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Republic of the Philippines lot No. 2650, 77% in lot No. 2652, 77% in lot No. 2080, 64% in
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16925 March 31, 1962
FABIAN PUGEDA, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RAPAEL TRIAS, MIGUEL TRIAS, SOLEDAD TRIAS, assisted by
her husband Angel Sanchez,
CLARA TRIAS, assisted by her husband Victoriano Salvanera,
GABRIEL TRIAS, minors ROMULO VINIEGRA, GLORIA
VINIEGRA
and FERNANDO VINIEGRA, JR., assisted by guardian-ad-
litem, Rafael Trias,
TEOFILO PUGEDA, and VIRGINIA PUGEDA, assisted by her
husband Ramon Portugal, defendants-appellants.
Placido Ramos for plaintiff-appellee.
Cajulis, Trias and Viniegra for defendants-appellants Trias, et
al.
Ramon C. Aquino for defendants-appellants Teofilo Pugeda
and Virginia Pugeda.
LABRADOR, J.:
The subject of this action, which was appealed from the Court
of First Instance of Cavite, is certain lands acquired from the
Friar Lands Estate Administration known as lots Nos. 225,
226, 269, 311, 1803, 1814, 1816, 1832, 2264, 2265, 2266,
2282, 2284, 2378, 2412, 2282, 2683, 2685, 2686, 2688, 2722,
3177 and 3178 of the San Francisco de Malabon estate
located in General Trias, Cavite, a house of strong materials, a
barn (camarin) also of strong materials, and a store also of
strong materials in General Trias, Cavite and sets of
household furniture. The plaintiff claims participation in the
said properties on the ground that the same were acquired
by him and the deceased Maria C. Ferrer, with whom plaintiff
contracted marriage in January, 1916 and who died on
February 11, 1934.
The defendants Rafael, Miguel, Soledad, Clara, Constancia
and Gabriel, all surnamed Trias are the children of the
deceased Maria C. Ferrer with her first husband Mariano
Trias, while the defendants Teofilo Pugeda and Virginia
Pugeda are children of the plaintiff with said deceased Maria
C. Ferrer.
The plaintiff alleges that during the lifetime of the marriage
between himself and the deceased Maria C. Ferrer, they
acquired with conjugal partnership funds lots Nos. 273, 2650,
2680, 2718 and 2764 of the San Francisco de Malabon estate
with the following interest therein; 71% in lot No. 273, 82% in
lot No. 2718 and 76% in lot No. 2764; that plaintiff is the
owner of one-half of the said interest in the lots above-
mentioned; that upon the death of Maria C. Ferrer in 1934
plaintiff and defendants became co-owners of said properties
and defendants managed the properties in trust as co-owners
thereof. Plaintiff prays that the properties above described,
acquired as conjugal properties by the plaintiff and deceased
Maria C. Ferrer, be partitioned -and one-half thereof be given
as share therein of plaintiff.
The defendants surnamed Trias and Viniegra denied the
claims of the plaintiff to the properties described in the
complaint, or that said properties had been administered by
the defendants in trust as co-owners with the plaintiff, and by
way of special and affirmative defense they alleged that the
properties subject of the complaint had been inherited by the
defendants from their deceased father Mariano Trias and
deceased mother Maria C. Ferrer and had been in possession
and full enjoyment thereof for more than 10 years,
peacefully, uninterruptedly, quietly and adversely under a
claim of ownership to the exclusion of all others, and that
plaintiff is estopped from claiming or asserting any rights or
participation in the said properties. Defendants Trias also
denied for lack of knowledge and belief the claim of plaintiff
in his complaint that he was married to Maria C. Ferrer and
that the marriage continued up to the death of the latter in
1934. They further presented a counterclaim against the
plaintiff for the sum of P40,000, this amount being what was
contributed by them in support of the candidacies of plaintiff
when running for the office of provincial governor of Cavite.
They also filed a counterclaim for 30 pieces of Spanish gold
coins and P5,000 in cash amounting in value to the total sum
of P50,000 and a counterclaim for P100,000 which is the
value of four big parcels of land belonging to the defendants
which the plaintiff had appropriated for his own use.
The defendants Pugeda joined the plaintiff in the latter's
claim that the properties mentioned in plaintiff's complaint
were joint properties of the plaintiff and the defendants.
They also allege that the properties had gone to the
management and control of the defendants Trias who should
be required to answer for the fruits and profits thereof during
the administration by them of said properties. As cross-claim
against their co-defendants, they allege that they are each
entitled to one-eighth of the properties left by their mother
as listed in the first ten paragraphs of the complaint, as well
as a share of one-eighth each in lots Nos. 98, 2015 of the San
Francisco de Malabon estate and in a parcel of land in Lingad,
Litiit in Silang, Cavite and in 60 heads of cattle.
Plaintiff denied the counterclaim of the defendants Trias and
the defendants Trias, answering the cross-claim of their co-
defendants Pugeda, denied all the allegations contained in
the answer of the defendants Pugeda, and further alleged
that the cross-claim is improper as the same should be the
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subject of probate proceedings, and the defendants Pugeda
are estopped and barred by prescription from claiming any
further right to the properties left by their deceased mother.
There are two questions or issues raised in the present case.
The first is the alleged existence of a marriage of Fabian
Pugeda and Maria C. Ferrer. The second is the claim of the
plaintiff to various lands acquired from the Friar Lands Estate
under certificates of sale issued first in the name of Mariano
Trias and later assigned to Maria C. Ferrer, but paid for in part
during the marriage of plaintiff and Maria C. Ferrer. A third
but minor issue is the claim for furniture alleged by plaintiff
to have been bought by him and Maria C. Ferrer during the
marriage, which plaintiff claims is in the possession of the
defendants.
On the first issue, the existence of marriage, plaintiff and his
witness Ricardo Ricafrente testified that in the afternoon of
January 5, 1916, on the eve of Epiphany or Three Kings,
plaintiff and the deceased Maria C. Ferrer went to the office
of the Justice of the Peace, who was then witness Ricardo
Ricafrente, to ask the latter to marry them; that accordingly
Ricafrente celebrated the desired marriage in the presence of
two witnesses one of whom was Santiago Salazar and
another Amado Prudente, deceased; that after the usual
ceremony Ricafrente asked the parties to sign two copies of a
marriage contract, and after the witnesses had signed the
same, he delivered one copy to the contracting parties and
another to the President of the Sanitary Division, which
officer was at that time the keeper of the records of the civil
register. Plaintiff and his witnesses explained that no
celebration of the marriage was held inspite of the
prominence of the contracting parties because plaintiff was
then busy campaigning for the office of Member of the
Provincial Board and Maria C. Ferrer was already on the
family way.
The defendants denied the existence of the marriage and
introduced a photostatic copy of the record of marriages in
the municipality of Rosario, Cavite, in the month of January,
1916, which showed that no record of the alleged marriage
existed therein; but this absence was explained by the Justice
of the Peace that perhaps the person who kept the register
forgot tomake an entry of the marriage in the registry.
Other witnesses were introduced to the effect that after the
marriage plaintiff lived in the house of Maria C. Ferrer, which
was the house of spouses Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer.
Evidence was also submitted to the effect that the first issue
was baptized on August 26, 1917 and the one who acted as
sponsor was a sister-in-law of Maria C. Ferrer. The baptismal
certificate submitted states that the baptized child was the
issue of the spouses Fabian Pugeda and Maria C. Ferrer. The
registry of said birth was also submitted and it states that the
father is Fabian Pugeda and the mother is Maria C. Ferrer.
It is also not denied that after the marriage, plaintiff
cohabited with the deceased wife, as husband and wife, until
the death of the latter, publicly and openly as husband and
wife. Lastly, a document entitled "Project of Partition"
(Exhibit 5-Trias) was signed by the parties defendants
themselves. The document contains the following significant
statement or admission: .
WHEREAS the parties hereto are the only children
and forced heirs of the said deceased: Rafael,
Miguel, Soledad, Clara, Constancia, and Gabriel, all
surnamed Trias y Ferrer, are the children of her first
marriage with Mariano Trias, now deceased; and
Teofilo and Virginia, both surnamed Pugeda y
Ferrer,are the children of her second marriage with
Fabian Pugeda..
.... That it is hereby agreed by and between the
parties hereto that lots Nos. 3177 and 3178 known
as the Buenavista property will be administered by
one of the parties to be agreed upon and for said
purpose they appoint MIGUEL F. TRIAS, and all
earnings, rentals and income or profits shall be
expended for the improvement and welfare of the
said property and for the payment of all claims and
accounts of our deceased mother Maria C. Ferrer,
and for the maintenance and education of Teofilo
and Virginia Pugeda y Ferrer.
The judge who heard the evidence, after a review of he
testimonial and documental evidence, arrived at the
conclusion that plaintiff Fabian Pugeda was in fact married to
Maria C. Ferrer on January 5, 1916, this conclusion being
borne out not only by the chain of circumstances but also by
the testimonies of the witnesses to the celebration of the
marriage, who appeared to be truthful, as well as by the fact
that plaintiff and deceased Maria C. Ferrer lived together as
husband and wife for eighteen years (1916-1934) and there is
a strong presumption that they were actually married.
On the competency of the evidence submitted by plaintiff to
prove the marriage we cite the following authority: .
Art. 53. As to marriages contracted subsequently,
no proof other than a certificate of the record in the
civil register shall be admitted, unless such books
have never been kept, or have disappeared, or the
question arises in litigation, in which cases the
marriage may be proved by evidence of any kind. (p.
27, Civil Code) .
The mere fact that the parish priest who married the
plaintiff's natural father and mother, while the latter
was in articulo mortis, failed to send a copy of the
marriage certificate to the municipal secretary, does
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not invalidate said marriage, since it does not appear
that in the celebration thereof all requisites for its
validity were not present, and the forwarding of a
copy of the marriage certificate not being one of said
requisites. (Madridejo v. De Leon, 55 Phil., 1) .
Testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or
by one of the witnesses to the marriage, has been
held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage.
The person who officiated at the solemnization is
also competent to testify as an eyewitness to the
fact of marriage. (55 C.J.S., p. 900).
In our judgment the evidence submitted shows conclusively
that plaintiff Fabian Pugeda was in fact married to Maria C.
Ferrer, said marriage subsisting from 1916 until 1934, upon
the death of the latter, and we affirm the finding of the trial
court to that effect.
On the second issue the evidence introduced at the trial
shows that the lands subject of the action were formerly Friar
Lands included in the San Francisco de Malabon Estate,
province of Cavite, which were acquired under certificates of
sale in the name of Mariano Trias in the year 1910 and later
assigned to his widow Maria C. Ferrer in the year 1916. The
different lots, the dates of their acquisition and assignment to
said Maria C. Ferrer, widow are set forth in a table appended
to this decision as Annex "A".
On the basis of the facts about their acquisition and
assignment Judge Lucero declared that the lots in question
were conjugal properties of Mariano Trias and Maria C.
Ferrer, and consequently decreed that 1/2 thereof, should be
adjudicated to Mariano Trias, as the latter's share in the
conjugal properties, to be divided among his 6 children at the
rate of 1/6 each, and the other half to Maria C. Ferrer, as her
share in the conjugal properties, to be assigned to her
children by both marriages at the rate of 1/9 each and the
balance of 1/9 to widower Fabian Pugeda in usufruct. From
this judgment the case was appealed to the Court of Appeals.
When the case was before the Court of Appeals, the
attorneys for the defendants presented a motion for new trial
on the ground that they discovered copies of four documents
namely Annexes "A", "B" "C," "D" and "E" Record on
Appeal, pp. 108-117, (The last document is a copy of a court
order issued by Judge Manuel V. Moran approving the project
of partition in Case No. 860, Intestate estate of Mariano Trias)
which if admitted might alter the decision. The Court of
Appeals granted the motion and remanded the case to the
Court of First Instance of Cavite for the consideration of said
evidence.
Upon the return of the case to the Court of First Instance,
Judge Primitivo Gonzales who then presided the court,
rendered a new decision. Judge Gonzales found that the total
amount paid by Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer on the lots
in question amounts to only P8,911.84, while the installments
paid during the marriage of the spouses Fabian Pugeda and
Maria C. Ferrer totaled P35,146.46. He also found that lots
3177 and 3178 were paid for during the marriage of Pugeda
and Ferrer in the total sum of P16,557.32. Judge Gonzales
therefore ruled that the two marriages should participate in
the ownership of the lands, according to the actual
contributions made by each marriage in the installments in
payment of the lands. The dispositive part of the decision,
now subject of the appeal, is as follows: .
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATION, the
Court hereby renders judgment: .
1. That lots 2378, 225, 226, 269, 311, 1808, 1804,
1816; 1832, 2264, 2265, 2282, 2284, 2412, 2682,
273, 2650, 2652, 2680, 2718, 2764 (21 lots) are
conjugal assets of Pugeda and Maria C. Ferrer in the
proportion of percentage and indicated in each
individual lot;
2. That lots 3177 and 3178, since all the installments
for the same were fully paid during the marriage of
Pugeda and Maria C. Ferrer are hereby declared
conjugal of the couple Pugeda and Ferrer; and even
some of the installments for these two lots were
paid after the death of Maria C. Ferrer, they do not
loss the character of conjugal property for payments
were made from the crops thereof;
3. That since Mariano Trias during his marriage to
Maria C. Ferrer contributed in the payment for the
installments of these 21 lots amounting to
P8,911.84, half of which must be reimbursed in favor
of the children or heirs of Mariano Trias to be paid
from the mass of the hereditary estate of Maria C.
Ferrer; the other half of P4,455.92 to be distributed
among all the children or heirs of Maria C. Ferrer in
her first and second marriage to be deducted from
the mass of her estate;
4. That lots 2266, 2683, 2685, 2686, 2688 and 2722
since all the installments for these six (6) lots were
fully paid during marriage of Mariano Trias and
Maria C. Ferrer, they are hereby declared to be
conjugal between them one half of which must go
to the children or heirs of Mariano Trias, the other
half must equally go to the children or heirs of Maria
C. Ferrer in her first and second marriage;
5. That Miguel Trias as administrator of all the
properties which commenced after the death of his
mother who died on February 11, 1934, must render
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an accounting of his administration within three (3)
months time from the date this judgment has
become final.
6. That defendants Trias to pay the costs of this
action. (Record on Appeal, pp. 154-156) .
Against this ruling the appeal has come to this Court.
Defendants-appellants claim that Judge Gonzales had no
power or authority to change the decision of Judge Lucero, as
it was not he but Judge Lucero himself, who had heard the
evidence. They have also assigned before Us a set of errors
which may be boiled down to the three main issues set forth
above. As the issue of marriage has already been considered
we will now pass to the second and more important question
as to whether the land subject of the action may be
considered conjugal properties of the first marriage or of the
second or of both.
A consideration of the legal nature and character of the
acquisition of the various lots is necessary that the issues in
the action may be justly determined.
A study of the provisions of the Friar Lands Act (Act No. 1120)
discloses that the friar lands were purchased by the
government for sale to actual occupants (actual settler and
occupants at the time said land are acquired by the
Government). (Paragraph 3 of Declaration of Purposes, Act
1120). The said act expressly declares that the land are not
public land in the sense in which this word is used in the
Public Land Act, and their acquisition is not governed by the
provisions of the Public Land Act (Par. IV, Declaration of
Purposes, Id.) .
The pertinent provisions of said Act No. 1120 are as follows: .
Sec. 12. .... When the costs thereof shall have
been thus ascertained, the Chief of the Bureau of
Public Lands shall give the said settler and occupant
a certificate which shall set forth in detail that the
Government has agreed to sell to such settler and
occupant the amount of land so held by him, at the
price so fixed, payable as provided in this Act at the
office of the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands, in
gold coin of the United States or its equivalent in
Philippine currency, and that upon the payment of
the final installment together with all accrued
interest the Government will convey to such settler
and occupant the said land so held by him by proper
instrument of conveyance, which shall be issued and
become effective in the manner provided in section
one hundred and twenty-two of the Land
Registration Act. ...
A study of the above quoted provisions clearly indicates that
the conveyance executed in favor of a buyer or purchaser, or
the so-called certificate of sale, is a conveyance of the
Sec. 13. The acceptance by the settler and
occupant of such certificate shall be considered as
an agreement by him to pay the purchase price so
fixed and in the installments and at the interest
specified in the certificate, and he shall by such
acceptance become a debtor to the Government in
that amount together with all accrued interest. ....
Provided however, That every settler and occupant
who desires to purchase his holding must enter into
the agreement to purchase such holding by
accepting the said certificate and executing the said
receipt whenever called on so to do by the Chief of
the Bureau of Public Lands, and a failure on the part
of the settler and occupant to comply with this
requirement shall be considered as a refusal to
purchase, and he shall be ousted as above provided
and thereafter his holding may be leased or sold as
in case of unoccupied lands: ....
Sec. 15. The Government hereby reserves the title
to each and every parcel of land sold under the
provisions of this Act until the full payment of all
installments of purchase money and interest by the
purchaser has been made, and any sale or
incumbrance made by him shall be invalid as against
the Government of the Philippine Islands and shall
be in all respects subordinate to its prior claim.
Sec. 16. In the event of the death of a holder of a
certificate the issuance of which is provided for in
section twelve hereof, prior to the execution of a
deed by the Government to any purchaser, his
widow shall be entitled to receive a deed of the land
stated in the certificate upon showing that she has
complied with the requirements of law for the
purchase of the same. In case a holder of a
certificate dies before the giving of the deed and
does not leave a widow, then the interest of the
holder of the certificate shall descend and deed shall
issue to the persons who under the laws of the
Philippine Islands would have taken had the title
been perfected before the death of the holder of the
certificate, upon proof of the holders thus entitled of
compliance with all the requirements of the
certificate. In case the holder of the certificate shall
have sold his interest in the land before having
complied with all the conditions thereof, the
purchaser from the holder of the certificate shall be
entitled to all the rights of the holder of the
certificate upon presenting his assignment to the
Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands for registration.
(Vol. III, Public Laws, pp. 315-316).
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ownership of the property, subject only to the resolutory
condition that the sale may be cancelled if the price agreed
upon is not paid for in full. In the case at bar the sale
certificates were made in favor of Mariano Trias, and upon
his death they were assigned in accordance with Sec. 16, to
his widow. But the law provides that when the buyer does
not leave a widow, the rights and interests of the holder of
the certificate of sale are left to the buyer's heirs in
accordance with the laws of succession. In the case of the
Director of Lands, et al. vs. Ricardo Rizal, et al., G.R. No. 2925
prom. December 29, 1950, this court thru Mr. Justice
Montemayor held: .
... All this clearly and inevitably leads to the
conclusion that the purchaser, even before the
payment of the full price and before the execution of
the final deed of conveyance, is considered by the
law as the actual owner of the lot purchased, under
obligation to pay in full the purchase price, the role
or position of the Government being that of a mere
lien holder or mortgagee.
... In conclusion, we find and hold that in the sale of
a Friar Lands lot or parcel under Act 1120, pending
payment in full of the purchase price, altho the
Government reserves title thereto, merely for its
protection, the beneficial and equitable title is in the
purchaser, and that any accretion received by the lot
even before payment of the last installment belongs
to the purchaser thereof.
We also invite attention to the fact that a sale of friar lands is
entirely different from a sale of public lands under the
provisions of the Public Land Act. In the case of public lands, a
person who desires to acquire must first apply for the parcel
of land desired. Thereafter, the land is opened for bidding. If
the land is awarded to an applicant or to a qualified bidder
the successful bidder is given a right of entry to occupy the
land and cultivate and improve it (Secs. 22-28,
Commonwealth Act 141). It is only after satisfying the
requirements of cultivation and improvement of 1/5 of the
land that the applicant is given a sales patent (Sec. 30).
In the case of friar lands the purchaser becomes the owner
upon issuance of the certificate of sale in his favor, subject
only to cancellation thereof in case the price agreed upon is
not paid. In case of sale of public lands if the applicant dies
and his widow remarries both she and the second husband
are entitled to the land; the new husband has the same right
as his wife. Such is not the case with friar lands. As indicated
in Section 16 of Act 1120, if a holder of a certificate dies
before the payment of the price in full, the sale certificate is
assigned to the widow, but if the buyer does not leave a
widow, the right to the friar lands is transmitted to his heirs
at law.
It is true that the evidence shows that of the various parcels
of land now subject of the action none was paid for in full
during the marriage of Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer, and
that payments in installments continued to be made even
after the marriage of Pugeda and Maria C. Ferrer on January
5, 1916. But it is also true that even after said marriage the
certificates of sale were assigned to Maria C. Ferrer and
installments for the lots after said marriage continued in the
name of Maria C. Ferrer; also all the amounts paid as
installments for the lots were taken from the fruits of the
properties themselves, according to the admission of plaintiff
Fabian Pugeda himself, thus: .
Mr. Viniegra:
Q De los productos de pesos terrenos, durante la
administracion por los demandados, recibia Vd. su
participation?
A No, seor.
Q Nunca? .
A Because I know there are obligations to be paid
to the Bureau of Lands, and I have been informed
that the obligations have been paid annually from
the products of the land.
Q Therefore, from the products of these lands -
the proceeds - the obligations to the Bureau of Lands
are being discounted from the said proceeds and
after the remainder, as in palay, are equally divided,
is that what you mean to say ? .
A Perhaps they were following the practice that,
from the products of the lands the obligations to the
Bureau of Lands would be paid.
Court: .
Q Pero Vd. no ha recibido ninguna cantidad, o sea
les darian alguna participation?
A No seor, porque estaba en Manila, but they
informed me that the obligations to the Bureau of
Lands were being paid from the products of the
lands.
Mr. Viniegra: .
Q You do not claim any participation in the
remainder of the products after paying the Bureau
of Lands? .
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A How would I ask for I knew they were still paying appeared in said proceedings to claim participation in the
the obligations to the Bureau of Lands - that was properties subject of the proceedings. His failure to intervene
until the Japanese time, and I knew some obligations in the proceedings to claim that the friar lands or some of
were not paid, as a result of which the sales them belonged to himself and his wife Maria C. Ferrer, shows
certificates of some big lots were cancelled. a conviction on his part that the said friar lands actually
belonged to the spouses Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer,
Court: and that he had no interest therein. The project of partition
was approved as late as 1929, by which time plaintiff and
Q Como se mantenia Vd.? . defendant had already been married for a period of 13 years.
Plaintiff's failure to assert any claim to the properties in the
said intestate proceedings during its pendency now bars him
A Mi madre tenia la casa en Manila y ella recibia
absolutely from asserting the claim that he now pretends to
alguna renta. My mother helped me. (Session of
have to said properties.
November 20, 1951, before Judge A. G. Lucero, pp.
259-261, Matro.) (Brief for Defendants-Appellants,
pp. 49-51). We will now proceed to consider plaintiff's claim that the
lands in question had, through the joint effort of himself and
his wife, increased in productivity from 900 cavans to 2,400
There is another reason why the above conclusion must be
cavans of rice because of the introduction therein of
upheld in the case at bar, and that is the fact that in the
improvements such as a system of irrigation for the lands. If,
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased
as admitted by plaintiff himself, the installments remaining
Mariano Trias, which was instituted in August 1915, the
unpaid were taken from the produce or the yield of the said
inventory of the estate left by said deceased included the lots
lands and if it be taken into account that one-half of said
purchased from the Friar Lands Estates (Exh. 2, Trias) and the
lands already belonged to the children of the first marriage,
project of partition in said special proceedings submitted to
to whom the lands were adjudicated in the settlement of the
the court as Exh. 3-Trias adjudicated 1/2 of said lands as the
estate of their father, the deceased Mariano C. Trias, the only
share of Mariano Trias in the conjugal properties, the other
portion of the products or produce of the lands in which
1/2 being awarded to Maria C. Ferrer.
plaintiff could claim any participation is the one-half share
therein produced from the paraphernal properties of Maria
The above considerations, factual and legal, lead us to the
C. Ferrer. How much of said produce belonging to Maria C.
inevitable conclusion that the friar lands purchased as above
Ferrer was actually used in the improvement of the lands is
described and paid for, had the character of conjugal not shown, but the fact that plaintiff was engaged in
properties of the spouses Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer.
continuous political campaigns, ever since his marriage in
But another compelling legal reason for this conclusion as
1916 (he had devoted most of his time while married to
against plaintiff, is the judicial pronouncement on said nature
Maria C. Ferrer to politics), portions of the products of the
of the lands in question. In the year 1915, even before the
paraphernal properties of Maria C. Ferrer must have been
marriage of plaintiff and Maria C. Ferrer took place, the latter
used in these political campaigns as well as in meeting the
was appointed administratrix of the estate of her deceased
expenses of the conjugal partnership. The value of the useful
husband Mariano Trias in Civil Case No. 860 of the Court of
improvements introduced on the lands, joint properties of
First Instance of Cavite (Exh. "1" Trias). An inventory of the
Maria C. Ferrer and her children, was not proved in court by
estate left by the deceased Mariano Trias, dated January 15,
plaintiff. Hence the provisions of Article 1404 of the old Civil
1929, was submitted by her and on April 10, 1929, the project
Code, to the effect that useful expenditures for the benefit of
of partition of the properties was submitted. The project the separate properties of one of the spouses are partnership
includes the friar lands subject of the action, and in
properties, cannot be applied. But even if such useful
accordance with it one-half of the properties listed in the
improvements had been proved, the statute of limitations
inventory was adjudicated to the deceased Mariano Trias as
bars plaintiff' action to recover his share therein because
his share and the other half adjudicated to Maria C. Ferrer
Maria C. Ferrer died in 1934, whereas the present action was
also as her share. The share of Mariano Trias was decreed in
instituted by plaintiff only in the year 1948. After the death of
favor of his children and heirs. This project of partition was
Maria C. Ferrer, plaintiff came to Manila, took a second wife,
approved by Judge Manuel V. Moran in an order dated
and was not heard from for 14 years, that is, until he
February 11, 1929, submitted to the Court of Appeals as
instituted this action in 1948. His claim for the improvements,
Annex "E", pp. 114-115 of the record on appeal.
if any, is therefore also barred. 1wph1.t

The pendency of the above intestate proceedings for the

The above ruling, that the action to demand his share in the
settlement of the estate of Mariano Trias must have been
value of the improvements in the paraphernal properties of
known to plaintiff Fabian Pugeda, who is a lawyer. It does not
Maria C. Ferrer is barred, is also applicable to the claim of the
appear, and neither does he claim or allege, that he ever
plaintiff herein for the construction alleged to have been
7

made and the furniture supposedly bought by him and his
spouse Maria C. Ferrer, and which had the character of
conjugal partnership property of said spouses. In the year
1935, defendants herein presented a project of partition to
plaintiff for his signature (the project of partition is dated
March, 1935 and is mark Exhibit "5"-Trias). In this project of
partition of the properties of the deceased Maria C. Ferrer,
mention is made of the participation of the plaintiff's children
with the deceased Maria C. Ferrer, but no mention is made
therein of any participation that plaintiff had or could have as
usufruct or otherwise, or in any building or improvement.
This deed of partition was shown to plaintif but the latter did
not sign it.
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the plaintiff's
complaint is hereby dismissed, and the judgment of the Court
of First Instance of Cavite, Hon. Antonio C. Lucero, presiding,
decreeing the division of the properties of the deceased
Maria C. Ferrer among her eight children and plaintiff, is
hereby modified in the sense that all of her properties be
divided among her eight children at the rate of one-eight per
child. As thus modified, the judgment of Judge Lucero is
hereby affirmed. Without costs.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

The express omission of the name of plaintiff here in the FIRST DIVISION
above deed of partition as one of the heirs of the deceased
Maria C. Ferrer was enough notice to plaintiff that
defendants had intended to deprive him of any share or
participation in the properties left by the deceased Maria C.
G.R. No. L-28248 March 12, 1975
Ferrer, even of the usufruct that the law assigns to him. But in
spite of his knowledge of this fact no action was taken by him
LEONORA PERIDO, joined by husband MANUEL PIROTE,
until February, 1948 when plaintiff demanded his share in the
INOCENCIA PERIDO, ALBENIO PERIDO, PAULINO PERIDO,
properties and later brought this action.
LETIA PERIDO, joined by husband BIENVENIDO BALYAO,
LETICIA PERIDO, joined by husband FELIX VILLARUZ,
The period of around 13 years therefore elapsed before
EUFEMIA PERIDO, CONSOLACION PERIDO, ALFREDO
plaintiff instituted this action. Consequently, whatever rights
PERIDO, GEORGE PERIDO, AMPARO PERIDO, WILFREDO
he may have had to any portion of the estate left by the
PERIDO, MARGARITA PERIDO, ROLANDO SALDE and
deceased Maria C. Ferrer, as a usufructuary or otherwise,
EDUARDO SALDE, petitioners,
must be deemed to have prescribed. As a consequence, we
vs.
find that the order of Judge Lucero granting to the plaintiff
MARIA PERIDO, SOFRONIO PERIDO, JUAN A. PERIDO,
herein one-ninth share in the estate of the deceased Maria C.
GONZALO PERIDO, PACITA PERIDO, MAGDALENA PERIDO,
Ferrer in usufruct should be set aside and the objection to the
ALICIA PERIDO, JOSEFINA PERIDO, FE PERIDO, TERESA
grant of such share to plaintiff on the ground of prescription
PERIDO and LUZ PERIDO, respondents.
is sustained.
Januario L. Jison, Jr. for petitioners.
Having disposed of the claims of plaintiff Fabian Pugeda, we
will now proceed to consider the cross-claim of his children,
Antonio T. de Jesus for respondents.
namely, Teofilo Pugeda and Virginia Pugeda. Judge Lucero
decreed that the properties left by the deceased Maria C.
Pugeda, be divided among her children, including the two
cross-claimants Teofilo Pugeda and Virginia Pugeda, and
decreed one-ninth of the properties of the said deceased MAKALINTAL, C.J.:+.wph!1
Maria C. Ferrer to each of these two children of hers with the
plaintiff and assigning also to the plaintiff one-ninth share in This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court
the said estate left by her in usufruct. of Appeals in its CA-G.R. No. 37034-R, affirming the decision
of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental in Civil
In view of our finding that the claim of the plaintiff to any Case No. 6529.
share in the estate of his wife Maria C. Ferrer is already
barred by the statute of limitations, the decree entered by Lucio Perido of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, married
Judge Lucero declaring that her properties be divided into twice during his lifetime. His first wife was Benita Talorong,
nine parts, one part belonging to each heir and one to with whom he begot three (3) children: Felix, Ismael, and
plaintiff in usufruct, is hereby modified, by eliminating the Margarita. After Benita died Lucio married Marcelina
share in usufruct of the plaintiff therein and increasing the Baliguat, with whom he had five (5) children: Eusebio, Juan,
share of each of her heirs to one-eighth. Maria, Sofronia and Gonzalo. Lucio himself died in 1942,
while his second wife died in 1943.
8
Of the three (3) children belonging to the first marriage only
Margarita Perido is still living. Her deceased brother, Felix
Perido, is survived by his children Inocencia, Leonora, Albinio,
Paulino, Letia, Leticia, and Eufemia, all surnamed Perido.
Nicanora Perido, another daughter of Felix, is also deceased,
but is survived by two (2) sons, Rolando and Eduardo Salde.
Margarita's other deceased brother, Ismael Perido, is
survived by his children, namely: Consolacion, Alfredo,
Wilfredo, and Amparo. Susano Perido, another son of Ismael,
is dead, but survived by his own son George Perido.
Of Lucio Perido's five (5) children by his second wife, two are
already dead, namely: Eusebio and Juan. Eusebio is survived
by his children Magdalena Perido, Pacita Perido, Alicia Perido,
Josefina Perido, Fe Perido, Teresa Perido, and Luz Perido,
while Juan is survived by his only child, Juan A. Perido.
On August 15, 1960 the children and grandchildren of the
first and second marriages of Lucio Perido executed a
document denominated as "Declaration of Heirship and
Extra-judicial Partition," whereby they partitioned among
themselves Lots Nos. 458, 471, 506, 511, 509, 513-B, 807, and
808, all of the Cadastral Survey of Himamaylan, Occidental
Negros.
Evidently the children belonging to the first marriage of Lucio
Perido had second thoughts about the partition. On March 8,
1962 they filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental, which complaint was later amended on
February 22, 1963, against the children of the second
marriage, praying for the annulment of the so-called
"Declaration of Heirship and Extra-Judicial Partition" and for
another partition of the lots mentioned therein among the
plaintiffs alone. They alleged, among other things, that they
had been induced by the defendants to execute the
document in question through misrepresentation, false
promises and fraudulent means; that the lots which were
partitioned in said document belonged to the conjugal
partnership of the spouses Lucio Perido and Benita Talorong,
and that the five children of Lucio Perido with Marcelina
Baliguat were all illegitimate and therefore had no
successional rights to the estate of Lucio Perido, who died in
1942. The defendants denied the foregoing allegations.
After trial the lower court rendered its decision dated July 31,
1965, annulling the "Declaration of Heirship and Extra-Judicial
Partition." However, it did not order the partition of the lots
involved among the plaintiffs exclusively in view of its findings
that the five children of Lucio Perido with his second wife,
Marcelina Baliguat, were legitimate; that all the lots, except
Lot No. 458, were the exclusive properties of Lucio Perido;
and that 11/12 of Lot No. 458 belonged to the conjugal
partnership of Lucio Perido and his second wife, Marcelina
Baliguat. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as
follows:t.hqw
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court
renders judgment as follows: declaring the
following as the legitimate children and
grandchildren and heirs of Lucio Perido and
Benita Talorong: Felix Perido, deceased;
grandchildren: Inocencia Perido, Leonora
Perido, Albinio Perido, Paulino Perido, Letia
Perido, Leticia Perido, Eufemia Perido;
Nicanora Perido, deceased; great
grandchildren: Rolando Salde and Eduardo
Salde; Ismael Perido, deceased;
grandchildren: Consolacion Perido, Alfredo
Perido, Susano Perido, deceased; great
grandson: George Perido; Amparo Perido
and Wilfredo Perido; and, Margarita Perido;
(2) declaring the following as the legitimate
children and grandchildren and heirs of
Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat:
Eusebio Perido, deceased; grandchildren:
Pacita Perido, Magdalena Perido, Alicia
Perido, Josefina Perido, Fe Perido, Teresa
Perido, and Luz Perido; Juan B. Perido,
deceased; grandson, Juan A. Perido; Maria
Perido; Sofronia Perido; and Gonzalo
Perido; (3) declaring all lots (471, 506, 511,
509, 513-part, 807, and 808) except Lot No.
458 as exclusive properties of Lucio Perido
so that each of them should be divided into
eight (8) equal parts: 1/8 belongs to Felix
Perido, but because of his death leaving
eight (8) children, the same should be
divided and alloted as follows: 1/64 to
Inocencia Perido of age, widow; 1/64 to
Leonora Perido, of age, married to Manuel
Pirote; 1/64 to Albinio Perido, of age,
married to Honorata Villasana; 1/64 to
Paulino Perido, of age, married to Norma
Villalba 1/64 to Letia Perido, of age, married
to Bienvenido Balyac; 1/64 to Leticia Perido,
of age, married to Felix Villaruz; 1/64 to
Eufemia Perido, of age, single; 1/64 to
Nicanora Perido, but because she is now
dead the same should be divided and
alloted as follows: 1/128 to Rolando Salde,
of age, single; and 1/128 to Eduardo Salde,
of age, single; 1/8 belongs to Ismael Perido,
but because he is already dead leaving five
children, the same should be divided and
alloted as follows: 1/40 to Consolacion
Perido, of age, widow; 1/40 to Alfredo
Perido, of age married to Trinidad Tamargo;
1/40 to Susano Perido, but he is already
dead with one son, the same goes to
George Perido, of age, single; 1/40 to
Wilfredo Perido, of age, single; 1/8 belongs
to Margarita Perido, of age, widow; 1/8
9
belongs to Eusebio Perido, but because he
is already dead with seven children, the
same should be divided and alloted as
follows: 1/56 goes to Pacita Perido, of age,
single; 1/56 goes to Magdalena Perido, of
age, single; 1/56 goes to Alicia Perido, of
age, married to Isaias Ruiz; 1/56 goes to
Josefina Perido, of age, married to Leopoldo
Doloroso; 1/56 goes to Fe Perido, of age,
single; 1/56 goes to Teresa Perido, of are
single; 1/56 goes to Luz Perido, of age,
married to Fidel de la Cruz; 1/8 belongs to
Juan B. Perido, but because he is already
dead with one child, the same 1/8 goes to
Juan A. Perido, of age, married to Salud
Salgado 1/8 goes to Maria Perido. of age,
married to Julio Pirote; 1/8 goes to Sofronia
Perido, of age, widow; and, 1/8 goes to
Gonzalo Perido, of age, married to
Lacomemoracion Estiller; (4) declaring the
11/12 shares in Lot No. 458 as conjugal
partnership property of Lucio Perido and
Marcelina Baliguat, which should be divided
and alloted as follows: 11/24 goes to Lucio
Perido to be divided into eight (8) equal
shares and 11/24 goes to Marcelina
Baliguat to be divided into five (5) equal
shares or 11/120 for each of the children
and again to be divided by the children of
each child now deceased; (6) declaring Fidel
Perido owner of 1/12 share in Lot 458 to be
divided among his heirs to be determined
accordingly later; and (6) declaring null and
void Exhibit "J" of the plaintiffs which is
Exhibit "10" for the defendants, without
costs and without adjudication with respect
to the counterclaim and damages, they
being members of the same family, for
equity and justice.
The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals, alleging that
the trial court erred: (1) in declaring that Eusebio Perido, Juan
Perido, Maria Perido, Sofronia Perido and Gonzalo Perido,
were the legitimate children of Lucio Perido and his second
wife, Marcelina Baliguat; (2) in declaring that Lucio Perido
was the exclusive owner of Lots Nos. 471, 506, 511, 509, 513-
Part, 807, and 808 of Cadastral Survey of Himamaylan,
Negros Occidental, and in not declaring that said lots were
the conjugal partnership property of Lucio Perido and his first
wife, Benita Talorong; and (3) in holding that 11/12 of Lot 458
was the conjugal partnership property of Lucio Perido and
Marcelina Baliguat.
Finding no reversible error in the decision of the lower court,
the Court of Appeals affirmed it in toto. The appellants
moved to reconsider but were turned down. Thereupon they
instituted he instant petition for review reiterating in effect
the assignments of error and the arguments in the brief they
submitted to the appellate court.
The first issue pertains to the legitimacy of the five children of
Lucio Perido with Marcelina Baliguat. The petitioners insist
that said children were illegitimate on the theory that the
first three were born out of wedlock even before the death of
Lucio Perido's first wife, while the last two were also born out
of wedlock and were not recognized by their parents before
or after their marriage. In support of their contention they
allege that Benita Talorong died in 1905, after the first three
children were born, as testified to by petitioner Margarita
Perido and corroborated by petitioner Leonora Perido; that
as late as 1923 Lucio Perido was still a widower, as shown on
the face of the certificates of title issued to him in said year;
and Lucio Perido married his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat,
only in 1925, as allegedly established through the testimony
of petitioner Leonora Perido.
The petition cannot be sustained. The Court of Appeals found
that there was evidence to show that Lucio Perido's wife,
Benita Talorong, died during the Spanish regime. This finding
conclusive upon us and beyond our power of review. Under
the circumstance, Lucio Perido had no legal impediment to
marry Marcelina Baliguat before the birth of their first child in
1900.
With respect to the civil status of Lucio Perido as stated in the
certificates of title issued to him in 1923, the Court of Appeals
correctly held that the statement was not conclusive to show
that he was not actually married to Marcelina Baliguat.
Furthermore, it is weak and insufficient to rebut the
presumption that persons living together husband and wife
are married to each other. This presumption, especially
where legitimacy of the issue is involved, as in this case, may
be overcome only by cogent proof on the part of those who
allege the illegitimacy. In the case of Adong vs. Cheong Seng
Gee1 this Court explained the rationale behind this
presumption, thus: "The basis of human society throughout
the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this
jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation,
an institution in the maintenance of which the public is
deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the
law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling
together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to
the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the
common order of society, and if the parties were not what
they thus hold themselves out as being, they would he living
in the constant violation of decency and of law. A
presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is
"that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband
and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage."
(Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio
Always presume marriage."
10
While the alleged marriage ceremony in 1925, if true, might
tend to rebut the presumption of marriage arising from
previous cohabitation, it is to be noted that both the trial
court and the appellate court did not even pass upon the
uncorroborated testimony of petitioner Leonora Perido on
the matter. The reason is obvious. Said witness, when asked
why she knew that Marcelina Baliguat was married to Lucio
Perido only in 1925, merely replied that she knew it because
"during the celebration of the marriage by the Aglipayan
priest (they) got flowers from (their) garden and placed in the
altar." Evidently she was not even an eyewitness to the
ceremony.
In view of the foregoing the Court of Appeals did not err in
concluding that the five children of Lucio Perido and
Marcelina Baliguat were born during their marriage and,
therefore, legitimate.
The second assignment of error refers to the determination
of whether or not Lots Nos. 471, 506, 511, 509-513-Part, 807
and 808 were the exclusive properties of Lucio Perido. In
disposing of the contention of the petitioners that said lots
belong to the conjugal partnership of spouses Lucio Perido
and Benita Talorong, the Court of Appeals said:t.hqw
... We cannot agree again with them on this
point. It is to be noted that the lands
covered by the certificates of title (Exhs. B
to G) were all declared in the name of Lucio
Perido. Then there is evidence showing that
the lands were inherited by Lucio Perido
from his grandmother (t.s.n., p. 21, Feb. 20,
1964). In other words, they were the
exclusive properties of the late Lucio Perido
which he brought into the first and second
marriages. By fiat of law said Properties
should be divided accordingly among his
legal heirs.
The petitioners take exception to the finding of the appellate
court that the aforementioned lots were inherited by Lucio
Perido from his grandmother and contend that they were
able to establish through the testimonies of their witnesses
that the spouses Lucio Perido and Benita Talorong acquired
them during their lifetime. Again, the petitioners cannot be
sustained. The question involves appreciation of the
evidence, which is within the domain of the Court of Appeals,
the factual findings of which are not reviewable by this Court.
The third assignment of error is with regard to the ruling of
the Court of Appeals sustaining the finding of the trial court
that 11/12 of Lot 458 was the conjugal partnership property
of Lucio Perido and his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat. Said
the appellate court:t.hqw
With respect to Lot No. 458 which is now
covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
21769 issued in 1925 the same should be
considered conjugally owned by Lucio
Perido and his second wife, Marcelina
Baliguat. The finding of the lower court on
this point need not be disturbed. It is
expressly stated in the certificate of title
(Exh. L) that Lucio Perido, the registered
owner, was married to Marcelina Baliguat
unlike in the previous land titles. If the law
presumes a property registered in the name
of only one of the spouses to be conjugal
(Guinguing vs. Abutin, 48 Phil. 144; Flores
vs. Flores, 48 Phil. 288, Escutin vs. Escutin,
60 Phil. 922), the presumption becomes
stronger when the document recites that
the spouse in whose name the land is
registered is married to somebody else, like
in the case at bar. It appearing that the legal
presumption that the No. 458 belonged to
the conjugal partnership had not been
overcome by clear proofs to the contrary,
we are constrained to rule, that the same is
the conjugal property of the deceased
spouses Lucio Perido and Marcelina
Baliguat.
In impugning the foregoing ruling, the petitioners maintain
that they were able to prove that 6/12 of said Lot 458 was
the conjugal property of spouses Lucio Perido and his first
wife, Benita Talorong, and that the purchase price of the
additional 5/12 of said lot came from the proceeds of sale of
a lot allegedly belonging to Lucio Perido and his three
children of the first marriage. As in the second assignment of
error, the issue raised here also involves appreciation of the
evidence and, consequently, the finding of the appellate
court on the matter is binding on this Court. Indeed, a review
of that finding would require an examination of all the
evidence introduced before the trial court, a consideration of
the credibility of witnesses and of the circumstances
surrounding the case, their relevancy or relation to one
another and to the whole, as well as an appraisal of the
probabilities of the entire situation. It would thus abolish the
distinction between an ordinary appeal on the one hand and
review on certiorari on the other, and thus defeat the
purpose for which the latter procedure has been
established.2
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
affirmed, with costs against the petitioners.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
11
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-43701 March 6, 1937
In re Instate of the deceased Marciana Escao.
ANGELITA JONES., petitioner-appellant-appellee,
vs.
FELIX HORTIGUELA, as administrator, widower and heir,
oppositor-appellant-appellee.
Salvador E. Imperial for petitioner-appellant-appellee.
Vicente L. Faelnar , Hipolito Alo and Ciriaco S. Salazar for
oppositor-appellant-appellee.
CONCEPCION, J.:
This is an appeal taken from the order issued by the Court of
First Instance of Cebu on March 14, 1935 , in the intestate
proceedings of the deceased Marciana Escao, denying
thereby: (1) the motion to appoint a new administrator and
(2) to set aside the order of May 9, 1932, declaring the heirs
of said deceased; (3) holding it unwarranted to declare that
the properties of the intestate estate are paraphernal
properties of said deceased, but reserving to the parties the
right to discuss which of said properties are paraphernal and
which are conjugal; (4)setting aside the order of January 10,
1933. granting to the administrator fees in the sum of
P10,000, and that of June 26, 1933, approving the project of
portion and the final account; and (5) ordering the
presentation of another project of partition and final account.
As Marciana Escao had died intestate, her widower Felix
Hortiguela was appointed judicial administrator of her entire
estate, and in an order issued on May 9, 1932, Angelita Jones,
her daughter by her first marriage, and Felix Hortiguela, her
widower by her second marriage, were declared her only
heirs. In a motion filed with the conformity of the guardian of
the heiress Angelita Jones, Felix Hortiguela, as administrator,
prayed that his fees, as such, be fixed at P10,000 which was
granted by the court in its order of January 10, 1933. The
administrator later presented an inventory of the properties
left by said deceased Marciana Escao, a final account of his
administration, and a project of partition of the intestate
estate wherein he adjudicated to himself a part of the estate
in payment of his share of the conjugal properties and his
usufructuary right, and the remaining part to Angelita Jones.
The latter, who was a minor, was represented in the
proceedings by her guardian Paz Escao de Corominas. The
project of partition and final account were approved in an
order of June 26, 1933, and the properties were turned over
to the respective grantees by virtue thereof.
On May 3, 1934, the heiress Angelita Jones, then married to
Ernesto Lardizabal, filed a motion alleging that she was the
only heir of her mother, the deceased Marciana Escao; that
there never was a valid marriage between her mother and
Felix Hortiguela or that had such marriage been celebrated, it
was null and void; and even granting that it were valid, Felix
Hortiguela was not entitled to a share in usufruct of one-third
of the inheritance; that the petitioner was a minor and that
during the hearing of the intestate proceedings she had not
been assisted by counsel but was represent by the same
attorney of Felix Hortiguela; that during said proceedings
there had been committed many errors and inaccuracies
which impaired her rights and that the fees of P10,000
charged by the administrator were highly unreasonable and
unconscionable. She prayed: (a) for the reopening of the
proceedings; (b) that her husband appointed special
administrator without bond; (c) that her mother's alleged
marriage to Felix Hortiguela be declared null and void; (d)
that the partition of the properties made by administrator or
Hortiguela be declared null and void that petitioner be
declared the only universal heir of her deceased mother; and
(e) that in case there was a valid marriage between Felix
Hortiguela and Marciana Escao, Hortiguela be declared not
entitled to the widower's usufruct; the errors in the
administrator's account be corrected; the latter be granted a
remuneration of only P4 a day, and new partition of the
properties be made.
After Hortiguela's answer had been filed and the evidence for
both parties received, the court issued the order of March 14,
1935, the provisions of which are stated in the first paragraph
of this decision. Both parties appealed therefrom.
The principal question upon the resolution of which depends
that of the others, is whether or not Felix Hortiguela's alleged
marriage to Marciana Escao was celebrated.
It is a fact that in December, 1914, Marciana Escao married
Arthur W. Jones in the suburban catholic church of San
Nicolas, Province of Cebu. On January 10, 1918, Jones
secured a passport to go abroad and thereafter nothing was
ever heard of him. In October, 1919, proceedings were
institute in the Court of First Instance of Maasin, Leyte, at the
instance of Marciana Escao, to have her husband judicially
declared an absentee. On the 25th of said month, the court
issued an order declaring Arthur W. Jones an absentee from
the Philippine Islands pursuant to the provisions of article 186
of the Civil Code, with the proviso that said judicial
declaration of absence would not take effect until six months
after its publication in the official newspapers. Said order
directed the publication thereof in the Official Gazette and in
the newspaper "El Ideal". Pursuant thereto, said order was
published in the Official Gazette during the month of
December, 1919, and January, February, March, April, May
and June, 1920. On April 23, 1921, the court issued another
order for the taking effect of the declaration of absence,
publication thereof having been made in the Official Gazette
and in "El Ideal." On May 6, 1927, Felix Hortiguela and
Marciana Escao were married before the justice of the
12
peace of Malitbog, Leyte, and they signed the certificate of
marriage.
Now, Angelita Jones contends that the declaration of absence
must be understood to have been made not in the order of
October 25, 1919, but in that of April 23, 1921, and that from
the latter date to May 6, 1927, the date of the celebration of
the marriage, only 6 years and 14 days elapsed; and in
accordance with section III, paragraph 2, of General Orders,
No. 68, the marriage so contracted by Felix Hortiguela and
Marciana Escao is null and void. This court does not believe
so. For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not
necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an
absentee. The declaration of absence made in accordance
with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose
to enable the taking of the necessary precautions for the
administration of the estate of the absentee. For the
celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only requires
that the former spouse has been absent for seven
consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that
the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse
to be living, that such former spouse is generally reputed to
be dead and the spouse present so believe at the time of the
celebration of the marriage (section III, paragraph 2, General
orders, No. 68).
In accordance with the foregoing legal provision, the absence
of Marciana Escao's former husband should be counted
from January 10, 1918, the date on which the last news
concerning Arthur W. Jones was received, and from said date
to May 6, 1927, more than nine years elapsed. Said marriage
is, therefore, valid and lawful.
For some unknown reason not attributable, of course, to the
fault or negligence of Felix Hortiguela or Marciana Escao,
the marriage contracted does not appear recorded in the
marriage register of the municipality of Malitbog. Angelita
Jones assigns as one of the errors of the court its having
declared that failure to record said marriage does not affect
the efficacy and validity thereof.
On this point, the court a quo very correctly stated as follows:
Section VIII of General Orders, No. 68, as amended,
provides that the person solemnizing the marriage
must transmit the marriage certificate to the
municipal secretary, and failure to transmit such
certificate shall be fined not less than twenty-five
and not more than fifty dollars; but does not provide
that failure to transmit such certificate to the
municipal secretary annuls the marriage.
Interpreting this legal provision, the Supreme Court,
in its decision of September 5, 1931 (Madridejo vs.
De Leon, 55 Phil., 1 ) said:
"The mere fact that the parish priest who
married the plaintiff's natural father and
mother, while the latter was in articulo
mortis failed to send a copy of the marriage
certificate to the municipal secretary, does
not invalidate said marriage, since it does
not appear that in the celebration thereof
all requisites for its validity were not
present, the forwarding of a copy of the
marriage certificate not being one said
requisites."
In another case (U. S. vs. De Vera, 28 Phil., 105), the court
said:
"Certificate issued pursuant the provisions of section
20 of the Municipal Code by municipal secretaries,
marriages recorded in their respective registers, are
not the only ones that can attest and prove such
facts to such an extent that other proofs established
by law may not be presented or admitted at trial,
when through the omission or fault either of the
municipal secretary himself or of the person who
solemnized the marriage, it was not duly entered or
recorded in the municipal register."
Furthermore, Marciana Escao believed Arthur W. Jones to
be dead when she contracted her second marriage. Her
daughter Angelita Jones herself was of the same belief, since
she lived with her mother after the latter had married
Hortiguela, treated Hortiguela as her true stepfather, and
lived and traveled with him together with her mother. She
certainly would not have behaved so if she had not believed
her father to be dead. Still furthermore, according to section
334, No. 24, of the Code of Civil Procedure, a person not
heard from in seven years is presumed to be dead.
Inasmuch as Felix Hortiguela was lawfully married to
Marciana Escao and was divorced from her at the time of
her death there is no doubt that he is entitled to inherit in
usufruct, not only in testate but also in intestate succession,
as in the present case (6 and 7 Manresa, pages 497-499 and
134-141, respectively).
Therefor, there is no reason to annul the order of May 9,
1932, declaring that the heirs of the deceased were her
widower and her daughter Angelita Jones. Neither is there
any reason to annul the order of June 26, 1933, approving the
partition of the properties of the intestate estate.
The inaccuracies and error attributed to the administrator
Felix Hortiguela in Angelita Jones' motion and alleged therein
as one of the grounds for asking for the reopening of any
assignment of error. It should, therefore, be considered that
13
the petitioner has desisted from her intention relative to this
alleged ground for the nullity of the proceedings.
As to the administrator's fees, the evidence shows that of the
P10,000 granted by the court to Hortiguela as his own sum of
P8,000 for the latter's professional services in this as well as
in other cases affecting the estate of his deceased wife.
Taking into consideration the nature of and the amount
involved in this and in the other cases wherein Attorney
Faelnar has rendered his services this court is of the opinion
that the sum of P8,000 paid by the administrator is a
reasonable and moderate compensation. Angelita Jones'
objection to the effect that she had no reason to contribute
to the payment of Faelnar's fees is untenable, considering the
fact that said attorney's professional services were rendered
for the benefit of the administration of the estate of the
deceased Escao prior to the controversy provoked by said
heiress. As to the remainder of P2,000, said administrator is
entitled to collect the sum of P4 for every day employed by
him as such, and considering the importance of the
inheritance in question and the time elapsed since the
inception of the administration proceedings this court is of
the opinion that the sum of P2,000 is an adequate
compensation for said administrator's services.
Lastly, had the court jurisdiction to set aside, as it did, the
order of January 10, 1933, approving the administrator's fees
and the order of June 26, 1933, approving the partition and
the final account? Had the court jurisdiction to order the
presentation of another project of partition and final
account? These are the questions raised by Felix Hortiguela
and this court is of the opinion that said orders having
therefrom, the court has lost jurisdiction that no appeal was
ever taken therefrom, the court has lost jurisdiction over the
case and it could not resume it under section 113 of the Code
of Civil Procedure or under section 598 thereof because the
above-cited section refer to grounds other than those upon
which Angelita Jones' motion of May 3, 1934, is based.
For all the foregoing consideration this court reverses the
appealed order of March 14, 1935, in so far as it set aside the
order of January 10, 1933, relative to the administrator's fees
and the order of June 26, 1933, approving the final account
and the project of portion, and in so far as said order of
March 14, 1935, required the presentation of a new project
of partition; denied the appointment of Angelita Jones
husband as administrator; affirms the order of May 9, 1932,
relative to declaration of heirs; and holds it unwarranted to
make a finding as to whether or not the properties of this
intestate estate are paraphernal properties of the deceased
Marciana Escao reserving to the parties the right to discuss
which are paraphernal and which are conjugal properties. So
ordered.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-4904 February 5, 1909
ROSALIA MARTINEZ, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ANGEL TAN, defendant-appellee.
Domingo Franco, for appellant.
Doroteo Karagdag, for appellee.
WILLARD, J.:
The only question in this case is whether or not the plaintiff
and the defendant were married on the 25th day of
September, 1907, before the justice of the peace, Jose Ballori,
in the town of Palompon in the Province of Leyte.
There was received in evidence at the trial what is called an
expediente de matrimonio civil. It is written in Spanish and
consists, first, of a petition directed to the justice of the
peace, dated on the 25th of September, 1907, signed by the
plaintiff and the defendant, in which they state that they
have mutually agreed to enter into a contract of marriage
before the justice of the peace, and ask that the justice
solemnize the marriage. Following this is a document dated
on the same day, signed by the justice of the peace, by the
plaintiff, by the defendant, and by Zacarias Esmero and Pacita
Ballori. It states the presentation of the petition above
mentioned; that the persons who signed it where actually
present in the office of the justice on the same day named;
that they ratified under oath the contents of the petition, and
that they insisted in what they had there asked for. It also
stated that being required to produce witnesses of the
marriage, the presented Zacarias Esmero as a witness for the
husband and Pacita Ballori as a witness for the wife.
Following this is a certificate of marriage signed by the justice
of the peace and the witnesses Zacarias Esmero and Pacita
Ballori, dated the 25th day of September, 1907, in which it is
stated that the plaintiff and the defendant were legally
married by the justice of the peace in the presence of the
witnesses on that day.
The court below decided the case in favor of the defendant,
holding that the parties were legally married on the day
named. The evidence in support of that decision is: First. The
document itself, which the plaintiff admits that she signed.
Second. The evidence of the defendant, who testifies that he
and said plaintiff appeared before the justice of the peace at
the time named, together with the witness Zacarias Esmero
and Pacita Ballori, and that they all signed the document
14
above mentioned. Third. The evidence of Zacarias Esmero,
one of the above-named witnesses, who testifies that the
plaintiff, the defendant, and Pacita Ballori appeared before
the justice at the time named and did sign the document
referred to. Fourth. The evidence of Pacita Ballori, who
testified to the same effect. Fifth. The evidence of Jose
Santiago, the bailiff of the court of the justice of the peace,
who testified that the plaintiff, the defendant, the two
witnesses above-named, and the justice of the peace were all
present in the office of the justice of the peace at the time
mentioned.
The only direct evidence in favor of the plaintiff is her own
testimony that she never appeared before the justice of the
peace and never was married to the defendant. She admits
that she signed the document in question, but says that she
signed it in her own home, without reading it, and at the
request of the defendant, who told her that it was a paper
authorizing him to ask the consent of her parents to the
marriage.
There is some indirect evidence which the plaintiff claims
supports her case, but which we think, when properly
considered, is not entitled to much weight. The plaintiff at the
time was visiting, in the town of Palompon, her married
brother and was there for about two weeks. The wife of her
brother, Rosario Bayot, testified that the plaintiff never left
the house except in her company. But she admitted on cross-
examination that she herself went to school every morning
and that on one occasion the plaintiff had gone to church
unaccompanied. The testimony of this witness loses its force
when the testimony of Pacita Ballori is considered. She says
that at the request of the defendant on the day named, about
5 o'clock in the afternoon, she went to the store of a Chinese
named Veles; that there she met the plaintiff and her mother;
that she asked the mother of the plaintiff to allow the
plaintiff to accompany her, the witness, to her own house for
the purpose of examining some dress patterns; that the
mother gave her consent and the two rights left the store,
but instead of going to the house of the witness they went
directly to the office of the justice of the peace where the
ceremony took place; that after the ceremony had taken
place, one came advising them that the mother was
approaching, and that they thereupon hurriedly left the office
of the justice and went to the house of Pacita Ballori, where
the mother later found them.
The other testimony of the plaintiff relating to certain
statements made by the justice of the peace, who died after
the ceremony was performed and before the trial, and
certain statements made by Pacita Ballori, is not sufficient to
overcome the positive testimony of the witnesses for the
defendant.
The other testimony of Pacita Ballori is severely criticized by
counsel for the appellant in his brief. It appears that during
her first examination she was seized with an hysterical attack
and practically collapsed at the trial. Her examination was
adjourned to a future day and was completed in her house
where she was sick in bed. It is claimed by counsel that her
collapse was due to the fact that she recognized that she
testified falsely in stating the office of the justice of the peace
was at the time in the municipal building, when, in fact, it was
in a private house. We do not think that the record justifies
the claim of the appellant. The statement as to the location of
the office of the justice of the peace was afterwards
corrected by the witness and we are satisfied that she told
the facts substantially as they occurred.
There is, moreover, in the case written evidence which
satisfies us that the plaintiff was not telling the truth when
she said she did not appear before the justice of the peace.
This evidence consists of eight letters, which the defendant
claims were all written by the plaintiff. The plaintiff admits
that she wrote letters numbered 2 and 9. The authenticity of
the others was proven. No. 9 is as follows:
ANGEL: Up to this time I did not see my father; but I
know that he is very angry and if he be informed that
we have been married civilly, I am sure that he will
turn me out of the house.
Do what you may deem convenient, as I don't know
what to do.
Should I be able to go to-morrow to Merida, I shall
do so, because I can not remain here.
Yours, ROSAL.
Letter No. 6, which bears no date, but which undoubtedly
was written on the morning of the 25th of September, is as
follows:
Sr. D. ANGEL, TAN.
ANGEL: It is impossible for me to go to the house of
Veles this morning because my sister in law will not
let me go there; if it suits you, I believe that this
afternoon, about 5 or 6 o'clock, is the best hour.
Arrange everything, as I shall go there only for the
purpose of signing, and have Pacita wait for me at
the Chinese store, because I don't like to go without
Pacita.
The house must be one belonging to prudent
people, and no one should know anything about it.
Yours, ROSAL.
15
It will be noticed that this corroborates completely the
testimony of Pacita Ballori as to her meeting the plaintiff in
the afternoon at the store of the Chinese, Veles. Letter No. 7
is also undated, but was evidently written after the marriage
before the justice of the peace. It is as follows:
Sr. D. ANGEL, TAN.
ANGEL: If you want to speak to my mother, who is
also yours, come here by and by, at about 9 or 10,
when you see that the tide is high because my
brother will have to go to the boat for the purpose
of loading lumber.
Don't tell her that we have been civilly married, but
tell her at first that you are willing to celebrate the
marriage at this time, because I don't like her to
know to-day that we have been at the court-house,
inasmuch as she told me this morning that she heard
that we would go to the court, and that we must not
cause her to be ashamed, and that if I insist on being
married I must do it right.
Tell her also that you have asked me to carry you.
I send you herewith the letter of your brother, in
order that you may do what he wishes.
Yours, ROSAL.
Letter No. 8 was also evidently written after the marriage and
is in part as follows:
Sr. D. ANGEL TAN.
ANGEL: I believe it is better for you to go to Ormoc
on Sunday of the steamer Rosa, for the purpose of
asking my father's permission for our marriage, and
in case he fails to give it, then we shall do what we
deem proper, and, if he does not wish us to marry
without his permission, you must request his
consent.
Tell me who said that my sister in law knows that we
are civilly married; my brother ill treatment is a
matter of no importance, as every thing may be
carried out, with patience.
It was proven at the trial that the defendant did go to Ormoc
on the steamer Rosa as indicated in this letter, and that the
plaintiff was on the same boat. The plaintiff testified,
however, that she had no communication with the defendant
during the voyage. The plaintiff and the defendant never lived
together as husband and wife, and upon her arrival in Ormoc,
after consulting with her family, she went to Cebu and
commenced this action, which was brought for the purpose
of procuring the cancellation of the certificate of marriage
and for damages. The evidence strongly preponderates in
favor of the decision of the court below to the effect that the
plaintiff appeared before the justice of the peace at the time
named.
It is claimed by the plaintiff that what took place before the
justice of the peace, even admitting all that the witnesses for
the defendant testified to, did not constitute a legal marriage.
General orders, No. 68, section 6, is as follows:
No particular form from the ceremony of marriage is
required, but the parties must declare in the
presence of the person solemnizing the marriage,
that they take each other as husband and wife.
Zacarias Esmero, one of the witnesses, testified that upon the
occasion in question the justice of the peace said nothing
until after the document was signed and then addressing
himself to the plaintiff and the defendant said, "You are
married." The petition signed the plaintiff and defendant
contained a positive statement that they had mutually agreed
to be married and they asked the justice of the peace to
solemnize the marriage. The document signed by the
plaintiff, the defendant, and the justice of the peace, stated
that they ratified under oath, before the justice, the contents
of the petition and that witnesses of the marriage were
produced. A mortgage took place as shown by the certificate
of the justice of the peace, signed by both contracting parties,
which certificates gives rise to the presumption that the
officer authorized the marriage in due form, the parties
before the justice of the peace declaring that they took each
other as husband and wife, unless the contrary is proved,
such presumption being corroborated in this case by the
admission of the woman to the effect that she had
contracted the marriage certified to in the document signed
by her, which admission can only mean the parties mutually
agreed to unite in marriage when they appeared and signed
the said document which so states before the justice of the
peace who authorized the same. It was proven that both the
plaintiff and the defendant were able to read and write the
Spanish language, and that they knew the contents of the
document which they signed; and under the circumstances in
this particular case were satisfied, and so hold, that what
took place before the justice of the peace on this occasion
amounted to a legal marriage.
The defendant's original answer was a general denial of the
allegations contained in the complaint. Among these
allegations was a statement that the parties had obtain
previously the consent of the plaintiff's parents. The
defendant was afterwards allowed to amend his answer so
that it was a denial of the allegations of the complaint except
that relating to the condition in regard to the consent of the
parents. The plaintiff objected to the allowance of this
16
amendment. After the trial had commenced the defendant
was again allowed to amend his answer so that it should be
an admission of paragraphs 2 and 3 of the complaint, except
that part which related to the consent of the parents. It will
be seen that this second amendment destroyed completely
the first amendment and the defendants lawyer stated that
what he intended to allege in his first amendment, but by
reason of the haste with which the first amendment was
drawn he had unintentionally made it exactly the opposite of
what he had intended to state. After argument the court
allowed the second amendment. We are satisfied that in this
allowance there was no abuse of discretion and we do not
see how the plaintiff was in any way prejudiced. She
proceeded with the trial of the case without asking for a
continuance.
The judgment of the court below acquitting the defendant of
the complaint is affirmed, with the costs of this instance
against the appellant.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995
LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO
BEDIA-SANTOS, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely,
controversial provision introduced by the Family Code is
Article 36 (as amended by E.O. No. 227 dated 17 July 1987),
which declares:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party
who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
The present petition for review on certiorari, at the
instance of Leouel Santos ("Leouel"), brings into fore
the above provision which is now invoked by him.
Undaunted by the decisions of the court a quo1 and
the Court of Appeal,2 Leouel persists in beseeching
its application in his attempt to have his marriage
with herein private respondent, Julia Rosario Bedia-
Santos ("Julia"), declared a nullity.
It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of
First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met Julia. The
meeting later proved to be an eventful day for Leouel and
Julia. On 20 September 1986, the two exchanged vows before
Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City,
followed, shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and
Julia lived with the latter's parents at the J. Bedia Compound,
La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to a baby
boy, and he was christened Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy,
however, did not last long. It was bound to happen, Leouel
averred, because of the frequent interference by Julia's
parents into the young spouses family affairs. Occasionally,
the couple would also start a "quarrel" over a number of
other things, like when and where the couple should start
living independently from Julia's parents or whenever Julia
would express resentment on Leouel's spending a few days
with his own parents.
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of
America to work as a nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so
dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, or on 01
January 1989, Julia called up Leouel for the first time by long
distance telephone. She promised to return home upon the
expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did. When
Leouel got a chance to visit the United States, where he
underwent a training program under the auspices of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines from 01 April up to 25 August
1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in
touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.
Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel
filed with the regional trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch
30, a complaint for "Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of
the Family Code" (docketed, Civil Case No. 9814). Summons
was served by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation in Negros Oriental.
On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through
counsel), opposed the complaint and denied its allegations,
claiming, in main, that it was the petitioner who had, in fact,
been irresponsible and incompetent.
A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of
nullity of their marriage was ruled out by the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor (in its report to the court).
On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had
repeatedly been set, albeit unsuccessfully, by the court, Julia
17
ultimately filed a manifestation, stating that she would
neither appear nor submit evidence.
On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the
complaint for lack of merit.3
Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed
the decision of the trial court.4
The petition should be denied not only because of its non-
compliance with Circular 28-91, which requires a certification
of non-shopping, but also for its lack of merit.
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at
the very least to communicate with him, for more than five
years are circumstances that clearly show her being
psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life. In his
own words, Leouel asserts:
. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection
for (him) because respondent Julia Rosario
Bedia-Santos failed all these years to
communicate with the petitioner. A wife
who does not care to inform her husband
about her whereabouts for a period of five
years, more or less, is psychologically
incapacitated.
The family Code did not define the term "psychological
incapacity." The deliberations during the sessions of the
Family Code Revision Committee, which has drafted the
Code, can, however, provide an insight on the import of the
provision.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be
void from the beginning:
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 36. . . .
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party
who, at the time of the celebration, was
wanting in the sufficient use of reason or
judgment to understand the essential
nature of marriage or was psychologically
or mentally incapacitated to discharge the
essential marital obligations, even if such
lack of incapacity is made manifest after the
celebration.
On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from
the Canon Law, Justice (Jose B.L.) Reyes
suggested that they say "wanting in
sufficient use," but Justice (Eduardo)
Caguioa preferred to say "wanting in the
sufficient use." On the other hand, Justice
Reyes proposed that they say "wanting in
sufficient reason." Justice Caguioa,
however, pointed out that the idea is that
one is not lacking in judgment but that he is
lacking in the exercise of judgment. He
added that lack of judgment would make
the marriage voidable. Judge (Alicia
Sempio-) Diy remarked that lack of
judgment is more serious than insufficient
use of judgment and yet the latter would
make the marriage null and void and the
former only voidable. Justice Caguioa
suggested that subparagraph (7) be
modified to read:
"That contracted by any
party who, at the time of
the celebration, was
psychologically
incapacitated to discharge
the essential marital
obligations, even if such
lack of incapacity is made
manifest after the
celebration."
Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase
"was wanting in sufficient use of reason of
judgment to understand the essential
nature of marriage" refers to defects in the
mental faculties vitiating consent, which is
not the idea in subparagraph (7), but lack of
appreciation of one's marital obligations.
Judge Diy raised the question: Since
"insanity" is also a psychological or mental
incapacity, why is "insanity" only a ground
for annulment and not for declaration or
nullity? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained
that in insanity, there is the appearance of
consent, which is the reason why it is a
ground for voidable marriages, while
subparagraph (7) does not refer to consent
but to the very essence of marital
obligations.
Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in
subparagraph (7), the word "mentally" be
deleted, with which Justice Caguioa
concurred. Judge Diy, however, prefers to
retain the word "mentally."
Justice Caguioa remarked that
subparagraph (7) refers to psychological
18
impotence. Justice (Ricardo) Puno stated
that sometimes a person may be
psychologically impotent with one but not
with another. Justice (Leonor Ines-) Luciano
said that it is called selective impotency.
Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the
confusion lies in the fact that in inserting
the Canon Law annulment in the Family
Code, the Committee used a language
which describes a ground for voidable
marriages under the Civil Code. Justice
Caguioa added that in Canon Law, there are
voidable marriages under the Canon Law,
there are no voidable marriages Dean Gupit
said that this is precisely the reason why
they should make a distinction.
Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law,
the defects in marriage cannot be cured.
Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem
is: Why is "insanity" a ground for void ab
initio marriages? In reply, Justice Caguioa
explained that insanity is curable and there
are lucid intervals, while psychological
incapacity is not.
On another point, Justice Puno suggested
that the phrase "even if such lack or
incapacity is made manifest" be modified to
read "even if such lack or incapacity
becomes manifest."
Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at
the time of the marriage, it is not apparent.
Justice Caguioa stated that there are two
interpretations of the phrase "psychological
or mentally incapacitated" in the first
one, there is vitiation of consent because
one does not know all the consequences of
the marriages, and if he had known these
completely, he might not have consented to
the marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of
making psychological incapacity a ground
for voidable marriages since otherwise it
will encourage one who really understood
the consequences of marriage to claim that
he did not and to make excuses for
invalidating the marriage by acting as if he
did not understand the obligations of
marriage. Dean Gupit added that it is a
loose way of providing for divorce.
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Caguioa explained that his point is
that in the case of incapacity by reason of
defects in the mental faculties, which is less
than insanity, there is a defect in consent
and, therefore, it is clear that it should be a
ground for voidable marriage because there
is the appearance of consent and it is
capable of convalidation for the simple
reason that there are lucid intervals and
there are cases when the insanity is curable.
He emphasized that psychological
incapacity does not refer to mental faculties
and has nothing to do with consent; it
refers to obligations attendant to marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida
Ruth P.) Romero inquired if they do not
consider it as going to the very essence of
consent. She asked if they are really
removing it from consent. In reply, Justice
Caguioa explained that, ultimately, consent
in general is effected but he stressed that
his point is that it is not principally a
vitiation of consent since there is a valid
consent. He objected to the lumping
together of the validity of the marriage
celebration and the obligations attendant
to marriage, which are completely different
from each other, because they require a
different capacity, which is eighteen years
of age, for marriage but in contract, it is
different. Justice Puno, however, felt that
psychological incapacity is still a kind of vice
of consent and that it should not be
classified as a voidable marriage which is
incapable of convalidation; it should be
convalidated but there should be no
prescription. In other words, as long as the
defect has not been cured, there is always a
right to annul the marriage and if the defect
has been really cured, it should be a
defense in the action for annulment so that
when the action for annulment is instituted,
the issue can be raised that actually,
although one might have been
psychologically incapacitated, at the time
the action is brought, it is no longer true
19
that he has no concept of the consequence
of marriage.
Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question:
Will not cohabitation be a defense? In
response, Justice Puno stated that even the
bearing of children and cohabitation should
not be a sign that psychological incapacity
has been cured.
Prof. Romero opined that psychological
incapacity is still insanity of a lesser degree.
Justice Luciano suggested that they invite a
psychiatrist, who is the expert on this
matter. Justice Caguioa, however,
reiterated that psychological incapacity is
not a defect in the mind but in the
understanding of the consequences of
marriage, and therefore, a psychiatrist will
not be a help.
Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same
manner that there is a lucid interval in
insanity, there are also momentary periods
when there is an understanding of the
consequences of marriage. Justice Reyes
and Dean Gupit remarked that the ground
of psychological incapacity will not apply if
the marriage was contracted at the time
when there is understanding of the
consequences of marriage.5
xxx xxx xxx
Judge Diy proposed that they include
physical incapacity to copulate among the
grounds for void marriages. Justice Reyes
commented that in some instances the
impotence that in some instances the
impotence is only temporary and only with
respect to a particular person. Judge Diy
stated that they can specify that it is
incurable. Justice Caguioa remarked that
the term "incurable" has a different
meaning in law and in medicine. Judge Diy
stated that "psychological incapacity" can
also be cured. Justice Caguioa, however,
pointed out that "psychological incapacity"
is incurable.
Justice Puno observed that under the
present draft provision, it is enough to show
that at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, one was psychologically
incapacitated so that later on if already he
can comply with the essential marital
obligations, the marriage is still void ab
initio. Justice Caguioa explained that since
in divorce, the psychological incapacity may
occur after the marriage, in void marriages,
it has to be at the time of the celebration of
marriage. He, however, stressed that the
idea in the provision is that at the time of
the celebration of the marriage, one is
psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations, which
incapacity continues and later becomes
manifest.
Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however,
pointed out that it is possible that after the
marriage, one's psychological incapacity
become manifest but later on he is cured.
Justice Reyes and Justice Caguioa opined
that the remedy in this case is to allow him
to remarry.6
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Puno formulated the next Article as
follows:
Art. 37. A marriage
contracted by any party
who, at the time of the
celebration, was
psychologically
incapacitated, to comply
with the essential
obligations of marriage
shall likewise be void from
the beginning even if such
incapacity becomes
manifest after its
solemnization.
Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if" be
substituted with "although." On the other
hand, Prof. Bautista proposed that the
clause "although such incapacity becomes
manifest after its solemnization" be deleted
since it may encourage one to create the
manifestation of psychological incapacity.
Justice Caguioa pointed out that, as in other
provisions, they cannot argue on the basis
of abuse.
Judge Diy suggested that they also include
mental and physical incapacities, which are
lesser in degree than psychological
20

incapacity. Justice Caguioa explained that Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if
mental and physical incapacities are vices of Article 37 should be retroactive or
consent while psychological incapacity is prospective in application.
not a species of vice or consent.
Justice Diy opined that she was for its
Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on retroactivity because it is their answer to
the matter in the minutes of their February the problem of church annulments of
9, 1984 meeting: marriages, which are still valid under the
Civil Law. On the other hand, Justice Reyes
"On the third ground, and Justice Puno were concerned about the
Bishop Cruz indicated that avalanche of cases.
the phrase "psychological
or mental impotence" is Dean Gupit suggested that they put the
an invention of some issue to a vote, which the Committee
churchmen who are approved.
moralists but not
canonists, that is why it is The members voted as follows:
considered a weak
phrase. He said that the (1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof.
Code of Canon Law would Romero were for prospectivity.
rather express it as
"psychological or mental
(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit,
incapacity to discharge . .
Prof. Bautista and Director Eufemio were
."
for retroactivity.

Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted

(3) Prof. Baviera abstained.
the word "mental" precisely to distinguish it
from vice of consent. He explained that
Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in
"psychological incapacity" refers to lack of
the prescriptive period of ten years within
understanding of the essential obligations
which the action for declaration of nullity of
of marriage.
the marriage should be filed in court. The
Committee approved the suggestion.7
Justice Puno reminded the members that,
at the last meeting, they have decided not
It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision
to go into the classification of
Committee in ultimately deciding to adopt the provision with
"psychological incapacity" because there
less specificity than expected, has in fact, so designed the law
was a lot of debate on it and that this is
as to allow some resiliency in its application. Mme. Justice
precisely the reason why they classified it as
Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the Code Committee, has
a special case.
been quoted by Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita vs.
Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13 June 1994); thus:8
At this point, Justice Puno, remarked that,
since there having been annulments of
The Committee did not give any examples
marriages arising from psychological
of psychological incapacity for fear that the
incapacity, Civil Law should not reconcile
giving of examples would limit the
with Canon Law because it is a new ground
applicability of the provision under the
even under Canon Law.
principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the
Committee would like the judge to interpret
Prof. Romero raised the question: With this
the provision on a case-to-case basis,
common provision in Civil Law and in Canon
guided by experience, the findings of
Law, are they going to have a provision in
experts and researchers in psychological
the Family Code to the effect that marriages
disciplines, and by decisions of church
annulled or declared void by the church on
tribunals which, although not binding on
the ground of psychological incapacity is
the civil courts, may be given persuasive
automatically annulled in Civil Law? The
effect since the provision was taken from
other members replied negatively.
Canon Law.
21
A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New
Code of Canon Law,9 which reads:
Canon 1095. They are incapable of
contracting marriage:
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of
discretion of judgment concerning essentila
matrimonial rights and duties, to be given
and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature
are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all
that persuasive for having no juridical or secular effect, the
jurisprudence under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the
code's enactment, nevertheless, cannot be dismissed as
impertinent for its value as an aid, at least, to the
interpretation or construction of the codal provision.
One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties, 10 giving an
account on how the third paragraph of Canon 1095 has been
framed, states:
The history of the drafting of this canon
does not leave any doubt that the legislator
intended, indeed, to broaden the rule. A
strict and narrow norm was proposed first:
Those who cannot assume
the essential obligations
of marriage because of a
grave psycho-sexual
anomaly (ob gravem
anomaliam
psychosexualem) are
unable to contract
marriage (cf. SCH/1975,
canon 297, a new canon,
novus);
then a broader one followed:
. . . because of a grave psychological
anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychicam)
. . . (cf. SCH/1980, canon 1049);
then the same wording was retained in the
text submitted to the pope (cf. SCH/1982,
canon 1095, 3);
finally, a new version was promulgated:
because of causes of a psychological nature
(ob causas naturae psychiae).
So the progress was from psycho-sexual to
psychological anomaly, then the term
anomaly was altogether eliminated. it
would be, however, incorrect to draw the
conclusion that the cause of the incapacity
need not be some kind of psychological
disorder; after all, normal and healthy
person should be able to assume the
ordinary obligations of marriage.
Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological incapacity"
defies any precise definition since psychological causes can
be of an infinite variety.
In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on Marriage,"
written by Ignatius Gramunt, Javier Hervada and LeRoy
Wauck, the following explanation appears:
This incapacity consists of the following: (a)
a true inability to commit oneself to the
essentials of marriage. Some psychosexual
disorders and other disorders of personality
can be the psychic cause of this defect,
which is here described in legal terms. This
particular type of incapacity consists of a
real inability to render what is due by the
contract. This could be compared to the
incapacity of a farmer to enter a binding
contract to deliver the crops which he
cannot possibly reap; (b) this inability to
commit oneself must refer to the essential
obligations of marriage: the conjugal act,
the community of life and love, the
rendering of mutual help, the procreation
and education of offspring; (c) the inability
must be tantamount to a psychological
abnormality. The mere difficulty of
assuming these obligations, which could be
overcome by normal effort, obviously does
not constitute incapacity. The canon
contemplates a true psychological disorder
which incapacitates a person from giving
what is due (cf. John Paul II, Address to R.
Rota, Feb. 5, 1987). However, if the
marriage is to be declared invalid under this
incapacity, it must be proved not only that
the person is afflicted by a psychological
defect, but that the defect did in fact
deprive the person, at the moment of giving
consent, of the ability to assume the
essential duties of marriage and
22
consequently of the possibility of being
bound by these duties.
Justice Sempio-Diy 11 cites with approval the work of Dr.
Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan
Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila
(Branch 1), who opines that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that
the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history
of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it
must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure
would be beyond the means of the party involved.
It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions,
including, and most importantly, the deliberations of the
Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the
phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the
Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible
cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some
ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence,
immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio
Baluma's "Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code
and their Parallels in Canon Law," quoting from the
Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the
American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's
"Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of the
Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently
of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in
our law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological
incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code,
include their mutual obligations to live together, observe
love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There
is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been
to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. This pschologic
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.
The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an
inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other.
This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code
which considers children conceived prior to the judicial
declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of
marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or
concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage
contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug
addiction, habitual alcholism, lesbianism or homosexuality
should occur only during the marriage, they become mere
grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family
Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not
necessarily preclude the possibility of these various
circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree
and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological
incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are
established, every circumstance that may have some bearing
on the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity
must, in every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so
that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily
decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists,
psychologists, and persons with expertise in psychological
disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.
Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We
should continue to be reminded that innate in our society,
then enshrined in our Civil Code, and even now still indelible
in Article 1 of the Family Code, is that
Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of
permanent union between a man a woman
entered into in accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life. It
is the foundation of the family and an
inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed
by law and not subject to stipulation, except
that marriage settlements may fix the
property relations during the marriage
within the limits provided by this Code.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Our Constitution is no less emphatic:
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino
family as the foundation of the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity
and actively promote its total development.
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family
and shall be protected by the State. (Article
XV, 1987 Constitution).
The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the
basic nucleus of our laws on marriage and the family, and
they are doubt the tenets we still hold on to.
The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all,
can come close to the standards required to decree a nullity
of marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands
23
aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation.
Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide
all the specific answers to every individual problem.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA,
respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new
ground (in addition to those enumerated in the Civil Code)
to assail the validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological
incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity, our courts have
been swamped with various petitions to declare marriages
void based on this ground. Although this Court had
interpreted the meaning of psychological incapacity in the
recent case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still many judges
and lawyers find difficulty in applying said novel provision in
specific cases. In the present case and in the context of the
herein assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, the
Solicitor General has labelled exaggerated to be sure but
nonetheless expressive of his frustration Article 36 as the
"most liberal divorce procedure in the world." Hence, this
Court in addition to resolving the present case, finds the
need to lay down specific guidelines in the interpretation
and application of Article 36 of the Family Code.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
challenging the January 25, 1993 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May
14, 1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad,3
Benguet, which declared the marriage of respondent Roridel
Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the
ground of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
The Facts
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing
by respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for
declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina.
Essentially, the petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo
were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church4 in
Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a
year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and
irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred
to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he
squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for
aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in
regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels
between them; that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo
was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had
been the sole breadwinner of the family; that in October
1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of
which their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987,
Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with
her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo
left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned
them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was
psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital
obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrel
some individual who thought of himself as a king to be
served; and that it would be to the couple's best interest to
have their marriage declared null and void in order to free
them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage
from the start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted
that he and Roridel could no longer live together as husband
and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and
frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior
of insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after
their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her
marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure
to run the household and handle their finances.
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were
stipulated:
1. That the parties herein were legally
married on April 14, 1985 at the Church of
St. Augustine, Manila;
2. That out of their marriage, a child named
Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was born on
July 29, 1986;
3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for
more than three years;
4. That petitioner is not asking support for
her and her child;
24
5. That the respondent is not asking for
damages;
6. That the common child of the parties is in
the custody of the petitioner wife.
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own
testimony and that of her friends Rosemarie Ventura and
Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social
worker, and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the
Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. She also
submitted documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1."
Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only
during the pre-trial conference.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring
the marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was denied by the
Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision.
Hence, the present recourse.
The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of
Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of
the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art.
36 of the Family Code) and made an incorrect application
thereof to the facts of the case," adding that the appealed
Decision tended "to establish in effect the most liberal
divorce procedure in the world which is anathema to our
culture."
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent
Court relied5 heavily on the trial court's findings "that the
marriage between the parties broke up because of their
opposing and conflicting personalities." Then, it added it
sown opinion that "the Civil Code Revision Committee
(hereinafter referred to as Committee) intended to liberalize
the application of our civil laws on personal and family rights.
. . ." It concluded that:
As ground for annulment of marriage, We
view psychologically incapacity as a broad
range of mental and behavioral conduct on
the part of one spouse indicative of how he
or she regards the marital union, his or her
personal relationship with the other
spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the
long haul for the attainment of the principal
objectives of marriage. If said conduct,
observed and considered as a whole, tends
to cause the union to self-destruct because
it defeats the very objectives of marriage,
then there is enough reason to leave the
spouses to their individual fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial
judge committed no indiscretion in
analyzing and deciding the instant case, as it
did, hence, We find no cogent reason to
disturb the findings and conclusions thus
made.
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions
of the Court of Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and
conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological
incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply the
neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities
and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature which
renders them incapable of performing such marital
responsibilities and duties."
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals6 this Court, speaking
thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical)
incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the
time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a
former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal
of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila,7 Justice Vitug wrote
that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear
showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an
incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not
outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some
marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable
differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise
constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove
that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and
duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be
shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological
(nor physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that
she and her husband could nor get along with each other.
There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem;
neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The
expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric
25
disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological
incapacity. Dr. Sison testified:8
COURT
Q It is therefore the
recommendation of the
psychiatrist based on your
findings that it is better
for the Court to annul (sic)
the marriage?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q There is no hope for the
marriage?
A There is no hope, the
man is also living with
another woman.
Q Is it also the stand of
the psychiatrist that the
parties are psychologically
unfit for each other but
they are psychologically fit
with other parties?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Neither are they
psychologically unfit for
their professions?
A Yes, Your Honor.
The
Court
has no
more
question
s.
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged
personality traits were constitutive of psychological
incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. While
some effort was made to prove that there was a failure to
fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and
gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being "conservative,
homely and intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure of
expectation is nor indicative of antecedent psychological
incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's temporary
blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond
merely ruling on the facts of this case vis-a-vis existing law
and jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the
Family Code and the difficulty experienced by many trial
courts interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to
invite two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V.
Cruz,9 Vicar Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a member of the
Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this
occasion to thank these friends of the Court for their
informative and interesting discussions during the oral
argument on December 3, 1996, which they followed up with
written memoranda.
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations,
the following guidelines in the interpretation and application
of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the
guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor
of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against
its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both
our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage
and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an
entire Article on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the
foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the
whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
"protected" by the state.
The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on
marriage and the family and emphasizes the permanence,
inviolability and solidarity
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint,
(c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in
the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological not physical. although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of
them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the
person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity
need be given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, 13
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature explained.
Expert evidence may be given qualified psychiatrist and
clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time
of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show
26

that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their
"I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse,
not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those
not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective
in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to
cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
decision of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our
law on evidence what is decreed as canonically invalid
should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and
purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous
religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here,
the State and the Church while remaining independent,
separate and apart from each other shall walk together in
synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and
cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of
the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for his agreement
or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall
submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days
from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of
the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095.
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have
already ruled to grant the petition. Such ruling becomes even
more cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision
by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate

Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was
taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon
1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective
in 1983 and which provides:

The following are incapable of contracting

marriage: Those who are unable to assume
the essential obligations of marriage due to
causes of psychological nature. 14

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family

Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of
our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such
harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to
27
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 136490. October 19, 2000]
BRENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner, vs. WILSON G. MARCOS,
respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity
of a marriage, may be established by the totality of evidence
presented. There is no requirement, however, that the
respondent should be examined by a physician or a
psychologist as a conditio sine qua non for such declaration.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, assailing the July 24, 1998 Decisioni[1]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 55588, which
disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the contested decision is set aside and the
marriage between the parties is hereby declared valid."ii[2]
Also challenged by petitioner is the December 3, 1998 CA
Resolution denying her Motion for Reconsideration.
Earlier, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had ruled thus:
"WHEREFORE, the marriage between petitioner Brenda B.
Marcos and respondent Wilson G. Marcos, solemnized on
September 6, 1982 in Pasig City is declared null and void ab
initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. The conjugal
properties, if any, is dissolved [sic] in accordance with Articles
126 and 129 of the same Code in relation to Articles 50, 51
and 52 relative to the delivery of the legitime of [the] parties'
children. In the best interest and welfare of the minor
children, their custody is granted to petitioner subject to the
visitation rights of respondent.
"Upon finality of this Decision, furnish copy each to the Office
of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City where the marriage was
solemnized, the National Census and Statistics Office, Manila
and the Register of Deeds of Mandaluyong City for their
appropriate action consistent with this Decision.
"SO ORDERED."
The Facts
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
"It was established during the trial that the parties were
married twice: (1) on September 6, 1982 which was
solemnized by Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu at the Municipal
Court of Pasig (Exh. A); and (2) on May 8, 1983 which was
solemnized by Rev. Eduardo L. Eleazar, Command Chaplain, at
the Presidential Security Command Chapel in Malacaang
Park, Manila (Exh. A-1). Out of their marriage, five (5) children
were born (Exhs. B, C, D, E and F).
"Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the
Philippines in 1973. Later on, he was transferred to the
Presidential Security Command in Malacaang during the
Marcos Regime. Appellee Brenda B. Marcos, on the other
hand, joined the Women's Auxilliary Corps under the
Philippine Air Force in 1978. After the Edsa Revolution, both
of them sought a discharge from the military service.
"They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were
assigned at the Malacaang Palace, she as an escort of Imee
Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand
Marcos. Through telephone conversations, they became
acquainted and eventually became sweethearts.
"After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided at
No. 1702 Daisy Street, Hulo Bliss, Mandaluyong, a housing
unit which she acquired from the Bliss Development
Corporation when she was still single.
"After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military
service in 1987 and then engaged in different business
ventures that did not however prosper. As a wife, she always
urged him to look for work so that their children would see
him, instead of her, as the head of the family and a good
provider. Due to his failure to engage in any gainful
employment, they would often quarrel and as a
consequence, he would hit and beat her. He would even
force her to have sex with him despite her weariness. He
would also inflict physical harm on their children for a slight
mistake and was so severe in the way he chastised them.
Thus, for several times during their cohabitation, he would
leave their house. In 1992, they were already living
separately.
"All the while, she was engrossed in the business of selling
"magic uling" and chickens. While she was still in the military,
she would first make deliveries early in the morning before
going to Malacaang. When she was discharged from the
military service, she concentrated on her business. Then, she
became a supplier in the Armed Forces of the Philippines
until she was able to put up a trading and construction
company, NS Ness Trading and Construction Development
Corporation.
28
"The 'straw that broke the camel's back' took place on
October 16, 1994, when they had a bitter quarrel. As they
were already living separately, she did not want him to stay in
their house anymore. On that day, when she saw him in their
house, she was so angry that she lambasted him. He then
turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her and even on
her mother who came to her aid. The following day, October
17, 1994, she and their children left the house and sought
refuge in her sister's house.
"On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical
examination at the Mandaluyong Medical Center where her
injuries were diagnosed as contusions (Exh. G, Records, 153).
"Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters
and driver, went to him at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong to
look for their missing child, Niko. Upon seeing them, he got
mad. After knowing the reason for their unexpected
presence, he ran after them with a samurai and even [beat]
her driver.
"At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children
were renting a house in Camella, Paraaque, while the
appellant was residing at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong.
"In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C.
Millan, the children described their father as cruel and
physically abusive to them (Exh. UU, Records, pp. 85-100).
"The appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A.
Dayan, Ph.D., for psychological evaluation (Exh. YY, Records,
pp. 207-216), while the appellant on the other hand, did not.
"The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically
incapacitated to perform his marital obligations mainly
because of his failure to find work to support his family and
his violent attitude towards appellee and their children, x x
x."iii[3]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychological incapacity
had not been established by the totality of the evidence
presented. It ratiocinated in this wise:
"Essential in a petition for annulment is the allegation of the
root cause of the spouse's psychological incapacity which
should also be medically or clinically identified, sufficiently
proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision. The
incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage and shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. It must also be grave
enough to bring about the disability of the parties to assume
the essential obligations of marriage as set forth in Articles 68
to 71 and Articles 220 to 225 of the Family Code and such
non-complied marital obligations must similarly be alleged in
the petition, established by evidence and explained in the
decision.
"In the case before us, the appellant was not subjected to any
psychological or psychiatric evaluation. The psychological
findings about the appellant by psychiatrist Natividad Dayan
were based only on the interviews conducted with the
appellee. Expert evidence by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists is essential if only to prove that the
parties were or any one of them was mentally or psychically
ill to be truly incognitive of the marital obligations he or she
was assuming, or as would make him or her x x x unable to
assume them. In fact, he offered testimonial evidence to
show that he [was] not psychologically incapacitated. The
root cause of his supposed incapacity was not alleged in the
petition, nor medically or clinically identified as a
psychological illness or sufficiently proven by an expert.
Similarly, there is no evidence at all that would show that the
appellant was suffering from an incapacity which [was]
psychological or mental - not physical to the extent that he
could not have known the obligations he was assuming: that
the incapacity [was] grave, ha[d] preceded the marriage and
[was] incurable."iv[4]
Hence, this Petition.v[5]
Issues
In her Memorandum,vi[6] petitioner presents for this Court's
consideration the following issues:
"I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals
could set aside the findings by the Regional Trial Court of
psychological incapacity of a respondent in a Petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage simply because the
respondent did not subject himself to psychological
evaluation.
II. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented
and the demeanor of all the witnesses should be the basis of
the determination of the merits of the Petition."vii[7]
The Court's Ruling
We agree with petitioner that the personal medical or
psychological examination of respondent is not a
requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity.
Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence she presented does
not show such incapacity.
Preliminary Issue: Need for Personal Medical Examination
Petitioner contends that the testimonies and the results of
various tests that were submitted to determine respondent's
29
psychological incapacity to perform the obligations of
marriage should not have been brushed aside by the Court of
Appeals, simply because respondent had not taken those
tests himself. Petitioner adds that the CA should have
realized that under the circumstances, she had no choice but
to rely on other sources of information in order to determine
the psychological capacity of respondent, who had refused to
submit himself to such tests.
In Republic v. CA and Molina,viii[8] the guidelines governing
the application and the interpretation of psychological
incapacity referred to in Article 36 of the Family Codeix[9]
were laid down by this Court as follows:
"1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor
of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against
its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both
our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage
and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an
entire Article on the Family, recognizing it 'as the foundation
of the nation.' It decrees marriage as legally 'inviolable,'
thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be 'protected' by
the state.
xxx xxx xxx
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must
be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may
be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such
an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of
such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the
time of the celebration' of the marriage. The evidence must
show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their 'I do's.' The manifestation of the illness need
not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically
or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse,
not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those
not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective
in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to
cure them but not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, 'mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and
225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated
in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of
the decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts.
xxx xxx xxx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney
or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement
or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall
submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days
from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of
the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095."x[10]
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements
earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of
Appeals:xi[11] "psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
30
incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not require that a
physician examine the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or
clinically identified." What is important is the presence of
evidence that can adequately establish the party's
psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to.
Main Issue: Totality of Evidence Presented
The main question, then, is whether the totality of the
evidence presented in the present case -- including the
testimonies of petitioner, the common children, petitioner's
sister and the social worker -- was enough to sustain a finding
that respondent was psychologically incapacitated.
We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently
convinced that respondent failed to provide material support
to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and
abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a
conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is
absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already
present at the inception of the marriage or that they are
incurable.
Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the
fact that he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed
for a period of more than six years. It was during this period
that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material
and moral support, and even left the family home.
Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said
period and not to the inception of the marriage. Equally
important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is
incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a
taxi driver.
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused
with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the
causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to
assume. These marital obligations are those provided under
Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code.
Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in
which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological
incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral
corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like.xii[12]
At best, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to
grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage
void.
Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce
law, this Court laid down the procedural requirements for its
invocation in Molina. Petitioner, however, has not faithfully
observed them.
In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the
marriage for failure of petitioner to show that the alleged
psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability; and for her failure to observe
the guidelines outlined in Molina.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and assailed Decision
AFFIRMED, except that portion requiring personal medical
examination as a conditio sine qua non to a finding of
psychological incapacity. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 104818 September 17, 1993
ROBERTO DOMINGO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and DELIA SOLEDAD AVERA represented
by her Attorney-in-Fact MOISES R. AVERA, respondents.
Jose P.O. Aliling IV for petitioner.
De Guzman, Meneses & Associates for private respondent.
ROMERO, J.:
The instant petition seeks the reversal of respondent court's
ruling finding no grave abuse of discretion in the lower court's
order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of property.
On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A.
Domingo filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig entitled "Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and
Separation of Property" against petitioner Roberto Domingo.
The petition which was docketed as Special Proceedings No.
31

1989-J alleged among others that: they were married on there is no dispute that the second
November 29, 1976 at the YMCA Youth Center Bldg., as marriage contracted by respondent with
evidenced by a Marriage Contract Registry No. 1277K-76 with herein petitioner after a first marriage with
Marriage License No. 4999036 issued at Carmona, Cavite; another woman is illegal and void.
unknown to her, he had a previous marriage with one However, as to whether or not the second
Emerlina dela Paz on April 25, 1969 which marriage is valid marriage should first be judicially declared a
and still existing; she came to know of the prior marriage only nullity is not an issue in said case. In the
sometime in 1983 when Emerlina dela Paz sued them for case of Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS, the
bigamy; from January 23 1979 up to the present, she has Supreme Court ruled in explicit terms, thus:
been working in Saudi Arabia and she used to come to the
Philippines only when she would avail of the one-month And with respect to the
annual vacation leave granted by her foreign employer since right of the second wife,
1983 up to the present, he has been unemployed and this Court observed that
completely dependent upon her for support and subsistence; although the second
out of her personal earnings, she purchased real and personal marriage can be
properties with a total amount of approximately presumed to be void ab
P350,000.00, which are under the possession and initio as it was celebrated
administration of Roberto; sometime in June 1989, while on while the first marriage
her one-month vacation, she discovered that he was was still subsisting, still
cohabiting with another woman; she further discovered that there is need for judicial
he had been disposing of some of her properties without her declaration of its nullity.
knowledge or consent; she confronted him about this and (37 SCRA 316, 326)
thereafter appointed her brother Moises R. Avera as her
attorney-in-fact to take care of her properties; he failed and The above ruling which is
refused to turn over the possession and administration of of later vintage deviated
said properties to her brother/attorney-in-fact; and he is not from the previous rulings
authorized to administer and possess the same on account of of the Supreme Court in
the nullity of their marriage. The petition prayed that a the aforecited cases of
temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary Aragon and Mendoza.
injunction be issued enjoining Roberto from exercising any
act of administration and ownership over said properties;
Finally, the contention of
their marriage be declared null and void and of no force and
respondent movant that
effect; and Delia Soledad be declared the sole and exclusive
petitioner has no property
owner of all properties acquired at the time of their void
in his possession is an
marriage and such properties be placed under the proper
issue that may be
management and administration of the attorney-in-fact.
determined only after trial
on the merits.1
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the
petition stated no cause of action. The marriage being void ab
A motion for reconsideration was filed stressing the
initio, the petition for the declaration of its nullity is,
erroneous application of Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS2 and the
therefore, superfluous and unnecessary. It added that private
absence of justiciable controversy as to the nullity of the
respondent has no property which is in his possession.
marriage. On September 11, 1991, Judge Austria denied the
motion for reconsideration and gave petitioner fifteen (15)
On August 20, 1991, Judge Maria Alicia M. Austria issued an days from receipt within which to file his answer.
Order denying the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. She
explained:
Instead of filing the required answer, petitioner filed a special
civil action of certiorari and mandamus on the ground that
Movant argues that a second marriage the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion
contracted after a first marriage by a man amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying the motion to
with another woman is illegal and void dismiss.
(citing the case of Yap v. Court of Appeals,
145 SCRA 229) and no judicial decree is
On February 7, 1992, the Court of Appeals3 dismissed the
necessary to establish the invalidity of a
petition. It explained that the case of Yap v. CA4 cited by
void marriage (citing the cases of People v.
petitioner and that of Consuegra v. GSIS relied upon by the
Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033; People v. Mendoza,
lower court do not have relevance in the case at bar, there
95 Phil. 845). Indeed, under the Yap case
32
being no identity of facts because these cases dealt with the
successional rights of the second wife while the instant case
prays for separation of property corollary with the
declaration of nullity of marriage. It observed that the
separation and subsequent distribution of the properties
acquired during the union can be had only upon proper
determination of the status of the marital relationship
between said parties, whether or not the validity of the first
marriage is denied by petitioner. Furthermore, in order to
avoid duplication and multiplicity of suits, the declaration of
nullity of marriage may be invoked in this proceeding
together with the partition and distribution of the properties
involved. Citing Articles 48, 50 and 52 of the Family Code, it
held that private respondent's prayer for declaration of
absolute nullity of their marriage may be raised together with
other incidents of their marriage such as the separation of
their properties. Lastly, it noted that since the Court has
jurisdiction, the alleged error in refusing to grant the motion
to dismiss is merely one of law for which the remedy
ordinarily would have been to file an answer, proceed with
the trial and in case of an adverse decision, reiterate the issue
on appeal. The motion for reconsideration was subsequently
denied for lack of merit.5
Hence, this petition.
The two basic issues confronting the Court in the instant case
are the following.
First, whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a
void marriage is necessary. If in the affirmative, whether the
same should be filed only for purposes of remarriage.
Second, whether or not SP No. 1989-J is the proper remedy of
private respondent to recover certain real and personal
properties allegedly belonging to her exclusively.
Petitioner, invoking the ruling in People v. Aragon6 and
People v. Mendoza,7 contends that SP. No. 1989-J for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property
filed by private respondent must be dismissed for being
unnecessary and superfluous. Furthermore, under his own
interpretation of Article 40 of the Family Code, he submits
that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
is required only for purposes of remarriage. Since the petition
in SP No. 1989-J contains no allegation of private
respondent's intention to remarry, said petition should
therefore, be dismissed.
On the other hand, private respondent insists on the
necessity of a judicial declaration of the nullity of their
marriage, not for purposes of remarriage, but in order to
provide a basis for the separation and distribution of the
properties acquired during coverture.
There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and
private respondent celebrated while the former's previous
marriage with one Emerlina de la Paz was still subsisting, is
bigamous. As such, it is from the beginning.8 Petitioner
himself does not dispute the absolute nullity of their
marriage.9
The cases of People v. Aragon and People v. Mendoza relied
upon by petitioner are cases where the Court had earlier
ruled that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the
invalidity of a void, bigamous marriage. It is noteworthy to
observe that Justice Alex Reyes, however, dissented on these
occasions stating that:
Though the logician may say that where the
former marriage was void there would be
nothing to dissolve, still it is not for the
spouses to judge whether that marriage
was void or not. That judgment is reserved
to the courts. . . . 10
This dissenting opinion was adopted as the majority position
in subsequent cases involving the same issue. Thus, in Gomez
v. Lipana, 11 the Court abandoned its earlier ruling in the
Aragon and Mendoza cases. In reversing the lower court's
order forfeiting the husband's share of the disputed property
acquired during the second marriage, the Court stated that "if
the nullity, or annulment of the marriage is the basis for the
application of Article 1417, there is need for a judicial
declaration thereof, which of course contemplates an action
for that purpose."
Citing Gomez v. Lipana, the Court subsequently held in Vda.
de Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance System, that
"although the second marriage can be presumed to be void
ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still
subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such
nullity."
In Tolentino v. Paras,12 however, the Court turned around
and applied the Aragon and Mendoza ruling once again. In
granting the prayer of the first wife asking for a declaration as
the lawful surviving spouse and the correction of the death
certificate of her deceased husband, it explained that "(t)he
second marriage that he contracted with private respondent
during the lifetime of his first spouse is null and void from the
beginning and of no force and effect. No judicial decree is
necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage."
However, in the more recent case of Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy 13
the Court reverted to the Consuegra case and held that there
was "no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior
marriage of her first husband at the time they married each
other, for then such a marriage though void still needs
according to this Court a judicial declaration of such fact and
33
for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded
as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage
with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel."
Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the
conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the
absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either
as a cause of action or a ground for defense. 14 Where the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be
invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the
sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage be
free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the
previous marriage void. 15
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code
Revision Committee 16 which drafted what is now the Family
Code of the Philippines took the position that parties to a
marriage should not be allowed to assume that their
marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure
a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before
they can be allowed to marry again. This is borne out by the
following minutes of the 152nd Joint Meeting of the Civil
Code and Family Law Committees where the present Article
40, then Art. 39, was discussed.
B. Article 39.
The absolute nullity of a
marriage may be invoked
only on the basis of a final
judgment declaring the
marriage void, except as
provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that the above
provision should include not only void but
also voidable marriages. He then suggested
that the above provision be modified as
follows:
The validity of a marriage
may be invoked only . . .
Justice Reyes (J.B.L. Reyes), however,
proposed that they say:
The validity or invalidity of
a marriage may be
invoked
only . . .
On the other hand, Justice Puno suggested that they
say:
The invalidity of a
marriage may be invoked
only . . .
Justice Caguioa explained that his idea is
that one cannot determine for himself
whether or not his marriage is valid and
that a court action is needed. Justice Puno
accordingly proposed that the provision be
modified to read:
The invalidity of a
marriage may be invoked
only on the basis of a final
judgment annulling the
marriage or declaring the
marriage void, except as
provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that in
annulment, there is no question. Justice
Puno, however, pointed out that, even if it
is a judgment of annulment, they still have
to produce the judgment.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they say:
The invalidity of a
marriage may be invoked
only on the basis of a final
judgment declaring the
marriage invalid, except
as provided in Article 41.
Justice Puno raised the question: When a
marriage is declared invalid, does it include
the annulment of a marriage and the
declaration that the marriage is void?
Justice Caguioa replied in the affirmative.
Dean Gupit added that in some judgments,
even if the marriage is annulled, it is
declared void. Justice Puno suggested that
this matter be made clear in the provision.
Prof. Baviera remarked that the original
idea in the provision is to require first a
judicial declaration of a void marriage and
not annullable marriages, with which the
other members concurred. Judge Diy added
that annullable marriages are presumed
valid until a direct action is filed to annul it,
which the other members affirmed. Justice
Puno remarked that if this is so, then the
phrase "absolute nullity" can stand since it
might result in confusion if they change the
34
phrase to "invalidity" if what they are
referring to in the provision is the
declaration that the marriage is void.
Prof. Bautista commented that they will be
doing away with collateral defense as well
as collateral attack. Justice Caguioa
explained that the idea in the provision is
that there should be a final judgment
declaring the marriage void and a party
should not declare for himself whether or
not the marriage is void, while the other
members affirmed. Justice Caguioa added
that they are, therefore, trying to avoid a
collateral attack on that point. Prof.
Bautista stated that there are actions which
are brought on the assumption that the
marriage is valid. He then asked: Are they
depriving one of the right to raise the
defense that he has no liability because the
basis of the liability is void? Prof. Bautista
added that they cannot say that there will
be no judgment on the validity or invalidity
of the marriage because it will be taken up
in the same proceeding. It will not be a
unilateral declaration that, it is a void
marriage. Justice Caguioa saw the point of
Prof. Bautista and suggested that they limit
the provision to remarriage. He then
proposed that Article 39 be reworded as
follows:
The absolute nullity of a
marriage for purposes of
remarriage may be
invoked only on the basis
of final judgment . . .
Justice Puno suggested that the above be
modified as follows:
The absolute nullity of a
previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of
establishing the validity of
a subsequent marriage
only on the basis of a final
judgment declaring such
previous marriage void,
except as provided in
Article 41.
Justice Puno later modified the above as
follows:
For the purpose of
establishing the validity of
a subsequent marriage,
the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage may
only be invoked on the
basis of a final judgment
declaring such nullity,
except as provided in
Article 41.
Justice Caguioa commented that the above
provision is too broad and will not solve the
objection of Prof. Bautista. He proposed
that they say:
For the purpose of
entering into a
subsequent marriage, the
absolute nullity of a
previous marriage may
only be invoked on the
basis of a final judgment
declaring such nullity,
except as provided in
Article 41.
Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in
the above provision is that if one enters into
a subsequent marriage without obtaining a
final judgment declaring the nullity of a
previous marriage, said subsequent
marriage is void ab initio.
After further deliberation, Justice Puno
suggested that they go back to the original
wording of the provision as follows:
The absolute nullity of a
previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of
remarriage only on the
basis of a final judgment
declaring such previous
marriage void, except as
provided in Article 41. 17
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity
of a marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who,
believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries
again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her
first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be
charged with bigamy. 18
35
Just over a year ago, the Court made the pronouncement that
there is a necessity for a declaration of absolute nullity of a
prior subsisting marriage before contracting another in the
recent case of Terre v. Terre. 19 The Court, in turning down
the defense of respondent Terre who was charged with
grossly immoral conduct consisting of contracting a second
marriage and living with another woman other than
complainant while his prior marriage with the latter remained
subsisting, said that "for purposes of determining whether a
person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial
declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio
is essential."
As regards the necessity for a judicial declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage, petitioner submits that the same can be
maintained only if it is for the purpose of remarriage. Failure
to allege this purpose, according to petitioner's theory, will
warrant dismissal of the same.
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage
void. (n)
Crucial to the proper interpretation of Article 40 is the
position in the provision of the word "solely." As it is placed,
the same shows that it is meant to qualify "final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void." Realizing the need for
careful craftsmanship in conveying the precise intent of the
Committee members, the provision in question, as it finally
emerged, did not state "The absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of remarriage . .
.," in which case "solely" would clearly qualify the phrase "for
purposes of remarriage." Had the phraseology been such, the
interpretation of petitioner would have been correct and,
that is, that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may
be invoked solely for purposes of remarriage, thus rendering
irrelevant the clause "on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void."
That Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant
clause denotes that such final judgment declaring the
previous marriage void need not be obtained only for
purposes of remarriage. Undoubtedly, one can conceive of
other instances where a party might well invoke the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage for purposes other than
remarriage, such as in case of an action for liquidation,
partition, distribution and separation of property between
the erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for the custody
and support of their common children and the delivery of the
latters' presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs
must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the
existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an
absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier
final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage
void. Hence, in the instance where a party who has previously
contracted a marriage which remains subsisting desires to
enter into another marriage which is legally unassailable, he
is required by law to prove that the previous one was an
absolute nullity. But this he may do on the basis solely of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
This leads us to the question: Why the distinction? In other
words, for purposes of remarriage, why should the only
legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an
absolute nullity be a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void? Whereas, for purposes other than remarriage,
other evidence is acceptable?
Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the
Constitution as an "inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family;" as such, it "shall be protected by
the State."20 In more explicit terms, the Family Code
characterizes it as "a special contract of permanent union
between a man and a woman entered into in accordance
with law for the establishment of conjugal, and family life."
21 So crucial are marriage and the family to the stability and
peace of the nation that their "nature, consequences, and
incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation .
. ." 22 As a matter of policy, therefore, the nullification of a
marriage for the purpose of contracting another cannot be
accomplished merely on the basis of the perception of both
parties or of one that their union is so defective with respect
to the essential requisites of a contract of marriage as to
render it void ipso jure and with no legal effect and
nothing more. Were this so, this inviolable social institution
would be reduced to a mockery and would rest on very shaky
foundations indeed. And the grounds for nullifying marriage
would be as diverse and far-ranging as human ingenuity and
fancy could conceive. For such a social significant institution,
an official state pronouncement through the courts, and
nothing less, will satisfy the exacting norms of society. Not
only would such an open and public declaration by the courts
definitively confirm the nullity of the contract of marriage,
but the same would be easily verifiable through records
accessible to everyone.
That the law seeks to ensure that a prior marriage is no
impediment to a second sought to be contracted by one of
the parties may be gleaned from new information required in
the Family Code to be included in the application for a
marriage license, viz, "If previously married, how, when and
where the previous marriage was dissolved and annulled." 23
Reverting to the case before us, petitioner's interpretation of
Art. 40 of the Family Code is, undoubtedly, quite restrictive.
Thus, his position that private respondent's failure to state in
the petition that the same is filed to enable her to remarry
will result in the dismissal of SP No. 1989-J is untenable. His
36
misconstruction of Art. 40 resulting from the misplaced
emphasis on the term "solely" was in fact anticipated by the
members of the Committee.
Dean Gupit commented the word "only"
may be misconstrued to refer to "for
purposes of remarriage." Judge Diy stated
that "only" refers to "final judgment."
Justice Puno suggested that they say "on
the basis only of a final judgment." Prof.
Baviera suggested that they use the legal
term "solely" instead of "only," which the
Committee approved. 24 (Emphasis
supplied)
Pursuing his previous argument that the declaration for
absolute nullity of marriage is unnecessary, petitioner
suggests that private respondent should have filed an
ordinary civil action for the recovery of the properties alleged
to have been acquired during their union. In such an
eventuality, the lower court would not be acting as a mere
special court but would be clothed with jurisdiction to rule on
the issues of possession and ownership. In addition, he
pointed out that there is actually nothing to separate or
partition as the petition admits that all the properties were
acquired with private respondent's money.
The Court of Appeals disregarded this argument and
concluded that "the prayer for declaration of absolute nullity
of marriage may be raised together with the other incident of
their marriage such as the separation of their properties."
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that
the final judgment therein shall provide for "the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses,
the custody and support of the common children, and the
delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters
had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings." 25
Other specific effects flowing therefrom, in proper cases, are
the following:
Art. 43. xxx xxx xxx
(2) The absolute community of property or
the conjugal partnership, as the case may
be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if
either spouse contracted said marriage in
bad faith, his or her share of the net profits
of the community property or conjugal
partnership property shall be forfeited in
favor of the common children or, if there
are none, the children of the guilty spouse
by a previous marriage or, in default of
children, the innocent spouse;
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall
remain valid, except that if the donee
contracted the marriage in bad faith, such
donations made to said donee are revoked
by operation of law;
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the
designation of the other spouse who acted
in bad faith as a beneficiary in any insurance
policy, even if such designation be
stipulated as irrevocable; and
(5) The spouse who contracted the
subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be
disqualified to inherit from the innocent
spouse by testate and intestate succession.
(n)
Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent
marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage
shall be void ab initio and all donations by
reason of marriage and testamentary
disposition made by one in favor of the
other are revoked by operation of law. (n)
26
Based on the foregoing provisions, private respondent's
ultimate prayer for separation of property will simply be one
of the necessary consequences of the judicial declaration of
absolute nullity of their marriage. Thus, petitioner's
suggestion that in order for their properties to be separated,
an ordinary civil action has to be instituted for that purpose is
baseless. The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of
the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the
separation of property according to the regime of property
relations governing them. It stands to reason that the lower
court before whom the issue of nullity of a first marriage is
brought is likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide the
incidental questions regarding the couple's properties.
Accordingly, the respondent court committed no reversible
error in finding that the lower court committed no grave
abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss
SP No. 1989-J.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The
decision of respondent Court dated February 7, 1992 and the
Resolution dated March 20, 1992 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
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