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BATAS PAMBANSA BLG.

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AN ACT PENALIZING THE MAKING OR DRAWING AND ISSUANCE OF A CHECK WITHOUT


SUFFICIENT FUNDS OR CREDIT AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

Section 1. Checks without sufficient funds. - Any person who makes or draws and issues any check
to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds
in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which
check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would
have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered
the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not
more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the
check which fine shall in no case exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such fine and
imprisonment at the discretion of the court.

The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who, having sufficient funds in or credit with
the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to
maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days
from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.

Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or persons who actually
signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act.

Section 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. - The making, drawing and issuance of a
check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such
bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie
evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the
holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of
such check within (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the
drawee.

Section 3. Duty of drawee; rules of evidence. - It shall be the duty of the drawee of any check, when
refusing to pay the same to the holder thereof upon presentment, to cause to be written, printed, or
stamped in plain language thereon, or attached thereto, the reason for drawee's dishonor or refusal
to pay the same: Provided, That where there are no sufficient funds in or credit with such drawee
bank, such fact shall always be explicitly stated in the notice of dishonor or refusal. In all
prosecutions under this Act, the introduction in evidence of any unpaid and dishonored check,
having the drawee's refusal to pay stamped or written thereon or attached thereto, with the reason
therefor as aforesaid, shall be prima facie evidence of the making or issuance of said check, and the
due presentment to the drawee for payment and the dishonor thereof, and that the same was
properly dishonored for the reason written, stamped or attached by the drawee on such dishonored
check.

Not with standing receipt of an order to stop payment, the drawee shall state in the notice that there
were no sufficient funds in or credit with such bank for the payment in full of such check, if such be
the fact.

Section 4. Credit construed. - The word "credit" as used herein shall be construed to mean an
arrangement or understanding with the bank for the payment of such check.

Section 5. Liability under the Revised Penal Code. - Prosecution under this Act shall be without
prejudice to any liability for violation of any provision of the Revised Penal Code.
Section 6. Separability clause. - If any separable provision of this Act be declared unconstitutional,
the remaining provisions shall continue to be in force.

Section 7. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect fifteen days after publication in the Official Gazette.

Approved: April 3, 1979.

Elements and Penalty of Estafa by Means of Deceit


Posted on February 15, 2012by Erineus
Article 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code penalizes fraud or deceit when committed
as follows:

xxxx

2. by means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to
or simultaneously with the commission of fraud:

(a) by using fictitious name, or actions, falsely pretending to possess power,


influence, qualification, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or
by means of other similar deceits.

The elements of the crime of estafa under the foregoing provision are: (1) there must be
a false pretense, fraudulent acts or fraudulent means; (2) such false pretense, fraudulent
act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud; (3) the offended party must have relied on the false pretense,
fraudulent act or fraudulent means and was thus induced to part with his money or
property; and (4) as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.[13]
Petitioners presented themselves toLourdesas persons possessing the authority and
capacity to engage in the financing of used vehicles in behalf of Final Access
Marketing. This was a clear misrepresentation considering their previous knowledge not
only of Erlindas complaint but also of several others as regards the failure of Final Access
Marketing to deliver the motor vehicles bought. Lourdesrelied on their
misrepresentations and parted with her money. Almost a week passed by, but petitioners
and Rule did not deliver the said motor vehicle. They also did not fulfill their subsequent
promise to provide a replacement or to refund her payment. WhenLourdesvisited the
office of Final Access Marketing to demand the return of her money, it was already
closed. She could not locate any of them except for Franco who denied any
wrongdoing. Consequently, she suffered damage.

If indeed they were innocent as they claimed to be, Erlindas complaint to petitioners and
the 12 other similar complaints with Hoy Gising regarding undelivered vehicles should
have dissuaded petitioners from further soliciting customers. The fact that they
continued to offer for sale a second-hand car to Lourdes is indicative of deceit and their
complicity in the conspiracy to commit estafa. The manner in which petitioners
transacted business with Erlinda and Lourdes as well as their awareness of 12 other
similar complaints with Hoy Gising were sufficient to establish the existence of a modus
operandi.
Francos attempt to escape culpability by feigning ignorance of the previously failed
transactions on the delivery of vehicles by Final Access Marketing cannot be
countenanced. As gleaned from the testimony of Erlinda, Franco was already with Final
Access Marketing at the time these transactions occurred. She was therefore familiar with
the companys procedure and policy on the sales of second-hand vehicles. She even
accompaniedLourdesto showrooms and introduced her to Besario and Rule.

As an employee of Final Access Marketing, Franco was expected to be familiar with its
daily activities. It would be unworthy of belief that she did not know of the complaints
for the unexplained failure of Final Access Marketing to deliver vehicles to its
customers. Human nature and experience would compel her to make queries on her own
to discover the reasons for the non-delivery of the vehicles. Her continued insistence in
solicitingLourdesas a client by introducing herself as an Assistant Administrative
Coordinator of Final Access Marketing with the ability to provide financing for a vehicle
of her choice is therefore indicative of fraudulent misrepresentation.

The petitioners also contend that they are not criminally liable since the transaction
withLourdeswas a contract of sale. This contention does not deserve serious
consideration. While the fact that they entered into a contract withLourdescannot be
denied, the transaction transpired due to their deceit. It was their misrepresentation that
inducedLourdesto sign the Sales Proposal agreement and part with her money.

In denying any criminal wrongdoing, petitioners blame their co-accused, Torres, whom
they claim to be the owner of Final Access Marketing. The shifting of blame is common
among conspirators in their attempt to escape liability. It is a desperate strategy to
compensate for their weak defense. We are not readily influenced by such a proposition
since its obvious motive is to distort the truth and frustrate the ends of justice.[14]
The Penalty
Having committed the crime of estafa, the petitioners must suffer the proper penalties
provided by law. The law imposes the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum
period to prision mayor in its minimum period if the amount is over P12,000.00 but does
not exceed P22,000.00. If the amount swindled exceeds P22,000.00, the penalty shall
be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional P10,000.00, but
the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed 20 years.[15] To determine the
minimum of the indeterminate penalty, prision correccional in its maximum period
to prision mayor in its minimum period shall be reduced by one degree, that is, to prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods. The minimum period of the
indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the full range of the penalty of prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods, which is six (6) months and one (1)
day to four (4) years and two (2) months. With the amount of the fraud at P80,000.00,
there is P58,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00. Five years must therefore be added to the
maximum period of the prescribed penalty ranging from six (6) years, eight (8) months
and twenty-one (21) days to eight (8) years. Thus, the maximum term of the penalty would
range from eleven (11) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days to thirteen (13)
years. This is in accord with our ruling in People v. Temparada,[16] viz:
The prescribed penalty for estafa under Article 315, par. 2(d) of the RPC, when the
amount defrauded exceeds P22,000.00, is prision correccional maximum to prision
mayor minimum. The minimum term is taken from the penalty next lower or anywhere
within prision correccional minimum and medium (i.e. from 6 months and 1 day to 4
years and 2 months). Consequently, the RTC correctly fixed the minimum term for the
five estafa cases at 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional since this is within the
range of prision correccional minimum and medium.
On the other hand, the maximum term is taken from the prescribed penalty
of prisioncorreccional maximum to prision mayor minimum in its maximum period,
adding 1 year of imprisonment for every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00, provided
that the total penalty shall not exceed 20 years. However, the maximum period of the
prescribed penalty of prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum is
not prision mayor minimum as apparently assumed by the RTC. To compute the
maximum period of the prescribed penalty, prision correccional maximum
to prision mayor minimum should be divided into three equal portions of time each of
which portion shall be deemed to form one period in accordance with Article 65 of the
RPC. Following this procedure, the maximum period of prision correccional maximum
to prision mayor minimum is from 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years. The
incremental penalty, when proper, shall thus be added to anywhere from 6 years, 8
months and 21 days to 8 years, at the discretion of the court.
In computing the incremental penalty, the amount defrauded shall be subtracted
by P22,000.00, and the difference shall be divided by P10,000.00. Any fraction of a year
shall be discarded as was done starting with the case of People v. Pabalan in consonance
with the settled rule that penal laws shall be construed liberally in favor of the accused. x
x x.
WHEREFORE, the petitions for review on certiorari are DENIED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 27414 which affirmed with modification the Decision
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, in Criminal Case No. 99-173688 convicting
petitioners Lyzah Sy Franco and Steve Besario of the crime of estafa is AFFIRMED with
further modification that the indeterminate prison term imposed on each of the
petitioners is four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as minimum to
thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/171328.htm

https://bataspinoy.wordpress.com/2012/02/15/elements-and-penalty-of-estafa-by-means-of-deceit/

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