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Mary Grace Natividad Po-Llamanzares vs COMELEC and Estrella

Elamparo( private respondent)

GR No. 221697, March 8, 2016

Perez, J.:

FACTS:

Estrella Elamparo filed a petition to deny due course or cancel the


certificate of candidacy (COC) of herein petitioner. Private respondent alleged
that petitioner committed material misrepresentation when she stated in her
COC that she is a natural born Filipino citizen and that she is a resident of the
Philippines for at least 10 years and eleven months up to the day before 9
May 2016 Election.

The private respondent further contends that petitioner cannot be


considered as natural born Filipino on account of the fact that she was a
foundling. Even assuming arguendo that petitioner was a natural born
Filipino, she is deemed to have lost that status when she became a
naturalized American citizen. According to the private respondent, natural
born citizenship must be continuous from birth.

The petitioner on her answer contends that the burden on proving that
she does not possess natural-born status was on the private respondent. She
alleged that she re-established her domicile in the Philippines as early as
May 24, 2005; that she could re-establish even before she reacquired
natural-born citizenship under RA 9225, and the statement regarding the
period of residence in her 2012 COC for Senator was an honest mistake, not
binding and should give way to evidence on her true date of reacquisition of
domicile.
The COMELEC 2nd division cancelled the COC of the petitioner. On her
motion for reconsideration, the COMELEC En Banc denied it.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is disqualified for running as President of


the Philippines.

HELD:

No. The supreme court ruled in favour of the petitioner, stating that
based on the official statistics from the Philippines Statistics Authority, the
probability of the petitioner being a Filipino Citizen is high. Furthermore, the
private respondent failed to have shown that her parents were aliens. Her
admission that she is a foundling did not shift the burden on her because
such status did not exclude the possibility that her parents were Filipinos
especially in this case where there is a high probability if not certainty that
her parents are Filipino.

Another evidence, circumstantial evidence for that matter, of the


nationality of the petitioner parents are the fact she was abandoned as an
infant in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo City and that she has typical
Filipino features.

In addition, the doctrine of incorporation or transformation was applied


in the instant case. In the said doctrine, it requires that an international law
should be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional
mechanism such a local legislation. Generally accepted principles by virtue
of the incorporation clause of the constitution, form part of the laws of the
land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. Thus, the generally
accepted principles under universal Declaration of Human Rights where it
stated under it Article 15 that: 1) everyone has the right to a nationality and
2) no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right
to change his nationality.

Also, in UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 7, it provides


that a child has a right to acquire a nationality for this would result in his
status as stateless.

In 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),


Article 24 thereof provide for the right of every child to acquire a nationality.

The common thread of UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is to obligate the


Philippines to grant nationality from birth and ensure that no child is
stateless.

Another basis of the Supreme Court is the Hague Convention on


Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws under which a
foundling is presumed to have the nationality of the Country of birth.

Despite of the fact that the jus sanguinis is followed in our country
where a persons nationality at birth is the same as that of his natural
parents, the supreme court adopted the legal principles from Hague
Convention Statelessness. Stating further that it is rational and reasonable
and consistent with the sanguinis regime in our constitution.
In the case of Bengson III vs HRET, it was ruled by the Supreme Court
that a natural born citizen did not have to undergo the process of
naturalization to obtain Philippine Citizenship. This principle, however was
reversed in the instant case.

As to petitioners residence, respondent contends that petitioner is an


alien staying in the Philippines on her stay from 24th of May 2005 to 7th July
2006 until she reacquired of her citizenship under RA 9225. The Supreme
Court in favour of the petitioner, stating that the petitioner has the residency
required because she decided to permanently abandon her US residence
evidenced by her acts, i.e. selling their house, taking the children from US
school and others.

In addition, the Supreme Court accepted the explanation of the


petitioner that she misunderstood the date required in her 2013 COC as the
period of residence as of the day she submitted that COC in 2012. She
further stated that she misunderstood the question and could have truthfully
indicated a longer period.

In conclusion, the petitioner is qualified to be a candidate for President


in National and Local Elections of 9 May 2016.

People vs Suplito

GR No. 104944, September 16, 1999

Mendoza, J.:

FACTS:

The RTC found the accused guilty of murder.

On appeal, the accused-appellant alleged that his counsel was not able
to cross-examine prosecution witness which, as a result, deprived him of the
opportunity to interpose, through counsel, timely objections to the questions
propounded to the witness during her direct examination and to cross
examine her immediately thereafter.

Although the cross-examination was held in the afternoon of the same


day, he argues that the defense counsel was not as effective as he would
have been had he been present during the direct examination.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the contention of the accused is tenable.

HELD:

No. In the case at bar, the counsel for accused appellant arrived in the
middle of the cross examination and manifested that he would conduct his
cross-examination and asked for a copy of the transcript of stenographic
notes so that he could conduct his cross examination.

Indeed, accused appellants counsel conducted an extensive cross


examination and re-cross-examination of witness. Accused-appellant cannot
therefore claim a denial of his right of cross-examination. What is proscribed
by statutory norm and jurisprudential precept is the absence of the
opportunity to cross examine the witness. The proscription, therefore, cannot
apply to the instant case where in spite of the absence of counsel during the
direct examination, he was thereafter accorded the opportunity to examine
the witness.

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