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249
2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
ALEXANDER CAVIEDES
Department of Political Science, University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI 53706, USA
(E-mail: Caviedes@polisci.wisc.edu)
Abstract. Europe is home to a vast array of indigenous languages, not to mention numerous
immigrant languages. European Union (EU) acknowledgement of national languages as
official languages results in a privileged status for these languages vis--vis the minority
languages with which they cohabit. This support prevents hegemony by a single language
such as English, yet the EU simultaneously undermines these national languages domestically
by promoting their minority language competitors. This paradox can only be understood by
examining the developing model for European identity whereby identity is viewed as variable
and multi-faceted, rooted in multilingual facility and the absence of a single, monolithic source
of identity. If the project of creating a European identity is viewed as nation-building, it is
central to consider how the issue of language diversity is addressed at the European level. The
paper begins by discussing the concept of national identity and the central role that language
plays in its determination, as well as what modern conceptions of language planning bring
to this process. After exploring the European language terrain, the paper considers whether
the EU can even be said to have a language policy. The discussion focuses on multilingual
education programs, the treatment of minority languages, and the issue of languages spoken
by immigrant populations. Having presented these conceptual tools and policy surveys, an
analytical framework is introduced that situates the nation-building process in relation to the
creation of a common European identity.
I. Introduction
The European Union (EU) makes an interesting object for study thanks to
the duality of its nature. Is it merely a supranational organization that recon-
figures the interests and economic paths of the member states along a single
guideline, or are we actually witnessing the slow yet deliberate progression
toward an actual European state? While some students of European integra-
tion postulate the creation of the latter, the truth is that the keys to the EU
are still held in the hands of the member states to a large degree. Even in
areas where the member states have ceded pockets of authority to the EU, the
Union carefully avoids diminishing the visibility and identity of the individual
nations. Nevertheless, there are developments toward creating a European
identity. This project is referred to by some as nation-forming, and if that is
truly what is occurring, it is appropriate to ask how the question of language
250 ALEXANDER CAVIEDES
A. National identity
The concept of nation is a frequently debated one, but a good starting point
would be to describe it as a human collectivity defining itself as historically
constituted or desired, where that notion makes some claim to autonomy.
While many of the components of national identity, such as religion, language
and symbols, may be older than history, the notion of the nation emerged
in the eighteenth century in Western Europe, where specifically ethnically
defined communities developed around already existing kingdoms or cultures
to form nation-states. As we are speaking about Europe, we will use this
model, even though there are alternative paths leading to the formation of
nations that center around the contrasting colonial experience and its reaction
to colonials or the home nations. Key to a conception of nation is the notion
of identity as a source of symbols and legitimacy for mobilization toward
the task of nation-building. Whether one is predisposed to a primordial or
constructivist explanatory framework of identity formation, each approach
shares the view that culture, language, and religion have historically been the
central components of national identity.
The survival of a nation and the success of its drive towards nation-state status
are predicated upon the existence of a language that its people can speak,
and more importantly, read and write. While it is important to be able to
THE ROLE OF LANGUAGE 251
C. Language planning
A. Approaching babel?
French was the original working language within the institutions of the EU.
This is only natural given that Brussels, Luxembourg, and Strasbourg all lie in
French-speaking territory. However, since the UK and Ireland joined the EC
in 1973, English has also become a working language within the institutions.
A recent study of language use within the European Commission showed
that English was used in 47% of oral communication within the Commission,
while French was used only 38% of the time. For written communica-
tion within the Commission English outdistanced French 49 to 45%, while
external communications were 54% English and only 35% French.14 This
confirms the effect that still derives through location, as the greatest differ-
ence is found where the receiving parties communicating were not necessarily
located in a French-speaking locale. Though French and English are the
dominant languages, German also comes in a poor third, used occasionally
within informal committee discussions (depending on the particular constel-
lation of its membership), even though translators of all the official languages
are present.15
Even francophones recognize the inroads made by English, so policy initi-
atives emanating from France are more concerned with retaining co-equal
status with English than actually elevating French back into primacy. There-
fore, France has forwarded proposals on the European level that solicit aid for
254 ALEXANDER CAVIEDES
mean to keep all languages usable if only a small core of working languages
remain? Either one is prepared to communicate in all languages, or the desig-
nation of a few working languages will result in the exclusion of all others.
To better understand why the EU continues to hold up this multilingual front
in the face of a reality that seems to contradict it, it will first be necessary to
review its policy and subsequently, the nature of the ideology behind it.
C. Minority languages
does not even acknowledge the presence of any minority languages within
the country because this would go against Article 2 of the Constitution that
prohibits differentiation between citizens on the grounds of their origin, race
or religion.41 What may not exist does not exist, so France does not contain
any identifiable, self-contained minorities to whom any recognition could
flow on the basis of their linguistic identity.
What is required in response to such national policies as these are mea-
sures that circumvent the arbitrary policy inclinations of the member states
by dealing directly with language minorities at the regional level. Of course,
such a policy itself can be faulted for being an arbitrary policy. Why is it that
Finnish, a language with less than 5 million speakers, is considered an official
language while Catalan, with 57 million speakers, will still be relegated
to minority language status?42 The rubric of minority language is meant to
delineate a relational status in which the language in question is a minority
vis--vis a majority language within the state.43 However, if the EU is creating
an entity within which all citizens are equal, why should national status
matter? If limitations on the designation of official language rest upon consid-
erations of efficiency, Occitan with its 9.512 million speakers44 should rank
ahead of some of the smaller national languages.
4. Dissenting voices
Not all EU commentators are convinced that the lesser languages even require
protection. Is the lack of integrated EU language policy supporting evidence
for a view which questions the idea of language planning on the grounds that
languages look after themselves?49 Forcing speakers of minority languages
to communicate in a foreign language places them at a disadvantage vis--vis
someone operating in their native tongue, but they also gain a bargaining edge
by having made the concession to work in that language. This is very much
260 ALEXANDER CAVIEDES
a classical economics adage that if you are buying, you do so in your own
language, but if you are selling you will switch to the customers language.50
However, this view does not take into account the psychological advantage
gained by forcing someone to submit to the power of ones language, nor
does it appreciate that some markets may be so minor that it will not be worth
learning their language to reach such a limited clientele.
Another view albeit one that envisions an active role for language plan-
ning which fails to predict further deterioration of minority languages with
the development of a single lingua franca is Laitins 21, which he origin-
ally developed in Language Repertoires. He feels that Europeans will need
to be able to speak their national language and the lingua franca (English),
as well as possibly a local vernacular if it is distinct from the national
language. English speakers can get by with only their mother tongue. He
holds that minority languages will be strengthened through their dealings
with the EU and its eurocrats. National bureaucrats seek to preserve their
national languages official status in the face of English hegemony, but such
support will only be forthcoming if the governments also promise to promote
and protect vernaculars.51 Laitin utilizes rational choice theory to support
the stability of the 21 structure, so one should note that this is a further
commentator basing his argument upon liberal economic theory. Whether
the market place truly can protect minorities as well as they believe is
questionable.
One of the relevant groups that have nevertheless been left out of the debate
with regard to minority languages are immigrants from non-union third
THE ROLE OF LANGUAGE 261
A. Citizenship
With the advent of the Amsterdam Treaty of 1996, the EU made clear its
intention to expand the conception of the Union from one based upon an
agreement between sovereign nations to one centered about the citizenship
of individuals. Article 17 declares that every national of a member state
also becomes a citizen of the Union. While the practical effect of this is
limited to those rights conferred by the Treaty (i.e., freedom of movement
262 ALEXANDER CAVIEDES
and the passive and active rights of voting in European Parliament elections),
symbolically it signifies another step toward political union.58 Nationals
of parties to international agreements or countries that are members of an
international organization do not accrue citizenship rights. By invoking the
language of citizenship, the EU is tipping its hand, exposing an intention to
achieve a status that approximates actual statehood. However, constructing a
European community as opposed to a mere common market requires a far
more concerted attempt at changing peoples image of themselves, including
their identity as nationals rather than European citizens. Another reason for
creating a European citizenry is to make use of a common identity to over-
come the problem of the EUs democratic deficit.59 The hope is that this
would enable people in the member states to identify more with the EU and its
institutions, which might assuage the Unions self-perceived lack of authority
and prestige.60 While this trend should not come as a great surprise to those
who follow the development of the EU, it does open up the question whether
the philosophy of the language policy currently pursued is appropriate to the
formation of a state.
peddled with the twelve star logo of the EU boldly emblazoned upon them.
While the EU works to solidify and subsidize the process of discrete nation-
making,61 the aforementioned activities can hardly be termed as discrete.
Subsidization of European contests and programs in the arts is a further
overt attempt to foster a European image. However, it has been rejected
that one can form new ideas about ones identity through artificial methods
with artificial time and content parameters. Language development, though
manipulable, is highly organic, especially when there is a degree of freedom
of decision on behalf of the public, as language planners in Africa frequently
discover to their chagrin.62 Even with its highly coercive program, the cent-
ralized projection of the Russian language on the Soviet republics did not
have the desired effect of replacing the national languages.63 Similarly, the
EU lacks the hundreds of years within which European nation-states were
consolidated. In addition, it is attempting to create identifications at a time
when the epic form of belonging, so popular before the devastation of the
two great wars of the century, has become dubious as a viable political
project.64 Therefore, what the EU needs to create is a European level of
identity and authority functioning as a type of organizational vessel that
can contain nationalist sentiments while at the same time allowing for the
enhanced expression regional identity.65
VI. Conclusion
Notes
26. Miquel Reniu i Tresserras, A Language Policy for Europe, in Watching Ones Tongue:
Issues in Language Planning, ed. Mairead Nic Craith (Liverpool: Liverpool University
Press, 1996), 64.
27. Dennis Ager, Language, Community and the State (Exeter: Intellect Books, 1997), 81.
28. Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977).
29. Matthias Koenig, Cultural Diversity and Language Policy, International Social Science
Journal 51 (1999), 405.
30. Zimmerman, 165.
31. Cris Shore, Inventing the Peoples Europe: Critical Approaches to European
Community Cultural Policy, Man (N.S.) 28 (1993), 787.
32. Ernest Gellner, On Nationalism, in Nationalism, eds. Anthony Smith and John
Hutchinson (NY: Oxford University Press, 1994), 56.
33. Coulmas, 13.
34. Gubbins, 126.
35. Fontenelle, 123.
36. Laitin 1997, 288289.
37. Schrder, 159.
38. Joint Interpreting & Conference Service, Multilingualism: The Key to Success, SCIC
multilingualism home page Online. December 1999.
39. Coulmas, 16.
40. Coulmas, 14.
41. Machill, 496.
42. Gubbins, 126.
43. Hartmut Haberland, Reflections about Minority Languages in the European
Community, in A Language Policy for the European Community: Prospects and
Quandaries, ed. Florian Coulmas (New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1991), 182.
44. Giulio Lepschy, Le lingue degli europei, in Storia dEuropa: Volume primo LEuropa
Oggi, eds. Anderson, Perry et al. (Turin, Italy: Giulio Einaudi, 1993), 893.
45. Machill, 495.
46. De Witte, 175.
47. Laitin 1997, 289.
48. Reniu i Tresserras, 65.
49. Thomas Herbst, 11 + x = 1? ZAA 47 (1999), IX.
50. Nick Roche, Multilingualism in European Community Meetings a Pragmatic
Approach, in A Language Policy for the European Community: Prospects and
Quandaries, ed. Florian Coulmas (New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1991), 145.
51. Laitin 1997, 298.
52. Herbst VIII.
53. Coulmas, 27.
54. Schrder, 156.
55. John Edwards, Language and Disadvantage, 2nd ed. (London: Whurr Publishers Ltd.,
1989), 126127.
56. Schrder, 156.
57. Eric Beck, Language Rights and Turkish Children in Germany, Patterns of Prejudice
(April 1999), 11.
58. Neill Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union, 4th ed. (Durham:
Duke University Press, 1999), 71.
59. Shore, 786.
268 ALEXANDER CAVIEDES
60. Michael J. Baun, An Imperfect Union: The Maastricht Treaty and the New Politics of
European Integration (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), 145146.
61. Borneman and Fowler, 489.
62. Cooper, 5962.
63. Harald Haarmann, Language Politics and the European Identity, in A Language Policy
for the European Community: Prospects and Quandaries, ed. Florian Coulmas (New
York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1991), 108.
64. Michael Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism (NY: The
Noonday Press, 1993), 245.
65. Shore, 784.
66. Borneman and Fowler, 492.
67. Koenig, 402.
68. Borneman and Fowler, 499.
69. Zimmerman, 165.
70. Konrad Ehlich, Linguistic Integration and Identity the Situation of Migrant Workers
in the EC as a Challenge and Opportunity, in A Language Policy for the European
Community: Prospects and Quandaries, ed. Florian Coulmas (New York: Mouton de
Gruyter, 1991), 196.
71. Habermas Jrgen, Citizenship and National Identity, in The Nationalism Reader, eds.
Omar Dahbour and Micheline R. Ishay (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press
International, 1995), 337.
72. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism (New York: Verso, 1983), 23.
73. Stephen Barbour, Language and National Identity in Europe; Theoretical and Prac-
tical Problems, in Language, Culture and Communication in Contemporary Europe, ed.
Charlotte Hoffman (Philadelphia: Multilingual Matters Ltd., 1996), 40.
74. Paul James, Nation Formation: Towards a Theory of Abstract Community (London: Sage
Publications, 1996), 145.
Biographical note