on April 13, 1981.
Petitioners then filed a motion for
reconsideration from the above order.
Respondent trial judge reset the hearing on
petitioners' motion for reconsideration to
April 6, 1981, and moved the scheduled
public sale to April 14, 1981.
Without awaiting resolution of their motion
for reconsideration, petitioners filed the
present petition for certiorari, alleging that
the respondent trial judge acted without
jurisdiction, or in grave abuse of its
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction,
in issuing his order dated March 16, 1981
which denied petitioners' claim of a pre-
emptive right to purchase private
respondents' pro-indiviso shares and which,
peremptorily, ordered the public sale of the
subject properties. On April 8, 1981, this
Court issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining the sale of the subject properties
at public auction.
With the comment and reply, the Court
considered the issues joined and the case
submitted for decision.
The Court finds no merit in the present
petition.
The attack on the validity of respondent
trial judge's order dated March 16, 1981 is
ultimately premised on petitioners' claim
that they had a pre-emptive right to
purchase the pro-indiviso shares of their co-
owners, private respondents herein, at a
"reasonable price". It is this same claim
which forms the basis of their complaint for
injunction and damages filed against
private respondents in the court a quo.
This claim is patently without basis. In this
jurisdiction, the legal provisions on co-
ownership do not grant to any of the
owners of a property held in common a pre-
emptive right to purchase the pro-indiviso
shares of his co-owners. Petitioners'
reliance on Article 1620 of the New Civil
Code is misplaced. Article 1620 provides:
owners, at the rate of P12.50 per square
meter, or whether or not they know of a
third party who is able and willing to buy
the subject properties at terms and
conditions more favorable than that offered
by VOLCANO LAKEVIEW RESORTS, INC. The
order contained a series of questions
addressed to all the parties, who were
thereupon required to submit their answers
thereto.
Private respondents filed a "Constancia"
expressing that they were willing to allot
their shares in the subject properties to
Socorro Marquez Vda. de Zaballero, at the
rate of P12.50 per square meter, and that
they did not know of any other party who
was willing and able to purchase the
subject properties under more favorable
conditions than that offered by VOLCANO
LAKEVIEW RESORTS, INC.
However, instead of submitting their
answers to the queries posed by
respondent trial judge, petitioners filed a
motion for clarification as to the true
identity of the third party allegedly willing
to purchase the subject properties.
On February 26, 1981, respondent trial
judge rejected petitioners' motion on the
ground that it was irrelevant.
Thereupon, on February 27, 1981,
petitioners filed a pleading captioned
"Compliance and Motion", (1) reiterating
the relevance of ascertaining the true
identity of the third party buyer, VOLCANO
SECURITIES TRADERS AND AGRI-BUSINESS
CORPORATION or VOLCANO LAKEVIEW
RESORTS, INC., (2) expressing their view
that there is actually no bona fide and
financially able third party willing to
purchase the subject properties at the rate
of P12.50 per square meter, and, (3) once
again insisting on their pre-emptive right to
purchase the shares of private respondents
in the co-ownership at a "reasonable price",
which is less than that computed
excessively by the latter at the rate of
P12.50 per square meter. Petitioners therein
prayed that further proceedings be
conducted in order to settle the factual
issue regarding the reasonable value of the
subject properties. cdll
On March 16, 1981, respondent trial judge
issued an order denying petitioners' motion.
The judge ruled that petitioners did not
involved. But the effect of the alienation of
the mortgage, with respect to the co-
owners shall be limited to the portion which
may be allotted to him in the division upon
the termination of the co-ownership.
The law does not prohibit a co-owner from
selling, alienating or mortgaging his ideal
share in the property held in common. The
law merely provides that the alienation or
mortgage shall be limited only to the
portion of the property which may be
allotted to him upon termination of the co-
ownership [See Mercado v. Liwanag, G.R.
No. L-14429, June 30, 1962, 5 SCRA 472;
PNB v. The Honorable Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. L-34404, June 25, 1980, 98 SCRA 207;
Go Ong v. The Honorable Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 75884, September 24, 1987, 154
SCRA 270,] and, as earlier discussed, that
the remaining co-owners have the right to
redeem, within a specified period, the
shares which may have been sold to the
third party. [Articles 1620 and 1623 of the
New Civil Code.]
Considering the foregoing, the Court holds
that respondent trial judge committed no
grave abuse of discretion when he denied
petitioners' claim of a pre-emptive right to
purchase private respondents' pro-indiviso
shares.
Moreover, there is no legal infirmity tainting
respondent trial judge's order for the
holding of a public sale of the subject
properties pursuant to the provisions of
Article 498 of the New Civil Code. After a
careful examination of the proceedings
before respondent trial judge, the Court
finds that respondent trial judge's order was
issued in accordance with the laws
pertaining to the legal or juridical
dissolution of co-ownerships.
It must be noted that private respondents,
in their answer with counterclaim prayed
for, inter alia, the partition of the subject
properties in the event that the petitioners
refused to purchase theirpro-indiviso shares
at the rate of P12.50 per square meter.
Unlike petitioners' claim of a pre-emptive
right to purchase the other co-owners' pro-
indiviso shares, private respondents'
counterclaim for the partition of the subject
properties is recognized by law, specifically
Article 494 of the New Civil Code which lays
down the general rule that no co-owner is
A co-owner of a thing may exercise the
right of redemption in case the shares of all
the co-owners or of any of them, are sold to
a third person. If the price of the alienation
is grossly excessive, the redemptioner shall
pay only a reasonable one.
Should two or more co-owners desire to
exercise the right of redemption, they may
only do so in proportion to the share they
may respectively have in the thing owned
in common [Emphasis supplied].
Article 1620 contemplates of a situation
where a co-owner has alienated his pro-
indiviso shares to a stranger. By the very
nature of the right of "legal redemption", a
co-owner's right to redeem is invoked only
after the shares of the other co-owners are
sold to a third party or stranger to the co-
ownership [See Estrada v. Reyes, 33 Phil.
31 (1915)]. But in the case at bar, at the
time petitioners filed their complaint for
injunction and damages against private
respondents, no sale of the latter's pro-
indiviso shares to a third party had yet been
made. Thus, Article 1620 of the New Civil
Code finds no application to the case at bar.
There is likewise no merit to petitioners'
contention that private respondents had
acknowledged the pre-emptive right of
petitioners to purchase their shares at a
"reasonable price". Although it appears that
private respondents had agreed to sell their
pro-indiviso shares to petitioners, the offer
was made at a fixed rate of P12.50 per
square meter [See Pre-trial Order dated July
9, 1980, Annex "C" of the Petition; Rollo, pp.
43-45]. It cannot be said that private
respondents had agreed, without
qualification, to sell their shares to
petitioners. Hence, petitioners cannot insist
on a right to purchase the shares at a price
lower than the selling price of private
respondents.
Neither do petitioners have the legal right
to enjoin private respondents from
alienating theirpro-indiviso shares to a third
party. The rights of a co-owner of a property
are clearly specified in Article 493 of the
New Civil Code, thus:
Article 493.Each co-owner shall have the
full ownership of his part and of the fruits
and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may
therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it,
and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are
parties to answer certain questions for the
purpose of determining whether or not the
legal conditions for the applicability of
Article 498 of the New Civil Code were
present in the case.
Article 498 provides that:
Whenever the thing is essentially indivisible
and the co-owners cannot agree that it be
alloted to one of them who shall indemnify
the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds
distributed.
The sale of the property held in common
referred to in the above article is resorted
to when (1) the right to partition the
property among the co-owners is invoked
by any of them but because of the nature of
the property, it cannot be subdivided or its
subdivision [See Article 495 of the New Civil
Code] would prejudice the interests of the
co-owners [See Section 5 of Rule 69 of the
Revised Rules of Court] and (2) the co-
owners are not in agreement as to who
among them shall be allotted or assigned
the entire property upon reimbursement of
the shares of the other co-owners.
Petitioners herein did not have justifiable
grounds to ignore the queries posed by
respondent trial judge and to insist that
hearings be conducted in order to ascertain
the reasonable price at which they could
purchase private respondents' pro-indiviso
shares [Petitioners' "Compliance and
Motion" dated February 27, 1981, Annex
"H" of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 57-60].
Since at this point in the case it became
reasonably evident to respondent trial
judge that the parties could not agree on
who among them would be allotted the
subject properties, the Court finds that
respondent trial judge committed no grave
abuse of discretion in ordering the holding
of a public sale for the subject properties
(with the opening bid pegged at P12.50 per
square meter), and the distribution of the
proceeds thereof amongst the co-owners,
as provided under Article 498 of the New
Civil Code.
Contrary to petitioners' contention, there
was no need for further hearings in the
case because it is apparent from the
various allegations and admissions of the
parties made during the pre-trial
proceedings, and in their respective
pleadings, that the legal requisites for the
obliged to remain in the co-ownership.
Article 494 reads as follows:
No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in
the co-ownership. Each co-owner may
demand at any time partition of the thing
owned in common, insofar as his share is
concerned.
Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the
thing undivided for a certain period of time,
not exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This
term may be extended by a new
agreement.
A donor or testator may prohibit partition
for a period which shall not exceed twenty
years.
Neither shall there be partition when it is
prohibited by law.
No prescription shall run in favor of a co-
owner or co-heir against his co-owners or
co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly
recognizes the co-ownership.
None of the legal exceptions under Article
494 applies to the case at bar. Private
respondents' counterclaim for the partition
of the subject properties was therefore
entirely proper. However, during the pre-
trial proceedings, petitioners adopted the
position that the subject properties were
incapable of physical partition. Initially,
private respondents disputed this position.
But after petitioners inexplicably refused to
abide by the pre-trial order issued by
respondent trial judge, and stubbornly
insisted on exercising an alleged pre-
emptive right to purchase private
respondents' shares at a "reasonable price",
private respondents relented and adopted
petitioner's position that the partition of the
subject properties was not economically
feasible, and, consequently, invoked the
provisions of Article 498 of the New Civil
Code [Private respondents' "Motion To Allot
Properties To Defendants Or To Sell the
Same Pursuant To Article 498 Of The Civil
Code", Annex "D" of the Petition, Rollo, pp.
46-49].
Inasmuch as the parties were in agreement
as regards the fact that the subject
properties should not be partitioned, and
private respondents continued to manifest
their desire to terminate the co-ownership
arrangement between petitioners and
themselves, respondent trial judge acted
within his jurisdiction when he issued his
order dated February 4, 1981 requiring the
application of Article 498 of the New Civil
Code were present in the case. No factual
issues remained to be litigated upon. LLpr
WHEREFORE, the present petition is
DISMISSED for lack of merit. The temporary
restraining order issued by the Court is
hereby LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and
Bidin, JJ., concur.
monthly installments until the purchase
price is fully settled, to wit:
RESIBO
Tinaggap ko ngayong araw na ito kay Engr.
Guillermo A. Batongbacal, ng Poblacion II,
Marilao, Bulacan, ang halagang sampung
libong piso (P10,000.00) salaping Pilipino,
bilang bahaging bayad sa bahagi ng lupang
may sukat na 3,750 sq.m. na aking
kabahagi sa isang (1) lagay na lupang
nasasaog, Marilao, Bulakan, sinasaklaw ng
T.C.T. No. T-107449, ng Bulakan, na
ipinagkasundo kong ipagbili sa naulit na
Engr. Guillermo A. Batongbacal sa halagang
Limampung Piso (P50.00) salaping Pilipino,
bawat isang (1) metrong parisukat. Ang
paunang bayad na aking tinaggap ukol sa
lupang nabanggit sa itaas ay P21,500.00,
nuong Abril 14-18, 1984. Ang halagang
dapat pa niyang bayaran sa akin ay
P156,000.00, na ang halagang
dalawampung libong piso (P20,000.00) ay
babayaran niya sa akin sa araw na nag
power-of-attorney nina Zenaida dela Rosa,
at Enrique Magsaloc ay aking nabigay sa
nasabing Engr. Guillermo A. Batongbacal;
na ang nalalabing bahaging bayad ay
kanyang babayaran sa akin ng Sampung
libong piso (P10,000.00) salaping Pilipino,
bawat buwan hanggang sa matapusan ang
pagbabayad ng kabuuang halaga na Isang
Daang at Walumpu't Pitong libo Limang
Daang Piso (P187,500.00). Ang bahaging
aking ipinagbibili ay ang Lote No. 1, may
sukat na 3,750 sq.m. na makikita sa
nakalakip na sketch plan na aking ding
nilagdaan sa ikaliliwanag ng kasulutang
DIETcH
Subsequent to the execution of the said
agreement, Mario and Guillermo, on their
own instance, initiated a survey to
segregate the area of 3,750 square meters
from the whole area covered by TCT No. T-
107449, delineating the boundaries of the
subdivided parts. As a result, they came up
with a subdivision plan specifically
designating the subject property signed by
a Geodetic Engineer. Mario and Guillermo
thereafter made several demands from
Reynaldo to deliver the SPA as agreed
upon, but such demands all went
unheeded.
Consequently, Guillermo and Mario initiated
an action for Specific Performance or
Rescission and Damages before the
G.R. No. 179205 | Heirs of Dela Rosa v.
Batongbacal
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 179205. July 30, 2014.]
HEIRS OF REYNALDO DELA ROSA,
Namely: TEOFISTA DELA ROSA,
JOSEPHINE SANTIAGO AND JOSEPH
DELA ROSA, petitioners, vs. MARIO A.
BATONGBACAL, IRENEO
BATONGBACAL, JOCELYN
BATONGBACAL, NESTOR
BATONGBACAL AND LOURDES
BATONGBACAL, respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J p:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
pursuant to Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court, assailing the 7 December 2006
Decision and 8 August 2007 Resolution of
the Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 64172. In its assailed
Resolution, the appellate court modified its
earlier ruling and proceeded to direct
petitioners to execute the requisite Deed of
Sale over the subject property.
The Facts
The subject property consists of a 3,750
square meter-portion of the 15,001 square
meters parcel of land situated in Barrio
Saog, Marilao, Bulacan denominated as Lot
No. 1, and registered under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-107449 under
the names of Reynaldo Dela Rosa
(Reynaldo), Eduardo Dela Rosa (Eduardo),
Araceli Dela Rosa (Araceli) and Zenaida
Dela Rosa (Zenaida).
Sometime in 1984, Reynaldo offered to sell
the subject property to Guillermo
Batongbacal (Guillermo) and Mario
Batongbacal (Mario) for P50.00 per square
meter or for a total of P187,500.00.
Pursuant to the agreement, Reynaldo
received an advance payment of
P31,500.00 leaving a balance of
P156,000.00. As shown in the document
denominated as Resibo and signed by
Reynaldo on 18 February 1987, the parties
agreed that the amount of P20,000.00 as
part of the advance payment shall be paid
upon the delivery of the Special Power-of-
Attorney (SPA), which would authorize
Reynaldo to alienate the subject property
on behalf of his co-owners and siblings
namely, Eduardo, Araceli and Zenaida. The
balance thereon shall be paid in P10,000.00
him to do so. As such, Reynaldo cannot be
compelled to deliver the subject property
but he was nonetheless ordered by the
court to return the amount he received as
part of the contract price since no one
should be allowed to unjustly enrich himself
at the expense of another. The RTC
disposed in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered[,] the
instant complaint is hereby DISMISSED.
However, [Reynaldo is] hereby ordered to
return to [Mario and Guillermo] the sum of
P28,000.00 plus 12% interest per annum
from the date of this decision until fully
paid.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in its
Decision dated 7 December 2006, brushed
aside the claim of equitable mortgage and
held that the sale effected by Reynaldo of
his undivided share in the property is valid
and enforceable. According to the appellate
court, no SPA is necessary for Reynaldo's
disposition of his undivided share as it is
limited to the portion that may be allotted
to him upon the termination of the co-
ownership. The Batongbacals could have
validly demanded from Reynaldo to deliver
the subject property pursuant to the
Contract to Sell but such option is no longer
feasible because the entire property has
already been sold to third persons to whom
a new title was issued. The appellate court
thus proceeded to rescind the contract and
ordered Reynaldo to return the amount he
received as consideration thereby restoring
the parties to their situation before entering
into the agreement. The decretal portion of
the decision reads: cAHDES
WHEREFORE, the decision dated March 24,
1999 is AFFIRMED with modification that
appellee is ordered to return to appellants
the amount of P31,500.00 plus 12% interest
per annum from the date of decision of the
trial court until full payment thereof.
In addition, the appellee is ordered:
1. To pay appellants P50,000.00 as
compensatory damages; P50,000.00 as
moral damages; and P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
2. To pay attorney's fees and litigation
expenses of P50,000.00; and
3. Double costs.
In seeking modification of the appellate
court's decision, Mario and Guillermo
pointed out that the title of the subject
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos,
Bulacan, seeking to enforce their Contract
to Sell dated 18 February 1987. In their
Complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 215-
M-90, Mario and Guillermo asserted that
they have a better right over the subject
property and alleged that the subsequent
sale thereof effected by Reynaldo to third
persons is void as it was done in bad faith.
It was prayed in the Complaint that
Reynaldo be directed to deliver the SPA
and, in case of its impossibility, to return
the amount of P31,500.00 with legal
interest and with damages in either case.
To protect their rights on the subject
property, Mario and Guillermo, after
initiating Civil Case No. 215-M-90, filed a
Notice of Lis Pendens registering their claim
on the certificate of title covering the entire
property.
In refuting the allegations of Mario and
Guillermo in their Complaint, Reynaldo in
his Answer countered that the purported
Contract to Sell is void, because he never
gave his consent thereto. Reynaldo insisted
that he was made to understand that the
contract between him and the
Batongbacals was merely an equitable
mortgage whereby it was agreed that the
latter will loan to him the amount of
P31,500.00 payable once he receives his
share in the proceeds of the sale of the land
registered under TCT No. T-107449.
Following the pre-trial conference without
the parties reaching an amicable
settlement, trial on the merits ensued. Both
parties proceeded to present, in open court,
documentary and testimonial evidence to
substantiate their claims.
For failure of Mario and Guillermo as
plaintiffs therein to adduce sufficient
evidence to support their complaint, the
RTC, in a Decision dated 24 March 1999,
dismissed Civil Case No. 215-M-90 and
ordered Reynaldo to return to the former
the sum of P28,000.00 with 12% annual
interest. Reynaldo failed to convince the
court a quo that the contract he entered
into with Mario was an equitable mortgage.
It was held by the trial court, however, that
the supposed Contract to Sell denominated
as Resibo is unenforceable under Article
1403 of the New Civil Code because
Reynaldo cannot bind his co-owners into
such contract without an SPA authorizing
WHETHER OR NOT MARIO BATONGBACAL IS
A PARTY TO THE TRANSACTION BETWEEN
REYNALDO DELA ROSA AND GUILLERMO
BATONGBACAL; SHDAEC
V.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT[S] ARE
ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF DAMAGES;
VI.
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT RESPONDENTS
ARE ENTITLED TO AWARD OF DAMAGES,
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS'
AWARD OF DAMAGES WAS EXCESSIVE.
The various contentions revolve on the sole
issue of whether the contract entered into
by parties was a Contract to Sell or an
equitable mortgage. The Court will not
delve into questions which are factual in
nature, consistent with the rule that this
Court is not a trier of facts.
The Court's Ruling
In assailing the Court of Appeals' Decision
and Resolution, petitioners are unflinching
in their stand that the disputed contract
purporting to be an absolute deed of sale
was an equitable mortgage with the subject
property as security for a loan obligation. To
prove their point, petitioners asserted that
the consideration in the amount of
P187,500.00 for a property consisting of
15,001 square meters is grossly inadequate
because the land valuation in Barrio Saog,
Marilao, Bulacan, at the time the
transaction was entered into by the parties
in 1984, was already P80.00 to P100.00 per
square meter. The gross inadequacy of the
price, the Heirs of Reynaldo argued, is
telling of the intention of the parties to
mortgage and not to sell the property with
the end view of affording the mortgagor an
easy opportunity to redeem the property
should his means permit him to do so.
An equitable mortgage is defined as one
although lacking in some formality, or form
or words, or other requisites demanded by
a statute, nevertheless reveals the
intention of the parties to charge real
property as security for a debt, and
contains nothing impossible or contrary to
law. For the presumption of an equitable
mortgage to arise, two requisites must
concur: (1) that the parties entered into a
contract denominated as a sale; and (2) the
intention was to secure an existing debt by
way of mortgage. Consequently, the non-
payment of the debt when due gives the
property has not yet been transferred to
third persons, and thus, Reynaldo can still
be compelled to execute a deed of
conveyance over his undivided share of the
entire property.
In a Resolution dated 8 August 2007, the
Court of Appeals granted the Motion for
Reconsideration of Mario and Guillermo and
directed Reynaldo to convey the subject
property to them, viz.:
WHEREFORE, [Reynaldo's] Motion for
Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.
Upon the other hand, [Mario and Guillermo]
Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED.
Accordingly, the decision dated December
7, 2006 is PARTIALLY RECONSIDERED
ordering defendant-appellee Reynaldo dela
Rosa or his successor-in-interest to execute
the requisite Deed of Sale over his 1/4
undivided share in the subject property
covered by TCT T-107449 and to accept the
consideration of P156,000.00 within thirty
(30) days from the finality of the decision.
In case of failure of [Reynaldo] to execute
the deed of sale, the Branch Clerk of Court
of RTC Br. 16 of Malolos, Bulacan is directed
to execute the same and receive the
P156,000.00 balance on the purchase price
on behalf of Reynaldo dela Rosa.
On 9 September 2007, the appellate court
was notified of the death of Reynaldo, and
his heirs sought to be substituted as party
in this case.
Petitioners Heirs of Reynaldo are now
before this Court via this instant Petition for
Review on Certiorari praying that the Court
of Appeals Decision and Resolution be
reversed on the ground that it was rendered
not in accordance with the applicable law
and jurisprudence.
Issues
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS A CONTRACT
OF SALE BETWEEN REYNALDO DELA ROSA
AND GUILLERMO BATONGBACAL;
II.
ASSUMING THAT THERE IS A CONTRACT OF
SALE, WHETHER OR NOT GUILLERMO
BATONGBACAL COMPLIED WITH HIS
OBLIGATION [UNDER THE CONTRACT];
III.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS ARE
GUILTY OF LACHES;
IV.
contravene the evident intention of the
parties, the latter shall prevail. Such
intention is determined not only from the
express terms of their agreement, but also
from the contemporaneous and subsequent
acts of the parties. That the parties
intended some other acts or contracts apart
from the express terms of the agreement,
was not proven by Reynaldo during the trial
or by his heirs herein. Beyond their bare
and uncorroborated asseverations that the
contract failed to express the true intention
of the parties, the record is bereft of any
evidence indicative that there was an
equitable mortgage. STHDAc
Neither could the allegation of gross
inadequacy of the price carry the day for
the petitioners. It must be underscored at
this point that the subject of the Contract to
Sell was limited only to 1/4 pro-indiviso
share of Reynaldo consisting an area of
3,750 square meter and not the entire
15,001-square meter parcel of land. As a
co-owner of the subject property,
Reynaldo's right to sell, assign or mortgage
his ideal share in the property held in
common is sanctioned by law. The
applicable law is Article 493 of the New Civil
Code, which spells out the rights of co-
owners over a co-owned property, to wit:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full
ownership of his part and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto, and he may
therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it,
and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involved. But the effect of the alienation or
the mortgage, with respect to the co-
owners, shall be limited to the portion
which may be allotted to him in the division
upon the termination of the co-ownership.
Pursuant to this law, a co-owner has the
right to alienate his pro-indiviso share in the
co-owned property even without the
consent of his co-owners. This right is
absolute and in accordance with the well-
settled doctrine that a co-owner has a full
ownership of his pro-indiviso share and has
the right to alienate, assign or mortgage it,
and substitute another person for its
enjoyment. In other words, the law does not
prohibit a co-owner from selling, alienating,
mortgaging his ideal share in the property
held in common.
mortgagee the right to foreclose the
mortgage, sell the property and apply the
proceeds of the sale for the satisfaction of
the loan obligation. While there is no single
test to determine whether the deed of
absolute sale on its face is really a simple
loan accommodation secured by a
mortgage, the Civil Code,however,
enumerates several instances when a
contract is presumed to be an equitable
mortgage, to wit:
Article 1602. The contract shall be
presumed to be an equitable mortgage, in
any of the following cases:
(1) When the price of a sale with right to
repurchase is unusually inadequate;
(2) When the vendor remains in possession
as lessee or otherwise;
(3) When upon or after the expiration of the
right to repurchase another instrument
extending the period of redemption or
granting a new period is executed;
(4) When the purchaser retains for himself
a part of the purchase price;
(5) When the vendor binds himself to pay
the taxes on the thing sold;
(6) In any other case where it may be fairly
inferred that the real intention of the
parties is that the transaction shall secure
the payment of a debt or the performance
of any other obligation.
In any of the foregoing cases, any money,
fruits, or other benefit to be received by the
vendee as rent or otherwise shall be
considered as interest which shall be
subject to the usury laws.
A perusal of the contract denominated as
Resibo reveals the utter frailty of
petitioners' position because nothing
therein suggests, even remotely, that the
subject property was given to secure a
monetary obligation. The terms of the
contract set forth in no uncertain terms that
the instrument was executed with the
intention of transferring the ownership of
the subject property to the buyer in
exchange for the price. Nowhere in the
deed is it indicated that the transfer was
merely intended to secure a debt
obligation. On the contrary, the document
clearly indicates the intent of Reynaldo to
sell his share in the property. The primary
consideration in determining the true
nature of a contract is the intention of the
parties. If the words of a contract appear to
by the fact that the entire property is co-
owned with others. That part which ideally
belongs to them, or their mental portion,
may be disposed of as they please,
independent of the decision of their co-
owners. So we rule in this case. The
respondents cannot be ordered to sell their
portion of the co-owned properties. In the
language of Rodriguez v. Court of First
Instance of Rizal, "each party is the sole
judge of what is good for him".
(Underscoring ours).
Thus, even if the impression of the Court of
Appeals were true, i.e., that the entire
property has been sold to thirds
Indeed, the intention clearly written, settles
the issue regarding the purchase price. A
contract of sale is a consensual contract,
which becomes valid and binding upon the
meeting of minds of the parties on the price
and the object of the sale. The mere
inadequacy of the price does not affect its
validity when both parties are in a position
to form an independent judgment
concerning the transaction, unless fraud,
mistake or undue influence indicative of a
defect in consent is present. A contract may
consequently be annulled on the ground of
vitiated consent and not due to the
inadequacy of the price. In the case at bar,
however, no evidence to prove fraud,
mistake or undue influence indicative of
vitiated consent is attendant.
As the parties invoking equitable mortgage,
the Heirs of Reynaldo did not even come
close to proving that the parties intended to
charge the property as security for a debt,
leaving us with no other choice but to
uphold the stipulations in the contract.
Basic is the rule that if the terms of the
contract are clear and leave no doubt upon
the intention of the parties, the literal
meaning of its stipulations shall control, we
find that the Court of Appeals cannot be
faulted for ruling, in modification of its
original judgment, that the sale effected by
Reynaldo of his undivided share in the
property is valid and enforceable.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Brion, Del Castillo and Perlas-
Bernabe, JJ., concur.
In Vaglidad v. Vaglidad, Jr., a case nearly on
all fours to the present petition, the Court
upheld the right of the co-owner to alienate
his pro-indiviso share in the co-owned
property as part of his right of dominion. It
was even pointed out that since the
previous sale is valid, the subsequent
conveyance effected by the co-owner is null
and void pursuant to the principle that "no
one can give what he does not have", nemo
dat quod non habet, thus:
LORETO sold the subject property to
GABINO, JR. on May 12, 1986 as a co-owner.
LORETO had a right, even before the
partition of the property on January 19,
1987, to transfer in whole or in part his
undivided interest in the lot even without
the consent of his co-heirs. This right is
absolute in accordance with the well-settled
doctrine that a co-owner has full ownership
of his pro-indiviso share and has the right to
alienate, assign or mortgage it, and
substitute another person for its enjoyment.
Thus, what GABINO, JR. obtained by virtue
of the sale on May 12, 1986 were the same
rights as the vendor LORETO had as co-
owner, in an ideal share equivalent to the
consideration given under their transaction.
LORETO sold some 1,604 square meters of
Lot No. 1253 to GABINO, JR. Consequently,
when LORETO purportedly sold to
WILFREDO on December 7, 1989 the same
portion of the lot, he was no longer the
owner of Lot No. 1253-B. Based on the
principle that "no one can give what he
does not have", LORETO could not have
validly sold to WILFREDO on December 7,
1989 what he no longer had. As correctly
pointed out by the appellate court, the
sale made by LORETO in favor of
WILFREDO is void as LORETO did not
have the right to transfer the
ownership of the subject property at
the time of sale. (Emphasis supplied).
In the same breadth, a co-owner cannot be
compelled by the court to give their
consent to the sale of his share in a co-
owned property. In Arambulo v. Nolasco, the
Court intimated:
The ultimate authorities in civil law,
recognized as such by the Court, agree that
co-owners such as respondents have over
their part, the right of full and absolute
ownership. Such right is the same as that of
individual owners which is not diminished