62.) G.R. No.
198012 April 22, 2015 Cahilig worked as cashier at Wyeth Philippines Employees Savings and Loan Association, Inc.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ANGEL MATEO y JACINTO AND VICENTA
LAPIZ y MEDINA, Accused-Appellants.
FACTS:
5 private complainant met accused appellants in separate occasion to apply for overseas
employment
Appellant Mateo, representing himself to have a tie-up with some Japanese firms, promised
them employment in Japan as conversion mechanics, welders, or fitters for a fee. Appellants
also promised that they could facilitate private complainants employment as direct hires and
assured their departure within three weeks.
However, after the private complainants paid the required fees ranging from P18,555.00 to
P25,000.00, appellants failed to secure any overseas employment for them.
Appellants likewise failed to return private complainants money
This prompted Manuel to go to the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)
where he was issued a Certification stating that appellants are not licensed to recruit
applicants for overseas employment.
Thereupon, the private complainants filed their Complaint and executed their respective
affidavits with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). The NBI referred the charges to
the Department of Justice which subsequently found probable cause against appellants for
large scale illegal recruitment and estafa and accordingly filed the corresponding
Informations for the same before the RTC of Manila.
RTC ruled guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale each in 5
complaints and 5 counts of Estafa.
CA affirmed the decision of RTC
ISSUE: whether or not they are guilty of the crime charge
HELD
Yes
The offense of illegal recruitment in large scale has the following elements: (1) the person
charged undertook any recruitment activity as defined under Section 6 of RA 8042; -
undertaken a recruitment activity when they promised private complainants
employment in Japan for a fee
(2) accused did not have the license or the authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment of
workers; and, - the Certification issued by the POEA unmistakably reveals that
appellants neither have a license nor authority to recruit workers for overseas
employment
(3) accused committed the same against three or more persons individually or as a group- it
was established that there were five complainants.
Appellants argument that there was no proof that they received money from the private
complainants deserves no credence Suffice it to say that money is not material to a
prosecution for illegal recruitment considering that the definition of "illegal recruitment"
under the law includes the phrase "whether for profit or not."
Anent the charge for estafa, "[w]ell-settled is the rule that a person convicted for illegal
recruitment under the [law] may, for the same acts, be separately convicted for estafa under
Article 315, par. 2(a) of the [Revised Penal Code]. The elements of estafa are: (1) the
accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit; and (2) the
offended party or a third party suffered damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary
estimation. All these elements are likewise present in this case.
Here, the appellants Mateo and Lapiz committed deceit against the private complainants by
making it appear as though they had the authority and resources to send them to Japan for
employment; that there were available jobs for them in Japan for which they would be hired
although, in truth, there were none; and, that by reason or on the strength of such
assurance, the private complainants parted with their money in payment of the placement
fee, documentation and hotel accommodations. All these representations were actually false
and fraudulent and thus, the apellants must be made liable under par2(a), Art. 315 of the
Revised Penal Code.
63.) G.R. No. 199208 July 30, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs.TRINIDAD A. CAHILIG, Appellant.
FACTS:
(WPESLAI) from December 1992 until 7 November 2001. She was tasked with handling,
managing, receiving, and disbursing the funds of the WPESLAI
It was discovered Cahilig made withdrawals from the funds ofWPESLAI and appropriated the
same for her personal benefit
Cahilig would prepare disbursement vouchers, to be approved by the WPESLAI president and
Board of Directors, in order to withdraw funds from one of WPESLAIs bank accounts then
transfer these funds to its other bank account.
The withdrawal was done by means of a check payable to Cahilig, in her capacity as
WPESLAI cashier.
The trial court found that Cahilig employed the same scheme in each of the 30 cases of
qualified theft filed against her, allowing her to pilfer from WPESLAIS funds a total of
P6,268,300.00
All 30 cases were consolidated and jointly heard. Upon agreement of the parties, only three
of the 30 cases went thru trial. The remaining 27 cases were the subject of a written
stipulation of facts, on the basis of which these were submitted for resolution.
hearing onsaid three (3) cases, the parties shall adopt the results thereof in the remaining
twenty-seven (27) counts.
The RTC found Cahilig guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified theft in each
of the informations
The RTC held that Cahilig, as cashier of WPESLAI, was granted trust and confidence by the
key officers ofthe association. The RTC noted that Cahilig "enjoyed access to the funds and
financial records of the association, a circumstance that understandably facilitated her easy
withdrawal of funds which she converted to her personal use in the manner heretofore
described. Undoubtedly, she betrayed the trust and confidence reposed upon her by her
employer.
CA affirmed the decision of RTC.
HELD:
Art. 308. Who are liable for theft. - Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to
gain but without violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take
personal property of another without the latters consent.
Theft is likewise committed by:
1. Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the same to the local authorities or
to its owner;
2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of another, shall remove or make
use of the fruits or objects of the damage caused by him; and
3. Any person who shall enter an enclosed estate or a field where trespass is forbidden or which
belongs to another and without the consent of its owner, shall hunt or fish upon the same or shall
gather fruits, cereals, or other forest or farm products.
Thus, the elements of Qualified Theft, committed with grave abuse of confidence, are as
follows:
1. Taking of personal property;
2. That the said property belongs to another;
3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain;
4. That it be done without the owners consent;
5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force
upon things;
6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence
Cahiligs position was one reposed with trust and confidence, considering that it involves "handling,
managing, receiving, and disbursing" money from WPESLAIs depositors and other funds of the
association.1wphi1 Cahiligs responsibilities as WPESLAI cashier required prudence and vigilance over
the money entrusted into her care.
However, instead of executing her duties, she deliberately misled
the board of directors into authorizing disbursements for money
Prosecution must prove beyond reasonable that the
accused maliciously damaged the property belonging
that eventually ended up in her personal account, a fact that
to another and, thereafter, removed or used the fruits
Cahilig did not deny.
or object thereof, with intent to gain. Evidently, theft
of damaged property is an intentional felony for
Art. 309. Penalties. -Any person guilty of theft shall be punished
which criminal liability attaches only when it is
by:
shown that the malefactor acted with criminal intent or
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and
malice. Criminal intent must be clearly established
medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is
with the other elements of the crime; otherwise, no
more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000
crime is committed.10 Was criminal intent
pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the
substantiated to justify the conviction of Magsumbol
latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum
and his co-accused? It does not so appear in this case.
period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and
used by him;
one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but
The uncertainty of the exact location of the coconut
the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall
not exceed twenty years. trees negates the presenceof the criminal intent to
2. Maximum is reclusion perpatua gain.
Atanacio informed Menandro about this and even
64.) G.R. No. 207175 November 26, 2014 offered to pay for the damages that he might have
sustained as some of his (Menandros) trees could
EDUARDO MAGSUMBOL, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
have been mistakenly cut down in the process; that
PHILIPPINES
Menandro refused his offer of compensation and
FACTS:
replied that a case had already been filed against the
Petitioner Magsumbol, together with Erasmo Magsino
four accused
(Mogsino). Apolonio Inanoria (Jnanoria), and Bonifacio
Family relationship, however, does not by itself render
Ramirez (Ramirez). vvas charged with the crime of
a witness testimony inadmissible or devoid of
Theft.
evidentiary weight. To warrant rejection of the
feloniously cut, take, steal and carry away with them
testimony of a relative or friend, it must be clearly
thirty three (33) coconut trees from the
shown that, independently of the relationship, the
coconutplantation of the said owner, valued at
testimony was inherently improbable or defective, or
FORTY FOUR THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED PESOS
that improper or evil motives had moved the witness
(P44,400.00), Philippine currency, belonging to said
to incriminate the accused falsely.
Menandro Avanzado, to his damage and prejudice in
The criminal mind is indeed wanting in the situation
the aforesaid amount.
where Magsumbol and his co-accused even sought
Caringal saw the four accused together with 7 other
prior permission from Brgy. Captain Arguelles to cut
cutting down tress on the said property and did not
down the coconut trees which was done openly and
attempt to stop and proceed to Menandro the owner of
during broad daylight effectively negated malice and
the property and reported to SPO1 Manalo and
criminal intent on their part. It defies reason that the
discovered the 33 coconut trees has been cut down
accused would still approach the barangay captain if
and took photograph on the stump left by the men.
their real intention was tosteal the coconut trees of
On defense :
Menandro. Besides, criminals would usually execute
Atanacio testified that he authorized his brothers-in-
their criminal activities clandestinely or through stealth
law, Magsino and Magsumbol, to cut down the coconut
or strategy to avoid detection of the commission of a
trees within the boundary of his property, which was
crime or a wrongdoing.
adjacent to the land co-owned by Menandro.
Petitioner Eduardo Magsumbol is ACQUITTED on
Defense witness Brgy. Captain Arguelles testified that
reasonable doubt.
on January 28, 2002, Magsumbol, Magsino, Ramirez,
and Inanoria came to his office seeking permission to
cut down the coconut trees planted on the land of 65.) G.R. No. 191015 August 6, 2014
Atanacio. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Petitioner, vs.JOSE C. GO,
Magsumbol claimed that he took no part in the felling AIDA C. DELA ROSA, and FELECITAS D. NECOMEDES,**
of the coconut trees but merely supervised the same.
Respondents.
He claimed that he did not receive any remuneration
for the service he rendered or a share from the On October 14, 1998, the Monetary Board of the
proceeds of the coco lumbers sale. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) issued Resolution
RTC ruled all accused guilty of simple theft No. 1427 ordering the closure of the Orient
Before CA accused prosecution evidence did not meet Commercial Banking Corporation (OCBC) and placing
the quantum of proof necessary towarrant their such bank under the receivership of the Philippine
conviction of the crime charged. They posited that the Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC). PDIC, as the
RTC erred in failing to appreciate the lack of criminal
statutory receiver of OCBC, effectively took charge of
intent on their part to commit the crime of simple
theft, no intent to gain. OCBCs assets and liabilities in accordance withits
CA affirmed the decision of RTC. mandate under Section 30 of Republic Act 7653
ISSUE: DIC began collecting on OCBCs past due loans
Whether Magsumbol is guilty of the Simple Theft(there receivable by sending demand letters to its borrowers
was error of judgment made by CA affirming decision for the immediate settlement oftheir outstanding
of RTC convicting Magsumbol) loans. Allegedly among these borrowers of OCBC are
HELD: Timmys, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. which
NO appeared to have obtained a loanof [P]10 Million each.
Accused were convicted by the CA of the crime of theft A representative of Timmys, Inc. denied being granted
of damaged property underparagraph (2) of Article any loan by OCBC and insisted that the signatures on
308 of the RPC which provides: the loan documents were falsified. A representative of
Art. 308. Who are liable for theft.: xxxxTheft is Asia Textile Mills, Inc. denied having applied, much
likewise committed by: less being granted, a loan by OCBC.
Any person who, after having maliciously damaged
the property of another, shall remove or make use The PDIC conducted an investigation and allegedly
of the fruits or object of the damage
came out with a finding that the loans purportedly in

2
 the names of Timmys, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc.
were released in the form of managerschecks in the
name of Philippine Recyclers and Zeta International,
Inc. These managers checks were then allegedly
deposited to the savings account of the private
respondent Jose C. Go with OCBC and, thereafter,
were automatically transferred to his current account
in order to fund personal checks issued by him earlier
PDIC filed a complaint4 for two (2) counts of Estafa
thru Falsification of Commercial Documents
Pleaded not guilty
Upon presentation of evidence, private respondent
filed private respondents filed a Motion for Leave to
File Demurrer to Evidence and a Motion for Voluntary
Inhibition.
In an Order dated December 19, 2006, the respondent
RTC judge granted the private respondents Motion for
Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence. On January 17,
2007, the private respondents filed their Demurrer to
Evidence7 praying for the dismissal of the criminal
cases instituted against them due to the failure of the
prosecution to establish their guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
RTC did then dismissed the case
CA affirmed the decision of RTC and deemed final
and executory.
The CA further held that the prosecution failed to
present a witness who could testify, based on personal
knowledge, that the loan documents were falsified by
the respondents; that the prosecution should not have
relied on "letters and unverified ledgers," and it
"should have trailed the money from the beginning to
the end;"17 that while the documentary
evidenceshowed that the signatures in the loan
documents were falsified, it has not been shown who
falsified them.
Finally, the petitioner failed to present evidence on
where the money went after they were deposited to
the checking account of the private respondent Jose C.
Go. There is only a vague reference that the money
was used to fund the personal checks earlier issued by
x x x Go.
ISSUE: whether or not there is abuse of discretion committed by
RTC grandting the demurrer to evidence.
HELD:
The Court grants the Petition.
Criminal Case Nos. 00-187318 and 00-187319 for
estafa through falsification of commercial documents
against the respondents are based on the theory that
in 1997, fictitious loans in favor of two entities
Timmys, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. were
approved, after which two managers checks
representing the supposed proceeds of these fictitious
loans were issued but made payable to two different
entities Philippine RecyclersInc. and
ZetaInternational without any documents issued by
the supposed borrowers Timmys, Inc. and Asia Textile
Mills, Inc. assigning the supposedloan proceeds tothe
two payees. Thereafter, these two managers checks
together with several others totaling
P120,819,475.00were encashed, and then deposited in
the OCBC Savings Account No. 00810-00108-0 of Go.
Then, several automatic transfer deposits were made
from Gos savings account to his OCBC Current
Account No. 008-00-000015-0 which were then used
to fund Gos previously dishonored personal checks
During efforts to collect OCBCs pastdue loan
receivables, PDIC as receiver sent demand letters to
the banks debtor-borrowers on record, including
Timmys, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. which
appeared to have obtained unsecured loans of P10
million each, and which apparently remained unpaid.
On the other hand, in a written reply to PDICs
demand letter, Asia Textile Mills, Inc. vehemently
denied thatit applied for a loan with OCBC. On this
basis, PDIC concluded that the AsiaTextile Mills,
Inc.loan was likewise bogus.
Through the falsified loan documents, the OCBC Loan
Committee composed of Go, who was likewise
OCBCPresident, respondent Dela Rosa (OCBC Senior
Vice President, or SVP, and Chief Operating Officer, or
COO), Arnulfo Aurellano and Richard Hsu approved a
P10 million unsecured loan purportedly in favor of
Timmys, Inc. After deducting finance charges,
advance interest and taxes, DelaRosa certified a net
loan proceeds amounting to P9,985,075.00 covered by
Managers Check No. 0000003347 dated February 5,
1997.
Demurrer to the evidence "an objection by one of the
parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence
which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of
law, whether true or not, to make out a case or
sustain the issue.
As to effect, "the grant of a demurrer to evidence
amounts to an acquittal and cannot be appealed
because it would place the accused in double jeopardy.
The elements of estafa through abuse ofconfidence
under Article 315, par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code
are: "(a) that money,goods or other personal property
is received by the offender in trust oron commission,
or for administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the
same; (b) that there be misappropriation orconversion
of such money or property by the offender, or denial
on his part of such receipt; (c) that such
misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the
prejudice of another; and (d) there is demand by the
offended party to the offender."
Next, regarding misappropriation, the evidence tends
to extablish that Managers Check Nos.0000003340
and 0000003347 were encashed, using the banks
funds which clearly belonged to OCBCs depositors,
and then deposited in Gos OCBC Savings Account No.
00810-00108-0 at OCBC Recto Branch although he
was not the named payee therein. Next, the money
was automatically transferred to Gos OCBC Current
Account No. 008-00-000015-0 and used to fund his
seven previously-issued personal checks totaling
P145,488,274.48, which checks were dishonored the
day before. Simply put, the evidence strongly
indicates that Go converted OCBC funds to his
own personal use and benefit.
Finally, on the matter of demand, while it has not been
shown that the bank demanded the return of the
funds, it has nevertheless been held that "[d]emand is
not an element of the felony or a condition precedent
tothe filing of a criminal complaint for estafa
On the other hand, the elements of the crime of
falsification of commercial document under Art. 172
are: "(1) that the offender is a private individual; (2)
that the offender committed any of the acts of
falsification; and (3) that the act of falsification is
3
 committed ina commercial document." As to estafa
through falsification of public, official or commercial
documents, it has been held that
The falsification of a public, official, or commercial
document may be a means of committing Estafa,
because before the falsified document is actually
utilized to defraud another, the crime of Falsification
has already been consummated, damage or intent to
cause damage not being an element of the crime of
falsification of public, official or commercial document.
In other words, the crime of falsification has already
existed. Actually utilizing that falsified public, official or
commercial document todefraud another is estafa. But
the damage is caused by the commission of Estafa, not
by the falsification of the document. Therefore, the
falsification of the public, official or commercial
document is only a necessary means to commit the
estafa.
In granting the demurrer, the trial court in its
assailed July 2, 2007 Order concluded that based on
the evidence adduced, the respondents could not have
falsified the loan documents pertaining toTimmys, Inc.
and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. since the individuals who
assert that their handwriting and signatures were
forged were not presented incourt to testify on such
claim; that the prosecution witnesses Honorio E.
Franco, Jr. (Franco) of PDIC, the designated Assisting
Deputy Liquidator of OCBC, and Virginia Rowella
Famirin (Famirin), Cashier of OCBC Recto Branch
were not present when the loan documents were
executed and signed, and thus have no personal
knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the
alleged falsification; and as high-ranking officers of
OCBC, respondents could not be expected to have
prepared the saiddocuments. The evidence, however,
suggests otherwise; it shows that respondents had a
direct hand in the falsification and creation of fictitious
loans. The loan documents were even signed by them.
By disregarding what is evident in the record, the trial
court committed substantial wrong that frustrates the
ends of justice and adversely affects the public
interest. The trial courts act was so patent and gross
as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.
Finally, it must be borne in mind that "[t]he granting
of a demurrer to evidence should x x x be exercised
with caution, taking into consideration not only the
rights of the accused, but also the right of the private
offended party to be vindicated of the wrongdoing
done against him, for if it is granted, the accused is
acquitted and the private complainant is generally left
with no more remedy
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The September
30, 2009 Decision and January 22, 2010 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The July 2, 2007 and October 19, 2007 Orders of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 49 in Criminal
Case Nos. 00-187318 and 00-187319 are declared null
and void, and the said cases are ordered REINSTATED
for the continuation of proceedings.
66.) G.R. No. 188708 July 31, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. ALAMADA
MACABANDO, Appellant.
FACTS:
Prosecution's evidence showed the appellant broke
bottles on the road while holding a G.I. pipe, and
shouted that he wanted to get even ("manabla ko").
Afterwards, he uttered that he would burn his house.
Cornelio Feliciano heard neighbor shouting that
there was a fire and went out and saw smoke coming
from the house of appellant.
Eric Quilantang neighbor of appellant ran to
barangay and get Fire Engtinguisher When Eric
approached the burning house, the appellant, who was
carrying a traveling bag and a gun, told him not to
interfere; the appellant then fired three (3) shots in
the air.6The appellant also told the people around that
whoever would put out the fire would be killed.
Fire Officer (FO) II Victor Naive and FOI Reynaldo
Maliao conducted a spot investigation of the
incident, and concluded, among others, that the fire
started in the appellants house; and that it had been
intentional.
Barangay Chairman with City Social Welfare and
Development Department personnel in assessing the
damage
The defense, on the other hand, presented a different
version of the events.
RTC ruled appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
the crime of destructive arson under 320 suffered
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
CA affirmed decision of RTC
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant is guilty of the charge, which is
Destructive Arson.
HELD:
Resorted to circumstantial evidence since there was no
direct evidence to prove the appellants culpability to
the crime charged.
It is settled that in the absence of direct
evidence, circumstantial evidence may be
sufficient to sustain a conviction provided that:
"(a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts
from which the inferences are derived have been
proven; and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances results in a moral certainty that the
accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the one who
has committed the crime.
Following circumstances constitute an unbroken
chain that leads to an unavoidable conclusion that the
appellant.
first, the appellant, while holding an iron lead pipe, acted
violently and broke bottles near his house at around 4:00 p.m.
of December 21, 2001; second, while he was still in a fit of
rage, the appellant stated that he would get even, and then
threatened to burn his own house;
third, Judith Quilantang saw a fire in the appellants room
approximately two hours after the appellant returned to his
house;
fourth, the appellant prevented Cornelio, Eric, and several other
people from putting out the fire in his house;
fifth, the appellant fired shots in the air, and then threatened to
kill anyone who would try to put out the fire in his house;
sixth, the appellant carried a traveling bag during the fire; and
finally, the investigation conducted by the fire marshals of the
Bureau of Fire Protection revealed that the fire started in the
appellants house, and that it had been intentional.
Article 320 contemplates the malicious burning of
structures, both public and private, hotels, buildings,
edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other
military, government or commercial establishments by
any person or group of persons."20
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1613,21 on the
other hand, currently governs simple arson
P.D. No. 1613 contemplates the malicious burning of
public and private structures, regardless of size, not
4
 included in Article 320 of the RPC, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659.22This law punishes simple arson
with a lesser penalty because the acts that constitute
it have a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness.
Simple arsoncontemplates crimes with less
significant social, economic, political, and
national security implications than destructive
arson.
The elements of simple arson under Section 3(2) of
P.D. No. 1613 are: (a) there is intentional
burning; and (b) what is intentionally burned is
an inhabited house or dwelling. Both these
elements have been proven in the present case.
That the appellants act affected many families will not
convert the crime to destructive arson, since the
appellants act does not appear to be heinous or
represents a greater degree of perversity and
viciousness when compared to those acts punished
under Article 320 of the RPC. The established
evidence only showed that the appellant
intended to burn his own house, but the
conflagration spread to the neighboring houses.
SC ruled appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of Simple Arson.
67.) G.R. No. 163437 February 13, 2008
ERNESTO PIDELI, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
FACTS:
Placido Cancio (Placido) and Wilson Pideli (Wilson) were
partners and subcontractors in a rip rapping and
spillway project at Benguet.
Petitioner Ernesto Pideli extended his credit limit with
the Mt. Trail Farm Supply and Hardware (MTFSH) to
Placido and Wilson for their purchase of construction
materials. After the release of the final payment to
Wilson and Placido, they calculated their expenses and
realized a net income of P130, 000.00.
This was fully entrusted to the custody of Pideli for the
settlement of their account with MTFHS.
Pideli was instructed that the balance should be
delivered to Wilson and Placido. The two, however, did
not anymore receive anything from Pideli. They were
informed that nothing was left from the proceeds after
the settlement of their account. A criminal complaint
was filed against him and the Regional Trial Court found
Pideli guilty of the crime of theft. On appeal, the Court
of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Pideli is guilty of theft or estafa
HELD:
Petition DISMISSED.
The elements of theft are as follows:
1. That there be taking of personal property;
2. That said property belongs to another;
3. That the taking be done with intent to gain;
4. That the taking be done without the consent of the
owner; and
5. That the taking be accomplished without the use of
violence against or intimidation of persons or force
upon things.
There is, here, a confluence of the elements of theft.
Petitioner received the final payment due the partners
Placido and Wilson under the pretext of paying off their
obligation with the MTFSH. Under the terms of their
agreement, petitioner was to account for the remaining
balance of the said funds and give each of the partners
their respective shares. He, however, failed to give
private complainant Placido what was due him under
the construction contract.
In an effort to exculpate himself, petitioner posits that
he cannot be held liable for theft of the unaccounted
funds. The monies subject matter of the complaint
pertain to the partnership. As an agent of partner
Wilson, intent to gain cannot be imputed against
petitioner.
Although there is misappropriation of funds here,
petitioner was correctly found guilty of theft. As early as
U.S. v. De Vera, the Court has consistently ruled that
not all misappropriation is estafa.
The principal distinction between the two crimes is that
in theft the thing is taken while in estafa the accused
receives the property and converts it to his own use or
benefit. However, there may be theft even if the
accused has possession of the property. If he was
entrusted only with the material or physical (natural) or
de facto possession of the thing, his misappropriation of
the same constitutes theft, but if he has the juridical
possession of the thing, his conversion of the same
constitutes embezzlement or estafa
68) G.R. No. 163705 July 30, 2007
NOMER OCAMPO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
FACTS:
Misayah was walking along the street when three
individual approached him, As the place was sufficiently
lighted by a nearby post, he was able to identify the trio
as accused Cruz, Ocampo and Miranda.
When the three accused were already near him, Cruz
grabbed Misayahs neck and choked him while Miranda
held his shoulder and got his shoulder bag. Ocampo
meanwhile was in the middle, holding a knife, warning
him not to fight back. Sensing that he would be harmed
anyway, Misayah fought back by pushing the hands of
the accused and trying to parry their blows. He and
Cruz then fell on the ground with Cruz on top of him.
When the handle of his shoulder bag snapped, all of the
accused ran away with the shoulder bag
Misayah sustained wounds in his hands caused by the
bladed weapon held by Ocampo when he attempted to
evade Ocampos blows.
Misayah then reported the incident to Police Station,
Misayah was brought to Balitucan Emergency Hospital
for treatment and thereafter proceeded to the precinct.
RTC found the 3 accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for the crime of Robbery and Physical Injuries
CA affirmed with modification the decision of RTC,
making crime of robbery with violence against
persons is penalized under par. 5, Article 294.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a error and failed to prove that
he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime for
which he is being charged.
HELD:
for conviction if it is free from any sign of impropriety
or falsehood.35 The testimony of a lone eyewitness, if
found positive and credible by the trial court, is
sufficient to support a conviction especially when the
5
 testimony bears the earmarks of truth and sincerity
and had been delivered spontaneously, naturally and
in a straightforward manner.36 Indeed, the testimony
of a single witness is sufficient and needs no
corroboration, save only in offenses where the law
expressly prescribes a minimum number of witnesses
As to the penalty, the crime of robbery with violence
against persons is penalized under par. 5, Article 294
of the Revised Penal Code by prision correccional
maximum to prision mayor medium. Considering the
attendant aggravating circumstance of abuse of
superior strength (not conspiracy as ruled by the trial
court),48 which is not offset by any mitigating
Article 294, paragraph (5) of the Revised Penal Code
fixes the penalty for simple robbery
69.)[G.R. No. 130508. April 5, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
ARMANDO REGALA y ABRIOL, accused-appellant.
FACTS
Nerissa(16 years old) together with her grandmother
Consuelo Arevalo were sleeping, Armando and two
other companion entered into their house through
kitchen and went to the room of Nerissa and her
grandmother and poked an 8-inch gun on them, one
after the other .
Nerissa and Grandmother hogtied, Nerissa was raped
by Armando Regalo in bed while her grandmother was
on the floor.
After the rape, appellant and his two companions
counted the money which they took from the
"aparador."
Appellant and his companions then ran away with
P3,000 in cash, 2 pieces of ring valued at P6,000 and
two wrist watches worth P5,000.
Following day, Nerissa went for medical examination
and result of possible sexual assault upon the victim.
Police made a line up and identified through pin
pointing the accused by Nerissa (appellant removed his
mask after she was hogtied)
RTC finds accused Armando Regala y Abriol guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with
Rape.
CA affirmed the decision of RTC
ISSUE: Whether or not Armando Regalo is guilty of crime of
Robbery with Rape.
HELD:
Consuelo Arevalo testified and corroborated the
testimony of her granddaughter.
Although the three intruders were wearing masks
when they entered the house, they removed their
masks later
The crime of robbery with rape was committed in 1995
when RA 7659 was already in force. Article 294 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended now provides, under
paragraph 1 thereof: Edpmis
The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when for
any reason of or on occasion of the robbery, the crime
of homicide shall have been committed, or when the
robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or
intentional mutilation or arson."
The victim in the case at bar was raped twice on the
occasion of the robbery.
It should be noted that there is no law providing that
the additional rape/s or homicide/s should be
considered as aggravating circumstance.
It is true that the additional rapes (or killings in the
case of multiple homicide on the occasion of the
robbery) would result in an "anomalous situation"
where from the standpoint of the gravity of the
offense, robbery with one rape would be on the same
level as robbery with multiple rapes.1 However,the
remedy lies with the legislature. A penal law is liberally
construed in favor of the offender2 and no person
should be brought within its terms if he is not clearly
made so by the statute.3
In view of the foregoing, the additional rape
committed by herein accused-appellant should not be
considered as aggravating. The penalty of reclusion
perpetua imposed by the trial court is proper.
70.) G.R. No. 77368 October 5, 1993
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs. HON. JOSE C. DE GUZMAN, PRESIDING JUDGE OF
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 93,
AND SPOUSES DANILO A. ALCANTARA AND ISABELITA
ESGUERRA-ALCANTARA, respondents
FACTS:
On 09 September 1985, robbery was committed in
Quezon City in the house of Jose L. Obillos, Sr., where
various pieces of precious jewelry alleged to be worth
millions of pesos were taken.It was filed in RTC.
Subsequently, an information, dated 22 October 1985,
for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1612, otherwise
known as the "Anti-Fencing Law," was also filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 93,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 42433, against herein
respondent spouses Danilo A. Alcantara and Isabelita
Esguerra-Alcantara, from whose possession the
jewelries stolen were recovered in Antipolo, Rizal.
Accused/RTC Contention Before the Court is a
Motion to Quash, filed by the accused thru counsel,
praying that the information filed against both accused
be quashed, on the ground that the Court has no
jurisdiction to try the offense charged. Among others,
the motion alleges, that as per police investigation, the
crime took place in Antipolo, Rizal. For this reason,
Violation of Presidential Decree No. 1612 is an
independent crime, separate and distinct from that of
Robbery.
Prosecution contention The Prosecution filed an
opposition thereto, alleging among others, that there
is nothing in the law which prohibits the filing of a case
of fencing in the court under whose jurisdiction the
principal offense of robbery was committed
Since the alleged act of fencing took place in Antipolo,
Rizal, outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court,
and considering that all criminal prosecutions must be
instituted and tried in the Municipality or Province
where the offense took place, this Court, necessarily,
does not have jurisdiction over the instant case.
Wherefore, the above-entitled case is hereby
QUASHED, without prejudice to the filing of the
corresponding action against the accused in the Court
having proper jurisdiction.
HELD:
Robbery is the taking of personal property belonging
to another, with intent to gain, by means of violence
against or intimidation of any person, or using force
upon anything. 7 "Fencing", upon the other hand, is
the act of any person who, with intent to gain for
himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess,
keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy
1
2
3
6
 and sell, or in any other manner deal in any article,
item, object or anything of value which he knows, or
should be known to him, to have been derived from
the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. 8
The crimes of robbery and fencing are clearly then
two distinct offenses. The law on fencing does
not require the accused to have participated in
the criminal design to commit, or to have been in
any wise involved in the commission of, the crime of
robbery or theft. Neither is the crime of robbery or
theft made to depend on an act of fencing in order
that it can be consummated. True, the object property
in fencing must have been previously taken by means
of either robbery or theft but the place where the
robbery or theft occurs is inconsequential. It may not
be suggested, for instance, that, in the crime of
bigamy which presupposes a prior subsisting marriage
of an accused, the case should thereby be triable
likewise at the place where the prior marriage has
been contracted.
when the Court would allow a change of venue in
criminal cases "whenever the interest of justice and
truth so demand, and there are serious and weighty
reasons to believe that a trial by the court that
originally had jurisdiction over the case would not
result in a fair and impartial trial and lead to a
miscarriage of justice.
Here, however, we do not see the attendance of such
compelling circumstances, nor are we prepared to
state that the lower court gravely abused its discretion
in its questioned orders
71.) G.R. No. 97471 February 17, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
ISABELO PUNO y GUEVARRA, alias"Beloy," and ENRIQUE
AMURAO y PUNO, alias "Enry," accused-appellants
FACTS
Mrs. Maria Socorro Mutuc-Sarmiento owns a bakeshop
in Araneta Avenue, Quezon City called Nika Cakes and
Pastries. She has a driver of her own just as her
husband does.
Fred her personal driver was in Davao for purpose of
local election as a temporary driver it was Isabelo
Puno takes his place.
Mrs Socorro on his way home(Valle Verde), Isabelo
then stopped and Enrique boarded the car beside the
driver.
Enrique then proceed near Mrs. Socorro and poke a
gun at her.
Isabelo then told that Enrique was his newphew, and
Isabelo wanted to get money out of her bag, which
contains 7,000.
Two accused then wanted 100,000 more from Mrs
Socorro then later drafted a check 2-30,000 and 1-
40,000.
Accused told that he is NPA and swallow a pill but Mrs.
Refuses
Was told to jump off the car, and then she was finally
able to flag down a fish vendors van. Her dress had
blood because, according to Ma. Socorro, she fell down
on the ground and was injured when she jumped out
of the car. Her dress was torn too.
On reaching Balintawak, Ma. Socorro reported the
matter to CAPCOM.
Both accused were, day after, arrested. Enrique was
arrested trying to encash Ma. Socorro's P40,000.00
check at PCI Bank, Makati.
RTC finding them guilty of robbery with extortion
committed on a highway, punishable under
Presidential Decree No. 532,
ISSUE: Whether the felony committed is kidnapping for ransom
under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as charged in the
information; or a violation of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-
Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974)?
HELD
The Crime committed is Robbery
Contrary to the postulation of the Solicitor General,
Presidential Decree No. 532 is not a modification of
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code on kidnapping
and serious illegal detention, but of Articles 306 and
307 on brigandage. This is evident from the fact that
the relevant portion thereof which treats of "highway
robbery" invariably uses this term in the
alternative and synonymously with brigandage,
that is, as "highway robbery/brigandage." This is but
in line with our previous ruling, and which still holds
sway in criminal law, that highway robbers (ladrones)
and brigands are synonymous.
True, Presidential Decree No. 532 did introduce
amendments to Articles 306 and 307 of the Revised
Penal Code by increasing the penalties, albeit limiting
its applicability to the offenses stated therein when
committed on the highways and without prejudice to
the liability for such acts if committed.
In fine, the purpose of brigandage is, inter alia,
indiscriminate highway robbery. If the purpose is only
a particular robbery, the crime is only robbery, or
robbery in band if there are at least four armed
participants.
That appellants in this case had no intention
whatsoever to kidnap or deprive the complainant of
her personal liberty is clearly demonstrated in the
veritably confessional.
Thus, to illustrate, the motive of the accused has been
held to be relevant or essential to determine the
specific nature of the crime as.
In the case at bar, there is no showing whatsoever
that appellants had any motive, nurtured prior to or at
the time they committed the wrongful acts against
complainant, other than the extortion of money from
her under the compulsion of threats or intimidation.
Neither can we consider the amounts given to
appellants as equivalent to or in the nature of ransom,
considering the immediacy of their obtention thereof
from the complainant personally.
Accordingly, we hold that the offense committed by
appellants is simple robbery defined in Article 293 and
punished under Paragraph 5 of Article 294 of the
Revised Penal Code with prision correccional in its
maximum period to prision mayor in its medium
period.
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the trial court
is hereby SET ASIDE and another one is rendered
CONVICTING accused-appellants Isabelo Puno y
Guevarra and Enrique Amurao y Puno of robbery as
Punished in Paragraph 5 of Article 294, in relation to
Article 295, of the Revised Penal Code and IMPOSING
on each of them an indeterminate sentence of four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as
maximum, and jointly and severally pay the offended
party, Maria del Socorro M. Sarmiento, the amounts of
P7,000.00 as actual damages and P20,000.00 as
moral damages, with costs.
72.) G.R. No. 138470 April 1, 2003
7
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ARTEMIO
GARCIA y CRUZ, JR. and REGALADO BERNABE y ORBE,
accused.REGALADO BERNABE y ORBE, appellant.
FACTS
Joselito Cortez, a taxicab operator based in Marilao,
Bulacan, was approached by Garcia and Bernabe
because they wanted to borrow his brand new
Mitsubishi L300 van for their trip to the Bicol region.
Cortez refused, saying that the van was unavailable.
Instead, he got in touch with Ferdinand Ignacio, who
had just purchased a brand new Toyota Tamaraw FX
for P475,500.00.3 Ignacio agreed to lease his vehicle
to Cortez for two days at the daily rate of P2,000.00.
Bernabe and Garcia, on the other hand, rented the
vehicle from Cortez for P4,000.00 a day inclusive of
the P500.00 drivers fee. They agreed to pay the rental
fee upon their return from Bicol.
In the early morning of December 18, 1996, Cortez
and his driver, Wilfredo Elis, picked up Ignacios
Tamaraw FX at his residence in Meycauayan, Bulacan.
Elis drove the same back to Marilao, Bulacan and, at
8:00 a.m., he and the two accused left for Bicol.
Four days passed without a word from Garcia and
Bernabe. Cortez began to worry about the vehicle he
had borrowed from Ferdinand Ignacio so he informed
the Barangay Captain of Saog, Marilao, Bulacan.
Meanwhile, Elis wife, Nancy, approached Cortez and
asked where her husband was.
SPO2 Emmanuel Lapurga of the Moncada, Tarlac Police
notified the Chief of Police that two suspicious looking
persons were seen selling a vehicle in Anao, Tarlac.
The two accused were seen in front of a store in Brgy.
Pangayan, Nampicuan, Nueva Ecija. When they failed
to produce documents of ownership over the Tamaraw
FX, they were brought to the Moncada Police Station
for investigation.
Garcia and Bernabe admitted to the Moncada Police
that they attempted to sell the Tamaraw FX belonging
to Ferdinand Ignacio. Which was later positively
identified Ignacios Tamaraw FX.
Cortez went to visit Garcia and Bernabe in detention.
They admitted to him that they stabbed Elis and
dumped him along the highway near the "sabana" in
San Rafael, Bulacan. They claimed that they were
compelled to eliminate Elis when he refused to join
their plan to sell the Tamaraw FX
Accused Pleaded not guilty
RTC- finding Artemio Garcia y Cruz, Jr. and Regalado
Bernabe y Orbe guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
special complex crime of Carnapping with Homicide in
violation of Republic Act No. 6539 as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659and sentencing them to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in holding all
the elements od carnapping as defined in RA 6539( Anti-
Carnapping Act).
HELD:
Republic Act No. 6539, otherwise known as "An Act
Preventing and Penalizing Carnapping", defines
"carnapping" as "the taking, with intent to gain, of a
motor vehicle belonging to another without the latters
consent, or by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons, or by using force upon
things."16 More specifically, the elements of the crime
are as follows:
1. That there is an actual taking of the vehicle;
2. That the offender intends to gain from the taking of the
vehicle;
3. That the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender
himself;
4. That the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof; or
that the taking was committed by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things.17
A careful examination of the evidence presented shows
that all the elements of carnapping were proved in this
case.
In the case at bar, it cannot be denied that the nature
of the appellants possession of the Tamaraw FX was
initially lawful. Nevertheless, the unlawful killing of the
deceased for the purpose of taking the vehicle radically
transformed the character of said possession into an
unlawful one
It does not matter whether the unlawful taking
occurred within the period of the lease. What is
decisive here is the purpose of appellant and his co-
accused in killing the victim.
To reiterate, the prosecution was able to establish that
appellant and his co-accused stabbed the victim to
death because he refused to join them in their plan to
appropriate the vehicle
This undoubtedly satisfied the element of unlawful
taking through violence, rendering appellant liable for
the crime charged
What is simply required is that the property taken
does not belong to the offender. Actual possession of
the property by the person dispossessed suffices
WHEREFORE, the decision dated March 10, 1999, of
the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch
21, finding appellant Regaldo Bernabe y Orbe guilty of
Carnapping with Homicide, sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to
pay the heirs of the victim, Wilfredo Elis, the sums of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P15,290.00 as
actual damages, is AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS: Appellant is further ordered to pay
the heirs of the victim, Wilfredo Elis, moral damages in
the reduced amount of P50,000.00. The award of
P250,000.00 for loss of earnings is DELETED for lack of
factual basis.
73.)G.R. No. 77429 January 29, 1990
LAURO SANTOS, petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
FACTS:
Encarnacion Pealosa, entrusted her car, a 1976 Ford
Escort, to herein petitioner Lauro Santos for repair of
the carburetor. The work was to cost P300.00. A week
later, Santos persuaded her to have her car repainted
by him for P6,500.00, within a period of two months.
After two months, Pealosa went to the petitioner's
repair shop at MacArthur Highway, Malabon, to
retrieve her car. Santos refused to deliver the vehicle
unless she paid him P634.60 for the repairs. As she
did not have the money then, she left the shop to get
the needed payment. Upon her return, she could not
find Santos although she waited five hours for him.
She went back to the shop several times thereafter but
to no avail.
Pealosa was to learn later that Santos had abandoned
his shop in Malabon. Unable to recover her car, she
filed a complaint for carnapping against Santos with
the Constabulary Highway Patrol Group in Camp
Crame.
The case was dismissed when the petitioner convinced
the military authorities that the complainant had sold
the vehicle to him. He submitted for this purpose a
Deed of Sale with Right of Repurchase in his favor.
8
 Notwithstanding, an information for estafa on
Pealosa's complaint was filed against Santos in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City on October
26,1982. After trial, the accused was found guilty
as charged.
On appeal, the conviction was affirmed but Santos
was held guilty of qualified theft and not estafa
HELD
In contention of Petiitioner that there was Deed of Sale
with Right of Repurchase. The name and address of
the supposed original vendee are crossed out and
those of the petitioner are written in place of the
deletions. Moreover, the so-called deed is not
notarized.
And as described therein, the offense imputed to Santos contains
all the essential elements of theft, to wit:
(1) that there be a taking of personal property;
(2) that said property belongs to another;
(3) that the taking be done with intent to gain;
(4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner;
and
(5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence
or intimidation against persons or force upon things
Besides, as the respondent court correctly observed, why
would Santos still demand from Pealosa the cost of the
repairs on the car if he claims he had already bought it from
her?
Theft should not be confused with estafa. According to Chief
Justice Ramon C. Aquino in his book on the Revised Penal
Code, "The principal distinction between the two crimes is
that in theft the thing is taken while in estafa the
accused receives the property and converts it to his
own use or benefit. However, there may be theft even if
the accused has possession of the property. If he was
entrusted only with the material or physical (natural) or de
facto possession of the thing, his misappropriation of the
same constitutes theft, but if he has the juridical possession
of the thing, his conversion of the same constitutes
embezzlement or estafa.
When there is appropriated or converted it is not theft.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED as herein
modified. The petitioner is declared guilty of theft and
sentenced to from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal. He is
also ordered to restore the car in question to the private
respondent, or if this is no longer possible, to pay her the
value thereof in the amount of P38,000.00,
74.) G.R. No. 134120 January 17, 2005
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs.LEA SAGAN
JULIANO, appellant.
FACTS:
Appellant was charge of violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 (the Bouncing Checks Law) in Criminal Cases
Nos. 2051 and 2052, and Estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2 (d), of the Revised Penal Code in Criminal
Case No. 2053.
In charge of Estafa, bought 190 bags of rice and
issued 89,000 in check but it was dishonored and
issued again another check but it was dishonored
again. (Insufficiency of funds)
On arraignment appellant pleaded not guilty.
RTC find found guilty of of Estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2(d), Revised Penal Code for issuing PCIB
Check No. 142254, and violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 for issuing PCIB Check Nos. 145452 and
145454.
CC 2051- ordered appellant to pay fine 60,000 and
cost of suit
CC 2052- ordered appellant to pay fine 40,000 and
cost of suit
CC 2053- suffer appelabt for indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment, ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO
(2) MONTHS of prision correccional, as minimum, to
FOURTEEN (14) YEARS of reclusion temporal, as
maximum; to pay to the JCT Agro-Development
Corporation, Isulan, Sultan Kudarat, the sum of
EIGHTY NINE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED
(P89,800.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, representing
the value of ONE HUNDRED NINETY (190) BAGS of
milled rice, with legal rate of interest from the date of
filing of the Information in this case, until fully paid;
and to pay the costs of suit.
Appellant appeal on her conviction for Estafa CA finds
appellant guilty of Estafa and Sentence to reclusion
perpetua
Issue: Whether or not appellant is guilty of estafa in the
absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt that the accused
employed deceit constituting false pretenses or any fraudulent
act.
SC set aside the decision of RTC for estafa and order
the appellant to pay 89,000 to JCT Agro-Development
Corporation, Isulan, Sultan Kudarat.
The fact that she (appellant) was mistaken in her
belief that she would be able to fund the check on its
maturity date does not prove deceit.
After she was notified of the dishonor of the first
check, she did not hide or abscond, but she offered to
replace the first check with two checks
The elements of Estafa are as follows: (1) The offender
has postdated or issued a check in payment of an
obligation contracted at the time of the postdating or
issuance; (2) at the time of postdating or issuance of
said check, the offender has no funds in the bank or
the funds deposited were not sufficient to cover the
amount of the check; (3) the payee has been
defrauded.14 Damage and deceit are essential
elements of the offense and must be established with
satisfactory proof to warrant conviction, while the false
pretense or fraudulent act must be committed prior to,
or simultaneous with, the issuance of the bad check.15
The drawer of the dishonored check is given
three days from receipt of the notice of dishonor
to cover the amount of the check, otherwise, a
prima facie presumption of deceit arises.
She stated that when complainant JCT accepted the
postdated check, it was aware that the funds for
the said payment would become available only
on the maturity date of the check
As regards the first reason of the trial court in holding
appellant liable for Estafa, we find that appellant did
not deceive complainant JCT by stating that she had
sufficient funds in the bank on the date of issuance of
the check. JCT knew that the postdated check was
not yet funded as of the date of its issuance and
that it would be funded on July 30, 1991.
In accepting the two replacement checks and
surrendering the first check to appellant instead of
demanding payment under the first check (PCIB Check
No. 142254) on the same day that JCTs Acting
Manager informed appellant of the dishonor of the first
check, JCT led appellant to believe that she no longer
had to deposit the necessary amount to cover the first
check within three days from the verbal notice of
dishonor. On July 31, 1991, appellants balance in her
account with PCIB Isulan Branch was P78,400. It is
possible that appellant could have deposited P11,400
9
 to make good the first check worth P89,800 if JCT
made it clear that it was demanding payment under
the first check
75.) G.R. No. 125059 March 17, 2000
FRANCISCO T. SYCIP, JR., petitioner, vs.COURT OF
APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents
FACTS:
Francisco T. Sycip agreed to buy, on installment, from
Francel Realty Corporation (FRC), a townhouse unit in the
latter's project at Bacoor, Cavite.
Upon execution of the contract to sell, Sycip, as required,
issued to FRC, forty-eight (48) postdated checks, each in
the amount of P9,304.00, covering 48 monthly installments
After moving in his unit, Sycip complained to FRC regarding
defects in the unit and incomplete features of the
townhouse project.
FRC ignored the complaint. Dissatisfied, Sycip served on
FRC two (2) notarial notices to the effect that he was
suspending his installment payments on the unit pending
compliance with the project plans and specifications, as
approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB).
The complaint was dismissed as to the defects, but FRC was
ordered by the HLURB to finish all incomplete features of its
townhouse project.
Notwithstanding the notarial notices, FRC continued to
present for encashment Sycip's postdated checks in its
possession. Sycip sent "stop payment orders" to the bank.
When FRC continued to present the other postdated checks
to the bank as the due date fell, the bank advised Sycip to
close his checking account to avoid paying bank charges
every time he made a "stop payment" order on the
forthcoming checks. Due to the closure of petitioner's
checking account, the drawee bank dishonored six
postdated checks.
FRC filed a complaint against petitioner for violations of B.P.
Blg. 22 involving said dishonored checks or 6 information
charging petitioner for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
Pleaded not guilty
RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating B.P. Blg. 22, the Bouncing Checks Law in each 6
cases which CA affirmed the decision.
ISSUE: whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming
the conviction of petitioner for violation of the Bouncing Checks
Law
HELD:
Petitioner insists that under P.D. No. 957, the buyer of
a townhouse unit has the right to suspend his
amortization payments, should the subdivision or
condominium developer fail to develop or complete the
project in accordance with duly-approved plans and
specifications. Given the findings of the HLURB that
certain aspects of private complainant's townhouse
project were incomplete and undeveloped, the
exercise of his right to suspend payments should not
render him liable under B.P. Blg. 22.
Under the provisions of the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P.
No. 22),9 an offense is committed when the following
elements are present:
(1) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to
apply for account or for value;
(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that
at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds
in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of
such check in full upon its presentment; and
(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or
dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop
payment.
In this case, we find that although the first element of
the offense exists, the other elements have not been
established beyond reasonable doubt.
As the evidence for the defense showed, the closure of
petitioner's Account No. 845515 with Citibank was not for
insufficiency of funds. It was made upon the advice of the
drawee bank, to avoid payment of hefty bank charges each
time petitioner issued a "stop payment" order to prevent
encashment of postdated checks in private respondent's
possession.
While B.P. Blg. 22 was enacted to safeguard the interest of
the banking system, 18 it is difficult to see how conviction
of the accused in this case will protect the sanctity of the
financial system. Moreover, protection must also be
afforded the interest of townhouse buyers under P.D. No.
95
Given the findings of the HLURB as to incomplete features
in the construction of petitioner's and other units of the
subject condominium bought on installment from FRC, we
are of the view that petitioner had a valid cause to order his
bank to stop payment.
To say the least, the third element of "subsequent dishonor
of the check. . . without valid cause" appears to us not
established by the prosecution. As already stated, the
prosecution tried to establish the crime on a prima facie
presumption in B.P. Blg. 22. Here that presumption is
unavailing, in the presence of a valid cause to stop
payment, thereby negating the third element of the crime
petitioner's exercise of a right of the buyer under Article 23
of P.D. No. 957 is a valid defense to the charges against
him.
76.) G.R. No. 149858 September 5, 2007
FRANCISCO M. BAX, petitioner,vs.PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and ILYON INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION,
respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner, for and in behalf of Vachman Industries,
Inc. (VACHMAN), purchased 80 metric tons of
chemical compounds, known as caustic soda flakes,
from Ilyon Industrial Corporation (ILYON), caustic
soda flakes was delivered and petitioner issued ten
(10) checks amounting to P464,750.00 in favor of
ILYON.
Upon presentation of the check it was then dishonored
by the bank for being drawn against insufficient funds.
Francisco M. Bax, petitioner, was charged with
violations of B.P. 22 (10 counts) before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 71, Pasig
City,3 docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 14354 to
14363. and accordingly sentences him to suffer
imprisonment of six (6) months in each case and to
pay the offended party the sum of P464,750.00, the
amount of all the ten (10) checks and to pay the cost.
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 70, Pasig City
declaring petitioner guilty of nine (9) counts of
violations of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. 22),
otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law.
ISSUE: Whether the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of
petitioner by evidence beyond reasonable doubt.
10
 Petitioner, on the other hand, maintains that since he
did not receive a written notice of dishonor, not all the
elements of the offense have been established by the
prosecution. Accordingly, he should be acquitted.
Thus, the prosecution must prove the following
essential elements of the offense:
(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to
apply for account or for value;
(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that
at the time of issue there are no sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such
check in full upon its presentment; and
(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or
dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop
payment
We find that the prosecution failed to prove the
second element.
It must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that he
knew of the insufficiency of funds at the time the
check was issued.
SC acquits the petitioner however he is ordered,
however, to pay the offended party, ILYON, the face
value of the nine (9) checks in the total amount of
P425,250.00 with 12% interest per annum from the
filing of the Informations until fully paid.
77.) G.R. No. 181409 February 11, 2010
INTESTATE ESTATE OF MANOLITA GONZALES VDA. DE
CARUNGCONG, represented by MEDIATRIX CARUNGCONG,
as Administratrix, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and WILLIAM SATO, Respondents.
Facts:
Mediatrix, as the duly appointed administrator of the
estate of her deceased mother, Manolita, filed a case
for estafa through falsification of documents against
her brother-in.law, William Sato, a Japanese national.
In essence, the affidavit narrated that William, who is
the husband of her sister Zenaida, who died ahead of
their mother Manolita, made Manolita sign special
powers of attorney in behalf of Williams daughter,
Wendy. Manolita, believing it was merely for paying
taxes, signed the documents unknowingly because she
was blind, in the presence of Wendy and her other
grandchildren.
These special powers of attorney were then made the basis
for the sale of four parcels of land in Tagaytay, wherein
William received the proceeds thereof amounting to P22,
034,000.00. After the preliminary investigation, the
prosecutor filed an Information charging William with estafa
through falsification of public documents.
At the Regional Trial Court, William filed a motion to quash
the information. According to him, his relationship with the
person allegedly defrauded, his mother-in-law, was an
exempting circumstance, citing Article 332 of the Revised
Penal Code which states:
ART. 332. Persons exempt from criminal liability. No
criminal, but only civil liability shall result from the
commission of the crime of theft, swindling, or malicious
mischief committed or caused mutually by the following
persons:
Spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives by
affinity in the same line;
2. The widowed spouse with respect to the property which
belonged to the deceased spouse before the same shall
have passed into the possession of another; and
3. Brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and sisters-in-
law, if living together.
The exemption established by this article shall not be
applicable to strangers participating in the commission of
the crime. (emphasis supplied)
The trial prosecutor opposed the motion, citing that the
death of Zenaida, Williams wife, extinguished the
relationship by affinity between Manolita and William.
The RTC granted Williams motion and quashed the
information, adopting the theory propounded by William
that he is exempted from criminal liability due to his
relationship by affinity with Manolita.
On petition for certiorari, the Court of Appeals upheld the
RTC decision and dismissed the petition filed by the estate.
ISSUE:
The estate represented by Mediatrix is now before the Supreme
Court questioning the rulings of both the RTC and the Court of
Appeals.
HELD
In case a marriage is terminated by the death of one
of the spouses, there are conflicting views. There are
some who believe that relationship by affinity is not
terminated whether there are children or not in the
marriage (Carman vs. Newell, N.Y. 1 [Denio] 25, 26).
However, the better view supported by most judicial
authorities in other jurisdictions is that, if the spouses
have no living issues or children and one of the
spouses dies, the relationship by affinity is dissolved.
It follows the rule that relationship by affinity ceases
with the dissolution of the marriage which produces it
(Kelly v. Neely, 12 Ark. 657, 659, 56 Am Dec. 288).
On the other hand, the relationship by affinity is
continued despite the death of one of the spouses
where there are living issues or children of the
marriage in whose veins the blood of the parties are
commingled, since the relationship of affinity was
continued through the medium of the issue of the
marriage (Paddock vs. Wells, 2 Barb. Ch. 331, 333).
The first view (the terminated affinity view) holds that
relationship by affinity terminates with the dissolution of the
marriage either by death or divorce which gave rise to the
relationship of affinity between the parties. Under this view,
the relationship by affinity is simply coextensive and
coexistent with the marriage that produced it. Its duration
is indispensably and necessarily determined by the
marriage that created it. Thus, it exists only for so long as
the marriage subsists, such that the death of a spouse ipso
facto ends the relationship by affinity of the surviving
spouse to the deceased spouses blood relatives.
The first view admits of an exception. The relationship by
affinity continues even after the death of one spouse when
there is a surviving issue. The rationale is that the
relationship is preserved because of the living issue of the
marriage in whose veins the blood of both parties is
commingled.
The second view (the continuing affinity view) maintains
that relationship by affinity between the surviving spouse
and the kindred of the deceased spouse continues even
after the death of the deceased spouse, regardless of
whether the marriage produced children or not. Under this
view, the relationship by affinity endures even after the
dissolution of the marriage that produced it as a result of
the death of one of the parties to the said marriage. This
view considers that, where statutes have indicated an intent
to benefit step-relatives or in-laws, the tie of affinity
between these people and their relatives-by-marriage is not
to be regarded as terminated upon the death of one of the
married parties.
After due consideration and evaluation of the relative merits
of the two views, we hold that the second view is more
11
 consistent with the language and spirit of Article 332(1) of
the Revised Penal Code.
First, the terminated affinity view is generally applied in
cases of jury disqualification and incest. On the other hand,
the continuing affinity view has been applied in the
interpretation of laws that intend to benefit step-relatives or
in-laws. Since the purpose of the absolutory cause in Article
332(1) is meant to be beneficial to relatives by affinity
within the degree covered under the said provision, the
continuing affinity view is more appropriate.
Second, the language of Article 332(1) which speaks of
relatives by affinity in the same line is couched in general
language. The legislative intent to make no distinction
between the spouse of ones living child and the surviving
spouse of ones deceased child (in case of a son-in-law or
daughter-in-law with respect to his or her parents-in-law)
can be drawn from Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code
without doing violence to its language.
Third, the Constitution declares that the protection and
strengthening of the family as a basic autonomous social
institution are policies of the State and that it is the duty of
the State to strengthen the solidarity of the family.
Congress has also affirmed as a State and national policy
that courts shall preserve the solidarity of the family. In this
connection, the spirit of Article 332 is to preserve family
harmony and obviate scandal. The view that relationship by
affinity is not affected by the death of one of the parties to
the marriage that created it is more in accord with family
solidarity and harmony.
Fourth, the fundamental principle in applying and in
interpreting criminal laws is to resolve all doubts in favor of
the accused. In dubio pro reo. When in doubt, rule for the
accused.This is in consonance with the constitutional
guarantee that the accused shall be presumed innocent
unless and until his guilt is established beyond reasonable
doubt.
Intimately related to the in dubio pro reo principle is the
rule of lenity. The rule applies when the court is faced with
two possible interpretations of a penal statute, one that is
prejudicial to the accused and another that is favorable to
him. The rule calls for the adoption of an interpretation
which is more lenient to the accused.
Lenity becomes all the more appropriate when this case is
viewed through the lens of the basic purpose of Article 332
of the Revised Penal Code to preserve family harmony by
providing an absolutory cause. Since the goal of Article
332(1) is to benefit the accused, the Court should adopt an
application or interpretation that is more favorable to the
accused. In this case, that interpretation is the continuing
affinity view.
Thus, for purposes of Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal
Code, we hold that the relationship by affinity created
between the surviving spouse and the blood relatives of the
deceased spouse survives the death of either party to the
marriage which created the affinity. (The same principle
applies to the justifying circumstance of defense of ones
relatives under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, the
mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of grave
offense committed against ones relatives under Article 13
of the same Code and the absolutory cause of relationship
in favor of accessories under Article 20 also of the same
Code.)
78.)G.R. No. 179934 May 21, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.ERLINDA ABORDO and VINA CABANLONG, Appellants.
By means of deceit and misrepresentation and not
legally authorize/without securing license from DOLE to
recruit, demanded 14,000 to Rayray, despite repeated
demand, Abordo refuses and failed to return (making
liable for Estafa and Illegal Recruitment)
The same goes with Jaime Fernandez(45,000 placement
fee), Exequiel Mendoza(placement fee) and Esmenia
Cario(15,000 placement fee but this time there was
conspiracy between Abordo and Cabanlong
Abordo to Rayray- possible employment and collected
15,000 for placement and assured to leave as soon as
possible, despite repeated demands, the said accused
who failed to cause complainants employment abroad,
failed and refused to return the said amount of
P14,000.00
Abordo together with Cabanlong went to House of
Cario, and persuade her to work as a domestic helper
in Hong Kong, and gave 15,000 for placement fee but
was unable to leave for abroad.
Abordo and Cabandong went to House of Segundina
who introduce as recruiter and they secure employment
to her son in hongkong agreed on proposition and pay
45,000 and given a plane ticket but which turned out to
be fake; hence, Jaime was unable to leave for abroad.
Accused went to house of Mendoza and secure
employment in Hog Kong as Security guard, Abordo
assured him that as soon as he could pay the
placement fee, he could work abroad. Mendoza gave
Abordo cash and pieces of jewelry amounting to
P39,000. Despite several promises from Abordo,
Mendoza was unable to leave for Hong Kong.
Dagupan District Officer of the Department of Labor and
Employment, issued certifications stating that the
accused were not included in the Philippine Overseas
and Employment Agency list of those licensed to recruit
in Pangasinan.
The accused denied the charges against them. In their
brief, the accused claimed that they could not be held
liable for estafa under Article 315, 2(a) of the Revised
Penal Code since the element of deceit was not
established. They alleged that they received the
placement fees on behalf of the travel agency.
RTC- Convicting Abordo and Cabanlong guilty of Illegal
Recruitment in Large Scale in for 4 complaints. Abordo
for Estafa for 1 complaint and Abordo and and
Cabanlong for 3 counts of Estafa
CA ruled The accused cannot be convicted for illegal
recruitment in large scale based on several
informations each filed by only one complainant. The
accused should be held liable only for simple illegal
recruitment. Making Abordo guilty of Simple Illegal
Complaint in 1 complaint and Estafa and Abordo and
Cabanlong liable for 3 counts of Estafa and 3 counts of
Simple Illegal Recruitment.
Issue:
The sole issue in this case is whether the accused are
guilty of simple illegal recruitment and estafa under
Article 315, 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code.
Held:
SC affirmed the decision of CA
The elements of illegal recruitment are (1) the
offender has no valid license or authority required by
law to lawfully engage in the recruitment and
placement of workers; and (2) he undertakes any
activity within the meaning of "recruitment and
placement" defined under Article 13(b) of the Labor
Code.18 Recruitment and placement is "any act of
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting,
utilizing, hiring or procuring workers; and includes
referrals, contact services, promising or advertising for
employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or
not: Provided, that any person or entity which, in any
manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to
two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in
recruitment and placement.
12
 The prosecution sufficiently established Abordos guilt
beyond reasonable doubt for the offense of simple
illegal recruitment in Criminal Case No. V-0655.
Without the necessary license, Abordo unlawfully
recruited Rayray for deployment abroad. In exchange
for this promised overseas job, Rayray paid Abordo
P14,000.
Conniving with Cabanlong, Abordo also illegally
recruited Jaime, Mendoza, and Cario who paid the
accused P45,000, P39,000 and P15,000, respectively,
as placement fees. Despite their payments of the
placement fees, all the complainants were unable to
depart the country for work abroad.
The Court also affirms the conviction of Abordo for
estafa committed against Rayray and the conviction of
Abordo and Cabanlong for estafa committed against
Jaime, Mendoza, and Cario. Conviction under the
Labor Code for illegal recruitment does not preclude
punishment under the Revised Penal Code for the
felony of estafa.24 The prosecution proved beyond
reasonable doubt that the accused committed estafa
under Article 315, 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code,
which states:
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or
fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously
with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name or falsely pretending to
possess power, influence, qualifications, property,
credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or
by means of other similar deceits.
The prosecution established that in falsely pretending
to possess power to deploy persons for overseas
employment, the accused deceived the complainants
into believing that they would provide them overseas
work. Their assurances made complainants pay the
placement fees required in exchange for the promised
jobs. The elements of deceit and damage for this
form of estafa are indisputably present; hence,
the conviction for estafa in Criminal Case Nos. V-0654
(against Abordo), V-0767, V-0769, and V-0772
(against Abordo and Cabanlong) should be affirmed.
79.)G.R. No. 184274 February 23, 2011
MARK SOLEDAD y CRISTOBAL, Petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
FACTS:
Private Respondent recieved a text message from
Rochelle Bagaporo), a credit card agent, who offered a
Citi financing loan assistance at a low interest rate.
Induced by the offer, theyve met and introduce to her
Boss which is Mark Soledad and was aks to submit
pertinent documents. Private complainant submitted
various documents, such as his Globe handyphone
original platinum gold card, identification cards and
statements of accounts. Subsequently, private
complainant followed up his loan status but he failed
to get in touch with either [petitioner] or Ronald
Gobenchiong.
During the first week of August 2004, private
complainant received his Globe handyphone statement
of account wherein he was charged for two (2) mobile
phone numbers which were not his. Upon verification
with the phone company, private complainant learned
that he had additional five (5) mobile numbers in his
name, and the application for said cellular phone lines
bore the picture of [petitioner] and his forged
signature.
Private complainant also checked with credit card
companies and learned that his Citibank Credit Card
database information was altered and he had a credit
card application with Metrobank Card Corporation
(Metrobank).
Thereafter, private complainant and Metrobanks junior
assistant manager Jefferson Devilleres lodged a
complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) which conducted an entrapment operation.
[Petitioner] responded that he was Henry Yu and
presented to [Arteche] two (2) identification cards
which bore the name and signature of private
complainant, while the picture showed the face of
[petitioner]. [Petitioner] signed the delivery receipt.
Thereupon, [Arteche] introduced himself as an NBI
operative and apprehended [petitioner]. [Arteche]
recovered from [petitioner] the two (2) identification
cards he presented to [Arteche] earlier.4
Accused pleaded not guilty.
RTC finding petitioner Mark C. Soledad guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 9(e), Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 8484, or the Access Devices Regulations
Act of 1998.
ISSUE:
Whether or not hes liable for the crime charger
HELD:
Petitioner was charged with Violation of R.A. No. 8484,
specifically Section 9(e), which reads as follows:
Section 9. Prohibited Acts. The following acts shall
constitute access device fraud and are hereby declared
to be unlawful:
(e) possessing one or more counterfeit access devices
or access devices fraudulently applied for.
SC affirmed the decision of CA
-
80.)G.R. No. 188726 January 25, 2012
CRESENCIO C. MILLA, Petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and MARKET PURSUITS, INC. represented
by CARLO V. LOPEZ, Respondents.
FACTS:
- Milla represent herself as a real estate developer,
engage in selling business properties and offered to
sell MPI
- Showed the TCT registered in sps Handog and SPA in
favor of Milla
- Lopez verified and confirmed that property was indeed
registered in name of spc Handog.(therefore
convinced)
- MPI purchased the property for 2M and mila gave a
notarized deed of Absolute deed of sale and Original
Owners Duplicate Copy of TCT.
- Upon paying 400,000 balance, milla gave tct ***777
to Acosta. but did not furnish the latter with the
receipts for the transfer taxes and other costs incurred
in the transfer of the property. This failure to turn over
the receipts prompted Lopez to check with the Register
of Deeds, where he discovered that (1) the Certificate
of Title given to them by Milla could not be found
therein; (2) there was no transfer of the property from
Sps. Handog to MPI; and (3) TCT No. 218777 was
registered in the name of a certain Matilde M.
Tolentino.6
- Consequently Lopez demanded the return of the
amount of P2 million from Milla, who then issued
check. However, these checks were dishonored for
having been drawn against insufficient funds.
- Lopez then filed two Informations for Estafa Thru
Falsification of Public Documents were filed against
Milla
- Milla was accused of having committed estafa through
the falsification of the notarized Deed of Absolute Sale
13
 and TCT No. 218777 purportedly issued by the
Register of Deeds of Makati
- RTC ruled Milla Guilty of guilty of two counts of estafa
through falsification of public documents.
ISSUE:

Whether or not she is liable for charges of two counts of estafa

through falsification of public documents.

HELD:
-The Court of Appeals was correct in affirming the trial courts
finding of guilt.
-Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code defines estafa and penalizes
any person who shall defraud another by "misappropriating or
converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any
other personal property received by the offender in trust or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same,
even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by
a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or
other property.

Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud

another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be
punished by:
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent
acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of
the fraud:
(a) By using a fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess
power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency,
business or imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar
deceits.
It was proven during trial that Milla misrepresented himself to
have the authority to sell the subject property, and it was
precisely this misrepresentation that prompted MPI to purchase
it. Because of its reliance on his authority and on the falsified
Deed of Absolute Sale and TCT No. 218777, MPI parted with its
money in the amount of P2 million, which has not been returned
until now despite Millas allegation of novation. Clearly, he is
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of estafa through falsification of
public documents.

14