Segura Vs.

Segura 165 SCRA 368

FACTS: This involves a parcel of land owned by Gertrudes Zamora. She died intestate and without debt
and was suvived by her 4 children who never decided to divide the property among themselves. The
conflict arises when Gertrudes' grandchildren filed a complaint for recovery of ownership and
possession of the disputed inheritance.

On April 6, 1961, three of the nine grandchildren - Nicolas, Santiago and Gaudencio Segura, executed a
deed of extrajudicial partition arrogating the entire property to themselves alone as equal pro indiviso
owners. The partition was not registered immediately, but only 5 years later, in 1946.

Before such registration, the following developments transpired:

The land was sold to Amojido with right to repurchase. Such right was not exercised. In November 28,
1946, Amojido executed an affidavit of consolidation of ownership and obtained a TCT with a
reservation of the rights of the other heirs annotated therein. Amojito sold the land to Mirope
Mascarenas vda. de Eliso who obtained the TCT in her name, which did not retain the annotation. In
turn, Elison sold the land to Mildred Elison vda. de Javelosa. Mildred sold the land to Ernesto and
Igmedio Amojido.

On January 16, 1958, the Civil Case was dismissed on motion of the plaintiff's counsel.

The complaint in the case at bar involves the six excluded children. They alleged that the partition and
all subsequent transfers of the subject land were null and void insofar as these transactions deprived
them of their shares as co-owners of the said property.

The defendants moved to dismiss, contending that the action was barred by prior judgment and that in
any even whatever rights might have pertained to the plaintiffs had already been prescribed under the
Rules of Court and the Civil Code.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the plaintiffs are barred by prescription from questioning the alleged
extrajudicial partition

2. Whether or not the extrajudicial partition executed by the three co-owners and subsequent
transfers of the subject land were null and void

RULING:

1. NO, petitioners are not barred by prescription. The claim of prescription is based first on the
contention that under the Rules of Court the deed of extrajudicial partition should have been impugned
within two years from the date of its execution in 1941. As the challenge in the instant case was made
only in 1956, when Civil Case No. 3941 was filed, that first case, and more so the case at bar which was
commenced in 1968, should be and were properly dismissed for tardiness under Rule 74, Section 4, of
the Rules of Court.
It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the partition in question which was null and void as
far as the plaintiffs were concerned. The rule covers only valid partitions.

The partition in the present case was invalid because it excluded six of the nine heirs who were entitled
to equal shares in the partitioned property. Under the rule, "no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding
upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof." As the partition was a total
nullity and did not affect the excluded heirs, it was not correct for the trial court to hold that their right
to challenge the partition had prescribed after two years from its execution in 1941.

2. The partition in the present case was invalid because it excluded six of the nine heirs who were
entitled to equal shares in the partitioned property.

As a person can sell only what he owns or is authorized to sell, the buyer can as a consequence acquire
no more than what the seller can legally transfer. The deed of partition being invalid as to the other
heirs, the vendors could dispose only of their respective shares in the land, or one-third only of the
property and not the other two-thirds as well which did not belong to them.

Article 493 of the Civil Code reads as follows:

Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto,
and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage,
with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the
division upon the termination of the co-ownership.

Amojido became pro indiviso co-owner of the land with the other six heirs, who retained title to their
respective shares although he had possession of the entire property. The portion pertaining to the
herein appellants should be deemed held by Amojido under an implied trust for their benefit.