De Castro v JBC

Summary: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just days after the
coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010. May the incumbent President appoint his successor, considering that
Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or Acting President from
making appointments within two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of
his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice
public service or endanger public safety? What is the relevance of Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department) of
the Constitution, which provides that any vacancy in the Supreme Court shall be filled within 90 days from the
occurrence thereof, to the matter of the appointment of his successor?

Petitioners Arturo M. De Castro and John G. Peralta respectively commenced G.R. No. 191002 and G.R. No. 191149
as special civil actions for certiorari and mandamus, praying that the JBC be compelled to submit to the incumbent
President the list of at least three nominees for the position of the next Chief Justice.

All the petitions now before the Court pose as the principal legal question whether the incumbent President can
appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement.

Facts:
De Castro submits that the conflicting opinions on the issue expressed by legal luminaries has impelled the JBC
to defer the decision to whom to send its list of at least three nominees, whether to the incumbent President
or to her successor JBC acted with grave abuse of discretion in deferring the submitting the list of nominees
to the president
On December 22, 2009, Congressman Matias V. Defensor, an ex officio member of the JBC, addressed a letter
to the JBC, requesting that the process for nominations to the office of the Chief Justice be commenced
immediately. JBC approved this en banc! it opened applications and recommendations for CJ
5 most senior were nominated + other members of the public and private sector in the end, the JBC resolved
to proceed to the next step of announcing the names of the following candidates to invite the public to file their
sworn complaint, written report, or opposition, if any, not later than February 22, 2010,
o the JBC reduced the list to 5 (Carpio, Corona, Carpio-Morales, De Castro, Sandoval)

Issues: G.R. No. 191002

a. Does the JBC have the power and authority to resolve the constitutional question of whether the incumbent
President can appoint a Chief Justice during the election ban period?
b. Does the incumbent President have the power and authority to appoint during the election ban the successor of
Chief Justice Puno when he vacates the position of Chief Justice on his retirement on May 17, 2010? YES

Held:
Procedural issues:
a. Petitioners have locus standi as citizens and taxpayers! they stand to get benefitted or injured depending
upon outcome of decision anyway, the court has the discretion to continue with the case if it deems it is
of transcendental importance
1. The court loosens up its standards when it deals with a public right since the issues affect everyone!
b. The issue is justiciable! ripe for controversy
1. Some say the JBC has not even completed its selection process but JBC already began the
process of nomination!
2. Some issues: Challenges to authority of JBC, WON JBC can be compelled by mandamus to submit
list to pres, etc.
Substantive merits:
I. Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme
Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary vs. Section 4 (1), Article VIII
a. The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the framers devoted
time to meticulously drafting, styling, and arranging the Constitution. Such meticulousness
 indicates that the organization and arrangement of the provisions of the Constitution were not
arbitrarily or whimsically done by the framers
i. Note the separation of powers implied in the division of the consti! (art 6, 7, 8 for leg,
exec and judiciary respectively) acc. to azcuna: only way to protect our freedom and
liberty
ii. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to
the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so.
They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15,
Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme
Court as in Section 4 (1), Article VIII emission reveals that the prohibition against the
President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term does
not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court
iii. In Valenzuela: Justice Regalado, a member of the con-comm, confirmed that the
prohibition did not intend to be applied to the appointments of the judiciary
iv. The language in sec 4(1) art 8 SHALL imperative, imposing a duty that has to be
enforced

b. Section 15, Article VII does not apply as well to all other appointments in the Judiciary.
i. Its purpose was to eliminate midnight appointment from being made by the outgoing
chief executive (aytona v Castillo CP Garcia outgoing to Diosdado Macapagal)
1. But the court said, as long as the appointments are few and so spaced as to
afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need
for the appointment and the appointees qualifications, can be made by the
outgoing President some appointments of CP Garcia were upheld!
ii. Given the background and rationale for the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII no
doubt that the Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition to appointments
made in the Executive Department
1. The framers did not need to extend the prohibition to appointments in the
Judiciary, because their establishment of the JBC and their subjecting the
nomination and screening of candidates for judicial positions to the unhurried
and deliberate prior process of the JBC ensured that there would no longer be
midnight appointments to the Judiciary depoliticizes selection process! (no
more CA)
2. It is axiomatic (unquestionable) in statutory construction that the ascertainment
of the purpose of the enactment is a step in the process of ascertaining the intent
or meaning of the enactment, because the reason for the enactment must
necessarily shed considerable light on the law of the statute, the enactment
should be construed with reference to its intended scope and purpose
c. Justice Regalado assured that on the basis of the (Constitutional) Commissions records, the
election ban had no application to appointments to the Court of Appeals.
d. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part
must be considered together with the other parts
i. Sections 14, 15, and 16 of Art 7 refer to the appointing powers of the pres articles 14
and 16 pertain to appointments to the executive so this must mean that appointments in
sec. 15 are also to the executive branch otherwise, thse would have inserted a
provision in art. 8
e. Sec 15 does not extend to appointments in the judiciary!!
i. undermines the intent of the Constitution of ensuring the independence of the Judicial
Department from the Executive and Legislative Departments
ii. this will tie the Judiciary and the Supreme Court to the fortunes or misfortunes of political
leaders vying for the Presidency in a presidential election.
iii. Cant ensure independence if the new pres will be the one appointing the new CJ
 f. The argument that there will be no need for the incumbent to appoint during the probihition a CJ
since there will be time remaining from the mandated 90 days is flawed! since it ignore the
need to apply sec 4(1) to every situation of a vacancy in the supreme court
g. in their deliberations on the mandatory period for the appointment of Supreme Court Justices
under Section 4 (1), Article VIII, the framers neither discussed, nor mentioned, nor referred to the
ban against midnight appointments under Section 15, Article VII, or its effects on the 90-day
period, or vice versa. they never intended Section 15, Article VII to apply to a vacancy in the
Supreme Court, or in any of the lower courts.
h. Can the pres appoint a CJ without the JBC? didnt decide on it!
II. The Judiciary Act of 1948 The posture has been taken that no urgency exists for the President to
appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno, considering that the Judiciary Act of 1948 can still address
the situation of having the next President appoint the successor.
a. Sec. 12 calls for an acting chief justice in the event of a vacancy SC disagrees! intention of
framers is to make position of CJ permanent, otherwise they wouldve provided an acting capacity
in the consti
b. Consti > Judiciary act of 1948
c. JA of 1948 enacted kasi different historical context! (1935 CJ was confirmed by CA and
process might take longer than expected)
d. Lack of an appointed CJ harms the independence of the judiciary since the CJ is the head of the
entire judiciary
e. Historically, there has been no gap bet the retirement and appointment of an old and new CJ
respectively
III. Writ of mandamus does not lie against the JBC
a. The actions for that purpose are premature, because it is clear that the JBC still has until May 17,
2010, at the latest, within which to submit the list of nominees to the President to fill the vacancy
created by the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno
b. Tasks of JBC not ministerial!!

Dissent, Carpio Morales: the essential question boils down to the limitation on the appointing power of the
President.
1. Constitutional draftsmanship style is the weakest aid in arriving at a constitutional construction
a. It is unfortunate that the ponencia chiefly relies on the trivialities of draftsmanship style in arriving
at a constitutional construction
b. AMIN v executive sec:
i. It is a precept, however, that inferences from title, chapter or section headings are
entitled to very little weight. And so must reliance on sub-headings, or the lack thereof,
to support a strained deduction be given the weight of helium.
ii. Its interpretation fails to clearly establish that the so-called ordering or arrangement
of provisions in the Constitution was consciously adopted to imply a signification in
terms of government hierarchy from where a constitutional mandate can per se be
derived or asserted
2. The establishment of the JBC is not sufficient to curtail the evils of midnight appointments in the judiciary

a. Con-Comm, keeping in mind Aytona v Castillo, saw it fit to provide for a comprehensive ban on
midnight appointments JBC not enough to insulate judicial appointments from politicization
b. Con-comm delibs: The clear intent of the framers is thus for the ban on midnight appointments to
apply to the judiciary.
i. Davide pres can appoint people to sensitive positions like the judiciary so he could
perpetuate himself in power even beyond office
3. All rules of statutory construction revolt against the interpretation arrived at by the ponencia
a. Simplistic and unreliable for ponencia to assume that if the framers intended ban to be applied to
the judiciary, it would have added it to the consti this insults the collective intelligence and
 diligence of the ConCom to postulate that it intended to exclude the judiciary but missed out on
that one.
b. The general rule is clear since the prohibition applies to ALL kinds of midnight appointments. The
Constitution made no distinction. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. all doubts
should be resolved in favor of the GR!
c. The exception is likewise clear. Expressio unius et exclusio alterius. The express mention of one
person, thing or consequence implies the exclusion of all others. There is no clear circumstance
that would indicate that the enumeration in the exception was not intended to be exclusive.
Moreover, the fact that Section 15 was couched in negative language reinforces the exclusivity of
the exception.
d. Ponencia should not hastily reverse courts ruling in Valencia due to sole basis of regalados opinion
court spoke as one! if this is the case we might as well reconvene con comm!
e. JP replete with guiding principles to ascertain consti meanings! people cannot possibly have
read into sec 15 the same way as Regalado
4. The 90-day period to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court is suspended during the ban on midnight
appointments
a. The ponencia declares that it is the Presidents imperative duty to make an appointment of a
Member of the Supreme Court within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy will be a clear
disobedience to the Constitution.
b. But there is no citation of any debate on how the framers reckoned or determined an appreciable
length of time of 90 days, in which case a delay of one day could already bring about the evils it
purports to avoid and spell a culpable violation of the Constitution in fact, the addition of one
month to the original proposal of 60 days was approved without controversy ineluctably shows
that the intent was not to strictly impose an inflexible timeframe.
5. The Supreme Court can function effectively during the midnight appointments ban without an appointed
Chief Justice
a. To begin with, judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and not in its individual members,
much less in the Chief Justice alone this is despite that courts work in divisions when the court
states what the law is, they speak with only one voice (execptions are dissents and partially
concurring opinions)
b. Notably, after Chief Justice Puno retires, the Court will have 14 members left, which is more than
sufficient to constitute a quorum.