G.R. No.

L-36409 October 26, 1973

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. LORETA GOZO

FERNANDO, J.:

Appellant seeks to set aside a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Zambales, convicting her
of a violation of an ordinance of Olongapo, Zambales, requiring a permit from the municipal mayor
for the construction or erection of a building, as well as any modification, alteration, repair or
demolition thereof. She questions its validity, or at the very least, its applicability to her, by invoking
due process,1 a contention she would premise on what for her is the teaching of People v.
Fajardo.2 If such a ground were far from being impressed with solidity, she stands on quicksand
when she would deny the applicability of the ordinance to her, on the pretext that her house was
constructed within the naval base leased to the American armed forces. While yielding to the well-
settled doctrine that it does not thereby cease to be Philippine territory, she would, in effect, seek
to emasculate our sovereign rights by the assertion that we cannot exercise therein administrative
jurisdiction. To state the proposition is to make patent how much it is tinged with unorthodoxy.
Clearly then, the lower court decision must be affirmed with the sole modification that she is given
thirty days from the finality of a judgment to obtain a permit, failing which, she is required to
demolish the same.

The facts are undisputed. As set forth in the decision of the lower court: "The accused bought a
house and lot located inside the United States Naval Reservation within the territorial jurisdiction
of Olongapo City. She demolished the house and built another one in its place, without a building
permit from the City Mayor of Olongapo City, because she was told by one Ernesto Evalle, an
assistant in the City Mayor's office, as well as by her neighbors in the area, that such building
permit was not necessary for the construction of the house. On December 29, 1966, Juan
Malones, a building and lot inspector of the City Engineer's Office, Olongapo City, together with
Patrolman Ramon Macahilas of the Olongapo City police force apprehended four carpenters
working on the house of the accused and they brought the carpenters to the Olongapo City police
headquarters for interrogation. ... After due investigation, Loreta Gozo was charged with violation
of Municipal Ordinance No. 14, S. of 1964 with the City Fiscal's Office." 3 The City Court of
Olongapo City found her guilty of violating Municipal Ordinance No. 14, Series of 1964 and
sentenced her to an imprisonment of one month as well as to pay the costs. The Court of Instance
of Zambales, on appeal, found her guilty on the above facts of violating such municipal ordinance
but would sentence her merely to pay a fine of P200.00 and to demolish the house thus erected.
She elevated the case to the Court of Appeals but in her brief, she would put in issue the validity
of such an ordinance on constitutional ground or at the very least its applicability to her in view of
the location of her dwelling within the naval base. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals, in a resolution
of January 29, 1973, noting the constitutional question raised, certified the case to this Court.

There is, as mentioned in the opening paragraph of this petition, no support in law for the stand
taken by appellant.

1. It would be fruitless for her to assert that local government units are devoid of authority to
require building permits. This Court, from Switzer v. Municipality of
Cebu,4 decided in 1911, has sanctioned the validity of such measures. It is much too late in the
day to contend that such a requirement cannot be validly imposed. Even appellant, justifiably
concerned about the unfavorable impression that could be created if she were to deny that such
competence is vested in municipal corporations and chartered cities, had to concede in her brief:
"If, at all; the questioned ordinance may be predicated under the general welfare clause ... ." 5 Its
scope is wide, well-nigh all embracing, covering every aspect of public health, public morals,
public safety, and the well-being and good order of the community.6

It goes without saying that such a power is subject to limitations. Certainly, if its exercise is
violative of any constitutional right, then its validity could be impugned, or at the very least, its
applicability to the person adversely affected could be questioned. So much is settled law.
Apparently, appellant has adopted the view that a due process question may indeed be raised in
view of what for her is its oppressive character. She is led to such a conclusion, relying on People
v. Fajardo.7 A more careful scrutiny of such a decision would not have led her astray, for that case
is easily distinguishable. The facts as set forth in the opinion follow: "It appears that on August
15, 1950, during the incumbency of defendant-appellant Juan F. Fajardo as mayor of the
municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, the municipal council passed the ordinance in question
providing as follows: "... 1. Any person or persons who will construct or repair a building should,
before constructing or repairing, obtain a written permit from the Municipal Mayor. ... 2. A fee of
not less than P2.00 should be charged for each building permit and P1.00 for each repair permit
issued. ... 3. [Penalty]-Any violation of the provisions of the above, this ordinance, shall make the
violator liable to pay a fine of not less than P25 nor more than P50 or imprisonment of not less
than 12 days nor more than 24 days or both, at the discretion of the court. If said building destroys
the view of the Public Plaza or occupies any public property, it shall be removed at the expense
of the owner of the building or house. ... ." Four years later, after the term of appellant Fajardo as
mayor had expired, he and his son-in-law, appellant Babilonia, filed a written request with the
incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to construct a building adjacent to their gasoline station
on a parcel of land registered in Fajardo's name, located along the national highway and
separated from the public plaza by a creek... . On January 16, 1954, the request was denied, for
the reason among others that the proposed building would destroy the view or beauty of the public
plaza... . On January 18, 1954, defendants reiterated their request for a building permit ..., but
again the request was turned down by the mayor. Whereupon, appellants proceeded with the
construction of the building without a permit, because they needed a place of residence very
badly, their former house having been destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had been living
on leased property."8

Clearly then, the application of such an ordinance to Fajardo was oppressive. A conviction
therefore for a violation thereof both in the justice of the peace court of Baao, Camarines Sur as
well as in the Court of First Instance could not be sustained. In this case, on the contrary, appellant
never bothered to comply with the ordinance. Perhaps aware of such a crucial distinction, she
would assert in her brief: "The evidence showed that even if the accused were to secure a permit
from the Mayor, the same would not have been granted. To require the accused to obtain a permit
before constructing her house would be an exercise in futility. The law will not require anyone to
perform an impossibility, neither in law or in fact: ... ." 9 It would be from her own version, at the
very least then, premature to anticipate such an adverse result, and thus to condemn an ordinance
which certainly lends itself to an interpretation that is neither oppressive, unfair, nor unreasonable.
That kind of interpretation suffices to remove any possible question of its validity, as was expressly
announced in Primicias v. Fugoso. 10 So it appears from this portion of the opinion of Justice Feria,
speaking for the Court: "Said provision is susceptible of two constructions: one is that the Mayor
of the City of Manila is vested with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse to grant permit for the
holding of a lawful assembly or meeting, parade, or procession in the streets and other public
places of the City of Manila; and the other is that the applicant has the right to a permit which shall
be granted by the Mayor, subject only to the latter's reasonable discretion to determine or specify
the streets or public places to be used for the purpose, with a view to prevent confusion by
overlapping, to secure convenient use of the streets and public places by others, and to provide
adequate and proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder. After a mature deliberation, we
have arrived at the conclusion that we must adopt the second construction, that is, construe the
provisions of the said ordinance to mean that it does not confer upon the Mayor the power to
refuse to grant the permit, but only the discretion, in issuing the permit, to determine or specify
the streets or public places where the parade or procession may pass or the meeting may be
held." 11 If, in a case affecting such a preferred freedom as the right to assembly, this Court could
construe an ordinance of the City of Manila so as to avoid offending against a constitutional
provision, there is nothing to preclude it from a similar mode of approach in order to show the lack
of merit of an attack against an ordinance requiring a permit. Appellant cannot therefore take
comfort from any broad statement in the Fajardo opinion, which incidentally is taken out of context,
considering the admitted oppressive application of the challenged measure in that litigation. So
much then for the contention that she could not have been validly convicted for a violation of such
ordinance. Nor should it be forgotten that she did suffer the same fate twice, once from the City
Court and thereafter from the Court of First Instance. The reason is obvious.Such ordinance
applies to her.

2. Much less is a reversal indicated because of the alleged absence of the rather novel concept
of administrative jurisdiction on the part of Olongapo City. Nor is novelty the only thing that may
be said against it. Far worse is the assumption at war with controlling and authoritative doctrines
that the mere existence of military or naval bases of a foreign country cuts deeply into the power
to govern. Two leading cases may be cited to show how offensive is such thinking to the juristic
concept of sovereignty, People v. Acierto, 12 and Reagan v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue. 13 As was so emphatically set forth by Justice Tuason in Acierto: "By the Agreement, it
should be noted, the Philippine Government merely consents that the United States exercise
jurisdiction in certain cases. The consent was given purely as a matter of comity, courtesy, or
expediency. The Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part
of the Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed
therein. Under the terms of the treaty, the United States Government has prior or preferential but
not exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses. The Philippine Government retains not only
jurisdictional rights not granted, but also all such ceded rights as the United States Military
authorities for reasons of their own decline to make use of. The first proposition is implied from
the fact of Philippine sovereignty over the bases; the second from the express provisions of the
treaty." 14 There was a reiteration of such a view in Reagan. Thus: "Nothing is better settled than
that the Philippines being independent and sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its
entire domain. There is no portion thereof that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees
are supreme, its commands paramount. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to whom it applies
must submit to its terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and personal.
Necessarily, likewise, it has to be exclusive. If it were not thus, there is a diminution of
sovereignty." 15 Then came this paragraph dealing with the principle of auto-limitation: "It is to be
admitted any state may, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of its sovereign
rights. There may thus be a curtailment of what otherwise is a power plenary in character. That is
the concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation, which, in the succinct language of Jellinek, "is the
property of a state-force due to which it has the exclusive capacity of legal self-determination and
self-restriction." A state then, if it chooses to, may refrain from the exercise of what otherwise is
illimitable competence." 16 The opinion was at pains to point out though that even then, there is at
the most diminution of jurisdictional rights, not its disappearance. The words employed follow: "Its
laws may as to some persons found within its territory no longer control. Nor does the matter end
there. It is not precluded from allowing another power to participate in the exercise of jurisdictional
right over certain portions of its territory. If it does so, it by no means follows that such areas
become impressed with an alien character. They retain their status as native soil. They are still
subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction may be diminished, but it does not disappear. So it is with
the bases under lease to the American armed forces by virtue of the military bases agreement of
1947. They are not and cannot be foreign territory." 17

Can there be anything clearer, therefore, than that only a turnabout, unwarranted and unjustified,
from what is settled and orthodox law can lend the slightest degree of plausibility to the contention
of absence of administrative jurisdiction. If it were otherwise, what was aptly referred to by Justice
Tuason "as a matter of comity, courtesy, or expediency" becomes one of obeisance and
submission. If on a concern purely domestic in its implications, devoid of any connection with
national security, the Military-Bases Agreement could be thus interpreted, then sovereignty
indeed becomes a mockery and an illusion. Nor does appellant's thesis rest on less shaky
foundation by the mere fact that Acierto and Reagan dealt with the competence of the national
government, while what is sought to be emasculated in this case is the so-called administrative
jurisdiction of a municipal corporation. Within the limits of its territory, whatever statutory powers
are vested upon it may be validly exercised. Any residual authority and therein conferred, whether
expressly or impliedly, belongs to the national government, not to an alien country. What is even
more to be deplored in this stand of appellant is that no such claim is made by the American naval
authorities, not that it would do them any good if it were so asserted. To quote from Acierto anew:
"The carrying out of the provisions of the Bases Agreement is the concern of the contracting
parties alone. Whether, therefore, a given case which by the treaty comes within the United States
jurisdiction should be transferred to the Philippine authorities is a matter about which the accused
has nothing to do or say. In other words, the rights granted to the United States by the treaty
insure solely to that country and cannot be raised by the offender." 18 If an accused would suffer
from such disability, even if the American armed forces were the beneficiary of a treaty privilege,
what is there for appellant to take hold of when there is absolutely no showing of any alleged grant
of what is quaintly referred to as administrative jurisdiction? That is all, and it is more than enough,
to make manifest the futility of seeking a reversal.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of November 11, 1969 is affirmed insofar as it found the
accused, Loreta Gozo, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of Municipal Ordinance No.
14, series of 1964 and sentencing her to pay a fine of P200.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, and modified insofar as she is required to demolish the house that is the
subject matter of the case, she being given a period of thirty days from the finality of this decision
within which to obtain the required permit. Only upon her failure to do so will that portion of the
appealed decision requiringdemolition be enforced. Costs against the accused.

A.M. No. 90-11-2697-CA. June 29, 1992.

LETTER OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE REYNATO S. PUNO of the Court of Appeals dated 14 November 1990.

RESOLUTION

PADILLA, J.:

Petitioner Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, a member of the Court of Appeals, wrote a letter dated 14
November 1990 addressed to this Court, seeking the correction of his seniority ranking in the Court of
Appeals.

It appears from the records that petitioner was first appointed Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals
on 20 June 1980 but took his oath of office for said position only on 29 November 1982, after serving as
Assistant Solicitor General in the Office of the Solicitor General since 1974. 1

On 17 January 1983, the Court of Appeals was reorganized and became the Intermediate Appellate
Court pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 entitled "An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary. Appropriating
Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes." 2 Petitioner was appointed Appellate Justice in the First
Special Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court. On 7 November 1984, petitioner accepted an
appointment to be ceased to be a member of the Judiciary. 3

The aftermath of the EDSA Revolution in February 1986 brought about a reorganization of the entire
government, including the Judiciary. To effect the reorganization of the Intermediate Appellate Court
and other lower courts, a Screening Committee was created, with the then Minister of Justice, now
Senator Neptali Gonzales as Chairman and then Solicitor General, now Philippine Ambassador to the
United Nations Sedfrey Ordoez as Vice Chairman. President Corazon C. Aquino, exercising legislative
powers by virtue of the revolution, issued Executive Order No. 33 to govern the aforementioned
reorganization of the Judiciary. 4

The Screening Committee recommended the return of petitioner as Associate Justice of the new Court
of Appeals and assigned him the rank of number eleven (11) in the roster of appellate court justices.
When the appointments were signed by President Aquino on 28 July 1986, petitioners seniority ranking
changed, however, from number eleven (11) to number twenty six (26). 5

Petitioner now alleges that the change in his seniority ranking could only be attributed to inadvertence
for, otherwise, it would run counter to the provisions of Section 2 of Executive Order No. 33, which
reads:

"SECTION 2. Section 3, Chapter 1 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, is hereby amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 2. Organization. There is hereby created a Court of Appeals which shall consist of a Presiding
Justice and fifty Associate Justices who shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines. The
Presiding Justice shall be so designated in his appointment and the Associate Justice shall have
precedence according to the dates of their respective appointments, or when the appointments of two
or more shall bear the same date, according to the order in which their appointments were issued by
the President. Any Member who is reappointed to the Court after rendering service in any other
position in the government shall retain the precedence to which he was entitled under his original
appointment, and his service in the Court shall, for all intents and purpose be considered as continuous
and uninterrupted." 6

Petitioner elaborates that President Aquino is presumed to have intended to comply with her own
Executive Order No. 33 so much so that the correction of the inadvertent error would only implement
the intent of the President as well as the spirit of Executive Order No. 33 and will not provoke any kind
of constitutional confrontation (between the President and the Supreme Court). 7

Petitioner points to the case of Justice Oscar Victoriano, former Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals
who, according to petitioner, was transferred from his position as Justice of the Court of Appeals to the
Ministry of Justice as Commissioner of Land Registration and in 1986 was reappointed to the Court of
Appeals. Petitioner states that his (Victorianos) stint in the Commission of Land Registration did not
adversely affect his seniority ranking in the Court of Appeals, for, in his case, Executive Order No. 33 was
correctly applied. 8

In a resolution of the Court en banc dated 29 November 1990, the Court granted Justice Punos request.
9 It will be noted that before the issuance of said resolution, there was no written opposition to, or
comment on petitioners aforesaid request. The dispositive portion of the resolution
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition of Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno for correction of his seniority
ranking in the Court of Appeals is granted. The presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals, the Honorable
Rodolfo A. Nocon, is hereby directed to correct the seniority rank of Justice Puno from number twelve
(12) to number five (5). Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Court Administrator and the
Judicial and Bar Council for their guidance and information." 10

A motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the Court en banc dated 29 November 1990 was later
filed by Associate Justices Jose C. Campos, Jr. and Luis A. Javellana, two (2) of the Associate Justices
affected by the ordered correction. They contend that the present Court of Appeals is a new Court with
fifty one (51) members and that petitioner could not claim a reappointment to a prior court; neither can
he claim that he was returning to his former court, for the courts where he had previously been
appointed ceased to exist at the date of his last appointment. 11

The Court en banc in a resolution dated 17 January 1992 required the petitioner to file his comment on
the motion for reconsideration of the resolution dated 29 November 1990.

In his Comment, petitioner argues that, by virtue of Executive Order No. 33 read in relation to B.P. Blg.
129, his seniority ranking in the Court of Appeals is now number five (5) for, though President Aquino
rose to power by virtue of a revolution, she had pledged at the issuance of Proclamation No. 3
(otherwise known as the Freedom Constitution) that "no right provided under the unratified 1973
Constitution (shall) be absent in the Freedom Constitution." 12

Moreover, since the last sentence of Section 2 of Executive Order No. 33 virtually re-enacted the last
sentence of Sec. 3, Chapter 1 of B.P. Blg. 129, statutory construction rules on simultaneous repeal and
re-enactment mandate, according to petitioner, the preservation and enforcement of all rights and
liabilities which had accrued under the original statute. 13 Furthermore, petitioner avers that, although
the power of appointment is executive in character and cannot be usurped by any other branch of the
Government, such power can still be regulated by the Constitution and by the appropriate law, in this
case, by the limits set by Executive Order NO. 33 14 for the power of appointment cannot be wielded in
violation of law. 15

Justices Javellana and Campos were required by the Court to file their reply to Justice Punos comment
on their motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the Court en banc dated 24 January
1991.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

In their Reply and Supplemental Reply, Associate Justices Javellana and Campos submit that the appeal
or request for correction filed by the petitioner was addressed to the wrong party. They aver that as
petitioner himself had alleged the mistake to be an "inadvertent error" of the Office of the President,
ergo, he should have filed his request for correction also with said Office of the President and not
directly with the Supreme Court. 16 Furthermore, they point out that petitioner had indeed filed with
the Office of the President a request or petition for correction of his ranking, (seniority) but the same
was not approved such that his recourse should have been an appropriate action before the proper
court and impleading all parties concerned. The aforesaid non-approval by the Office of the President
they argue, should be respected by the Supreme Court "not only on the basis of the doctrine of
separation of powers but also their presumed knowledge ability and even expertise in the laws they are
entrusted to enforce" 17 for it (the non-approval) is a confirmation that petitioners seniority ranking at
the time of his appointment by President Aquino was, in fact, deliberate and not an "inadvertent error"
as petitioner would have the Court believe. 18

The resolution of this controversy is not a pleasant task for the Court since it involves not only members
of the next highest court of the land but persons who are close to members of this Court. But the
controversy has to be resolved. The core issue in this case is whether the present Court of Appeals is a
new court such that it would negate any claim to precedence or seniority admittedly enjoyed by
petitioner in the Court of Appeals and Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to Executive Order No.
33 or whether the present Court of Appeals is merely a continuation of the Court of Appeals and
Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to said Executive Order No. 33.

It is the holding of the Court that the present Court of Appeals is a new entity, different and distinct
from the Court of Appeals or the Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to Executive Order No. 33,
for it was created in the wake of the massive reorganization launched by the revolutionary government
of Corazon C. Aquino in the aftermath of the people power (EDSA) revolution in 1986.

A resolution has been defined as "the complete overthrow of the established government in any country
or state by those who were previously subject to it" 19 or as "a sudden, radical and fundamental change
in the government or political system, usually effected with violence or at least some acts of violence."
20 In Kelsens book, General Theory of Law and State, it is defined as that which "occurs whenever the
legal order of a community is nullified and replaced by a new order . . . a way not prescribed by the first
order itself." 21

It was through the February 1986 revolution, a relatively peaceful one, and more popularly known as
the "people power revolution" that the Filipino people tore themselves away from an existing regime.
This revolution also saw the unprecedented rise to power of the Aquino government.

From the natural law point of view, the right of revolution has been defined as "an inherent right of a
people to cast out their rulers, change their policy or effect radical reforms in their system of
government or institutions by force or a general uprising when the legal and constitutional methods of
making such change have proved inadequate or are so obstructed as to be unavailable." 22 It has been
said that "the locus of positive law-making power lies with the people of the state" and from there is
derived "the right of the people to abolish, to reform and to alter any existing form of government
without regard to the existing constitution." 23

The three (3) clauses that precede the text of the Provisional (Freedom) Constitution, 24 read:
"WHEREAS, the new government under President Corazon C. Aquino was installed through a direct
exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the
Philippines;

"WHEREAS, the heroic action of the people was done in defiance of the provisions of the 1973
Constitution, as amended;

"WHEREFORE, I, Corazon C. Aquino, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by
the sovereign mandate of the people, do hereby promulgate the following Provisional
Constitution."25cralaw:red

These summarize the Aquino governments position that its mandate is taken from "a direct exercise of
the power of the Filipino people." 26

Discussions and opinions of legal experts also proclaim that the Aquino government was "revolutionary
in the sense that it came into existence in defiance of the existing legal processes" 27 and that it was a
revolutionary government "instituted by the direct action of the people and in opposition to the
authoritarian values and practices of the overthrown government." 28

A question which naturally comes to mind is whether the then existing legal order was overthrown by
the Aquino government. "A legal order is the authoritative code of a polity. Such code consists of all the
rules found in the enactments of the organs of the polity. Where the state operates under a written
constitution, its organs may be readily determined from a reading of its provisions. Once such organs are
ascertained, it becomes an easy matter to locate their enactments. The rules in such enactments, along
with those in the constitution, comprise the legal order of that constitutional state." 29 It is assumed
that the legal order remains as a "culture system" of the polity as long as the latter endures 30 and that
a point may be reached, however, where the legal system ceases to be operative as a whole for it is no
longer obeyed by the population nor enforced by the officials. 31

It is widely known that Mrs. Aquinos rise to the presidency was not due to constitutional processes; in
fact, it was achieved in violation of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution as a Batasang Pambansa
resolution had earlier declared Mr. Marcos at the winner in the 1986 presidential election. 32 Thus it
can be said that the organization of Mrs. Aquinos Government which was met by little resistance and
her control of the state evidenced by the appointment of the Cabinet and other key officers of the
administration, the departure of the Marcos Cabinet officials, revampt of the Judiciary and the Military
signalled the point where the legal system then in effect, had ceased to be obeyed by the Filipino.

The Court holds that the Court of Appeals and Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to Executive
Order No. 33 phased out as part of the legal system abolished by the revolution and that the Court of
Appeals established under Executive Order No. 33 was an entirely new court with appointments thereto
having no relation to earlier appointments to the abolished courts, and that the reference to
precedence in rank contained in the last sentence of Sec. 2, BP Blg. No. 129 as amended by Executive
Order No. 33 refers to prospective situations as distinguished from retroactive ones.

But even assuming, arguendo, that Executive Order No. 33 did not abolish the precedence or seniority
ranking resulting from previous appointment to the Court of Appeals or Intermediate Appellate Court
existing prior to the 1986 revolution, it is believed that President Aquino as head of then revolutionary
government, could disregard or set aside such precedence or seniority in ranking when she made her
appointments to the reorganized Court of Appeals in 1986.

It is to be noted that, at the time of the issuance of Executive Order No. 33, President Aquino was still
exercising the powers of a revolutionary government, encompassing both executive and legislative
powers, such that she could, if she so desired, amend, modify or repeal any part of B.P. Blg. 129 or her
own Executive Order No. 33. It should also be remembered that the same situation was still in force
when she issued the 1986 appointments to the Court of Appeals. In other words, President Aquino, at
the time of the issuance of the 1986 appointments, modified or disregarded the rule embodied in B.P.
Blg. 129 as amended by Executive Order No. 33, on precedence or seniority in the case of the petitioner,
for reasons known only to her. Since the appointment extended by the President to the petitioner in
1986 for membership in the new Court of Appeals with its implicit ranking in the roster of justices, was a
valid appointment anchored on the Presidents exercise of her then revolutionary powers, it is not for
the Court at this time to question or correct that exercise.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration and the seniority rankings of
members of the Court of Appeals, including that of the petitioner, at the time the appointments were
made by the President in 1986, are recognized and upheld.SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 104768. July 21, 2003]

Republic of the Philippines, petitioner, vs. Sandiganbayan, Major General Josephus Q. Ramas and
Elizabeth Dimaano, respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan (First Division)[1] dated 18 November 1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037. The
first Resolution dismissed petitioners Amended Complaint and ordered the return of the confiscated items
to respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, while the second Resolution denied petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration. Petitioner prays for the grant of the reliefs sought in its Amended Complaint, or in the
alternative, for the remand of this case to the Sandiganbayan (First Division) for further proceedings
allowing petitioner to complete the presentation of its evidence.

Antecedent Facts

Immediately upon her assumption to office following the successful EDSA Revolution, then President
Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 1 (EO No. 1) creating the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG). EO No. 1 primarily tasked the PCGG to recover all ill-gotten wealth of former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates. EO No.
1 vested the PCGG with the power (a) to conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to accomplish
and carry out the purposes of this order and the power (h) to promulgate such rules and regulations as
may be necessary to carry out the purpose of this order. Accordingly, the PCGG, through its then Chairman
Jovito R. Salonga, created an AFP Anti-Graft Board (AFP Board) tasked to investigate reports of
unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by AFP personnel, whether in the active service or retired.[2]

Based on its mandate, the AFP Board investigated various reports of alleged unexplained wealth of
respondent Major General Josephus Q. Ramas (Ramas). On 27 July 1987, the AFP Board issued a
Resolution on its findings and recommendation on the reported unexplained wealth of Ramas. The
relevant part of the Resolution reads:

III. FINDINGS and EVALUATION:

Evidence in the record showed that respondent is the owner of a house and lot located at 15-Yakan St.,
La Vista, Quezon City. He is also the owner of a house and lot located in Cebu City. The lot has an area of
3,327 square meters.

The value of the property located in Quezon City may be estimated modestly at P700,000.00.

The equipment/items and communication facilities which were found in the premises of Elizabeth
Dimaano and were confiscated by elements of the PC Command of Batangas were all covered by invoice
receipt in the name of CAPT. EFREN SALIDO, RSO Command Coy, MSC, PA. These items could not have
been in the possession of Elizabeth Dimaano if not given for her use by respondent Commanding General
of the Philippine Army.

Aside from the military equipment/items and communications equipment, the raiding team was also able
to confiscate money in the amount of P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars in the house of Elizabeth
Dimaano on 3 March 1986.

Affidavits of members of the Military Security Unit, Military Security Command, Philippine Army, stationed
at Camp Eldridge, Los Baos, Laguna, disclosed that Elizabeth Dimaano is the mistress of respondent. That
respondent usually goes and stays and sleeps in the alleged house of Elizabeth Dimaano in Barangay
Tengga, Itaas, Batangas City and when he arrives, Elizabeth Dimaano embraces and kisses
respondent. That on February 25, 1986, a person who rode in a car went to the residence of Elizabeth
Dimaano with four (4) attache cases filled with money and owned by MGen Ramas.

Sworn statement in the record disclosed also that Elizabeth Dimaano had no visible means of income and
is supported by respondent for she was formerly a mere secretary.
Taking in toto the evidence, Elizabeth Dimaano could not have used the military equipment/items seized
in her house on March 3, 1986 without the consent of respondent, he being the Commanding General of
the Philippine Army. It is also impossible for Elizabeth Dimaano to claim that she owns the P2,870,000.00
and $50,000 US Dollars for she had no visible source of income.

This money was never declared in the Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent. There was an
intention to cover the existence of these money because these are all ill-gotten and unexplained
wealth. Were it not for the affidavits of the members of the Military Security Unit assigned at Camp
Eldridge, Los Baos, Laguna, the existence and ownership of these money would have never been known.

The Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent were also submitted for scrutiny and analysis by the
Boards consultant. Although the amount of P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars were not included, still
it was disclosed that respondent has an unexplained wealth of P104,134. 60.

IV. CONCLUSION:

In view of the foregoing, the Board finds that a prima facie case exists against respondent for ill-gotten
and unexplained wealth in the amount of P2,974,134.00 and $50,000 US Dollars.

V. RECOMMENDATION:

Wherefore it is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas (ret.) be prosecuted and tried for
violation of RA 3019, as amended, otherwise known as Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and RA 1379,
as amended, otherwise known as The Act for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property.[3]

Thus, on 1 August 1987, the PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379 (RA No.
1379) [4] against Ramas.

Before Ramas could answer the petition, then Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez filed an Amended
Complaint naming the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), represented by the PCGG, as plaintiff and
Ramas as defendant. The Amended Complaint also impleaded Elizabeth Dimaano (Dimaano) as co-
defendant.

The Amended Complaint alleged that Ramas was the Commanding General of the Philippine Army until
1986. On the other hand, Dimaano was a confidential agent of the Military Security Unit, Philippine Army,
assigned as a clerk-typist at the office of Ramas from 1 January 1978 to February 1979. The Amended
Complaint further alleged that Ramas acquired funds, assets and properties manifestly out of proportion
to his salary as an army officer and his other income from legitimately acquired property by taking undue
advantage of his public office and/or using his power, authority and influence as such officer of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and as a subordinate and close associate of the deposed President Ferdinand
Marcos.[5]

The Amended Complaint also alleged that the AFP Board, after a previous inquiry, found reasonable
ground to believe that respondents have violated RA No. 1379.[6] The Amended Complaint prayed for,
among others, the forfeiture of respondents properties, funds and equipment in favor of the State.

Ramas filed an Answer with Special and/or Affirmative Defenses and Compulsory Counterclaim to the
Amended Complaint. In his Answer, Ramas contended that his property consisted only of a residential
house at La Vista Subdivision, Quezon City, valued at P700,000, which was not out of proportion to his
salary and other legitimate income. He denied ownership of any mansion in Cebu City and the cash,
communications equipment and other items confiscated from the house of Dimaano.

Dimaano filed her own Answer to the Amended Complaint. Admitting her employment as a clerk-typist in
the office of Ramas from January-November 1978 only, Dimaano claimed ownership of the monies,
communications equipment, jewelry and land titles taken from her house by the Philippine Constabulary
raiding team.

After termination of the pre-trial,[7] the court set the case for trial on the merits on 9-11 November 1988.

On 9 November 1988, petitioner asked for a deferment of the hearing due to its lack of preparation for
trial and the absence of witnesses and vital documents to support its case. The court reset the hearing to
17 and 18 April 1989.
On 13 April 1989, petitioner filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint in order to charge the
delinquent properties with being subject to forfeiture as having been unlawfully acquired by defendant
Dimaano alone x x x.[8]

Nevertheless, in an order dated 17 April 1989, the Sandiganbayan proceeded with petitioners
presentation of evidence on the ground that the motion for leave to amend complaint did not state when
petitioner would file the amended complaint. The Sandiganbayan further stated that the subject matter
of the amended complaint was on its face vague and not related to the existing complaint. The
Sandiganbayan also held that due to the time that the case had been pending in court, petitioner should
proceed to present its evidence.

After presenting only three witnesses, petitioner asked for a postponement of the trial.

On 28 September 1989, during the continuation of the trial, petitioner manifested its inability to proceed
to trial because of the absence of other witnesses or lack of further evidence to present. Instead,
petitioner reiterated its motion to amend the complaint to conform to the evidence already presented or
to change the averments to show that Dimaano alone unlawfully acquired the monies or properties
subject of the forfeiture.

The Sandiganbayan noted that petitioner had already delayed the case for over a year mainly because of
its many postponements. Moreover, petitioner would want the case to revert to its preliminary stage
when in fact the case had long been ready for trial. The Sandiganbayan ordered petitioner to prepare for
presentation of its additional evidence, if any.

During the trial on 23 March 1990, petitioner again admitted its inability to present further
evidence. Giving petitioner one more chance to present further evidence or to amend the complaint to
conform to its evidence, the Sandiganbayan reset the trial to 18 May 1990. The Sandiganbayan, however,
hinted that the re-setting was without prejudice to any action that private respondents might take under
the circumstances.

However, on 18 May 1990, petitioner again expressed its inability to proceed to trial because it had no
further evidence to present. Again, in the interest of justice, the Sandiganbayan granted petitioner 60
days within which to file an appropriate pleading. The Sandiganbayan, however, warned petitioner that
failure to act would constrain the court to take drastic action.

Private respondents then filed their motions to dismiss based on Republic v. Migrino.[9] The Court held
in Migrino that the PCGG does not have jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute military officers by
reason of mere position held without a showing that they are subordinates of former President Marcos.

On 18 November 1991, the Sandiganbayan rendered a resolution, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the Amended Complaint, without pronouncement
as to costs. The counterclaims are likewise dismissed for lack of merit, but the confiscated sum of money,
communications equipment, jewelry and land titles are ordered returned to Elizabeth Dimaano.

The records of this case are hereby remanded and referred to the Hon. Ombudsman, who has primary
jurisdiction over the forfeiture cases under R.A. No. 1379, for such appropriate action as the evidence
warrants. This case is also referred to the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a
determination of any tax liability of respondent Elizabeth Dimaano in connection herewith.

SO ORDERED.

On 4 December 1991, petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration.

In answer to the Motion for Reconsideration, private respondents filed a Joint Comment/Opposition to
which petitioner filed its Reply on 10 January 1992.

On 25 March 1992, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration.

Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

The Sandiganbayan dismissed the Amended Complaint on the following grounds:

(1.) The actions taken by the PCGG are not in accordance with the rulings of the Supreme Court in Cruz,
Jr. v. Sandiganbayan[10] and Republic v. Migrino[11] which involve the same issues.
(2.) No previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigations in criminal cases was conducted against
Ramas and Dimaano.

(3.) The evidence adduced against Ramas does not constitute a prima facie case against him.

(4.) There was an illegal search and seizure of the items confiscated.

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues:

A. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT PETITIONERS EVIDENCE CANNOT MAKE
A CASE FOR FORFEITURE AND THAT THERE WAS NO SHOWING OF CONSPIRACY, COLLUSION OR
RELATIONSHIP BY CONSANGUINITY OR AFFINITY BY AND BETWEEN RESPONDENT RAMAS AND
RESPONDENT DIMAANO NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT SUCH CONCLUSIONS WERE CLEARLY
UNFOUNDED AND PREMATURE, HAVING BEEN RENDERED PRIOR TO THE COMPLETION OF THE
PRESENTATION OF THE EVIDENCE OF THE PETITIONER.

B. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE PETITIONER,
INCLUDING THE FILING OF THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT AND THE AMENDED COMPLAINT, SHOULD BE
STRUCK OUT IN LINE WITH THE RULINGS OF THE SUPREME COURT IN CRUZ, JR. v. SANDIGANBAYAN, 194
SCRA 474 AND REPUBLIC v. MIGRINO, 189 SCRA 289, NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT:

1. The cases of Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, supra, and Republic v. Migrino, supra, are clearly not applicable
to this case;

2. Any procedural defect in the institution of the complaint in Civil Case No. 0037 was cured and/or waived
by respondents with the filing of their respective answers with counterclaim; and

3. The separate motions to dismiss were evidently improper considering that they were filed after
commencement of the presentation of the evidence of the petitioner and even before the latter was
allowed to formally offer its evidence and rest its case;

C. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ARTICLES AND THINGS SUCH AS SUMS
OF MONEY, COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT, JEWELRY AND LAND TITLES CONFISCATED FROM THE
HOUSE OF RESPONDENT DIMAANO WERE ILLEGALLY SEIZED AND THEREFORE EXCLUDED AS EVIDENCE.[12]

The Courts Ruling

First Issue: PCGGs Jurisdiction to Investigate Private Respondents

This case involves a revisiting of an old issue already decided by this Court in Cruz, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan[13] and Republic v. Migrino.[14]

The primary issue for resolution is whether the PCGG has the jurisdiction to investigate and cause the
filing of a forfeiture petition against Ramas and Dimaano for unexplained wealth under RA No. 1379.

We hold that PCGG has no such jurisdiction.

The PCGG created the AFP Board to investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP
personnel, whether in the active service or retired.[15] The PCGG tasked the AFP Board to make the
necessary recommendations to appropriate government agencies on the action to be taken based on its
findings.[16] The PCGG gave this task to the AFP Board pursuant to the PCGGs power under Section 3 of EO
No. 1 to conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to accomplish and to carry out the purposes
of this order. EO No. 1 gave the PCGG specific responsibilities, to wit:

SEC. 2. The Commission shall be charged with the task of assisting the President in regard to the following
matters:

(a) The recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his
immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or
abroad, including the takeover and sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or
controlled by them, during his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage
of their public office and/ or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship.
(b) The investigation of such cases of graft and corruption as the President may assign to the Commission
from time to time.

x x x.

The PCGG, through the AFP Board, can only investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of
AFP personnel who fall under either of the two categories mentioned in Section 2 of EO No. 1. These are:
(1) AFP personnel who have accumulated ill-gotten wealth during the administration of former President
Marcos by being the latters immediate family, relative, subordinate or close associate, taking undue
advantage of their public office or using their powers, influence x x x;[17] or (2) AFP personnel involved in
other cases of graft and corruption provided the President assigns their cases to the PCGG.[18]

Petitioner, however, does not claim that the President assigned Ramas case to the PCGG. Therefore,
Ramas case should fall under the first category of AFP personnel before the PCGG could exercise its
jurisdiction over him. Petitioner argues that Ramas was undoubtedly a subordinate of former President
Marcos because of his position as the Commanding General of the Philippine Army. Petitioner claims that
Ramas position enabled him to receive orders directly from his commander-in-chief, undeniably making
him a subordinate of former President Marcos.

We hold that Ramas was not a subordinate of former President Marcos in the sense contemplated under
EO No. 1 and its amendments.

Mere position held by a military officer does not automatically make him a subordinate as this term is
used in EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A absent a showing that he enjoyed close association with former President
Marcos. Migrino discussed this issue in this wise:

A close reading of EO No. 1 and related executive orders will readily show what is contemplated within
the term subordinate. The Whereas Clauses of EO No. 1 express the urgent need to recover the ill-gotten
wealth amassed by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close
associates both here and abroad.

EO No. 2 freezes all assets and properties in the Philippines in which former President Marcos and/or his
wife, Mrs. Imelda Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents, or
nominees have any interest or participation.

Applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem generis that is-

[W]here general words follow an enumeration of persons or things by words of a particular and specific
meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying
only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned [Smith, Bell & Co, Ltd.
vs. Register of Deeds of Davao, 96 Phil. 53, 58, citing Black on Interpretation of Laws, 2nd Ed., 203].

[T]he term subordinate as used in EO Nos. 1 & 2 refers to one who enjoys a close association with former
President Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the immediate family member, relative, and close associate
in EO No. 1 and the close relative, business associate, dummy, agent, or nominee in EO No. 2.

xxx

It does not suffice, as in this case, that the respondent is or was a government official or employee during
the administration of former President Marcos. There must be a prima facie showing that the respondent
unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his close association or relation with former Pres. Marcos
and/or his wife. (Emphasis supplied)

Ramas position alone as Commanding General of the Philippine Army with the rank of Major
General[19] does not suffice to make him a subordinate of former President Marcos for purposes of EO No.
1 and its amendments. The PCGG has to provide a prima facieshowing that Ramas was a close associate
of former President Marcos, in the same manner that business associates, dummies, agents or nominees
of former President Marcos were close to him. Such close association is manifested either by Ramas
complicity with former President Marcos in the accumulation of ill-gotten wealth by the deposed President
or by former President Marcos acquiescence in Ramas own accumulation of ill-gotten wealth if any.

This, the PCGG failed to do.

Petitioners attempt to differentiate the instant case from Migrino does not convince us. Petitioner argues
that unlike in Migrino, the AFP Board Resolution in the instant case states that the AFP Board conducted
the investigation pursuant to EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A in relation to RA No. 1379. Petitioner asserts that
there is a presumption that the PCGG was acting within its jurisdiction of investigating crony-related cases
of graft and corruption and that Ramas was truly a subordinate of the former President. However, the
same AFP Board Resolution belies this contention. Although the Resolution begins with such statement, it
ends with the following recommendation:

V. RECOMMENDATION:

Wherefore it is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas (ret.) be prosecuted and tried for
violation of RA 3019, as amended, otherwise known as Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and RA 1379,
as amended, otherwise known as The Act for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property.[20]

Thus, although the PCGG sought to investigate and prosecute private respondents under EO Nos. 1, 2, 14
and 14-A, the result yielded a finding of violation of Republic Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 without any relation
to EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. This absence of relation to EO No. 1 and its amendments proves fatal to
petitioners case. EO No. 1 created the PCGG for a specific and limited purpose, and necessarily its powers
must be construed to address such specific and limited purpose.

Moreover, the resolution of the AFP Board and even the Amended Complaint do not show that the
properties Ramas allegedly owned were accumulated by him in his capacity as a subordinate of his
commander-in-chief. Petitioner merely enumerated the properties Ramas allegedly owned and suggested
that these properties were disproportionate to his salary and other legitimate income without showing
that Ramas amassed them because of his close association with former President Marcos. Petitioner, in
fact, admits that the AFP Board resolution does not contain a finding that Ramas accumulated his wealth
because of his close association with former President Marcos, thus:

10. While it is true that the resolution of the Anti-Graft Board of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines
did not categorically find a prima facie evidence showing that respondent Ramas unlawfully
accumulated wealth by virtue of his close association or relation with former President Marcos and/or
his wife, it is submitted that such omission was not fatal. The resolution of the Anti-Graft Board should
be read in the context of the law creating the same and the objective of the investigation which was, as
stated in the above, pursuant to Republic Act Nos. 3019 and 1379 in relation to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2,
14 and 14-a;[21] (Emphasis supplied)

Such omission is fatal. Petitioner forgets that it is precisely a prima facie showing that the ill-gotten wealth
was accumulated by a subordinate of former President Marcos that vests jurisdiction on PCGG. EO No.
1[22] clearly premises the creation of the PCGG on the urgent need to recover all ill-gotten wealth amassed
by former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close
associates. Therefore, to say that such omission was not fatal is clearly contrary to the intent behind the
creation of the PCGG.

In Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,[23] the Court outlined the cases that fall under the jurisdiction of the PCGG
pursuant to EO Nos. 1, 2,[24] 14,[25] 14-A:[26]

A careful reading of Sections 2(a) and 3 of Executive Order No. 1 in relation with Sections 1, 2 and 3 of
Executive Order No. 14, shows what the authority of the respondent PCGG to investigate and prosecute
covers:

(a) the investigation and prosecution of the civil action for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth under Republic
Act No. 1379, accumulated by former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates
and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the take-over or
sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them, during his
administration, directly or through his nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or
using their powers, authority and influence, connections or relationships; and

(b) the investigation and prosecution of such offenses committed in the acquisition of said ill-gotten
wealth as contemplated under Section 2(a) of Executive Order No. 1.

However, other violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act not otherwise falling under the
foregoing categories, require a previous authority of the President for the respondent PCGG to
investigate and prosecute in accordance with Section 2 (b) of Executive Order No. 1.Otherwise,
jurisdiction over such cases is vested in the Ombudsman and other duly authorized investigating
agencies such as the provincial and city prosecutors, their assistants, the Chief State Prosecutor and his
assistants and the state prosecutors. (Emphasis supplied)
The proper government agencies, and not the PCGG, should investigate and prosecute forfeiture petitions
not falling under EO No. 1 and its amendments. The preliminary investigation of unexplained wealth
amassed on or before 25 February 1986 falls under the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman, while the authority
to file the corresponding forfeiture petition rests with the Solicitor General.[27] The Ombudsman Act or
Republic Act No. 6770 (RA No. 6770) vests in the Ombudsman the power to conduct preliminary
investigation and to file forfeiture proceedings involving unexplained wealth amassed after 25 February
1986.[28]

After the pronouncements of the Court in Cruz, the PCGG still pursued this case despite the absence of
a prima facie finding that Ramas was a subordinate of former President Marcos. The petition for forfeiture
filed with the Sandiganbayan should be dismissed for lack of authority by the PCGG to investigate
respondents since there is no prima facie showing that EO No. 1 and its amendments apply to
respondents. The AFP Board Resolution and even the Amended Complaint state that there are violations
of RA Nos. 3019 and 1379. Thus, the PCGG should have recommended Ramas case to the Ombudsman
who has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation of ordinary unexplained wealth and graft
cases. As stated in Migrino:

[But] in view of the patent lack of authority of the PCGG to investigate and cause the prosecution of private
respondent for violation of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379, the PCGG must also be enjoined from
proceeding with the case, without prejudice to any action that may be taken by the proper prosecutory
agency. The rule of law mandates that an agency of government be allowed to exercise only the powers
granted to it.

Petitioners argument that private respondents have waived any defect in the filing of the forfeiture
petition by submitting their respective Answers with counterclaim deserves no merit as well.

Petitioner has no jurisdiction over private respondents. Thus, there is no jurisdiction to waive in the first
place. The PCGG cannot exercise investigative or prosecutorial powers never granted to it. PCGGs powers
are specific and limited. Unless given additional assignment by the President, PCGGs sole task is only to
recover the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their relatives and cronies.[29] Without these elements, the
PCGG cannot claim jurisdiction over a case.

Private respondents questioned the authority and jurisdiction of the PCGG to investigate and prosecute
their cases by filing their Motion to Dismiss as soon as they learned of the pronouncement of the Court
in Migrino. This case was decided on 30 August 1990, which explains why private respondents only filed
their Motion to Dismiss on 8 October 1990. Nevertheless, we have held that the parties may raise lack of
jurisdiction at any stage of the proceeding.[30] Thus, we hold that there was no waiver of jurisdiction in this
case. Jurisdiction is vested by law and not by the parties to an action.[31]

Consequently, the petition should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by the PCGG to conduct the
preliminary investigation. The Ombudsman may still conduct the proper preliminary investigation for
violation of RA No. 1379, and if warranted, the Solicitor General may file the forfeiture petition with the
Sandiganbayan.[32] The right of the State to forfeit unexplained wealth under RA No. 1379 is not subject
to prescription, laches or estoppel.[33]

Second Issue: Propriety of Dismissal of Case

Before Completion of Presentation of Evidence

Petitioner also contends that the Sandiganbayan erred in dismissing the case before completion of the
presentation of petitioners evidence.

We disagree.

Based on the findings of the Sandiganbayan and the records of this case, we find that petitioner has only
itself to blame for non-completion of the presentation of its evidence. First, this case has been pending
for four years before the Sandiganbayan dismissed it.Petitioner filed its Amended Complaint on 11
August 1987, and only began to present its evidence on 17 April 1989. Petitioner had almost two years to
prepare its evidence. However, despite this sufficient time, petitioner still delayed the presentation of the
rest of its evidence by filing numerous motions for postponements and extensions. Even before the date
set for the presentation of its evidence, petitioner filed, on 13 April 1989, a Motion for Leave to Amend
the Complaint.[34] The motion sought to charge the delinquent properties (which comprise most of
petitioners evidence) with being subject to forfeiture as having been unlawfully acquired by defendant
Dimaano alone x x x.
The Sandiganbayan, however, refused to defer the presentation of petitioners evidence since petitioner
did not state when it would file the amended complaint. On 18 April 1989, the Sandiganbayan set the
continuation of the presentation of evidence on 28-29 September and 9-11 October 1989, giving
petitioner ample time to prepare its evidence. Still, on 28 September 1989, petitioner manifested its
inability to proceed with the presentation of its evidence. The Sandiganbayan issued an Order expressing
its view on the matter, to wit:

The Court has gone through extended inquiry and a narration of the above events because this case has
been ready for trial for over a year and much of the delay hereon has been due to the inability of the
government to produce on scheduled dates for pre-trial and for trial documents and witnesses, allegedly
upon the failure of the military to supply them for the preparation of the presentation of evidence
thereon. Of equal interest is the fact that this Court has been held to task in public about its alleged failure
to move cases such as this one beyond the preliminary stage, when, in view of the developments such as
those of today, this Court is now faced with a situation where a case already in progress will revert back
to the preliminary stage, despite a five-month pause where appropriate action could have been
undertaken by the plaintiff Republic.[35]

On 9 October 1989, the PCGG manifested in court that it was conducting a preliminary investigation on
the unexplained wealth of private respondents as mandated by RA No. 1379.[36] The PCGG prayed for an
additional four months to conduct the preliminary investigation. The Sandiganbayan granted this request
and scheduled the presentation of evidence on 26-29 March 1990. However, on the scheduled date,
petitioner failed to inform the court of the result of the preliminary investigation the PCGG supposedly
conducted. Again, the Sandiganbayan gave petitioner until 18 May 1990 to continue with the presentation
of its evidence and to inform the court of what lies ahead insofar as the status of the case is concerned x
x x.[37] Still on the date set, petitioner failed to present its evidence. Finally, on 11 July 1990, petitioner
filed its Re-Amended Complaint.[38] The Sandiganbayan correctly observed that a case already pending for
years would revert to its preliminary stage if the court were to accept the Re-Amended Complaint.

Based on these circumstances, obviously petitioner has only itself to blame for failure to complete the
presentation of its evidence. The Sandiganbayan gave petitioner more than sufficient time to finish the
presentation of its evidence. The Sandiganbayan overlooked petitioners delays and yet petitioner ended
the long-string of delays with the filing of a Re-Amended Complaint, which would only prolong even more
the disposition of the case.

Moreover, the pronouncements of the Court in Migrino and Cruz prompted the Sandiganbayan to dismiss
the case since the PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute the case against private
respondents. This alone would have been sufficient legal basis for the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the
forfeiture case against private respondents.

Thus, we hold that the Sandiganbayan did not err in dismissing the case before completion of the
presentation of petitioners evidence.

Third Issue: Legality of the Search and Seizure

Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan erred in declaring the properties confiscated from Dimaanos
house as illegally seized and therefore inadmissible in evidence. This issue bears a significant effect on
petitioners case since these properties comprise most of petitioners evidence against private
respondents. Petitioner will not have much evidence to support its case against private respondents if
these properties are inadmissible in evidence.

On 3 March 1986, the Constabulary raiding team served at Dimaanos residence a search warrant
captioned Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition. Dimaano was not present during the raid but
Dimaanos cousins witnessed the raid. The raiding team seized the items detailed in the seizure receipt
together with other items not included in the search warrant. The raiding team seized these items: one
baby armalite rifle with two magazines; 40 rounds of 5.56 ammunition; one pistol, caliber .45;
communications equipment, cash consisting of P2,870,000 and US$50,000, jewelry, and land titles.

Petitioner wants the Court to take judicial notice that the raiding team conducted the search and seizure
on March 3, 1986 or five days after the successful EDSA revolution.[39] Petitioner argues that a
revolutionary government was operative at that time by virtue of Proclamation No. 1 announcing that
President Aquino and Vice President Laurel were taking power in the name and by the will of the Filipino
people.[40] Petitioner asserts that the revolutionary government effectively withheld the operation of the
1973 Constitution which guaranteed private respondents exclusionary right.
Moreover, petitioner argues that the exclusionary right arising from an illegal search applies only
beginning 2 February 1987, the date of ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner contends that all
rights under the Bill of Rights had already reverted to its embryonic stage at the time of the search.
Therefore, the government may confiscate the monies and items taken from Dimaano and use the same
in evidence against her since at the time of their seizure, private respondents did not enjoy any
constitutional right.

Petitioner is partly right in its arguments.

The EDSA Revolution took place on 23-25 February 1986. As succinctly stated in President Aquinos
Proclamation No. 3 dated 25 March 1986, the EDSA Revolution was done in defiance of the provisions of
the 1973 Constitution.[41] The resulting government was indisputably a revolutionary government bound
by no constitution or legal limitations except treaty obligations that the revolutionary government, as
the de jure government in the Philippines, assumed under international law.

The correct issues are: (1) whether the revolutionary government was bound by the Bill of Rights of the
1973 Constitution during the interregnum, that is, after the actual and effective take-over of power by
the revolutionary government following the cessation of resistance by loyalist forces up to 24 March 1986
(immediately before the adoption of the Provisional Constitution); and (2) whether the protection
accorded to individuals under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Covenant) and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Declaration) remained in effect during the interregnum.

We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the
interregnum. However, we rule that the protection accorded to individuals under the Covenant and the
Declaration remained in effect during the interregnum.

During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary government were the supreme law
because no constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives and orders. With the abrogation
of the 1973 Constitution by the successful revolution, there was no municipal law higher than the
directives and orders of the revolutionary government. Thus, during the interregnum, a person could not
invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of
Rights during the interregnum. As the Court explained in Letter of Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno:[42]

A revolution has been defined as the complete overthrow of the established government in any country
or state by those who were previously subject to it or as a sudden, radical and fundamental change in the
government or political system, usually effected with violence or at least some acts of violence. In Kelsen's
book, General Theory of Law and State, it is defined as that which occurs whenever the legal order of a
community is nullified and replaced by a new order . . . a way not prescribed by the first order itself.

It was through the February 1986 revolution, a relatively peaceful one, and more popularly known as the
people power revolution that the Filipino people tore themselves away from an existing regime. This
revolution also saw the unprecedented rise to power of the Aquino government.

From the natural law point of view, the right of revolution has been defined as an inherent right of a
people to cast out their rulers, change their policy or effect radical reforms in their system of government
or institutions by force or a general uprising when the legal and constitutional methods of making such
change have proved inadequate or are so obstructed as to be unavailable. It has been said that the locus
of positive law-making power lies with the people of the state and from there is derived the right of the
people to abolish, to reform and to alter any existing form of government without regard to the existing
constitution.

xxx

It is widely known that Mrs. Aquinos rise to the presidency was not due to constitutional processes; in
fact, it was achieved in violation of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution as a Batasang Pambansa
resolution had earlier declared Mr. Marcos as the winner in the 1986 presidential election. Thus it can
be said that the organization of Mrs. Aquinos Government which was met by little resistance and her
control of the state evidenced by the appointment of the Cabinet and other key officers of the
administration, the departure of the Marcos Cabinet officials, revamp of the Judiciary and the Military
signaled the point where the legal system then in effect, had ceased to be obeyed by the
Filipino. (Emphasis supplied)

To hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution remained operative during the interregnum
would render void all sequestration orders issued by the Philippine Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) before the adoption of the Freedom Constitution. The sequestration orders, which direct the
freezing and even the take-over of private property by mere executive issuance without judicial action,
would violate the due process and search and seizure clauses of the Bill of Rights.

During the interregnum, the government in power was concededly a revolutionary government bound by
no constitution. No one could validly question the sequestration orders as violative of the Bill of Rights
because there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum.However, upon the adoption of the Freedom
Constitution, the sequestered companies assailed the sequestration orders as contrary to the Bill of Rights
of the Freedom Constitution.

In Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co. Inc. vs. Presidential Commission on Good
Government,[43] petitioner Baseco, while conceding there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum,
questioned the continued validity of the sequestration orders upon adoption of the Freedom Constitution
in view of the due process clause in its Bill of Rights. The Court ruled that the Freedom Constitution, and
later the 1987 Constitution, expressly recognized the validity of sequestration orders, thus:

If any doubt should still persist in the face of the foregoing considerations as to the validity and propriety
of sequestration, freeze and takeover orders, it should be dispelled by the fact that these particular
remedies and the authority of the PCGG to issue them have received constitutional approbation and
sanction. As already mentioned, the Provisional or Freedom Constitution recognizes the power and duty
of the President to enact measures to achieve the mandate of the people to . . . (r)ecover ill-gotten
properties amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous regime and protect the interest of the
people through orders of sequestration or freezing of assets or accounts. And as also already adverted to,
Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution treats of, and ratifies the authority to issue sequestration
or freeze orders under Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986.

The framers of both the Freedom Constitution and the 1987 Constitution were fully aware that the
sequestration orders would clash with the Bill of Rights. Thus, the framers of both constitutions had to
include specific language recognizing the validity of the sequestration orders. The following discourse by
Commissioner Joaquin G. Bernas during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission is instructive:

FR. BERNAS: Madam President, there is something schizophrenic about the arguments in defense of the
present amendment.

For instance, I have carefully studied Minister Salongas lecture in the Gregorio Araneta University
Foundation, of which all of us have been given a copy. On the one hand, he argues that everything the
Commission is doing is traditionally legal. This is repeated by Commissioner Romulo also. Minister Salonga
spends a major portion of his lecture developing that argument. On the other hand, almost as an
afterthought, he says that in the end what matters are the results and not the legal niceties, thus
suggesting that the PCGG should be allowed to make some legal shortcuts, another word for niceties or
exceptions.

Now, if everything the PCGG is doing is legal, why is it asking the CONCOM for special protection? The
answer is clear. What they are doing will not stand the test of ordinary due process, hence they are
asking for protection, for exceptions. Grandes malos, grandes remedios, fine, as the saying stands, but
let us not say grandes malos, grande y malos remedios. That is not an allowable extrapolation. Hence, we
should not give the exceptions asked for, and let me elaborate and give three reasons:

First, the whole point of the February Revolution and of the work of the CONCOM is to hasten
constitutional normalization. Very much at the heart of the constitutional normalization is the full
effectivity of the Bill of Rights. We cannot, in one breath, ask for constitutional normalization and at the
same time ask for a temporary halt to the full functioning of what is at the heart of constitutionalism. That
would be hypocritical; that would be a repetition of Marcosian protestation of due process and rule of
law. The New Society word for that is backsliding. It is tragic when we begin to backslide even before we
get there.

Second, this is really a corollary of the first. Habits tend to become ingrained. The committee report asks
for extraordinary exceptions from the Bill of Rights for six months after the convening of Congress, and
Congress may even extend this longer.

Good deeds repeated ripen into virtue; bad deeds repeated become vice. What the committee report is
asking for is that we should allow the new government to acquire the vice of disregarding the Bill of Rights.

Vices, once they become ingrained, become difficult to shed. The practitioners of the vice begin to think
that they have a vested right to its practice, and they will fight tooth and nail to keep the franchise. That
would be an unhealthy way of consolidating the gains of a democratic revolution.
Third, the argument that what matters are the results and not the legal niceties is an argument that is
very disturbing. When it comes from a staunch Christian like Commissioner Salonga, a Minister, and
repeated verbatim by another staunch Christian like Commissioner Tingson, it becomes doubly disturbing
and even discombobulating. The argument makes the PCGG an auctioneer, placing the Bill of Rights on
the auction block. If the price is right, the search and seizure clause will be sold. Open your Swiss bank
account to us and we will award you the search and seizure clause. You can keep it in your private safe.

Alternatively, the argument looks on the present government as hostage to the hoarders of hidden
wealth. The hoarders will release the hidden health if the ransom price is paid and the ransom price is the
Bill of Rights, specifically the due process in the search and seizure clauses. So, there is something
positively revolving about either argument. The Bill of Rights is not for sale to the highest bidder nor can
it be used to ransom captive dollars. This nation will survive and grow strong, only if it would become
convinced of the values enshrined in the Constitution of a price that is beyond monetary estimation.

For these reasons, the honorable course for the Constitutional Commission is to delete all of Section 8 of
the committee report and allow the new Constitution to take effect in full vigor. If Section 8 is deleted,
the PCGG has two options. First, it can pursue the Salonga and the Romulo argument that what the PCGG
has been doing has been completely within the pale of the law. If sustained, the PCGG can go on and
should be able to go on, even without the support of Section 8. If not sustained, however, the PCGG has
only one honorable option, it must bow to the majesty of the Bill of Rights.

The PCGG extrapolation of the law is defended by staunch Christians. Let me conclude with what another
Christian replied when asked to toy around with the law. From his prison cell, Thomas More said, "I'll give
the devil benefit of law for my nations safety sake. I ask the Commission to give the devil benefit of law
for our nations sake. And we should delete Section 8.

Thank you, Madam President. (Emphasis supplied)

Despite the impassioned plea by Commissioner Bernas against the amendment

excepting sequestration orders from the Bill of Rights, the Constitutional Commission still adopted the
amendment as Section 26,[44] Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. The framers of the Constitution were
fully aware that absent Section 26, sequestration orders would not stand the test of due process under
the Bill of Rights.

Thus, to rule that the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution remained in force during the interregnum,
absent a constitutional provision excepting sequestration orders from such Bill of Rights, would clearly
render all sequestration orders void during the interregnum.Nevertheless, even during the interregnum
the Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the Covenant and the Declaration, almost the same rights
found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution.

The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the de jure government, assumed responsibility
for the States good faith compliance with the Covenant to which the Philippines is a signatory. Article 2(1)
of the Covenant requires each signatory State to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory
and subject to its jurisdiction the rights[45] recognized in the present Covenant. Under Article 17(1) of the
Covenant, the revolutionary government had the duty to insure that [n]o one shall be subjected to
arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence.

The Declaration, to which the Philippines is also a signatory, provides in its Article 17(2) that [n]o one shall
be arbitrarily deprived of his property. Although the signatories to the Declaration did not intend it as a
legally binding document, being only a declaration, the Court has interpreted the Declaration as part of
the generally accepted principles of international law and binding on the State.[46] Thus, the revolutionary
government was also obligated under international law to observe the rights[47] of individuals under the
Declaration.

The revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration during the interregnum.
Whether the revolutionary government could have repudiated all its obligations under the Covenant or
the Declaration is another matter and is not the issue here.Suffice it to say that the Court considers the
Declaration as part of customary international law, and that Filipinos as human beings are proper subjects
of the rules of international law laid down in the Covenant. The fact is the revolutionary government did
not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration in the same way it repudiated the 1973 Constitution. As
the de jure government, the revolutionary government could not escape responsibility for the States good
faith compliance with its treaty obligations under international law.

It was only upon the adoption of the Provisional Constitution on 25 March 1986 that the directives and
orders of the revolutionary government became subject to a higher municipal law that, if contravened,
rendered such directives and orders void. The Provisional Constitution adopted verbatim the Bill of Rights
of the 1973 Constitution.[48] The Provisional Constitution served as a self-limitation by the revolutionary
government to avoid abuses of the absolute powers entrusted to it by the people.

During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed, directives and orders issued by
government officers were valid so long as these officers did not exceed the authority granted them by the
revolutionary government. The directives and orders should not have also violated the Covenant or the
Declaration. In this case, the revolutionary government presumptively sanctioned the warrant since the
revolutionary government did not repudiate it. The warrant, issued by a judge upon proper application,
specified the items to be searched and seized. The warrant is thus valid with respect to the items
specifically described in the warrant.

However, the Constabulary raiding team seized items not included in the warrant. As admitted by
petitioners witnesses, the raiding team confiscated items not included in the warrant, thus:

Direct Examination of Capt. Rodolfo Sebastian

AJ AMORES

Q. According to the search warrant, you are supposed to seize only for weapons. What else, aside from the
weapons, were seized from the house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?

A. The communications equipment, money in Philippine currency and US dollars, some jewelries, land
titles, sir.

Q. Now, the search warrant speaks only of weapons to be seized from the house of Elizabeth Dimaano. Do
you know the reason why your team also seized other properties not mentioned in said search warrant?

A. During the conversation right after the conduct of said raid, I was informed that the reason why they
also brought the other items not included in the search warrant was because the money and other
jewelries were contained in attach cases and cartons with markings Sony Trinitron, and I think three (3)
vaults or steel safes. Believing that the attach cases and the steel safes were containing firearms, they
forced open these containers only to find out that they contained money.

xxx

Q. You said you found money instead of weapons, do you know the reason why your team seized this
money instead of weapons?

A. I think the overall team leader and the other two officers assisting him decided to bring along also the
money because at that time it was already dark and they felt most secured if they will bring that because
they might be suspected also of taking money out of those items, your Honor.[49]

Cross-examination

Atty. Banaag

Q. Were you present when the search warrant in connection with this case was applied before the
Municipal Trial Court of Batangas, Branch 1?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And the search warrant applied for by you was for the search and seizure of five (5) baby armalite rifles
M-16 and five (5) boxes of ammunition?

A. Yes, sir.

xxx

AJ AMORES

Q. Before you applied for a search warrant, did you conduct surveillance in the house of Miss Elizabeth
Dimaano?

A. The Intelligence Operatives conducted surveillance together with the MSU elements, your Honor.
Q. And this party believed there were weapons deposited in the house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?

A. Yes, your Honor.

Q. And they so swore before the Municipal Trial Judge?

A. Yes, your Honor.

Q. But they did not mention to you, the applicant for the search warrant, any other properties or
contraband which could be found in the residence of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?

A. They just gave us still unconfirmed report about some hidden items, for instance, the communications
equipment and money. However, I did not include that in the application for search warrant considering
that we have not established concrete evidence about that. So when

Q. So that when you applied for search warrant, you had reason to believe that only weapons were in the
house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?

A. Yes, your Honor.[50]

xxx

Q. You stated that a .45 caliber pistol was seized along with one armalite rifle M-16 and how many
ammunition?

A. Forty, sir.

Q. And this became the subject of your complaint with the issuing Court, with the fiscals office who charged
Elizabeth Dimaano for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you know what happened to that case?

A. I think it was dismissed, sir.

Q. In the fiscals office?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Because the armalite rifle you seized, as well as the .45 caliber pistol had a Memorandum Receipt in the
name of Felino Melegrito, is that not correct?

A. I think that was the reason, sir.

Q. There were other articles seized which were not included in the search warrant, like for instance,
jewelries. Why did you seize the jewelries?

A. I think it was the decision of the overall team leader and his assistant to bring along also the jewelries
and other items, sir. I do not really know where it was taken but they brought along also these articles. I
do not really know their reason for bringing the same, but I just learned that these were taken because
they might get lost if they will just leave this behind.

xxx

Q. How about the money seized by your raiding team, they were not also included in the search warrant?

A. Yes sir, but I believe they were also taken considering that the money was discovered to be contained in
attach cases. These attach cases were suspected to be containing pistols or other high powered firearms,
but in the course of the search the contents turned out to be money. So the team leader also decided to
take this considering that they believed that if they will just leave the money behind, it might get lost also.

Q. That holds true also with respect to the other articles that were seized by your raiding team, like Transfer
Certificates of Title of lands?
A. Yes, sir. I think they were contained in one of the vaults that were opened.[51]

It is obvious from the testimony of Captain Sebastian that the warrant did not include the monies,
communications equipment, jewelry and land titles that the raiding team confiscated. The search warrant
did not particularly describe these items and the raiding team confiscated them on its own authority. The
raiding team had no legal basis to seize these items without showing that these items could be the subject
of warrantless search and seizure.[52] Clearly, the raiding team exceeded its authority when it seized these
items.

The seizure of these items was therefore void, and unless these items are contraband per se,[53] and they
are not, they must be returned to the person from whom the raiding seized them. However, we do not
declare that such person is the lawful owner of these items, merely that the search and seizure warrant
could not be used as basis to seize and withhold these items from the possessor. We thus hold that these
items should be returned immediately to Dimaano.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The questioned Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan
dated 18 November 1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037, remanding the records of this case
to the Ombudsman for such appropriate action as the evidence may warrant, and referring this case to
the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a determination of any tax liability of respondent
Elizabeth Dimaano, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Tondo Medical Center vs. Court of Appeals

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
Decision,[1] promulgated by the Court of Appeals on 26 November 2004, denying a petition for the
nullification of the Health Sector Reform Agenda (HSRA) Philippines 1999-2004 of the Department of
Health (DOH); and Executive Order No. 102, Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the Department
of Health, which was issued by then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada on 24 May 1999.
Prior hereto, petitioners originally filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus under Rule 65
of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure before the Supreme Court on 15 August 2001. However, the
Supreme Court, in a Resolution dated 29 August 2001, referred the petition to the Court of Appeals for
appropriate action.

HEALTH SECTOR REFORM AGENDA (HSRA)

In 1999, the DOH launched the HSRA, a reform agenda developed by the HSRA Technical Working Group
after a series of workshops and analyses with inputs from several consultants, program managers and
technical staff possessing the adequate expertise and experience in the health sector. It provided for five
general areas of reform: (1) to provide fiscal autonomy to government hospitals; (2) secure funding for
priority public health programs; (3) promote the development of local health systems and ensure its
effective performance; (4) strengthen the capacities of health regulatory agencies; and (5) expand the
coverage of the National Health Insurance Program (NHIP).[2]

Petitioners questioned the first reform agenda involving the fiscal autonomy of government hospitals,
particularly the collection of socialized user fees and the corporate restructuring of government
hospitals. The said provision under the HSRA reads:

Provide fiscal autonomy to government hospitals. Government hospitals must be

allowed to collect socialized user fees so they can reduce the dependence on direct
subsidies from the government. Their critical capacities like diagnostic equipment,
laboratory facilities and medical staff capability must be upgraded to effectively exercise
fiscal autonomy. Such investment must be cognizant of complimentary capacity provided
by public-private networks. Moreover such capacities will allow government hospitals to
supplement priority public health programs. Appropriate institutional arrangement must
be introduced such as allowing them autonomy towards converting them into
government corporations without compromising their social responsibilities. As a result,
 government hospitals are expected to be more competitive and responsive to health
needs.

Petitioners also assailed the issuance of a draft administrative order issued by the DOH, dated 5 January
2001, entitled Guidelines and Procedure in the Implementation of the Corporate Restructuring of Selected
DOH Hospitals to Achieve Fiscal Autonomy, and Managerial Flexibility to Start by January 2001;[3] and
Administrative Order No. 172 of the DOH, entitled Policies and Guidelines on the Private Practice of
Medical and Paramedical Professionals in Government Health Facilities,[4] dated 9 January 2001, for
imposing an added burden to indigent Filipinos, who cannot afford to pay for medicine and medical
services.[5]

Petitioners alleged that the implementation of the aforementioned reforms had resulted in making free
medicine and free medical services inaccessible to economically disadvantaged Filipinos. Thus, they
alleged that the HSRA is void for being in violation of the following constitutional provisions:[6]

ART. III, SEC. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process
of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the law.

ART II, SEC. 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and
property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment of all
the people of the blessings of democracy.

ART II, SEC. 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the
prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through
policies that provide adequate social services, promote full employment, a rising standard
of living and an improved quality of life for all.

ART II, SEC. 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national
development.

ART II, SEC. 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full
respect for human rights.

ART II, SEC. 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall
promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual and social well-being
x x x.

ART II, SEC. 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect
the rights of workers and promote their welfare.

ART XV, SEC. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the
nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
development.

ART XV, SEC. 3. The State shall defend:

xxxx
(2) the right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special
protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions
prejudicial to their development.

xxxx

ART XIII, SEC. 14. The State shall protect working women by providing safe and healthful
working conditions, taking into account their maternal functions, and such facilities and
opportunities that will enhance their welfare and enable them to realize their full
potential in the service of the nation.

ART II, SEC. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and
instill health consciousness among them.

ART XIII, SEC. 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to
health development which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other
social services available to all people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the
 needs of the underprivileged sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall
endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 102

On 24 May 1999, then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Executive Order No. 102, entitled
Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the Department of Health, which provided for the changes
in the roles, functions, and organizational processes of the DOH. Under the assailed executive order, the
DOH refocused its mandate from being the sole provider of health services to being a provider of specific
health services and technical assistance, as a result of the devolution of basic services to local government
units. The provisions for the streamlining of the DOH and the deployment of DOH personnel to regional
offices and hospitals read:

Sec. 4. Preparation of a Rationalization and Streamlining Plan. In view of the functional

and operational redirection in the DOH, and to effect efficiency and effectiveness in its
activities, the Department shall prepare a Rationalization and Streamlining Plan (RSP)
which shall be the basis of the intended changes. The RSP shall contain the following:

a) the specific shift in policy directions, functions, programs and

activities/strategies;
b) the structural and organizational shift, stating the specific functions and activities
by organizational unit and the relationship of each units;
c) the staffing shift, highlighting and itemizing the existing filled and unfilled
positions;
d) the resource allocation shift, specifying the effects of the streamline set-up on the
agency budgetary allocation and indicating where possible, savings have been
generated.

The RSP shall [be] submitted to the Department of Budget and Management for approval
before the corresponding shifts shall be affected (sic) by the DOH Secretary.

Sec. 5. Redeployment of Personnel. The redeployment of officials and other personnel on

the basis of the approved RSP shall not result in diminution in rank and compensation of
existing personnel. It shall take into account all pertinent Civil Service laws and rules.

Section 6. Funding. The financial resources needed to implement the Rationalization and
Streamlining Plan shall be taken from funds available in the DOH, provided that the total
requirements for the implementation of the revised staffing pattern shall not exceed
available funds for Personnel Services.

Section 7. Separation Benefits. Personnel who opt to be separated from the service as a
consequence of the implementation of this Executive Order shall be entitled to the
benefits under existing laws. In the case of those who are not covered by existing laws,
they shall be entitled to separation benefits equivalent to one month basic salary for
every year of service or proportionate share thereof in addition to the terminal fee
benefits to which he/she is entitled under existing laws.

Executive Order No. 102 was enacted pursuant to Section 17 of the Local Government Code
(Republic Act No. 7160), which provided for the devolution to the local government units of basic services
and facilities, as well as specific health-related functions and responsibilities.[7]

Petitioners contended that a law, such as Executive Order No. 102, which effects the
reorganization of the DOH, should be enacted by Congress in the exercise of its legislative function. They
argued that Executive Order No. 102 is void, having been issued in excess of the Presidents authority.[8]
Moreover, petitioners averred that the implementation of the Rationalization and Streamlining
Plan (RSP) was not in accordance with law. The RSP was allegedly implemented even before the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) approved it. They also maintained that the Office of the
President should have issued an administrative order to carry out the streamlining, but that it failed to do
so.[9]

Furthermore, petitioners Elsa O. Guevarra, Arcadio B. Gonzales, Jose G. Galang, Domingo

P. Manay, Eduardo P. Galope, Remedios M. Ysmael, Alfredo U. Bacuata and Edgardo J. Damicog, all DOH
employees, assailed the validity of Executive Order No. 102 on the ground that they were likely to lose
their jobs, and that some of them were suffering from the inconvenience of having to travel a longer
distance to get to their new place of work, while other DOH employees had to relocate to far-flung
areas.[10]

Petitioners also pointed out several errors in the implementation of the RSP. Certain employees
allegedly suffered diminution of compensation,[11] while others were supposedly assigned to positions for
which they were neither qualified nor suited.[12] In addition, new employees were purportedly hired by
the DOH and appointed to positions for which they were not qualified, despite the fact that the objective
of the ongoing streamlining was to cut back on costs.[13] It was also averred that DOH employees were
deployed or transferred even during the three-month period before the national and local elections in
May 2001,[14] in violation of Section 2 of the Republic Act No. 7305, also known as Magna Carta for Public
Health Workers.[15]Petitioners, however, failed to identify the DOH employees referred to above, much
less include them as parties to the petition.
The Court of Appeals denied the petition due to a number of procedural defects, which proved fatal: 1)
Petitioners failed to show capacity or authority to sign the certification of non-forum shopping and the
verification; 2) Petitioners failed to show any particularized interest for bringing the suit, nor any direct or
personal injury sustained or were in the immediate danger of sustaining; 3) the Petition, brought before
the Supreme Court on 15 August 1999, was filed out of time, or beyond 60 days from the time the
reorganization methods were implemented in 2000; and 4) certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus will not
lie where the President, in issuing the assailed Executive Order, was not acting as a tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.

In resolving the substantial issues of the case, the Court of Appeals ruled that the HSRA cannot be declared
void for violating Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 18 of Article II; Section 1 of Article III; Sections 11 and 14 of
Article XIII; and Sections 1 and 3(2) of Article XV, all of the 1987 Constitution, which directly or indirectly
pertain to the duty of the State to protect and promote the peoples right to health and well-being. It
reasoned that the aforementioned provisions of the Constitution are not self-executing; they are not
judicially enforceable constitutional rights and can only provide guidelines for legislation.

Moreover, the Court of Appeals held that the petitioners assertion that Executive Order No. 102
is detrimental to the health of the people cannot be made a justiciable issue. The question of whether the
HSRA will bring about the development or disintegration of the health sector is within the realm of the
political department.

Furthermore, the Court of Appeals decreed that the President was empowered to issue Executive Order
No. 102, in accordance with Section 17 Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. It also declared that the DOH
did not implement Executive Order No. 102 in bad faith or with grave abuse of discretion, as alleged by
the petitioners, as the DOH issued Department Circular No. 275-C, Series of 2000, which created the
different committees tasked with the implementation of the RSP, only after both the DBM
and Presidential Committee on Effective Governance (PCEG) approved the RSP on 8 July 2000 and 17 July
2000, respectively.

Petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision rendered on 26
November 2004, but the same was denied in a Resolution dated 7 March 2005.

Hence, the present petition, where the following issues are raised:

I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR IN RULING THAT

ANY QUESTION ON THE WISDOM AND EFFICACY OF THE HEALTH SECTOR REFORM
AGENDA IS NOT A JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY AND THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS PROTECTING THE HEALTH OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE ARE NOT JUDICIALLY
ENFORCEABLE;
II.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR IN RULING THAT

PETITIONERS COMPLAINT THAT EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 102 IS DETRIMENTAL TO THE
FILIPINO IS LIKEWISE NOT A JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY AND THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS
THE AUTHORITY TO ISSUE SAID ORDER; AND
 III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR IN UPHOLDING
TECHNICALITIES OVER AND ABOVE THE ISSUES OF TRANSCENDENTAL IMPORTANCE
RAISED IN THE PETITION BELOW. [16]

The Court finds the present petition to be without merit.

Petitioners allege that the HSRA should be declared void, since it runs counter to the aspiration
and ideals of the Filipino people as embodied in the Constitution.[17] They claim that the HSRAs policies of
fiscal autonomy, income generation, and revenue enhancement violate Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and
18 of Article II, Section 1 of Article III; Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII; and Sections 1 and 3 of Article XV
of the 1987 Constitution. Such policies allegedly resulted in making inaccessible free medicine and free
medical services. This contention is unfounded.

As a general rule, the provisions of the Constitution are considered self-executing, and do not
require future legislation for their enforcement. For if they are not treated as self-executing, the mandate
of the fundamental law can be easily nullified by the inaction of Congress.[18] However, some provisions
have already been categorically declared by this Court as non self-executing.

In Tanada v. Angara,[19] the Court specifically set apart the sections found under Article II of the
1987 Constitution as non self-executing and ruled that such broad principles need legislative enactments
before they can be implemented:

By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a declaration of principles and state
policies. x x x. These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executing principles
ready for enforcement through the courts. They are used by the judiciary as aids or as
guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its
enactment of laws.

In Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation,[20] this Court declared that Sections
11, 12, and 13 of Article II; Section 13 of Article XIII; and Section 2 of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution
are not self-executing provisions. In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,[21] the Court referred to Section 1 of
Article XIII and Section 2 of Article XIV of the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially
enforceable rights. These provisions, which merely lay down a general principle, are distinguished from
other constitutional provisions as non self-executing and, therefore, cannot give rise to a cause of action
in the courts; they do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights.[22]

Some of the constitutional provisions invoked in the present case were taken from Article II of the
Constitution -- specifically, Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and 18 -- the provisions of which the Court
categorically ruled to be non self-executing in the aforecited case of Taada v. Angara.[23]

Moreover, the records are devoid of any explanation of how the HSRA supposedly violated the equal
protection and due process clauses that are embodied in Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution. There
were no allegations of discrimination or of the lack of due process in connection with the HSRA. Since they
failed to substantiate how these constitutional guarantees were breached, petitioners are unsuccessful in
establishing the relevance of this provision to the petition, and consequently, in annulling the HSRA.

In the remaining provisions, Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII and Sections 1 and 3 of Article XV,
the State accords recognition to the protection of working women and the provision for safe and healthful
working conditions; to the adoption of an integrated and comprehensive approach to health; to the
Filipino family; and to the right of children to assistance and special protection, including proper care and
nutrition. Like the provisions that were declared as non self-executory in the cases of Basco v. Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation[24] and Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,[25] they are mere
statements of principles and policies. As such, they are mere directives addressed to the executive and
the legislative departments. If unheeded, the remedy will not lie with the courts; but rather, the
electorates displeasure may be manifested in their votes.

The rationale for this is given by Justice Dante Tinga in his Separate Opinion in the case
of Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission[26]:
 x x x However, to declare that the constitutional provisions are enough to guarantee the
full exercise of the rights embodied therein, and the realization of the ideals therein
expressed, would be impractical, if not unrealistic. The espousal of such view presents the
dangerous tendency of being overbroad and exaggerated. x x x Subsequent legislation is
still needed to define the parameters of these guaranteed rights. x x x Without specific
and pertinent legislation, judicial bodies will be at a loss, formulating their own conclusion
to approximate at least the aims of the Constitution.

The HSRA cannot be nullified based solely on petitioners bare allegations that it violates the
general principles expressed in the non self-executing provisions they cite herein. There are two reasons
for denying a cause of action to an alleged infringement of broad constitutional principles: basic
considerations of due process and the limitations of judicial power.[27]

Petitioners also claim that Executive Order No. 102 is void on the ground that it was issued by the
President in excess of his authority. They maintain that the structural and functional reorganization of the
DOH is an exercise of legislative functions, which the President usurped when he issued Executive Order
No. 102.[28] This line of argument is without basis.

This Court has already ruled in a number of cases that the President may, by executive or
administrative order, direct the reorganization of government entities under the Executive
Department.[29] This is also sanctioned under the Constitution, as well as other statutes.

Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, clearly states: [T]he president shall have control
of all executive departments, bureaus and offices. Section 31, Book III, Chapter 10 of Executive Order No.
292, also known as the Administrative Code of 1987 reads:

SEC. 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office - The President,
subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy
and efficiency, shall have continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure
of the Office of the President. For this purpose, he may take any of the following actions:

(1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper,
including the immediate offices, the Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers System and
the Common Staff Support System, by abolishing consolidating or merging units thereof
or transferring functions from one unit to another;

(2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other
Department or Agency as well as transfer functions to the Office of the President from
other Departments or Agencies; and

(3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other department
or agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the President from other
Departments or agencies.

In Domingo v. Zamora,[30] this Court explained the rationale behind the Presidents continuing
authority under the Administrative Code to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the
President. The law grants the President the power to reorganize the Office of the President in recognition
of the recurring need of every President to reorganize his or her office to achieve simplicity, economy and
efficiency. To remain effective and efficient, it must be capable of being shaped and reshaped by the
President in the manner the Chief Executive deems fit to carry out presidential directives and policies.

The Administrative Code provides that the Office of the President consists of the Office of the
President Proper and the agencies under it.[31] The agencies under the Office of the President are
identified in Section 23, Chapter 8, Title II of the Administrative Code:

Sec. 23. The Agencies under the Office of the President.The agencies under the Office of
the President refer to those offices placed under the chairmanship of the President, those
under the supervision and control of the President, those under the administrative
supervision of the Office of the President, those attached to it for policy and program
coordination, and those that are not placed by law or order creating them under any
specific department. (Emphasis provided.)
Section 2(4) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code defines the term agency of the
government as follows:

Agency of the Government refers to any of the various units of the Government,
including a department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or government-owned or
controlled corporation, or a local government or a distinct unit therein.

Furthermore, the DOH is among the cabinet-level departments enumerated under Book IV of the
Administrative Code, mainly tasked with the functional distribution of the work of the
President.[32] Indubitably, the DOH is an agency which is under the supervision and control of the President
and, thus, part of the Office of the President. Consequently, Section 31, Book III, Chapter 10 of the
Administrative Code, granting the President the continued authority to reorganize the Office of the
President, extends to the DOH.

The power of the President to reorganize the executive department is likewise recognized in
general appropriations laws. As early as 1993, Sections 48 and 62 of Republic Act No. 7645, the General
Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1993, already contained a provision stating that:

Sec. 48. Scaling Down and Phase Out of Activities Within the Executive Branch.The heads
of departments, bureaus and offices and agencies are hereby directed to identify their
respective activities which are no longer essential in the delivery of public services and
which may be scaled down, phased out, or abolished, subject to civil service rules and
regulations. x x x. Actual scaling down, phasing out, or abolition of activities shall be
effected pursuant to Circulars or Orders issued for the purpose by the Office of the
President. (Emphasis provided.)

Sec. 62. Unauthorized Organizational Changes. Unless otherwise created by law or

directed by the President of the Philippines, no organizational unit or changes in key
positions in any department or agency shall be authorized in their respective
organizational structures and be funded form appropriations by this Act.

Again, in the year when Executive Order No. 102 was issued, The General Appropriations Act of Fiscal Year
1999 (Republic Act No. 8745) conceded to the President the power to make any changes in any of the key
positions and organizational units in the executive department thus:

Sec. 77. Organized Changes. Unless otherwise provided by law or directed by the
President of the Philippines, no changes in key positions or organizational units in any
department or agency shall be authorized in their respective organizational structures
and funded from appropriations provided by this Act.

Clearly, Executive Order No. 102 is well within the constitutional power of the President to
issue. The President did not usurp any legislative prerogative in issuing Executive Order No. 102. It is an
exercise of the Presidents constitutional power of control over the executive department, supported by
the provisions of the Administrative Code, recognized by other statutes, and consistently affirmed by this
Court.

Petitioners also pointed out several flaws in the implementation of Executive Order No. 102,
particularly the RSP. However, these contentions are without merit and are insufficient to invalidate the
executive order.

The RSP was allegedly implemented even before the DBM approved it. The facts show
otherwise. It was only after the DBM approved the Notice of Organization, Staffing and Compensation
Action on 8 July 2000,[33] and after the Presidential Committee on Effective Governance (PCEG) issued on
17 July 2000 Memorandum Circular No. 62,[34] approving the RSP, that then DOH Secretary Alberto
G. Romualdez issued on 28 July 2000 Department Circular No. 275-C, Series of 2000,[35]creating the
different committees to implement the RSP.
 Petitioners also maintain that the Office of the President should have issued an administrative
order to carry out the streamlining, but that it failed to do so. Such objection cannot be given any weight
considering that the acts of the DOH Secretary, as an alter ego of the President, are presumed to be the
acts of the President. The members of the Cabinet are subject at all times to the disposition of the
President since they are merely his alter egos.[36] Thus, their acts, performed and promulgated in the
regular course of business, are, unless disapproved by the President, presumptively acts of the
President.[37] Significantly, the acts of the DOH Secretary were clearly authorized by the President, who,
thru the PCEG, issued the aforementioned Memorandum Circular No. 62, sanctioning the implementation
of the RSP.

Petitioners Elsa Odonzo Guevarra, Arcadio B. Gonzales, Jose G. Galang, Domingo P. Manay,
Eduardo P. Galope, Remedios M. Ysmael, Alfredo U. Bacuata, and Edgardo Damicog, all DOH employees,
assailed the validity of Executive Order No. 102 on the ground that they were likely to lose their jobs, and
that some of them were suffering from the inconvenience of having to travel a longer distance to get to
their new place of work, while other DOH employees had to relocate to far-flung areas.

In several cases, this Court regarded reorganizations of government units or departments as valid,
for so long as they are pursued in good faiththat is, for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy
more efficient.[38] On the other hand, if the reorganization is done for the purpose of defeating security of
tenure or for ill-motivated political purposes, any abolition of position would be invalid. None of these
circumstances are applicable since none of the petitioners were removed from public service, nor did they
identify any action taken by the DOH that would unquestionably result in their dismissal. The
reorganization that was pursued in the present case was made in good faith. The RSP was clearly designed
to improve the efficiency of the department and to implement the provisions of the Local Government
Code on the devolution of health services to local governments. While this Court recognizes the
inconvenience suffered by public servants in their deployment to distant areas, the executive
departments finding of a need to make health services available to these areas and to make delivery of
health services more efficient and more compelling is far from being unreasonable or arbitrary, a
determination which is well within its authority. In all, this Court finds petitioners contentions to be
insufficient to invalidate Executive Order No. 102.

Without identifying the DOH employees concerned, much less including them as parties to the
petition, petitioners went on identifying several errors in the implementation of Executive Order No.
102. First, they alleged that unidentified DOH employees suffered from a diminution of compensation by
virtue of the provision on Salaries and Benefits found in Department Circular No. 312, Series of 2000,
issued on 23 October 2000, which reads:

2. Any employee who was matched to a position with lower salary grade (SG) shall not
suffer a reduction in salary except where his/her current salary is higher than the
maximum step of the SG of the new position, in which case he/she shall be paid the salary
corresponding to the maximum step of the SG of the new position. RATA shall no longer
be received, if employee was matched to a Non-Division Chief Position.

Incidentally, the petition shows that none of the petitioners, who are working in the DOH, were entitled
to receive RATA at the time the petition was filed. Nor was it alleged that they suffered any diminution of
compensation. Secondly, it was claimed that certain unnamed DOH employees were matched with
unidentified positions for which they were supposedly neither qualified nor suited. New employees, again
unnamed and not included as parties, were hired by the DOH and appointed to unidentified positions for
which they were purportedly not qualified, despite the fact that the objective of the ongoing streamlining
was to cut back on costs. Lastly, unspecified DOH employees were deployed or transferred during the
three-month period before the national and local elections in May 2001, in violation of Section 2 of the
Republic Act No. 7305, also known as Magna Carta for Public Health Workers.

Petitioners allegations are too general and unsubstantiated by the records for the Court to pass upon. The
persons involved are not identified, details of their appointments and transfers such as position, salary
grade, and the date they were appointed - are not given; and the circumstances which attended the
alleged violations are not specified.
 Even granting that these alleged errors were adequately proven by the petitioners, they would
still not invalidate Executive Order No. 102. Any serious legal errors in laying down the compensation of
the DOH employees concerned can only invalidate the pertinent provisions of Department Circular No.
312, Series of 2000. Likewise, any questionable appointments or transfers are properly addressed by an
appeal process provided under Administrative Order No. 94, series of 2000;[39] and if the appeal is
meritorious, such appointment or transfer may be invalidated. The validity of Executive Order No. 102
would, nevertheless, remain unaffected. Settled is the rule that courts are not at liberty to declare statutes
invalid, although they may be abused or misabused, and may afford an opportunity for abuse in the
manner of application. The validity of a statute or ordinance is to be determined from its general purpose
and its efficiency to accomplish the end desired, not from its effects in a particular case.[40]

In a number of cases,[41] the Court upheld the standing of citizens who filed suits, wherein the
transcendental importance of the constitutional question justified the granting of relief. In spite of these
rulings, the Court, in Domingo v. Carague,[42]dismissed the petition when petitioners therein failed to
show any present substantial interest. It demonstrated how even in the cases in which the Court declared
that the matter of the case was of transcendental importance, the petitioners must be able to assert
substantial interest. Present substantial interest, which will enable a party to question the validity of the
law, requires that a party sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement.[43] It is
distinguished from a mere expectancy or future, contingent, subordinate, or inconsequential interest.[44]

In the same way, the Court, in Telecommunications & Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc.
v. Comelec,[45] ruled that a citizen is allowed to raise a constitutional question only when he can show that
he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of
the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favorable action. This case likewise stressed that the rule on constitutional questions which
are of transcendental importance cannot be invoked where a partys substantive claim is without
merit. Thus, a partys standing is determined by the substantive merit of his case or a preliminary estimate
thereof. After a careful scrutiny of the petitioners substantive claims, this Court finds that the petitioners
miserably failed to show any merit to their claims.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DENIED. This Court AFFIRMS the assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 26 November 2004, declaring both the HSRA and
Executive Order No. 102 as valid. No costs. SO ORDERED.

OPOSA vs. FACORAN, JR.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which
the petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and
"inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the said petitioners have a
cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the
unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."

The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro
Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein,
now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents.
Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock
and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared
for the protection of our environment and natural resources. The original defendant was the Honorable
Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was
subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners.1 The complaint2was instituted as a
taxpayers' class suit3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines,
taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the
country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned
about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all
before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn."4Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:

. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;

(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements.

and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises."5

The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has a
land area of thirty million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in
which varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be found; these rainforests contain a genetic,
biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of indigenous Philippine
cultures which have existed, endured and flourished since time immemorial; scientific evidence reveals
that in order to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology, the country's land area should be utilized on
the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural,
residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and disturbance of this balance as a
consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies, such as (a) water
shortages resulting from drying up of the water table, otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well as of
rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization of the water table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt
water, incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the island of Cebu and the Municipality of
Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural productivity,
with the volume of soil eroded estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum
approximately the size of the entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the
country's unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation of cultural
communities, including the disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers
and seabeds and consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a critical reduction
in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is presently experienced by the entire
country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds which result from the absence of windbreakers, (i) the
floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains arising from the absence of the absorbent mechanism of
forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and operated
for the purpose of supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of electric power, and
(k) the reduction of the earth's capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and
catastrophic climatic changes such as the phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as the
"greenhouse effect."

Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation
are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial
notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present expert witnesses as well as
documentary, photographic and film evidence in the course of the trial.

As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:

CAUSE OF ACTION

7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.

8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million hectares of rainforests
constituting roughly 53% of the country's land mass.

9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2 million hectares of said
rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the country's land area.

10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth rainforests are left,
barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of the Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of
immature and uneconomical secondary growth forests.

11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have granted timber license agreements
('TLA's') to various corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for commercial logging
purposes.

A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto attached as Annex "A".

12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or 25 hectares per hour
nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included the Philippines will be bereft of forest resources
after the end of this ensuing decade, if not earlier.
13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable damage of this continued
trend of deforestation to the plaintiff minor's generation and to generations yet unborn are evident and
incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the environmental damages enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are
already being felt, experienced and suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.

14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forest stands
will work great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs especially plaintiff minors and their
successors who may never see, use, benefit from and enjoy this rare and unique natural resource
treasure.

This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource property
he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.

15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to
protection by the State in its capacity as the parens patriae.

16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's office. On March 2, 1990,
plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the country.

A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex "B".

17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to the continuing serious damage
and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.

18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act violative of the rights of
plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may be left with a country that is desertified (sic), bare, barren
and devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous cultures which the Philippines had been
abundantly blessed with.

19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary to the public policy
enunciated in the Philippine Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part, states that it is the policy of
the State

(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in
productive and enjoyable harmony with each other;

(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos
and;

(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conductive to a life of dignity and well-
being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977)

20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is contradictory to
the Constitutional policy of the State to

a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth" and "make full and efficient
use of natural resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);

b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);

c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic)" (Section 14, Article XIV, id.);

d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the
rhythm and harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article II, id.)

21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind the natural law and violative
of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation.

22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the instant action to arrest the
unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth. 6

On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint
based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue
raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive
branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1)
the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action
presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.

On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss.7 In
the said order, not only was the defendant's claim that the complaint states no cause of action against
him and that it raises a political question sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that the
granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the
fundamental law of the land.

Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court
and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge
gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only
represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case.8

On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their
respective Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the
respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.

Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains
sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the
Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987
Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of
generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and
self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative
obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment.

It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in
granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available involves
a judicial question.

Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners
maintain that the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit
that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they may still be
revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.

On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific
legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing
in the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations concerning an "environmental right" which
supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in its capacity as parens patriae." Such
allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of action. They then reiterate the theory that
the question of whether logging should be permitted in the country is a political question which should
be properly addressed to the executive or legislative branches of Government. They therefore assert that
the petitioners' resources is not to file an action to court, but to lobby before Congress for the passage of
a bill that would ban logging totally.

As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be done by the
State without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time
usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor cancelled
unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms of the
agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs
indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative of the requirements of due
process.

Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners instituted Civil Case
No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original defendant and the present respondents did not take issue with this
matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of
the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines.
Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to
bring all of them before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and
representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites
for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in
the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves,
for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue
in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as
hereinafter expounded, considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety.9 Such rhythm and
harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other
natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible
to the present as well as future generations. 10 Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to
the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology.
Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same
time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to
come.

The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the merits of the
petition.

After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and evaluation of the
issues raised and arguments adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners and
rule against the respondent Judge's challenged order for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the said order reads as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot help but agree with the
defendant. For although we believe that plaintiffs have but the noblest of all intentions, it (sic) fell short
of alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a specific legal right they are seeking to enforce and protect, or a
specific legal wrong they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the Court
notes that the Complaint is replete with vague assumptions and vague conclusions based on unverified
data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in its Complaint against the herein defendant.

Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed with political color and
involving a matter of public policy, may not be taken cognizance of by this Court without doing violence
to the sacred principle of "Separation of Powers" of the three (3) co-equal branches of the Government.

The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the
reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and
to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the
fundamental law. 11

We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient
definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is
replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. A reading of the complaint
itself belies these conclusions.

The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the
fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:

Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology
in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same article:

Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them.

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and
State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the
civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights
altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation aptly and fittingly
stressed by the petitioners the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments
and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for
they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the
fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a
balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself,
thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to
preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would
be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come generations which stand to
inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing
the environment. During the debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, the following exchange transpired between Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and
Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section in question:

MR. VILLACORTA:

Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all forms of pollution air, water and
noise pollution?

MR. AZCUNA:

Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment necessarily carries with it the correlative
duty of not impairing the same and, therefore, sanctions may be provided for impairment of
environmental balance. 12

The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the
country's forests.

Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversiby disrupted.

Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as well
as the other related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and
utilization of the country's natural resources, 13 then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June
1987 E.O. No. 192, 14Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources "shall be the primary government agency responsible for the conservation,
management, development and proper use of the country's environment and natural resources,
specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including those in reservation and watershed
areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as
may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the
welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following
statement of policy:

Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure the sustainable use,
development, management, renewal, and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, off-shore
areas and other natural resources, including the protection and enhancement of the quality of the
environment, and equitable access of the different segments of the population to the development and
the use of the country's natural resources, not only for the present generation but for future generations
as well. It is also the policy of the state to recognize and apply a true value system including social and
environmental cost implications relative to their utilization, development and conservation of our natural
resources.

This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of
1987,15specifically in Section 1 thereof which reads:

Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino people, the full
exploration and development as well as the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other
natural resources, consistent with the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting
and enhancing the quality of the environment and the objective of making the exploration, development
and utilization of such natural resources equitably accessible to the different segments of the present as
well as future generations.

(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into account social and
environmental cost implications relative to the utilization, development and conservation of our natural
resources.
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and
enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically
speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular reference to the fact of the agency's
being subject to law and higher authority. Said section provides:

Sec. 2. Mandate. (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall be primarily
responsible for the implementation of the foregoing policy.

(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the State's constitutional
mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization, and conservation of the
country's natural resources.

Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the
bases for policy formulation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.

It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes
already paid special attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6
June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment
Code) were issued. The former "declared a continuing policy of the State (a) to create, develop, maintain
and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony
with each other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future
generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conducive to
a life of dignity and well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each generation as
trustee and guardian of the environment for succeeding generations." 17The latter statute, on the other
hand, gave flesh to the said policy.

Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as
clear as the DENR's duty under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No.
192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and advance the said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to respect or
protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which
they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful
ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.

A cause of action is defined as:

. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its essential
elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the
defendant in violation of said legal right. 18

It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to
state a cause of action, 19 the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the
facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth of
falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted.
The only issue to be resolved in such a case is: admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the court
render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint? 20 In Militante vs.
Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost care and
circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof [cause of action]
lest, by its failure to manifest a correct appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically
admitted, what the law grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the
legal order. The law itself stands in disrepute."

After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the introductory
affirmative allegations, as well as the specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be
adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights. On the basis thereof, they
may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that insofar as
the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees
thereof for they are indispensable parties.

The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question. Policy formulation or
determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What
is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in
legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer, the
insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects
executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article
VIII of the Constitution states that:

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government.

Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a
distinguished member of this Court, says:

The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving the settlement
of conflicting rights as conferred as law. The second part of the authority represents a broadening of
judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the
discretion of the political departments of the government.

As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule
upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid
for lack or excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is
the meaning of "grave abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or contract
according to the disposition of the judiciary.

In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:

In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason
is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would
still not be precluded from revolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now
covers, in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly
provides: . . .

The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment of contracts
clause found in the Constitution. The court a quo declared that:

The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the
reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and
to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the
fundamental law. 24

We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a sweeping
pronouncement. In the first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in
his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he would have acted with utmost
infidelity to the Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber
license holders because he would have forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses
according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest
and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber license must
be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:

. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify, replace or
rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein . . .

Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract,
property or a property right protested by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of
Forestry, 25 this Court held:

. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest
resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview
of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever
dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case.

A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract
between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted;
neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168).
Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property
or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary: 26

. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State
regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted.
And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified
entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area
and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the
Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the
purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as
amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].

Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:

Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 27

cannot be invoked.

In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not
involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber
licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that
a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be
stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose,
such as law could have only been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose
of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and
enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:

The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be absolute. The same is
understood to be subject to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of public health,
moral, safety and welfare. In other words, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations
of contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public health,
safety, moral and general welfare.

The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted in Philippine American Life
Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General,30 to wit:

Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are normally matters of
private and not of public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of governmental interference.
But neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may
at will use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them
harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate it in the common interest.

In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. 31

Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply with
respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing
or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as of yet existed
in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of
right.

WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged
Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The
petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the
questioned timber license agreements.

No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 110120 March 16, 1994

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, vs. COURT OF APPEALS.

ROMERO, J.:

The clash between the responsibility of the City Government of Caloocan to dispose off the 350 tons
of garbage it collects daily and the growing concern and sensitivity to a pollution-free environment of
the residents of Barangay Camarin, Tala Estate, Caloocan City where these tons of garbage are
dumped every day is the hub of this controversy elevated by the protagonists to the Laguna Lake
Development Authority (LLDA) for adjudication.

The instant case stemmed from an earlier petition filed with this Court by Laguna Lake Development
Authority (LLDA for short) docketed as G.R.
No. 107542 against the City Government of Caloocan, et al. In the Resolution of November 10, 1992,
this Court referred G.R. No. 107542 to the Court of Appeals for appropriate disposition. Docketed
therein as CA-G.R. SP
No. 29449, the Court of Appeals, in a decision1 promulgated on January 29, 1993 ruled that the LLDA
has no power and authority to issue a cease and desist order enjoining the dumping of garbage in
Barangay Camarin, Tala Estate, Caloocan City. The LLDA now seeks, in this petition, a review of the
decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts, as disclosed in the records, are undisputed.

On March 8, 1991, the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish, Barangay
Camarin, Caloocan City, filed a letter-complaint2 with the Laguna Lake Development Authority seeking
to stop the operation of the 8.6-hectare open garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin,
Caloocan City due to its harmful effects on the health of the residents and the possibility of pollution
of the water content of the surrounding area.

On November 15, 1991, the LLDA conducted an on-site investigation, monitoring and test sampling
of the leachate3 that seeps from said dumpsite to the nearby creek which is a tributary of the Marilao
River. The LLDA Legal and Technical personnel found that the City Government of Caloocan was
maintaining an open dumpsite at the Camarin area without first securing an Environmental Compliance
Certificate (ECC) from the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, as required under Presidential Decree No. 1586,4 and clearance
from LLDA as required under Republic Act No. 4850,5 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 813
and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983.6

After a public hearing conducted on December 4, 1991, the LLDA, acting on the complaint of Task
Force Camarin Dumpsite, found that the water collected from the leachate and the receiving streams
could considerably affect the quality, in turn, of the receiving waters since it indicates the presence of
bacteria, other than coliform, which may have contaminated the sample during collection or
handling.7 On December 5, 1991, the LLDA issued a Cease and Desist Order8 ordering the City
Government of Caloocan, Metropolitan Manila Authority, their contractors, and other entities, to
completely halt, stop and desist from dumping any form or kind of garbage and other waste matter at
the Camarin dumpsite.

The dumping operation was forthwith stopped by the City Government of Caloocan. However,
sometime in August 1992 the dumping operation was resumed after a meeting held in July 1992
among the City Government of Caloocan, the representatives of Task Force Camarin Dumpsite and
LLDA at the Office of Environmental Management Bureau Director Rodrigo U. Fuentes failed to settle
the problem.

After an investigation by its team of legal and technical personnel on August 14, 1992, the LLDA issued
another order reiterating the December 5, 1991, order and issued an Alias Cease and Desist Order
enjoining the City Government of Caloocan from continuing its dumping operations at the Camarin
area.

On September 25, 1992, the LLDA, with the assistance of the Philippine National Police, enforced its
Alias Cease and Desist Order by prohibiting the entry of all garbage dump trucks into the Tala Estate,
Camarin area being utilized as a dumpsite.

Pending resolution of its motion for reconsideration earlier filed on September 17, 1992 with the LLDA,
the City Government of Caloocan filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an action for the
declaration of nullity of the cease and desist order with prayer for the issuance of writ of injunction,
docketed as Civil Case No. C-15598. In its complaint, the City Government of Caloocan sought to be
declared as the sole authority empowered to promote the health and safety and enhance the right of
the people in Caloocan City to a balanced ecology within its territorial jurisdiction.9

On September 25, 1992, the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining the LLDA from enforcing its cease and desist order.
Subsequently, the case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 126 of Caloocan which, at the
time, was presided over by Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 127, the
pairing judge of the recently-retired presiding judge.

The LLDA, for its part, filed on October 2, 1992 a motion to dismiss on the ground, among others, that
under Republic Act No. 3931, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 984, otherwise known as the
Pollution Control Law, the cease and desist order issued by it which is the subject matter of the
complaint is reviewable both upon the law and the facts of the case by the Court of Appeals and not
by the Regional Trial Court. 10

On October 12, 1992 Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio issued an order consolidating Civil Case No. C-15598
with Civil Case No. C-15580, an earlier case filed by the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite entitled "Fr.
John Moran, et al. vs. Hon. Macario Asistio." The LLDA, however, maintained during the trial that the
foregoing cases, being independent of each other, should have been treated separately.

On October 16, 1992, Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio, after hearing the motion to dismiss, issued in the
consolidated cases an order11 denying LLDA's motion to dismiss and granting the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining the LLDA, its agent and all persons acting for and on its behalf, from
enforcing or implementing its cease and desist order which prevents plaintiff City of Caloocan from
dumping garbage at the Camarin dumpsite during the pendency of this case and/or until further orders
of the court.

On November 5, 1992, the LLDA filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with prayer for
restraining order with the Supreme Court, docketed as G.R. No. 107542, seeking to nullify the
aforesaid order dated October 16, 1992 issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 127 of Caloocan
City denying its motion to dismiss.

The Court, acting on the petition, issued a Resolution12 on November 10, 1992 referring the case to
the Court of Appeals for proper disposition and at the same time, without giving due course to the
petition, required the respondents to comment on the petition and file the same with the Court of
Appeals within ten (10) days from notice. In the meantime, the Court issued a temporary restraining
order, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from it, ordering the respondents: (1)
Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 127, Caloocan City to cease
and desist from exercising jurisdiction over the case for declaration of nullity of the cease and desist
order issued by the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA); and (2) City Mayor of Caloocan
and/or the City Government of Caloocan to cease and desist from dumping its garbage at the Tala
Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City.

Respondents City Government of Caloocan and Mayor Macario A. Asistio, Jr. filed on November 12,
1992 a motion for reconsideration and/or to quash/recall the temporary restraining order and an urgent
motion for reconsideration alleging that ". . . in view of the calamitous situation that would arise if the
respondent city government fails to collect 350 tons of garbage daily for lack of dumpsite (i)t is
therefore, imperative that the issue be resolved with dispatch or with sufficient leeway to allow the
respondents to find alternative solutions to this garbage problem."

On November 17, 1992, the Court issued a Resolution13 directing the Court of Appeals to immediately
set the case for hearing for the purpose of determining whether or not the temporary restraining order
issued by the Court should be lifted and what conditions, if any, may be required if it is to be so lifted
or whether the restraining order should be maintained or converted into a preliminary injunction.

The Court of Appeals set the case for hearing on November 27, 1992, at 10:00 in the morning at the
Hearing Room, 3rd Floor, New Building, Court of Appeals.14 After the oral argument, a conference was
set on December 8, 1992 at 10:00 o'clock in the morning where the Mayor of Caloocan City, the
General Manager of LLDA, the Secretary of DENR or his duly authorized representative and the
Secretary of DILG or his duly authorized representative were required to appear.

It was agreed at the conference that the LLDA had until December 15, 1992 to finish its study and
review of respondent's technical plan with respect to the dumping of its garbage and in the event of a
rejection of respondent's technical plan or a failure of settlement, the parties will submit within 10 days
from notice their respective memoranda on the merits of the case, after which the petition shall be
deemed submitted for resolution.15 Notwithstanding such efforts, the parties failed to settle the dispute.

On April 30, 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision holding that: (1) the Regional Trial
Court has no jurisdiction on appeal to try, hear and decide the action for annulment of LLDA's cease
and desist order, including the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction in
relation thereto, since appeal therefrom is within the exclusive and appellate jurisdiction of the Court
of Appeals under Section 9, par. (3), of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129; and (2) the Laguna Lake
Development Authority has no power and authority to issue a cease and desist order under its enabling
law, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order
No. 927, series of 1983.

The Court of Appeals thus dismissed Civil Case No. 15598 and the preliminary injunction issued in
the said case was set aside; the cease and desist order of LLDA was likewise set aside and the
temporary restraining order enjoining the City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City Government of
Caloocan to cease and desist from dumping its garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin,
Caloocan City was lifted, subject, however, to the condition that any future dumping of garbage in said
area, shall be in conformity with the procedure and protective works contained in the proposal attached
to the records of this case and found on pages 152-160 of the Rollo, which was thereby adopted by
reference and made an integral part of the decision, until the corresponding restraining and/or
injunctive relief is granted by the proper Court upon LLDA's institution of the necessary legal
proceedings.

Hence, the Laguna Lake Development Authority filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, now
docketed as G.R. No. 110120, with prayer that the temporary restraining order lifted by the Court of
Appeals be re-issued until after final determination by this Court of the issue on the proper
interpretation of the powers and authority of the LLDA under its enabling law.

On July, 19, 1993, the Court issued a temporary restraining order16 enjoining the City Mayor of
Caloocan and/or the City Government of Caloocan to cease and desist from dumping its garbage at
the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, effective as of this date and containing until
otherwise ordered by the Court.

It is significant to note that while both parties in this case agree on the need to protect the environment
and to maintain the ecological balance of the surrounding areas of the Camarin open dumpsite, the
question as to which agency can lawfully exercise jurisdiction over the matter remains highly open to
question.

The City Government of Caloocan claims that it is within its power, as a local government unit, pursuant
to the general welfare provision of the Local Government Code, 17 to determine the effects of the
operation of the dumpsite on the ecological balance and to see that such balance is maintained. On
the basis of said contention, it questioned, from the inception of the dispute before the Regional Trial
Court of Caloocan City, the power and authority of the LLDA to issue a cease and desist order
enjoining the dumping of garbage in the Barangay Camarin over which the City Government of
Caloocan has territorial jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeals sustained the position of the City of Caloocan on the theory that Section 7 of
Presidential Decree No. 984, otherwise known as the Pollution Control law, authorizing the defunct
National Pollution Control Commission to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order was not
incorporated in Presidential Decree No. 813 nor in Executive Order No. 927, series of
1983. The Court of Appeals ruled that under Section 4, par. (d), of Republic Act No. 4850, as amended,
the LLDA is instead required "to institute the necessary legal proceeding against any person who shall
commence to implement or continue implementation of any project, plan or program within the Laguna
de Bay region without previous clearance from the Authority."

The LLDA now assails, in this partition for review, the abovementioned ruling of the Court of Appeals,
contending that, as an administrative agency which was granted regulatory and adjudicatory powers
and functions by Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws, Presidential Decree No. 813 and
Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, it is invested with the power and authority to issue a cease
and desist order pursuant to Section 4 par. (c), (d), (e), (f) and (g) of Executive Order No. 927 series
of 1983 which provides, thus:

Sec. 4. Additional Powers and Functions. The authority shall have the following powers
and functions:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) Issue orders or decisions to compel compliance with the provisions of this Executive
Order and its implementing rules and regulations only after proper notice and hearing.

(d) Make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution specifying the
conditions and the time within which such discontinuance must be accomplished.

(e) Issue, renew, or deny permits, under such conditions as it may determine to be
reasonable, for the prevention and abatement of pollution, for the discharge of sewage,
industrial waste, or for the installation or operation of sewage works and industrial
disposal system or parts thereof.

(f) After due notice and hearing, the Authority may also revoke, suspend or modify any
permit issued under this Order whenever the same is necessary to prevent or abate
pollution.

(g) Deputize in writing or request assistance of appropriate government agencies or

instrumentalities for the purpose of enforcing this Executive Order and its implementing
rules and regulations and the orders and decisions of the Authority.

The LLDA claims that the appellate court deliberately suppressed and totally disregarded the above
provisions of Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, which granted administrative quasi-judicial
functions to LLDA on pollution abatement cases.
In light of the relevant environmental protection laws cited which are applicable in this case, and the
corresponding overlapping jurisdiction of government agencies implementing these laws, the
resolution of the issue of whether or not the LLDA has the authority and power to issue an order which,
in its nature and effect was injunctive, necessarily requires a determination of the threshold question:
Does the Laguna Lake Development Authority, under its Charter and its amendatory laws, have the
authority to entertain the complaint against the dumping of garbage in the open dumpsite in Barangay
Camarin authorized by the City Government of Caloocan which is allegedly endangering the health,
safety, and welfare of the residents therein and the sanitation and quality of the water in the area
brought about by exposure to pollution caused by such open garbage dumpsite?

The matter of determining whether there is such pollution of the environment that requires control, if
not prohibition, of the operation of a business establishment is essentially addressed to the
Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR which, by virtue of Section 16 of Executive
Order No. 192, series of 1987,18 has assumed the powers and functions of the defunct National
Pollution Control Commission created under Republic Act No. 3931. Under said Executive Order, a
Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) under the Office of the DENR Secretary now assumes the powers
and functions of the National Pollution Control Commission with respect to adjudication of pollution
cases. 19

As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication
Board (PAB), except in cases where the special law provides for another forum. It must be recognized
in this regard that the LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency, is specifically mandated under
Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws to carry out and make effective the declared national
policy20 of promoting and accelerating the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area
and the surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay,
Quezon and Caloocan21 with due regard and adequate provisions for environmental management and
control, preservation of the quality of human life and ecological systems, and the prevention of undue
ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution. Under such a broad grant and power and
authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its special charter, obviously has the responsibility to protect the
inhabitants of the Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from the
discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas. In carrying out the aforementioned declared policy,
the LLDA is mandated, among others, to pass upon and approve or disapprove all plans, programs,
and projects proposed by local government offices/agencies within the region, public corporations,
and private persons or enterprises where such plans, programs and/or projects are related to those of
the LLDA for the development of the region. 22

In the instant case, when the complainant Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes
Parish, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, filed its letter-complaint before the LLDA, the latter's
jurisdiction under its charter was validly invoked by complainant on the basis of its allegation that the
open dumpsite project of the City Government of Caloocan in Barangay Camarin was undertaken
without a clearance from the LLDA, as required under Section 4, par. (d), of Republic Act. No. 4850,
as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927. While there is also an allegation that the
said project was without an Environmental Compliance Certificate from the Environmental
Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR, the primary jurisdiction of the LLDA over this case was
recognized by the Environmental Management Bureau of the DENR when the latter acted as
intermediary at the meeting among the representatives of the City Government of Caloocan, Task
Force Camarin Dumpsite and LLDA sometime in July 1992 to discuss the possibility of
re-opening the open dumpsite.

Having thus resolved the threshold question, the inquiry then narrows down to the following issue:
Does the LLDA have the power and authority to issue a "cease and desist" order under Republic Act
No. 4850 and its amendatory laws, on the basis of the facts presented in this case, enjoining the
dumping of garbage in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City.

The irresistible answer is in the affirmative.

The cease and desist order issued by the LLDA requiring the City Government of Caloocan to stop
dumping its garbage in the Camarin open dumpsite found by the LLDA to have been done in violation
of Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, and other relevant environment laws,23 cannot be stamped as
an unauthorized exercise by the LLDA of injunctive powers. By its express terms, Republic Act No.
4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, authorizes the LLDA
to "make, alter or modify order requiring the discontinuance or pollution."24 (Emphasis supplied)
Section 4, par. (d) explicitly authorizes the LLDA to makewhatever order may be necessary in the
exercise of its jurisdiction.

To be sure, the LLDA was not expressly conferred the power "to issue and ex-parte cease and desist
order" in a language, as suggested by the City Government of Caloocan, similar to the express grant
to the defunct National Pollution Control Commission under Section 7 of P.D. No. 984 which,
admittedly was not reproduced in P.D. No. 813 and E.O. No. 927, series of 1983. However, it would
be a mistake to draw therefrom the conclusion that there is a denial of the power to issue the order in
question when the power "to make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution" is
expressly and clearly bestowed upon the LLDA by Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983.
Assuming arguendo that the authority to issue a "cease and desist order" were not expressly conferred
by law, there is jurisprudence enough to the effect that the rule granting such authority need not
necessarily be express.25While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such
powers as are expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise a settled rule that an administrative agency
has also such powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers.26 In the exercise,
therefore, of its express powers under its charter as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect
to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region, the authority of the LLDA to issue a "cease and desist
order" is, perforce, implied. Otherwise, it may well be reduced to a "toothless" paper agency.

In this connection, it must be noted that in Pollution Adjudication Board v. Court of Appeals, et al.,27 the
Court ruled that the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) has the power to issue an ex-parte cease and
desist order when there is prima facie evidence of an establishment exceeding the allowable
standards set by the anti-pollution laws of the country. The ponente, Associate Justice Florentino P.
Feliciano, declared:

Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations
like that here presented precisely because stopping the continuous discharge of
pollutive and untreated effluents into the rivers and other inland waters of the
Philippines cannot be made to wait until protracted litigation over the ultimate
correctness or propriety of such orders has run its full course, including multiple and
sequential appeals such as those which Solar has taken, which of course may take
several years. The relevant pollution control statute and implementing regulations
were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power to
protect the safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the
protection of plant and animal life, commonly designated as the police power. It is a
constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process
yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests like those here involved,
through the exercise of police power. . . .

The immediate response to the demands of "the necessities of protecting vital public interests" gives
vitality to the statement on ecology embodied in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies or the
1987 Constitution. Article II, Section 16 which provides:

The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

As a constitutionally guaranteed right of every person, it carries the correlative duty of non-impairment.
This is but in consonance with the declared policy of the state "to protect and promote the right to
health of the people and instill health consciousness among them."28 It is to be borne in mind that the
Philippines is party to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Alma Conference
Declaration of 1978 which recognize health as a fundamental human right. 29

The issuance, therefore, of the cease and desist order by the LLDA, as a practical matter of procedure
under the circumstances of the case, is a proper exercise of its power and authority under its charter
and its amendatory laws. Had the cease and desist order issued by the LLDA been complied with by
the City Government of Caloocan as it did in the first instance, no further legal steps would have been
necessary.

The charter of LLDA, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, instead of conferring upon the LLDA the
means of directly enforcing such orders, has provided under its Section 4 (d) the power to institute
"necessary legal proceeding against any person who shall commence to implement or continue
implementation of any project, plan or program within the Laguna de Bay region without previous
clearance from the LLDA."

Clearly, said provision was designed to invest the LLDA with sufficiently broad powers in the regulation
of all projects initiated in the Laguna Lake region, whether by the government or the private sector,
insofar as the implementation of these projects is concerned. It was meant to deal with cases which
might possibly arise where decisions or orders issued pursuant to the exercise of such broad powers
may not be obeyed, resulting in the thwarting of its laudabe objective. To meet such contingencies,
then the writs of mandamus and injunction which are beyond the power of the LLDA to issue, may be
sought from the proper courts.

Insofar as the implementation of relevant anti-pollution laws in the Laguna Lake region and its
surrounding provinces, cities and towns are concerned, the Court will not dwell further on the related
issues raised which are more appropriately addressed to an administrative agency with the special
knowledge and expertise of the LLDA.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court on July
19, 1993 enjoining the City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City Government of Caloocan from dumping
their garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City is hereby made permanent.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 92024 November 9, 1990
GARCIA vs. THE BOARD OF INVESTMENTS,

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition to annul and set aside the decision of the Board of Investments (BOI)/Department of
Trade and Industry (DTI) approving the transfer of the site of the proposed petrochemical plant from
Bataan to Batangas and the shift of feedstock for that plant from naphtha only to naphtha and/or
liquefied petroleum gas (LPG).

This petition is a sequel to the petition in G.R. No. 88637 entitled "Congressman Enrique T. Garcia v.
the Board of Investments", September 7, 1989, where this Court issued a decision, ordering the BOI
as follows:

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. The Board of Investments is ordered: (1) to publish
the amended application for registration of the Bataan Petrochemical Corporation, (2) to allow the
petitioner to have access to its records on the original and amended applications for registration, as a
petrochemical manufacturer, of the respondent Bataan Petrochemical Corporation, excluding,
however, privileged papers containing its trade secrets and other business and financial information,
and (3) to set for hearing the petitioner's opposition to the amended application in order that he may
present at such hearing all the evidence in his possession in support of his opposition to the transfer
of the site of the BPC petrochemical plant to Batangas province. The hearing shall not exceed a period
of ten (10) days from the date fixed by the BOI, notice of which should be served by personal service
to the petitioner through counsel, at least three (3) days in advance. The hearings may be held from
day to day for a period of ten (10) days without postponements. The petition for a writ of prohibition or
preliminary injunction is denied. No costs. (Rollo, pages 450-451)

However, acting on the petitioner's motion for partial reconsideration asking that we rule on the import
of P.D. Nos. 949 and 1803 and on the foreign investor's claim of right of final choice of plant site, in
the light of the provisions of the Constitution and the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987, this Court
on October 24, 1989, made the observation that P.D. Nos. 949 and 1803 "do not provide that the
Limay site should be the only petrochemical zone in the country, nor prohibit the establishment of a
petrochemical plant elsewhere in the country, that the establishment of a petrochemical plant in
Batangas does not violate P.D. No. 949 and P.D. No. 1803.

Our resolution skirted the issue of whether the investor given the initial inducements and other
circumstances surrounding its first choice of plant site may change it simply because it has the final
choice on the matter. The Court merely ruled that the petitioner appears to have lost interest in the
case by his failure to appear at the hearing that was set by the BOI after receipt of the decision, so he
may be deemed to have waived the fruit of the judgment. On this ground, the motion for partial
reconsideration was denied.

A motion for reconsideration of said resolution was filed by the petitioner asking that we resolve the
basic issue of whether or not the foreign investor has the right of final choice of plant site; that the non-
attendance of the petitioner at the hearing was because the decision was not yet final and executory;
and that the petitioner had not therefor waived the right to a hearing before the BOI.

In the Court's resolution dated January 17, 1990, we stated:

Does the investor have a "right of final choice" of plant site? Neither under the 1987 Constitution nor
in the Omnibus Investments Code is there such a 'right of final choice.' In the first place, the investor's
choice is subject to processing and approval or disapproval by the BOI (Art. 7, Chapter II, Omnibus
Investments Code). By submitting its application and amended application to the BOI for approval, the
investor recognizes the sovereign prerogative of our Government, through the BOI, to approve or
disapprove the same after determining whether its proposed project will be feasible, desirable and
beneficial to our country. By asking that his opposition to the LPC's amended application be heard by
the BOI, the petitioner likewise acknowledges that the BOI, not the investor, has the last word or the
"final choice" on the matter.

Secondly, as this case has shown, even a choice that had been approved by the BOI may not be
'final', for supervening circumstances and changes in the conditions of a place may dictate a
corresponding change in the choice of plant site in order that the project will not fail. After all, our
country will benefit only when a project succeeds, not when it fails. (Rollo, pp. 538-539)

Nevertheless, the motion for reconsideration of the petitioner was denied.

A minority composed of Justices Melencio-Herrera, Gancayco, Sarmiento and this ponente voted to
grant the motion for reconsideration stating that the hearing set by the BOI was premature as the
decision of the Court was not yet final and executory; that as contended by the petitioner the Court
must first rule on whether or not the investor has the right of final choice of plant site for if the ruling is
in the affirmative, the hearing would be a useless exercise; that in the October 19, 1989 resolution,
the Court while upholding validity of the transfer of the plant site did not rule on the issue of who has
the final choice; that they agree with the observation of the majority that "the investor has no final
choice either under the 1987 Constitution or in the Omnibus Investments Code and that it is the BOI
who decides for the government" and that the plea of the petitioner should be granted to give him the
chance to show the justness of his claim and to enable the BOI to give a second hard look at the
matter.

Thus, the herein petition which relies on the ruling of the Court in the resolution of January 17, 1990
in G.R. No. 88637 that the investor has no right of final choice under the 1987 Constitution and the
Omnibus Investments Code.

Under P.D. No. 1803 dated January 16, 1981, 576 hectares of the public domain located in Lamao,
Limay, Bataan were reserved for the Petrochemical Industrial Zone under the administration,
management, and ownership of the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC).

The Bataan Refining Corporation (BRC) is a wholly government owned corporation, located at Bataan.
It produces 60% of the national output of naphtha.

Taiwanese investors in a petrochemical project formed the Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC)
and applied with BOI for registration as a new domestic producer of petrochemicals. Its application
specified Bataan as the plant site. One of the terms and conditions for registration of the project was
the use of "naphtha cracker" and "naphtha" as feedstock or fuel for its petrochemical plant. The
petrochemical plant was to be a joint venture with PNOC. BPC was issued a certificate of registration
on February 24, 1988 by BOI.

BPC was given pioneer status and accorded fiscal and other incentives by BOI, like: (1) exemption
from taxes on raw materials, (2) repatriation of the entire proceeds of liquidation investments in
currency originally made and at the exchange rate obtaining at the time of repatriation; and (3)
remittance of earnings on investments. As additional incentive, the House of Representatives
approved a bill introduced by the petitioner eliminating the 48% ad valorem tax on naphtha if and when
it is used as raw materials in the petrochemical plant. (G.R. No. 88637, September 7, 1989, pp. 2-3.
Rollo, pp. 441-442)

However, in February, 1989, A.T. Chong, chairman of USI Far East Corporation, the major investor in
BPC, personally delivered to Trade Secretary Jose Concepcion a letter dated January 25, 1989
advising him of BPC's desire to amend the original registration certification of its project by changing
the job site from Limay, Bataan, to Batangas. The reason adduced for the transfer was the insurgency
and unstable labor situation, and the presence in Batangas of a huge liquefied petroleum gas (LPG)
depot owned by the Philippine Shell Corporation.

The petitioner vigorously opposed the proposal and no less than President Aquino expressed her
preference that the plant be established in Bataan in a conference with the Taiwanese investors, the
Secretary of National Defense and The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces.

Despite speeches in the Senate and House opposing the Transfer of the project to Batangas, BPC
filed on April 11, 1989 its request for approval of the amendments. Its application is as follows: "(l)
increasing the investment amount from US $220 million to US $320 million; (2) increasing the
production capacity of its naphtha cracker, polythylene plant and polypropylene plant; (3) changing
the feedstock from naphtha only to "naphtha and/or liquefied petroleum gas;" and (4) transferring the
job site from Limay, Bataan, to Batangas. (Annex B to Petition; Rollo, p. 25)

Notwithstanding opposition from any quarters and the request of the petitioner addressed to Secretary
Concepcion to be furnished a copy of the proposed amendment with its attachments which was denied
by the BOI on May 25, 1989, BOI approved the revision of the registration of BPC's petrochemical
project. (Petition, Annex F; Rollo, p. 32; See pp. 4 to 6, Decision in G.R. No. 88637; supra.)

BOI Vice-Chairman Tomas I. Alcantara testifying before the Committee on Ways and Means of the
Senate asserted that:

The BOI has taken a public position preferring Bataan over Batangas as the site of the petrochemical
complex, as this would provide a better distribution of industries around the Metro Manila area. ... In
advocating the choice of Bataan as the project site for the petrochemical complex, the BOI, however,
made it clear, and I would like to repeat this that the BOI made it clear in its view that the BOI or the
government for that matter could only recomend as to where the project should be located. The BOI
recognizes and respect the principle that the final chouce is still with the proponent who would in the
final analysis provide the funding or risk capital for the project. (Petition, P. 13; Annex D to the petition)

This position has not been denied by BOI in its pleadings in G.R. No. 88637 and in the present petition.

Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.

There is before us an actual controversy whether the petrochemical plant should remain in Bataan or
should be transferred to Batangas, and whether its feedstock originally of naphtha only should be
changed to naphtha and/or liquefied petroleum gas as the approved amended application of the BPC,
now Luzon Petrochemical Corporation (LPC), shows. And in the light of the categorical admission of
the BOI that it is the investor who has the final choice of the site and the decision on the feedstock,
whether or not it constitutes a grave abuse of discretion for the BOI to yield to the wishes of the
investor, national interest notwithstanding.

We rule that the Court has a constitutional duty to step into this controversy and determine the
paramount issue. We grant the petition.

First, Bataan was the original choice as the plant site of the BOI to which the BPC agreed. That is why
it organized itself into a corporation bearing the name Bataan. There is available 576 hectares of public
land precisely reserved as the petrochemical zone in Limay, Bataan under P.D. No. 1803. There is no
need to buy expensive real estate for the site unlike in the proposed transfer to Batangas. The site is
the result of careful study long before any covetous interests intruded into the choice. The site is ideal.
It is not unduly constricted and allows for expansion. The respondents have not shown nor reiterated
that the alleged peace and order situation in Bataan or unstable labor situation warrant a transfer of
the plant site to Batangas. Certainly, these were taken into account when the firm named
itself Bataan Petrochemical Corporation. Moreover, the evidence proves the contrary.

Second, the BRC, a government owned Filipino corporation, located in Bataan produces 60% of the
national output of naphtha which can be used as feedstock for the plant in Bataan. It can provide the
feedstock requirement of the plant. On the other hand, the country is short of LPG and there is need
to import the same for use of the plant in Batangas. The local production thereof by Shell can hardly
supply the needs of the consumers for cooking purposes. Scarce dollars will be diverted,
unnecessarily, from vitally essential projects in order to feed the furnaces of the transferred
petrochemical plant.

Third, naphtha as feedstock has been exempted by law from the ad valorem tax by the approval of
Republic Act No. 6767 by President Aquino but excluding LPG from exemption from ad valorem tax.
The law was enacted specifically for the petrochemical industry. The policy determination by both
Congress and the President is clear. Neither BOI nor a foreign investor should disregard or contravene
expressed policy by shifting the feedstock from naphtha to LPG.

Fourth, under Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, it is the duty of the State to "regulate
and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction and in accordance with
its national goals and priorities." The development of a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos is mandated in Section 19, Article II of the Constitution.

In Article 2 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 "the sound development of the national economy
in consonance with the principles and objectives of economic nationalism" is the set goal of
government.

Fifth, with the admitted fact that the investor is raising the greater portion of the capital for the project
from local sources by way of loan which led to the so-called "petroscam scandal", the capital
requirements would be greatly minimized if LPC does not have to buy the land for the project and its
feedstock shall be limited to naphtha which is certainly more economical, more readily available than
LPG, and does not have to be imported.

Sixth, if the plant site is maintained in Bataan, the PNOC shall be a partner in the venture to the great
benefit and advantage of the government which shall have a participation in the management of the
project instead of a firm which is a huge multinational corporation.

In the light of all the clear advantages manifest in the plant's remaining in Bataan, practically nothing
is shown to justify the transfer to Batangas except a near-absolute discretion given by BOI to investors
not only to freely choose the site but to transfer it from their own first choice for reasons which remain
murky to say the least.

And this brings us to a prime consideration which the Court cannot rightly ignore.

Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution provides that:

xxx xxx xxx

The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound agricultural
development and agrarian reform, through industries that make full and efficient use of human and
natural resources, and which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets. However, the
State shall protect Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices.

xxx xxx xxx

Every provision of the Constitution on the national economy and patrimony is infused with the spirit of
national interest. The non-alienation of natural resources, the State's full control over the development
and utilization of our scarce resources, agreements with foreigners being based on real contributions
to the economic growth and general welfare of the country and the regulation of foreign investments
in accordance with national goals and priorities are too explicit not to be noticed and understood.

A petrochemical industry is not an ordinary investment opportunity. It should not be treated like a
garment or embroidery firm, a shoe-making venture, or even an assembler of cars or manufacturer of
computer chips, where the BOI reasoning may be accorded fuller faith and credit. The petrochemical
industry is essential to the national interest. In other ASEAN countries like Indonesia and Malaysia,
the government superintends the industry by controlling the upstream or cracker facility.

In this particular BPC venture, not only has the Government given unprecedented favors, among them:

(1) For an initial authorized capital of only P20 million, the Central Bank gave an eligible relending
credit or relending facility worth US $50 million and a debt to swap arrangement for US $30 million or
a total accommodation of US $80 million which at current exchange rates is around P2080 million.

(2) A major part of the company's capitalization shall not come from foreign sources but from loans,
initially a Pl Billion syndicated loan, to be given by both government banks and a consortium of
Philippine private banks or in common parlance, a case of 'guiniguisa sa sariling manteca.'

(3) Tax exemptions and privileges were given as part of its 'preferred pioneer status.'

(4) Loan applications of other Philippine firms will be crowded out of the Asian Development Bank
portfolio because of the petrochemical firm's massive loan request. (Taken from the proceedings
before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee).

but through its regulatory agency, the BOI, it surrenders even the power to make a company abide by
its initial choice, a choice free from any suspicion of unscrupulous machinations and a choice which is
undoubtedly in the best interests of the Filipino people.

The Court, therefore, holds and finds that the BOI committed a grave abuse of discretion in approving
the transfer of the petrochemical plant from Bataan to Batangas and authorizing the change of
feedstock from naphtha only to naphtha and/or LPG for the main reason that the final say is in the
investor all other circumstances to the contrary notwithstanding. No cogent advantage to the
government has been shown by this transfer. This is a repudiation of the independent policy of the
government expressed in numerous laws and the Constitution to run its own affairs the way it deems
best for the national interest.

One can but remember the words of a great Filipino leader who in part said he would not mind having
a government run like hell by Filipinos than one subservient to foreign dictation. In this case, it is not
even a foreign government but an ordinary investor whom the BOI allows to dictate what we shall do
with our heritage.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted. The decision of the respondent Board of Investments
approving the amendment of the certificate of registration of the Luzon Petrochemical Corporation on
May 23, 1989 under its Resolution No. 193, Series of 1989, (Annex F to the Petition) is SET ASIDE
as NULL and VOID. The original certificate of registration of BPC' (now LPC) of February 24, 1988
with Bataan as the plant site and naphtha as the feedstock is, therefore, ordered maintained.

SO ORDERED.

Pamatong vs. Comelec

RESOLUTION

TINGA, J.:

Petitioner Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy for President on December 17,
2003. Respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) refused to give due course to
petitioners Certificate of Candidacy in its Resolution No. 6558 dated January 17, 2004. The decision,
however, was not unanimous since Commissioners Luzviminda G. Tancangco and Mehol K. Sadain
voted to include petitioner as they believed he had parties or movements to back up his candidacy.

On January 15, 2004, petitioner moved for reconsideration of Resolution No. 6558. Petitioners Motion
for Reconsideration was docketed as SPP (MP) No. 04-001. The COMELEC, acting on
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration and on similar motions filed by other aspirants for national
elective positions, denied the same under the aegis of Omnibus Resolution No. 6604 dated February
11, 2004. The COMELEC declared petitioner and thirty-five (35) others nuisance candidates who could
not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by
a registered political party with a national constituency. Commissioner Sadain maintained his vote for
petitioner. By then, Commissioner Tancangco had retired.

In this Petition For Writ of Certiorari, petitioner seeks to reverse the resolutions which were allegedly
rendered in violation of his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26,
Article II of the 1987

Constitution,1 by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a
nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. In so doing, petitioner argues that the
COMELEC indirectly amended the constitutional provisions on the electoral process and limited the
power of the sovereign people to choose their leaders. The COMELEC supposedly erred in
disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he
possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable of
waging a national campaign since he has numerous national organizations under his leadership, he
also has the capacity to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in other countries,
and he has a platform of government. Petitioner likewise attacks the validity of the form for
the Certificate of Candidacy prepared by the COMELEC. Petitioner claims that the form does not
provide clear and reasonable guidelines for determining the qualifications of candidates since it does
not ask for the candidates bio-data and his program of government.

First, the constitutional and legal dimensions involved.

Implicit in the petitioners invocation of the constitutional provision ensuring "equal access to
opportunities for public office" is the claim that there is a constitutional right to run for or hold public
office and, particularly in his case, to seek the presidency. There is none. What is recognized is merely
a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. Section 26, Article II of the Constitution neither
bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in
the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the
sort.

The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration
of Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-
executing,2 and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the "equal access"
provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any
judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive
action.3 The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts.4

An inquiry into the intent of the framers5 produces the same determination that the provision is not
self-executory. The original wording of the present Section 26, Article II had read, "The State shall
broaden opportunities to public office and prohibit public dynasties."6 Commissioner (now Chief
Justice) Hilario Davide, Jr. successfully brought forth an amendment that changed the word "broaden"
to the phrase "ensure equal access," and the substitution of the word "office" to "service." He explained
his proposal in this wise:

I changed the word "broaden" to "ENSURE EQUAL ACCESS TO" because what is important
would be equal access to the opportunity. If you broaden, it would necessarily mean that
the government would be mandated to create as many offices as are possible to
accommodate as many people as are also possible. That is the meaning of broadening
opportunities to public service. So, in order that we should not mandate the State to make
the government the number one employer and to limit offices only to what may be
necessary and expedient yet offering equal opportunities to access to it, I change the
word "broaden."7 (emphasis supplied)

Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would
accommodate as many people as possible into public office. The approval of the "Davide amendment"
indicates the design of the framers to cast the provision as simply enunciatory of a desired policy
objective and not reflective of the imposition of a clear State burden.

Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of
positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its
effective means and reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be
subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely open-ended.8 Words and phrases such as "equal
access," "opportunities," and "public service" are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their
inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an
operative but amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable rights may be sourced.

As earlier noted, the privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to
limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the
provisions9 of the Omnibus Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates" and COMELEC Resolution No.
645210 dated December 10, 2002 outlining the instances wherein the COMELEC may motu
proprio refuse to give due course to or cancel a Certificate of Candidacy.

As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal access
clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations
are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar,
there is no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create.

Significantly, petitioner does not challenge the constitutionality or validity of Section 69 of the Omnibus
Election Code and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 dated 10 December 2003. Thus, their presumed
validity stands and has to be accorded due weight.

Clearly, therefore, petitioners reliance on the equal access clause in Section 26, Article II of the
Constitution is misplaced.

The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates
who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a
compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards
this end, the State takes into account the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably,
the greater the number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to
mention the increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election. These practical
difficulties should, of course, never exempt the State from the conduct of a mandated electoral
exercise. At the same time, remedial actions should be available to alleviate these logistical hardships,
whenever necessary and proper. Ultimately, a disorderly election is not merely a textbook example of
inefficiency, but a rot that erodes faith in our democratic institutions. As the United States Supreme
Court held:

[T]here is surely an important state interest in requiring some preliminary showing of a

significant modicum of support before printing the name of a political organization and its
candidates on the ballot the interest, if no other, in avoiding confusion, deception and even
frustration of the democratic [process].11

The COMELEC itself recognized these practical considerations when it promulgated Resolution No.
6558 on 17 January 2004, adopting the study Memorandum of its Law Department dated 11 January
2004. As observed in the COMELECs Comment:

There is a need to limit the number of candidates especially in the case of candidates for
national positions because the election process becomes a mockery even if those who cannot
clearly wage a national campaign are allowed to run. Their names would have to be printed in
the Certified List of Candidates, Voters Information Sheet and the Official Ballots. These would
entail additional costs to the government. For the official ballots in automated counting and
canvassing of votes, an additional page would amount to more or less FOUR HUNDRED
FIFTY MILLION PESOS (450,000,000.00).

xxx[I]t serves no practical purpose to allow those candidates to continue if they cannot wage
a decent campaign enough to project the prospect of winning, no matter how slim.12

The preparation of ballots is but one aspect that would be affected by allowance of "nuisance
candidates" to run in the elections. Our election laws provide various entitlements for candidates for
public office, such as watchers in every polling place,13 watchers in the board of canvassers,14 or even
the receipt of electoral contributions.15Moreover, there are election rules and regulations the
formulations of which are dependent on the number of candidates in a given election.

Given these considerations, the ignominious nature of a nuisance candidacy becomes even more
galling. The organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add
into the mix candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would
actually impair the electoral process. This is not to mention the candidacies which are palpably
ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae
covering every step of the electoral process, most probably posed at the instance of these nuisance
candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State.

Owing to the superior interest in ensuring a credible and orderly election, the State could exclude
nuisance candidates and need not indulge in, as the song goes, "their trips to the moon on gossamer
wings."
The Omnibus Election Code and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 are cognizant of the compelling
State interest to ensure orderly and credible elections by excising impediments thereto, such as
nuisance candidacies that distract and detract from the larger purpose. The COMELEC is mandated
by the Constitution with the administration of elections16 and endowed with considerable latitude in
adopting means and methods that will ensure the promotion of free, orderly and honest
elections.17 Moreover, the Constitution guarantees that only bona fide candidates for public office shall
be free from any form of harassment and discrimination.18 The determination of bona fidecandidates
is governed by the statutes, and the concept, to our mind is, satisfactorily defined in the Omnibus
Election Code.

Now, the needed factual premises.

However valid the law and the COMELEC issuance involved are, their proper application in the case
of the petitioner cannot be tested and reviewed by this Court on the basis of what is now before it. The
assailed resolutions of the COMELEC do not direct the Court to the evidence which it considered in
determining that petitioner was a nuisance candidate. This precludes the Court from reviewing at this
instance whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioner, since
such a review would necessarily take into account the matters which the COMELEC considered in
arriving at its decisions.

Petitioner has submitted to this Court mere photocopies of various documents purportedly evincing
his credentials as an eligible candidate for the presidency. Yet this Court, not being a trier of facts, can
not properly pass upon the reproductions as evidence at this level. Neither the COMELEC nor the
Solicitor General appended any document to their respective Comments.

The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The basis
of the factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of
further evidence is in order.

A word of caution is in order. What is at stake is petitioners aspiration and offer to serve in the
government. It deserves not a cursory treatment but a hearing which conforms to the requirements of
due process.

As to petitioners attacks on the validity of the form for the certificate of candidacy, suffice it to say that
the form strictly complies with Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code. This provision specifically
enumerates what a certificate of candidacy should contain, with the required information tending to
show that the candidate possesses the minimum qualifications for the position aspired for as
established by the Constitution and other election laws.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, COMELEC Case No. SPP (MP) No. 04-001 is hereby remanded to
the COMELEC for the reception of further evidence, to determine the question on whether petitioner
Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus
Election Code.

The COMELEC is directed to hold and complete the reception of evidence and report its findings to
this Court with deliberate dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

ENRIQUE T. GARCIA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

PUNO, J.:

The 1987 Constitution is borne of the conviction that people power can be trusted to check excesses
of government. One of the means by which people power can be exercised is thru initiatives where
local ordinances and resolutions can be enacted or repealed. An effort to trivialize the effectiveness
of people's initiatives ought to be rejected.

In its Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993, 1 the Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong, Bataan
agreed to the inclusion of the municipality of Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone in
accord with Republic Act
No. 7227.

On May 24, 1993, petitioners filed a petition 2 with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul
Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993. The petition states:

I. Bawiin, nulipikahin at pawalang-bisa ang Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 ng
Sangguniang Bayan para sa pag-anib ng Morong sa SSEZ na walang kondisyon.
II. Palitan ito ng isang Pambayang Kapasiyahan na aanib lamang ang Morong sa SSEZ kung ang
mga sumusunod na kondisyones ay ipagkakaloob, ipatutupad at isasagawa para sa kapakanan at
interes ng Morong at Bataan:

(A). Ibalik sa Bataan ang "Virgin Forests" isang bundok na hindi nagagalw at punong-puno ng
malalaking punong-kahoy at iba'-ibang halaman.

(B) Ihiwalay ang Grande Island sa SSEZ at ibalik ito sa Bataan.

(K). Isama ang mga lupain ng Bataan na nakapaloob sa SBMA sa pagkukuenta ng salaping
ipinagkakaloob ng pamahalaang national o "Internal Revenue Allotment" (IRA) sa Morong, Hermosa
at sa Lalawigan.

(D). Payagang magtatag rin ng sariling "special economic zones" ang bawat bayan ng Morong,
Hermosa at Dinalupihan.

(E). Ibase sa laki ng kanya-kanyang lupa ang pamamahagi ng kikitain ng SBMA.

(G). Ibase rin ang alokasyon ng pagbibigay ng trabaho sa laki ng nasabing mga lupa.

(H). Pabayaang bukas ang pinto ng SBMA na nasa Morong ng 24 na oras at bukod dito sa magbukas
pa ng pinto sa hangganan naman ng Morong at Hermosa upang magkaroon ng pagkakataong
umunlad rin ang mga nasabing bayan, pati na rin ng iba pang bayan ng Bataan.

(I). Tapusin ang pagkokonkreto ng mga daang Morong-Tala-Orani at Morong-Tasig-Dinalupihan para

sa kabutihan ng mga taga-Bataan at tuloy makatulong sa pangangalaga ng mga kabundukan.

(J). Magkaroon ng sapat na representasyon sa pamunuan ng SBMA ang Morong, Hermosa at Bataan.

The municipality of Morong did not take any action on the petition within thirty (30) days after its
submission. Petitioners then resorted to their power of initiative under the Local Government Code of
1991. 3 They started to solicit the required number of signatures 4 to cause the repeal of said
resolution. Unknown to the petitioners, however, the Honorable Edilberto M. de Leon, Vice Mayor and
Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong, wrote a letter dated June 11, 1993 to the
Executive Director of COMELEC requesting the denial of " . . . the petition for a local initiative and/or
referendum because the exercise will just promote divisiveness, counter productive and futility." 5 We
quote the letter, viz:

The Executive Director

COMELEC
Intramuros, Metro Manila

S i r:

In view of the petition filed by a group of proponents headed by Gov. Enrique T. Garcia, relative to the
conduct of a local initiative and/or referendum for the annulment of Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10,
Serye 1993, may we respectfully request to deny the petition referred thereto considering the issues
raised by the proponents were favorably acted upon and endorsed to Congress and other government
agencies by the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong.

For your information and guidance, we are enumerating hereunder the issues raised by the petitioners
with the corresponding actions undertaken by the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, to wit:

ISSUES RAISED BY PROPONENTS

I. Pawalang-bisa ang Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye ng taong 1993.

II. Palitan ito ng isang Kapasyahang Pag-anib sa SSEZ kung:

a) Ibabalik sa Morong ang pag-aaring Grande Island, kabundukan at Naval Reservation;

b) Ibase sa aring Lupa ng LGU ang kikitain at mapapasok na manggagawa nila sa SSEZ;

c) Isama ang nasabing lupa sa pagkukuwenta ng "IRA" ng Morong, Hermosa at Dinalupihan;

d) Makapagtatag ng sariling "economic zones" ang Morong, Hermosa at Dinalupihan;

e) Pabayaan bukas ang pinto ng Morong patungong SSEZ at magbukas ng dalawang (2) pinto pa;

(f) Konkretohin ang daang Morong papunta sa Orani at Dinalupihan;

g) Pumili ng SBMA Chairman na taga-ibang lugar.

ACTIONS UNDERTAKEN BY THE SB OF MORONG

1. By virtue of R.A. 7227, otherwise known as the Bases Conversion Development Act of 1992, all
actions of LGU's correlating on the above issues are merely recommendatory in nature when such
provisions were already embodied in the statute.

2. Corollary to the notion, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong passed and approved Pambayang
Kapasyahan Blg. 18, Serye 1993, requesting Congress of the Philippines to amend certain provisions
of R.A. 7227, wherein it reasserted its position embodied in Pambayan Kapasyahan Blg. 08 and Blg.
12, Serye ng taong 1992, (Attached and marked as Annex "A:) which tackled the same issues raised
by the petitioners particularly items a), b), c), e), and g).

3. Item d) is already acted upon by BCDA Chairman Arsenio Bartolome III in its letter to His Excellency
President Fidel V. Ramos, dated May 7, 1993 (Attached and marked as Annex "B") with clarifying
letter from BCDA Vice-Chairman Rogelio L. Singson regarding lands on Mabayo and Minanga dated
June 3, 1993 that only lands inside the perimeter fence are envisioned to be part of SBMA.

4. Item f), President Ramos in his marginal note over the letter request of Morong, Bataan Mayor
Bienvenido L. Vicedo, the Sangguniang Bayan and Congressman Payumo, when the Resolution of
Concurrence to SBMA was submitted last April 6, 1993, order the priority implementation of completion
of Morong-Dinalupihan (Tasik-Road) Project, including the Morong-Poblacion-Mabayo Road to
DPWH. (Attached and marked as Annex "C").

Based on the foregoing facts, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong had accommodated the clamor of
the petitioners in accordance with its limited powers over the issues. However, the Sangguniang Bayan
of Morong cannot afford to wait for amendments by Congress of R.A. 7227 that will perhaps drag for
several months or years, thereby delaying the development of Morong, Bataan.

Henceforth, we respectfully reiterate our request to deny the petition for a local initiative and/or
referendum because the exercise will just promote divisiveness, counter productive and futility.

Thank you and more power.

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) EDILBERTO M. DE LEON

Mun. Vice Mayor/Presiding Officer

In its session of July 6, 1993, the COMELEC en banc resolved to deny the petition for local initiative
on the ground that its subject is "merely a resolution (pambayang kapasyahan) and not an
ordinance." 6 On July 13, 1993, the COMELEC en banc further resolved to direct Provincial Election
Supervisor, Atty. Benjamin N. Casiano, to hold action on the authentication of signatures being
gathered by petitioners. 7

These COMELEC resolutions are sought to be set aside in the petition at bench. The petition makes
the following submissions:

5. This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus.

5.01 For certiorari, conformably to Sec. 7, Art. IX of the Constitution, to set aside Comelec Resolution
Nos. 93-1676 and 93-1623 (Annexes "E" and "H") insofar as it disallowed the initiation of a local
initiative to annul PAMBAYANG KAPASYAHAN BLG. 10, SERYE 1993 including the gathering and
authentication of the required number of signatures in support thereof.

5.01.1 As an administrative agency, respondent Comelec is bound to observe due process in the
conduct of its proceedings. Here, the subject resolutions, Annexes "E" and "H", were issued ex
parte and without affording petitioners and the other proponents of the initiative the opportunity to be
heard thereon. More importantly, these resolutions and/or directives were issued with grave abuse of
discretion. A Sangguniang Bayan resolution being an act of the aforementioned local legislative
assembly is undoubtedly a proper subject of initiative. (Sec. 32, Art. VI, Constitution)

5.02 For mandamus, pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 65, Rules of Court, to command the respondent
Comelec to schedule forthwith the continuation of the signing of the petition, and should the required
number of signatures be obtained, set a date for the initiative within forty-five (45) days thereof.

5.02.1 Respondent Comelec's authority in the matter of local initiative is merely ministerial. It is duty-
bound to supervise the gathering of signatures in support of the petition and to set the date of the
initiative once the required number of signatures are obtained.
If the required number of signatures is obtained, the Comelec shall then set a date for the initiative
during which the proposition shall be submitted to the registered voters in the local government unit
concerned for their approval within sixty (60) days from the date of certification by the Comelec, as
provided in subsection (g) hereof, in case of provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in case of
municipalities, and thirty (30) days in case of barangays. The initiative shall then be held on the date
set, after which the results thereof shall be certified and proclaimed by the Comelec. (Sec. 22, par. (h)
R.A. 7160.

Respondent COMELEC opposed the petition. Through the Solicitor General, it contends that under
the Local Government Code of 1991, a resolution cannot be the subject of a local initiative. The same
stance is assumed by the respondent Sangguniang Bayan of Morong. 8

We grant the petition.

The case at bench is of transcendental significance because it involves an issue of first impression
delineating the extent of the all important original power of the people to legislate. Father Bernas
explains that "in republican systems, there are generally two kinds of legislative power, original and
derivative. Original legislative power is possessed by the sovereign people. Derivative legislative
power is that which has been delegated by the sovereign people to legislative bodies and is
subordinate to the original power of the people."9

Our constitutional odyssey shows that up until 1987, our people have not directly exercised legislative
power, both the constituent power to amend or revise the Constitution or the power to enact ordinary
laws. Section 1, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution delegated legislative power to Congress, thus "the
legislative power shall be vested in a Congress of the Philippines, which shall consist of a Senate and
a House of Representatives." Similarly, section 1, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, as amended,
provided that "the Legislative power shall be vested in a Batasang Pambansa." 10

Implicit in the set up was the trust of the people in Congress to enact laws for their benefit. So total
was their trust that the people did not reserve for themselves the same power to make or repeal laws.
The omission was to prove unfortunate. In the 70's and until the EDSA revolution, the legislature failed
the expectations of the people especially when former President Marcos wielded lawmaking powers
under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. Laws which could have bridled the nation's
downslide from democracy to authoritarianism to anarchy never saw the light of day.

In February 1986, the people took a direct hand in the determination of their destiny. They toppled
down the government of former President Marcos in a historic bloodless revolution. The Constitution
was rewritten to embody the lessons of their sad experience. One of the lessons is the folly of
completely surrendering the power to make laws to the legislature. The result, in the perceptive words
of Father Bernas, is that the new Constitution became "less trusting of public officials than the
American Constitution." 11

For the first time in 1987, the system of people's initiative was thus installed in our fundamental law.
To be sure, it was a late awakening. As early as 1898, the state of South Dakota has adopted initiative
and referendum in its constitution 12 and many states have followed suit. 13 In any event, the framers
of our 1987 Constitution realized the value of initiative and referendum as an ultimate weapon of the
people to negate government malfeasance and misfeasance and they put in place an overarching
system. Thus, thru an initiative, the people were given the power to amend the Constitution itself. Sec.
2 of Art. XVII provides: "Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered
voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the
registered voters therein." Likewise, thru an initiative, the people were also endowed with the power
to enact or reject any act or law by congress or local legislative body. Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI
provide:

Sec. 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of
a Senate and a House of Representatives except to the extent reserved to the people by the provisions
on initiative and referendum.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 32. The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum,
and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or
reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative body after the
registration of a petition therefor signed by at least ten per centum of the total number of registered
voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the
registered voters thereto.

The COMELEC was also empowered to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an initiative and referendum. 14 Worthwhile noting is the scope of coverage of an initiative
or referendum as delineated by section 32 Art. VI of the Constitution, supra any act or law passed
by Congress or local legislative body.
In due time, Congress respondent to the mandate of the Constitution. It enacted laws to put into
operation the constitutionalized concept of initiative and referendum. On August 4, 1989, it approved
Republic Act No. 6735 entitled "An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and
Appropriating Funds Therefor." Liberally borrowed from American laws, 15 R.A. No. 6735, among
others, spelled out the requirements 16 for the exercise of the power of initiative and referendum, the
conduct of national initiative and referendum; 17 procedure of local initiative and referendum; 18 and
their limitations. 19 Then came Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as The Local Government
Code of 1991. Chapter 2, Title XI, Book I of the Code governed the conduct of local initiative and
referendum.

In light of this legal backdrop, the essential issue to be resolved in the case at bench is whether
Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan is the
proper subject of an initiative. Respondents take the negative stance as they contend that under the
Local Government Code of 1991 only an ordinance can be the subject of initiative. They rely on section
120, Chapter 2, Title XI, Book I of the Local Government Code of 1991 which provides: "Local Initiative
Defined. Local initiative is the legal process whereby the registered voters of a local government
unit may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance."

We reject respondents' narrow and literal reading of the above provision for it will collide with the
Constitution and will subvert the intent of the lawmakers in enacting the provisions of the Local
Government Code of 1991 on initiative and referendum.

The Constitution clearly includes not only ordinances but resolutions as appropriate subjects of a local
initiative. Section 32 of Article VI provides in luminous language: "The Congress shall, as early as
possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the
people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed
by the Congress, or local legislative body . . ." An act includes a resolution. Black 20 defines an act as
"an expression of will or purpose . . . it may denote something done . . . as a legislature, including not
merely physical acts, but also decrees, edicts, laws, judgments,resolves, awards, and determinations
. . . ." It is basic that a law should be construed in harmony with and not in violation of the
constitution. 21 In line with this postulate, we held in In Re Guarina that "if there is doubt or uncertainty
as to the meaning of the legislative, if the words or provisions are obscure, or if the enactment is fairly
susceptible of two or more constructions, that interpretation will be adopted which will avoid the effect
of unconstitutionality, even though it may be necessary, for this purpose, to disregard the more usual
or apparent import of the language used." 22

The constitutional command to include acts (i.e., resolutions) as appropriate subjects of initiative was
implemented by Congress when it enacted Republic Act No. 6735 entitled "An Act Providing for a
System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor." Thus, its section 3(a)
expressly includes resolutions as subjects of initiatives on local legislations, viz:

Sec. 3. Definition of Terms For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean;

(a) "Initiative" is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and
enact legislations through an election called for the purpose.

There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:

a.1. Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution.

a.2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and

a.3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial,
city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution, or ordinance. (Emphasis ours)

Similarly, its section 16 states: "Limitations Upon Local Legislative Bodies Any proposition on
ordinance or resolution approved through the system of initiative and referendum as herein provided
shall not be repealed, modified or amended, by the local legislative body concerned within six (6)
months from the date therefrom . . . ." On January 16, 1991, the COMELEC also promulgated its
Resolution No. 2300 entitled "In Re Rules and Regulations Governing the Conduct of Initiative on the
Constitution, and Initiative and Referendum, on National and Local Laws." It likewise recognized
resolutions as proper subjects of initiatives. Section 5, Article I of its Rules states: "Scope of power of
initiative The power of initiative may be exercised to amend the Constitution, or to enact a national
legislation, a regional, provincial, city, municipal or barangay law, resolution or ordinance."

There can hardly be any doubt that when Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6735 it intend
resolutions to be proper subjects of local initiatives. The debates confirm this intent. We quote some
of the interpellations when the Conference Committee Report on the disagreeing provisions between
Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505 were being considered in the House of
Representatives, viz:
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. The Gentleman from Camarines Sur is recognized.

MR. ROCO. On the Conference Committee Report on the disagreeing provisions between Senate Bill
No. 17 and the consolidated House Bill No. 21505 which refers to the system providing for the initiative
ad referendum, fundamentally, Mr. Speaker, we consolidated the Senate and the House versions, so
both versions are totally intact in the bill. The Senators ironically provided for local initiative and
referendum and the House of Representatives correctly provided for initiative and referendum on the
Constitution and on national legislation.

I move that we approve the consolidated bill.

MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker.

THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. What is the pleasure of the Minority Floor Leader?

MR. ALBANO. Will the distinguished sponsor answer just a few questions?

THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. What does the sponsor say?

MR. ROCO. Willingly, Mr. Speaker.

THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. The Gentleman will please proceed.

MR. ALBANO. I heard the sponsor say that the only difference in the two bills was that in the Senate
version there was a provision for local initiative and referendum, whereas the House version has none.

MR. ROCO. In fact, the Senate version provided purely for local initiative and referendum, whereas in
the House version, we provided purely for national and constitutional legislation.

MR. ALBANO. Is it our understanding, therefore, that the two provisions were incorporated.?

MR. ROCO. Yes, Mr. Speaker.

MR. ALBANO. So that we will now have a complete initiative and referendum both in the constitutional
amendment and national legislation.

MR. ROCO. That is correct.

MR. ALBANO. And provincial as well as municipal resolutions?

MR. ROCO. Down to barangay, Mr. Speaker.

MR. ALBANO. And this initiative and referendum is in consonance with the provision of the
Constitution whereby it mandates this Congress to enact the enabling law, so that we shall have a
system which can be done every five years. Is it five years in the provision of the Constitution?

MR. ROCO. That is correct, Mr. Speaker. For constitutional amendments to the 1987 Constitution, it
is every five years. 23

Contrary to the submission of the respondents, the subsequent enactment of the local Government
Code of 1991 which also dealt with local initiative did not change the scope of its coverage. More
specifically, the Code did not limit the coverage of local initiatives to ordinances alone. Section 120,
Chapter 2, Title IX Book I of the Code cited by respondents merely defines the concept of local initiative
as the legal process whereby the registered voters of a local government unit may directly propose,
enact, or amend any ordinance. It does not, however, deal with the subjects or matters that can be
taken up in a local initiative. It is section 124 of the same Code which does. It states:

Sec. 124. Limitations on Local Initiatives. (a) The power of local initiative shall not be exercised more
than once a year.

(b) Initiative shall extend only to subjects or matters which are within the legal powers of the
Sanggunians to enact.

xxx xxx xxx

This provision clearly does not limit the application of local initiatives to ordinances, but to all "subjects
or matters which are within the legal powers of the Sanggunians to enact," which undoubtedly includes
resolutions. This interpretation is supported by Section 125 of the same Code which provides:
"Limitations upon Sanggunians. Any proposition or ordinance approved through the system of
initiative and referendum as herein provided shall not be repealed, modified or amended by the
sanggunian concerned within six (6) months from the date of the approval thereof . . . ." Certainly, the
inclusion of the wordproposition is inconsistent with respondents' thesis that only ordinances can be
the subject of local initiatives. The principal author of the Local Government Code of 1991, former
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, espouses the same view. In his commentaries on the said law, he
wrote, viz: 24

4. Subject Matter Of Initiative. All sorts of measures may be the subject of direct initiative for as long
as these are within the competence of the Sanggunian to enact. In California, for example, direct
initiatives were proposed to enact a fishing control bill, to regulate the practice of chiropractors, to levy
a special tax to secure a new library, to grant a franchise to a railroad company, and to prevent
discrimination in the sale of housing and similar bills.

Direct initiative on the local lever may, therefore, cover all kinds of measures provided that these are
within the power of the local Sanggunians to enact, subject of course to the other requisites
enumerated in the Section.

5. Form of Initiative. Regarding the form of the measure, the section speaks only of "ordinance,"
although the measure may be contained in a resolution. If the registered voters can propose
ordinances, why are they not allowed to propose resolutions too? Moreover, the wording of Sec. 125,
below, which deals not only with ordinances but with "any proposition" implies the inclusion of
resolutions. The discussion hereunder will also show support for the conclusion that resolutions may
indeed be the subject of local initiative.

We note that respondents do not give any reason why resolutions should not be the subject of a local
initiative. In truth, the reason lies in the well known distinction between a resolution and an ordinance
i.e., that a resolution is used whenever the legislature wishes to express an opinion which is to have
only a temporary effect while an ordinance is intended to permanently direct and control matters
applying to persons or things in general. 25 Thus, resolutions are not normally subject to referendum
for it may destroy the efficiency necessary to the successful administration of the business affairs of a
city. 26

In the case at bench, however, it can not be argued that the subject matter of the resolution of the
municipality of Morong merely temporarily affects the people of Morong for it directs a permanent rule
of conduct or government. The inclusion of Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone has
far reaching implications in the governance of its people. This is apparent from a reading of section 12
of Republic Act No. 7227 entitled "An Act Accelerating the Conversion of Military Reservations Into
Other Productive Uses, Creating the Bases Conversion and Development Authority For This Purpose,
Providing Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes." to wit:

Sec. 12. Subic Special Economic Zone. Subject to the concurrence by resolution of
the sangguniang panlungsod of the City of Olongapo and the sangguniang bayan of the Municipalities
of Subic, Morong and Hermosa, there is hereby created a Special Economic and Free-port Zone
consisting of the City of Olongapo and the Municipality of Subic, Province of Zambales, the lands
occupied by the Subic Naval Base and its contiguous extensions as embraced, covered, and defined
by the 1947 Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States of America as
amended, and within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipalities of Morong and Hermosa, Province
of Bataan, hereinafter referred to a as the Subic Special Economic Zone whose metes and bounds
shall be delineated in a proclamation to be issued by the President of the Philippines. Within thirty (30)
days after the approval of this Act, each local government unit shall submit its resolution of
concurrence to join the Subic Special Economic Zone to the Office of the President. Thereafter, the
President of the Philippines shall issue a proclamation defining the metes and bounds of the zone as
provided herein.

The abovementioned zone shall be subject to the following policies:

(a) Within the framework and subject to the mandate and limitations of the Constitution and the
pertinent provisions of the Local Government Code, the Subic Special Economic Zone shall be
developed into a self-sustaining, industrial, commercial, financial and investment center to generate
employment opportunities in and around the zone and to attract and promote productive foreign
investments;

(b) The Subic Special Economic Zone shall be operated and managed as a separate customs territory
ensuring free flow or movement of goods and capital within, into a exported out of the Subic Special
Economic Zone, as well as provide incentives such as tax and duty-free importations of raw material,
capital and equipment. However, exportations or removal of goods from the territory of the Subic
Special Economic Zone to the other parts of the Philippine territory shall be subject to customs duties
and taxes under the Customs and Tariff Code and other relevant tax laws of the Philippines:

(c) The provision of existing laws, rules and regulations to the contrary notwithstanding, no taxes, local
and national, shall be imposed within the Subic Special Economic Zone. In lieu of paying taxes, three
percent (3%) of the of the gross income earned by all businesses and enterprises within the Subic
Special Economic Zone shall be remitted to the National Government one percent (1%) each to the
local government units affected by the declaration of the zone in proportion to their population area,
and other factors. In addition, there is hereby established a development fund of one percent (1%) of
the gross income earned by all businesses and enterprises within the Subic Special Economic Zone
to be utilized for the development of municipalities outside the City of Olongapo and the Municipality
of Subic, and other municipalities contiguous to the base areas.

In case of conflict between national and local laws with respect to tax exemption privileges in the Subic
Special Economic Zone, the same shall be resolved in favor of the latter;

(d) No exchange control policy shall be applied and free markets for foreign exchange, gold, securities
and futures shall be allowed and maintained in the Subic Special Economic Zone;

(e) The Central Bank, through the Monetary Board, shall supervise and regulate the operations of
banks and other financial institutions within the Subic Special Economic Zone;

(f) Banking and finance shall be liberalized with the establishment of foreign currency depository units
of local commercial banks and offshore banking units of foreign banks with minimum Central Bank
regulation;

(g) Any investor within the Subic Special Economic Zone whose continuing investment shall not be
less than Two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000), his/her spouse and dependent children under
twenty-one (21) years of age, shall be granted permanent resident status within the Subic Special
Economic Zone. They shall have freedom of ingress and egress to and from the Subic Special
Economic Zone without any need of special authorization from the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation. The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority referred to in Section 13 of this Act may also issue
working visas renewable every two (2) years to foreign executives and other aliens possessing highly-
technical skills which no Filipino within the Subic Special Economic Zone possesses, as certified by
the Department of Labor and Employment. The names of aliens granted permanent residence status
and working visas by the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority shall be reported to the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation within thirty (30) days after issuance thereof.

(h) The defense of the zone and the security of its perimeters shall be the responsibility of the National
Government in coordination with the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority. The Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority shall provide and establish its own internal security and fire fighting forces; and

(i) Except as herein provided, the local government units comprising the Subic Special Economic Zone
shall retain their basic autonomy and identity. The cities shall be governed by their respective charters
and the municipalities shall operate and function in accordance with Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code of 1991.

In relation thereto, section 14 of the same law provides:

Sec. 14. Relationship with the Conversion Authority and the Local Government Units.

(a) The provisions of existing laws, rules and regulations to the contrary notwithstanding, the Subic
Authority shall exercise administrative powers, rule-making and disbursement of funds over the Subic
Special Economic Zone in conformity with the oversight function of the Conversion Authority.

(b) In case of conflict between the Subic Authority and the local government units concerned on
matters affecting the Subic Special Economic zone other than defense and security, the decision of
the Subic Authority shall prevail.

Considering the lasting changes that will be wrought in the social, political, and economic existence of
the people of Morong by the inclusion of their municipality in the Subic Special Economic Zone, it is
but logical to hear their voice on the matter via an initiative. It is not material that the decision of the
municipality of Morong for the inclusion came in the form of a resolution for what matters is its enduring
effect on the welfare of the people of Morong.

Finally, it cannot be gained that petitioners were denied due process. They were not furnished a copy
of the letter-petition of Vice Mayor Edilberto M. de Leon to the respondent COMELEC praying for
denial of their petition for a local initiative on Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993. Worse,
respondent COMELEC granted the petition without affording petitioners any fair opportunity to oppose
it. This procedural lapse is fatal for at stake is not an ordinary right but the sanctity of the sovereignty
of the people, their original power to legislate through the process of initiative. Ours is the duty to listen
and the obligation to obey the voice of the people. It could well be the only force that could foil the
mushrooming abuses in government.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED and COMELEC Resolution 93-1623 dated July 6, 1993
and Resolution 93-1676 dated July 13, 1993 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. No costs.

SO ORDERED
 EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, vs. (POEA)

CRUZ, J.:

The private respondent in this case was awarded the sum of P192,000.00 by the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) for the death of her husband. The decision is challenged by the
petitioner on the principal ground that the POEA had no jurisdiction over the case as the husband was
not an overseas worker.

Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an accident in Tokyo,
Japan, March 15, 1985. His widow sued for damages under Executive Order No. 797 and
Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the POEA. The petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued that the
complaint was cognizable not by the POEA but by the Social Security System and should have been
filed against the State Insurance Fund. The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after
considering the position papers of the parties ruled in favor of the complainant. The award consisted
of P180,000.00 as death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial expenses.

The petitioner immediately came to this Court, prompting the Solicitor General to move for dismissal
on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Ordinarily, the decisions of the POEA should first be appealed to the National Labor Relations
Commission, on the theory inter alia that the agency should be given an opportunity to correct the
errors, if any, of its subordinates. This case comes under one of the exceptions, however, as the
questions the petitioner is raising are essentially questions of law. 1 Moreover, the private respondent
himself has not objected to the petitioner's direct resort to this Court, observing that the usual
procedure would delay the disposition of the case to her prejudice.

The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration was created under Executive Order No. 797,
promulgated on May 1, 1982, to promote and monitor the overseas employment of Filipinos and to
protect their rights. It replaced the National Seamen Board created earlier under Article 20 of the Labor
Code in 1974. Under Section 4(a) of the said executive order, the POEA is vested with "original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims, involving employee-employer relations
arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino contract workers, including seamen."
These cases, according to the 1985 Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment issued by the
POEA, include "claims for death, disability and other benefits" arising out of such employment. 2

The petitioner does not contend that Saco was not its employee or that the claim of his widow is not
compensable. What it does urge is that he was not an overseas worker but a 'domestic employee and
consequently his widow's claim should have been filed with Social Security System, subject to appeal
to the Employees Compensation Commission.

We see no reason to disturb the factual finding of the POEA that Vitaliano Saco was an overseas
employee of the petitioner at the time he met with the fatal accident in Japan in 1985.

Under the 1985 Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment, overseas employment is defined
as "employment of a worker outside the Philippines, including employment on board vessels plying
international waters, covered by a valid contract. 3 A contract worker is described as "any person
working or who has worked overseas under a valid employment contract and shall include
seamen" 4 or "any person working overseas or who has been employed by another which may be a
local employer, foreign employer, principal or partner under a valid employment contract and shall
include seamen." 5 These definitions clearly apply to Vitaliano Saco for it is not disputed that he died
while under a contract of employment with the petitioner and alongside the petitioner's vessel, the M/V
Eastern Polaris, while berthed in a foreign country. 6

It is worth observing that the petitioner performed at least two acts which constitute implied or tacit
recognition of the nature of Saco's employment at the time of his death in 1985. The first is its
submission of its shipping articles to the POEA for processing, formalization and approval in the
exercise of its regulatory power over overseas employment under Executive Order NO. 797. 7 The
second is its payment 8 of the contributions mandated by law and regulations to the Welfare Fund for
Overseas Workers, which was created by P.D. No. 1694 "for the purpose of providing social and
welfare services to Filipino overseas workers."

Significantly, the office administering this fund, in the receipt it prepared for the private respondent's
signature, described the subject of the burial benefits as "overseas contract worker Vitaliano
Saco." 9 While this receipt is certainly not controlling, it does indicate, in the light of the petitioner's own
previous acts, that the petitioner and the Fund to which it had made contributions considered Saco to
be an overseas employee.

The petitioner argues that the deceased employee should be likened to the employees of the
Philippine Air Lines who, although working abroad in its international flights, are not considered
overseas workers. If this be so, the petitioner should not have found it necessary to submit its shipping
articles to the POEA for processing, formalization and approval or to contribute to the Welfare Fund
which is available only to overseas workers. Moreover, the analogy is hardly appropriate as the
employees of the PAL cannot under the definitions given be considered seamen nor are their
appointments coursed through the POEA.

The award of P180,000.00 for death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial expenses was made by the
POEA pursuant to its Memorandum Circular No. 2, which became effective on February 1, 1984. This
circular prescribed a standard contract to be adopted by both foreign and domestic shipping
companies in the hiring of Filipino seamen for overseas employment. A similar contract had earlier
been required by the National Seamen Board and had been sustained in a number of cases by this
Court. 10 The petitioner claims that it had never entered into such a contract with the deceased Saco,
but that is hardly a serious argument. In the first place, it should have done so as required by the
circular, which specifically declared that "all parties to the employment of any Filipino seamen on board
any ocean-going vessel are advised to adopt and use this employment contract effective 01 February
1984 and to desist from using any other format of employment contract effective that date." In the
second place, even if it had not done so, the provisions of the said circular are nevertheless deemed
written into the contract with Saco as a postulate of the police power of the State. 11

But the petitioner questions the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as violative of the principle
of non-delegation of legislative power. It contends that no authority had been given the POEA to
promulgate the said regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an
exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation.

The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order No.
797, reading as follows:

... The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided shall promulgate the
necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the
Administration (POEA).

Similar authorization had been granted the National Seamen Board, which, as earlier observed, had
itself prescribed a standard shipping contract substantially the same as the format adopted by the
POEA.

The second challenge is more serious as it is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive
contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the
law may be enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative
of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the
delegate. Thus, in Ynot v. Intermediate Apellate Court 12 which annulled Executive Order No. 626, this
Court held:

We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated property
as prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the seized property shall
be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National
Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabaos.' (Italics supplied.) The phrase "may
see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous
opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual standard
and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the officers must observe when they
make their distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the
fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers
named can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in
their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a 'roving commission a wide and sweeping
authority that is not canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing,' in short a clearly profligate
and therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative
power, viz, the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be
complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the
delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce it. 13 Under the sufficient standard test, there must
be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority
and prevent the delegation from running riot. 14

Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is
not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.

The principle of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all the three major powers of the Government
but is especially important in the case of the legislative power because of the many instances when
its delegation is permitted. The occasions are rare when executive or judicial powers have to be
delegated by the authorities to which they legally certain. In the case of the legislative power, however,
such occasions have become more and more frequent, if not necessary. This had led to the
observation that the delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its non-delegation the
exception.
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing inability of the
legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth of society
has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot
be expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To
many of the problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may not have the
competence to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These
solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the
particular fields assigned to them.

The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly applicable
to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar
problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative
agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called
the "power of subordinate legislation."

With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by
"filling in' the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. This
is effected by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the
implementing rules issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations
have the force and effect of law.

Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation. The model contract prescribed
thereby has been applied in a significant number of the cases without challenge by the employer. The
power of the POEA (and before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring the model contract is not
unlimited as there is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said authority.
That standard is discoverable in the executive order itself which, in creating the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration, mandated it to protect the rights of overseas Filipino workers to "fair and
equitable employment practices."

Parenthetically, it is recalled that this Court has accepted as sufficient standards "Public interest"
in People v. Rosenthal 15 "justice and equity" in Antamok Gold Fields v. CIR 16 "public convenience
and welfare" in Calalang v. Williams 17 and "simplicity, economy and efficiency" in Cervantes v. Auditor
General, 18 to mention only a few cases. In the United States, the "sense and experience of men" was
accepted in Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 19 and "national security" in Hirabayashi v.
United States. 20

It is not denied that the private respondent has been receiving a monthly death benefit pension of
P514.42 since March 1985 and that she was also paid a P1,000.00 funeral benefit by the Social
Security System. In addition, as already observed, she also received a P5,000.00 burial gratuity from
the Welfare Fund for Overseas Workers. These payments will not preclude allowance of the private
respondent's claim against the petitioner because it is specifically reserved in the standard contract of
employment for Filipino seamen under Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1984, that

Section C. Compensation and Benefits.

1. In case of death of the seamen during the term of his Contract, the employer shall pay his
beneficiaries the amount of:

a. P220,000.00 for master and chief engineers

b. P180,000.00 for other officers, including radio operators and master electrician

c. P 130,000.00 for ratings.

2. It is understood and agreed that the benefits mentioned above shall be separate and distinct from,
and will be in addition to whatever benefits which the seaman is entitled to under Philippine laws. ...

3. ...

c. If the remains of the seaman is buried in the Philippines, the owners shall pay the beneficiaries of
the seaman an amount not exceeding P18,000.00 for burial expenses.

The underscored portion is merely a reiteration of Memorandum Circular No. 22, issued by the
National Seamen Board on July 12,1976, providing an follows:

Income Benefits under this Rule Shall be Considered Additional Benefits.

All compensation benefits under Title II, Book Four of the Labor Code of the Philippines (Employees
Compensation and State Insurance Fund) shall be granted, in addition to whatever benefits, gratuities
or allowances that the seaman or his beneficiaries may be entitled to under the employment contract
approved by the NSB. If applicable, all benefits under the Social Security Law and the Philippine
Medicare Law shall be enjoyed by the seaman or his beneficiaries in accordance with such laws.

The above provisions are manifestations of the concern of the State for the working class, consistently
with the social justice policy and the specific provisions in the Constitution for the protection of the
working class and the promotion of its interest.

One last challenge of the petitioner must be dealt with to close t case. Its argument that it has been
denied due process because the same POEA that issued Memorandum Circular No. 2 has also
sustained and applied it is an uninformed criticism of administrative law itself. Administrative agencies
are vested with two basic powers, the quasi-legislative and the quasi-judicial. The first enables them
to promulgate implementing rules and regulations, and the second enables them to interpret and apply
such regulations. Examples abound: the Bureau of Internal Revenue adjudicates on its own revenue
regulations, the Central Bank on its own circulars, the Securities and Exchange Commission on its
own rules, as so too do the Philippine Patent Office and the Videogram Regulatory Board and the Civil
Aeronautics Administration and the Department of Natural Resources and so on ad infinitumon their
respective administrative regulations. Such an arrangement has been accepted as a fact of life of
modern governments and cannot be considered violative of due process as long as the cardinal rights
laid down by Justice Laurel in the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations 21 are
observed.

Whatever doubts may still remain regarding the rights of the parties in this case are resolved in favor
of the private respondent, in line with the express mandate of the Labor Code and the principle that
those with less in life should have more in law.

When the conflicting interests of labor and capital are weighed on the scales of social justice, the
heavier influence of the latter must be counter-balanced by the sympathy and compassion the law
must accord the underprivileged worker. This is only fair if he is to be given the opportunity and the
right to assert and defend his cause not as a subordinate but as a peer of management, with which
he can negotiate on even plane. Labor is not a mere employee of capital but its active and equal
partner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner. The temporary restraining
order dated December 10, 1986 is hereby LIFTED. It is so ordered.

TABLARIN VS. GUTTIEREZ

FELICIANO, J.:

The petitioners sought admission into colleges or schools of medicine for the school year 1987-1988.
However, the petitioners either did not take or did not successfully take the National Medical Admission
Test (NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education, one of the public respondents, and
administered by the private respondent, the Center for Educational Measurement (CEM).

On 5 March 1987, the petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region,
a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order
and Preliminary Injunction. The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and
Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing
Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985,
dated 23 August 1985 and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for
securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for taking
the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. After
hearing on the petition for issuance of preliminary injunction, the trial court denied said petition on 20
April 1987. The NMAT was conducted and administered as previously scheduled.

Petitioners accordingly filed this Special Civil Action for certiorari with this Court to set aside the Order
of the respondent judge denying the petition for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.

Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and 5946, known as the "Medical Act of
1959" defines its basic objectives in the following manner:

Section 1. Objectives. This Act provides for and shall govern (a) the standardization and regulation
of medical education (b) the examination for registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision, control
and regulation of the practice of medicine in the Philippines. (Underscoring supplied)

The statute, among other things, created a Board of Medical Education which is composed of (a) the
Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports or his duly authorized representative, as Chairman; (b) the
Secretary of Health or his duly authorized representative; (c) the Director of Higher Education or his
duly authorized representative; (d) the Chairman of the Medical Board or his duly authorized
representative; (e) a representative of the Philippine Medical Association; (f) the Dean of the College
of Medicine, University of the Philippines; (g) a representative of the Council of Deans of Philippine
Medical Schools; and (h) a representative of the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges, as
members. The functions of the Board of Medical Education specified in Section 5 of the statute include
the following:

(a) To determine and prescribe equirements for admission into a recognized college of medicine;

(b) To determine and prescribe requirements for minimum physical facilities of colleges of medicine,
to wit: buildings, including hospitals, equipment and supplies, apparatus, instruments, appliances,
laboratories, bed capacity for instruction purposes, operating and delivery rooms, facilities for
outpatient services, and others, used for didactic and practical instruction in accordance with modern
trends;

(c) To determine and prescribe the minimum number and minimum qualifications of teaching
personnel, including student-teachers ratio;

(d) To determine and prescribe the minimum required curriculum leading to the degree of Doctor of
Medicine;

(e) To authorize the implementation of experimental medical curriculum in a medical school that has
exceptional faculty and instrumental facilities. Such an experimental curriculum may prescribe
admission and graduation requirements other than those prescribed in this Act; Provided, That only
exceptional students shall be enrolled in the experimental curriculum;

(f) To accept applications for certification for admission to a medical school and keep a register of
those issued said certificate; and to collect from said applicants the amount of twenty-five pesos each
which shall accrue to the operating fund of the Board of Medical Education;

(g) To select, determine and approve hospitals or some departments of the hospitals for training which
comply with the minimum specific physical facilities as provided in subparagraph (b) hereof; and

(h) To promulgate and prescribe and enforce the necessary rules and regulations for the proper
implementation of the foregoing functions. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for applicants to medical schools:

Admission requirements. The medical college may admit any student who has not been convicted
by any court of competent jurisdiction of any offense involving moral turpitude and who presents (a) a
record of completion of a bachelor's degree in science or arts; (b) a certificate of eligibility for entrance
to a medical school from the Board of Medical Education; (c) a certificate of good moral character
issued by two former professors in the college of liberal arts; and (d) birth certificate. Nothing in this
act shall be construed to inhibit any college of medicine from establishing, in addition to the preceding,
other entrance requirements that may be deemed admissible.

xxx xxx x x x (Emphasis supplied)

MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of Education, Culture and Sports and dated
23 August 1985, established a uniform admission test called the National Medical Admission Test
(NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility for admission into medical
schools of the Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-1987. This Order goes on to state that:

2. The NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as an instrument toward upgrading the selection of
applicants for admission into the medical schools and its calculated to improve the quality of medical
education in the country. The cutoff score for the successful applicants, based on the scores on the
NMAT, shall be determined every year by the Board of Medical Education after consultation with the
Association of Philippine Medical Colleges. The NMAT rating of each applicant, together with the other
admission requirements as presently called for under existing rules, shall serve as a basis for the
issuance of the prescribed certificate of elegibility for admission into the medical colleges.

3. Subject to the prior approval of the Board of Medical Education, each medical college may give
other tests for applicants who have been issued a corresponding certificate of eligibility for
admission that will yield information on other aspects of the applicant's personality to complement the
information derived from the NMAT.

xxx xxx xxx

8. No applicant shall be issued the requisite Certificate of Eligibility for Admission (CEA), or admitted
for enrollment as first year student in any medical college, beginning the school year, 1986-87, without
the required NMAT qualification as called for under this Order. (Underscoring supplied)

Pursuant to MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, the private respondent Center conducted NMATs for
entrance to medical colleges during the school year 1986-1987. In December 1986 and in April 1987,
respondent Center conducted the NMATs for admission to medical colleges during the school year
1987.1988.1avvphi1

Petitioners raise the question of whether or not a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued to enjoin
the enforcement of Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No.
52, s. 1985, pending resolution of the issue of constitutionality of the assailed statute and
administrative order. We regard this issue as entirely peripheral in nature. It scarcely needs
documentation that a court would issue a writ of preliminary injunction only when the petitioner
assailing a statute or administrative order has made out a case of unconstitutionality strong enough to
overcome, in the mind of the judge, the presumption of constitutionality, aside from showing a clear
legal right to the remedy sought. The fundamental issue is of course the constitutionality of the statute
or order assailed.

1. The petitioners invoke a number of provisions of the 1987 Constitution which are, in their assertion,
violated by the continued implementation of Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act 2381, as amended,
and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985. The provisions invoked read as follows:

(a) Article 11, Section 11: "The state values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full
respect of human rights. "

(b) ArticleII, Section l3: "The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation building and shall
promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual and social well being. It shall inculcate
in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs."

(c) Article II, Section 17: "The State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts,
culture and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress and to promote total
human liberation and development. "

(d) Article XIV, Section l: "The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality
education at all levels and take appropriate steps to make such education accessible to all. "

(e) Article XIV, Section 5 (3): "Every citizen has a right to select a profession or course of study, subject
to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements."

Article II of the 1987 Constitution sets forth in its second half certain "State policies" which the
government is enjoined to pursue and promote. The petitioners here have not seriously undertaken to
demonstrate to what extent or in what manner the statute and the administrative order they assail
collide with the State policies embodied in Sections 11, 13 and 17. They have not, in other words,
discharged the burden of proof which lies upon them. This burden is heavy enough where the
constitutional provision invoked is relatively specific, rather than abstract, in character and cast in
behavioral or operational terms. That burden of proof becomes of necessity heavier where the
constitutional provision invoked is cast, as the second portion of Article II is cast, in language
descriptive of basic policies, or more precisely, of basic objectives of State policy and therefore highly
generalized in tenor. The petitioners have not made their case, even a prima facie case, and we are
not compelled to speculate and to imagine how the legislation and regulation impugned as
unconstitutional could possibly offend the constitutional provisions pointed to by the petitioners.

Turning to Article XIV, Section 1, of the 1987 Constitution, we note that once more petitioners have
failed to demonstrate that the statute and regulation they assail in fact clash with that provision. On
the contrary we may note-in anticipation of discussion infra that the statute and the regulation which
petitioners attack are in fact designed to promote "quality education" at the level of professional
schools. When one reads Section 1 in relation to Section 5 (3) of Article XIV as one must one cannot
but note that the latter phrase of Section 1 is not to be read with absolute literalness. The State is not
really enjoined to take appropriate steps to make quality education " accessible to all who might for
any number of reasons wish to enroll in a professional school but rather merely to make such education
accessible to all who qualify under "fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic
requirements. "

2. In the trial court, petitioners had made the argument that Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No.
2382, as amended, offend against the constitutional principle which forbids the undue delegation of
legislative power, by failing to establish the necessary standard to be followed by the delegate, the
Board of Medical Education. The general principle of non-delegation of legislative power, which both
flows from the reinforces the more fundamental rule of the separation and allocation of powers among
the three great departments of government,1 must be applied with circumspection in respect of statutes
which like the Medical Act of 1959, deal with subjects as obviously complex and technical as medical
education and the practice of medicine in our present day world. Mr. Justice Laurel stressed this point
47 years ago in Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc. vs. The Public Service Commission:2

One thing, however, is apparent in the development of the principle of separation of powers and that
is that the maxim of delegatus non potest delegare or delegate potestas non potest delegare, adopted
this practice (Delegibus et Consuetudiniis Anglia edited by G.E. Woodbine, Yale University Press,
1922, Vol. 2, p. 167) but which is also recognized in principle in the Roman Law (d. 17.18.3) has
been made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern government, giving rise to the adoption, within
certain limits of the principle of "subordinate legislation," not only in the United States and England but
in practically all modern governments. (People vs. Rosenthal and Osmena [68 Phil. 318, 1939].
Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of
governmental regulation and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly
growing tendency toward the delegation of greater power by the legislature, and toward the approval
of the practice by the courts." 3

The standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of rule making authority by an
administrative agency like the Board of Medical Education are necessarily broad and highly abstract.
As explained by then Mr. Justice Fernando in Edu v. Ericta4

The standard may be either expressed or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily
met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the
policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative
objective is public safety. What is sought to be attained as in Calalang v. Williams is "safe transit upon
the roads. 5

We believe and so hold that the necessary standards are set forth in Section 1 of the 1959 Medical
Act: "the standardization and regulation of medical education" and in Section 5 (a) and 7 of the same
Act, the body of the statute itself, and that these considered together are sufficient compliance with
the requirements of the non-delegation principle.

3. The petitioners also urge that the NMAT prescribed in MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, is an "unfair,
unreasonable and inequitable requirement," which results in a denial of due process. Again, petitioners
have failed to specify just what factors or features of the NMAT render it "unfair" and "unreasonable"
or "inequitable." They appear to suggest that passing the NMAT is an unnecessary requirement when
added on top of the admission requirements set out in Section 7 of the Medical Act of 1959, and other
admission requirements established by internal regulations of the various medical schools, public or
private. Petitioners arguments thus appear to relate to utility and wisdom or desirability of the NMAT
requirement. But constitutionality is essentially a question of power or authority: this Court has neither
commission or competence to pass upon questions of the desirability or wisdom or utility of legislation
or administrative regulation. Those questions must be address to the political departments of the
government not to the courts.

There is another reason why the petitioners' arguments must fail: the legislative and administrative
provisions impugned by them constitute, to the mind of the Court, a valid exercise of the police power
of the state. The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non-waivable power
and authority of the sovereign to secure and promote an the important interests and needs in a
word, the public order of the general community.6 An important component of that public order is
the health and physical safety and well being of the population, the securing of which no one can deny
is a legitimate objective of governmental effort and regulation.7

Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable relation
between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on the
one hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general community, on the other hand. This
question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the practice of
medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health
and safety of the public.8 That the power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the
power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine, is also well
recognized. thus, legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice
medicine first to take and pass medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid
exercises of governmental power.9 Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical educational
requirements i.e., the completion of prescribed courses in a recognized medical school for
admission to the medical profession, has also been sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory
authority of the state.10 What we have before us in the instant case is closely related: the regulation of
access to medical schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, as noted earlier, articulates the rationale of
regulation of this type: the improvement of the professional and technical quality of the graduates of
medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student body of the medical schools.
That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other
things, of limiting admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies
and eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high
standards in our professional schools in general, and medical schools in particular, in the current stage
of our social and economic development, are widely known.

We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means
for achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools"
and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country." Given the widespread use today
of such admission tests in, for instance, medical schools in the United States of America (the Medical
College Admission Test [MCAT]11 and quite probably in other countries with far more developed
educational resources than our own, and taking into account the failure or inability of the petitioners to
even attempt to prove otherwise, we are entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the
securing of the ultimate end of legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is
the protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those
who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma.

4. Petitioners have contended, finally, that MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, is in conflict with the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. More specifically, petitioners assert that that portion of the MECS
Order which provides that

the cutoff score for the successful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be determined
every-year by the Board of Medical 11 Education after consultation with the Association of Philippine
Medical Colleges. (Emphasis supplied)

infringes the requirements of equal protection. They assert, in other words, that students seeking
admission during a given school year, e.g., 1987-1988, when subjected to a different cutoff score than
that established for an, e.g., earlier school year, are discriminated against and that this renders the
MECS Order "arbitrary and capricious." The force of this argument is more apparent than real.
Different cutoff scores for different school years may be dictated by differing conditions obtaining
during those years. Thus, the appropriate cutoff score for a given year may be a function of such
factors as the number of students who have reached the cutoff score established the preceding year;
the number of places available in medical schools during the current year; the average score attained
during the current year; the level of difficulty of the test given during the current year, and so forth. To
establish a permanent and immutable cutoff score regardless of changes in circumstances from year
to year, may wen result in an unreasonable rigidity. The above language in MECS Order No. 52, far
from being arbitrary or capricious, leaves the Board of Medical Education with the measure of flexibility
needed to meet circumstances as they change.

We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores therein as a condition
for admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional imposition.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for certiorari is DISMISSED and the Order of the respondent trial court
denying the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS UNION, vs. THE HONORABLE MINISTER OF LABOR

FERNANDO, C.J.:

The constitutionality of the amendment to the Article of the Labor Code regarding strikes "affecting
the national interest" 1 is assailed in this petition which partakes of the nature of a prohibition
proceeding filed by the Free Telephone Workers Union. As amended, the Article now reads: "In
labor disputes causing or likely to cause strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national
interest, such as may occur in but not limited to public utilities, companies engaged in the
generation or distribution of energy, banks, hospitals, and those within export processing zones,
the Minister of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or
certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification
shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout. If one
has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out
employees shall immediately return to work and the employers shall immediately resume
operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the
strike or lockout. The Minister may seek the assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure
compliance with this provision as well as with such orders as he may issue to enforce the
same." 2 It is the submission of petitioner labor union that "Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 in so far as
it amends article 264 of the Labor Code delegating to the Honorable Minister of Labor and
Employment the power and discretion to assume jurisdiction and/or certify strikes for compulsory
arbitration to the National Labor Relations Commission, and in effect make or unmake the law on
free collective bargaining, is an undue delegation of legislative powers. 3 There is likewise the
assertion that such conferment of authority "may also ran (sic) contrary to the assurance of the
State to the workers' right to self-organization and collective bargaining. 4

On the CRUCIAL ISSUE PRESENTED; THE Court holds that petitioner was not able to make out
a case of an undue delegation of legislative power. There could be, however, an unconstitutional
application. For while the Constitution allows compulsory arbitration, it must be stressed that the
exercise of such competence cannot ignore the basic fundamental principle and state policy that
the state should afford protection to labor. 5 Whenever, therefore, it is resorted to in labor disputes
causing or likely to cause strikes or lockouts affecting national interest, the State still is required
to "assure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and
just and humane conditions of work. 6 At this stage of the litigation, however, in the absence of
factual determination by the Ministry of Labor and the National Labor Relations Commission, this
Court is not in a position to rule on whether or not there is an unconstitutional application. There
was not even a categorical assertion to that effect by petitioner's counsel which was indicative of
the care in his choice of words. He only assumed that the conferment of such authority may run
counter to the right of the workers to self-organization and collective bargaining. The petition then
cannot prosper.

The facts alleged in the petition relevant for the purpose of determining whether or not there is an
undue delegation of legislative power do not sustain the claim of petitioner union. On September
14, 1981, there was a notice of strike with the Ministry of Labor for unfair labor practices stating
the following grounds " 1) Unilateral and arbitrary implementation of a Code of Conduct, a copy
of which is attached, to the detriment of the interest of our members; 2) Illegal terminations and
suspensions of our officers and members as a result of the implementation of said Code of
Conduct; and 3) Unconfirmation (sic) of call sick leaves and its automatic treatment as Absence
Without Official Leave of Absence (AWOL) with corresponding suspensions, in violation of our
Collective Bargaining Agreement." 7 After which came, on September 15, 1981, the notification to
the Ministry that there was compliance with the two-thirds strike vote and other formal
requirements of the law and Implementing Rules. 8Several conciliation meetings called by the
Ministry followed, with petitioner manifesting its willingness to have a revised Code of Conduct
that would be fair to all concerned but with a plea that in the meanwhile the Code of Conduct
being imposed be suspended a position that failed to meet the approval of private respondent.
Subsequently, respondent, 9 on September 25, 1981, certified the labor dispute to the National
Labor Relations Commission for compulsory arbitration and enjoined any strike at the private
respondent's establishment. 10 The labor dispute was set for hearing by respondent National
Labor Relations Commission on September 28,
1981. 11 There was in the main an admission of the above relevant facts by public respondents.
Private respondent, following the lead of petitioner labor union, explained its side on the
controversy regarding the Code of Conduct, the provisions of which as alleged in the petition were
quite harsh, resulting in what it deemed indefinite preventive suspension apparently the principal
cause of the labor dispute. At this stage, as mentioned, it would be premature to discuss the
merits, or lack of it, of such claim, the matter being properly for the Ministry of Labor to determine.

The very next day after the filing of the petition, to be exact on September 29, 1981, this Court
issued the following resolution: "Considering the allegations contained, the issues raised and the
arguments adduced in the petition for certiorari with prayer for a restraining order, the Court
Resolved to (a) require the respondents to file an [answer], not a motion to dismiss, on or before
Wednesday, October 7, 1981; and (b) [Set] this case for hearing on Thursday, October 8, 1981
at 11:00 o'clock in the morning. 12 After the parties were duly heard, Solicitor General Estelito P.
Mendoza 13 appearing for the public respondents, the case was considered ripe for decision. 14

To repeat, while the unconstitutionality of the amendatory act has not been demonstrated, there
is no ruling on the question of unconstitutional application, especially so as to any alleged
infringement in the exercise of the power of compulsory arbitration of the specific modes provided
in the Constitution to assure compliance with the constitutional mandate to "afford protection to
labor" being at this stage premature.

1. The allegation that there is undue delegation of legislative powers cannot stand the test of
scrutiny. The power which he would deny the Minister of Labor by virtue of such principle is for
petitioner labor union within the competence of the President, who in its opinion can best
determine national interests, but only when a strike is in progress. 15 Such admission is qualified
by the assumption that the President "can make law," " an assertion which need not be passed
upon in this petition.'What possesses significance for the purpose of this litigation is that it is the
President who "Shall have control of the ministries. 16 It may happen, therefore, that a single
person may occupy a dual position of Minister and Assemblyman. To the extent, however, that
what is involved is the execution or enforcement of legislation, the Minister is an official of the
executive branch of the government. The adoption of certain aspects of a parliamentary system
in the amended Constitution does not alter its essentially presidential character. Article VII on the
presidency starts with this provision: "The President shall be the head of state and chief executive
of the Republic of the Philippines. 17 Its last section is an even more emphatic affirmation that it is
a presidential system that obtains in our government. Thus: "All powers vested in the President
of the Philippines under the 1935 Constitution and the laws of the land which are not herein
provided for or conferred upon any official shall be deemed and are hereby vested in the President
unless the Batasang Pambansa provides otherwise. 18 There is a provision, of course, on the
Prime Minister, but the Constitution is explicit that while he shall be the head of the Cabinet, it is
the President who nominates him from among the members of the Batasang Pambansa,
thereafter being "elected by a majority of all the members thereof. 19 He is primarily, therefore, a
Presidential choice. He need not even come from its elected members. He is responsible, along
with the Cabinet, to the Batasang Pambansa for the program of government but as "approved by
the
President. 20 His term of office as Prime Minister "shall commence from the date of his election
by the Batasang Pambansa and shall end on the date that the nomination of his successor is
submitted by the President to the Batasang Pambansa. Any other member of the Cabinet or the
Executive Committee may be removed at the discretion of the President. 21 Even the duration of
his term then depends on the Presidential pleasure, not on legislative approval or lack of it. During
his incumbency, he exercises supervision over all ministries, 22 a recognition of the important role
he plays in the implementation of the policy of the government, the legislation duly enacted in
pursuance thereof, and the decrees and orders of the President. To the Prime Minister can thus
be delegated the performance of the administrative functions of the President, who can then
devote more time and energy in the fulfillment of his exacting role as the national leader. 23 As the
only one whose constituency is national it is the President who, by virtue of his election by the
entire electorate, has an indisputable claim to speak for the country as a whole. Moreover, it is he
who is explicitly granted the greater power of control of such ministries. He continues to be the
Executive, the amplitude and scope of the functions entrusted to him in the formulation of policy
and its execution leading to the apt observation by Laski that there is not one aspect of which that
does not affect the lives of all. The Prime Minister can be of valuable assistance indeed to the
President in the discharge of his awesome responsibility, but it is the latter who is vested with
powers, aptly characterized by Justice Laurel in Planas v. Gil 24 as "broad and extraordinary
[being] expected to govern with a firm and steady hand without vexation or embarrassing
interference and much less dictation from any source. 25 It may be said that Justice Laurel was
referring to his powers under the 1935 Constitution. It suffices to refer anew to the last section of
the article of the present Constitution on the presidency to the effect that all powers vested in the
President of the Philippines under the 1935 Constitution remain with him. It cannot be emphasized
too strongly that under the 1935 Constitution. "The Executive power shall be vested in the
President of the Philippines. 26

2. A later decision, Villena v. Secretary of Interior 27 greater relevance to this case. The opinion of
Justice Laurel, again the ponente, made clear that under the presidential system, "all executive
and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the
various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in
cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or the law to act in person or the
exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive
departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in
the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. 28 At the time of the adoption of the present
Constitution on January 17, 1973, this Court had cited with approval the above ruling of Villena in
twelve cases. 29 It is particularly noteworthy that the first decision promulgated under the present
Constitution reiterating the above doctrine is Philippine American Management Co. v. Philippine
American Management Employees Association. 30 For the question therein involved, as in this
case, is the statutory grant of authority to the then Secretary of Labor, now Minister of Labor, by
the Minimum Wage Law to refer to the then existing Court of Industrial Relations for arbitration
the dispute that led to a strike. It is indisputable, according to the opinion, that in the very petition,
the Secretary of Labor on January 6, 1972, pursuant to the Minimum Wage Law, "endorsed the
controversy on the precise question of whether or not petitioner Philippine American Management
Company was complying with its mandatory terms. What was done by him, as a department head,
in the regular course of business and conformably to a statutory provision is, according to settled
jurisprudence that dates back to an authoritative pronouncement by Justice Laurel in 1939
in Villena v. Secretary of the Interior, presumptively the act of the President, who is the only
dignitary who could, paraphrasing the language of the decision, disapprove or reprobate it. What
other response could be legitimately expected from respondent Court then? It could not just
simply fold its hands and refuse to pass on the dispute. 31 The Villena doctrine was stressed even
more in denying a motion for reconsideration by a more extensive citation from the ponencia of
Justice Laurel: "Without minimizing the importance of the heads of the various departments, their
personality is in reality but the projection of that of the President. Stated otherwise, and as forcibly
characterized by Chief Justice Taft of the Supreme Court of the United States, "each head of a
department is, and must be, the President's alter ego in the matters of that department where the
President is required by law to exercise authority." ... Secretaries of departments, of course,
exercise certain powers under the law but the law cannot impair or in any way affect the
constitutional power of control and direction of the President. As a matter of executive policy, they
may be granted departmental autonomy as to certain matters but this is by mere concession of
the executive, in the absence of valid legislation in the particular field. If the President, then, is the
authority in the Executive Department, he assumes the corresponding responsibility. The head of
a department is a man of his confidence; he control and directs his acts; he appoints him and can
remove him at pleasure; he is the executive, not any of his secretaries. It is therefore logical that
he, the President, should be answerable for the acts of administration of the entire Executive
Department before his own conscience no less than before that undefined power of public opinion
which, in the language of Daniel Webster, is the last repository of popular government. 32 So it
should be in this case.
3. Even on the assumption, indulged in solely because of the claim earnestly and vigorously
pressed by counsel for petitioner, that the authority conferred to the Minister of Labor partakes of
a legislative character, still no case of an unlawful delegation of such power may be discerned.
That is the teaching from Edu v. Ericta 33 Thus: "What cannot be delegated is the authority under
the Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the completeness of the
statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature, To determine
whether or riot there is an undue delegation of legislative power, the inquiry must be directed to
the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its
functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his
authority. For a complex economy, that may indeed be the only way in which the legislative
process can go forward. A distinction has rightfully been made between delegation of power to
make the laws which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, which constitutionally
may not be done, and delegation of authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised
under and in pursuance of the law, to which no valid objection can be made. The Constitution is
thus not to be regarded as denying the legislature the necessary resources of flexibility and
practicability. To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies
at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters principle and lays down fundamental
policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus
defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency
to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected.
It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or
administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate
supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may be either express or implied. If the former,
the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out
specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. ...
This is to adhere to the recognition given expression by Justice Laurel in a decision [Pangasinan
Transportation v. Public Service Commission] announced not-too-long after the Constitution
came into force and effect that the principle of non-delegation 'has been made to adapt itself to
the complexities of modem governments giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the
principle of "subordinate legislation" not only in the United States and England but in practically
all modern governments He continued: 'Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life,
the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of
administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater
powers by the legislature and toward the approval of the practice by the courts.' Consistency with
the conceptual approach requires the reminder that what is delegated is authority non-legislative
in character, the completeness of the statute when it leaves the hands of Congress being
assumed. Our later decisions speak to the same effect. Thus from Justice J.B.L. Reyes in People
v. Exconde; 'It is well established in this jurisdiction that, while the making of laws is a non-
delegable activity that corresponds exclusively to Congress, nevertheless the latter may
constitutionally delegate authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given
legislation and effectuate its policies, for the reason that the legislature often finds it impracticable
(if not impossible) to anticipate and provide for the multifarious and complex situations that may
be met in carrying the law into effect. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane
to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction with it; but
conform to the standards that the law prescribes.' 34 Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 cannot be any
clearer, the coverage being limited to "strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national interest."

4. The strict rule on non-delegation was enunciated by Justice Laurel in People v. Vera, 35 Which
declared unconstitutional the then Probation Act. 36 Such an approach, conceded, by some
constitutionalists to be both scholarly and erudite nonetheless aroused apprehension for being
too rigid and inflexible. While no doubt appropriate in that particular case, the institution of a new
mode of treating offenders, it may pose difficulty for social and economic legislation needed by
the times. Even prior to the above-cited Pangasinan Transportation decision, Justice Laurel
himself in an earlier decision, People v. Rosenthal in 1939, promulgated less than two years after
Vera, pointed out that such doctrine of non-delegation "has been made to adopt itself to the
complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the
principle of 'subordinate legislation' not only in the United States and England but in practically all
modern governments. The difficulty lies in the fixing of the limit and extent of the authority. While
courts have undertaken to lay down general principles, the safest is to decide each case according
to its peculiar environment, having in mind the wholesome legislative purpose intended to be
achieved. 37 After which, in came the even more explicit formulation in Pangasinan Transportation
appearing in the quoted excerpt from Edu v. Ericta. There is no question therefore that there is a
marked drift in the direction of a more liberal approach. It is partly in recognition of the ever
increasing needs for the type of legislation allowing rule-making in accordance with standards,
explicit or implicit, discernible from a perusal of the entire enactment that in Agricultural Credit
and Cooperative Financing Administration v. Confederation of Unions in Government
Corporations and Offices" 38 the then Justice, now the retired Chief Justice and presently
Speaker, Makalintal had occasion to refer to "the growing complexities of society" as well as "the
increasing social challenges of the times. 39 It would be self-defeating in the extreme if the
legislation intended to cope with the grave social and economic problems of the present and
foreseeable future would founder on the rock of an unduly restrictive and decidedly unrealistic
meaning to be affixed to the doctrine of non-delegation. Fortunately with the retention in the
amended Constitution of some features of the 1973 Constitution as originally adopted leading to
an appreciable measure of concord and harmony between the policy-making branches of the
government, executive and legislative, the objection on the grounds of non- delegation would be
even less persuasive. It is worth repeating that the Prime Minister, while the choice of the
President, must have the approval of all members of the Batasang Pambansa. 40 At least the
majority of the cabinet members, the Ministers being appointed by the President, if heads of
ministries, shall come from its regional representatives. 41 So, also, while the Prime Minister and
the Cabinet are responsible to the Batasang Pambansa for the program of government, it must
be one "approved by the President. 42 While conceptually, there still exists a distinction between
the enactment of legislation and its execution, between formulation and implementation, the
fundamental principle of separation of powers of which non-delegation is a logical corollary
becomes even more flexible and malleable. Even in the case of the United States, with its
adherence to the Madisonian concept of separation of powers, President Kennedy could state
that its Constitution did not make "the Presidency and Congress rivals for power but partners for
progress [with the two branches] being trustees for the people, custodians of their
heritage. 43 With the closer relationship provided for by the amended Constitution in our case,
there is likely to be even more promptitude and dispatch in framing the policies and thereafter
unity and vigor in their execution. A rigid application of the non-delegation doctrine, therefore,
would be an obstacle to national efforts at development and progress. There is accordingly more
receptivity to laws leaving to administrative and executive agencies the adoption of such means
as may be necessary to effectuate a valid legislative purpose. It is worth noting that a highly-
respected legal scholar, Professor Jaffe as early as 1947, could speak of delegation as the
"dynamo of modern government. 44 He then went on to state that "the occasions for delegating
power to administrative offices [could be] compassed by a single generalization. 45 Thus: "Power
should be delegated where there is agreement that a task must be performed and it cannot be
effectively performed by the legislature without the assistance of a delegate or without an
expenditure of time so great as to lead to the neglect of equally important business. Delegation is
most commonly indicated where the relations to be regulated are highly technical or where their
regulation requires a course of continuous decision. 46 His perceptive study could rightfully
conclude that even in a strictly presidential system like that of the United States, the doctrine of
non-delegation reflects the American "political philosophy that insofar as possible issues be
settled [by legislative bodies], an essentially restrictive approach" may ignore "deep currents of
social force. 47 In plainer terms, and as applied to the Philippines under the amended Constitution
with the close ties that bind the executive and legislative departments, certain features of
parliamentarism having been retained, it may be a deterrent factor to much needed legislation.
The spectre of the non-delegation concept need not haunt, therefore, party caucuses, cabinet
sessions or legislative chambers.

5. By way of summary, this Court holds that Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 insofar as it empowers the
Minister of Labor to assume jurisdiction over labor disputes causing or likely to cause strikes or
lockouts adversely affecting the national interest and thereafter decide it or certify the same the
National Labor Relations Commission is not on its face unconstitutional for being violative of the
doctrine of non-delegation of legislative power. To repeat, there is no ruling on the question of
whether or not it has been unconstitutionally applied in this case, for being repugnant to the regime
of self-organization and free collective bargaining, as on the facts alleged, disputed by private
respondent, the matter is not ripe for judicial determination. It must be stressed anew, however,
that the power of compulsory arbitration, while allowable under the Constitution and quite
understandable in labor disputes affected with a national interest, to be free from the taint of
unconstitutionality, must be exercised in accordance with the constitutional mandate of protection
to labor. The arbiter then is called upon to take due care that in the decision to be reached, there
is no violation of "the rights of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of
tenure, and just and humane conditions of work. 48 It is of course manifest that there is such
unconstitutional application if a law "fair on its face and impartial in appearance (is) applied and
administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand. 49 It does not even have
to go that far. An instance of unconstitutional application would be discernible if what is ordained
by the fundamental law, the protection of labor, is ignored or disregarded.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. During the pendency of the compulsory
arbitration proceedings, both petitioner labor union and private respondent are enjoined to good
faith compliance with the provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. 130. No costs.

CEBU OXYGEN & ACETYLENE CO., INC. (COACO) vs. DOLE

GANCAYCO, J.;

The principal issue raised in this petition is whether or not an Implementing Order of the Secretary of
Labor and Employment (DOLE) can provide for a prohibition not contemplated by the law it seeks to
implement.
The undisputed facts are as follows:

Petitioner and the union of its rank and file employees, Cebu Oxygen, Acetylene and Central Visayas
Employees Association (COAVEA) entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) covering the
years 1986 to 1988. Pursuant thereto, the management gave salary increases as follows:

ARTICLE IV SALARIES/RICE RATION

Section 1. The COMPANY agrees that for and during the three (3) year effectivity of this
AGREEMENT, it will grant to all regular covered employees the following salary increases:

Salaries:

1) For the first year which will be paid on January 14, 1986 P200 to each covered employee.

IT IS HEREBY EXPRESSLY AGREED AND UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS PAY INCREASE SHALL
BE CREDITED AS PAYMENT TO ANY MANDATED GOVERNMENT WAGE ADJUSTMENT OR
ALLOWANCE INCREASES WHICH MAY BE ISSUED BY WAY OF LEGISLATION, DECREE OR
PRESIDENT

2) For the second year which will be paid on January 16, 1987-P 200 to each covered employee.

IT IS HEREBY EXPRESSLY AGREED AND UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS PAY INCREASE SHALL
BE CREDITED AS PAYMENT TO ANY DATED GOVERNMENT WAGE ADJUSTMENT OR
ALLOWANCE INCREASES WHICH MAY BE ISSUED BY WAY OF LEGISLATION, DECREE OR
PRESIDENTIAL EDICT COUNTED FROM THE ABOVE DATE TO THE NEXT INCREASE.

3) For the third year which will be paid on January 16, 1988 P300 to each covered employee.

IT IS HEREBY EXPRESSLY AGREED AND UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS PAY INCREASE SHALL
BE CREDITED AS PAYMENT TO ANY MANDATED GOVERNMENT WAGE ADJUSTMENT OR
ALLOWANCE INCREASES WHICH MAY BE ISSUED BY WAY OF LEGISLATION, DECREE OR
PRESIDENTIAL EDICT COUNTED FROM THE ABOVE DATE TO THE NEXT INCREASE.

IF THE WAGE ADJUSTMENT OF ALLOWANCE INCREASES DECREED BY LAW, LEGISLATION

OR PRESIDENTIAL qqqEDICT IN ANY PARTICULAR YEAR SHALL BE HIGHER THAN THE
FOREGOING INCREASES IN THAT PARTICULAR YEAR, THEN THE COMPANY SHALL PAY THE
DIFFERENCE.

On December 14, 1987, Republic Act No. 6640 was passed increasing the minimum wage, as follows:

Sec. 2. The statutory minimum wage rates of workers and employees in the private sector, whether
agricultural or non-agricultural, shall be increased by ten pesos (P10.00) per day, except non-
agricultural workers and employees outside Metro Manila who shall receive an increase of eleven
pesos (P11.00) per day: Provided, that those already receiving above the minimum wage up to one
hundred pesos (Pl 00.00 shall receive an increase of ten pesos (Pl 0.00) per day. Excepted from the
provisions of this Act are domestic helpers and persons employed in the personal service of another.

The Secretary of Labor issued the pertinent rules implementing the provisions of Republic Act No.
6640. Section 8 thereof provides:

Section 8. Wage Increase Under Individual/Collective Agreements. No wage increase shall be

credited as compliance with the increase prescribed herein unless expressly provided under valid
individual written/collective agreements; and, provided further, that such wage increase was granted
in anticipation of the legislated wage increase under the act. Such increases shall not include
anniversary wage increases provided on collective agreements.

In sum, Section 8 of the implementing rules prohibits the employer from crediting anniversary wage
increases negotiated under a collective bargaining agreement against such wage increases mandated
by Republic Act No. 6640.

Accordingly, petitioner credited the first year increase of P200.00 under the CBA and added the
difference of P61.66 (rounded to P62.00) and P31.00 to the monthly salary and the 13th month pay,
respectively, of its employees from the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6640 on December 14,1987 to
February 15, 1988.

On February 22, 1988, a Labor and Employment Development Officer, pursuant to Inspection
Authority No. 058-88, commenced a routine inspection of petitioner's establishment. Upon completion
of the inspection on March 10, 1988, and based on payrolls and other records, he found that petitioner
committed violations of the law as follows:
1. Under payment of Basic Wage per R.A. No. 6640 covering the period of two (2) months representing
208 employees who are not receiving wages above P100/day prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 6640
in the aggregate amount of EIGHTY THREE THOUSAND AND TWO HUNDRED PESOS
(P83,200.00); and

2. Under payment of 13th month pay for the year 1987, representing 208 employees who are not
receiving wages above P 100/day prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 6640 in the aggregate amount of
FORTY EIGHT THOUSAND AND FORTY EIGHT PESOS (P48,048.00).

On April 7, 1988, respondent Assistant Regional Director, issued an Order instructing petitioner to pay
its 208 employees the aggregate amount of P 131,248.00, computed as follows:

Computation sheet of differentials due to COACO-Cebu Workers.

Salary Differentials:

a) From December 14/87 to February 15/88

= P200.00/mo x 2 months

= P400.00

= P400 x 208 employees (who are not receiving above P100/day as wages before the effectivity of
R.A. No. 6640)

=P 83,200.00

b) 13th month pay differentials of the year 1987:

= P231.00 x 208 employees (who are not receiving above P100/day as wages before the effectivity of
RA. No. 6640)

=P48,048.00

Total = P131,248.00

In sum, the Assistant Regional Director ordered petitioner to pay the deficiency of P200.00 in the
monthly salary and P 231.00 in the 13th month pay of its employees for the period stated. Petitioner
protested the Order of the Regional Director on the ground that the anniversary wage increases under
the CBA can be credited against the wage increase mandated by Republic Act No. 6640. Hence,
petitioner contended that inasmuch as it had credited the first year increase negotiated under the CBA,
it was liable only for a salary differential of P 62.00 and a 13th month pay differential of P31.00.
Petitioner argued that the payment of the differentials constitutes full compliance with Republic Act
No. 6640. Apparently, the protest was not entertained. Petitioner brought the case immediately to this
Court without appealing the matter to the Secretary of Labor and Employment. On May 9,1988, this
Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the Assistant Regional Director from enforcing
his Order dated April 7, 1988.1 The thrust of the argument of petitioner is that Section 8 of the rules
implementing the provisions of Republic Act No. 6640 particularly the provision excluding anniversary
wage increases from being credited to the wage increase provided by said law is null and void on the
ground that the same unduly expands the provisions of the said law.

This petition is impressed with merit.

Public respondents aver that petitioner should have first appealed to the Secretary of Labor before
going to court. It is fundamental that in a case where only pure questions of law are raised, the doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies cannot apply because issues of law cannot be resolved with
finality by the administrative officer. Appeal to the administrative officer of orders involving questions
of law would be an exercise in futility since administrative officers cannot decide such issues with
finality.2 The questions raised in this petition are questions of law. Hence, the failure to exhaust
administrative remedies cannot be considered fatal to this petition.

As to the issue of the validity of Section 8 of the rules implementing Republic Act No. 6640, which
prohibits the employer from crediting the anniversary wage increases provided in collective bargaining
agreements, it is a fundamental rule that implementing rules cannot add or detract from the provisions
of law it is designed to implement. The provisions of Republic Act No. 6640, do not prohibit the crediting
of CBA anniversary wage increases for purposes of compliance with Republic Act No. 6640. The
implementing rules cannot provide for such a prohibition not contemplated by the law. Administrative
regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the
provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions.
The law itself cannot be expanded by such regulations. An administrative agency cannot amend an
act of Congress. 3 Thus petitioner's contention that the salary increases granted by it pursuant to the
existing CBA including anniversary wage increases should be considered in determining compliance
with the wage increase mandated by Republic Act No. 6640, is correct. However, the amount that
should only be credited to petitioner is the wage increase for 1987 under the CBA when the law took
effect. The wage increase for 1986 had already accrued in favor of the employees even before the
said law was enacted.

Petitioner therefor correctly credited its employees P62.00 for the differential of two (2) months
increase and P31.00 each for the differential in 13th month pay, after deducting the P200.00
anniversary wage increase for 1987 under the CBA. Indeed, it is stipulated in the CBA that in case
any wage adjustment or allowance increase decreed by law, legislation or presidential edict in any
particular year shall be higher than the foregoing increase in that particular year, then the company
(petitioner) shall pay the difference.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Order of the respondent Assistant Regional
Director dated April 7, 1988 is modified in that petitioner is directed to pay its 208 employees so entitled
the amount of P62.00 each as salary differential for two (2) months and P31.00 as 13th month pay
differential in full compliance with the provisions of Republic Act No. 6640. Section 8 of the rules
implementing Republic 6640, is hereby declared null and void in so far as it excludes the anniversary
wage increases negotiated under collective bargaining agreements from being credited to the wage
increase provided for under Republic Act No. 6440. This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

TATAD VS. SECRETARY OF ENERGY

PUNO, J.:

The petitions at bar challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8180 entitled "An Act
Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes".1 R.A. No. 8180 ends twenty six
(26) years of government regulation of the downstream oil industry. Few cases carry a surpassing
importance on the life of every Filipino as these petitions for the upswing and downswing of our
economy materially depend on the oscillation of oil.

First, the facts without the fat. Prior to 1971, there was no government agency regulating the oil
industry other than those dealing with ordinary commodities. Oil companies were free to enter and exit
the market without any government interference. There were four (4) refining companies (Shell, Caltex,
Bataan Refining Company and Filoil Refining) and six (6) petroleum marketing companies (Esso, Filoil,
Caltex, Getty, Mobil and Shell), then operating in the country.2

In 1971, the country was driven to its knees by a crippling oil crisis. The government, realizing that
petroleum and its products are vital to national security and that their continued supply at reasonable
prices is essential to the general welfare, enacted the Oil Industry Commission Act.3 It created the Oil
Industry Commission (OIC) to regulate the business of importing, exporting, re-exporting, shipping,
transporting, processing, refining, storing, distributing, marketing and selling crude oil, gasoline,
kerosene, gas and other refined petroleum products. The OIC was vested with the power to fix the
market prices of petroleum products, to regulate the capacities of refineries, to license new refineries
and to regulate the operations and trade practices of the industry.4

In addition to the creation of the OIC, the government saw the imperious need for a more active role
of Filipinos in the oil industry. Until the early seventies, the downstream oil industry was controlled by
multinational companies. All the oil refineries and marketing companies were owned
by foreigners whose economic interests did not always coincide with the interest of the Filipino. Crude
oil was transported to the country by foreign-controlled tankers. Crude processing was done locally by
foreign-owned refineries and petroleum products were marketed through foreign-owned retail outlets.
On November 9, 1973, President Ferdinand E. Marcos boldly created the Philippine National Oil
Corporation (PNOC) to break the control by foreigners of our oil industry.5 PNOC engaged in the
business of refining, marketing, shipping, transporting, and storing petroleum. It acquired ownership
of ESSO Philippines and Filoil to serve as its marketing arm. It bought the controlling shares of Bataan
Refining Corporation, the largest refinery in the country.6 PNOC later put up its own marketing
subsidiary Petrophil. PNOC operated under the business name PETRON Corporation. For the first
time, there was a Filipino presence in the Philippine oil market.

In 1984, President Marcos through Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 1956, created the Oil Price
Stabilization Fund (OPSF) to cushion the effects of frequent changes in the price of oil caused by
exchange rate adjustments or increase in the world market prices of crude oil and imported petroleum
products. The fund is used (1) to reimburse the oil companies for cost increases in crude oil and
imported petroleum products resulting from exchange rate adjustment and/or increase in world market
prices of crude oil, and (2) to reimburse oil companies for cost underrecovery incurred as a result of
the reduction of domestic prices of petroleum products. Under the law, the OPSF may be sourced
from:
1. any increase in the tax collection from ad valorem tax or customs duty imposed on petroleum
products subject to tax under P.D. No. 1956 arising from exchange rate adjustment,

2. any increase in the tax collection as a result of the lifting of tax exemptions of government
corporations, as may be determined by the Minister of Finance in consultation with the Board of
Energy,

3. any additional amount to be imposed on petroleum products to augment the resources of the fund
through an appropriate order that may be issued by the Board of Energy requiring payment of persons
or companies engaged in the business of importing, manufacturing and/or marketing petroleum
products, or

4. any resulting peso costs differentials in case the actual peso costs paid by oil companies in the
importation of crude oil and petroleum products is less than the peso costs computed using the
reference foreign exchange rate as fixed by the Board of Energy.7

By 1985, only three (3) oil companies were operating in the country Caltex, Shell and the
government-owned PNOC.

In May, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino signed Executive Order No. 172 creating the Energy
Regulatory Boardto regulate the business of importing, exporting, re-exporting, shipping, transporting,
processing, refining, marketing and distributing energy resources "when warranted and only when
public necessity requires." The Board had the following powers and functions:

1. Fix and regulate the prices of petroleum products;

2. Fix and regulate the rate schedule or prices of piped gas to be charged by duly franchised gas
companies which distribute gas by means of underground pipe system;

3. Fix and regulate the rates of pipeline concessionaries under the provisions of R.A. No. 387, as
amended . . . ;

4. Regulate the capacities of new refineries or additional capacities of existing refineries and license
refineries that may be organized after the issuance of (E.O. No. 172) under such terms and conditions
as are consistent with the national interest; and

5. Whenever the Board has determined that there is a shortage of any petroleum product, or when
public interest so requires, it may take such steps as it may consider necessary, including the
temporary adjustment of the levels of prices of petroleum products and the payment to the Oil Price
Stabilization Fund . . . by persons or entities engaged in the petroleum industry of such amounts as
may be determined by the Board, which may enable the importer to recover its cost of importation.8

On December 9, 1992, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7638 which created the Department of Energy to
prepare, integrate, coordinate, supervise and control all plans, programs, projects, and activities of the
government in relation to energy exploration, development, utilization, distribution and
conservation.9 The thrust of the Philippine energy program under the law was toward privatization of
government agencies related to energy, deregulation of the power and energy industry and reduction
of dependency on oil-fired plants.10 The law also aimed to encourage free and active participation and
investment by the private sector in all energy activities. Section 5(e) of the law states that "at the end
of four (4) years from the effectivity of this Act, the Department shall, upon approval of the President,
institute the programs and timetable of deregulation of appropriate energy projects and activities of
the energy industry."

Pursuant to the policies enunciated in R.A. No. 7638, the government approved the privatization of
Petron Corporation in 1993. On December 16, 1993, PNOC sold 40% of its equity in Petron
Corporation to the Aramco Overseas Company.

In March 1996, Congress took the audacious step of deregulating the downstream oil industry. It
enacted R.A. No.8180, entitled the "Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996." Under the
deregulated environment, "any person or entity may import or purchase any quantity of crude oil and
petroleum products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or own and operate refineries and other
downstream oil facilities and market such crude oil or use the same for his own requirement," subject
only to monitoring by the Department of
Energy.11

The deregulation process has two phases: the transition phase and the full deregulation phase. During
the transition phase, controls of the non-pricing aspects of the oil industry were to be lifted. The
following were to be accomplished: (1) liberalization of oil importation, exportation, manufacturing,
marketing and distribution, (2) implementation of an automatic pricing mechanism, (3) implementation
of an automatic formula to set margins of dealers and rates of haulers, water transport operators and
pipeline concessionaires, and (4) restructuring of oil taxes. Upon full deregulation, controls on the price
of oil and the foreign exchange cover were to be lifted and the OPSF was to be abolished.

The first phase of deregulation commenced on August 12, 1996.

On February 8, 1997, the President implemented the full deregulation of the Downstream Oil Industry
through E.O. No. 372.

The petitions at bar assail the constitutionality of various provisions of R.A No. 8180 and E.O. No. 372.

In G.R. No. 124360, petitioner Francisco S. Tatad seeks the annulment of section 5(b) of R.A. No.
8180. Section 5(b) provides:

b) Any law to the contrary notwithstanding and starting with the effectivity of this Act, tariff duty shall
be imposed and collected on imported crude oil at the rate of three percent (3%) and imported refined
petroleum products at the rate of seven percent (7%), except fuel oil and LPG, the rate for which shall
be the same as that for imported crude oil: Provided, That beginning on January 1, 2004 the tariff rate
on imported crude oil and refined petroleum products shall be the same: Provided, further, That this
provision may be amended only by an Act of Congress.

The petition is anchored on three arguments:

First, that the imposition of different tariff rates on imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum
products violates the equal protection clause. Petitioner contends that the 3%-7% tariff differential
unduly favors the three existing oil refineries and discriminates against prospective investors in the
downstream oil industry who do not have their own refineries and will have to source refined petroleum
products from abroad.

Second, that the imposition of different tariff rates does not deregulate the downstream oil industry but
instead controls the oil industry, contrary to the avowed policy of the law. Petitioner avers that the tariff
differential between imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum products bars the entry of other
players in the oil industry because it effectively protects the interest of oil companies with existing
refineries. Thus, it runs counter to the objective of the law "to foster a truly competitive market."

Third, that the inclusion of the tariff provision in section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 violates Section 26(1)
Article VI of the Constitution requiring every law to have only one subject which shall be expressed in
its title. Petitioner contends that the imposition of tariff rates in section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 is foreign
to the subject of the law which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry.

In G.R. No. 127867, petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Joker P. Arroyo, Enrique Garcia, Wigberto Tanada,
Flag Human Rights Foundation, Inc., Freedom from Debt Coalition (FDC) and Sanlakas contest the
constitutionality of section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392. Section 15 provides:

Sec. 15. Implementation of Full Deregulation. Pursuant to Section 5(e) of Republic Act No. 7638,
the DOE shall, upon approval of the President, implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil
industry not later than March 1997. As far as practicable, the DOE shall time the full deregulation when
the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the
exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable. Upon the implementation of the full
deregulation as provided herein, the transition phase is deemed terminated and the following laws are
deemed repealed:

xxx xxx xxx

E.O. No. 372 states in full, viz.:

WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 7638, otherwise known as the "Department of Energy Act of 1992,"
provides that, at the end of four years from its effectivity last December 1992, "the Department (of
Energy) shall, upon approval of the President, institute the programs and time table of deregulation of
appropriate energy projects and activities of the energy sector;"

WHEREAS, Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8180, otherwise known as the "Downstream Oil Industry
Deregulation Act of 1996," provides that "the DOE shall, upon approval of the President, implement
full deregulation of the downstream oil industry not later than March, 1997. As far as practicable, the
DOE shall time the full deregulation when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world
market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable;"

WHEREAS, pursuant to the recommendation of the Department of Energy, there is an imperative

need to implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry because of the following recent
developments: (i) depletion of the buffer fund on or about 7 February 1997 pursuant to the Energy
Regulatory Board's Order dated 16 January 1997; (ii) the prices of crude oil had been stable at $21-
$23 per barrel since October 1996 while prices of petroleum products in the world market had been
stable since mid-December of last year. Moreover, crude oil prices are beginning to soften for the last
few days while prices of some petroleum products had already declined; and (iii) the exchange rate of
the peso in relation to the US dollar has been stable for the past twelve (12) months, averaging at
around P26.20 to one US dollar;

WHEREAS, Executive Order No. 377 dated 31 October 1996 provides for an institutional framework
for the administration of the deregulated industry by defining the functions and responsibilities of
various government agencies;

WHEREAS, pursuant to Republic Act No. 8180, the deregulation of the industry will foster a truly
competitive market which can better achieve the social policy objectives of fair prices and adequate,
continuous supply of environmentally-clean and high quality petroleum products;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by the powers
vested in me by law, do hereby declare the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry.

In assailing section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392, petitioners offer the following submissions:

First, section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power to the President
and the Secretary of Energy because it does not provide a determinate or determinable standard to
guide the Executive Branch in determining when to implement the full deregulation of the downstream
oil industry. Petitioners contend that the law does not define when it is practicable for the Secretary of
Energy to recommend to the President the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry or when
the President may consider it practicable to declare full deregulation. Also, the law does not provide
any specific standard to determine when the prices of crude oil in the world market are considered to
be declining nor when the exchange rate of the peso to the US dollar is considered stable.

Second, petitioners aver that E.O. No. 392 implementing the full deregulation of the downstream oil
industry is arbitrary and unreasonable because it was enacted due to the alleged depletion of the
OPSF fund a condition not found in R.A. No. 8180.

Third, section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392 allow the formation of a de facto cartel among
the three existing oil companies Petron, Caltex and Shell in violation of the constitutional
prohibition against monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition.

Respondents, on the other hand, fervently defend the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No.
392. In addition, respondents contend that the issues raised by the petitions are not justiciable as they
pertain to the wisdom of the law. Respondents further aver that petitioners have no locus standi as
they did not sustain nor will they sustain direct injury as a result of the implementation of R.A. No.
8180.

The petitions were heard by the Court on September 30, 1997. On October 7, 1997, the Court ordered
the private respondents oil companies "to maintain the status quo and to cease and desist from
increasing the prices of gasoline and other petroleum fuel products for a period of thirty (30) days . . .
subject to further orders as conditions may warrant."

We shall now resolve the petitions on the merit. The petitions raise procedural and substantive issues
bearing on the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392. The procedural issues are: (1)
whether or not the petitions raise a justiciable controversy, and (2) whether or not the petitioners have
the standing to assail the validity of the subject law and executive order. The substantive issues are:
(1) whether or not section 5 (b) violates the one title one subject requirement of the Constitution;
(2) whether or not the same section violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution; (3) whether
or not section 15 violates the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of power; (4) whether or
not E.O. No. 392 is arbitrary and unreasonable; and (5) whether or not R.A. No. 8180 violates the
constitutional prohibition against monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition.

We shall first tackle the procedural issues. Respondents claim that the avalanche of arguments of the
petitioners assail the wisdom of R.A. No. 8180. They aver that deregulation of the downstream oil
industry is a policy decision made by Congress and it cannot be reviewed, much less be reversed by
this Court. In constitutional parlance, respondents contend that the petitions failed to raise a justiciable
controversy.

Respondents' joint stance is unnoteworthy. Judicial power includes not only the duty of the courts to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also the
duty to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.12 The courts, as
guardians of the Constitution, have the inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by
the legislature transcends the limit imposed by the fundamental law. Where a statute violates the
Constitution, it is not only the right but the duty of the judiciary to declare such act as unconstitutional
and void.13 We held in the recent case of Tanada v. Angara:14
xxx xxx xxx

In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution,
the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty
of the judiciary to settle the dispute. The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty
to adjudicate remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. Once a controversy
as to the application or interpretation of a constitutional provision is raised before this Court, it becomes
a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide.

Even a sideglance at the petitions will reveal that petitioners have raised constitutional issues which
deserve the resolution of this Court in view of their seriousness and their value as precedents. Our
statement of facts and definition of issues clearly show that petitioners are assailing R.A. No. 8180
because its provisions infringe the Constitution and not because the law lacks wisdom. The principle
of separation of power mandates that challenges on the constitutionality of a law should be resolved
in our courts of justice while doubts on the wisdom of a law should be debated in the halls of Congress.
Every now and then, a law may be denounced in court both as bereft of wisdom and constitutionally
infirmed. Such denunciation will not deny this Court of its jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of
the said law while prudentially refusing to pass on its wisdom.

The effort of respondents to question the locus standi of petitioners must also fall on barren ground.
In language too lucid to be misunderstood, this Court has brightlined its liberal stance on a
petitioner's locus standi where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to
the people.15 In Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan,16 we
stressed:

xxx xxx xxx

Objections to taxpayers' suit for lack of sufficient personality, standing or interest are, however, in the
main procedural matters. Considering the importance to the public of the cases at bar, and in keeping
with the Court's duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of
government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have
not abused the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and
has taken cognizance of these petitions.

There is not a dot of disagreement between the petitioners and the respondents on the far reaching
importance of the validity of RA No. 8180 deregulating our downstream oil industry. Thus, there is no
good sense in being hypertechnical on the standing of petitioners for they pose issues which are
significant to our people and which deserve our forthright resolution.

We shall now track down the substantive issues. In G.R. No. 124360 where petitioner is Senator Tatad,
it is contended that section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 on tariff differential violates the provision 17 of the
Constitution requiring every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in its title. We do
not concur with this contention. As a policy, this Court has adopted a liberal construction of the one
title one subject rule. We have consistently ruled18 that the title need not mirror, fully index or
catalogue all contents and minute details of a law. A law having a single general subject indicated in
the title may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they
are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of
such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject.19 We hold
that section 5(b) providing for tariff differential is germane to the subject of R.A. No. 8180 which is the
deregulation of the downstream oil industry. The section is supposed to sway prospective investors to
put up refineries in our country and make them rely less on imported petroleum.20 We shall, however,
return to the validity of this provision when we examine its blocking effect on new entrants to the oil
market.

We shall now slide to the substantive issues in G.R. No. 127867. Petitioners assail section 15 of R.A.
No. 8180 which fixes the time frame for the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry. We restate
its pertinent portion for emphasis, viz.:

Sec. 15. Implementation of Full Deregulation Pursuant to section 5(e) of Republic Act No. 7638,
the DOE shall, upon approval of the President, implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil
industry not later than March 1997. As far as practicable, the DOE shall time the full deregulation when
the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the
exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable . . .

Petitioners urge that the phrases "as far as practicable," "decline of crude oil prices in the world market"
and "stability of the peso exchange rate to the US dollar" are ambivalent, unclear and inconcrete in
meaning. They submit that they do not provide the "determinate or determinable standards" which can
guide the President in his decision to fully deregulate the downstream oil industry. In addition, they
contend that E.O. No. 392 which advanced the date of full deregulation is void for it illegally considered
the depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor.
The power of Congress to delegate the execution of laws has long been settled by this Court. As early
as 1916 in Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas vs. The Board of Public Utility
Commissioners,21 this Court thru, Mr. Justice Moreland, held that "the true distinction is between the
delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be,
and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of
the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made." Over the years, as the
legal engineering of men's relationship became more difficult, Congress has to rely more on the
practice of delegating the execution of laws to the executive and other administrative agencies. Two
tests have been developed to determine whether the delegation of the power to execute laws does
not involve the abdication of the power to make law itself. We delineated the metes and bounds of
these tests in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. VS. POEA,22 thus:

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative
power, viz: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be
complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislative such that when it reaches the
delegate the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must
be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority
and prevent the delegation from running riot. Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of
legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and
exercise a power essentially legislative.

The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet area in our constitutional landscape. As
sagely observed, delegation of legislative power has become an inevitability in light of the increasing
complexity of the task of government. Thus, courts bend as far back as possible to sustain the
constitutionality of laws which are assailed as unduly delegating legislative powers. Citing Hirabayashi
v. United States23 as authority, Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz states "that even if the law does not
expressly pinpoint the standard, the courts will bend over backward to locate the same elsewhere in
order to spare the statute, if it can, from constitutional infirmity."24

Given the groove of the Court's rulings, the attempt of petitioners to strike down section 15 on the
ground of undue delegation of legislative power cannot prosper. Section 15 can hurdle both the
completeness test and the sufficient standard test. It will be noted that Congress expressly provided
in R.A. No. 8180 that full deregulation will start at the end of March 1997, regardless of the occurrence
of any event. Full deregulation at the end of March 1997 is mandatory and the Executive has no
discretion to postpone it for any purported reason. Thus, the law is complete on the question of the
final date of full deregulation. The discretion given to the President is to advance the date of full
deregulation before the end of March 1997. Section 15 lays down the standard to guide the judgment
of the President he is to time it as far as practicable when the prices of crude oil and petroleum
products in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the
US dollar is stable.

Petitioners contend that the words "as far as practicable," "declining" and "stable" should have been
defined in R.A. No. 8180 as they do not set determinate or determinable standards. The stubborn
submission deserves scant consideration. The dictionary meanings of these words are well settled
and cannot confuse men of reasonable intelligence. Webster defines "practicable" as meaning
possible to practice or perform, "decline" as meaning to take a downward direction, and "stable" as
meaning firmly established.25 The fear of petitioners that these words will result in the exercise of
executive discretion that will run riot is thus groundless. To be sure, the Court has sustained the validity
of similar, if not more general standards in other cases.26

It ought to follow that the argument that E.O. No. 392 is null and void as it was based on indeterminate
standards set by R.A. 8180 must likewise fail. If that were all to the attack against the validity of E.O.
No. 392, the issue need not further detain our discourse. But petitioners further posit the thesis that
the Executive misapplied R.A. No. 8180 when it considered the depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor
in fully deregulating the downstream oil industry in February 1997. A perusal of section 15 of R.A. No.
8180 will readily reveal that it only enumerated two factors to be considered by the Department of
Energy and the Office of the President, viz.: (1) the time when the prices of crude oil and petroleum
products in the world market are declining, and (2) the time when the exchange rate of the peso in
relation to the US dollar is stable. Section 15 did not mention the depletion of the OPSF fund as a
factor to be given weight by the Executive before ordering full deregulation. On the contrary, the
debates in Congress will show that some of our legislators wanted to impose as a pre-condition to
deregulation a showing that the OPSF fund must not be in deficit.27 We therefore hold that the
Executive department failed to follow faithfully the standards set by R.A. No. 8180 when it considered
the extraneous factor of depletion of the OPSF fund. The misappreciation of this extra factor cannot
be justified on the ground that the Executive department considered anyway the stability of the prices
of crude oil in the world market and the stability of the exchange rate of the peso to the dollar. By
considering another factor to hasten full deregulation, the Executive department rewrote the standards
set forth in R.A. 8180. The Executive is bereft of any right to alter either by subtraction or addition the
standards set in R.A. No. 8180 for it has no power to make laws. To cede to the Executive the power
to make law is to invite tyranny, indeed, to transgress the principle of separation of powers. The
exercise of delegated power is given a strict scrutiny by courts for the delegate is a mere agent whose
action cannot infringe the terms of agency. In the cases at bar, the Executive co-mingled the factor of
depletion of the OPSF fund with the factors of decline of the price of crude oil in the world market and
the stability of the peso to the US dollar. On the basis of the text of E.O. No. 392, it is impossible to
determine the weight given by the Executive department to the depletion of the OPSF fund. It could
well be the principal consideration for the early deregulation. It could have been accorded an equal
significance. Or its importance could be nil. In light of this uncertainty, we rule that the early
deregulation under E.O. No. 392 constitutes a misapplication of R.A. No. 8180.

We now come to grips with the contention that some provisions of R.A. No. 8180 violate section 19 of
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. These provisions are:

(1) Section 5 (b) which states "Any law to the contrary notwithstanding and starting with the
effectivity of this Act, tariff duty shall be imposed and collected on imported crude oil at the rate of
three percent (3%) and imported refined petroleum products at the rate of seven percent (7%) except
fuel oil and LPG, the rate for which shall be the same as that for imported crude oil. Provided, that
beginning on January 1, 2004 the tariff rate on imported crude oil and refined petroleum products shall
be the same. Provided, further, that this provision may be amended only by an Act of Congress."

(2) Section 6 which states "To ensure the security and continuity of petroleum crude and products
supply, the DOE shall require the refiners and importers to maintain a minimum inventory equivalent
to ten percent (10%) of their respective annual sales volume or forty (40) days of supply, whichever is
lower," and

(3) Section 9 (b) which states "To ensure fair competition and prevent cartels and monopolies in
the downstream oil industry, the following acts shall be prohibited:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Predatory pricing which means selling or offering to sell any product at a price unreasonably below
the industry average cost so as to attract customers to the detriment of competitors.

On the other hand, section 19 of Article XII of the Constitution allegedly violated by the aforestated
provisions of R.A. No. 8180 mandates: "The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the
public interest so requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed."

A monopoly is a privilege or peculiar advantage vested in one or more persons or companies,

consisting in the exclusive right or power to carry on a particular business or trade, manufacture a
particular article, or control the sale or the whole supply of a particular commodity. It is a form of market
structure in which one or only a few firms dominate the total sales of a product or service.28 On the
other hand, a combination in restraint of trade is an agreement or understanding between two or more
persons, in the form of a contract, trust, pool, holding company, or other form of association, for the
purpose of unduly restricting competition, monopolizing trade and commerce in a certain commodity,
controlling its, production, distribution and price, or otherwise interfering with freedom of trade without
statutory authority.29 Combination in restraint of trade refers to the means while monopoly refers to the
end.30

Article 186 of the Revised Penal Code and Article 28 of the New Civil Code breathe life to this
constitutional policy. Article 186 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes monopolization and creation of
combinations in restraint of
trade, 31 while Article 28 of the New Civil Code makes any person who shall engage in unfair
competition liable for damages.32

Respondents aver that sections 5(b), 6 and 9(b) implement the policies and objectives of R.A. No.
8180. They explain that the 4% tariff differential is designed to encourage new entrants to invest in
refineries. They stress that the inventory requirement is meant to guaranty continuous domestic supply
of petroleum and to discourage fly-by-night operators. They also submit that the prohibition against
predatory pricing is intended to protect prospective entrants. Respondents manifested to the Court
that new players have entered the Philippines after deregulation and have now captured 3% 5% of
the oil market.

The validity of the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 8180 has to be decided in light of the letter and spirit
of our Constitution, especially section 19, Article XII. Beyond doubt, the Constitution committed us to
the free enterprise system but it is a system impressed with its own distinctness. Thus, while the
Constitution embraced free enterprise as an economic creed, it did not prohibit per se the operation
of monopolies which can, however, be regulated in the public interest.33 Thus too, our free enterprise
system is not based on a market of pure and unadulterated competition where the State pursues a
strict hands-off policy and follows the let-the-devil devour the hindmost rule. Combinations in restraint
of trade and unfair competitions are absolutely proscribed and the proscription is directed both against
the State as well as the private sector.34 This distinct free enterprise system is dictated by the need to
achieve the goals of our national economy as defined by section 1, Article XII of the Constitution which
are: more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth; a sustained increase in the
amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the benefit of the people; and an expanding
productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all, especially the underprivileged. It also calls
for the State to protect Filipino enterprises against unfair competition and trade practices.

Section 19, Article XII of our Constitution is anti-trust in history and in spirit. It espouses competition.
The desirability of competition is the reason for the prohibition against restraint of trade, the reason for
the interdiction of unfair competition, and the reason for regulation of unmitigated monopolies.
Competition is thus the underlying principle of section 19, Article XII of our Constitution which cannot
be violated by R.A. No. 8180. We subscribe to the observation of Prof. Gellhorn that the objective of
anti-trust law is "to assure a competitive economy, based upon the belief that through competition
producers will strive to satisfy consumer wants at the lowest price with the sacrifice of the fewest
resources. Competition among producers allows consumers to bid for goods and services, and thus
matches their desires with society's opportunity costs."35 He adds with appropriateness that there is a
reliance upon "the operation of the 'market' system (free enterprise) to decide what shall be produced,
how resources shall be allocated in the production process, and to whom the various products will be
distributed. The market system relies on the consumer to decide what and how much shall be
produced, and on competition, among producers to determine who will manufacture it."

Again, we underline in scarlet that the fundamental principle espoused by section 19, Article XII of the
Constitution is competition for it alone can release the creative forces of the market. But the
competition that can unleash these creative forces is competition that is fighting yet is fair. Ideally, this
kind of competition requires the presence of not one, not just a few but several players. A market
controlled by one player (monopoly) or dominated by a handful of players (oligopoly) is hardly the
market where honest-to-goodness competition will prevail. Monopolistic or oligopolistic markets
deserve our careful scrutiny and laws which barricade the entry points of new players in the market
should be viewed with suspicion.

Prescinding from these baseline propositions, we shall proceed to examine whether the provisions of
R.A. No. 8180 on tariff differential, inventory reserves, and predatory prices imposed substantial
barriers to the entry and exit of new players in our downstream oil industry. If they do, they have to be
struck down for they will necessarily inhibit the formation of a truly competitive market. Contrariwise,
if they are insignificant impediments, they need not be stricken down.

In the cases at bar, it cannot be denied that our downstream oil industry is operated and controlled by
an oligopoly, a foreign oligopoly at that. Petron, Shell and Caltex stand as the only major league
players in the oil market. All other players belong to the lilliputian league. As the dominant players,
Petron, Shell and Caltex boast of existing refineries of various capacities. The tariff differential of 4%
therefore works to their immense benefit. Yet, this is only one edge of the tariff differential. The other
edge cuts and cuts deep in the heart of their competitors. It erects a high barrier to the entry of new
players. New players that intend to equalize the market power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by building
refineries of their own will have to spend billions of pesos. Those who will not build refineries but
compete with them will suffer the huge disadvantage of increasing their product cost by 4%. They will
be competing on an uneven field. The argument that the 4% tariff differential is desirable because it
will induce prospective players to invest in refineries puts the cart before the horse. The first need is
to attract new players and they cannot be attracted by burdening them with heavy disincentives.
Without new players belonging to the league of Petron, Shell and Caltex, competition in our
downstream oil industry is an idle dream.

The provision on inventory widens the balance of advantage of Petron, Shell and Caltex against
prospective new players. Petron, Shell and Caltex can easily comply with the inventory requirement
of R.A. No. 8180 in view of their existing storage facilities. Prospective competitors again will find
compliance with this requirement difficult as it will entail a prohibitive cost. The construction cost of
storage facilities and the cost of inventory can thus scare prospective players. Their net effect is to
further occlude the entry points of new players, dampen competition and enhance the control of the
market by the three (3) existing oil companies.

Finally, we come to the provision on predatory pricing which is defined as ". . . selling or offering to sell
any product at a price unreasonably below the industry average cost so as to attract customers to the
detriment of competitors." Respondents contend that this provision works against Petron, Shell and
Caltex and protects new entrants. The ban on predatory pricing cannot be analyzed in isolation. Its
validity is interlocked with the barriers imposed by R.A. No. 8180 on the entry of new players. The
inquiry should be to determine whether predatory pricing on the part of the dominant oil companies is
encouraged by the provisions in the law blocking the entry of new players. Text-writer
Hovenkamp,36 gives the authoritative answer and we quote:

xxx xxx xxx

The rationale for predatory pricing is the sustaining of losses today that will give a firm monopoly profits
in the future. The monopoly profits will never materialize, however, if the market is flooded with new
entrants as soon as the successful predator attempts to raise its price. Predatory pricing will be
profitable only if the market contains significant barriers to new entry.
As aforediscsussed, the 4% tariff differential and the inventory requirement are significant barriers
which discourage new players to enter the market. Considering these significant barriers established
by R.A. No. 8180 and the lack of players with the comparable clout of PETRON, SHELL and CALTEX,
the temptation for a dominant player to engage in predatory pricing and succeed is a chilling reality.
Petitioners' charge that this provision on predatory pricing is anti-competitive is not without reason.

Respondents belittle these barriers with the allegation that new players have entered the market since
deregulation. A scrutiny of the list of the alleged new players will, however, reveal that not one belongs
to the class and category of PETRON, SHELL and CALTEX. Indeed, there is no showing that any of
these new players intends to install any refinery and effectively compete with these dominant oil
companies. In any event, it cannot be gainsaid that the new players could have been more in number
and more impressive in might if the illegal entry barriers in R.A. No. 8180 were not erected.

We come to the final point. We now resolve the total effect of the untimely deregulation, the imposition
of 4% tariff differential on imported crude oil and refined petroleum products, the requirement of
inventory and the prohibition on predatory pricing on the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8180. The
question is whether these offending provisions can be individually struck down without invalidating the
entire R.A. No. 8180. The ruling case law is well stated by author Agpalo,37 viz.:

xxx xxx xxx

The general rule is that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution, while another
part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. The presence
of a separability clause in a statute creates the presumption that the legislature intended separability,
rather than complete nullity of the statute. To justify this result, the valid portion must be so far
independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the legislature would have enacted it
by itself if it had supposed that it could not constitutionally enact the other. Enough must remain to
make a complete, intelligible and valid statute, which carries out the legislative intent. . . .

The exception to the general rule is that when the parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and
connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to
warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, the nullity of one part will vitiate the rest.
In making the parts of the statute dependent, conditional, or connected with one another, the
legislature intended the statute to be carried out as a whole and would not have enacted it if one part
is void, in which case if some parts are unconstitutional, all the other provisions thus dependent,
conditional, or connected must fall with them.

R.A. No. 8180 contains a separability clause. Section 23 provides that "if for any reason, any section
or provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional or invalid, such parts not affected thereby shall
remain in full force and effect." This separability clause notwithstanding, we hold that the offending
provisions of R.A. No. 8180 so permeate its essence that the entire law has to be struck down. The
provisions on tariff differential, inventory and predatory pricing are among the principal props of R.A.
No. 8180. Congress could not have deregulated the downstream oil industry without these provisions.
Unfortunately, contrary to their intent, these provisions on tariff differential, inventory and predatory
pricing inhibit fair competition, encourage monopolistic power and interfere with the free interaction of
market forces. R.A. No. 8180 needs provisions to vouchsafe free and fair competition. The need for
these vouchsafing provisions cannot be overstated. Before deregulation, PETRON, SHELL and
CALTEX had no real competitors but did not have a free run of the market because government
controls both the pricing and non-pricing aspects of the oil industry. After deregulation, PETRON,
SHELL and CALTEX remain unthreatened by real competition yet are no longer subject to control by
government with respect to their pricing and non-pricing decisions. The aftermath of R.A. No. 8180 is
a deregulated market where competition can be corrupted and where market forces can be
manipulated by oligopolies.

The fall out effects of the defects of R.A. No. 8180 on our people have not escaped Congress. A lot of
our leading legislators have come out openly with bills seeking the repeal of these odious and
offensive provisions in R.A. No. 8180. In the Senate, Senator Freddie Webb has filed S.B. No. 2133
which is the result of the hearings conducted by the Senate Committee on Energy. The hearings
revealed that (1) there was a need to level the playing field for the new entrants in the downstream oil
industry, and (2) there was no law punishing a person for selling petroleum products at unreasonable
prices. Senator Alberto G. Romulo also filed S.B. No. 2209 abolishing the tariff differential beginning
January 1, 1998. He declared that the amendment ". . . would mean that instead of just three (3) big
oil companies there will be other major oil companies to provide more competitive prices for the market
and the consuming public." Senator Heherson T . Alvarez, one of the principal proponents of R.A. No.
8180, also filed S.B. No. 2290 increasing the penalty for violation of its section 9. It is his opinion as
expressed in the explanatory note of the bill that the present oil companies are engaged in cartelization
despite R.A. No. 8180, viz,:

xxx xxx xxx

Since the downstream oil industry was fully deregulated in February 1997, there have been eight (8)
fuel price adjustments made by the three oil majors, namely: Caltex Philippines, Inc.; Petron
Corporation; and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation. Very noticeable in the price adjustments
made, however, is the uniformity in the pump prices of practically all petroleum products of the three
oil companies. This, despite the fact, that their selling rates should be determined by a combination of
any of the following factors: the prevailing peso-dollar exchange rate at the time payment is made for
crude purchases, sources of crude, and inventory levels of both crude and refined petroleum products.
The abovestated factors should have resulted in different, rather than identical prices.

The fact that the three (3) oil companies' petroleum products are uniformly priced suggests collusion,
amounting to cartelization, among Caltex Philippines, Inc., Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell
Petroleum Corporation to fix the prices of petroleum products in violation of paragraph (a), Section 9
of R.A. No. 8180.

To deter this pernicious practice and to assure that present and prospective players in the downstream
oil industry conduct their business with conscience and propriety, cartel-like activities ought to be
severely penalized.

Senator Francisco S. Tatad also filed S.B. No. 2307 providing for a uniform tariff rate on imported
crude oil and refined petroleum products. In the explanatory note of the bill, he declared in no uncertain
terms that ". . . the present set-up has raised serious public concern over the way the three oil
companies have uniformly adjusted the prices of oil in the country, an indication of a possible existence
of a cartel or a cartel-like situation within the downstream oil industry. This situation is mostly attributed
to the foregoing provision on tariff differential, which has effectively discouraged the entry of new
players in the downstream oil industry."

In the House of Representatives, the moves to rehabilitate R.A. No. 8180 are equally
feverish. Representative Leopoldo E. San Buenaventura has filed H.B. No. 9826 removing the tariff
differential for imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum products. In the explanatory note of
the bill, Rep. Buenaventura explained:

xxx xxx xxx

As we now experience, this difference in tariff rates between imported crude oil and imported refined
petroleum products, unwittingly provided a built-in-advantage for the three existing oil refineries in the
country and eliminating competition which is a must in a free enterprise economy. Moreover, it created
a disincentive for other players to engage even initially in the importation and distribution of refined
petroleum products and ultimately in the putting up of refineries. This tariff differential virtually created
a monopoly of the downstream oil industry by the existing three oil companies as shown by their
uniform and capricious pricing of their products since this law took effect, to the great disadvantage of
the consuming public.

Thus, instead of achieving the desired effects of deregulation, that of free enterprise and a level playing
field in the downstream oil industry, R.A. 8180 has created an environment conducive to cartelization,
unfavorable, increased, unrealistic prices of petroleum products in the country by the three existing
refineries.

Representative Marcial C. Punzalan, Jr., filed H.B. No. 9981 to prevent collusion among the present
oil companies by strengthening the oversight function of the government, particularly its ability to
subject to a review any adjustment in the prices of gasoline and other petroleum products. In the
explanatory note of the bill, Rep. Punzalan, Jr., said:

xxx xxx xxx

To avoid this, the proposed bill seeks to strengthen the oversight function of government, particularly
its ability to review the prices set for gasoline and other petroleum products. It grants the Energy
Regulatory Board (ERB) the authority to review prices of oil and other petroleum products, as may be
petitioned by a person, group or any entity, and to subsequently compel any entity in the industry to
submit any and all documents relevant to the imposition of new prices. In cases where the Board
determines that there exist collusion, economic conspiracy, unfair trade practice, profiteering and/or
overpricing, it may take any step necessary to protect the public, including the readjustment of the
prices of petroleum products. Further, the Board may also impose the fine and penalty of
imprisonment, as prescribed in Section 9 of R.A. 8180, on any person or entity from the oil industry
who is found guilty of such prohibited acts.

By doing all of the above, the measure will effectively provide Filipino consumers with a venue where
their grievances can be heard and immediately acted upon by government.

Thus, this bill stands to benefit the Filipino consumer by making the price-setting process more
transparent and making it easier to prosecute those who perpetrate such prohibited acts as collusion,
overpricing, economic conspiracy and unfair trade.
Representative Sergio A.F . Apostol filed H.B. No. 10039 to remedy an omission in R.A. No. 8180
where there is no agency in government that determines what is "reasonable" increase in the prices
of oil products. Representative Dente O. Tinga, one of the principal sponsors of R.A. No. 8180, filed
H.B. No. 10057 to strengthen its anti-trust provisions. He elucidated in its explanatory note:

xxx xxx xxx

The definition of predatory pricing, however, needs to be tightened up particularly with respect to the
definitive benchmark price and the specific anti-competitive intent. The definition in the bill at hand
which was taken from the Areeda-Turner test in the United States on predatory pricing resolves the
questions. The definition reads, "Predatory pricing means selling or offering to sell any oil product at
a price below the average variable cost for the purpose of destroying competition, eliminating a
competitor or discouraging a competitor from entering the market."

The appropriate actions which may be resorted to under the Rules of Court in conjunction with the oil
deregulation law are adequate. But to stress their availability and dynamism, it is a good move to
incorporate all the remedies in the law itself. Thus, the present bill formalizes the concept of
government intervention and private suits to address the problem of antitrust violations. Specifically,
the government may file an action to prevent or restrain any act of cartelization or predatory pricing,
and if it has suffered any loss or damage by reason of the antitrust violation it may recover damages.
Likewise, a private person or entity may sue to prevent or restrain any such violation which will result
in damage to his business or property, and if he has already suffered damage he shall recover treble
damages. A class suit may also be allowed.

To make the DOE Secretary more effective in the enforcement of the law, he shall be given additional
powers to gather information and to require reports.

Representative Erasmo B. Damasing filed H.B. No. 7885 and has a more unforgiving view of R.A. No.
8180. He wants it completely repealed. He explained:

xxx xxx xxx

Contrary to the projections at the time the bill on the Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation was
discussed and debated upon in the plenary session prior to its approval into law, there aren't any new
players or investors in the oil industry. Thus, resulting in practically a cartel or monopoly in the oil
industry by the three (3) big oil companies, Caltex, Shell and Petron. So much so, that with the
deregulation now being partially implemented, the said oil companies have succeeded in increasing
the prices of most of their petroleum products with little or no interference at all from the government.
In the month of August, there was an increase of Fifty centavos (50) per liter by subsidizing the same
with the OPSF, this is only temporary as in March 1997, or a few months from now, there will be full
deregulation (Phase II) whereby the increase in the prices of petroleum products will be fully absorbed
by the consumers since OPSF will already be abolished by then. Certainly, this would make the lives
of our people, especially the unemployed ones, doubly difficult and unbearable.

The much ballyhooed coming in of new players in the oil industry is quite remote considering that
these prospective investors cannot fight the existing and well established oil companies in the country
today, namely, Caltex, Shell and Petron. Even if these new players will come in, they will still have no
chance to compete with the said three (3) existing big oil companies considering that there is an
imposition of oil tariff differential of 4% between importation of crude oil by the said oil refineries paying
only 3% tariff rate for the said importation and 7% tariff rate to be paid by businessmen who have no
oil refineries in the Philippines but will import finished petroleum/oil products which is being taxed with
7% tariff rates.

So, if only to help the many who are poor from further suffering as a result of unmitigated increase in
oil products due to deregulation, it is a must that the Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of
1996, or R.A.8180 be repealed completely.

Various resolutions have also been filed in the Senate calling for an immediate and comprehensive
review of R.A. No. 8180 to prevent the downpour of its ill effects on the people. Thus, S. Res. No. 574
was filed by Senator Gloria M. Macapagal entitled Resolution "Directing the Committee on Energy to
Inquire Into The Proper Implementation of the Deregulation of the Downstream Oil Industry and Oil
Tax Restructuring As Mandated Under R.A. Nos. 8180 and 8184, In Order to Make The Necessary
Corrections In the Apparent Misinterpretation Of The Intent And Provision Of The Laws And Curb The
Rising Tide Of Disenchantment Among The Filipino Consumers And Bring About The Real Intentions
And Benefits Of The Said Law." Senator Blas P. Ople filed S. Res. No. 664 entitled resolution
"Directing the Committee on Energy To Conduct An Inquiry In Aid Of Legislation To Review The
Government's Oil Deregulation Policy In Light Of The Successive Increases In Transportation,
Electricity And Power Rates, As well As Of Food And Other Prime Commodities And Recommend
Appropriate Amendments To Protect The Consuming Public." Senator Ople observed:

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREAS, since the passage of R.A. No. 8180, the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) has imposed
successive increases in oil prices which has triggered increases in electricity and power rates,
transportation fares, as well as in prices of food and other prime commodities to the detriment of our
people, particularly the poor;

WHEREAS, the new players that were expected to compete with the oil cartel-Shell, Caltex and
Petron-have not come in;

WHEREAS, it is imperative that a review of the oil deregulation policy be made to consider appropriate
amendments to the existing law such as an extension of the transition phase before full deregulation
in order to give the competitive market enough time to develop;

WHEREAS, the review can include the advisability of providing some incentives in order to attract the
entry of new oil companies to effect a dynamic competitive market;

WHEREAS, it may also be necessary to defer the setting up of the institutional framework for full
deregulation of the oil industry as mandated under Executive Order No. 377 issued by President
Ramos last October 31, 1996 . . .

Senator Alberto G. Romulo filed S. Res. No. 769 entitled resolution "Directing the Committees on
Energy and Public Services In Aid Of Legislation To Assess The Immediate Medium And Long Term
Impact of Oil Deregulation On Oil Prices And The Economy." Among the reasons for the resolution is
the finding that "the requirement of a 40-day stock inventory effectively limits the entry of other oil firms
in the market with the consequence that instead of going down oil prices will rise."

Parallel resolutions have been filed in the House of Representatives. Representative Dante
O. Tinga filed H. Res. No. 1311 "Directing The Committee on Energy To Conduct An Inquiry, In Aid of
Legislation, Into The Pricing Policies And Decisions Of The Oil Companies Since The Implementation
of Full Deregulation Under the Oil Deregulation Act (R.A. No. 8180) For the Purpose of Determining
In the Context Of The Oversight Functions Of Congress Whether The Conduct Of The Oil Companies,
Whether Singly Or Collectively, Constitutes Cartelization Which Is A Prohibited Act Under R.A. No.
8180, And What Measures Should Be Taken To Help Ensure The Successful Implementation Of The
Law In Accordance With Its Letter And Spirit, Including Recommending Criminal Prosecution Of the
Officers Concerned Of the Oil Companies If Warranted By The Evidence, And For Other
Purposes." Representatives Marcial C. Punzalan, Jr. Dante O. Tinga and Antonio E. Bengzon III filed
H.R. No. 894 directing the House Committee on Energy to inquire into the proper implementation of
the deregulation of the downstream oil industry. House Resolution No. 1013 was also filed
by Representatives Edcel C. Lagman, Enrique T . Garcia, Jr. and Joker P. Arroyo urging the President
to immediately suspend the implementation of E.O. No. 392.

In recent memory there is no law enacted by the legislature afflicted with so much constitutional
deformities as R.A. No. 8180. Yet, R.A. No. 8180 deals with oil, a commodity whose supply and price
affect the ebb and flow of the lifeblood of the nation. Its shortage of supply or a slight, upward spiral in
its price shakes our economic foundation. Studies show that the areas most impacted by the
movement of oil are food manufacture, land transport, trade, electricity and water.38 At a time when
our economy is in a dangerous downspin, the perpetuation of R.A. No. 8180 threatens to multiply the
number of our people with bent backs and begging bowls. R.A. No. 8180 with its anti-competition
provisions cannot be allowed by this Court to stand even while Congress is working to remedy its
defects.

The Court, however, takes note of the plea of PETRON, SHELL and CALTEX to lift our restraining
order to enable them to adjust upward the price of petroleum and petroleum products in view of the
plummeting value of the peso. Their plea, however, will now have to be addressed to the Energy
Regulatory Board as the effect of the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 8180 is to revive
the former laws it repealed.39 The length of our return to the regime of regulation depends on Congress
which can fasttrack the writing of a new law on oil deregulation in accord with the Constitution.

With this Decision, some circles will chide the Court for interfering with an economic decision of
Congress. Such criticism is charmless for the Court is annulling R.A. No. 8180 not because it disagrees
with deregulation as an economic policy but because as cobbled by Congress in its present form, the
law violates the Constitution. The right call therefor should be for Congress to write a new oil
deregulation law that conforms with the Constitution and not for this Court to shirk its duty of striking
down a law that offends the Constitution. Striking down R.A. No. 8180 may cost losses in quantifiable
terms to the oil oligopolists. But the loss in tolerating the tampering of our Constitution is not
quantifiable in pesos and centavos. More worthy of protection than the supra-normal profits of private
corporations is the sanctity of the fundamental principles of the Constitution. Indeed when confronted
by a law violating the Constitution, the Court has no option but to strike it down dead. Lest it is missed,
the Constitution is a covenant that grants and guarantees both the political and economic rights of the
people. The Constitution mandates this Court to be the guardian not only of the people's political rights
but their economic rights as well. The protection of the economic rights of the poor and the powerless
is of greater importance to them for they are concerned more with the exoterics of living and less with
the esoterics of liberty. Hence, for as long as the Constitution reigns supreme so long will this Court
be vigilant in upholding the economic rights of our people especially from the onslaught of the powerful.
Our defense of the people's economic rights may appear heartless because it cannot be half-hearted.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions are granted. R.A. No. 8180 is declared unconstitutional and E.O.
No. 372 void.

SO ORDERED

PEOPLE VS. DACUYCUY

REGALADO, J.:

Involved in this special civil action is the unique situation, to use an euphemistic phrase, of an
alternative penal sanction of imprisonment imposed by law but without a specification as to the term
or duration thereof.

As a consequence of such legislative faux pas or oversight, the petition at bar seeks to set aside the
decision of the then Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branch IV, dated September 8,1976, 1 penned by
herein respondent judge and granting the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction filed by herein private respondents and docketed therein as Civil Case No. 5428, as well as
his resolution of October 19, 1976 2 denying the motions for reconsideration filed by the parties therein.
Subject of said decision were the issues on jurisdiction over violations of Republic Act No. 4670,
otherwise known as the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, and the constitutionality of Section 32
thereof.

In a complaint filed by the Chief of Police of Hindang, Leyte on April 4, 1975, herein private respondents
Celestino S. Matondo, Segundino A. Caval and Cirilo M. Zanoria, public school officials of Leyte, were
charged before the Municipal Court of Hindang, Leyte in Criminal Case No. 555 thereof for violation of
Republic Act No. 4670. The case was set for arraignment and trial on May 29, 1975. At the arraignment,
the herein private respondents, as the accused therein, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Immediately
thereafter, they orally moved to quash the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the offense allegedly
due to the correctional nature of the penalty of imprisonment prescribed for the offense. The motion
to quash was subsequently reduced to writing on June 13, 1975. 3 On August 21, 1975, the municipal
court denied the motion to quash for lack of merit. 4 On September 2, 1975, private respondents filed a
motion for the reconsideration of the aforesaid denial order on the same ground of lack of jurisdiction,
but with the further allegation that the facts charged do not constitute an offense considering that
Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670 is null and void for being unconstitutional. In an undated order
received by the counsel for private respondents on October 20,1975, the motion for reconsideration
was denied. 5

On October 26, 1975, private respondents filed a petitions 6 for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction before the former Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branch VIII, where it was
docketed as Civil Case No. B-622, to restrain the Municipal Judge, Provincial Fiscal and Chief of Police of
Hindang, Leyte from proceeding with the trial of said Criminal Case No. 555 upon the ground that the
former Municipal Court of Hindang had no jurisdiction over the offense charged. Subsequently, an
amended petition 7 alleged the additional ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense
since the penal provision, which is Section 32 of said law, is unconstitutional for the following reasons:
(1) It imposes a cruel and unusual punishment, the term of imprisonment being unfixed and may run
to reclusion perpetua; and (2) It also constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power, the duration
of the penalty of imprisonment being solely left to the discretion of the court as if the latter were the
legislative department of the Government.

On March 30, 1976, having been advised that the petition of herein private respondents was related to
Criminal Case No. 1978 for violation of Presidential Decree No. 442 previously transferred from Branch
VIII to Branch IV of the erstwhile Court of First Instance of Leyte, Judge Fortunate B. Cuna of the former
branch transferred the said petition to the latter branch for further proceedings and where it was
subsequently docketed therein as Civil Case No. 5428. 8 On March 15, 1976, the petitioner herein filed
an opposition to the admission of the said amended petitions 9 but respondent judge denied the same
in his resolution of April 20, 1976. 10 On August 2, 1976, herein petitioner filed a supplementary
memorandum in answer to the amended petition. 11

On September 8, 1976, respondent judge rendered the aforecited challenged decision holding in
substance that Republic Act No. 4670 is valid and constitutional but cases for its violation fall outside
of the jurisdiction of municipal and city courts, and remanding the case to the former Municipal Court
of Hindang, Leyte only for preliminary investigation.
As earlier stated, on September 25, 1976, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. 12 Likewise,
private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration of the lower court's decision but the same was
limited only to the portion thereof which sustains the validity of Section 32 of Republic Act No.
4670. 13 Respondent judge denied both motions for reconsideration in a resolution dated October 19,
1976. 14

The instant petition to review the decision of respondent judge poses the following questions of law:
(1) Whether the municipal and city courts have jurisdiction over violations of Republic Act No. 4670;
and (2) Whether Section 32 of said Republic Act No. 4670 is constitutional.

We shall resolve said queries in inverse order, since prior determination of the constitutionality of the
assailed provision of the law involved is necessary for the adjudication of the jurisdictional issue raised
in this petition.

1. The disputed section of Republic Act No. 4670 provides:

Sec. 32. Penal Provision. A person who shall wilfully interfere with, restrain or coerce any teacher in
the exercise of his rights guaranteed by this Act or who shall in any other manner commit any act to
defeat any of the provisions of this Act shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not less than one
hundred pesos nor more than one thousand pesos, or by imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.
(Emphasis supplied).

Two alternative and distinct penalties are consequently imposed, to wit: (a) a fine ranging from P100.00
to P1,000.00; or (b) imprisonment. It is apparent that the law has no prescribed period or term for the
imposable penalty of imprisonment. While a minimum and maximum amount for the penalty of fine is
specified, there is no equivalent provision for the penalty of imprisonment, although both appear to be
qualified by the phrase "in the discretion of the court.

Private respondents contend that a judicial determination of what Congress intended to be the duration
of the penalty of imprisonment would be violative of the constitutional prohibition against undue
delegation of legislative power, and that the absence of a provision on the specific term of
imprisonment constitutes that penalty into a cruel and unusual form of punishment. Hence, it is
vigorously asserted, said Section 32 is unconstitutional.

The basic principle underlying the entire field of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation
is that in the enactment of legislation a constitutional measure is thereby created. In every case where
a question is raised as to the constitutionality of an act, the court employs this doctrine in scrutinizing
the terms of the law. In a great volume of cases, the courts have enunciated the fundamental rule that
there is a presumption in favor of the constitutionality of a legislative enactment. 15

It is contended that Republic Act No. 4670 is unconstitutional on the ground that the imposable but
indefinite penalty of imprisonment provided therein constitutes a cruel and unusual punishment, in
defiance of the express mandate of the Constitution. This contention is inaccurate and should be
rejected.

We note with approval the holding of respondent judge that

The rule is established beyond question that a punishment authorized by statute is not cruel or unusual
or disproportionate to the nature of the offense unless it is a barbarous one unknown to the law or so
wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community.
Based on the principle, our Supreme Court has consistently overruled contentions of the defense that
the punishment of fine or imprisonment authorized by the statute involved is cruel and unusual.
(Legarda vs. Valdez, 1 Phil. 146; U.S. vs. Pico, 18 Phil. 386; People vs. Garay, 2 ACR 149; People vs.
Estoista 93 Phil. 647; People vs. Tiu Ua. 96 Phil. 738; People vs. Dionisio, 22 SCRA 1299). The language
of our Supreme Court in the first of the cases it decided after the last world war is appropriate here:

The Constitution directs that 'Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment
inflicted.' The prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is generally aimed at the form or character
of the punishment rather than its severity in respect of duration or amount, and apply to punishments
which never existed in America, or which public sentiment has regarded as cruel or obsolete (15 Am.
Jur., p. 172), for instance there (sic) inflicted at the whipping post, or in the pillory, burning at the stake,
breaking on the wheel, disemboweling, and the like (15 Am. Jur. Supra, Note 35 L.R.A. p. 561). Fine and
imprisonment would not thus be within the prohibition.' (People vs. de la Cruz, 92 Phil. 906). 16

The question that should be asked, further, is whether the constitutional prohibition looks only to the
form or nature of the penalty and not to the proportion between the penalty and the crime.
The answer thereto may be gathered from the pronouncement in People vs. Estoista, 17 where an
"excessive" penalty was upheld as constitutional and was imposed but with a recommendation for
executive clemency, thus:

... If imprisonment from 5 to 10 years is out of proportion to the present case in view of certain
circumstances, the law is not to be declared unconstitutional for this reason. The constitutionality of an
act of the legislature is not to be judged in the light of exceptional cases. Small transgressors for which
the heavy net was not spread are, like small fishes, bound to be caught, and it is to meet such a situation
as this that courts are advised to make a recommendation to the Chief Executive for clemency or
reduction of the penalty...

That the penalty is grossly disproportionate to the crime is an insufficient basis to declare the law
unconstitutional on the ground that it is cruel and unusual. The fact that the punishment authorized by
the statute is severe does not make it cruel or unusual. 18 In addition, what degree of disproportion the
Court will consider as obnoxious to the Constitution has still to await appropriate determination in due
time since, to the credit of our legislative bodies, no decision has as yet struck down a penalty for being
"cruel and unusual" or "excessive."

We turn now to the argument of private respondents that the entire penal provision in question should
be invalidated as an 49 "undue delegation of legislative power, the duration of penalty of imprisonment
being solely left to the discretion of the court as if the lattter were the legislative department of the
government."

Petitioner counters that the discretion granted therein by the legislature to the courts to determine the
period of imprisonment is a matter of statutory construction and not an undue delegation of legislative
power. It is contended that the prohibition against undue delegation of legislative power is concerned
only with the delegation of power to make laws and not to interpret the same. It is also submitted that
Republic Act No. 4670 vests in the courts the discretion, not to fix the period of imprisonment, but to
choose which of the alternative penalties shall be imposed.

Respondent judge sustained these theses of petitioner on his theory that "the principle of separation
of powers is not violated by vesting in courts discretion as to the length of sentence or amount of fine
between designated limits in sentencing persons convicted of crime. In such instance, the exercise of
judicial discretion by the courts is not an attempt to use legislative power or to prescribe and create a
law but is an instance of the administration of justice and the application of existing laws to the facts
of particular cases." 19 What respondent judge obviously overlooked is his own reference to penalties
"between designated limits."

In his commentary on the Constitution of the United States, Corwin wrote:

.. At least three distinct ideas have contributed to the development of the principle that legislative
power cannot be delegated. One is the doctrine of separation of powers: Why go to the trouble of
separating the three powers of government if they can straightway remerge on their own motion? The
second is the concept of due process of laws which precludes the transfer of regulatory functions to
private persons. Lastly, there is the maxim of agency "Delegata potestas non potest delegari." 20

An apparent exception to the general rule forbidding the delegation of legislative authority to the courts
exists in cases where discretion is conferred upon said courts. It is clear, however, that when the courts
are said to exercise a discretion, it must be a mere legal discretion which is exercised in discerning the
course prescribed by law and which, when discerned, it is the duty of the court to follow. 21

So it was held by the Supreme Court of the United States that the principle of separation of powers is
not violated by vesting in courts discretion as to the length of sentence or the amount of fine between
designated limits in sentencing persons convicted of a crime. 22

In the case under consideration, the respondent judge erronneously assumed that since the penalty of
imprisonment has been provided for by the legislature, the court is endowed with the discretion to
ascertain the term or period of imprisonment. We cannot agree with this postulate. It is not for the
courts to fix the term of imprisonment where no points of reference have been provided by the
legislature. What valid delegation presupposes and sanctions is an exercise of discretion to fix the
length of service of a term of imprisonment which must be encompassed within specific or designated
limits provided by law, the absence of which designated limits well constitute such exercise as an undue
delegation, if not-an outright intrusion into or assumption, of legislative power.

Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670 provides for an indeterminable period of imprisonment, with
neither a minimum nor a maximum duration having been set by the legislative authority. The courts
are thus given a wide latitude of discretion to fix the term of imprisonment, without even the benefit
of any sufficient standard, such that the duration thereof may range, in the words of respondent judge,
from one minute to the life span of the accused. Irremissibly, this cannot be allowed. It vests in the
courts a power and a duty essentially legislative in nature and which, as applied to this case, does
violence to the rules on separation of powers as well as the non-delegability of legislative powers. This
time, the preumption of constitutionality has to yield.

On the foregoing considerations, and by virtue of the separability clause in Section 34 of Republic Act
No. 4670, the penalty of imprisonment provided in Section 32 thereof should be, as it is hereby, declared
unconstitutional.

It follows, therefore, that a ruling on the proper interpretation of the actual term of imprisonment, as
may have been intended by Congress, would be pointless and academic. It is, however, worth
mentioning that the suggested application of the so-called rule or principle of parallelism, whereby a
fine of P1,000.00 would be equated with one year of imprisonment, does not merit judicial acceptance.
A fine, whether imposed as a single or as an alternative penalty, should not and cannot be reduced or
converted into a prison term; it is to be considered as a separate and independent penalty consonant
with Article 26 of the Revised Penal Code. 23 It is likewise declared a discrete principal penalty in the
graduated scales of penalties in Article 71 of said Code. There is no rule for transmutation of the amount
of a fine into a term of imprisonment. Neither does the Code contain any provision that a fine when
imposed in conjunction with imprisonment is subordinate to the latter penalty. In sum, a fine is as much
a principal penalty as imprisonment. Neither is subordinate to the other. 24

2. It has been the consistent rule that the criminal jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute
in force at the time of the commencement of the action. 25

With the deletion by invalidation of the provision on imprisonment in Section 32 of Republic Act No.
4670, as earlier discussed, the imposable penalty for violations of said law should be limited to a fine of
not less than P100.00 and not more than P1, 000.00, the same to serve as the basis in determining which
court may properly exercise jurisdiction there over. When the complaint against private respondents
was filed in 1975, the pertinent law then in force was Republic Act No. 296, as amended by Republic Act
No. 3828, under which crimes punishable by a fine of not more than P 3,000.00 fall under the original
jurisdiction of the former municipal courts. Consequently, Criminal Case No. 555 against herein private
respondents falls within the original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of Hindang, Leyte.

WHEREFORE, the decision and resolution of respondent judge are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Criminal Case No. 555 filed against private respondents herein is hereby ordered to be remanded to the
Municipal Trial Court of Hindang, Leyte for trial on the merits.

SO ORDERED.

EMPLOYERS CONFEDERATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs
NATIONAL WAGES AND PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION

SARMIENTO, J.:

The petition is given due course and the various pleadings submitted being sufficient to aid the Court
in the proper resolution of the basic issues raised in this case, we decide it without further ado.

The Employers Confederation of the Philippines (ECOP) is questioning the validity of Wage Order No.
NCR-01-A dated October 23, 1990 of the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board, National
Capital Region, promulgated pursuant to the authority of Republic Act No. 6727, "AN ACT TO
RATIONALIZE WAGE POLICY DETERMINATION BY ESTABLISHING THE MECHANISM AND PROPER
STANDARDS THEREFORE, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ARTICLE 99 OF, AND INCORPORATING
ARTICLES 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 126, AND 127 INTO, PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 442 AS AMENDED,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, FIXING NEW WAGE RATES, PROVIDING
WAGE INCENTIVES FOR INDUSTRIAL DISPERSAL TO THE COUNTRYSIDE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES,"
was approved by the President on June 9, 1989. Aside from providing new wage rates, 1 the "Wage
Rationalization Act" also provides, among other things, for various Regional Tripartite Wages and
Productivity Boards in charge of prescribing minimum wage rates for all workers in the various
regions2 and for a National Wages and Productivity Commission to review, among other functions, wage
levels determined by the boards.3
On October 15, 1990, the Regional Board of the National Capital Region issued Wage Order No. NCR-
01, increasing the minimum wage by P17.00 daily in the National Capital Region. 4 The Trade Union
Congress of the Philippines (TUCP) moved for reconsideration; so did the Personnel Management
Association of the Philippines (PMAP).5 ECOP opposed.

On October 23, 1990, the Board issued Wage Order No. NCR-01-A amending Wage Order No. NCR-01,
as follows:

Section 1. Upon the effectivity of this Wage Order, all workers and employees in the private sector in
the National Capital Region already receiving wages above the statutory minimum wage rates up to
one hundred and twenty-five pesos (P125.00) per day shall also receive an increase of seventeen pesos
(P17.00) per day.

ECOP appealed to the National Wages and Productivity Commission. On November 6, 1990, the
Commission promulgated an Order, dismissing the appeal for lack of merit. On November 14, 1990, the
Commission denied reconsideration.

The Orders of the Commission (as well as Wage Order No. NCR-01-A) are the subject of this petition, in
which. ECOP assails the board's grant of an "across-the-board" wage increase to workers already being
paid more than existing minimum wage rates (up to P125. 00 a day) as an alleged excess of authority,
and alleges that under the Republic Act No. 6727, the boards may only prescribe "minimum wages,"
not determine "salary ceilings." ECOP likewise claims that Republic Act No. 6727 is meant to promote
collective bargaining as the primary mode of settling wages, and in its opinion, the boards can not
preempt collective bargaining agreements by establishing ceilings. ECOP prays for the nullification of
Wage Order No. NCR 01-A and for the "reinstatement" of Wage Order No. NCR-01.

The Court directed the Solicitor General to comment on behalf of the Government, and in the Solicitor
General's opinion, the Board, in prescribing an across-the-board hike did not, in reality, "grant
additional or other benefits to workers and employees, such as the extension of wage increases to
employees and workers already receiving more than minimum wages ..."6 but rather, fixed minimum
wages according to the "salary-ceiling method."

ECOP insists, in its reply, that wage is a legislative function, and Republic Act No. 6727 delegated to the
regional boards no more "than the power to grant minimum wage adjustments"7 and "in the absence
of clear statutory authority,"8 the boards may no more than adjust "floor wages."9

The Solicitor General, in his rejoinder, argues that Republic Act No. 6727 is intended to correct "wage
distortions" and the salary-ceiling method (of determining wages) is meant, precisely, to rectify wage
distortions.10

The Court is inclined to agree with the Government. In the National Wages and Productivity
Commission's Order of November 6, 1990, the Commission noted that the determination of wages has
generally involved two methods, the "floor-wage" method and the "salary-ceiling" method. We quote:

Historically, legislation involving the adjustment of the minimum wage made use of two methods. The
first method involves the fixing of determinate amount that would be added to the prevailing statutory
minimum wage. The other involves "the salary-ceiling method" whereby the wage adjustment is
applied to employees receiving a certain denominated salary ceiling. The first method was adopted in
the earlier wage orders, while the latter method was used in R.A. Nos. 6640 and 6727. Prior to this, the
salary-ceiling method was also used in no less than eleven issuances mandating the grant of cost-of-
living allowances (P.D. Nos. 525, 1123, 1614, 1634, 1678, 1713 and Wage Order Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6).
The shift from the first method to the second method was brought about by labor disputes arising from
wage distortions, a consequence of the implementation of the said wage orders. Apparently, the wage
order provisions that wage distortions shall be resolved through the grievance procedure was perceived
by legislators as ineffective in checking industrial unrest resulting from wage order implementations.
With the establishment of the second method as a practice in minimum wage fixing, wage distortion
disputes were minimized.11

As the Commission noted, the increasing trend is toward the second mode, the salary-cap method,
which has reduced disputes arising from wage distortions (brought about, apparently, by the floor-wage
method). Of course, disputes are appropriate subjects of collective bargaining and grievance
procedures, but as the Commission observed and as we are ourselves agreed, bargaining has helped
very little in correcting wage distortions. Precisely, Republic Act No. 6727 was intended to rationalize
wages, first, by providing for full-time boards to police wages round-the-clock, and second, by giving
the boards enough powers to achieve this objective. The Court is of the opinion that Congress meant
the boards to be creative in resolving the annual question of wages without labor and management
knocking on the legislature's door at every turn. The Court's opinion is that if Republic No. 6727
intended the boards alone to set floor wages, the Act would have no need for a board but an accountant
to keep track of the latest consumer price index, or better, would have Congress done it as the need
arises, as the legislature, prior to the Act, has done so for years. The fact of the matter is that the Act
sought a "thinking" group of men and women bound by statutory standards. We quote:

ART. 124. Standards / Criteria for Minimum Wage Fixing. The regional minimum wages to be
established by the Regional Board shall be as nearly adequate as is economically feasible to maintain
the minimum standards of living necessary for the health, efficiency and general well-being of the
employees within the framework of the national economic and social development program. In the
determination of such regional minimum wages, the Regional Board shall, among other relevant
factors, consider the following:

(a) The demand for living wages;

(b) Wage adjustment vis-a-vis the consumer price index;

(c) The cost of living and changes or increases therein;

(d) The needs of workers and their families;

(e) The need to induce industries to invest in the countryside;

(f) Improvements in standards of living;

(g) The prevailing wage levels;

(h) Fair return of the capital invested and capacity to pay of emphasis employers;

(i) Effects of employment generation and family income; and

(j) The equitable distribution of income and wealth along the imperatives of economic and social
development.12

The Court is not convinced that the Regional Board of the National Capital Region, in decreeing an
across-the-board hike, performed an unlawful act of legislation. It is true that wage-fixing, like rate
constitutes an act Congress;13 it is also true, however, that Congress may delegate the power to fix
rates14 provided that, as in all delegations cases, Congress leaves sufficient standards. As this Court has
indicated, it is impressed that the above-quoted standards are sufficient, and in the light of the floor-
wage method's failure, the Court believes that the Commission correctly upheld the Regional Board of
the National Capital Region.

Apparently, ECOP is of the mistaken impression that Republic Act No. 6727 is meant to "get the
Government out of the industry" and leave labor and management alone in deciding wages. The Court
does not think that the law intended to deregulate the relation between labor and capital for several
reasons: (1) The Constitution calls upon the State to protect the rights of workers and promote their
welfare;15 (2) the Constitution also makes it a duty of the State "to intervene when the common goal so
demands" in regulating property and property relations;16 (3) the Charter urges Congress to give priority
to the enactment of measures, among other things, to diffuse the wealth of the nation and to regulate
the use of property;17 (4) the Charter recognizes the "just share of labor in the fruits of production;"18 (5)
under the Labor Code, the State shall regulate the relations between labor and management;19(6) under
Republic Act No. 6727 itself, the State is interested in seeing that workers receive fair and equitable
wages;20 and (7) the Constitution is primarily a document of social justice, and although it has
recognized the importance of the private sector,21 it has not embraced fully the concept of laissez
faire22 or otherwise, relied on pure market forces to govern the economy; We can not give to the Act a
meaning or intent that will conflict with these basic principles.

It is the Court's thinking, reached after the Court's own study of the Act, that the Act is meant to
rationalize wages, that is, by having permanent boards to decide wages rather than leaving wage
determination to Congress year after year and law after law. The Court is not of course saying that the
Act is an effort of Congress to pass the buck, or worse, to abdicate its duty, but simply, to leave the
question of wages to the expertise of experts. As Justice Cruz observed, "[w]ith the proliferation of
specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more
necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the power of subordinate legislation' as it is caned."23

The Labor Code defines "wage" as follows:

"Wage" paid to any employee shall mean the remuneration or earnings, however designated, capable
of being expressed in terms of money, whether fixed or ascertained on a time, task, piece, or
commission basis, or other method of calculating the same, which is payable by an employer to an
employee under a written or unwritten contract of employment for work done or to be done, or for
services rendered or to be rendered and includes the fair and reasonably value, as determined by the
Secretary of Labor, of board, lodging, or other facilities customarily furnished by the employer to the
employee. "Fair and reasonable value" shall not include any profit to the employer or to any person
affiliated with the employer.24

The concept of "minimum wage" is, however, a different thing, and certainly, it means more than
setting a floor wage to upgrade existing wages, as ECOP takes it to mean. "Minimum wages" underlies
the effort of the State, as Republic Act No. 6727 expresses it, "to promote productivity-improvement
and gain-sharing measures to ensure a decent standard of living for the workers and their families; to
guarantee the rights of labor to its just share in the fruits of production; to enhance employment
generation in the countryside through industry dispersal; and to allow business and industry reasonable
returns on investment, expansion and growth,"25 and as the Constitution expresses it, to affirm "labor
as a primary social economic force."26 As the Court indicated, the statute would have no need for a
board if the question were simply "how much". The State is concerned, in addition, that wages are not
distributed unevenly, and more important, that social justice is subserved.

It is another question, to be sure, had Congress created "roving" boards, and were that the case, a
problem of undue delegation would have ensued; but as we said, we do not see a Board (National
Capital Region) "running riot" here, and Wage Order No. NCR-01-A as an excess of authority.

It is also another question whether the salary-cap method utilized by the Board may serve the purposes
of Republic Act No. 6727 in future cases and whether that method is after all, a lasting policy of the
Board; however, it is a question on which we may only speculate at the moment. At the moment, we
find it to be reasonable policy (apparently, it has since been Government policy); and if in the future it
would be perceptibly unfair to management, we will take it up then.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY VS. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD AND PDEA

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug
testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and
employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutors office with certain
offenses, among other personalities, is put in issue.

As far as pertinent, the challenged section reads as follows:

SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing.Authorized drug testing shall be done by any government forensic
laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories accredited and monitored by the DOH to
safeguard the quality of the test results. x x x The drug testing shall employ, among others, two (2)
testing methods, the screening test which will determine the positive result as well as the type of drug
used and the confirmatory test which will confirm a positive screening test. x x x The following shall be
subjected to undergo drug testing:

xxxx

(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools.Students of secondary and tertiary schools shall, pursuant
to the related rules and regulations as contained in the schools student handbook and with notice to
the parents, undergo a random drug testing x x x;

(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices.Officers and employees of public and private
offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a random drug test as contained
in the companys work rules and regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the workplace. Any
officer or employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs shall be dealt with administratively which
shall be a ground for suspension or termination, subject to the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor
Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law;

xxxx

(f) All persons charged before the prosecutors office with a criminal offense having an imposable
penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo a mandatory drug
test;

(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or local
government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.

In addition to the above stated penalties in this Section, those found to be positive for dangerous drugs
use shall be subject to the provisions of Section 15 of this Act.

G.R. No. 161658 (Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. v. Commission on Elections)

On December 23, 2003, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 6486,
prescribing the rules and regulations on the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office in
connection with the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local elections. The pertinent portions of
the said resolution read as follows:

WHEREAS, Section 36 (g) of Republic Act No. 9165 provides:

SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing.x x x

xxxx

(g) All candidates for public office x x x both in the national or local government shall undergo a
mandatory drug test.

WHEREAS, Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that public officers and employees
must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty
and efficiency;

WHEREAS, by requiring candidates to undergo mandatory drug test, the public will know the quality of
candidates they are electing and they will be assured that only those who can serve with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency would be elected x x x.

NOW THEREFORE, The [COMELEC], pursuant to the authority vested in it under the Constitution, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code), [RA] 9165 and other election laws, RESOLVED to
promulgate, as it hereby promulgates, the following rules and regulations on the conduct of mandatory
drug testing to candidates for public office[:]

SECTION 1. Coverage.All candidates for public office, both national and local, in the May 10, 2004
Synchronized National and Local Elections shall undergo mandatory drug test in government forensic
laboratories or any drug testing laboratories monitored and accredited by the Department of Health.

SEC. 3. x x x

On March 25, 2004, in addition to the drug certificates filed with their respective offices, the Comelec
Offices and employees concerned shall submit to the Law Department two (2) separate lists of
candidates. The first list shall consist of those candidates who complied with the mandatory drug test
while the second list shall consist of those candidates who failed to comply x x x.

SEC. 4. Preparation and publication of names of candidates.Before the start of the campaign period, the
[COMELEC] shall prepare two separate lists of candidates. The first list shall consist of those candidates
who complied with the mandatory drug test while the second list shall consist of those candidates who
failed to comply with said drug test. x x x

SEC. 5. Effect of failure to undergo mandatory drug test and file drug test certificate.No person elected
to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test
and filed with the offices enumerated under Section 2 hereof the drug test certificate herein
required. (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the Republic and a candidate for re-election in the May
10, 2004 elections,[1] filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to
nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being
unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for candidates for senators in addition to those
already provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing
Resolution No. 6486.

Pimentel invokes as legal basis for his petition Sec. 3, Article VI of the Constitution, which states:

SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and, on
the day of the election, is at least thirty-five years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and
a resident of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the election.

According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5) qualifications for one to
be a candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the Senate. He says that both the Congress and
COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other
candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test, create an additional qualification that all candidates for
senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds that there is no provision in the Constitution
authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of candidates for
senator.

G.R. No. 157870 (Social Justice Society v. Dangerous

Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)

In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social Justice Society (SJS), a registered political
party, seeks to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA) from enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that they are
constitutionally infirm. For one, the provisions constitute undue delegation of legislative power when
they give unbridled discretion to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug testing. For
another, the provisions trench in the equal protection clause inasmuch as they can be used to harass a
student or an employee deemed undesirable. And for a third, a persons constitutional right against
unreasonable searches is also breached by said provisions.

G.R. No. 158633 (Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr. v. Dangerous Drugs Board and Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency)

Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and taxpayer, also seeks in his Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition under Rule 65 that Sec. 36(c), (d), (f), and (g) of RA 9165 be struck down as
unconstitutional for infringing on the constitutional right to privacy, the right against unreasonable
search and seizure, and the right against self-incrimination, and for being contrary to the due process
and equal protection guarantees.

The Issue on Locus Standi

First off, we shall address the justiciability of the cases at bench and the matter of the standing of
petitioners SJS and Laserna to sue. As respondents DDB and PDEA assert, SJS and Laserna failed to allege
any incident amounting to a violation of the constitutional rights mentioned in their separate
petitions.[2]

It is basic that the power of judicial review can only be exercised in connection with a bona
fide controversy which involves the statute sought to be reviewed. [3] But even with the presence of an
actual case or controversy, the Court may refuse to exercise judicial review unless the constitutional
question is brought before it by a party having the requisite standing to challenge it.[4] To have standing,
one must establish that he or she has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the
allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and
the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.[5]

The rule on standing, however, is a matter of procedure; hence, it can be relaxed for non-traditional
plaintiffs, like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as
when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overarching significance to society, or of
paramount public interest.[6] There is no doubt that Pimentel, as senator of the Philippines and
candidate for the May 10, 2004 elections, possesses the requisite standing since he has substantial
interests in the subject matter of the petition, among other preliminary considerations. Regarding SJS
and Laserna, this Court is wont to relax the rule on locus standi owing primarily to the transcendental
importance and the paramount public interest involved in the enforcement of Sec. 36 of RA 9165.

The Consolidated Issues

The principal issues before us are as follows:

(1) Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional qualification for
candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates
for senator in addition to those laid down by the Constitution? and

(2) Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional? Specifically, do these
paragraphs violate the right to privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and seizure, and the
equal protection clause? Or do they constitute undue delegation of legislative power?

Pimentel Petition

(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[g] of RA 9165 and

COMELEC Resolution No. 6486)

In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally
impose an additional qualification on candidates for senator. He points out that, subject to the
provisions on nuisance candidates, a candidate for senator needs only to meet the qualifications laid
down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4)
age, and (5) residency. Beyond these stated qualification requirements, candidates for senator need
not possess any other qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and elected as member of the
Senate. The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it
cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate,[7] or alter or enlarge the
Constitution.

Pimentels contention is well-taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby declared
as, unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the
Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which
all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution. [8] In the discharge of
their defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to
the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.[9]

Congress inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are subject to certain limitations. As early
as 1927, in Government v. Springer, the Court has defined, in the abstract, the limits on legislative power
in the following wise:

Someone has said that the powers of the legislative department of the Government, like the boundaries
of the ocean, are unlimited. In constitutional governments, however, as well as governments acting
under delegated authority, the powers of each of the departments x x x are limited and confined within
the four walls of the constitution or the charter, and each department can only exercise such powers as
are necessarily implied from the given powers. The Constitution is the shore of legislative authority
against which the waves of legislative enactment may dash, but over which it cannot leap.[10]

Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is subject to substantive and constitutional
limitations which circumscribe both the exercise of the power itself and the allowable subjects of
legislation.[11] The substantive constitutional limitations are chiefly found in the Bill of Rights[12] and
other provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution prescribing the qualifications of candidates
for senators.

In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or
promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates
for senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for
senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The
right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted
impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution.[13]

Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively
enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. As
couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be certified illegal-drug clean,
obviously as a pre-condition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator or, with like effect,
a condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as senator-elect. The COMELEC
resolution completes the chain with the proviso that [n]o person elected to any public office shall enter
upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test. Viewed, therefore, in its
proper context, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add another
qualification layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership in the
Senate. Whether or not the drug-free bar set up under the challenged provision is to be hurdled before
or after election is really of no moment, as getting elected would be of little value if one cannot assume
office for non-compliance with the drug-testing requirement.

It may of course be argued, in defense of the validity of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, that the provision does
not expressly state that non-compliance with the drug test imposition is a disqualifying factor or would
work to nullify a certificate of candidacy. This argument may be accorded plausibility if the drug test
requirement is optional. But the particular section of the law, without exception, made drug-testing on
those covered mandatory, necessarily suggesting that the obstinate ones shall have to suffer the
adverse consequences for not adhering to the statutory command. And since the provision deals with
candidates for public office, it stands to reason that the adverse consequence adverted to can only refer
to and revolve around the election and the assumption of public office of the candidates. Any other
construal would reduce the mandatory nature of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 into a pure jargon without
meaning and effect whatsoever.

While it is anti-climactic to state it at this juncture, COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 is no longer
enforceable, for by its terms, it was intended to cover only the May 10, 2004 synchronized elections
and the candidates running in that electoral event. Nonetheless, to obviate repetition, the Court deems
it appropriate to review and rule, as it hereby rules, on its validity as an implementing issuance.

It ought to be made abundantly clear, however, that the unconstitutionality of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 is
rooted on its having infringed the constitutional provision defining the qualification or eligibility
requirements for one aspiring to run for and serve as senator.

SJS Petition

(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d], [f], and [g] of RA 9165)

The drug test prescribed under Sec. 36(c), (d), and (f) of RA 9165 for secondary and tertiary level
students and public and private employees, while mandatory, is a random and suspicionless
arrangement. The objective is to stamp out illegal drug and safeguard in the process the well being of
[the] citizenry, particularly the youth, from the harmful effects of dangerous drugs. This statutory
purpose, per the policy-declaration portion of the law, can be achieved via the pursuit by the state of
an intensive and unrelenting campaign against the trafficking and use of dangerous drugs x x x through
an integrated system of planning, implementation and enforcement of anti-drug abuse policies,
programs and projects.[14] The primary legislative intent is not criminal prosecution, as those found
positive for illegal drug use as a result of this random testing are not necessarily treated as criminals.
They may even be exempt from criminal liability should the illegal drug user consent to undergo
rehabilitation. Secs. 54 and 55 of RA 9165 are clear on this point:

Sec. 54. Voluntary Submission of a Drug Dependent to Confinement, Treatment and Rehabilitation.A
drug dependent or any person who violates Section 15 of this Act may, by himself/herself or through
his/her parent, [close relatives] x x x apply to the Board x x x for treatment and rehabilitation of the
drug dependency. Upon such application, the Board shall bring forth the matter to the Court which shall
order that the applicant be examined for drug dependency. If the examination x x x results in the
certification that the applicant is a drug dependent, he/she shall be ordered by the Court to undergo
treatment and rehabilitation in a Center designated by the Board x x x.

xxxx

Sec. 55. Exemption from the Criminal Liability Under the Voluntary Submission Program.A drug
dependent under the voluntary submission program, who is finally discharged from confinement,
shall be exempt from the criminal liability under Section 15 of this Act subject to the following
conditions:

xxxx

School children, the US Supreme Court noted, are most vulnerable to the physical, psychological, and
addictive effects of drugs. Maturing nervous systems of the young are more critically impaired by
intoxicants and are more inclined to drug dependency. Their recovery is also at a depressingly low
rate.[15]

The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected
by the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure[16] under Sec. 2, Art. III[17] of the Constitution.
But while the right to privacy has long come into its own, this case appears to be the first time that the
validity of a state-decreed search or intrusion through the medium of mandatory random drug testing
among students and employees is, in this jurisdiction, made the focal point. Thus, the issue tendered in
these proceedings is veritably one of first impression.

US jurisprudence is, however, a rich source of persuasive jurisprudence. With respect to random drug
testing among school children, we turn to the teachings of Vernonia School District 47J v.
Acton (Vernonia) and Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie
County, et al. v. Earls, et al. (Board of Education),[18] both fairly pertinent US Supreme Court-decided
cases involving the constitutionality of governmental search.

In Vernonia, school administrators in Vernonia, Oregon wanted to address the drug menace in their
respective institutions following the discovery of frequent drug use by school athletes. After
consultation with the parents, they required random urinalysis drug testing for the schools
athletes. James Acton, a high school student, was denied participation in the football program after he
refused to undertake the urinalysis drug testing. Acton forthwith sued, claiming that the schools drug
testing policy violated, inter alia, the Fourth Amendment[19] of the US Constitution.

The US Supreme Court, in fashioning a solution to the issues raised in Vernonia, considered the
following: (1) schools stand in loco parentis over their students; (2) school children, while not shedding
their constitutional rights at the school gate, have less privacy rights; (3) athletes have less privacy rights
than non-athletes since the former observe communal undress before and after sports events; (4) by
joining the sports activity, the athletes voluntarily subjected themselves to a higher degree of school
supervision and regulation; (5) requiring urine samples does not invade a students privacy since a
student need not undress for this kind of drug testing; and (6) there is need for the drug testing because
of the dangerous effects of illegal drugs on the young. The US Supreme Court held that the policy
constituted reasonable search under the Fourth[20] and 14th Amendments and declared the random
drug-testing policy constitutional.

In Board of Education, the Board of Education of a school in Tecumseh, Oklahoma required a drug test
for high school students desiring to join extra-curricular activities. Lindsay Earls, a member of the show
choir, marching band, and academic team declined to undergo a drug test and averred that the drug-
testing policy made to apply to non-athletes violated the Fourth and 14th Amendments. As Earls
argued, unlike athletes who routinely undergo physical examinations and undress before their peers in
locker rooms, non-athletes are entitled to more privacy.

The US Supreme Court, citing Vernonia, upheld the constitutionality of drug testing even among non-
athletes on the basis of the schools custodial responsibility and authority. In so ruling, said court made
no distinction between a non-athlete and an athlete. It ratiocinated that schools and teachers act in
place of the parents with a similar interest and duty of safeguarding the health of the students. And in
holding that the school could implement its random drug-testing policy, the Court hinted that such a
test was a kind of search in which even a reasonable parent might need to engage.

In sum, what can reasonably be deduced from the above two cases and applied to this jurisdiction are:
(1) schools and their administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their students; (2) minor
students have contextually fewer rights than an adult, and are subject to the custody and supervision
of their parents, guardians, and schools; (3) schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard
the health and well-being of their students and may adopt such measures as may reasonably be
necessary to discharge such duty; and (4) schools have the right to impose conditions on applicants for
admission that are fair, just, and non-discriminatory.

Guided by Vernonia and Board of Education, the Court is of the view and so holds that the provisions of
RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional.
Indeed, it is within the prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission,
compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to enroll is
not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable requirements.

The Court can take judicial notice of the proliferation of prohibited drugs in the country that threatens
the well-being of the people,[21] particularly the youth and school children who usually end up as
victims. Accordingly, and until a more effective method is conceptualized and put in motion, a random
drug testing of students in secondary and tertiary schools is not only acceptable but may even be
necessary if the safety and interest of the student population, doubtless a legitimate concern of the
government, are to be promoted and protected. To borrow from Vernonia, [d]eterring drug use by our
Nations schoolchildren is as important as enhancing efficient enforcement of the Nations laws against
the importation of drugs; the necessity for the State to act is magnified by the fact that the effects of a
drug-infested school are visited not just upon the users, but upon the entire student body and
faculty.[22] Needless to stress, the random testing scheme provided under the law argues against the
idea that the testing aims to incriminate unsuspecting individual students.

Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, the mandatory but random drug test
prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for officers and employees of public and private offices is justifiable,
albeit not exactly for the same reason. The Court notes in this regard that petitioner SJS, other than
saying that subjecting almost everybody to drug testing, without probable cause, is unreasonable, an
unwarranted intrusion of the individual right to privacy,[23] has failed to show how the mandatory,
random, and suspicionless drug testing under Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 violates the right to privacy
and constitutes unlawful and/or unconsented search under Art. III, Secs. 1 and 2 of the
Constitution.[24] Petitioner Lasernas lament is just as simplistic, sweeping, and gratuitous and does not
merit serious consideration. Consider what he wrote without elaboration:

The US Supreme Court and US Circuit Courts of Appeals have made various rulings on the
constitutionality of mandatory drug tests in the school and the workplaces. The US courts have been
consistent in their rulings that the mandatory drug tests violate a citizens constitutional right to privacy
and right against unreasonable search and seizure. They are quoted extensively hereinbelow. [25]

The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone.[26] In context, the right to privacy means the right to
be free from unwarranted exploitation of ones person or from intrusion into ones private activities in
such a way as to cause humiliation to a persons ordinary sensibilities. [27] And while there has been
general agreement as to the basic function of the guarantee against unwarranted search, translation of
the abstract prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures into workable broad guidelines for
the decision of particular cases is a difficult task, to borrow from C. Camara v. Municipal
Court.[28] Authorities are agreed though that the right to privacy yields to certain paramount rights of
the public and defers to the states exercise of police power.[29]

As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched and as has been held,
reasonableness is the touchstone of the validity of a government search or intrusion. [30] And whether a
search at issue hews to the reasonableness standard is judged by the balancing of the government-
mandated intrusion on the individuals privacy interest against the promotion of some compelling state
interest.[31] In the criminal context, reasonableness requires showing of probable cause to be personally
determined by a judge. Given that the drug-testing policy for employeesand students for that
matterunder RA 9165 is in the nature of administrative search needing what was referred to
in Vernonia as swift and informal disciplinary procedures, the probable-cause standard is not required
or even practicable. Be that as it may, the review should focus on the reasonableness of the challenged
administrative search in question.

The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of the privacy interest upon
which the drug testing, which effects a search within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution,
intrudes. In this case, the office or workplace serves as the backdrop for the analysis of the privacy
expectation of the employees and the reasonableness of drug testing requirement. The employees
privacy interest in an office is to a large extent circumscribed by the companys work policies, the
collective bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by management and the bargaining unit, and the
inherent right of the employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in the workplace. Their privacy
expectation in a regulated office environment is, in fine, reduced; and a degree of impingement upon
such privacy has been upheld.

Just as defining as the first factor is the character of the intrusion authorized by the challenged law.
Reduced to a question form, is the scope of the search or intrusion clearly set forth, or, as formulated
in Ople v. Torres, is the enabling law authorizing a search narrowly drawn or narrowly focused? [32]

The poser should be answered in the affirmative. For one, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 and its implementing rules
and regulations (IRR), as couched, contain provisions specifically directed towards preventing a
situation that would unduly embarrass the employees or place them under a humiliating experience.
While every officer and employee in a private establishment is under the law deemed forewarned that
he or she may be a possible subject of a drug test, nobody is really singled out in advance for drug
testing. The goal is to discourage drug use by not telling in advance anyone when and who is to be
tested. And as may be observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165 itself prescribes what, in Ople, is a narrowing
ingredient by providing that the employees concerned shall be subjected to random drug test as
contained in the companys work rules and regulations x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the work
place.

For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken under conditions calculated to protect as
much as possible the employees privacy and dignity. As to the mechanics of the test, the law specifies
that the procedure shall employ two testing methods, i.e., the screening test and the confirmatory test,
doubtless to ensure as much as possible the trustworthiness of the results. But the more important
consideration lies in the fact that the test shall be conducted by trained professionals in access-
controlled laboratories monitored by the Department of Health (DOH) to safeguard against results
tampering and to ensure an accurate chain of custody.[33] In addition, the IRR issued by the DOH
provides that access to the drug results shall be on the need to know basis;[34] that the drug test result
and the records shall be [kept] confidential subject to the usual accepted practices to protect the
confidentiality of the test results.[35] Notably, RA 9165 does not oblige the employer concerned to report
to the prosecuting agencies any information or evidence relating to the violation of
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act received as a result of the operation of the drug testing. All
told, therefore, the intrusion into the employees privacy, under RA 9165, is accompanied by proper
safeguards, particularly against embarrassing leakages of test results, and is relatively minimal.

To reiterate, RA 9165 was enacted as a measure to stamp out illegal drug in the country and thus protect
the well-being of the citizens, especially the youth, from the deleterious effects of dangerous drugs. The
law intends to achieve this through the medium, among others, of promoting and resolutely pursuing
a national drug abuse policy in the workplace via a mandatory random drug test. [36] To the Court, the
need for drug testing to at least minimize illegal drug use is substantial enough to override the
individuals privacy interest under the premises. The Court can consider that the illegal drug menace
cuts across gender, age group, and social- economic lines. And it may not be amiss to state that the sale,
manufacture, or trafficking of illegal drugs, with their ready market, would be an investors dream were
it not for the illegal and immoral components of any of such activities. The drug problem has hardly
abated since the martial law public execution of a notorious drug trafficker. The state can no longer
assume a laid back stance with respect to this modern-day scourge. Drug enforcement agencies
perceive a mandatory random drug test to be an effective way of preventing and deterring drug use
among employees in private offices, the threat of detection by random testing being higher than other
modes. The Court holds that the chosen method is a reasonable and enough means to lick the problem.

Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of privacy on the part of the
employees, the compelling state concern likely to be met by the search, and the well-defined limits set
forth in the law to properly guide authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold that the
challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited context of the case, reasonable and, ergo,
constitutional.

Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and employees also labor under
reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by the Civil Service law and other laws on public
officers, all enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the public service.[37] And if RA 9165 passes
the norm of reasonableness for private employees, the more reason that it should pass the test for civil
servants, who, by constitutional command, are required to be accountable at all times to the people
and to serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiency.[38]

Petitioner SJS next posture that Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is objectionable on the ground of undue delegation
of power hardly commends itself for concurrence. Contrary to its position, the provision in question is
not so extensively drawn as to give unbridled options to schools and employers to determine the
manner of drug testing. Sec. 36 expressly provides how drug testing for students of secondary and
tertiary schools and officers/employees of public/private offices should be conducted. It enumerates
the persons who shall undergo drug testing. In the case of students, the testing shall be in accordance
with the school rules as contained in the student handbook and with notice to parents. On the part of
officers/employees, the testing shall take into account the companys work rules. In either case, the
random procedure shall be observed, meaning that the persons to be subjected to drug test shall be
picked by chance or in an unplanned way. And in all cases, safeguards against misusing and
compromising the confidentiality of the test results are established.

Lest it be overlooked, Sec. 94 of RA 9165 charges the DDB to issue, in consultation with the DOH,
Department of the Interior and Local Government, Department of Education, and Department of Labor
and Employment, among other agencies, the IRR necessary to enforce the law. In net effect then, the
participation of schools and offices in the drug testing scheme shall always be subject to the IRR of RA
9165. It is, therefore, incorrect to say that schools and employers have unchecked discretion to
determine how often, under what conditions, and where the drug tests shall be conducted.

The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet area in the constitutional landscape.[39] In the
face of the increasing complexity of the task of the government and the increasing inability of the
legislature to cope directly with the many problems demanding its attention, resort to delegation of
power, or entrusting to administrative agencies the power of subordinate legislation, has become
imperative, as here.

Laserna Petition (Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d],

[f], and [g] of RA 9165)

Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court finds no valid justification for
mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes. In the case of students, the constitutional
viability of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing for students emanates
primarily from the waiver by the students of their right to privacy when they seek entry to the school,
and from their voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental authority of school authorities. In
the case of private and public employees, the constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and
suspicionless drug testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement.

We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the public prosecutors
office with criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day imprisonment. The operative
concepts in the mandatory drug testing are randomness and suspicionless. In the case of persons
charged with a crime before the prosecutors office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or
suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made
defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond
suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are
impleaded against their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the
prosecutors office and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not
necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy. [40] To impose mandatory
drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal
prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a
persons right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused
persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 161658 and declares Sec. 36(g) of RA
9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 as UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and to PARTIALLY GRANT the petition
in G.R. Nos. 157870 and 158633 by declaring Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 CONSTITUTIONAL, but
declaring its Sec. 36(f) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. All concerned agencies are, accordingly, permanently
enjoined from implementing Sec. 36(f) and (g) of RA 9165. No costs. SO ORDERED.

VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY VS. COMELEC

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:*

Prologue

To determine the winners in a Philippine-style party-list election, the Constitution and Republic Act (RA)
No. 7941 mandate at least four inviolable parameters. These are:

First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not
exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those
elected under the party list.

Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total
valid votes cast for the party-list system are qualified to have a seat in the House of Representatives;

Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained,
is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one qualifying and two additional seats.

Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be
computed in proportion to their total number of votes.

Because the Comelec violated these legal parameters, the assailed Resolutions must be struck down for
having been issued in grave abuse of discretion. The poll body is mandated to enforce and administer
election-related laws. It has no power to contravene or amend them. Neither does it have authority to
decide the wisdom, propriety or rationality of the acts of Congress.
Its bounden duty is to craft rules, regulations, methods and formulas to implement election laws -- not
to reject, ignore, defeat, obstruct or circumvent them.

In fine, the constitutional introduction of the party-list system - a normal feature of parliamentary
democracies - into our presidential form of government, modified by unique Filipino statutory
parameters, presents new paradigms and novel questions, which demand innovative legal solutions
convertible into mathematical formulations which are, in turn, anchored on time-tested jurisprudence.

The Case

Before the Court are three consolidated Petitions for Certiorari (with applications for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction) under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
assailing (1) the October 15, 1998 Resolution[1] of the Commission on Elections (Comelec), Second
Division, in Election Matter 98-065;[2] and (2) the January 7, 1999 Resolution[3] of the Comelec en banc,
affirming the said disposition. The assailed Resolutions ordered the proclamation of thirty-eight (38)
additional party-list representatives "to complete the full complement of 52 seats in the House of
Representatives as provided under Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. 7941.

The Facts and the Antecedents

Our 1987 Constitution introduced a novel feature into our presidential system of government -- the
party-list method of representation. Under this system, any national, regional or sectoral party or
organization registered with the Commission on Elections may participate in the election of party-list
representatives who, upon their election and proclamation, shall sit in the House of Representatives as
regular members.[4] In effect, a voter is given two (2) votes for the House -- one for a district
congressman and another for a party-list representative.[5]

Specifically, this system of representation is mandated by Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, which
provides:

Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided
by law, shall be elected by a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification
of this Constitution, one half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as
provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious
sector.

Complying with its constitutional duty to provide by law the selection or election of party-list
representatives, Congress enacted RA 7941 on March 3, 1995. Under this statutes policy declaration,
the State shall "promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies
but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit
the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the
State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest
possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by
enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest
scheme possible. (italics ours.)

The requirements for entitlement to a party-list seat in the House are prescribed by this law (RA 7941)
in this wise:

Sec. 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. -- The party-list representatives shall constitute
twenty per centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of Representatives including
those under the party-list.
For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party
representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines
shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.

In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall be observed:

(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on
the number of votes they garnered during the elections.

(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast
for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided, That those garnering more than
two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number
of votes; Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than
three (3) seats.

Pursuant to Section 18 of RA 7941, the Comelec en banc promulgated Resolution No. 2847, prescribing
the rules and regulations governing the election of party-list representatives through the party-list
system.

Election of the Fourteen Party-List Representatives

On May 11, 1998, the first election for party-list representation was held simultaneously with the
national elections. A total of one hundred twenty-three (123) parties, organizations and coalitions
participated. On June 26, 1998, the Comelec en banc proclaimed thirteen (13) party-list representatives
from twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had obtained at least two percent of the total number
of votes cast for the party-list system. Two of the proclaimed representatives belonged to Petitioner
APEC, which obtained 5.5 percent of the votes.The proclaimed winners and the votes cast in their favor
were as follows:[6]

Party/Organization/ Number of Percentage of Nominees

Coalition Votes Obtained Total Votes

1. APEC 503,487 5.5% Rene M. Silos

Melvyn D. Eballe

2. ABA 321,646 3.51% Leonardo Q. Montemayor

3. ALAGAD 312,500 3.41% Diogenes S. Osabel

4. VETERANS 304,802 3.33% Eduardo P. Pilapil

FEDERATION

5. PROMDI 255,184 2.79% Joy A.G. Young

6. AKO 239,042 2.61% Ariel A. Zartiga

7. NCSCFO 238,303 2.60% Gorgonio P. Unde

8. ABANSE! PINAY 235,548 2.57% Patricia M. Sarenas

9. AKBAYAN 232,376 2.54% Loreta Ann P. Rosales

10. BUTIL 215,643 2.36% Benjamin A. Cruz

11. SANLAKAS 194,617 2.13% Renato B. Magtubo

12. COOP-NATCCO 189,802 2.07% Cresente C. Paez

After passing upon the results of the special elections held on July 4, 18, and 25, 1998, the Comelec en
banc further determined that COCOFED (Philippine Coconut Planters Federation, Inc.) was entitled to
one party-list seat for having garnered 186,388 votes, which were equivalent to 2.04 percent of the
total votes cast for the party-list system. Thus, its first nominee, Emerito S. Calderon, was proclaimed
on September 8, 1998 as the 14th party-list representative.[7]

On July 6, 1998, PAG-ASA (Peoples Progressive Alliance for Peace and Good Government Towards
Alleviation of Poverty and Social Advancement) filed with the Comelec a "Petition to Proclaim [the] Full
Number of Party-List Representatives provided by the Constitution." It alleged that the filling up of the
twenty percent membership of party-list representatives in the House of Representatives, as provided
under the Constitution, was mandatory. It further claimed that the literal application of the two percent
vote requirement and the three-seat limit under RA 7941 would defeat this constitutional provision, for
only 25 nominees would be declared winners, short of the 52 party-list representatives who should
actually sit in the House.

Thereafter, nine other party-list organizations[8] filed their respective Motions for Intervention, seeking
the same relief as that sought by PAG-ASA on substantially the same grounds. Likewise, PAG-ASAs
Petition was joined by other party-list organizations in a Manifestation they filed on August 28,
1998. These organizations were COCOFED, Senior Citizens, AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP,
AMIN, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, OCW-UNIFIL, KAMPIL, MAHARLIKA, AFW, Women Power, Inc., Ang
Lakas OCW, FEJODAP, CUP, Veterans Care, Bantay Bayan, 4L, AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, ALU and BIGAS.

On October 15, 1998, the Comelec Second Division promulgated the present assailed Resolution
granting PAG-ASA's Petition. It also ordered the proclamation of herein 38 respondents who, in addition
to the 14 already sitting, would thus total 52 party-list representatives. It held that "at all times, the
total number of congressional[9] seats must be filled up by eighty (80%) percent district representatives
and twenty (20%) percent party-list representatives." In allocating the 52 seats, it disregarded the two
percent-vote requirement prescribed under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941. Instead, it identified three
"elements of the party-list system," which should supposedly determine "how the 52 seats should be
filled up." First, "the system was conceived to enable the marginalized sectors of the Philippine society
to be represented in the House of Representatives." Second, "the system should represent the broadest
sectors of the Philippine society." Third, "it should encourage [the] multi-party system. (Boldface in the
original.) Considering these elements, but ignoring the two percent threshold requirement of RA
7941, it concluded that "the party-list groups ranked Nos. 1 to 51 x x x should have at least one
representative. It thus disposed as follows:

"WHEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (B.P.
881), Republic Act No. 7941 and other election laws, the Commission (Second Division) hereby resolves
to GRANT the instant petition and motions for intervention, to include those similarly situated.

ACCORDINGLY, the nominees from the party-list hereinbelow enumerated based on the list of names
submitted by their respective parties, organizations and coalitions are PROCLAIMED as party-list
representatives, to wit:

1. SENIOR CITIZENS 20. VETERANS CARE

2. AKAP 21. 4L

3. AKSYON 22. AWATU

4. PINATUBO 23. PMP

5. NUPA 24. ATUCP

6. PRP 25. NCWP

7. AMIN 26. ALU

8. PAG-ASA 27. BIGAS

9. MAHARLIKA 28. COPRA

10. OCW-UNIFIL 29. GREEN

11. FCL 30. ANAKBAYAN

12. AMMA-KATIPUNAN 31. ARBA

13. KAMPIL 32. MINFA

14. BANTAY BAYAN 33. AYOS

15. AFW 34. ALL COOP

16. ANG LAKAS OCW 35. PDP-LABAN

17. WOMENPOWER, INC. 36. KATIPUNAN

18. FEJODAP 37. ONEWAY PRINT

19. CUP 38. AABANTE KA PILIPINAS

to complete the full complement of 52 seats in the House of Representatives as provided in Section 5,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. 7941.

The foregoing disposition sums up a glaring bit of inconsistency and flip-flopping. In its Resolution No.
2847 dated June 25, 1996, the Comelec en banc had unanimously promulgated a set of Rules and
Regulations Governing the Election of x x x Party-List Representatives Through the Party-List System.
Under these Rules and Regulations, one additional seat shall be given for every two percent of the vote,
a formula the Comelec illustrated in its Annex A. It apparently relied on this method when it proclaimed
the 14 incumbent party-list solons (two for APEC and one each for the 12 other qualified
parties). However, for inexplicable reasons, it abandoned said unanimous Resolution and proclaimed,
based on its three elements, the Group of 38 private respondents.[10]

The twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had earlier been proclaimed winners on the basis of
having obtained at least two percent of the votes cast for the party-list system, objected to the
proclamation of the 38 parties and filed separate Motions for Reconsideration. They contended that (1)
under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941, only parties, organizations or coalitions garnering at least two percent
of the votes for the party-list system were entitled to seats in the House of Representatives; and (2)
additional seats, not exceeding two for each, should be allocated to those which had garnered the two
percent threshold in proportion to the number of votes cast for the winning parties, as provided by said
Section 11.

Ruling of the Comelec En Banc

Noting that all the parties -- movants and oppositors alike - had agreed that the twenty percent
membership of party-list representatives in the House "should be filled up, the Comelec en banc
resolved only the issue concerning the apportionment or allocation of the remaining seats. In other
words, the issue was: Should the remaining 38 unfilled seats allocated to party-list solons be given (1)
to the thirteen qualified parties that had each garnered at least two percent of the total votes, or (2) to
the Group of 38 - herein private respondents - even if they had not passed the two percent threshold?

The poll body held that to allocate the remaining seats only to those who had hurdled the two percent
vote requirement "will mean the concentration of representation of party, sectoral or group interests
in the House of Representatives to thirteen organizations representing two political parties, three
coalitions and four sectors: urban poor, veterans, women and peasantry x x x. Such strict application of
the 2% 'threshold' does not serve the essence and object of the Constitution and the legislature -- to
develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives x x x. Additionally,
it "will also prevent this Commission from complying with the constitutional and statutory decrees for
party-list representatives to compose 20% of the House of Representatives.

Thus, in its Resolution dated January 7, 1999, the Comelec en banc, by a razor-thin majority -- with three
commissioners concurring[11] and two members[12] dissenting -- affirmed the Resolution of its Second
Division. It, however, held in abeyance the proclamation of the 51st party (AABANTE KA PILIPINAS),
"pending the resolution of petitions for correction of manifest errors.

Without expressly declaring as unconstitutional or void the two percent vote requirement imposed by
RA 7941, the Commission blithely rejected and circumvented its application, holding that there were
more important considerations than this statutory threshold.

Consequently, several petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayers for the issuance
of temporary restraining orders or writs of preliminary injunction, were filed before this Court by the
parties and organizations that had obtained at least two per cent of the total votes cast for the party-
list system.[13] In the suits, made respondents together with the Comelec were the 38 parties,
organizations and coalitions that had been declared by the poll body as likewise entitled to party-list
seats in the House of Representatives.Collectively, petitioners sought the proclamation of additional
representatives from each of their parties and organizations, all of which had obtained at least two
percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system.

On January 12, 1999, this Court issued a Status Quo Order directing the Comelec to CEASE and DESIST
from constituting itself as a National Board of Canvassers on 13 January 1999 or on any other date and
proclaiming as winners the nominees of the parties, organizations and coalitions enumerated in the
dispositive portions of its 15 October 1998 Resolution or its 7 January 1999 Resolution, until further
orders from this Court.
On July 1, 1999, oral arguments were heard from the parties. Atty. Jeremias U. Montemayor appeared
for petitioners in GR No. 136781; Atty. Gregorio A. Andolana, for petitioners in GR No. 136786; Atty.
Rodante D. Marcoleta for petitioners in GR No. 136795; Attys. Ricardo Blancaflor and Pete Quirino
Quadra, for all the private respondents; Atty. Porfirio V. Sison for Intervenor NACUSIP; and Atty. Jose
P. Balbuena for Respondent Comelec. Upon invitation of the Court, retired Comelec Commissioner
Regalado E. Maambong acted as amicus curiae. Solicitor General Ricardo P. Galvez appeared, not for
any party but also as a friend of the Court.

Thereafter, the parties and the amici curiae were required to submit their respective Memoranda in
amplification of their verbal arguments.[14]

The Issues

The Court believes, and so holds, that the main question of how to determine the winners of the subject
party-list election can be fully settled by addressing the following issues:

1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI of
the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other words, should the twenty percent
allocation for party-list solons be filled up completely and all the time?

2. Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section 11 (b) of RA
7941 constitutional?

3. If the answer to Issue 2 is in the affirmative, how should the additional seats of a qualified party be
determined?

The Courts Ruling

The Petitions are partly meritorious. The Court agrees with petitioners that the assailed Resolutions
should be nullified, but disagrees that they should all be granted additional seats.

First Issue: Whether the Twenty Percent Constitutional Allocation Is Mandatory

The pertinent provision[15] of the Constitution on the composition of the House of Representatives reads
as follows:

Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided
by law, shall be elected by a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification
of this Constitution, one half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as
provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious
sector.

Determination of the Total Number of Party-List Lawmakers

Clearly, the Constitution makes the number of district representatives the determinant in arriving at
the number of seats allocated for party-list lawmakers, who shall comprise "twenty per centum of the
total number of representatives including those under the party-list." We thus translate this legal
provision into a mathematical formula, as follows:

No. of district representatives

---------------------------------- x .20 = No. of party-list

.80 representatives

This formulation[16] means that any increase in the number of district representatives, as may be
provided by law, will necessarily result in a corresponding increase in the number of party-list seats. To
illustrate, considering that there were 208 district representatives to be elected during the 1998
national elections, the number of party-list seats would be 52, computed as follows:
208

-------- x .20 = 52

.80

The foregoing computation of seat allocation is easy enough to comprehend. The problematic question,
however, is this: Does the Constitution require all such allocated seats to be filled up all the time and
under all circumstances? Our short answer is No.

Twenty Percent Allocation a Mere Ceiling

The Constitution simply states that "[t]he party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum
of the total number of representatives including those under the party-list.

According to petitioners, this percentage is a ceiling; the mechanics by which it is to be filled up has
been left to Congress. In the exercise of its prerogative, the legislature enacted RA 7941, by which it
prescribed that a party, organization or coalition participating in the party-list election must obtain at
least two percent of the total votes cast for the system in order to qualify for a seat in the House of
Representatives.

Petitioners further argue that the constitutional provision must be construed together with this
legislative requirement. If there is no sufficient number of participating parties, organizations or
coalitions which could hurdle the two percent vote threshold and thereby fill up the twenty percent
party-list allocation in the House, then naturally such allocation cannot be filled up completely. The
Comelec cannot be faulted for the "incompleteness," for ultimately the voters themselves are the ones
who, in the exercise of their right of suffrage, determine who and how many should represent them.

On the other hand, Public Respondent Comelec, together with the respondent parties, avers that the
twenty percent allocation for party-list lawmakers is mandatory, and that the two percent vote
requirement in RA 7941 is unconstitutional, because its strict application would make it mathematically
impossible to fill up the House party-list complement.

We rule that a simple reading of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, easily conveys the equally
simple message that Congress was vested with the broad power to define and prescribe the mechanics
of the party-list system of representation. The Constitution explicitly sets down only the percentage of
the total membership in the House of Representatives reserved for party-list representatives.

In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress enacted RA 7941. As said earlier, Congress
declared therein a policy to promote "proportional representation" in the election of party-list
representatives in order to enable Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors
to contribute legislation that would benefit them. It however deemed it necessary to require parties,
organizations and coalitions participating in the system to obtain at least two percent of the total votes
cast for the party-list system in order to be entitled to a party-list seat. Those garnering more than this
percentage could have "additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes. Furthermore, no
winning party, organization or coalition can have more than three seats in the House of
Representatives. Thus the relevant portion of Section 11(b) of the law provides:

(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast
for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided, That those garnering more than
two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number
of votes; Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than
three (3) seats.

Considering the foregoing statutory requirements, it will be shown presently that Section 5 (2), Article
VI of the Constitution is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for party-list seats in Congress.

On the contention that a strict application of the two percent threshold may result in a mathematical
impossibility, suffice it to say that the prerogative to determine whether to adjust or change this
percentage requirement rests in Congress.[17] Our task now, as should have been the Comelecs, is not
to find fault in the wisdom of the law through highly unlikely scenarios of clinical extremes, but to craft
an innovative mathematical formula that can, as far as practicable, implement it within the context of
the actual election process.
Indeed, the function of the Supreme Court, as well as of all judicial and quasi-judicial agencies, is to
apply the law as we find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it. Unless declared unconstitutional,
ineffective, insufficient or otherwise void by the proper tribunal, a statute remains a valid command of
sovereignty that must be respected and obeyed at all times. This is the essence of the rule of law.

Second Issue: The Statutory Requirement and Limitation

The Two Percent Threshold

In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties, organizations
and coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are actually
represented in Congress. This intent can be gleaned from the deliberations on the proposed bill. We
quote below a pertinent portion of the Senate discussion:

SENATOR GONZALES: For purposes of continuity, I would want to follow up a point that was raised by,
I think, Senator Osmea when he said that a political party must have obtained at least a minimum
percentage to be provided in this law in order to qualify for a seat under the party-list system.

They do that in many other countries. A party must obtain at least 2 percent of the votes cast, 5 percent
or 10 percent of the votes cast. Otherwise, as I have said, this will actually proliferate political party
groups and those who have not really been given by the people sufficient basis for them to represent
their constituents and, in turn, they will be able to get to the Parliament through the backdoor under
the name of the party-list system, Mr. President."[18]

A similar intent is clear from the statements of the bill sponsor in the House of Representatives, as the
following shows:

MR. ESPINOSA. There is a mathematical formula which this computation is based at, arriving at a five
percent ratio which would distribute equitably the number of seats among the different sectors. There
is a mathematical formula which is, I think, patterned after that of the party list of the other parliaments
or congresses, more particularly the Bundestag of Germany.[19]

Moreover, even the framers of our Constitution had in mind a minimum-vote requirement, the
specification of which they left to Congress to properly determine. Constitutional Commissioner
Christian S. Monsod explained:

MR. MONSOD. x x x We are amenable to modifications in the minimum percentage of votes. Our
proposal is that anybody who has two-and-a-half percent of the votes gets a seat. There are about 20
million who cast their votes in the last elections. Two-and-a-half percent would mean 500,000
votes. Anybody who has a constituency of 500,000 votes nationwide deserves a seat in the Assembly. If
we bring that down to two percent, we are talking about 400,000 votes. The average vote per family is
three. So, here we are talking about 134,000 families. We believe that there are many sectors who will
be able to get seats in the Assembly because many of them have memberships of over 10,000. In effect,
that is the operational implication of our proposal. What we are trying to avoid is this selection of
sectors, the reserve seat system. We believe that it is our job to open up the system and that we should
not have within that system a reserve seat. We think that people should organize, should work hard,
and should earn their seats within that system.[20]

The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the Constitution and
the law, but with the very essence of "representation." Under a republican or representative state, all
government authority emanates from the people, but is exercised by representatives chosen by
them.[21] But to have meaningful representation, the elected persons must have the mandate of a
sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-list system, the result
might be the proliferation of small groups which are incapable of contributing significant legislation,
and which might even pose a threat to the stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative districts are
apportioned according to "the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform
and progressive ratio"[22] to ensure meaningful local representation.

All in all, we hold that the statutory provision on this two percent requirement is precise and
crystalline. When the law is clear, the function of courts is simple application, not interpretation or
circumvention.[23]

The Three-Seat-Per-Party Limit

An important consideration in adopting the party-list system is to promote and encourage a multiparty
system of representation. Again, we quote Commissioner Monsod:

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the party list system
because we wanted to open up the political system to a pluralistic society through a multiparty
system. But we also wanted to avoid the problems of mechanics and operation in the implementation
of a concept that has very serious shortcomings of classification and of double or triple votes. We are
for opening up the system, and we would like very much for the sectors to be there. That is why one of
the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the number of representatives from any single party that can
sit within the 50 allocated under the party list system. This way, we will open it up and enable sectoral
groups, or maybe regional groups, to earn their seats among the fifty. x x x.[24]

Consistent with the Constitutional Commission's pronouncements, Congress set the seat-limit to three
(3) for each qualified party, organization or coalition. "Qualified" means having hurdled the two percent
vote threshold. Such three-seat limit ensures the entry of various interest-representations into the
legislature; thus, no single group, no matter how large its membership, would dominate the party-list
seats, if not the entire House.

We shall not belabor this point, because the validity of the three-seat limit is not seriously challenged
in these consolidated cases.

Third Issue: Method of Allocating Additional Seats

Having determined that the twenty percent seat allocation is merely a ceiling, and having upheld the
constitutionality of the two percent vote threshold and the three-seat limit imposed under RA 7941, we
now proceed to the method of determining how many party-list seats the qualified parties,
organizations and coalitions are entitled to. The very first step - there is no dispute on this - is to rank
all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions (hereafter collectively referred to as "parties")
according to the votes they each obtained. The percentage of their respective votes as against the total
number of votes cast for the party-list system is then determined. All those that garnered at least two
percent of the total votes cast have an assured or guaranteed seat in the House of
Representatives. Thereafter, "those garnering more than two percent of the votes shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes." The problem is how to distribute
additional seats "proportionally," bearing in mind the three-seat limit further imposed by the law.

One Additional Seat Per Two Percent Increment

One proposed formula is to allocate one additional seat for every additional proportion of the votes
obtained equivalent to the two percent vote requirement for the first seat.[25] Translated in figures, a
party that wins at least six percent of the total votes cast will be entitled to three seats; another party
that gets four percent will be entitled to two seats; and one that gets two percent will be entitled to
one seat only. This proposal has the advantage of simplicity and ease of comprehension. Problems
arise, however, when the parties get very lop-sided votes -- for example, when Party A receives 20
percent of the total votes cast; Party B, 10 percent; and Party C, 6 percent. Under the method just
described, Party A would be entitled to 10 seats; Party B, to 5 seats and Party C, to 3 seats. Considering
the three-seat limit imposed by law, all the parties will each uniformly have three seats only. We would
then have the spectacle of a party garnering two or more times the number of votes obtained by
another, yet getting the same number of seats as the other one with the much lesser votes. In effect,
proportional representation will be contravened and the law rendered nugatory by this suggested
solution. Hence, the Court discarded it.

The Niemeyer Formula

Another suggestion that the Court considered was the Niemeyer formula, which was developed by a
German mathematician and adopted by Germany as its method of distributing party-list seats in the
Bundestag. Under this formula, the number of additional seats to which a qualified party would be
entitled is determined by multiplying the remaining number of seats to be allocated by the total number
of votes obtained by that party and dividing the product by the total number of votes garnered by all
the qualified parties. The integer portion of the resulting product will be the number of additional seats
that the party concerned is entitled to. Thus:

No. of remaining seats

to be allocated No. of additional

--------------------------- x No. of votes of = seats of party

Total no. of votes of party concerned concerned

qualified parties (Integer.decimal)

The next step is to distribute the extra seats left among the qualified parties in the descending order of
the decimal portions of the resulting products. Based on the 1998 election results, the distribution of
party-list seats under the Niemeyer method would be as follows:

Party Number of Guaranteed Additional Extra Total

Votes Seats Seats Seats

1. APEC 503,487 1 5.73 1 7 8. ABANSE! PINAY 235,548 1 2.68 1 4

2. ABA 321,646 1 3.66 1 5 9. AKBAYAN 232,376 1 2.64 1 4

3. ALAGAD 312,500 1 3.55 4 10. BUTIL 215,643 1 2.45 3

4. VETERANS 304,802 1 3.47 4 11. SANLAKAS 194,617 1 2.21 3

FEDERATION 12. COOP-NATCCO 189,802 1 2.16 3

5. PROMDI 255,184 1 2.90 1 4 13. COCOFED 186,388 1 2.12 3

6. AKO 239,042 1 2.72 1 4 Total 3,429,338 13 32 7 52

7. NCSCFO 238,303 1 2.71 1 4

However, since Section 11 of RA 7941 sets a limit of three (3) seats for each party, those obtaining more
than the limit will have to give up their excess seats. Under our present set of facts, the thirteen
qualified parties will each be entitled to three seats, resulting in an overall total of 39. Note that like
the previous proposal, the Niemeyer formula would violate the principle of "proportional
representation," a basic tenet of our party-list system.

The Niemeyer formula, while no doubt suitable for Germany, finds no application in the Philippine
setting, because of our three-seat limit and the non-mandatory character of the twenty percent
allocation. True, both our Congress and the Bundestag have threshold requirements -- two percent for
us and five for them. There are marked differences between the two models, however. As ably pointed
out by private respondents,[26] one half of the German Parliament is filled up by party-list
members. More important, there are no seat limitations, because German law discourages the
proliferation of small parties. In contrast, RA 7941, as already mentioned, imposes a three-seat limit to
encourage the promotion of the multiparty system. This major statutory difference makes the
Niemeyer formula completely inapplicable to the Philippines.

Just as one cannot grow Washington apples in the Philippines or Guimaras mangoes in the Arctic
because of fundamental environmental differences, neither can the Niemeyer formula be transplanted
in toto here because of essential variances between the two party-list models.

The Legal and Logical Formula for the Philippines

It is now obvious that the Philippine style party-list system is a unique paradigm which demands an
equally unique formula. In crafting a legally defensible and logical solution to determine the number
of additional seats that a qualified party is entitled to, we need to review the parameters of the Filipino
party-list system.

As earlier mentioned in the Prologue, they are as follows:

First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not
exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those
elected under the party list.

Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total
valid votes cast for the party-list system are qualified to have a seat in the House of Representatives;

Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained,
is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one qualifying and two additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be
computed in proportion to their total number of votes.

The problem, as already stated, is to find a way to translate proportional representation into a
mathematical formula that will not contravene, circumvent or amend the above-mentioned
parameters.

After careful deliberation, we now explain such formula, step by step.

Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private respondents, as well as
the members of this Court, that the initial step is to rank all the participating parties, organizations and
coalitions from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they each received. Then the
ratio for each party is computed by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all the parties
participating in the system. All parties with at least two percent of the total votes are guaranteed one
seat each. Only these parties shall be considered in the computation of additional seats. The party
receiving the highest number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the first party.

Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to, in order to be
able to compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution is based on proportional
representation, the number of seats to be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to
which the first party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes.

For example, the first party received 1,000,000 votes and is determined to be entitled to
two additional seats. Another qualified party which received 500,000 votes cannot be entitled to the
same number of seats, since it garnered only fifty percent of the votes won by the first party. Depending
on the proportion of its votes relative to that of the first party whose number of seats has already been
predetermined, the second party should be given less than that to which the first one is entitled.

The other qualified parties will always be allotted less additional seats than the first party for two
reasons: (1) the ratio between said parties and the first party will always be less than 1:1, and (2) the
formula does not admit of mathematical rounding off, because there is no such thing as a fraction of a
seat. Verily, an arbitrary rounding off could result in a violation of the twenty percent allocation. An
academic mathematical demonstration of such incipient violation is not necessary because the present
set of facts, given the number of qualified parties and the voting percentages obtained, will
definitely not end up in such constitutional contravention.

The Court has previously ruled in Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales[27] that a fractional membership cannot be
converted into a whole membership of one when it would, in effect, deprive another party's fractional
membership. It would be a violation of the constitutional mandate of proportional representation. We
said further that "no party can claim more than what it is entitled to x x x.

In any case, the decision on whether to round off the fractions is better left to the legislature. Since
Congress did not provide for it in the present law, neither will this Court. The Supreme Court does not
make the law; it merely applies it to a given set of facts.

Formula for Determining Additional Seats for the First Party

Now, how do we determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to? The only basis given by
the law is that a party receiving at least two percent of the total votes shall be entitled to one
seat. Proportionally, if the first party were to receive twice the number of votes of the second party, it
should be entitled to twice the latter's number of seats and so on. The formula, therefore, for
computing the number of seats to which the first party is entitled is as follows:

Number of votes

of first party Proportion of votes of

-------------------- = first party relative to

Total votes for total votes for party-list system

party-list system

If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is equal to at least six
percent of the total valid votes cast for all the party list groups, then the first party shall be entitled to
two additional seats or a total of three seats overall. If the proportion of votes without a rounding off
is equal to or greater than four percent, but less than six percent, then the first party shall have one
additional or a total of two seats. And if the proportion is less than four percent, then the first party
shall not be entitled to any additional seat.

We adopted this six percent bench mark, because the first party is not always entitled to the maximum
number of additional seats. Likewise, it would prevent the allotment of more than the total number of
available seats, such as in an extreme case wherein 18 or more parties tie for the highest rank and are
thus entitled to three seats each. In such scenario, the number of seats to which all the parties are
entitled may exceed the maximum number of party-list seats reserved in the House of Representatives.

Applying the above formula, APEC, which received 5.5% of the total votes cast, is entitled to one
additional seat or a total of two seats.

Note that the above formula will be applicable only in determining the number of additional seats
the first party is entitled to. It cannot be used to determine the number of additional seats of the other
qualified parties. As explained earlier, the use of the same formula for all would contravene the
proportional representation parameter. For example, a second party obtains six percent of the total
number of votes cast. According to the above formula, the said party would be entitled to two
additional seats or a total of three seats overall. However, if the first party received a significantly higher
amount of votes -- say, twenty percent -- to grant it the same number of seats as the second party would
violate the statutory mandate of proportional representation, since a party getting only six percent of
the votes will have an equal number of representatives as the one obtaining twenty percent. The proper
solution, therefore, is to grant the first party a total of three seats; and the party receiving six percent,
additional seats in proportion to those of the first party.

Formula for Additional Seats of Other Qualified Parties

Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified
parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation. The formula is encompassed by the
following complex fraction:

No. of votes of

concerned party

------------------

Total no. of votes

Additional seats for party-list system No. of additional

for concerned = ----------------------- x seats allocated to

party No. of votes of the first party

first party

------------------

Total no. of votes

for party list system

In simplified form, it is written as follows:

No. of votes of

Additional seats concerned party No. of additional

for concerned = ------------------ x seats allocated to

party No. of votes of the first party

first party

Thus, in the case of ABA, the additional number of seats it would be entitled to is computed as follows:

No. of votes of

Additional seats ABA No. of additional

for concerned = -------------------- x seats allocated to

party (ABA) No. of votes of the first party

first party (APEC)

Substituting actual values would result in the following equation:

Additional seats 321,646

for concerned = ----------- x 1 = .64 or 0 additional seat, since

party (ABA) 503,487 rounding off is not to be applied

Applying the above formula, we find the outcome of the 1998 party-list election to be as follows:

Organization Votes %age of Initial No. Additional Total

Garnered Total Votes of Seats Seats

1. APEC 503,487 5.50% 1 1 2

2. ABA 321,646 3.51% 1 321,646 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.64 1

3. ALAGAD 312,500 3.41% 1 312,500 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.62 1

4. VETERANS 304,802 3.33% 1 304,802 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.61 1

FEDERATION

5. PROMDI 255,184 2.79% 1 255,184 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.51 1

6. AKO 239,042 2.61% 1 239,042 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.47 1

7. NCSFO 238,303 2.60% 1 238,303 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.47 1

8. ABANSE! 235,548 2.57% 1 321,646 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.47 1

PINAY

9. AKBAYAN! 232,376 2.54% 1 232,376 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.46 1

10. BUTIL 215,643 2.36% 1 215,643 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.43 1

11. SANLAKAS 194,617 2.13% 1 194,617 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.39 1

12. COOP- 189,802 2.07% 1 189,802 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.38 1

NATCCO

13. COCOFED 186,388 2.04% 1 186,388 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.37 1

Incidentally, if the first party is not entitled to any additional seat, then the ratio of the number of votes
for the other party to that for the first one is multiplied by zero. The end result would be zero additional
seat for each of the other qualified parties as well.

The above formula does not give an exact mathematical representation of the number of additional
seats to be awarded since, in order to be entitled to one additional seat, an exact whole number is
necessary. In fact, most of the actual mathematical proportions are not whole numbers and are not
rounded off for the reasons explained earlier. To repeat, rounding off may result in the awarding of a
number of seats in excess of that provided by the law. Furthermore, obtaining absolute proportional
representation is restricted by the three-seat-per-party limit to a maximum of two additional slots. An
increase in the maximum number of additional representatives a party may be entitled to would result
in a more accurate proportional representation. But the law itself has set the limit: only two additional
seats. Hence, we need to work within such extant parameter.

The net result of the foregoing formula for determining additional seats happily coincides with the
present number of incumbents; namely, two for the first party (APEC) and one each for the twelve other
qualified parties. Hence, we affirm the legality of the incumbencies of their nominees, albeit through
the use of a different formula and methodology.
In his Dissent, Justice Mendoza criticizes our methodology for being too strict. We say, however, that
our formula merely translated the Philippine legal parameters into a mathematical equation, no more
no less. If Congress in its wisdom decides to modify RA 7941 to make it less strict, then the formula will
also be modified to reflect the changes willed by the lawmakers.

Epilogue

In sum, we hold that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the thirty-eight (38) herein
respondent parties, organizations and coalitions are each entitled to a party-list seat, because it
glaringly violated two requirements of RA 7941: the two percent threshold and proportional
representation.

In disregarding, rejecting and circumventing these statutory provisions, the Comelec effectively
arrogated unto itself what the Constitution expressly and wholly vested in the legislature: the power
and the discretion to define the mechanics for the enforcement of the system.The wisdom and the
propriety of these impositions, absent any clear transgression of the Constitution or grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, are beyond judicial review.[28]

Indeed, the Comelec and the other parties in these cases - both petitioners and respondents - have
failed to demonstrate that our lawmakers gravely abused their discretion in prescribing such
requirements. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment
equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[29]

The Comelec, which is tasked merely to enforce and administer election-related laws,[30] cannot simply
disregard an act of Congress exercised within the bounds of its authority. As a mere implementing body,
it cannot judge the wisdom, propriety or rationality of such act.Its recourse is to draft an amendment
to the law and lobby for its approval and enactment by the legislature.

Furthermore, a reading of the entire Constitution reveals no violation of any of its provisions by the
strict enforcement of RA 7941. It is basic that to strike down a law or any of its provisions as
unconstitutional, there must be a clear and unequivocal showing that what the Constitution prohibits,
the statute permits.[31]

Neither can we grant petitioners prayer that they each be given additional seats (for a total of three
each), because granting such plea would plainly and simply violate the proportional representation
mandated by Section 11 (b) of RA 7941.

The low turnout of the party-list votes during the 1998 elections should not be interpreted as a total
failure of the law in fulfilling the object of this new system of representation. It should not be deemed
a conclusive indication that the requirements imposed by RA 7941 wholly defeated the implementation
of the system. Be it remembered that the party-list system, though already popular in parliamentary
democracies, is still quite new in our presidential system. We should allow it some time to take root in
the consciousness of our people and in the heart of our tripartite form of republicanism. Indeed, the
Comelec and the defeated litigants should not despair.

Quite the contrary, the dismal result of the first election for party-list representatives should serve as a
challenge to our sectoral parties and organizations. It should stir them to be more active and vigilant in
their campaign for representation in the State's lawmaking body. It should also serve as a clarion call
for innovation and creativity in adopting this novel system of popular democracy.

With adequate information dissemination to the public and more active sectoral parties, we are
confident our people will be more responsive to future party-list elections. Armed with patience,
perseverance and perspicacity, our marginalized sectors, in time, will fulfill the Filipino dream of full
representation in Congress under the aegis of the party-list system, Philippine style.

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are hereby partially GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the Comelec
are SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED. The proclamations of the fourteen (14) sitting party-list representatives -
two for APEC and one each for the remaining twelve (12) qualified parties - are AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Ang Bagong Bayani vs Comelec
G.R. No. 147589 June 26, 2001
PANGANIBAN, J.:

The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give more law to the great masses of
our people who have less in life, but also to enable them to become veritable lawmakers themselves,
empowered to participate directly in the enactment of laws designed to benefit them. It intends to
make the marginalized and the underrepresented not merely passive recipients of the State's
benevolence, but active participants in the mainstream of representative democracy. Thus, allowing all
individuals and groups, including those which now dominate district elections, to have the same
opportunity to participate in party-list elections would desecrate this lofty objective and mongrelize the
social justice mechanism into an atrocious veneer for traditional politics.

The Case

Before us are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging Omnibus Resolution No.
3785 1issued by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) on March 26, 2001. This Resolution approved
the participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-
list elections. Petitioners seek the disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-
list system was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream
political parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented.

The Factual Antecedents

With the onset of the 2001 elections, the Comelec received several Petitions for registration filed by
sectoral parties, organizations and political parties. According to the Comelec, "[v]erifications were
made as to the status and capacity of these parties and organizations and hearings were scheduled day
and night until the last party w[as] heard. With the number of these petitions and the observance of
the legal and procedural requirements, review of these petitions as well as deliberations takes a longer
process in order to arrive at a decision and as a result the two (2) divisions promulgated a separate
Omnibus Resolution and individual resolution on political parties. These numerous petitions and
processes observed in the disposition of these petition[s] hinder the early release of the Omnibus
Resolutions of the Divisions which were promulgated only on 10 February 2001." 2

Thereafter, before the February 12, 2001 deadline prescribed under Comelec Resolution No. 3426 dated
December 22, 2000, the registered parties and organizations filed their respective Manifestations,
stating their intention to participate in the party-list elections. Other sectoral and political parties and
organizations whose registrations were denied also filed Motions for Reconsideration, together with
Manifestations of their intent to participate in the party-list elections. Still other registered parties filed
their Manifestations beyond the deadline.

The Comelec gave due course or approved the Manifestations (or accreditations) of 154 parties and
organizations, but denied those of several others in its assailed March 26, 2001 Omnibus Resolution No.
3785, which we quote:

"We carefully deliberated the foregoing matters, having in mind that this system of proportional
representation scheme will encourage multi-partisan [sic] and enhance the inability of small, new or
sectoral parties or organization to directly participate in this electoral window.

"It will be noted that as defined, the 'party-list system' is a 'mechanism of proportional representation'
in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections.

"However, in the course of our review of the matters at bar, we must recognize the fact that there is a
need to keep the number of sectoral parties, organizations and coalitions, down to a manageable level,
keeping only those who substantially comply with the rules and regulations and more importantly the
sufficiency of the Manifestations or evidence on the Motions for Reconsiderations or Oppositions." 3

On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the Comelec a Petition praying that "the
names of [some of herein respondents] be deleted from the 'Certified List of Political Parties/Sectoral
Parties/Organizations/Coalitions Participating in the Party List System for the May 14, 2001 Elections'
and that said certified list be accordingly amended." It also asked, as an alternative, that the votes cast
for the said respondents not be counted or canvassed, and that the latter's nominees not be
proclaimed. 4 On April 11, 2001, Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-Youth also filed a Petition for
Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of herein respondents. 5

On April 18, 2001, the Comelec required the respondents in the two disqualification cases to file
Comments within three days from notice. It also set the date for hearing on April 26, 2001, 6 but
subsequently reset it to May 3, 2001. 7 During the hearing, however, Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion
merely directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda. 8

Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the Comelec, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party filed a
Petition 9before this Court on April 16, 2001. This Petition, docketed as GR No. 147589, assailed Comelec
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated April 17, 2001, 10 the Court directed respondents
to comment on the Petition within a non-extendible period of five days from notice. 11

On April 17, 2001, Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed before this Court a Petition, 12 docketed as GR No.
147613, also challenging Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated May 9,
2001, 13 the Court ordered the consolidation of the two Petitions before it; directed respondents named
in the second Petition to file their respective Comments on or before noon of May 15, 2001; and called
the parties to an Oral Argument on May 17, 2001. It added that the Comelec may proceed with the
counting and canvassing of votes cast for the party-list elections, but barred the proclamation of any
winner therein, until further orders of the Court.

Thereafter, Comments 14 on the second Petition were received by the Court and, on May 17, 2001, the
Oral Argument was conducted as scheduled. In an Order given in open court, the parties were directed
to submit their respective Memoranda simultaneously within a non-extendible period of five days. 15

Issues:

During the hearing on May 17, 2001, the Court directed the parties to address the following issues:

"1. Whether or not recourse under Rule 65 is proper under the premises. More specifically, is there no
other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law?

"2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections.

"3. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to 'marginalized and underrepresented' sectors
and organizations.

"4. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785." 16

The Court's Ruling

The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be remanded to the Comelec which will
determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations enumerated
in the assailed Omnibus Resolution satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941, as
specified in this Decision.

First Issue:

Recourse Under Rule 65

Respondents contend that the recourse of both petitioners under Rule 65 is improper because there
are other plain, speedy and adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law. 17 The Office of the
Solicitor General argues that petitioners should have filed before the Comelec a petition either for
disqualification or for cancellation of registration, pursuant to Sections 19, 20, 21 and 22 of Comelec
Resolution No. 3307-A 18 dated November 9, 2000. 19

We disagree. At bottom, petitioners attack the validity of Comelec Omnibus Resolution 3785 for having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion, insofar as it allowed respondents to participate in the party-
list elections of 2001. Indeed, under both the Constitution 20 and the Rules of Court, such challenge may
be brought before this Court in a verified petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

Moreover, the assailed Omnibus Resolution was promulgated by Respondent Commission en banc;
hence, no motion for reconsideration was possible, it being a prohibited pleading under Section 1 (d),
Rule 13 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure. 21
The Court also notes that Petitioner Bayan Muna had filed before the Comelec a Petition for
Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of herein respondents. 22 The Comelec,
however, did not act on that Petition. In view of the pendency of the elections, Petitioner Bayan Muna
sought succor from this Court, for there was no other adequate recourse at the time. Subsequent events
have proven the urgency of petitioner's action; to this date, the Comelec has not yet formally resolved
the Petition before it. But a resolution may just be a formality because the Comelec, through the Office
of the Solicitor General, has made its position on the matter quite clear.

In any event, this case presents an exception to the rule that certiorari shall lie only in the absence of
any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy. 23 It has been held that certiorari is available,
notwithstanding the presence of other remedies, "where the issue raised is one purely of law, where
public interest is involved, and in case of urgency." 24 Indeed, the instant case is indubitably imbued
with public interest and with extreme urgency, for it potentially involves the composition of 20 percent
of the House of Representatives.

Moreover, this case raises transcendental constitutional issues on the party-list system, which this
Court must urgently resolve, consistent with its duty to "formulate guiding and controlling
constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules." 25

Finally, procedural requirements "may be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of justice, when the
issue involves the principle of social justice x x x when the decision sought to be set aside is a nullity, or
when the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy
available." 26

Second Issue:

Participation of Political Parties

In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party contends that "the inclusion of political parties in
the party-list system is the most objectionable portion of the questioned Resolution." 27 For its part,
Petitioner Bayan Muna objects to the participation of "major political parties." 28 On the other hand,
the Office of the Solicitor General, like the impleaded political parties, submits that the Constitution
and RA No. 7941 allow political parties to participate in the party-list elections. It argues that the party-
list system is, in fact, open to all "registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations." 29

We now rule on this issue. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be
disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section
5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of Representatives may "be elected
through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations."

Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political parties may be
registered under the party-list system.

"Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid, except for
those registered under the party-list system as provided in this Constitution.

"Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list system, shall not
be represented in the voters' registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers,
or other similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with
law." 30

During the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, Comm. Christian S. Monsod pointed out that
the participants in the party-list system may "be a regional party, a sectoral party, a national party,
UNIDO, 31Magsasaka, or a regional party in Mindanao." 32 This was also clear from the following
exchange between Comms. Jaime Tadeo and Blas Ople: 33

"MR. TADEO. Naniniwala ba kayo na ang party list ay pwedeng paghati-hatian ng UNIDO, PDP-Laban,
PNP, Liberal at Nacionalista?

MR. OPLE. Maaari yan sapagkat bukas ang party list system sa lahat ng mga partido."

Indeed, Commissioner Monsod stated that the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the
system, in order to give a chance to parties that consistently place third or fourth in congressional
district elections to win a seat in Congress. 34 He explained: "The purpose of this is to open the system.
In the past elections, we found out that there were certain groups or parties that, if we count their votes
nationwide, have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were always third or fourth place in
each of the districts. So, they have no voice in the Assembly. But this way, they would have five or six
representatives in the Assembly even if they would not win individually in legislative districts. So, that
is essentially the mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the party-list system."

For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of registered national, regional
and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, x x x." Section 3 expressly states that a
"party" is "either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties." More to the point, the
law defines "political party" as "an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform,
principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means
of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as
candidates for public office."

Furthermore, Section 11 of RA 7941 leaves no doubt as to the participation of political parties in the
party-list system. We quote the pertinent provision below:

"x x x

"For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party
representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines
shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.

x x x"

Indubitably, therefore, political parties even the major ones -- may participate in the party-list
elections.

Third Issue:

Marginalized and Underrepresented

That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean, however, that any
political party -- or any organization or group for that matter -- may do so. The requisite character of
these parties or organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down
in the Constitution and RA 7941. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, provides as follows:

"(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law,
shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification
of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as
provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious
sector." (Emphasis supplied.)

Notwithstanding the sparse language of the provision, a distinguished member of the Constitutional
Commission declared that the purpose of the party-list provision was to give "genuine power to our
people" in Congress. Hence, when the provision was discussed, he exultantly announced: "On this first
day of August 1986, we shall, hopefully, usher in a new chapter to our national history, by giving genuine
power to our people in the legislature."35

The foregoing provision on the party-list system is not self-executory. It is, in fact, interspersed with
phrases like "in accordance with law" or "as may be provided by law"; it was thus up to Congress to
sculpt in granite the lofty objective of the Constitution. Hence, RA 7941 was enacted. It laid out the
statutory policy in this wise:

"SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. -- The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-
defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party
system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in
the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the
legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible."

The Marginalized and Underrepresented to Become Lawmakers Themselves

The foregoing provision mandates a state policy of promoting proportional representation by means of
the Filipino-style party-list system, which will "enable" the election to the House of Representatives of
Filipino citizens,

1. who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties; and

2. who lack well-defined constituencies; but

3. who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit
the nation as a whole.

The key words in this policy are "proportional representation," "marginalized and underrepresented,"
and "lack ofwell-defined constituencies."

"Proportional representation" here does not refer to the number of people in a particular district,
because the party-list election is national in scope. Neither does it allude to numerical strength in a
distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the representation of the "marginalized and
underrepresented" as exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely, "labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth,
veterans, overseas workers, and professionals."

However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the marginalized and
underrepresented, because representation is easy to claim and to feign. The party-list organization or
party must factually and truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented constituencies
mentioned in Section 5. 36 Concurrently, the persons nominated by the party-list candidate-organization
must be "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties."

Finally, "lack of well-defined constituenc[y] " refers to the absence of a traditionally identifiable
electoral group, like voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of government. Rather, it points
again to those with disparate interests identified with the "marginalized or underrepresented."

In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it that only those Filipinos who are "marginalized and
underrepresented" become members of Congress under the party-list system, Filipino-style.

The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the people, not only by giving more law
to those who have less in life, but more so by enabling them to become veritable lawmakers
themselves. Consistent with this intent, the policy of the implementing law, we repeat, is likewise clear:
"to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties, x x x, to become members of the House of Representatives." Where the language of the law is
clear, it must be applied according to its express terms. 37

The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be represented under the party-list system are
enumerated in Section 5 of RA 7941, which states:

"SEC. 5. Registration. -- Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition
for purposes of the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before
the election a petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-
list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or
organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, list of
officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC may require: Provided,
that the sector shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals."

While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it demonstrates
the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented under the party-list system. It is a
fundamental principle of statutory construction that words employed in a statute are interpreted in
connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by reference to, the words and the phrases with
which they are associated or related. Thus, the meaning of a term in a statute may be limited, qualified
or specialized by those in immediate association. 38

The Party-List System Desecrated by the OSG Contentions

Notwithstanding the unmistakable statutory policy, the Office of the Solicitor General submits that RA
No. 7941 "does not limit the participation in the party-list system to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors of society." 39 In fact, it contends that any party or group that is not
disqualified under Section 6 40 of RA 7941 may participate in the elections. Hence, it admitted during
the Oral Argument that even an organization representing the super rich of Forbes Park or Dasmarias
Village could participate in the party-list elections. 41

The declared policy of RA 7941 contravenes the position of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). We
stress that the party-list system seeks to enable certain Filipino citizens specifically those belonging
to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties to be elected to the House
of Representatives. The assertion of the OSG that the party-list system is not exclusive to the
marginalized and underrepresented disregards the clear statutory policy. Its claim that even the super-
rich and overrepresented can participate desecrates the spirit of the party-list system.

Indeed, the law crafted to address the peculiar disadvantages of Payatas hovel dwellers cannot be
appropriated by the mansion owners of Forbes Park. The interests of these two sectors are manifestly
disparate; hence, the OSG's position to treat them similarly defies reason and common sense. In
contrast, and with admirable candor, Atty. Lorna Patajo-Kapunan 42 admitted during the Oral Argument
that a group of bankers, industrialists and sugar planters could not join the party-list system as
representatives of their respective sectors. 43

While the business moguls and the mega-rich are, numerically speaking, a tiny minority, they are
neither marginalized nor underrepresented, for the stark reality is that their economic clout engenders
political power more awesome than their numerical limitation. Traditionally, political power does not
necessarily emanate from the size of one's constituency; indeed, it is likely to arise more directly from
the number and amount of one's bank accounts.

It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented in our midst are the majority who
wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity. It was for them that the party-list system was enacted --
to give them not only genuine hope, but genuine power; to give them the opportunity to be elected
and to represent the specific concerns of their constituencies; and simply to give them a direct voice in
Congress and in the larger affairs of the State. In its noblest sense, the party-list system truly empowers
the masses and ushers a new hope for genuine change. Verily, it invites those marginalized and
underrepresented in the past the farm hands, the fisher folk, the urban poor, even those in the
underground movement to come out and participate, as indeed many of them came out and
participated during the last elections. The State cannot now disappoint and frustrate them by disabling
and desecrating this social justice vehicle.

Because the marginalized and underrepresented had not been able to win in the congressional district
elections normally dominated by traditional politicians and vested groups, 20 percent of the seats in
the House of Representatives were set aside for the party-list system. In arguing that even those sectors
who normally controlled 80 percent of the seats in the House could participate in the party-list elections
for the remaining 20 percent, the OSG and the Comelec disregard the fundamental difference between
the congressional district elections and the party-list elections.

As earlier noted, the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the system, 44 in order to
enhance the chance of sectoral groups and organizations to gain representation in the House of
Representatives through the simplest scheme possible. 45 Logic shows that the system has been opened
to those who have never gotten a foothold within it -- those who cannot otherwise win in regular
elections and who therefore need the "simplest scheme possible" to do so. Conversely, it would be
illogical to open the system to those who have long been within it -- those privileged sectors that have
long dominated the congressional district elections.

The import of the open party-list system may be more vividly understood when compared to a student
dormitory "open house," which by its nature allows outsiders to enter the facilities. Obviously, the
"open house" is for the benefit of outsiders only, not the dormers themselves who can enter the
dormitory even without such special privilege. In the same vein, the open party-list system is only for
the "outsiders" who cannot get elected through regular elections otherwise; it is not for the non-
marginalized or overrepresented who already fill the ranks of Congress.

Verily, allowing the non-marginalized and overrepresented to vie for the remaining seats under the
party-list system would not only dilute, but also prejudice the chance of the marginalized and
underrepresented, contrary to the intention of the law to enhance it. The party-list system is a tool for
the benefit of the underprivileged; the law could not have given the same tool to others, to the
prejudice of the intended beneficiaries.

This Court, therefore, cannot allow the party-list system to be sullied and prostituted by those who are
neither marginalized nor underrepresented. It cannot let that flicker of hope be snuffed out. The clear
state policy must permeate every discussion of the qualification of political parties and other
organizations under the party-list system.

Refutation of the Separate Opinions

The Separate Opinions of our distinguished colleagues, Justices Jose C. Vitug and Vicente V. Mendoza,
are anchored mainly on the supposed intent of the framers of the Constitution as culled from their
deliberations.

The fundamental principle in constitutional construction, however, is that the primary source from
which to ascertain constitutional intent or purpose is the language of the provision itself. The
presumption is that the words in which the constitutional provisions are couched express the objective
sought to be attained. 46 In other words, verba legis still prevails. Only when the meaning of the words
used is unclear and equivocal should resort be made to extraneous aids of construction and
interpretation, such as the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission or Convention, in order to
shed light on and ascertain the true intent or purpose of the provision being construed. 47

Indeed, as cited in the Separate Opinion of Justice Mendoza, this Court stated in Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive Secretary 48 that "the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention [may be
consulted] in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution x x x only when
other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the
meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention 'are of value as showing the views of the
individual members, and as indicating the reason for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views
of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass or our fellow citizens whose votes at the
polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution
from what appears upon its face.' The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was
understood by the people adopting it than in the framers' understanding thereof."

Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, relative to the party-list system, is couched in clear terms: the
mechanics of the system shall be provided by law. Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7941. In
understanding and implementing party-list representation, we should therefore look at the law first.
Only when we find its provisions ambiguous should the use of extraneous aids of construction be
resorted to.

But, as discussed earlier, the intent of the law is obvious and clear from its plain words. Section 2 thereof
unequivocally states that the party-list system of electing congressional representatives was designed
to "enable underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political
constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation
that will benefit the nation as a whole x x x." The criteria for participation is well defined. Thus, there is
no need for recourse to constitutional deliberations, not even to the proceedings of Congress. In any
event, the framers' deliberations merely express their individual opinions and are, at best, only
persuasive in construing the meaning and purpose of the constitution or statute.

Be it remembered that the constitutionality or validity of Sections 2 and 5 of RA 7941 is not an issue
here. Hence, they remain parts of the law, which must be applied plainly and simply.

Fourth Issue:

Grave Abuse of Discretion

From its assailed Omnibus Resolution, it is manifest that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear
policy of the law and the Constitution. On the contrary, it seems to have ignored the facet of the party-
list system discussed above. The OSG as its counsel admitted before the Court that any group, even the
non-marginalized and overrepresented, could field candidates in the party-list elections.

When a lower court, or a quasi-judicial agency like the Commission on Elections, violates or ignores the
Constitution or the law, its action can be struck down by this Court on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion. 49Indeed, the function of all judicial and quasi-judicial instrumentalities is to apply the law as
they find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it. 50

In its Memorandum, Petitioner Bayan Muna passionately pleads for the outright disqualification of the
major political parties Respondents Lakas-NUCD, LDP, NPC, LP and PMP on the ground that under
Comelec Resolution No. 4073, they have been accredited as the five (six, including PDP-Laban) major
political parties in the May 14, 2001 elections. It argues that because of this, they have the "advantage
of getting official Comelec Election Returns, Certificates of Canvass, preferred poll watchers x x x." We
note, however, that this accreditation does not refer to the party-list election, but, inter alia, to the
election of district representatives for the purpose of determining which parties would be entitled to
watchers under Section 26 of Republic Act No. 7166.

What is needed under the present circumstances, however, is a factual determination of whether
respondents herein and, for that matter, all the 154 previously approved groups, have the necessary
qualifications to participate in the party-list elections, pursuant to the Constitution and the law.

Bayan Muna also urges us to immediately rule out Respondent Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga (MAD),
because "it is a government entity using government resources and privileges." This Court, however, is
not a trier of facts. 51 It is not equipped to receive evidence and determine the truth of such factual
allegations.

Basic rudiments of due process require that respondents should first be given an opportunity to show
that they qualify under the guidelines promulgated in this Decision, before they can be deprived of their
right to participate in and be elected under the party-list system.

Guidelines for Screening Party-List Participants

The Court, therefore, deems it proper to remand the case to the Comelec for the latter to determine,
after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations allowed to participate
in the party-list elections comply with the requirements of the law. In this light, the Court finds it
appropriate to lay down the following guidelines, culled from the law and the Constitution, to assist the
Comelec in its work.

First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and
underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must show -- through its
constitution, articles of incorporation, bylaws, history, platform of government and track record -- that
it represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its
membership should belong to the marginalized and underrepresented. And it must demonstrate that
in a conflict of interests, it has chosen or is likely to choose the interest of such sectors.

Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to
participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling
"Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the
House of Representatives." In other words, while they are not disqualified merely on the ground that
they are political parties, they must show, however, that they represent the interests of the
marginalized and underrepresented. The counsel of Aksyon Demokratiko and other similarly situated
political parties admitted as much during the Oral Argument, as the following quote shows:

"JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: I am not disputing that in my question. All I am saying is, the political party
must claim to represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors?

ATTY. KAPUNAN: Yes, Your Honor, the answer is yes."52

Third, in view of the objections53 directed against the registration of Ang Buhay Hayaang Yumabong,
which is allegedly a religious group, the Court notes the express constitutional provision that the
religious sector may not be represented in the party-list system. The extent of the constitutional
proscription is demonstrated by the following discussion during the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission:

"MR. OPLE. x x x
In the event that a certain religious sect with nationwide and even international networks of members
and supporters, in order to circumvent this prohibition, decides to form its own political party in
emulation of those parties I had mentioned earlier as deriving their inspiration and philosophies from
well-established religious faiths, will that also not fall within this prohibition?

MR. MONSOD. If the evidence shows that the intention is to go around the prohibition, then certainly
the Comelec can pierce through the legal fiction."54

The following discussion is also pertinent:

"MR. VILLACORTA. When the Commissioner proposed "EXCEPT RELIGIOUS GROUPS," he is not, of
course, prohibiting priests, imams or pastors who may be elected by, say, the indigenous community
sector to represent their group.

REV. RIGOS. Not at all, but I am objecting to anybody who represents the Iglesia ni Kristo, the Catholic
Church, the Protestant Church et cetera."55

Furthermore, the Constitution provides that "religious denominations and sects shall not be
registered."56 The prohibition was explained by a member57 of the Constitutional Commission in this
wise: "[T] he prohibition is on any religious organization registering as a political party. I do not see any
prohibition here against a priest running as a candidate. That is not prohibited here; it is the registration
of a religious sect as a political party."58

Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which
enumerates the grounds for disqualification as follows:

"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes;

(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;

(3) It is a foreign party or organization;

(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization,
whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan
election purposes;

(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;

(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;

(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum
(2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency
in which it has registered."59

Note should be taken of paragraph 5, which disqualifies a party or group for violation of or failure to
comply with election laws and regulations. These laws include Section 2 of RA 7941, which states that
the party-list system seeks to "enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties x x x to become members of the House of Representatives." A party
or an organization, therefore, that does not comply with this policy must be disqualified.

Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity funded or
assisted by, the government. By the very nature of the party-list system, the party or organization must
be a group of citizens, organized by citizens and operated by citizens. It must be independent of the
government. The participation of the government or its officials in the affairs of a party-list candidate
is not only illegal60 and unfair to other parties, but also deleterious to the objective of the law: to enable
citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations to be elected to the
House of Representatives.

Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees must likewise do
so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as follows:

"SEC. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list

representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the
Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able
to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at
least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on
the day of the election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty
(30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of
thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term."

Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and
underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees. To repeat, under Section 2 of RA 7941, the
nominees must be Filipino citizens "who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties." Surely, the interests of the youth cannot be fully represented by a retiree;
neither can those of the urban poor or the working class, by an industrialist. To allow otherwise is to
betray the State policy to give genuine representation to the marginalized and underrepresented.

Eighth, as previously discussed, while lacking a well-defined political constituency, the nominee must
likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will
benefit the nation as a whole. Senator Jose Lina explained during the bicameral committee proceedings
that "the nominee of a party, national or regional, is not going to represent a particular district x x x."61

Epilogue

The linchpin of this case is the clear and plain policy of the law: "to enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined
political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives."

Crucial to the resolution of this case is the fundamental social justice principle that those who have less
in life should have more in law. The party-list system is one such tool intended to benefit those who
have less in life. It gives the great masses of our people genuine hope and genuine power. It is a message
to the destitute and the prejudiced, and even to those in the underground, that change is possible. It is
an invitation for them to come out of their limbo and seize the opportunity.

Clearly, therefore, the Court cannot accept the submissions of the Comelec and the other respondents
that the party-list system is, without any qualification, open to all. Such position does not only weaken
the electoral chances of the marginalized and underrepresented; it also prejudices them. It would gut
the substance of the party-list system. Instead of generating hope, it would create a mirage. Instead of
enabling the marginalized, it would further weaken them and aggravate their marginalization.

In effect, the Comelec would have us believe that the party-list provisions of the Constitution and RA
7941 are nothing more than a play on dubious words, a mockery of noble intentions, and an empty
offering on the altar of people empowerment. Surely, this could not have been the intention of the
framers of the Constitution and the makers of RA 7941.

WHEREFORE, this case is REMANDED to the Comelec, which is hereby DIRECTED to immediately conduct
summary evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the party-list participants in the light of the
guidelines enunciated in this Decision. Considering the extreme urgency of determining the winners in
the last party-list elections, the Comelec is directed to begin its hearings for the parties and
organizations that appear to have garnered such number of votes as to qualify for seats in the House of
Representatives. The Comelec is further DIRECTED to submit to this Court its compliance report within
30 days from notice hereof.1wphi1.nt

The Resolution of this Court dated May 9, 2001, directing the Comelec "to refrain from proclaiming any
winner" during the last party-list election, shall remain in force until after the Comelec itself will have
complied and reported its compliance with the foregoing disposition.

This Decision is immediately executory upon the Commission on Elections' receipt thereof. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.