Hannah Petruzzi

PLSC 014
Professor Lemke
19 April 2017

The Invasion of Poland and the Game of Chicken

On September 1, 1939, Adolf Hitler made the provocative decision to invade Poland with

his newly-rebuilt German military. In response, Great Britain declared war on Germany on

September 3, 1939. The impending Second World War had finally begun. The months leading

up to this invasion involved a multitude of interactions between these two actors, including the

appeasement policies set forth by Great Britain. Throughout this period, Nazi Germany

continuously tested the limits of other world powers as it acted with blatant disregard to the

Treaty of Versailles. Due to the strategic nature of the interactions which led to the invasion of

Poland, it is worth exploring the possibility that Game Theory may help explain the outcomes of

this momentous event.

Hitlers Invasion of Poland

The Nazi decision to invade Poland toward the beginning of the Second World War is

often seen as the first major military act in the international conflict. Prior to the invasion, Hitler

signed a nonaggression pact with Poland in January of 1934. This pact was designed to diminish

the possibility of an alliance between France and Poland, which Hitler feared would occur before

he had completed his plans for German rearmament. Throughout the 1930s, both Britain and

France had followed an appeasement policy with regard to Nazi Germany. This meant that

despite significant and frequent violations of the Treaty of Versailles, Britain and France did not

take action to prevent the military rearmament of the Nazi government, the remilitarization of the

Rhineland, or the annexation of Austria.

 The Treaty of Versailles was signed by German leaders on May 7, 1919, and served

mainly to punish Germany for prompting the First World War. In addition to forcing Germany to

give up many of the territories it had acquired, the treaty included the, War Guilt Clause which

held Germany responsible for single-handedly instigating World War I. The treaty required

Germany to pay material damages, which was intended to prevent recovery that might lead to the

start of another war. Germany was not allowed to have an air force and was limited to a 100,000-

man army as well as total navy vessels weighing less than 10,000 tons. The treaty was an

embarrassment and insult to the people of Germany and remained as such in the years leading up

to the Second World War. Thus, on a platform of reform to the Treaty of Versailles, right-wing

entities such as the Nazi Party were able to gain great power in Germany.

Britain and France, alongside most major actors of World War I, knew of Germanys

dissatisfaction with the Treaty of Versailles and worked to maintain peace as long as possible.

This contributed largely to the appeasement policies of Britain and later to the Munich

Conference. At the Munich Conference, Britain and France signed an agreement allowing

Germany to take the Sudetenland, which contained regions of the Czech border. Hitler quickly

violated this agreement when he took all of Czechoslovakia instead of the agreed upon border

regions. On September 1, 1939, Hitler invaded Poland.

Hitlers decision to invade Poland was heavily influenced by the previously-implemented

appeasement policies of Great Britain and France. Ultimately, Hitler did not expect to face any

repercussions for ceasing Poland in this manner. He felt the decision would result in a brief and

victorious war with the Polish army and absolutely no interference from other states. Further,

Hitler viewed the British prime minister, Neville Chamberlain, as a, weak, indecisive leader

who would opt for a peace settlement rather than war (Lightbody). Unfortunately for Germany
this was not the case. In response to the invasion, Great Britain declared war on Germany on

September 3, 1939.

Game Theory

Game theory is a useful tool for political scientists and other researchers to analyze

strategic interactions. Game theory involves two actors, sometimes called players, who both have

two choices and must decide which course of action to take. These options are typically

described as cooperation and defection. In any game, there are four possible outcomes which

may result from the decisions of both actors. Firstly, both actors may choose to cooperate with

one another. This is represented as CC for cooperate and cooperate. Secondly, both actors may

choose to defect from one another. This is represented as DD for defect and defect. Third, the

first player can choose to cooperate while the second player chooses to defect, which would be

represented as CD. Lastly, the first actor may defect while the second actor chooses to cooperate,

which would be represented as DC.

Each actor in a game contributes their own preference ranking. In other terms, each actor

prefers every possible outcome in a given order. This preference ranking is from the best

possible outcome, typically represented as a 4 for that actor, to the worst possible outcome,

which would be represented as a 1. Thus, the higher the number the more preferred the outcome

is to the corresponding actor. Importantly, the actors make their decisions simultaneously with

one another. Thus each actor maintains full knowledge of their own preferences and the other

actors preferences, but has no information regarding the choice the other actor will actually

make.

Actors known as purposive actors will aim to gain the highest payoff that can be

expected, which involves making the choice which would be the best against the anticipated
decision of the other actor. A dominant strategy exists when one actor would be best-off by

making one choice no matter what the other actor does. The best outcome would result from

always choosing to cooperate or always choosing to defect. Otherwise, the best option will

depend on the anticipated action of the other player in the game. Equilibriums exist when each

player implements their best response strategy, or chooses the option which generates their best

outcome. An equilibrium can only exist when the actors would not benefit from changing their

choice. Several widely-known games, such as the Prisoners Dilemma, the game of Chicken, and

the Stag Hunt, are used to understand specific international interactions and conflicts, as well as

other topics of interest in social science research. The game of Chicken will later be included in

an analysis of the decisions Hitler and Great Britain made relating to the invasion of Poland at

the start of World War II.

Game of Chicken

The game of Chicken represents a particular strategic dilemma. This game gets its name

from the story used to explain the situation and preference orderings of the actors. Imagine that

two individuals are driving down a road towards one another. The chicken of the game will

swerve off the road and thus, be humiliated and embarrassed by his/her peers for being scared

instead of driving forward. The winner in this situation does not swerve off the road but rather,

continues driving at full speed toward the other driver. Further, if both drivers swerve off the

road neither will be humiliated because both of them were scared or chickened out before a

crash occurred. Alternatively, if neither driver swerves off the road both would risk death or

otherwise serious injury.

In this game, cooperation and defection take on particular values. Swerving off the road

and away from the other driver is viewed as cooperation. Driving down the road toward the other
 driver is considered defection. Therefore, the preference ordering for the game is DC > CC > CD

> DD or defect, cooperate; cooperate, cooperate; cooperate, defect; defect, defect. In actual

terms, this would involve player 1 driving onward while player 2 swerves, both players

swerving, player 1 swerving while player 2 drives onward, and both players driving onward,

respectively. The following figure illustrates the preferences of the actors in this game:

Figure 1.0

Player 2
Cooperate Defect
Defect
Player 1

Cooperate

The * indicates an equilibrium.

In the game of Chicken, there is no dominant strategy for either player. Each player must

choose their action based on an expectation of what the other actor will do. This leads the actors

to do the opposite of what the other actor is expected to do. If the other actor will keep driving,

then the actor in question should decide to swerve off the road. If the other actor is expected to

turn, then the actor in question will decide to keep driving onward. Since the actor would not

receive benefit from making another decision in the same circumstances, both of those scenarios

are equilibriums in the game of Chicken.

 Analysis

The game of Chicken can be applied to various international and domestic conflicts and

interactions in political science. Several components of the game may also be successfully

applied to Hitlers invasion of Poland, while other characteristics of the game are not applicable

to the historical circumstances regarding the event. There are a variety of significant factors to

consider while determining whether the game of Chicken is applicable to Hitlers invasion of

Poland and Britains response. First, the actors must be specified alongside their options and

preferences. Second, the expectations each player has of the other actor must be examined in

reference to that players decision. Third, characteristics of the game such as neither player

having a dominant strategy and supposed simultaneous decision-making must be taken into

account. These considerations will make it possible to determine whether Game Theory and

more specifically, the game of Chicken, can be effectively utilized to explain the outcome related

to Hitlers invasion of Poland at the start of World War II.

As mentioned above, the game of Chicken involves two actors driving towards one

another with the option to cooperate (veer of the road) or defect (drive toward the opponent). In

relation to the invasion of Poland, Nazi Germany serves as player 1 and Great Britain serves as

player 2. Each of the players is contemplating a decision. Hitlers options for Nazi Germany are

to invade Poland, i.e. take military action, or not invade Poland. Britains options are to declare

war on Germany and defend invaded regions such as Poland, i.e. take military action, or remain

neutral and not defend any territory against Germany. In this case, Germany would obviously

prefer to invade and conquer Poland without interference from Britain. However, if Germany

believes that Britain would take military action to defend Poland, it would prefer not to invade

since it would come at a high cost to the German military in its time of rebuilding. Alternatively,
 Britain would prefer that its decision to defend Poland would prevent invasion any other

aggressive military antics on the part of Nazi Germany. If Germany would invade Poland in the

case of a British defense, then Britain would prefer not to send troops in the hopes that Nazi

Germany would not invade if it was not threatened. The actors least preferred option is both

taking military action, since this would result in prolonged conflict, higher monetary cost, and

the loss of lives and military equipment. These proposed preferences for Nazi Germany and

Great Britain with regard to a possible German invasion of Poland are represented by the

following figure:

Figure 1.1

Great Britain
Do Not Defend Defend
Invade
Nazi Germany

Do Not Invade

The * indicates an equilibrium.

As in all strategic interactions, an actors expectations of their opponents choice

contribute largely to the decision that actor will make. In this case, Hitler did not expect that

Britain would take military action against Nazi Germany. As mentioned previously, he felt

Neville Chamberlain was both indecisive and weak, making him unlikely to instigate any

military action against rising Nazi power. The policies of appeasement which had been practiced
by both Britain and France in the months leading up to the event gave Hitler confidence that

there would be no repercussion if the decision to invade were selected. Thus, Hitler chose to

invade Poland based on his expectations of the other actor. The same cannot be said for the

decision Great Britain made. If the game of Chicken did adequately describe the preference

orderings of Great Britain and Germany in this situation, then Britain would prefer to not get

involved even if Germany invaded. In other words, if Germany were driving straight toward

Great Britain and was not expected to veer off-road, Britain would swerve off the road to save

itself. Before the invasion, Britain had strong reason to believe Germany would make the

decision Hitler did make based on its disregard for the Munich Conference agreement and the

Treaty of Versailles. Even so, Britain chose to take military action against Nazi Germany. If

Britains preferences were those of actors in the game of Chicken, this would not have been the

case.

In spite of the fact that Nazi Germany and Great Britain may have held similar preference

orderings to those of players in the game of Chicken model, inappropriate applicability of other

components of the game strengthen the argument that the model could not have accurately

predicted nor adequately explain the events relating to Hitlers invasion of Poland. Most

importantly, in Game Theory and especially in the game of Chicken, actors decisions must be

made simultaneously. The major concept of the game is that the actors do not know exactly what

their opponent will do and must choose whether to risk their lives driving onward or chicken

out. This was not the case with regard to Nazi Germany and Great Britain. While Germany had

expectations for Britains eventual decision leading up to the event, Hitler made his decision to

invade Poland before Britain chose to take military action. Thus the decisions did not take place

simultaneously but rather, Great Britain responded to the decision made by Nazi Germany.
Furthermore, it is unclear that neither of the players had a dominant strategy. In the Game of

Chicken, neither actor has a dominant strategy and thus the decision they make must me heavily

based on expectations of the opponent. However, it is unclear that Nazi Germany would have left

Poland alone even if Britain had sent preventative troops. Since Hitler did decide to invade

Poland due to his expectation that Britain would not react, one could reasonably argue that

Germany did not have a dominant strategy and was simply acting on expectations of Great

Britain, but this is not entirely clear and thus a dominant strategy cannot be ruled out.

While Game Theory is useful in understanding a variety of strategic interactions, the

game of Chicken is not entirely appropriate for application to Hitlers invasion of Poland and the

corresponding military action from Great Britain.

Conclusion

Game Theory and more specifically the game of Chicken can serve as helpful tools for

analyzing interactions between international actors. In the case of the German invasion of Poland

and the British decision to defend the territory, the aspects of the event do not line up perfectly

with the games characteristics. While the preferences of Germany and Great Britain may be

similar to those of the actors in the game of Chicken, significant factors prevent the game from

maintaining full applicability. The lack of simultaneous decision-making, in addition to the fact

that it is not certain a dominant strategy was absent for both countries, raise questions with

regard to the applicability of the game. Overall, while it may serve as a useful model for

understanding the preferences and interaction of the actors in a general sense, there is likely a

more appropriate theoretical framework to explain Hitlers invasion of Poland and the British

decision to declare war on Germany.

 References

Frieden, Jeffry A., David A. Lake, and Kenneth A. Schultz. World Politics: Interests,

Interactions, Institutions. 3rd ed. New York: W.W. Norton, 2016. Print.

Lightbody, Bradley. "BBC - History - World Wars: Invasion of Poland." BBC News. BBC, 30

Mar. 2011. Web. 18 Apr. 2017.

"Invasion of Poland, Fall 1939." United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. United States

Holocaust Memorial Museum, 6 Aug. 2003. Web. 18 Mar. 2017.