Republic of the Philippines ARE
SUPREME COURT vs.
Baguio City
EN BANC
G.R. No. 180771 April 21, 2015
RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED
SEASCAPE TAON STRAIT, e.g., TOOTHED WHALES,
DOLPHINS, PORPOISES, AND OTHER CETACEAN SPECIES,
Joined in and Represented herein by Human Beings Gloria Estenzo
Ramos and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio, In Their Capacity as Legal
Guardians of the Lesser Life-Forms and as Responsible Stewards of
God's Creations, Petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Energy (DOE), SECRETARY JOSE L. ATIENZA,
in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), LEONARDO R. SIBBALUCA, DENR
Regional Director-Region VII and in his capacity as Chairperson of
the Taon Strait Protected Seascape Management Board, Bureau of
Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR), DIRECTOR MALCOLM
J. SARMIENTO, JR., BFAR Regional Director for Region VII
ANDRES M. BOJOS, JAPAN PETROLEUM EXPLORATION
CO., LTD. (JAPEX), as represented by its Philippine Agent,
SUPPLY OILFIELD SERVICES, INC. Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 181527
CENTRAL VISAYAS FISHERFOLK DEVELOPMENT CENTER
(FIDEC), CERILO D. ENGARCIAL, RAMON YANONG,
FRANCISCO LABID, in their personal capacity and as
representatives of the SUBSISTENCE FISHERFOLKS OF THE
MUNICIPALITIES OF ALOGUINSAN AND PINAMUNGAJAN,
CEBU, AND THEIR FAMILIES, AND THE PRESENT AND
FUTURE GENERATIONS OF FILIPINOS WHOSE RIGHTS
SIMILARLY AFFECTED, Petitioners,
SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Energy (DOE), JOSE L. ATIENZA, in his capacity
as Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), LEONARDO R. SIBBALUCA, in his capacity
as DENR Regional Director-Region VII and as Chairperson of the
Taon Strait Protected Seascape Management Board, ALAN
ARRANGUEZ, in his capacity as Director - Environmental
Management Bureau-Region VII, DOE Regional Director for
Region VIII1 ANTONIO LABIOS, JAPAN PETROLEUM
EXPLORATION CO., LTD. (JAPEX), as represented by its
Philippine Agent, SUPPLY OILFIELD SERVICES,
INC., Respondents.
CONCURRING OPINION
"Until one has loved an animal,
a part of one 's soul remains unawakened."
Anatole France
LEONEN, J.:
I concur in the result, with the following additional reasons.
I
In G.R. No. 180771, petitioners Resident Marine Mammals allegedly
bring their case in their personal capacity, alleging that they stand to
benefit or be injured from the judgment on the issues. The human
petitioners implead themselves in a representative capacity "as legal
guardians of the lesser life-forms and as responsible stewards of God's
Creations."1 They use Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.2 as basis for their claim,
asserting their right to enforce international and domestic environmental
laws enacted for their benefit under the concept of stipulation pour
autrui.3 As the representatives of Resident Marine Mammals, the human
petitioners assert that they have the obligation to build awareness among
the affected residents of Taon Strait as well as to protect the
environment, especially in light of the government's failure, as primary
steward, to do its duty under the doctrine of public trust.4
Resident Marine Mammals and the human petitioners also assert that
through this case, this court will have the opportunity to lower the
threshold for locus standi as an exercise of "epistolary jurisdiction."5
The zeal of the human petitioners to pursue their desire to protect the
environment and to continue to define environmental rights in the
context of actual cases is commendable. However, the space for legal
creativity usually required for advocacy of issues of the public interest
is not so unlimited that it should be allowed to undermine the other
values protected by current substantive and procedural laws. Even rules
of procedure as currently formulated set the balance between competing
interests. We cannot abandon these rules when the necessity is not
clearly and convincingly presented.
The human petitioners, in G.R. No. 180771, want us to create
substantive and procedural rights for animals through their allegation
that they can speak for them. Obviously, we are asked to accept the
premises that (a) they were chosen by the Resident Marine Mammals of
Taon Strait; (b) they were chosen by a representative group of all the
species of the Resident Marine Mammals; (c) they were able to
communicate with them; and (d) they received clear consent from their
animal principals that they would wish to use human legal institutions to
pursue their interests. Alternatively, they ask us to acknowledge through
judicial notice that the interests that they, the human petitioners, assert
are identical to what the Resident Marine Mammals would assert had
they been humans and the legal strategies that they invoked are the
strategies that they agree with.
In the alternative, they want us to accept through judicial notice that
there is a relationship of guardianship between them and all the resident
mammals in the affected ecology.
Fundamental judicial doctrines that may significantly change
substantive and procedural law cannot be founded on feigned
representation.
Instead, I agree that the human petitioners should only speak for
themselves and already have legal standing to sue with respect to the
issue raised in their pleading. The rules on standing have already been
liberalized to take into consideration the difficulties in the assertion of
environmental rights. When standing becomes too liberal, this can be
the occasion for abuse.
II
Rule 3, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, in part,
provides:
SECTION 1. Who may be parties; plaintiff and defendant. - Only
natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties
in a civil action.
The Rules provide that parties may only be natural or juridical persons
or entities that may be authorized by statute to be parties in a civil
action.
Basic is the concept of natural and juridical persons in our Civil Code:
ARTICLE 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of
legal relations, is inherent in every natural person and is lost only
through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal
effect, is acquired and may be lost.
Article 40 further defines natural persons in the following manner:
ARTICLE 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child
shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it,
provided it be born later with the conditions specified 'in the following
article.
Article 44, on the other hand, enumerates the concept of a juridical
person:
ARTICLE 44. The following are juridical persons:
(1) The State and its political subdivisions;
(2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or
purpose, created by law; their personality begins as soon as they have
been constituted according to law;
(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or
purpose to which the law grants a juridical personality, separate and
distinct from that of each shareholder, partner or member.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 180771 implicitly suggest that we amend, rather
than simply construe, the provisions of the Rules of Court as well as
substantive law to accommodate Resident Marine Mammals or animals.
This we cannot do.
Rule 3, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure further defines
real party in interest:
SEC. 2. Parties in interest.-A real party in interest is the party who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or
these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of
the real party in interest. (2a)6
A litigant who stands to benefit or sustain an injury from the judgment
of a case is a real party in interest.7 When a case is brought to the courts,
the real party in interest must show that another party's act or omission
has caused a direct injury, making his or her interest both material and
based on an enforceable legal right.8
Representatives as parties, on the other hand, are parties acting in
representation of the real party in interest, as defined in Rule 3, Section
3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:
SEC. 3. Representatives as parties. - Where the action is allowed to be
prosecuted or defended by a representative or someone acting in a
fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the
case and shall be deemed to be the real party in interest. A representative
may be a trustee of an express rust, a guardian, an executor or
administrator, or a party authorized by law or these Rules. An agent
acting in his own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal
may sue or be sued without joining the principal except when the
contract involves things belonging to the principal.(3a)9
The rule is two-pronged. First, it defines .a representative as a party who
is not bound to directly or actually benefit or suffer from the judgment,
but instead brings a case in favor of an identified real party in
interest.10 The representative is an outsider to the cause of action.
Second, the rule provides a list of who may be considered as
"representatives." It is not an exhaustive list, but the rule limits the
coverage only to those authorized by law or the Rules of Court.11
These requirements should apply even in cases involving the
environment, which means that for the Petition of the human petitioners
to prosper, they must show that (a) the Resident Marine Mammals are
real parties in interest; and (b) that the human petitioners are authorized
by law or the Rules to act in a representative capacity.
The Resident Marine Mammals are comprised of "toothed whales,
dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean species inhabiting Taon
Strait."12 While relatively new in Philippine jurisdiction, the issue of
whether animals have legal standing before courts has been the subject
of academic discourse in light of the emergence of animal and
environmental rights.
In the United States, anim4l rights advocates have managed to establish
a system which Hogan explains as the "guardianship model for
nonhuman animals":13
Despite Animal Lovers, there exists a well-established system by which
nonhuman animals may obtain judicial review to enforce their statutory
rights and protections: guardianships. With court approval, animal
advocacy organizations may bring suit on behalf of nonhuman animals
in the same way court-appointed guardians bring suit on behalf of
mentally-challenged humans who possess an enforceable right but lack
the ability to enforce it themselves.
In the controversial but pivotal Should Trees Have Standing?-Toward
Legal Rights for Natural Objects, Christopher D. Stone asserts that the
environment should possess the right to seek judicial redress even
though it is incapable of representing itself. While asserting the rights of
speechless entities such as the environment or nonhuman animals
certainly poses legitimate challenges - such as identifying the proper
spokesman -the American legal system is already well-equipped with a
reliable mechanism by which nonhumans may obtain standing via a
judicially established guardianship. Stone notes that other speechless -
and nonhuman - entities such as corporations, states, estates, and
municipalities have standing to bring suit on their own behalf. There is
little reason to fear abuses under this regime as procedures for removal
and substitution, avoiding conflicts of interest, and termination of a
guardianship are well established.
In fact, the opinion in Animal Lovers suggests that such an arrangement
is indeed possible. The court indicated that AL VA might have obtained
standing in its own right if it had an established history of dedication to
the cause of the humane treatment of animals. It noted that the Fund for
Animals had standing and indicated that another more well-known
advocacy organization might have had standing as well. The court
further concluded that an organization's standing is more than a
derivative of its history, but history is a relevant consideration where
organizations are not well-established prior to commencing legal action.
ALVA was not the proper plaintiff because it could not identify previous
activities demonstrating its recognized activism for and commitment to
the dispute independent of its desire to pursue legal action. The court's
analysis suggests that a qualified organization with a demonstrated
commitment to a cause could indeed bring suit on behalf of the
speechless in the form of a court-sanctioned guardianship.
This Comment advocates a shift in contemporary standing doctrine to
empower non-profit organizations with an established history of
dedication to the cause and relevant expertise to serve as official
guardians ad !item on behalf of nonhuman animals interests. The
American legal system has numerous mechanisms for representing the
rights and interests of nonhumans; any challenges inherent in extending
these pre-existing mechanisms to nonhuman animals are minimal
compared to an interest in the proper administration of justice. To
adequately protect the statutory rights of nonhuman animals, the legal
system must recognize those statutory rights independent of humans and
provide a viable means of enforcement. Moreover, the idea of a
guardianship for speechless plaintiffs is not new and has been urged on
behalf of the natural environment. 'Such a model is even more
compelling as applied to nonhuman animals, because they are sentient
beings with the ability to feel pain and exercise rational thought. Thus,
animals are qualitatively different from other legally protected
nonhumans and therefore have interests deserving direct legal
protection.
Furthermore, the difficulty of enforcing the statutory rights of
nonhuman animals threatens the integrity of the federal statutes
designed to protect them, essentially rendering them meaningless.
Sensing that laws protecting nonhuman animals would be difficult to
enforce, Congress provided for citizen suit provisions: the most well-
known example is found in the Endangered Species Act (ESA). Such
provisions are evidence of legislative intent to encourage civic
participation on behalf of nonhuman animals. Our law of standing
should reflect this intent and its implication that humans are suitable
representatives of the natural environment, which includes nonhuman
animals.14 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
When a court allows guardianship as a basis of representation, animals
are considered as similarly situated as individuals who have enforceable
rights but, for a legitimate reason (e.g., cognitive disability), are unable
to bring suit for themselves. They are also similar to entities that by
their very nature are incapable of speaking for themselves (e.g.,
corporations, states, and others).
In our jurisdiction, persons and entities are recognized both in law and
the Rules of Court as having standing to sue and, therefore, may be
properly represented as real parties in interest. The same cannot be said
about animals.
Animals play an important role in households, communities, and the
environment. While we, as humans, may feel the need to nurture and
protect them, we cannot go as far as saying we represent their best
interests and can, therefore, speak for them before the courts. As
humans, we cannot be so arrogant as to argue that we know the
suffering of animals and that we know what remedy they need in the
face of an injury.
Even in Hogan's discussion, she points out that in a case before the
United States District Court for the Central District of California,
Animal Lovers Volunteer Ass'n v. Weinberger, 15 the court held that an
emotional response to what humans perceive to be an injury inflicted on
an animal is not within the "zone-of-interest" protected by law. 16Such
sympathy cannot stand independent of or as a substitute for an actual
injury suffered by the claimant.17 The ability to represent animals was
further limited in that case by the need to prove "genuine dedication" to
asserting and protecting animal rights:
What ultimately proved fatal to ALVA 's claim, however, was the court's
assertion that standing doctrine further required ALVA to differentiate its
genuine dedication to the humane treatment of animals from the general
disdain for animal cruelty shared by the public at large. In doing so, the
court found ALVA 's asserted organizational injury to be abstract and
thus relegated ALVA to the ranks of the "concerned bystander. "
....
In fact, the opinion in Animal Lovers suggests that such an arrangement
is indeed possible. The court indicated that ALVA might have obtained
standing in its own right if it had an established history of dedication to
the cause of the humane treatment of animals. It noted that the Fund for
Animals had standing and indicated that another more well-known
advocacy organization might have had standing as well. The court
further concluded that an organization's standing is more than a
derivative of its history, but history is a relevant consideration where
organizations are not well-established prior to commencing legal action.
ALVA was not the proper plaintiff because it could not identify previous
activities demonstrating its recognized activism for and commitment to
the dispute independent of its desire to pursue legal action. The court's
analysis suggests that a qualified organization with a demonstrated
commitment to a cause could indeed bring suit on behalf of the
speechless in the form of a court-sanctioned guardianship.18 (Emphasis
supplied, citation omitted)
What may be argued as being parallel to this concept of guardianship is
the principle of human stewardship over the environment in a citizen
suit under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases. A citizen
suit allows any Filipino to act as a representative of a party who has
enforceable rights under environmental laws before Philippine courts,
and is defined in Section 5: .
SEC. 5. Citizen suit. - Any Filipino citizen in representation of others,
including minors or generations yet unborn, may file an action to
enforce rights or obligations under environmental laws. Upon the filing
of a citizen suit, the court shall issue an order which shall contain a brief
description of the cause of action and the reliefs prayed for, requiring all
interested parties to manifest their interest to intervene in the case within
fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The plaintiff may publish the order
once in a newspaper of a general circulation in the Philippines or furnish
all affected barangays copies of said order.
There is no valid reason in law or the practical requirements of this case
to implead and feign representation on behalf of animals. To have done
so betrays a very anthropocentric view of environmental advocacy.
There is no way that we, humans, can claim to speak for animals let
alone present that they would wish to use our court system, which is
designed to ensure that humans seriously carry their responsibility
including ensuring a viable ecology for themselves, which of course
includes compassion for all living things.
Our rules on standing are sufficient and need not be further relaxed.
In Arigo v. Swift,19 I posed the possibility of further reviewing the broad
interpretation we have given to the rule on standing. While
representatives are not required to establish direct injury on their part,
they should only be allowed to represent after complying with the
following: [I]t is imperative for them to indicate with certainty the
injured parties on whose behalf they bring the suit. Furthermore, the
interest of those they represent must be based upon concrete legal rights.
It is not sufficient to draw out a perceived interest from a general,
nebulous idea of a potential "injury."20
I reiterate my position in Arigo v. Swift and in Paje v.
Casio21 regarding this rule alongside the appreciation of legal standing
in Oposa v. Factoran22 for environmental cases. In Arigo, I opined that
procedural liberality, especially in cases brought by representatives,
should be used with great caution:
Perhaps it is time to revisit the ruling in Oposa v. Factoran.
That case was significant in that, at that time, there was need to call
attention to environmental concerns in light of emerging international
legal principles. While "intergenerational responsibility" is a noble
principle, it should not be used to obtain judgments that would preclude
future generations from making their own assessment based on their
actual concerns. The present generation must restrain itself from
assuming that it can speak best for those who will exist at a different
time, under a different set of circumstances. In essence, the unbridled
resort to representative suit will inevitably result in preventing future
generations from protecting their own rights and pursuing their own
interests and decisions. It reduces the autonomy of our children and our
children 's children. Even before they are born, we again restricted their
ability to make their own arguments.
It is my opinion that, at best, the use of the Oposa doctrine in
environmental cases should be allowed only when a) there is a clear
legal basis for the representative suit; b) there are actual concerns based
squarely upon an existing legal right; c) there is no possibility of any
countervailing interests existing within the population represented or
those that are yet to be born; and d) there is an absolute necessity for
such standing because there is a threat of catastrophe so imminent that
an immediate protective measure is necessary. Better still, in the light of
its costs and risks, we abandon the precedent all together.23 (Emphasis in
the original)
Similarly, in Paje:
A person cannot invoke the court's jurisdiction if he or she has no right
or interest to protect. He or she who invokes the court's jurisdiction
must be the "owner of the right sought to be enforced." In other words,
he or she must have a cause of action. An action may be dismissed on
the ground of lack of cause of action if the person who instituted it is
not the real party in interest.24 The term "interest" under the Rules of
Court must refer to a material interest that is not merely a curiosity
about or an "interest in the question involved." The interest must be
present and substantial. It is not a mere expectancy or a future,
contingent interest.
A person who is not a real party in interest may institute an action if he
or she is suing as representative of a .real party in interest. When an
action is prosecuted or defended by a representative, that representative
is not and does not become the real party in interest. The person
represented is deemed the real party in interest. The representative
remains to be a third party to the action instituted on behalf of another.
....
To sue under this rule, two elements must be present: "(a) the suit is
brought on behalf of an identified party whose right has been violated,
resulting in some form of damage, and (b) the representative authorized
by law or the Rules of Court to represent the victim."
The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases allows filing of a
citizen's suit. A citizen's suit under this rule allows any Filipino citizen
to file an action for the enforcement of environmental law on behalf of
minors or generations yet unborn. It is essentially a representative suit
that allows persons who are not real parties in interest to institute
actions on behalf of the real party in interest.
The expansion of what constitutes "real party in interest" to include
minors and generations yet unborn is a recognition of this court's ruling
in Oposa v. Factoran. This court recognized the capacity of minors
(represented by their parents) to file a class suit on behalf of succeeding
generations based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility to
ensure the future generation's access to and enjoyment of [the] country's
natural resources.
To allow citizen's suits to enforce environmental rights of others,
including future generations, is dangerous for three reasons:
First, they run the risk of foreclosing arguments of others who are
unable to take part in the suit, putting into. question its
representativeness. Second, varying interests may potentially result in
arguments that are bordering on political issues, the resolutions of which
do not fall upon this court. Third, automatically allowing a class or
citizen's suit on behalf of minors and generations yet unborn may result
in the oversimplification of what may be a complex issue, especially in
light of the impossibility of determining future generation's true
interests on the matter.
In citizen's suits, persons who may have no interest in the case may file
suits for others. Uninterested persons will argue for the persons they
represent, and the court will decide based on their evidence and
arguments. Any decision by the court will be binding upon the
beneficiaries, which in this case are the minors and the future
generations. The court's decision will be res judicata upon them and
conclusive upon the issues presented.25
The danger in invoking Oposa v. Factoran to justify all kinds of
environmental claims lies in its potential to diminish the value of
legitimate environmental rights. Extending the application of "real party
in interest" to the Resident Marine Mammals, or animals in general,
through a judicial pronouncement will potentially result in allowing
petitions based on mere concern rather than an actual enforcement of a
right. It is impossible for animals to tell humans what their concerns are.
At best, humans can only surmise the extent of injury inflicted, if there
be any. Petitions invoking a right and seeking legal redress before this
court cannot be a product of guesswork, and representatives have the
responsibility to ensure that they bring "reasonably cogent, rational,
scientific, well-founded arguments"26 on behalf of those they represent.
Creative approaches to fundamental problems should be welcome.
However, they should be considered carefully so that no unintended or
unwarranted consequences should follow. I concur with the approach of
Madame Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro in her brilliant ponencia
as it carefully narrows down the doctrine in terms of standing. Resident
Marine Mammals and the human petitioners have no legal standing to
file any kind of petition.
However, I agree that petitioners in G.R. No. 181527, namely, Central
Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center,. Engarcial, Yanong, and Labid,
have standing both as real parties in interest and as representatives of
subsistence fisherfolks of the Municipalities of Aloguinsan and
Pinamungahan, Cebu, and their families, and the present and future
generations of Filipinos whose rights are similarly affected. The
activities undertaken under Service Contract 46 (SC-46) directly
affected their source of livelihood, primarily felt through the significant
reduction of their fish harvest.27 The actual, direct, and material damage
they suffered, which has potential long-term effects transcending
generations, is a proper subject of a legal suit.
III
In our jurisdiction, there is neither reason nor any legal basis for the
concept of implied petitioners, most especially when the implied
petitioner was a sitting President of the Republic of the Philippines. In
G.R. No. 180771, apart from adjudicating unto themselves the status of
"legal guardians" of whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean
species, human petitioners also impleaded Former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as "unwilling co-petitioner" for "her express
declaration and undertaking in the ASEAN Charter to protect Taon
Strait."28
No person may implead any other person as a co-plaintiff or co-
petitioner without his or her consent. In our jurisdiction, only when
there is a party that should have been a necessary party but was
unwilling to join would there be an allegation as to why that party has
been omitted. In Rule 3, Section 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:
SEC. 9. Non-joinder of necessary parties to be pleaded. -Whenever in
any pleading in which a claim is asserted a necessary party is not joined,
the pleader shall set forth his name, if known, and shall state why he is
omitted. Should the court find the reason for the omission
unmeritorious, it may order the inclusion of the omitted necessary party
if jurisdiction over his person may be obtained.
The failure to comply with the order for his inclusion, without
justifiable cause, shall be deemed a waiver of the claim against such
party.
The non-inclusion of a necessary party does not prevent the court from
proceeding in the action, and the judgment rendered therein shall be
without prejudice to the rights of such necessary party.29
A party who should have been a plaintiff or petitioner but whose
consent cannot be obtained should be impleaded as a defendant in the
nature of an unwilling co-plaintiff under Rule 3, Section 10 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure:
SEC. 10. Unwilling co-plaintiff. - If the consent of any party who
should be joined as plaintiff can not be obtained, he may be made a
defendant and the reason therefor shall be stated in the complaint.30
The reason for this rule is plain: Indispensable party plaintiffs who
should be part of the action but who do not consent should be put within
the jurisdiction of the court through summons or other court processes.
Petitioners. should not take it upon themselves to simply imp lead any
party who does not consent as a petitioner. This places the unwilling co-
petitioner at the risk of being denied due process.
Besides, Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo cannot be a party
to this suit. As a co-equal constitutional department, we cannot assume
that the President needs to enforce policy directions by suing his or her
alter-egos. The procedural situation caused by petitioners may have
gained public attention, but its legal absurdity borders on the
contemptuous. The Former President's name should be stricken out of
the title of this case.
IV
I also concur with the conclusion that SC-46 is both. illegal and
unconstitutional.
SC-46 is illegal because it violates Republic Act No. 7586 or the
National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992, and
Presidential Decree No. 1234,31 which declared Taon Strait as a
protected seascape. It is unconstitutional because it violates the fourth
paragraph of Article XII, Section 2 of the Constitution.
V
Petitioner Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center asserts that
SC-46 violated Article XII, Section 2, paragraph 1 of the .1987
Constitution because Japan Petroleum Exploration Co., Ltd. (JAPEX) is
100% Japanese-owned.32 It further asserts that SC-46 cannot be validly
classified as a technical and financial assistance agreement executed
under Article XII, Section 2, paragraph 4 of the 1987
Constitution.33 Public respondents counter that SC-46 does not fall
under the coverage of paragraph 1, but is a validly executed contract
under paragraph 4.34 Public respondents further aver that SC-46 neither
granted exclusive fishing rights to JAPEX nor violated Central Visayas
Fisherfolk Development Center's right to preferential use of communal
marine and fishing resources.35
VI
Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution states:
Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State. With the exception. of agricultural
lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration,
development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full
control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake
such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or
production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such
citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-
five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under
such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water
rights for irrigation, water supply fisheries, or industrial uses other than
the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and
limit of the grant.
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic
waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use
and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural
resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with
priority to subsistence fishermen and fish-workers in rivers, lakes, bays,
and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned
corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for large-
scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum,
and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions
provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth
and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall
promote the development and use of local scientific and technical
resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in
accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its execution.
(Emphasis supplied)
I agree that fully foreign-owned corporations may participate in the
exploration, development, and use of natural resources, but only through
either financial agreements or technical ones. This is the clear import of
the words "either financial or technical assistance agreements." This is
also
the clear result if we compare the 1987 constitutional provision with the
versions in the 1973 and 1935 Constitution:
1973 CONSTITUTION
ARTICLE XIV
THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND THE PATRIMONY OF THE
NATION
SEC. 9. The disposition, exploration, development, of exploitation, or
utilization of any of the natural resources of the Philippines shall be
limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or association at
least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens.
The Batasang Pambansa, in the national interest, may allow such
citizens, corporations, or associations to enter into service contracts for
financial, technical, management, or other forms of assistance with any
foreign person or entity for the exploitation, development, exploitation,
or utilization of any of the natural resources. Existing valid and binding
service contracts for financial, the technical, management, or other
forms of assistance are hereby recognized as such. (Emphasis supplied)
1935 CONSTITUTION
ARTICLE XIII
CONSERVATION AND UTILIZATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES
SECTION 1. All agricultural timber, and mineral. lands of the public
domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines
belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or
utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of
which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant,
lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government
established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the
exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no
license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or
utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period
exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years,
except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or
industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which
cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant.
The clear text of the Constitution in light of its history prevails over any
attempt to infer interpretation from the Constitutional Commission
deliberations. The constitutional texts are the product of a full sovereign
act: deliberations in a constituent assembly and ratification. Reliance on
recorded discussion of Constitutional Commissions, on the other hand,
may result in dependence on incomplete authorship; Besides, it opens
judicial review to further subjectivity from those who spoke during the
Constitutional Commission deliberations who may not have predicted
how their words will be used. It is safer that we use the words already in
the Constitution. The Constitution was their product. Its words were
read by those who ratified it. The Constitution is what society relies
upon even at present.
SC-46 is neither a financial assistance nor a technical assistance
agreement.
Even supposing for the sake of argument that it is, it could not be
declared valid in light of the standards set forth in La Bugal-B'laan
Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos:36
Such service contracts may be entered into only with respect to
minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils. The grant thereof is subject
to several safeguards, among which are these requirements:
(1) The service contract shall be crafted m accordance with a general
law that will set standard or uniform terms, conditions and
requirements, presumably to attain a certain uniformity in provisions
and avoid the possible insertion of terms disadvantageous to the country.
(2) The President shall be the signatory for the government because,
supposedly before an agreement is presented to the President for
signature, it will have been vetted several times over at different levels
to ensure that it conforms to law and can withstand public scrutiny.
(3) Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President shall
report it to Congress to give that branch of government an opportunity
to look over the agreement and interpose timely objections, if
any.37(Emphasis in the original, citation omitted)
Based on the standards pronounced in La Bugal, SC-46' S validity must
be tested against three important points: (a) whether SC-46 was crafted
in accordance with a general law that provides standards, terms, and
conditions; (b) whether SC-46 was signed by the President for and on
behalf of the government; and (c) whether it was reported by the
President to Congress within 30 days of execution.
VII
The general law referred to as a possible basis for SC-46's validity is
Presidential Decree No. 87 or the Oil Exploration and Development Act
of 1972.1wphi1 It is my opinion that this law is unconstitutional in that
it allows service contracts, contrary to Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution:
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned
corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for large-
scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum,
and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions
provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth
and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall
promote the development and use of local scientific and technical
resources. (Emphasis supplied)
The deletion of service contracts from the enumeration of the kind of
agreements the President may enter into with foreign-owned
corporations for exploration and utilization of resources means that
service contracts are no longer allowed by the Constitution. Pursuant to
Article XVIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution,38 this inconsistency
renders the law invalid and ineffective.
SC-46 suffers from the lack of a special law allowing its activities. The
Main Opinion emphasizes an important point, which is that SC-46 did
not merely involve exploratory activities, but also provided the rights
and obligations of the parties should it be discovered that there is oil in
commercial quantities in the area. The Taon Strait being a protected
seascape under Presidential Decree No. 123439 requires that the
exploitation and utilization of energy resources from that area are
explicitly covered by a law passed by Congress specifically for that
purpose, pursuant to Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7586 or the
National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992:
SEC. 14. Survey for Energy R6'sources. - Consistent with the policies
declared in Section 2, hereof, protected areas, except strict nature
reserves and natural parks, may be subjected to exploration only for the
purpose of gathering information on energy resources and only if such
activity is carried out with the least damage to surrounding areas.
Surveys shall be conducted only in accordance with a program approved
by the DENR, and the result of such surveys shall be made available to
the public and submitted to the President for recommendation to
Congress. Any exploitation and utilization of energy resources found
within NIP AS areas shall be allowed only through a law passed by
Congress.40 (Emphasis supplied)
No law was passed by Congress specifically providing the standards,
terms, and conditions of an oil exploration, extraction, and/or utilization
for Taon Strait and, therefore, no such activities could have been
validly undertaken under SC-46. The National Integrated Protected
Areas System Act of 1992 is clear that exploitation and utilization of
energy resources in a protected seascape such as Taon Strait shall only
be allowed through a specific law.
VIII
Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was not the signatory to
SC-46, contrary to the requirement set by paragraph 4 of Article XII,
Section 2 for service contracts involving the exploration of petroleum.
SC-46 was entered into by then Department of Energy Secretary Vicente
S. Perez, Jr., on behalf of the government. I agree with the Main
Opinion that in cases where the Constitution or law requires the
President to act personally on the matter, the duty cannot be delegated to
another public official.41 La Bugal highlights the importance of the
President's involvement, being one of the constitutional safeguards
against abuse and corruption, as not mere formality:
At this point, we sum up the matters established, based on a careful
reading of the ConCom deliberations, as follows:
In their deliberations on what was to become paragraph 4, the framers
used the term service contracts in referring to agreements x x x
involving either technical or financial assistance. They spoke of
service contracts as the concept was understood in the 1973
Constitution.
It was obvious from their discussions that they were not about to ban
or eradicate service contracts.
Instead, they were plainly crafting provisions to. put in place
safeguards that would eliminate or m minimize the abuses prevalent
during the marital law regime.42 (Emphasis in the original)
Public respondents failed to show that. Former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo was involved in the signing or execution of SC-46.
The failure to comply with this constitutional requirement renders SC-
46 null and void.
IX
Public respondents also failed to show that Congress was subsequently
informed of the execution and existence of SC-46. The reporting
requirement is an equally important requisite to the validity of any
service contract involving the exploration, development, and utilization
of Philippine petroleum. Public respondents' failure to report to
Congress about SC-46 effectively took away any opportunity for the
legislative branch to scrutinize its terms and conditions.
In sum, SC-46 was executed and implemented absent all the
requirements provided under paragraph 4 of Article XII, Section 2. It is,
therefore, null and void.
X
I am of the view that SC-46, aside from not having complied with the
1987 Constitution, is also null and void for being violative of
environmental laws protecting Taon Strait. In particular, SC-46 was
implemented despite falling short of the requirements of the National
Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992.
As a protected seascape under Presidential Decree No. 1234,43 Taon
Strait is covered by the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act
of 1992. This law declares as a matter of policy:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. Cognizant of the profound impact of
man's activities on all components of the natural environment
particularly the effect of increasing population, resource exploitation
and industrial advancement and recognizing the critical importance of
protecting and maintaining the natural biological and physical
diversities of the environment notably on areas with biologically unique
features to sustain human life and development, as well as plant and
animal life, it is hereby declared the policy of the State to secure for the
Filipino people of present and future generations the perpetual existence
of all native plants and animals through the establishment of a
comprehensive system of integrated protected areas within the
classification of national park as provided for in the Constitution.
It is hereby recognized that these areas, although distinct in features,
possess common ecological values that may be incorporated into a
holistic plan representative of our natural heritage; that effective
administration of these areas is possible only through cooperation
among national government, local and concerned private organizations;
that the use and enjoyment of these protected areas must be consistent
with the principles of biological diversity and sustainable development.
To this end, there is hereby established a National Integrated Protected
Areas System (NIPAS), which shall encompass outstanding remarkable
areas and biologically important public lands that are habitats of rare
and endangered species of plants and animals, biogeographic zones and
related ecosystems, whether terrestrial, wetland or marine, all of which
shall be designated as "protected areas."44 (Emphasis supplied)
Pursuant to this law, any proposed activity in Taon Strait must undergo
an Environmental Impact Assessment:
SEC. 12. Environmental Impact Assessment. - Proposals for activities
which are outside the scope of the management plan for protected areas
shall be subject to an environmental impact assessment as required by
law before they are adopted, and the results thereof shall be taken into
consideration in the decision-making process.45 (Emphasis supplied)
The same provision further requires that an Environmental Compliance
Certificate be secured under the Philippine Environmental Impact
Assessment System before arty project is implemented:
No actual implementation of such activities shall be allowed without the
required Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) under the
Philippine Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) system. In instances
where such activities are allowed to be undertaken, the proponent shall
plan and carry them out in such manner as will minimize any adverse
effects and take preventive and remedial action when appropriate. The
proponent shall be liable for any damage due to lack of caution or
indiscretion.46 (Emphasis supplied)
In projects involving the exploration or utilization of energy resources,
the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992 additionally
requires that a program be approved by the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources, which shall be publicly accessible. The program
shall also be submitted to the President, who in turn will recommend the
program to Congress. Furthermore, Congress must enact a law
specifically allowing the exploitation of energy resources found within a
protected area such as Taon Strait:
SEC. 14. Survey for Energy Resources. - Consistent with the policies
declared in Section 2, hereof, protected areas, except strict nature
reserves and natural parks, may be subjected to exploration only for the
purpose of gathering information on energy resources and only if such
activity is carried out with the least damage to surrounding areas.
Surveys shall be conducted only in accordance with a program approved
by the DENR, and the result of such surveys shall be made available to
the public and submitted to the President for recommendation to
Congress. Any exploitation and utilization of energy resources found
within NIPAS areas shall be allowed only through a taw passed by
Congress.47 (Emphasis supplied)
Public respondents argue that SC-46 complied with the procedural
requirements of obtaining an Environmental Compliance
48
Certificate. At any rate, they assert that the activities covered by SC-46
fell under Section 14 of the National Integrated Protected Areas System
Act of 1992, which they interpret to be an exception to Section 12. They
argue that the Environmental Compliance Certificate is not a strict
requirement for the validity of SC-46 since (a) the Taon Strait is not a
nature' reserve or natural park; (b) the exploration was merely for
gathering information; and ( c) measures were in place to ensure that the
exploration caused the least possible damage to the area.49
ACCORDINGLY, I vote:
(a) to DISMISS G.R. No. 180771 for lack of standing and STRIKE
OUT the name of Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo from the
title of this case;

Section 14 is not an exception to Section 12, but instead provides (b) to GRANT G.R. No. 181527; and
additional requirements for cases involving Philippine energy resources.
The National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992 was (c) to DECLARE SERVICE CONTRACT 46 NULL AND VOID for
enacted to recognize the importance of protecting the environment in violating the 1987 Constitution, Republic Act No. 7586, and
light of resource exploitation, among others.50 Systems are put in place Presidential Decree No. 1234.
to secure for Filipinos local resources under the most favorable
conditions. With the status of Taon Strait as a protected seascape, the MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
institution of additional legal safeguards is even more significant. Associate Justice

Public respondents did not validly obtain an Environmental Compliance

Certificate for SC-46. Based on the records, JAPEX commissioned an
environmental impact evaluation only in the second subphase of its
project, with the Environmental Management .Bureau of Region

VII granting the project an Environmental Compliance Certificate on

March 6, 2007.51

Despite its scale, the seismic surveys from May 9 to 18, 2005 were
conducted without any environmental assessment contrary to Section 12
of the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992.

XI

Finally, we honor every living creature when we take care of our

environment. As sentient species, we do not lack in the wisdom or
sensitivity to realize that we only borrow the resources that we use to Republic of the Philippines
survive and to thrive. We are not incapable of mitigating the greed that SUPREME COURT
is slowly causing the demise of our planet. Thus, there is no need for us Manila
to feign representation of any other species or some imagined unborn
generation in filing any action in our courts of law to claim any of our EN BANC
fundamental rights to a healthful ecology. In this way and with candor
and courage, we fully shoulder the responsibility deserving of the grace G.R. No. L-48321 August 31, 1946
and power endowed on our species.
OH CHO, applicant-appellee,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, oppositor-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Roman Ozaeta and Assistant Solicitor
General Rafael Amparo for appellant.
Vicente Constantino for appellee.
Ferrier, Gomez and Sotelo and J. T. Chuidian as amici curiae.
PADILLA, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment decreeing the registration of a
residential lot located in the municipality of Guinayangan, Province of
Tayabas in the name of the applicant.
The opposition of the Director of Lands is based on the applicant's lack
of title to the lot, and on his disqualification, as alien, from acquiring
lands of the public domain.
The applicant, who is an alien, and his predecessors in interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the lot
from 1880 to filing of the application for registration on January 17,
1940.
The Solicitor General reiterates the second objection of the opponent
and adds that the lower court, committed an error in not declaring null
and void the sale of the lot to the applicant.
The applicant invokes the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496), or
should it not be applicable to the case, then he would apply for the
benefits of the Public Land Act (C.A. No. 141).
The applicant failed to show that he has title to the lot that may be
confirmed under the Land Registration Act. He failed to show that he or
any of his predecessors in interest had acquired the lot from the
Government, either by purchase or by grant, under the laws, orders and
decrease promulgated by the Spanish Government in the Philippines, or
by possessory information under the Mortgaged Law (section 19, Act
496). All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by
purchase or by grant below to the public domain. An exception to the
rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an
occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for
such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never
been part of the public domain or that it had been a private property
even before the Spanish conquest. (Cario vs.Insular Government, 212
U.S., 449; 53 Law. Ed., 594.) The applicant does not come under the
exception, for the earliest possession of the lot by his first predecessors
in interest begun in 1880.
As the applicant failed to show title to the lot, the next question is
whether he is entitled to decree or registration of the lot, because he is
alien disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain (sections
48, 49, C.A. No. 141).
As the applicant failed to show the title to the lot, and has invoked the
provisions of the Public Land Act, it seems unnecessary to make
pronouncement in this case on the nature or classifications of the sought
to be registered.
It may be argued that under the provisions of the Public Land Act the
applicant immediate predecessor in interest would have been entitled to
a decree of registration of the lot had they applied for its registration;
and that he having purchased or acquired it, the right of his immediate
predecessor in interest to a decree of registration must be deemed also to
have been acquired by him. The benefits provided in the Public Land
Act for applicant's immediate predecessors in interest should comply
with the condition precedent for the grant of such benefits. The
condition precedent is to apply for the registration of the land of which
they had been in possession at least since July 26, 1894. This the
applicant's immediate predecessors in interest failed to do. They did not
have any vested right in the lot amounting to the title which was
transmissible to the applicant. The only right, if it may thus be called, is
their possession of the lot which, tacked to that of their predecessors in
interest, may be availed of by a qualified person to apply for its
registration but not by a person as the applicant who is disqualified.
It is urged that the sale of the lot to the applicant should have been
declared null and void. In a suit between vendor and vendee for the
annulment of the sale, such pronouncement would be necessary, if the Republic of the Philippines
court were of the opinion that it is void. It is not necessary in this case SUPREME COURT
where the vendors do not even object to the application filed by the Manila
vendee.
THIRD DIVISION
Accordingly, judgment is reversed and the application for registration
dismissed, without costs. G.R. No. 112567 February 7, 2000

Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Hilado and Bengzon, JJ., concur. THE DIRECTOR, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and AQUILINO L. CARIO, respondents.

PURISIMA, J.:

At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules

of Court, seeking to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated November 11, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. 29218, which affirmed the
Decision, dated February 5, 1990, of Branch XXIV, Regional Trial
Court of Laguna, in LRC No. B-467, ordering the registration of Lot
No. 6 in the name of the private respondent.

The facts that matter are as follows:

On May 15, 1975, the private respondent, Aquilino Cario, filed with
the then Branch I, Court of First Instance of Laguna, a petition 1 for
registration of Lot No. 6, a sugar land with an area of forty-three
thousand six hundred fourteen (43,614) square meters, more or less,
forming part of a bigger tract of land surveyed as Psu-108952 and
situated in Barrio Sala, Cabuyao, Laguna.

Private respondent declared that subject land was originally owned by

his mother, Teresa Lauchangco, who died on February 15, 1911, 2 and
later administered by him in behalf of his five brothers and sisters, after
the death of their father in 1934.3

In 1949, private respondent and his brother, Severino Cario, became

co-owners of Lot No. 6 by virtue of an extra-judicial partition of the
land embraced in Plan Psu-108952, among the heirs of Teresa
Lauchangco. On July 26, 1963, through another deed of extrajudicial
settlement, sole ownership of Lot No. 6 was adjudicated to the private
respondent.4
Pertinent report of the Land Investigator of the Bureau of Lands (now
Bureau of Lands Management), disclosed:
xxx xxx xxx
1. That the land subject for registration thru judicial confirmation of
imperfect title is situated in the barrio of Sala, municipality of Cabuyao,
province of Laguna as described on plan Psu-108952 and is identical to
Lot No. 3015, Cad. 455-0, Cabuyao Cadastre; and that the same is
agricultural in nature and the improvements found thereon are
sugarcane, bamboo clumps, chico and mango trees and one house of the
tenant made of light materials;
2. That the land subject for registration is outside any civil or military
reservation, riverbed, park and watershed reservation and that same land
is free from claim and conflict;
3. That said land is neither inside the relocation site earmarked for
Metro Manila squatters nor any pasture lease; it is not covered by any
existing public land application and no patent or title has been issued
therefor;
4. That the herein petitioner has been in continuous, open and exclusive
possession of the land who acquired the same thru inheritance from his
deceased mother, Teresa Lauchangco as mentioned on the Extra-judicial
partition dated July 26, 1963 which applicant requested that said
instrument will be presented on the hearing of this case; and that said
land is also declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No.
6359 in the name of the petitioner;
5
xxx xxx xxx
With the private respondent as lone witness for his petition, and the
Director of Lands as the only oppositor, the proceedings below ended.
On February 5, 1990, on the basis of the evidence on record, the trial
court granted private respondent's petition, disposing thus:
WHEREFORE, the Count hereby orders and declares the registration
and confirmation of title to one (1) parcel of land identified as Lot 6,
plan Psu-108952, identical to Cadastral Lot No. 3015, Cad. 455-D,
Cabuyao Cadastre, situated in the barrio of Sala, municipality of
Cabuyao, province of Laguna, containing an area of FORTY THREE
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FOURTEEN (43,614) Square Meters,
more or less, in favor of applicant AQUILINO L. CARINO, married to
Francisca Alomia, of legal age, Filipino, with residence and postal
address at Bian, Laguna.
After this decision shall have become final, let an order for the issuance
of decree of registration be issued.
SO ORDERED.6
From the aforesaid decision, petitioner (as oppositor) went to the Court
of Appeals, which, on November 11, 1993, affirmed the decision
appealed from.
Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this Court via the present
Petition; theorizing that:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT
PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NOT SUBMITTED PROOF OF HIS
FEE SIMPLE TITLE OR PROOF OF POSSESSION IN THE
MANNER AND FOR THE LENGTH OF TIME REQUIRED BY THE
LAW TO JUSTIFY CONFIRMATION OF AN IMPERFECT TITLE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT
PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NOT OVERTHROWN THE
PRESUMPTION THAT THE LAND IS A PORTION OF THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN BELONGING TO THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES.7
The Petition is impressed with merit.
The petition for land registration8 at bar is under the Land Registration
Act.9 Pursuant to said Act, he who alleges in his petition or application,
ownership in fee simple, must present muniments of title since the
Spanish times, such as a titulo real or royal grant, a concession especial
or special grant, a composicion con al estado or adjustment title, or
a titulo de compra or title through purchase; and "informacion
possessoria" or "possessory information title", which would become a
"titulo gratuito" or a gratuitous title.10
In the case under consideration, the private respondents (petitioner
below) has not produced a single muniment of title substantiate his
claim of ownership.11 The Court has therefore no other recourse, but to
dismiss private respondent's petition for the registration of subject land
under Act 496.
Anyway, even if considered as petition for confirmation of imperfect
title under the Public land Act (CA No. 141), as amended, private
respondent's petition would meet the same fate. For insufficiency of
evidence, its denial is inevitable. The evidence adduced by the private
respondent is not enough to prove his possession of subject lot in
concept of owner, in the manner and for the number of years required by
law for the confirmation of imperfect title.
Sec. 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141,12 as amended R.A. No. 1942
and R.A. No. 3872, the law prevailing at the time the Petition of private
respondent was filed on May 15, 1975, provides:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying
lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an
interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed,
may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land
is located for confirmation of their claim and the issuance of title
therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except
when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis supplied)
Possession of public lands, however long, never confers title upon the
possessor, unless the occupant can prove possession or occupation of
the same under claim of ownership for the required period to constitute
a grant from the State.13
Notwithstanding absence of opposition from the government, the
petitioner in land registration cases is not relieved of the burden of
proving the imperfect right or title sought to be confirmed. In Director
of Lands vs. Agustin,14 this Court stressed that:
. . . The petitioner is not necessarily entitled to have the land registered
under the Torrens system simply because no one appears to oppose his
title and to oppose the registration of his land. He must show, even
though there is no opposition, to the satisfaction of the court, that he is
the absolute owner, in fee simple. Courts are not justified in registering
property under the Torrens system, simply because there is no
opposition offered. Courts may, even in the absence of any opposition,
deny the registration of the land under the Torrens system, upon the
ground that the facts presented did not show that petitioner is the owner,
in fee simple, of the land which he is attempting to have registered.15
There is thus an imperative necessity of the most rigorous scrutiny
before imperfect titles over public agricultural lands may be granted
judicial
recognition.16
The underlying principle is that all lands that were not acquired from the
government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the state as part of
the public domain. As enunciated in Republic vs. Lee:17
. . . Both under the 1935 and the present Constitutions, the conservation
no less than the utilization of the natural resources is ordained. There
would be a failure to abide by its command if the judiciary does not
scrutinize with care applications to private ownership of real estate. To
be granted, they must be grounded in well-nigh incontrovertible
evidence. Where, as in this case, no such proof would be forthcoming,
there is no justification for viewing such claim with favor. It is a basic
assumption of our polity that lands of whatever classification belong to
the state. Unless alienated in accordance with law, it retains its right
over the same as dominus. . . .18
In order that a petition for registration of land may prosper and the
petitioners may savor the benefit resulting from the issuance of
certificate of title for the land petitioned for, the burden is upon him
(petitioner) to show that he and/or his predecessor-in-interest has been
in open, continuous, exclusive, and adverse possession and occupation
of the land sought for registration, for at least (30) thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the petition for confirmation of
title.19
In the case under consideration, private respondent can only trace his
own possession of subject parcel of land to the year 1949, when the
same was adjudicated to him by virtue of an extra-judicial settlement
and partition. Assuming that such a partition was truly effected, the
private respondent has possessed the property thus partitioned for only
twenty-six (26) years as of 1975, when he filed his petition for the
registration thereof. To bridge the gap, he proceeded to tack his
possession to what he theorized upon as possession of the same land by
his parents. However, other than his unilateral assertion, private
respondent has not introduced sufficient evidence to substantiate his
allegation that his late mother possessed the land in question even prior
to 1911.1wphi1.nt
Basic is the rule that the petitioner in a land registration case must prove
the facts and circumstances evidencing his alleged ownership of the
land applied for. General statements, which are mere conclusions of law
and not factual proof of possession are unavailing and cannot suffice.20
From the relevant documentary evidence, it can be gleaned that the
earliest tax declaration covering Lot No. 6 was Tax Declaration No.
3214 issued in 1949 under the names of the private respondent and his
brother, Severino Cario. The same was followed by Tax Declaration
No. 1921 issued in 1969 declaring an assessed value of Five Thousand
Two Hundred Thirty-three (P5,233.00) Pesos and Tax Declaration No.
6359 issued in 1974 in the name of private respondent, declaring an
assessment of Twenty-One Thousand Seven Hundred Seventy
(P21,770.00) Pesos.21
It bears stressing that the Exhibit "E" referred to in the decision below
as the tax declaration for subject land under the names of the parents of
herein private respondent does not appear to have any sustainable basis.
Said Exhibit "E" shows that it is Tax Declaration 1921 for Lot No. 6 in
the name of private respondent and not in the name of his parents.22
The rule that findings of fact by the trial court and the Court of Appeals
are binding upon this Court is not without exceptions. Where, as in this
case, pertinent records belie the findings by the lower courts that subject
land was declared for taxation purposes in the name of private
respondent's predecessor-in-interest, such findings have to be
disregarded by this Court. In Republic vs. Court of Appeals,23 the Court
ratiocinated thus:
This case represents an instance where the findings of the lower court
overlooked certain facts of substance and value that if considered would
affect the result of the case (People v. Royeras, 130 SCRA 259) and
when it appears that the appellate court based its judgment on a
misapprehension of facts (Carolina Industries, Inc. v. CMS Stock
Brokerage, Inc., et al., 97 SCRA 734; Moran, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,
133 SCRA 88; Director of Lands v. Funtillar, et al., G.R. No. 68533,
May 3, 1986). This case therefore is an exception to the general rule that
the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and
cannot be reviewed on appeal to this Court.'
and
. . . in the interest of substantial justice this Court is not prevented from
considering such a pivotal factual matter that had been overlooked by
the Courts below. The Supreme Court is clothed with ample authority to
review palpable errors not assigned as such if it finds that their
consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision.24
Verily, the Court of Appeals just adopted entirely the findings of the trial
court. Had it examined the original records of the case, the said court
could have verified that the land involved was never declared for
taxation purposes by the parents of the respondent. Tax receipts and tax
declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership. They are
mere indicia of claim of ownership.25 In Director of Lands
vs. Santiago.26
. . . if it is true that the original owner and possessor, Generosa Santiago,
had been in possession since 1925, why were the subject lands declared
for taxation purposes for the first time only in 1968, and in the names of
Garcia and Obdin? For although tax receipts and declarations of
ownership for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of
ownership, they constitute at least proof that the holder had a claim of
title over the property.27
As stressed by the Solicitor General, the contention of private
respondent that his mother had been in possession of subject land even
prior to 1911 is self-serving, hearsay, and inadmissible in evidence. The
phrase "adverse, continuous, open, public, and in concept of owner", by
which characteristics private respondent describes his possession and
that of his parents, are mere conclusions of law requiring evidentiary
support and substantiation. The burden of proof is on the private
respondent, as applicant, to prove by clear, positive and convincing
evidence that the alleged possession of his parents was of the nature and
duration required by law. His bare allegations without more, do not
amount to preponderant evidence that would shift the burden of proof to
the oppositor.28
In a case,29 this Court set aside the decisions of the trial court and the
Court of Appeals for the registration of a parcel of land in the name of
the applicant, pursuant to Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Law;
holding as follows:
Based on the foregoing, it is incumbent upon private respondent to
prove that the alleged twenty year or more possession of the spouses
Urbano Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan which supposedly formed part of
the thirty (30) year period prior to the filing of the application, was
open, continuous, exclusive, notorious and in concept of owners. This
burden, private respondent failed to discharge to the satisfaction of the
Court. The bare assertion that the spouses Urbano Diaz and Bernarda
Vinluan had been in possession of the property for more than twenty
(20) years found in private respondent's declaration is hardly the "well-
nigh incontrovertible" evidence required in cases of this nature. Private
respondent should have presented specific facts that would have shown
the nature of such possession. . . .30
In Director of Lands vs. Datu,31 the application for confirmation of
imperfect title was likewise denied on the basis of the following
disquisition, to wit:
We hold that applicants' nebulous evidence does not support their claim
of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious occupation of Lot No.
2027-B en concepto de dueo. Although they claimed that they have
possessed the land since 1950, they declared it for tax purposes only in
1972. It is not clear whether at the time they filed their application in
1973, the lot was still cogon land or already cultivated land.
They did not present as witness their predecessor, Peaflor, to testify on
his alleged possession of the land. They alleged in their application that
they had tenants on the land. Not a single tenant was presented as
witness to prove that the applicants had possessed the land as owners.
xxx xxx xxx
On the basis of applicants' insubstantial evidence, it cannot justifiably
be concluded that they have an imperfect title that should be confirmed
or that they had performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant of a portion of the public domain.32
Neither can private respondent seek refuge under P.D. No.
1073,33 amending Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 under
which law a certificate of title may issue to any occupant of a public
land, who is a Filipino citizen, upon proof of open, continuous
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation since June 12, 1945,
or earlier. Failing to prove that his predecessors-in-interest occupied
subject land under the conditions laid down by law, the private
respondent could only establish his possession since 1949, four years
later than June 12, 1945, as set by law.
The Court cannot apply here the juris et de jure presumption that the lot
being claimed by the private respondent ceased to be a public land and
has become private property.34 To reiterate, under the Regalian doctrine
all lands belong to the State. 35 Unless alienated in accordance with law,
it retains its basic rights over the same as dominus.36
Private respondent having failed to come forward with muniments of
title to reinforce his petition for registration under the Land Registration
Act (Act 496), and to present convincing and positive proof of his open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious occupation of Lot No. 6 en
concepto de dueo for at least 30 years immediately preceding the filing
of his petition,37 the Court is of the opinion, and so finds, that subject
Lot No. 6 surveyed under Psu-108952, forms part of the public domain
not registrable in the name of private respondent.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the Decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated November 11, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. 29218 affirming
the Decision, dated February 5, 1990, of Branch XXIV, Regional Trial
Court of Laguna in LRC No. 8-467, is SET ASIDE; and Lot No. 6,
covered by and more particularly described in Psu-108952, is hereby
declared a public land, under the administrative supervision and power
of disposition of the Bureau of Lands Management. No pronouncement
as to costs.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Vitug, Panganiban and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 171631 November 15, 2010
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
AVELINO R. DELA PAZ, ARSENIO R. DELA PAZ, JOSE R.
DELA PAZ, and GLICERIO R. DELA PAZ, represented by JOSE
R. DELA PAZ, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), dated February 15, 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 84206,
which affirmed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig
City, Branch 167, in LRC Case No. N-11514, granting respondents
application for registration and confirmation of title over a parcel of
land located in Barangay Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila.
The factual milieu of this case is as follows:
On November 13, 2003, respondents Avelino R. dela Paz, Arsenio R.
dela Paz, Jose R. dela Paz, and Glicerio R. dela Paz, represented by Jose
R. dela Paz (Jose), filed with the RTC of Pasig City an application for
registration of land3 under Presidential Decree No. 1529 (PD 1529)
otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree. The application
covered a parcel of land with an area of 25,825 square meters, situated
at Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, described under survey Plan
Ccn-00-000084, (Conversion Consolidated plan of Lot Nos. 3212 and
3234, MCADM 590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping). Together with their
application for registration, respondents submitted the following
documents: (1) Special power of attorney showing that the respondents
authorized Jose dela Paz to file the application; (2) Conversion
Consolidated plan of Lot Nos. 3212 and 3234, MCADM 590-D, Taguig
Cadastral Mapping (Ccn-00-000084) with the annotation that the survey
is inside L.C. Map No. 2623 Proj. No. 27-B classified as
alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development, Quezon City
on January 03, 1968; (3) Technical Descriptions of Ccn-00-000084; (4)
Geodetic Engineer's Certificate; (5) Tax Declaration No. FL-018-01466;
(6) Salaysay ng Pagkakaloob dated June 18, 1987; (7) Sinumpaang
Pahayag sa Paglilipat sa Sarili ng mga Pagaari ng Namatay dated March
10, 1979; (8) Certification that the subject lots are not covered by any
land patent or any public land appilcation; and (9) Certification by the
Office of the Treasurer, Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila, that the
tax on the real property for the year 2003 has been paid.
Respondents alleged that they acquired the subject property, which is an
agricultural land, by virtue of Salaysay ng Pagkakaloob4 dated June 18,
1987, executed by their parents Zosimo dela Paz and Ester dela Paz
(Zosimo and Ester), who earlier acquired the said property from their
deceased parent Alejandro dela Paz (Alejandro) by virtue of
a "Sinumpaang Pahayag sa Paglilipat sa Sarili ng mga Pag-aari ng
Namatay5 dated March 10, 1979. In their application, respondents
claimed that they are co-owners of the subject parcel of land and they
have been in continuous, uninterrupted, open, public, adverse
possession of the same, in the concept of owner since they acquired it in
1987. Respondents further averred that by way of tacking of possession,
they, through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, public,
adverse, continuous, and uninterrupted possession of the same, in the
concept of an owner even before June 12, 1945, or for a period of more
than fifty (50) years since the filing of the application of registration
with the trial court. They maintained that the subject property is
classified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
The case was set for initial hearing on April 30, 2004. On said date,
respondents presented documentary evidence to prove compliance with
the jurisdictional requirements of the law.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the application for registration on
the following grounds, among others: (1) that neither the applicants nor
their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question for a
period of not less than thirty (30) years; (2) that the muniments of title,
and/or the tax declarations and tax payments receipts of applicants, if
any, attached to or alleged in the application, do not constitute
competent and sufficient evidence of bona fide acquisition of the land
applied for; and (3) that the parcel of land applied for is a portion of
public domain belonging to the Republic not subject to private
appropriation. Except for the Republic, there was no other oppositor to
the application.
On May 5, 2004, the trial court issued an Order of General
Default6 against the whole world except as against the Republic.
Thereafter, respondents presented their evidence in support of their
application.
In its Decision dated November 17, 2004, the RTC granted respondents'
application for registration of the subject property. The dispositive
portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, affirming the order of general default hereto entered,
judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING and CONFIRMING the title
of AVELINO R. DELA PAZ, Arsenio R. dela Paz, Jose R. dela Paz and
Glicerio R. dela Paz, all married and residents of and with postal
address at No. 65 Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, over a parcel
of land described and bounded under Plan Ccn-00-000084
(consolidation of Lots No. 3212 and 3234, Mcadm-590-D, Taguig,
Cadastral Mapping, containing Twenty-Five Thousand Eight Hundred
Twenty-Five (25,825) Square Meters, more or less, situated at Barangay
Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, under the operation of P.D.
1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree.
After the decision shall have been become final and executory and,
upon payment of all taxes and other charges due on the land, the order
for the issuance of a decree of registration shall be accordingly
undertaken.
SO ORDERED.7
Aggrieved by the Decision, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. 8 The
CA, in its Decision dated February 15, 2006, dismissed the appeal and
affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA ruled that respondents were
able to show that they have been in continuous, open, exclusive and
notorious possession of the subject property through themselves and
their predecessors-in-interest. The CA found that respondents acquired
the subject land from their predecessors-in-interest, who have been in
actual, continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession in the
concept of an owner since time immemorial. The CA, likewise, held
that respondents were able to present sufficient evidence to establish
that the subject property is part of the alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain. Hence, the instant petition raising the following
grounds:
I taxes. Respondents maintain that the annotations appearing on the
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURT'S ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENTS' APPLICATION
FOR REGISTRATION OF THE SUBJECT LOT CONSIDERING
THAT THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD FAILED TO ESTABLISH
THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE BEEN IN OPEN, CONTINUOUS,
EXCLUSIVE AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT
LOT IN THE CONCEPT OF AN OWNER.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE
REGISTRATION OF THE SUBJECT LOT IN RESPONDENTS'
NAME CONSIDERING THAT NO EVIDENCE WAS FORMALLY
OFFERED TO PROVE THAT THE SAME IS WITHIN THE
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE AREA OF THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN.9
In its Memorandum, petitioner claims that the CA's findings that
respondents and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
uninterrupted, public, and adverse possession in the concept of owners,
for more than fifty years or even before June 12, 1945, was
unsubstantiated. Respondents failed to show actual or constructive
possession and occupation over the subject land in the concept of an
owner. Respondents also failed to establish that the subject property is
within the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain. The
subject property remained to be owned by the State under the Regalian
Doctrine.
In their Memorandum, respondents alleged that they were able to
present evidence of specific acts of ownership showing open, notorious,
continuous and adverse possession and occupation in the concept of an
owner of the subject land. To prove their continuous and uninterrupted
possession of the subject land, they presented several tax declarations,
dated 1949, 1966, 1974, 1979, 1980, 1985, 1991, 1994 and 2000, issued
in the name of their predecessors-in-interest. In addition, respondents
presented a tax clearance issued by the Treasurer's Office of the City of
Taguig to show that they are up to date in their payment of real property
survey plan of the subject land serves as sufficient proof that the land is
within the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain.
Finally, respondents assert that the issues raised by the petitioner are
questions of fact which the Court should not consider in a petition for
review under Rule 45.
The petition is meritorious.
In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules
of Court, this Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of
fact, unless the factual findings complained of are devoid of support by
the evidence on record, or the assailed judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts.10 It is not the function of this Court to analyze
or weigh evidence all over again, unless there is a showing that the
findings of the lower court are totally devoid of support or are glaringly
erroneous as to constitute palpable error or grave abuse of discretion.11
In the present case, the records do not support the findings made by the
CA that the subject land is part of the alienable and disposable portion
of the public domain.
Section 14 (1) of PD 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may file in the
proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to
land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
From the foregoing, respondents need to prove that (1) the land forms
part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain; and (2)
they, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been
in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership from June 12,
1945 or earlier.12 These the respondents must prove by no less than
clear, positive and convincing evidence.13
Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all
lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of
any asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to
be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or
released as alienable agricultural land, or alienated to a private person
by the State, remain part of the inalienable public domain.14 The burden
of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands
of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or
claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the
application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of
the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.15
To support its contention that the land subject of the application for
registration is alienable, respondents presented survey Plan Ccn-00-
00008416 (Conversion Consolidated plan of Lot Nos. 3212 & 3234,
MCADM 590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping) prepared by Geodetic
Engineer Arnaldo C. Torres with the following annotation:
This survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623 Proj. No. 27-B clasified as
alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development, Quezon City
on Jan. 03, 1968.
Respondents' reliance on the afore-mentioned annotation is misplaced.
In Republic v. Sarmiento,17 the Court ruled that the notation of the
surveyor-geodetic engineer on the blue print copy of the conversion and
subdivision plan approved by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) Center, that "this survey is inside the
alienable and disposable area, Project No. 27-B. L.C. Map No. 2623,
certified on January 3, 1968 by the Bureau of Forestry," is insufficient
and does not constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome the
presumption that the land remains part of the inalienable public domain.
Further, in Republic v. Tri-plus Corporation,18 the Court held that:
In the present case, the only evidence to prove the character of the
subject lands as required by law is the notation appearing in the
Advance Plan stating in effect that the said properties are alienable and
disposable. However, this is hardly the kind of proof required by law. To
prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable,
an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the
government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order,
an administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators, and a legislative act or statute. The applicant may also
secure a certification from the Government that the lands applied for are
alienable and disposable. In the case at bar, while the Advance Plan
bearing the notation was certified by the Lands Management Services of
the DENR, the certification refers only to the technical correctness of
the survey plotted in the said plan and has nothing to do whatsoever
with the nature and character of the property surveyed. Respondents
failed to submit a certification from the proper government agency to
prove that the lands subject for registration are indeed alienable and
disposable.
Furthermore, in Republic of the Philippines v. Rosila Roche,19 the Court
held that the applicant bears the burden of proving the status of the land.
In this connection, the Court has held that he must present a certificate
of land classification status issued by the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO), or the Provincial Environment and
Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of the DENR. He must also prove
that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and
released the land as alienable and disposable, and that it is within the
approved area per verification through survey by the CENRO or
PENRO. Further, the applicant must present a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true
copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be
established by the applicant to prove that the land is alienable and
disposable.
Clearly, the surveyor's annotation presented by respondents is not the
kind of proof required by law to prove that the subject land falls within
the alienable and disposable zone. Respondents failed to submit a
certification from the proper government agency to establish that the
subject land are part of the alienable and disposable portion of the
public domain. In the absence of incontrovertible evidence to prove that
the subject property is already classified as alienable and disposable, we
must consider the same as still inalienable public domain.20
Anent respondents possession and occupation of the subject property, a
reading of the records failed to show that the respondents by themselves
or through their predecessors-in-interest possessed and occupied the
subject land since June 12, 1945 or earlier.1avvphil
The evidence submitted by respondents to prove their possession and
occupation over the subject property consists of the testimonies of Jose
and Amado Geronimo (Amado), the tenant of the adjacent lot. However,
their testimonies failed to establish respondents predecessors-in-
interest' possession and occupation of subject property since June 12,
1945 or earlier. Jose, who was born on March 19, 1939, 21 testified that
since he attained the age of reason he already knew that the land subject
of this case belonged to them.22 Amado testified that he was a tenant of
the land adjacent to the subject property since 1950, 23 and on about the
same year, he knew that the respondents were occupying the subject
land.24
Jose and Amado's testimonies consist merely of general statements with
no specific details as to when respondents' predecessors-in-interest
began actual occupancy of the land subject of this case. While Jose
testified that the subject land was previously owned by their parents
Zosimo and Ester, who earlier inherited the property from their parent
Alejandro, no clear evidence was presented to show Alejandro's mode
of acquisition of ownership and that he had been in possession of the
same on or before June 12, 1945, the period of possession required by
law. It is a rule that general statements that are mere conclusions of law
and not factual proof of possession are unavailing and cannot
suffice.25 An applicant in a land registration case cannot just harp on
mere conclusions of law to embellish the application but must impress
thereto the facts and circumstances evidencing the alleged ownership
and possession of the land.26
Respondents earliest evidence can be traced back to a tax declaration
issued in the name of their predecessors-in-interest only in the year
1949. At best, respondents can only prove possession since said date.
What is required is open, exclusive, continuous and notorious
possession by respondents and their predecessors-in-interest, under a
bona fide claim of ownership, since June 12, 1945 or
earlier.27 Respondents failed to explain why, despite their claim that their
predecessors-in interest have possessed the subject properties in the
concept of an owner even before June 12, 1945, it was only in 1949 that
their predecessors-in-interest started to declare the same for purposes of
taxation. Well settled is the rule that tax declarations and receipts are not
conclusive evidence of ownership or of the right to possess land when
not supported by any other evidence. The fact that the disputed property
may have been declared for taxation purposes in the names of the
applicants for registration or of their predecessors-in-interest does not
necessarily prove ownership. They are merely indicia of a claim of
ownership.28
The foregoing pieces of evidence, taken together, failed to paint a clear
picture that respondents by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, exclusive, continuous and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject land, under a bona fide claim
of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Evidently, since respondents failed to prove that (1) the subject property
was classified as part of the disposable and alienable land of the public
domain; and (2) they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
thereof under a bonafide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or
earlier, their application for confirmation and registration of the subject
property under PD 1529 should be denied.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court

of Appeals dated February 15, 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 84206,
affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch
167, in LRC Case No. N-11514, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
application for registration and confirmation of title filed by respondents
Avelino R. dela Paz, Arsenio R. dela Paz, Jose R. dela Paz, and Glicerio
R. dela Paz, as represented by Jose R. dela Paz, over a parcel of land,
with a total area of twenty-five thousand eight hundred twenty-five Republic of the Philippines
(25,825) square meters situated at Barangay Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, SUPREME COURT
Metro Manila, is DENIED. Manila

SO ORDERED. FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-43938 April 15, 1988

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (DIRECTOR OF FOREST

DEVELOPMENT), petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION) and JOSE Y.
DE LA ROSA, respondents.

G.R. No. L-44081 April 15, 1988

BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, VICTORIA,
BENJAMIN and EDUARDO, all surnamed DE LA ROSA,
represented by their father JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, respondents.

G.R. No. L-44092 April 15, 1988

ATOK-BIG WEDGE MINING COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, VICTORlA,
BENJAMIN and EDUARDO, all surnamed DE LA ROSA,
represented by their father, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
The Regalian doctrine reserves to the State all natural wealth that may
be found in the bowels of the earth even if the land where the discovery
is made be private. 1 In the cases at bar, which have been consolidated
because they pose a common issue, this doctrine was not correctly
applied.
These cases arose from the application for registration of a parcel of
land filed on February 11, 1965, by Jose de la Rosa on his own behalf
and on behalf of his three children, Victoria, Benjamin and Eduardo.
The land, situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet Province, was divided
into 9 lots and covered by plan Psu-225009. According to the
application, Lots 1-5 were sold to Jose de la Rosa and Lots 6-9 to his
children by Mamaya Balbalio and Jaime Alberto, respectively, in 1964. 2
The application was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc.
as to Lots 1-5, Atok Big Wedge Corporation, as to Portions of Lots 1-5
and all of Lots 6-9, and by the Republic of the Philippines, through the
Bureau of Forestry Development, as to lots 1-9. 3
In support of the application, both Balbalio and Alberto testified that
they had acquired the subject land by virtue of prescription Balbalio
claimed to have received Lots 1-5 from her father shortly after the
Liberation. She testified she was born in the land, which was possessed
by her parents under claim of ownership. 4 Alberto said he received Lots
6-9 in 1961 from his mother, Bella Alberto, who declared that the land
was planted by Jaime and his predecessors-in-interest to bananas,
avocado, nangka and camote, and was enclosed with a barbed-wire
fence. She was corroborated by Felix Marcos, 67 years old at the time,
who recalled the earlier possession of the land by Alberto's
father. 5 Balbalio presented her tax declaration in 1956 and the realty tax
receipts from that year to 1964, 6 Alberto his tax declaration in 1961 and
the realty tax receipts from that year to 1964. 7
Benguet opposed on the ground that the June Bug mineral claim
covering Lots 1-5 was sold to it on September 22, 1934, by the
successors-in-interest of James Kelly, who located the claim in
September 1909 and recorded it on October 14, 1909. From the date of
its purchase, Benguet had been in actual, continuous and exclusive
possession of the land in concept of owner, as evidenced by its
construction of adits, its affidavits of annual assessment, its geological
mappings, geological samplings and trench side cuts, and its payment of
taxes on the land. 8
For its part, Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9
were covered by the Emma and Fredia mineral claims located by
Harrison and Reynolds on December 25, 1930, and recorded on January
2, 1931, in the office of the mining recorder of Baguio. These claims
were purchased from these locators on November 2, 1931, by Atok,
which has since then been in open, continuous and exclusive possession
of the said lots as evidenced by its annual assessment work on the
claims, such as the boring of tunnels, and its payment of annual taxes
thereon. 9
The location of the mineral claims was made in accordance with Section
21 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 which provided that:
SEC. 21. All valuable mineral deposits in public lands in the philippine
Islands both surveyed and unsurveyed are hereby declared to be free and
open to exploration, occupation and purchase and the land in which they
are found to occupation and purchase by the citizens of the United
States, or of said islands.
The Bureau of Forestry Development also interposed its objection,
arguing that the land sought to be registered was covered by the Central
Cordillera Forest Reserve under Proclamation No. 217 dated February
16, 1929. Moreover, by reason of its nature, it was not subject to
alienation under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973. 10
The trial court * denied the application, holding that the applicants had
failed to prove their claim of possession and ownership of the land
sought to be registered. 11 The applicants appealed to the respondent
court, * which reversed the trial court and recognized the claims of the
applicant, but subject to the rights of Benguet and Atok respecting their
mining claims. 12 In other words, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land while at the same time
reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of their
mining claims.
Both Benguet and Atok have appealed to this Court, invoking their
superior right of ownership. The Republic has filed its own petition for
review and reiterates its argument that neither the private respondents
nor the two mining companies have any valid claim to the land because
it is not alienable and registerable.
It is true that the subject property was considered forest land and
included in the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve, but this did not impair
the rights already vested in Benguet and Atok at that time. The Court of
Appeals correctly declared that:
There is no question that the 9 lots applied for are within the June Bug
mineral claims of Benguet and the "Fredia and Emma" mineral claims
of Atok. The June Bug mineral claim of plaintiff Benguet was one of the
16 mining claims of James E. Kelly, American and mining locator. He
filed his declaration of the location of the June Bug mineral and the
same was recorded in the Mining Recorder's Office on October 14,
1909. All of the Kelly claims ha subsequently been acquired by Benguet
Consolidated, Inc. Benguet's evidence is that it had made improvements
on the June Bug mineral claim consisting of mine tunnels prior to 1935.
It had submitted the required affidavit of annual assessment. After
World War II, Benguet introduced improvements on mineral claim June
Bug, and also conducted geological mappings, geological sampling and
trench side cuts. In 1948, Benguet redeclared the "June Bug" for
taxation and had religiously paid the taxes.
The Emma and Fredia claims were two of the several claims of Harrison
registered in 1931, and which Atok representatives acquired. Portions of
Lots 1 to 5 and all of Lots 6 to 9 are within the Emma and Fredia
mineral claims of Atok Big Wedge Mining Company.
The June Bug mineral claim of Benguet and the Fredia and Emma
mineral claims of Atok having been perfected prior to the approval of
the Constitution of the Philippines of 1935, they were removed from the
public domain and had become private properties of Benguet and Atok.
It is not disputed that the location of the mining claim under
consideration was perfected prior to November 15, 1935, when the
Government of the Commonwealth was inaugurated; and according to
the laws existing at that time, as construed and applied by this court
in McDaniel v. Apacible and Cuisia (42 Phil. 749), a valid location of a
mining claim segregated the area from the public domain. Said the court
in that case: The moment the locator discovered a valuable mineral
deposit on the lands located, and perfected his location in accordance
with law, the power of the United States Government to deprive him of
the exclusive right to the possession and enjoyment of the located claim
was gone, the lands had become mineral lands and they were exempted
from lands that could be granted to any other person. The reservations
of public lands cannot be made so as to include prior mineral perfected
locations; and, of course, if a valid mining location is made upon public
lands afterwards included in a reservation, such inclusion or reservation
does not affect the validity of the former location. By such location and
perfection, the land located is segregated from the public domain even
as against the Government. (Union Oil Co. v. Smith, 249 U.S. 337; Van
Mess v. Roonet, 160 Cal. 131; 27 Cyc. 546).
"The legal effect of a valid location of a mining claim is not only to
segregate the area from the public domain, but to grant to the locator the
beneficial ownership of the claim and the right to a patent therefor upon
compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed by law. Where
there is a valid location of a mining claim, the area becomes segregated
from the public domain and the property of the locator." (St. Louis
Mining & Milling Co. v. Montana Mining Co., 171 U.S. 650; 655; 43
Law ed., 320, 322.) "When a location of a mining claim is perfected it
has the effect of a grant by the United States of the right of present and
exclusive possession, with the right to the exclusive enjoyment of all the
surface ground as well as of all the minerals within the lines of the
claim, except as limited by the extralateral right of adjoining locators;
and this is the locator's right before as well as after the issuance of the
patent. While a lode locator acquires a vested property right by virtue of
his location made in compliance with the mining laws, the fee remains
in the government until patent issues."(18 R.C.L. 1152) (Gold Creek
Mining Corporation v. Hon. Eulogio Rodriguez, Sec. of Agriculture and
Commerce, and Quirico Abadilla, Director of the Bureau of Mines, 66
Phil. 259, 265-266)
It is of no importance whether Benguet and Atok had secured a patent
for as held in the Gold Creek Mining Corp. Case, for all physical
purposes of ownership, the owner is not required to secure a patent as
long as he complies with the provisions of the mining laws; his
possessory right, for all practical purposes of ownership, is as good as
though secured by patent.
We agree likewise with the oppositors that having complied with all the
requirements of the mining laws, the claims were removed from the
public domain, and not even the government of the Philippines can take
away this right from them. The reason is obvious. Having become the
private properties of the oppositors, they cannot be deprived thereof
without due process of law. 13
Such rights were not affected either by the stricture in the
Commonwealth Constitution against the alienation of all lands of the
public domain except those agricultural in nature for this was made
subject to existing rights. Thus, in its Article XIII, Section 1, it was
categorically provided that:
SEC. 1. All agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the public domain,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy and other natural resources of the Philipppines belong
to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or
utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines or to
corporations or associations at least 60% of the capital of which is
owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease or
concession at the time of the inauguration of the government established
under this Constitution. Natural resources with the exception of public
agricultural lands, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or
lease for the exploitation, development or utilization of any of the
natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding 25 years,
except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or
industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which
case beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant.
Implementing this provision, Act No. 4268, approved on November 8,
1935, declared:
Any provision of existing laws, executive order, proclamation to the
contrary notwithstanding, all locations of mining claim made prior to
February 8, 1935 within lands set apart as forest reserve under Sec.
1826 of the Revised Administrative Code which would be valid and
subsisting location except to the existence of said reserve are hereby
declared to be valid and subsisting locations as of the date of their
respective locations.
The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to mineral
land and under the laws then in force removed it from the public
domain. 14 By such act, the locators acquired exclusive rights over the
land, against even the government, without need of any further act such
as the purchase of the land or the obtention of a patent over it. 15 As the
land had become the private property of the locators, they had the right
to transfer the same, as they did, to Benguet and Atok.
It is true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that such private property
was subject to the "vicissitudes of ownership," or even to forfeiture by
non-user or abandonment or, as the private respondents aver, by
acquisitive prescription. However, the method invoked by the de la
Rosas is not available in the case at bar, for two reasons.
First, the trial court found that the evidence of open, continuous, adverse
and exclusive possession submitted by the applicants was insufficient to
support their claim of ownership. They themselves had acquired the
land only in 1964 and applied for its registration in 1965, relying on the
earlier alleged possession of their predecessors-in-interest. 16 The trial
judge, who had the opportunity to consider the evidence first-hand and
observe the demeanor of the witnesses and test their credibility was not
convinced. We defer to his judgment in the absence of a showing that it
was reached with grave abuse of discretion or without sufficient basis. 17
Second, even if it be assumed that the predecessors-in-interest of the de
la Rosas had really been in possession of the subject property, their
possession was not in the concept of owner of the mining claim but of
the property as agricultural land, which it was not. The property was
mineral land, and they were claiming it as agricultural land. They were
not disputing the lights of the mining locators nor were they seeking to
oust them as such and to replace them in the mining of the land. In fact,
Balbalio testified that she was aware of the diggings being undertaken
"down below" 18 but she did not mind, much less protest, the same
although she claimed to be the owner of the said land.
The Court of Appeals justified this by saying there is "no conflict of
interest" between the owners of the surface rights and the owners of the
sub-surface rights. This is rather doctrine, for it is a well-known
principle that the owner of piece of land has rights not only to its surface
but also to everything underneath and the airspace above it up to a
reasonable height. 19 Under the aforesaid ruling, the land is classified as
mineral underneath and agricultural on the surface, subject to separate
claims of title. This is also difficult to understand, especially in its
practical application.
Under the theory of the respondent court, the surface owner will be
planting on the land while the mining locator will be boring tunnels
underneath. The farmer cannot dig a well because he may interfere with
the operations below and the miner cannot blast a tunnel lest he destroy
the crops above. How deep can the farmer, and how high can the miner,
go without encroaching on each other's rights? Where is the dividing
line between the surface and the sub-surface rights?
The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and that the
land itself cannot be half agricultural and half mineral. The
classification must be categorical; the land must be either completely
mineral or completely agricultural. In the instant case, as already
observed, the land which was originally classified as forest land ceased
to be so and became mineral and completely mineral once the
mining claims were perfected. 20 As long as mining operations were
being undertaken thereon, or underneath, it did not cease to be so and
become agricultural, even if only partly so, because it was enclosed with
a fence and was cultivated by those who were unlawfully occupying the
surface.
What must have misled the respondent court is Commonwealth Act No.
137, providing as follows:
Sec. 3. All mineral lands of the public domain and minerals belong to
the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development or utilization,
shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations, or
associations, at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by such
citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease or concession at the
time of the inauguration of government established under the
Constitution.
SEC. 4. The ownership of, and the right to the use of land for
agricultural, industrial, commercial, residential, or for any purpose other
than mining does not include the ownership of, nor the right to extract
or utilize, the minerals which may be found on or under the surface.
SEC. 5. The ownership of, and the right to extract and utilize, the
minerals included within all areas for which public agricultural land
patents are granted are excluded and excepted from all such patents.
SEC. 6. The ownership of, and the right to extract and utilize, the
minerals included within all areas for which Torrens titles are granted
are excluded and excepted from all such titles.
This is an application of the Regalian doctrine which, as its name
implies, is intended for the benefit of the State, not of private persons.
The rule simply reserves to the State all minerals that may be found in
public and even private land devoted to "agricultural, industrial,
commercial, residential or (for) any purpose other than mining." Thus, if
a person is the owner of agricultural land in which minerals are
discovered, his ownership of such land does not give him the right to
extract or utilize the said minerals without the permission of the State to
which such minerals belong.
The flaw in the reasoning of the respondent court is in supposing that
the rights over the land could be used for both mining and non-mining
purposes simultaneously. The correct interpretation is that once minerals
are discovered in the land, whatever the use to which it is being devoted
at the time, such use may be discontinued by the State to enable it to
extract the minerals therein in the exercise of its sovereign prerogative.
The land is thus converted to mineral land and may not be used by any
private party, including the registered owner thereof, for any other
purpose that will impede the mining operations to be undertaken
therein, For the loss sustained by such owner, he is of course entitled to
just compensation under the Mining Laws or in appropriate
expropriation proceedings. 21

Our holding is that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the
property in question by virtue of their respective mining claims which
they validly acquired before the Constitution of 1935 prohibited the
alienation of all lands of the public domain except agricultural lands,
subject to vested rights existing at the time of its adoption. The land was
not and could not have been transferred to the private respondents by
virtue of acquisitive prescription, nor could its use be shared
simultaneously by them and the mining companies for agricultural and
mineral purposes.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent court dated April 30,

1976, is SET ASIDE and that of the trial court dated March 11, 1969, is
REINSTATED, without any pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Gancayco and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.