Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
Dave Bodden
Senior Fellow
Lockheed Martin Aeronautics
F-117 Nighthawk
Or Ill fool your fancy logic and calmly slit your throat!!
Author Unknown
Flight Critical Systems
Integrity Management
Built in Test (BIT)
System Integrity Monitors
ACCELEROMETER FLIGHT
ASSEMBLY CONTROL
LW
D
PANEL
RATE GYRO
J624
ASSEMBLIES J622 J62
1
PNEUMATIC MANUAL
SENSOR TRIM PANEL
ASSEMBLY
QUAD-REDUNDANT ELECTRONICS
Mil-1750 Processor
~ .7 Mips
Single Mil-1553 RT
QUAD-REDUNDANT
EACH ASSEMBLY CONTAINS FOUR
IDENTICAL RATE GYROS
RATE GYRO
J62
4
ASSEMBLIES J622 J6
21
Typical Flight Control Grade Rate Gyros Strapdown Inertial Navigation System
Temporal Redundancy
14
15
FREE RUN
16
(ms)
Inductive Redundancy
SideMount Probe
P, P,
Pt(3), Ps(3)
AoA(3),
FWD MACH/ Air Data (Triplex)
AIRSPEED
INDICATOR PSA
Nose Probe DIGITAL
Pt(2), Ps(2)
FLIGHT DP
Pt(1), Ps(1) CONTROL SENSOR
FWD AFT AoA
COMPUTER
ALTIMETER ALTIMETER
ANALOG
INPUTS FLAPERONS (2) INTEGRATED
SERVO-
ACTUATORS
RUDDER
CONTROL
LAWS
LEF
DISCRETE
INPUTS
LEADING
EDGE
FLAP
COMMAND
MIDDLE VALUE/ PRE-SELECTED DFLCC
SERVOS
MAJORITY SELECTION OUTPUT ELECTRICAL
HARDWARE
Input Selector Monitor
BRANCH A INPUT
S MID-VALUE
BRANCH A
BRANCH B INPUT
S MID-VALUE
BRANCH B
FAULT PROCESSING TRIP LEVEL
MONITOR/LOGIC
BRANCH C INPUT
S MID-VALUE
BRANCH C
BRANCH D INPUT
S MID-VALUE
BRANCH D
Mid - Value Select
A = 10.3o
B = 10.1o
C = 10.2o
Average Value = 10.2o
Mid-Value = 10.2o
A = 10.3o
B = 56.0o
C = 10.2o
Post-Flight BIT
Tolerances and Coverages
Maintenance BIT Are Most Stringent
CPU
ROM
RAM
IOC File
IOC Data Transmit
MUX
Reference Voltage
Analog Addressing
Analog Input
Watch Dog Timer
Discrete I/O
Failure Logic
AOA to CADC
Coil Current Monitor
Sensor
NVM
SDR
MFT Flyup Disable
CADC
LEF
ISA
Input Selector Monitor
BRANCH A INPUT
S MID-VALUE
BRANCH A
BRANCH B INPUT
S MID-VALUE
BRANCH B
FAULT PROCESSING TRIP LEVEL
MONITOR/LOGIC
BRANCH C INPUT
S MID-VALUE
BRANCH C
BRANCH D INPUT
S MID-VALUE
BRANCH D
Typical Input Monitor Trip Levels
Fault Identification
Fault Identification for Quad Devices
D1 = -6 D1 = -6.1 D1 = -7.1
D2 = 5 D2 = 5.1 D2 = 6.1
D3 = -1 D3 = -1 D3 = -1
Rudder
Structural Failure
Flaperon Hinge
Failure
A Bad Day at the Office - Continued
"Seeded Failure Testing and Analysis of an Electro-Mechanical Actuator", Bodden, D.S., and
Clements, N.S., Proceedings of the IEEE Aerospace Conference, March 2007, Big Sky Montana
"Seeded Fault Testing and In-situ Analysis of Critical Electronic Components in EMA Power
Circuitry", Baybutt, M., Bodden, D.S., et.al., Proceedings of the IEEE Aerospace Conference,
March 2008, Big Sky Montana.
Hypothesis 1
Realistic?
ACCELEROMETER FLIGHT
ASSEMBLY CONTROL
L
W
D
PANEL
TOTAL TEMPERATURE
PROBE
LEADING POWER
INTEGRATED SERVO
ACTUATORS
Cost of Prognostics?
Mechanical Systems?
DRIVE UNIT
SIDE STICK
CONTROLLER
RATE GYRO
Electrical Systems?
J62
4
ASSEMBLIES
Eliminate Physical
J622 J621
Redundancy?
PNEUMATIC MANUAL
SENSOR TRIM PANEL
ASSEMBLY
Objective
Which has Better
Mission
Reliabilty?
Optimize Number of
Control Surfaces and
Actuator Redundancy
Failure Immunity?
with Prognostics as a
Design Variable
Air Vehicle Conceptual Design Process
Iteration Conventional
PHM
Carrier Suitable:
Catapult Launch
Arrested Recovery
1.02 Spot Factor (F/A-18C Ref)
Resolv EHA
Electronics Unit LVDT
Pressure Bypass
& Temp
Sol
270 VDC Sensors Blocking
#1
Control Electronics (CE) #2 Sol
Port 1 NDB Power Drive #3
High Pressure
Firewire Interface IEEE 1394 Electronics & Temp Bypass
Performance Sol
Port 2 High Speed (PDE) Sensors
Digital Signal
Serial
Port 3 Processor (DSP) Resolv
Interface
Sol. Drives
M
& Input C C C C C
XMIT RCV Conditioning
28 VDC CCDL H H H H H
Sol Drv , Exc.
A B C B C
Model Channel
270 VDC
Control E lectronics (CE) Model C hannels
Port 1 NDB Pow er Drive
Firewire Interface IEEE 1394 Electronics
Digital Signal
Port 2 High Speed (PDE)
Processor (DSP)
Serial
Port 3 Interface Sol Drv , E xc.
Sol. Drives C C C
& Input H H H
XM IT RCV Conditio ning
28 VDC CCDL M
A B C
Resolv
Electronics Unit Pressure
LVDT & Temp
#1 Sensors Fail
#2 Safe
#3 Sol
Model C hannels
EHA
Optimization Space
j Airframe Configuration
1. Nominal*
2. Split Flaps
3. Split Rudders
4. Split Flaps & Rudders
k Actuator Configuration
1. Simplex Actuators/
Simplex Electronics
2. Duplex Actuators Outbd Flap
3. Simplex Flap/ Flap
Inbd Flap
Duplex Rudder
4. Simplex/
Duplex Electronics Rudder Outbd Rudder
Inbd Rudder
m PHM Configuration n Failure State
1. no PHM 1. no Failures 10. Left Flap/Right Rudder
2. With EHA PHM 85% 2. Left Rudder 11. Inbd Rudder/Inbd
Rudder/Inbd Flap
3. With EHA PHM 60% 3. Left Flap 12. Inbd Rudder/Outbd
Rudder/Outbd Flap
4. With EHA PHM 35% 4. Inbd Flap 13. Outbd Rudder/Inbd
Rudder/Inbd Flap
5. No PHM with TCI 5. Outbd Flap 14. Outbd Rudder/Outbd
Rudder/Outbd Flap
6. Inbd Rudder 15. Left Inbd Rudder/Left Outbd Rudder
*Nominal Configuration 7. Outbd Rudder 16. Left Inbd Flap/Left Outbd Flap
- No Split Surfaces 8. Left Rudder 2nd Fail 17. Right Inbd Rudder/Left Flap
- k=2, m=1, n=1 9. Left Flap 2nd Fail
Reliability Criteria
Failure Immunity
- Addresses Consequences of Failure of any Component
- Based on Fault Tree Analysis and Adjusted Supplier MTBF Data
Mission Availability
- Measure of Percentage of Time Aircraft Would be Available
- Based on Adjusted Supplier MTBF Data and Time To Repair an LRU
Optimization Problem
Optimize the Air Vehicle Design to Minimize the Air Vehicle Weight
and Life Cycle Cost, Subject to the Following Constraints: