RULE 111 - Prosecution of Civil Action In a Decision16 dated December 3, 1998, the RTC convicted Chiok of the crime
In a Decision16 dated December 3, 1998, the RTC convicted Chiok of the crime of estafa (RTC conviction). Its dispositive portion reads:
SECTION 1. Institution of Criminal and Civil Actions.
1. Chiok v. People, G.R. Nos. 179814 & 180021, December 7, 2015.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 179814, December 07, 2015
WILFRED N.CHIOK, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND RUFINA CHUA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 180021
RUFINA CHUA, Petitioner, v. WILFRED N. CHIOK, AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (AS AN UNWILLING CO-PARTY PETITIONER), Respondent.
DECISION
JARDELEZA, J.:
These are consolidated petitions1 seeking to nullify the Court of Appeals (CA) July 19, 2007 Decision2 and October 3, 2007 Resolution3 in CA-G.R. CR No.
23309. The CA reversed and set aside the December 3, 1998 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig-Branch 165, and acquitted petitioner
Wilfred Chiok (Chiok) of the crime of estafa in Criminal Case No. 109927, but ordered him to pay civil liability to Rufina Chua in the total amount of
P9,500,000.00, plus interests:
WHEREFORE, the DECISION DATED DECEMBER 3, 1998 is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and accused WILFRED N. CHIOK is ACQUITTED for failure of the
Prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, but he is ORDERED to pay complainant RUFINA CHUA the principal amount of [P]9,500,000.00, plus
legal interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the tiling of this case, which rate shall increase to 12% per annum from the finality of judgment.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.5 (Emphasis in original)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Chiok was charged with estafa, defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, in an Information that reads:
That sometime in June, 1995 in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, received in trust from Rufina Chua the amount of P9,563,900.00 for him to buy complainant shares of stocks, under the express obligation
on the part of the accused to deliver the documents thereon or to return the whole amount if the purchase did not materialize, but the accused once in
possession of the said amount, far from complying will his obligation as aforesaid, with intent to defraud the complainant, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously misapply, misappropriate and convert lo his own personal use and benefit the said amount of P9,563,900.00, and despite
repeated demands failed and relused and still fails and refuses to return the said amount or to account for the same, to the damage and prejudice of the
complainant Rufina Chua in the aforementioned amount of P9,563,900.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Chiok pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Thereafter, trial ensued, with both parties presenting their evidence in support of their respective claims and
defenses.
According to the Prosecution, petitioner Rufina Chua (Chua) met Chiok in mid-1989, during which he offered to be her investment adviser.
Convinced by Chiok's representations and the fact that he is Chinese, Chua made an initial investment of P200,000.00, allegedly to buy Meralco and PLDT
shares. She rolled over the original investment and profits, and this went on until 1994. For each of their transactions, Chua claimed she was not given any
document evidencing every stock transaction and that she only relied on the assurances of Chiok. In mid-1995, she accepted his proposal to buy shares in
bulk in the amount of P9,563,900.00. Chua alleged that she deposited P7,100,000.00 to Chiok's Far East Bank, Annapolis account on June 9, 1995 and
delivered to him P2,463,900.00 in cash later that same date at the Han Court Restaurant in Annapolis, Greenhills. As proof, she presented a deposit slip
dated June 9, 1995 of Chiok's Far Bast Bank Annapolis account. There was no receipt or memorandum for the cash delivery.7
Chua narrated that she became suspicious when Chiok later on avoided her calls and when he failed to show any document of the sale. He
reassured her by giving her two interbank checks, Check No. 02030693 dated July 11, 1995 for P7,963,900.00 and Check No. 02030694 dated August 15,
1995 in the amount of P1,600,000.00 (interbank checks). The interbank checks were given with the request to deposit the first check only after 60-75 days
to enable him to generate funds from the sale of a property in I long Kong. Both interbank checks were ultimately dishonored upon presentment for
payment due to garnishment and insufficiency of funds. Despite Chua's pleas, Chiok did not return her money. Hence, she referred the matter to her counsel
who wrote a demand letter dated October 25, 1995. Chiok sent her a letter-reply dated November 16, 1995 stating that the money was Chua's investment in
their unregistered partnership, and was duly invested with Yu Que Ngo. In the end, Chua decided to file her complaint-affidavit against him in the Pasig
Prosecutor's Office.8
In his defense, Chiok denied that he enticed Chua to invest in the stock market, or offered her the prospect of buying shares of stocks in bulk.
Chiok maintained that from the time he met her in 1991 and until 1995, he previously only had dollar transactions with Chua. It was in 1995 when both of
them decided to form an unregistered partnership. He admitted that the P7,963,900.00 she gave him before she left for the United States was her
investment in this unregistered partnership. Chua allegedly instructed him to invest according to his best judgment and asked him to issue a check in her
name for her peace of mind. Chiok denied having received the P2,463,900.00 in cash from her.9
On cross-examination, however, Chiok admitted receiving "P7.9" million in June 1995 and "P1.6" million earlier.10 He testified that exercising
his best judgment, he invested P8,000,000.00 with Yu Que Ngo, a businesswoman engaged in the manufacture of machine bolts and screws under the name
and style of Capri Manufacturing Company.11 Chiok narrated that Chua only panicked when she learned that he was swindled by one Gonzalo Nuguid, who
supplied him with dollars.12 It was then that she immediately demanded the return of her investment. To reassure Chua, Chiok informed her that lie had
invested the money with Yu Que Ngo and offered to give Yu Que Ngo's checks to replace his previously issued interbank checks.13 Chua agreed, but instead
of returning his checks, she retained them along with the checks of Yu Que Ngo. Chua rejected Yu Que Ngo's offer to settle her obligation with land and
machineries, insisting on recovering the "whole amount plus interest, litigation expenses plus attorney's fees."14 After the case was filed, Chiok and Yu Que
Ngo met with Chua, accompanied by their lawyers, in an effort to amicably settle Chua's demand for the return of her funds. Chua demanded more than
P30,000,000.00, but Chiok and Yu Que Ngo requested for a lower amount because the original claim was only P9,500,000.00. Chua did not grant their
request.15
In View Of All The Foregoing, the Court hereby finds the accused Wilfred N. Chiok guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa under Art. 315,
paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court hereby sentences the accused to suffer imprisonment of twelve (12) years of prision mayor as
minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum and to pay the costs.
The accused is ordered to pay the private complainant the amount of P9,563,900.00 with interest at the legal rate to be computed from the date of demand
- October 25, 1995 until fully paid.
For want of evidence, the Court cannot award the alleged actual damages.
SO ORDERED.17
The prosecution filed a Motion for Cancellation of Bail18 pursuant to Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure on February 1, 1999, the
same day the judgment was promulgated.19 On February 15, 1999, Chiok filed a Motion for Reconsideration20 of the RTC conviction.
The RTC, in an omnibus order21 dated May 28, 1999 (omnibus order), denied Chiok's motion for reconsideration, and also cancelled his bail pursuant to
Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. The RTC held that the circumstances of the accused indicated the probability of flight if
released on bail and/or that there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, he may commit another crime. Thus:
WHEREFORE, the bail of the accused is cancelled. The accused is given five (5) days from receipt of this order within which to surrender before this Court
otherwise, his arrest will be ordered.
SO ORDERED.22ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On June 18, 1999, Chiok filed a Notice of Appeal23 on the RTC conviction and omnibus order, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 23309 (the appeal case) and rallied
to the CA Fifteenth Division. On June 19, 1999, Chiok also filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
and/or Injunction against the omnibus order,24 which was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 53340 (bail case) and raffled to the CA Thirteenth Division.
Meanwhile, the RTC issued an order of arrest25 on June 25, 1999 (order of arrest) pursuant to the omnibus order. The order of arrest was returned to the
trial court by the Makati Police Station on July 25, 1999 on the ground that Chiok could not be located at his last given address.26
The Bail Case
On July 27, 1999, the CA issued a TRO on the implementation of the omnibus order until further orders.27 On September 20, 1999, the CA issued a writ of
preliminary injunction28 enjoining the arrest of Chiok. The CA ruled that Chiok should not be deprived of liberty pending the resolution of his appeal
because the offense for which he was convicted is a non-capital offense, and that the probability of flight during the pendency of his appeal is merely
conjectural.29 The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and Chua filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated
November 16, 1999.
On November 3, 1999, the OSG representing the People of the Philippines, and Chua, filed separate petitions for certiorari before us seeking review of the
CA Resolutions dated September 20, 1999 and November 16, 1999.30 We granted the OSG's and Chua's petitions and reversed the CA's injunction on the
arrest of Chiok.31 Our decisions (SC bail decisions) became final on December 6, 2006 and June 20, 2007, respectively.
The Appeal Case
On September 21, 1999, the CA Thirteenth Division dismissed the appeal of Chiok finding him to have jumped bail when the order of arrest was returned
unserved.32 The CA considered his appeal abandoned, dismissing it pursuant to Section 8, Rule 124 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. However, on
February 29, 2000, the CA reinstated Chiok's appeal when it learned of the issuance of the TRO and injunction in the bail case on September 20, 1999 or a
day prior to the appeal's dismissal.33
Proceedings before the CA ensued. Chiok filed his Appellant's Brief34 dated August 28, 2003 while the OSG filed its Appellee's Brief35 dated December 23,
2003. Chiok submitted his Reply Brief36 dated April 14, 2004 while the OSG and Chua replied through their Rejoinder Briefs37 dated October 6, 2004.
On July 19, 2007, the CA in a Special Division of Five (Former-Fourth Division) rendered a Decision reversing and setting aside the Decision dated December
3, 1998 of the trial court, and acquitted Chiok for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt (CA acquittal).
The CA found that the RTC conviction did not contain findings of fact on the prosecution's evidence but merely recited the evidence of the prosecution as if
such evidence was already proof of the ultimate facts constituting estafa. Instead of relying on the strength of the prosecution's evidence, the trial court
relied on the weakness of the defense. It found that Chua's testimony, which was the sole evidence of the prosecution, was inconsistent and improbable.
Specifically, it was irregular that Chua was not able to produce any single receipt or documentary evidence of all the alleged stock dealings which spanned
for a long period of six years with Chiokthe purpose of which was to prove that he misappropriated the amount contrary to her instructions of investing it
to blue chip stocks. More importantly, the acceptance by Chua of the checks issued by Yu Que Ngo ratified his application of the funds based on the
instructions to invest it. Simply put, the prosecution was not able to prove the element of misappropriation (i.e., deviation from Chua's instructions). As to
the civil aspect, the CA found Chiok liable to Chua for the amount of P9,500,000.00,38 the amount he admitted on record.
The OSG did not file a motion for reconsideration on the ground of double jeopardy. Chua, on the other hand, filed a motion for reconsideration39 on
August 8, 2007. Chiok also filed his own motion for reconsideration,40 on the civil liability imposed on him.
In a Resolution41 dated October 3, 2007, the CA denied Chua's motion for reconsideration and its supplement on the ground that acquittal is immediately
final and the re-examination of the record of the case would violate the guarantee against double jeopardy. It also denied the motions tor reconsideration of
both parties on the civil aspect of the case.
Hence, these consolidated petitions questioning the CA acquittal by way of a petition for certiorari and mandamus, and the civil aspect of the case by way of
appeal by certiorari.
Issues
The consolidated petitions raise the following issues:
Whether or not Chua has a legal personality to file and prosecute this petition.
Whether or not the case is an exception to the rule on finality of acquittal and the doctrine of double jeopardy.
Whether or not Chiok is civilly liable to Chua.
Discussion
I. Chua lacks the legal personality to file this petition.
Chua argues that her petition should be allowed because the circumstances of this case warrant leniency on her lack of personality to assail the criminal
aspect of the CA acquittal. She argues that "the OSG did not take any action to comment on the position of Chua [and] that this case belongs to the realm of
exceptions to the doctrine of double jeopardy."42
We disagree with Chua.
Chua lacks the personality or legal standing to question the CA Decision because it is only the OSG, on behalf of the State, which can bring actions in criminal
proceedings before this Court and the CA.
In Villareal v. Aliga,43 we upheld the doctrine that it is only the OSG, as representative of the State, which may question the acquittal of the accused via a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65, viz:
x x x The authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the Supreme Court and the CA is solely vested in the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG). Section 35 (I), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code explicitly provides that the OSG shall represent the Government
of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of
lawyers. It shall have specific powers and functions to represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court and the CA, and all other courts or
tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party. The OSG is the law office
of the Government.
To be sure, in criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case against him can only be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on
behalf of the State. The private complainant or the offended party may question such acquittal or dismissal only insofar as the civil liability of the accused is
concerned. In a catena of cases, this view has been time and again espoused and maintained by the Court. In Rodriguez v. Gadiane, it was categorically
slated that if the criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, the appeal on the criminal aspect of the case must be instituted by
the Solicitor General in behalf of the State. The capability of the private complainant to question such dismissal or acquittal is limited only to the civil aspect
of the case. The same determination was also arrived at by the Court in Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Veridiano II. In the recent case of
Bangayan, Jr. v. Bangayan, the Court again upheld this guiding principle.
xxx
Thus, the Court has definitively ruled that in a criminal case in which the offended party is the State, the interest of the private complainant or the private
offended party is limited to the civil liability arising therefrom. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal of the
criminal aspect may be undertaken, whenever legally feasible, only by the State through the Solicitor General. As a rule, only the Solicitor General may
represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not undertake such appeal. (Emphasis supplied)
The rationale behind this rule is that in a criminal case, the party affected by the dismissal of the criminal action is the State and not the private
complainant.44 The interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited only to the civil liability.45 In the prosecution of the offense,
the complainant's role is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution such that when a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an
acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General.46 The private offended party or
complainant may not take such appeal, but may only do so as to the civil aspect of the case.47
Although there are instances when we adopt a liberal view and give due course to a petition filed by an offended party, we direct the OSG to file its
comment.48 When through its comment, the OSG takes a position similar to the private complainant's, we hold that the OSG ratifies and adopts the private
complainant's petition as its own.49 However, when the OSG in its comment neither prays that the petition be granted nor expressly ratifies and adopts the
petition as its own, we hesitate in disregarding, and uphold instead, the rule on personality or legal standing.50
In this case, the OSG neither appealed the judgment of acquittal of the CA nor gave its conformity to Chua's special civil action for certiorari and mandamus.
In its Comment51 dated March 27, 2008, the OSG is of the view that Chua's petition will place Chiok in double jeopardy:
x x x Notably, while petitioner [Chua] imputes grave abuse of discretion on the Court of Appeals in acquitting private respondent, a perusal of the allegations
will reveal errors of judgment in the appreciation of evidence, not error of jurisdiction. Verily, petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals abused its
discretion when it pronounced that "we have also reviewed the evidence of the accused in order to satisfy ourselves about the essential question of
misappropriation or conversion" and hold thereafter that "review now justifies us to pronounce that his version on the matter was probably credible."
Petitioner argues that a simple review of the evidence of respondent accused readily leads to the conclusion that it is very far from being probably credible.
Clearly, the errors ascribed to the Court of Appeals are errors that go deeply into the appreciation and assessment of the evidence presented by the
prosecution and the defense during the trial. Thus, the present petition smacks in the heart of the Court of [Appeals] appreciation of evidence x x
x.52ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In view of the contrary position of the OSG, we do not subscribe to Chua's view that the circumstances of this case warrant the relaxation on the rule. Even if
we do relax this procedural rule, we find that the merits of the case still calls for the dismissal of Chua's petition.
II. The appeal from the judgment of acquittal will place Chiok in double jeopardy.
The 1987 Constitution, as well as its predecessors, guarantees the right of the accused against double jeopardy.53 Section 7, Rule 117 of the 1985 and 2000
Rules on Criminal Procedure strictly adhere to the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy and provide for the requisites in order for double
jeopardy to attach. For double jeopardy to attach, the following elements must concur: (1) a valid information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction of the crime charged; (2) a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the accused has been arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the accused was
convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed without his express consent.54
In order to give life to the rule on double jeopardy, our rules on criminal proceedings require that a judgment of acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or
the appellate court, is final, unappealable, and immediately executory upon its promulgation.55 This is referred to as the "finality-of-acquittal" rule. The
rationale for the rule was explained in People v. Velasco:56
The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial court cuts deep into "the humanity of the laws and in a jealous watchfulness
over the rights of the citizen, when brought in unequal contest with the State, x x x." Thus, Green expressed the concern that "(t)he underlying idea, one
that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with sill its resources and power should not be allowed to
make repealed attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him
to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he may be found guilty."
It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the
finality of his acquittal. The philosophy underlying this rule establishing the absolute nature of acquittals is "part of the paramount importance criminal
justice system attaches to the protection of the innocent against wrongful conviction." The interest in the finality-of-acquittal rule, confined exclusively to
verdicts of not guilty, is easy to understand: it is a need for "repose," a desire to know the exact extent of one's liability. With this right of repose, the
criminal justice system has built in a protection lo insure that the innocent, even those whose innocence rests upon a jury's leniency, will not be found guilty
in a subsequent proceeding.
Related to his right of repose is the defendant's interest in his right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal. This interest encompasses his right to
have his guilt or innocence determined in a single proceeding by the initial jury empanelled to try him, for society's awareness of the heavy personal strain
which the criminal trial represents for the individual defendant is manifested in the willingness to limit Government to a single criminal proceeding to
vindicate its very vital interest in enforcement of criminal laws. The ultimate goal is prevention of government oppression; the goal finds its voice in the
finality of the initial proceeding. As observed in Lockhart v. Nelson, "(t)he fundamental tenet animating the Double Jeopardy Clause is that the State should
not be able to oppress individuals through the abuse of the criminal process." Because the innocence of the accused has been confirmed by a final
judgment, the Constitution conclusively presumes that a second trial would be unfair. (Citations omitted, Emphasis supplied)
There were cases, however, where we recognized certain exceptions to the rule against double jeopardy and its resultant doctrine of finality-of-acquittal.
In Galman v. Sandiganbayan,57 we remanded a judgment of acquittal to a trial court due to a finding of mistrial. In declaring the trial before the
Sandiganbayan of the murder of former Senator Benigno Simeon "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr., which resulted in the acquittal of all the accused, as a sham, we found
that "the prosecution and the sovereign people were denied due process of law with a partial court and biased [Tanodbayan] under the constant and
pervasive monitoring and pressure exerted by the authoritarian [p]resident to assure the carrying out of his instructions."58 We considered the acquittal as
void, and held that no double jeopardy attached.
In People v. Uy,59 we held that by way of exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court upon clear showing by the petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment
but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void.
Chua assails the acquittal of Chiok on two grounds. First, the first jeopardy did not attach because the CA did not have jurisdiction over the appeal; Chiok
having lost his right to appeal when the CA found him to have jumped bail. Second assuming that the first jeopardy attached, the circumstances of this case
is an exception to the rule on double jeopardy.
A. The CA had jurisdiction to entertain Chiok's appeal.
Chua claims that the SC bail decisions set aside as bereft of any factual or legal basis the CA resolutions in the bail case which enjoined the cancellation of
bail of Chiok and his warrant of arrest by the trial court. The logical and legal consequence of the nullification of the CA resolutions is to automatically revive
the CA's Resolution dated September 21, 1999 dismissing the appeal of Chiok. Accordingly, the CA had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal of Chiok and
the proceedings therein are null and void.
We find no merit in Chua's claims.
At the outset, the CA validly acquired jurisdiction over Chiok's appeal. Chiok filed his Notice of Appeal on June 18, 1999 at the time when the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure was still in effect. Section 6, Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure explicitly provides that the right to appeal is not
automatically forfeited when an accused fails to appear during the promulgation of judgment.60 Upon perfection of Chiok's Notice of Appeal and the
subsequent denial of the prosecution's Motion to Deny Due Course to the Notice of Appeal by the RTC in its Order61 dated July 15, 1999, the CA completely
acquired jurisdiction over Chiok's appeal.
After acquiring jurisdiction over the appeal, the CA took cognizance of the unserved order of arrest. Exercising jurisdiction over Chiok's appeal, the CA in its
Resolution dated September 21, 1999 dismissed his appeal in accordance with Section 8, Rule 124 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure:
Sec. 8. Dismissal of appeal for abandonment, or failure to prosecute. - The appellate court may, upon motion of the appellee or on its own motion and
notice to the appellant, dismiss the appeal if the appellant fails to file his brief within the time prescribed by this Rule, except in case the appellant is
represented by a counsel de oficio.
The court may also, upon motion of the appellee or on its own motion, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail
or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal. (Emphasis and italics supplied)
The aforecited section gives the CA the authority to dismiss an appeal for abandonment if the accused escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or
flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal. This authority to dismiss an appeal is, nevertheless, discretionary.62 When an accused jumps
bail during the pendency of his appeal, the appellate court may exercise its discretion whether to proceed with the appeal or dismiss it outright.63 In several
cases, we still proceeded to acquit an accused who remained at large during the pendency of the appeal.64
In this case, the CA exercised this discretion when it found that Chiok jumped bail because the order of arrest was not served. Subsequently, when Chiok
moved for its reconsideration, the CA again exercised its discretion, this time to entertain the appeal. Notably, neither the prosecution nor Chua attributed
any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the appellate court when it reinstated the appeal via a Resolution dated February 29, 2000. This resolution,
which effectively replaces the original resolution dismissing the appeal, has already attained finality.
Thus, contrary to the claim of Chua, the SC bail decisions which set aside the CA resolutions enjoining Chiok's arrest did not automatically revive the CA
resolution dismissing the appeal; the dismissal being a discretionary act on the part of the appellate court. Consequently, we reject the claim of Chua that
the first jeopardy did not attach because the whole proceedings before the CA, and the CA acquittal, are null and void.
B. Exceptions to the rate on finality-of-acquittal and double jeopardy doctrine do not apply.
Chua next asserts that certain exceptions to the rule on double jeopardy are present in this case. Particularly, she submits that: (1) the appellate court's
proceeding is a sham or mock proceeding; (2) the People through the OSG, was deprived of the opportunity to be heard and its "day in court"; and (3) the
result is a null and void judgment of acquittal. Chua cites the case of Galman v. Sandiganbayan65 to bolster her assertions.
Chua claims that the "trial in both the bouncing checks cases and this estafa case, is a sham insofar as they have resulted in acquittals."66 Chua anchors her
claim on the report submitted by Judge Elvira D.C. Panganiban that there were unauthorized tamperings in the evidence in the bouncing checks cases67 (BP
22 case) she filed against Chiok, and that a TSN in the same BP 22 case, where Chiok allegedly made an implied admission of guilt, has been secretly
removed from the record.
We do not see any exception to the rule on double jeopardy in this case.
The factual milieu in Galman v. Sandiganbayan68 is starkly different from this case. In Galman, we concluded that there was a mock or sham trial because of
the overwhelming evidence of collusion and undue pressures made by former President Marcos on the prosecution and the Justices who tried and decided
the case, which prevented the prosecution from fully ventilating its position and offering all evidence. We recognized the intensity and gravity of the
pressure exerted by the highest official in the land that resulted to a miscarriage of justice.
In this case, Chua presents a report submitted by Judge Elvira D.C. Panganiban showing irregularities in the BP 22 case against Chiok, including the loss of a
TSN containing an alleged offer of settlement by Chiok equivalent to his implied admission of guilt. We, however, do not see the same evils presented in
Galman when the alleged anomalies pointed out by Chua were in a different case and when the main basis of the acquittal is not on the credibility of the
physical evidence but of the testimony of Chua herself. Moreover, it is apparent from the CA acquittal that the appellate court considered Chiok's offer of
settlement in arriving at the decision, having included it in its statement of facts. In essence, Chua is asking us to nullify the CA acquittal because in her
opinion, if the appellate court considered these pieces of evidence, it would have convicted Chiok. These are purported errors of judgment or those
involving misappreciation of evidence which cannot be raised and be reviewed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
We are also not convinced that the State was deprived of due process in presenting its case. The OSG, in fact, actively participated in prosecuting the case
before the CA. It was able to file an Appellee's Brief69 dated December 23, 2003, as well as its Rejoinder Brief70 dated October 6, 2004. As Chua even
admits in her petition, the OSG was able to present its case before the appellate court as when "[t]he OSG's position in this case on the merits is clear in the
submissions it has filed, as most eloquently expressed in the Rejoinder Brief..."71 Certainly, no grave abuse of discretion can be ascribed where both parties
had the opportunity to present their case and even required them to submit memoranda from which its decision is based, as in this case.72
Although we do not absolutely preclude the availment of the remedy of certiorari to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner must clearly and
convincingly demonstrate that the appellate court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave and so severe as to deprive it of its very power to
dispense justice.73 Chua failed to do so.
III. Chiok is civilly liable to Chua in the amount of P9,563,900.00.
Chiok claims thai the Joint Decision74 dated November 27, 2000 in the BP 22 case docketed as Criminal Case No. 44739 of the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) San Juan, Manila - Branch 58, which absolved Chiok from civil liability, is res judicata on this case. On the other hand, Chua. claims that the CA erred
when it ordered Chiok to pay only the amount of P9,500,000.00 when it was shown by evidence that the amount should be P9,563,900.00.
We rule that Chiok is liable For the amount of P9,563,900.00.
In Castillo v. Salvador75 and several cases before it, we ruled that if the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt, the accused is not automatically exempt
from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. In this regard, preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the
aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence" or "greater weight of the
credible evidence." Preponderance of evidence is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition
thereto.76
While the CA acquitted Chiok on the ground that the prosecution's evidence on his alleged misappropriation of Chua's money did not meet the quantum of
proof beyond reasonable doubt, we hold that the monetary transaction between Chua and Chiok was proven by preponderance of evidence.
Chua presented in evidence a bank deposit slip dated June 9, 1995 to Chiok's Far East Bank, Annapolis account in the amount of P7,100,000.00. She also
testified that she delivered to him in cash the amount of P2,463,900.00. Chiok's admission that he issued the interbank checks in the total amount of
P9,563,900.00 to Chua, albeit claiming that it was "for safekeeping purposes only" and to assure her that she will be paid back her investment, corroborates
Chua's evidence. In any event, as found by the appellate court, Chiok admitted that he received from Chua the amount of "P7.9" million in June 1995 and for
"P1.6" million at an earlier time. It is on this basis that the CA found Chiok civilly liable in the amount of P9,500,000.00 only.
However, we find that during the direct and cross-examination of Chiok on September 15, 1997 and October 13, 1997, the reference to "P9.5" million is the
amount in issue, which is the whole of P9,563,900.00:
TSN September 15, 1907 (direct examination of Wilfred Chiok)
ATTY ESPIRITU[:] Mr. Witness. The amount here you are being charged in the information is P9,563,900.00 covered by I lie two (2) checks Exhibits "C" and
"D" of the prosecution. x x x77
TSN Octobcr 13, 1997 (cross examination of Wilfred Chiok)
PROSECUTOR RASA[:] Do you know how much Mrs. Chua is claiming from you [which is the] subject matter of this case of estafa?
WITNKSK[:] Yes, ma'am.
PROSECUTOR RASA[:] How much?
WITNESS[:] More or less 9.5.
PROSECUTOR RASA[:] In peso or in dollar?
WITNESS[:] In Peso.
PROSECUTOR RASA[:] 9.5 Million what?
WITNESS[:] Million Peso, ma'am.
PROSECUTOR RASA[:] You admit that you received 9.5 Million from Mrs. Chua?
WITNESS[:] I admitted that, ma'am.78 (Italics supplied)
Accordingly, the amount admitted should be P9,563,900.00.
There is also no merit in Chiok's claim that his absolution from civil liability in the BP 22 case involving the same transaction bars civil liability in this estafa
case under the doctrine of res judicata in the concept of "conclusiveness of judgment."
The doctrine of res judicata under the concept of "conclusiveness of judgment" is found in paragraph (c) of Section 47, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Under this doctrine, a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in
all later suits on points and matters determined in the former suit.79 Stated differently, facts and issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot
again be raised in any future case between the same parties, even if the latter suit may involve a different cause of action.80 This principle of res judicata
bars the re-litigation of particular facts or issues in another litigation between the same parties on a different claim or cause of action.81
In Rodriguez v. Ponferrada,82 we explained that a civil action in a BP 22 case is not a bar to a civil action in estafa case. In rejecting the theory of petitioner
therein that the civil action arising from the criminal case for violation of BP 22 precludes the institution of the corresponding civil action in the criminal case
for estafa pending before the RTC, we ruled that Rule 111 of the Rules of Court expressly allows the institution of a civil action in the crimes of both estafa
and violation of BP 22, without need of election by the offended party. There is no forum shopping because both remedies are simultaneously available to
the offended party. We explained that while every such act of issuing a bouncing check involves only one civil liability for the offended party who has
sustained only a single injury, this single civil liability can be the subject of both civil actions in the estafa case and the BP 22 case. However, there may only
be one recovery of the single civil liability.
We affirmed this in Rimando v. Aldaba,83 where we were confronted with the similar issue of whether an accused's civil liability in the estafa case must be
upheld despite acquittal and exoneration from civil liability in BP 22 cases. We held that both estafa and BP 22 cases can proceed to their final adjudication-
both as to their criminal and civil aspectssubject only to the prohibition on double recovery.
Since the Rules itself allows for both remedies to be simultaneously availed of by the offended party, the doctrine of res judicata finds no application here.
Moreover, the principle of res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment presupposes that facts and issues were actually and directly resolved in
a previous case.84 However, the records show that in the BP 22 case, the facts and issues proving the transaction were not actually and directly resolved in
the decision, viz:
The court is not persuaded.
First, what the law requires is a notice of dishonor of the check to be given to the accused after its dishonor. There is no showing dial this requirement was
complied by the prosecution. Second, the drawer must be given at least 5 banking days from such notice of dishonor within which to pay the holder thereof
the amount due thereon or to make arrangement for payment in full by the drawee of such check. Indeed, there was no notice of dishonor established to
have been furnished the accused and therefore there is more reason that the accused was not given the requisite 5-banking day to make good aforesaid
cheeks. The 5-day notice serves to mitigate the harshness of the law in its application by giving the drawer an opportunity to make good the bum check.
And, it cannot be said that accused was ever given that opportunity simply because the prosecution failed to prove that accused was notified of the
dishonor of the checks in suit.
xxx
Even assuming without admitting but only for the sake of argument that accused was notified of the dishonor of the checks in suit by the demand letter
adverted to above, still the prosecution cause must fail because there are more reasons not to believe than to believe the theory of the prosecution as
compared with that of the defense as will be explained hereunder.
xxx
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the court hereby absolves the accused from criminal as well as civil liability and orders these cases
DISMISSED for lack of evidence to support the charges levelled against him.
Costs de officio. No other pronouncements.
SO ORDERED.
The basis or Chiok's acquittal therein is the prosecution's failure to show that a notice of dishonor was first given to Chiok. The discussion that the
prosecution's version is incredible was merely secondary, and was not necessary, for accused's acquittal. There were no findings of fact on the transaction
which gives rise to the civil liability.
In light of these, we reject Chiok's claim that res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment bars Chua from recovering any civil claims.
Following this Court's ruling in Nacar v. Gallery Frames,86 the foregoing amount of P9,563,900.00 shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum computed from October 25, 1995, the date of Chua's extrajudicial demand, until the date of finality of this judgment. The total amount shall
thereafter earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from such finality of judgment until its satisfaction.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 179814 and the special civil action for certiorari and mandamus in G.R. No. 180021 are
DENIED. The petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 180021 is GRANTED. The Assailed Decision dated July 19, 2007 and the Resolution dated October 3,
2007 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Wilfred Chiok is ordered to pay Rufina Chua the principal amount of
P9,563,900.00, with interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum computed from October 25, 1995 until the date of finality of this judgment. The total
amount shall thereafter earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of judgment until its satisfaction.
No costs. SO ORDERED.
2. Bernardo v. People, G.R. No. 182210, October 5, 2015.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 182210, October 05, 2015
PAZ T. BERNARDO, SUBSTITUTED BY HEIRS, MAPALAD G. BERNARDO, EMILIE B. KO, MARILOU B. VALDEZ, EDWIN T. BERNARDO AND GERVY B. SANTOS,
Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by accused petitioner Paz T. Bernardo (Bernardo) under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
Court of Appeals (CA) August 31, 2007 decision1 and the March 14, 2008 resolution2 in CA-G.R. CR 28721, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Paz T.
Bernardo." The appellate court affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 56, Makati City, finding Bernardo guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of five (5) counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. 22).
The Factual Antecedents
In June 1991, Bernardo obtained a loan from the private complainant Carmencita C. Bumanglag (Bumanglag) in the amount of P460,000.00 payable on or
before its maturity on November 30, 1991. That loan was evidenced by a promissory note3 Bernardo and her husband had executed, whereby the couple
solidarity bound themselves to pay the loan with corresponding interest at 12% per annum payable upon default.4 As additional security, Bernardo gave
Bumanglag the owner's duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. (T-1034) 151841.
Prior to the loan's maturity, Bernardo took back the title from Bumanglag to use as a collateral in another transaction. In place of the title, Bernardo issued
to Bumanglag the following five (5) Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC) checks,5 posted on different dates in June 1992, covering the loan's aggregate
amount:cralawlawlibrary
Check No.
Amount
Date
FEBTC No. 391033
Php 100,000.00
June 1, 1992
FEBTC No. 391034
Php 100,000.00
June 8, 1992
FEBTC No. 391035
Php 100,000.00
June 15, 1992
FEBTC No. 391036
Php 100,000.00
June 22, 1992
FEBTC No. 391037
Php 60,000.00
June 29, 1992
In September 1992, Bumanglag deposited these checks to Bernardo's account but they were dishonored; the reason given was "Account Closed."
Bumanglag thus sent Bernardo a notice informing her of the dishonor of the checks. The demand went unheeded, prompting Bumanglag to initiate a
criminal complaint against Bernardo with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati for five (5) counts of violation of B.P. 22.
After the requisite preliminary investigation, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City found probable cause to indict Bernardo for the offenses
charged. Bernardo entered a not guilty plea on arraignment.
The prosecution rested its case on September 21, 1994. Bernardo took the witness stand only on May 9, 1996, to present her defense evidence.
In her testimony, Bernardo argued that she could not be held liable for violation of B.P. 22 because the questioned checks were presented beyond the 90-
day period provided under the law. She also denied having received any notice of dishonor, which she insisted was essential to prove the material element
of knowledge of insufficiency of funds.
In any case, she maintained that the checks were never meant to be presented as she had always paid her loans in cash, which she claimed to have done in
the aggregate amount of P717,000.00. According to Bernardo, although Bumanglag returned to her the title to the property after payment, Bumanglag
never bothered to issue her receipts. Bumanglag did not return the checks either.
Following Bernardo's cross-examination, the RTC reset the hearing for redirect examination to September 4, 1996.6 That hearing, however, was again reset
to April 3, 1997, in view of the absence of Bernardo's counsel. When Bernardo and her counsel again failed to appear during the April 3, 1997 hearing, and
in view of the numerous previous postponements the defense had asked for, the RTC considered her right to present additional evidence waived.
Bernardo moved for reconsideration but the RTC denied her motion. The RTC, however, gave her ten (10) days within which to submit her formal offer of
evidence, which she failed to do. As a result, the RTC declared that Bernardo had waived her right to submit her formal offer of evidence.
RTC Ruling
On May 28, 2003, the RTC issued its ruling finding Bernardo guilty of five counts of violation of B.P. 22.7 The RTC held that Bernardo failed to substantiate
her claim of payment. The RTC further ruled that it is not the nonpayment of the obligation but the issuance of a worthless check that B.P. 22 punishes.
The RTC sentenced Bernardo to one (1) year imprisonment for each count of the offense charged and ordered her to indemnify Bumanglag the amount of
P460,000.00, plus 12% interest and 5% penalty charges, from December 1, 1991, until full payment.8
CA Ruling
On appeal, the CA affirmed Bernardo's conviction but deleted the penalty of imprisonment and in lieu thereof, imposed a P460,000.00 fine.9 The CA also
retained the civil indemnity of P460,000.00 that the lower court imposed, plus 12% interest from the time of the institution of the criminal charges until full
payment.10
In denying Bernardo's appeal, the CA noted that Bernardo failed to adduce sufficient evidence of payment. The CA further held that the 90-day period
within which to present a check under B.P. 22 is not an element of the crime.
The CA also did not recognize any merit in Bernardo's claim that she had been denied due process, in view of the RTC's order waiving her right to present
additional evidence.11 To the CA, Bernardo had sufficient opportunity to present her defense but did not avail of these opportunities. Instead, she and her
counsel moved for postponement at least nine (9) times, not to mention their subsequent failure to appear four (4) times despite due notice of the
scheduled hearings. These developments led the RTC to consider Bernardo's right to present additional evidence waived.12
Bernardo moved for reconsideration but the CA denied her motion;13 hence, the present petition.14
The Petition and Comment
Bernardo insists in her present petition15 that the CA erred in finding that she had been accorded due process; she was denied the full opportunity to
present her defense and was thus deprived of the chance to prove her innocence of the crime charged.
She likewise avers that the CA erred in affirming her criminal and civil liabilities because the prosecution failed to prove her knowledge of insufficiency of
funds. According to Bernardo, there was no violation of B.P. 22 because the checks were presented beyond the mandatory 90-day period. Moreover,
Bernardo claimed that these subject checks were issued without consideration as she had already paid the loan.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) posits in its Comment that Bernardo was given the opportunity to present her defense evidence.16 Citing Wong v.
CA,17 the OSG further points out that the 90-day period provided in the law is not an element of the offense;18 it is simply one of the conditions to
establish a prima facie presumption of knowledge of lack of funds.19
The OSG also claims that Bumanglag failed to substantiate her claim that she had settled the obligation.20 In any event, the OSG asserted B.P. 22 penalizes
the act of making and issuing a worthless check, not the nonpayment of the obligation.2
Subsequent Developments
On March 14, 2011, Bernardo's counsel informed the Court of the petitioner's death on February 3, 2011, and provided, as well, the names of her heirs (her
widower, Mapalad Bernardo, and children: Emilie B. Ko, Marilou B. Valdez, Edwin T. Bernardo, and Gervy B. Santos), and their address (26 Magdiwang St.,
Real Village 2, Tandang Sora, Quezon City). In due course, in our March 7, 2012 Resolution,22 we required Bernardo's heirs to appear as substitutes for the
deceased Bernardo in the present petition for purposes of Bernardo's civil liability.
Bernardo's heirs moved to reconsider our March 7, 2012 resolution. They argued that Bernardo's death extinguished her civil liability. In the alternative, they
contended that any civil liability should be settled in a separate civil case.
We denied the heirs' motion in our June 27, 2012 resolution. We explained that Bernardo's civil liability survived her death as it is based on contract.
Moreover, we observed that it would be costly, burdensome, and time-consuming to dismiss the present case and require the Bumanglags to file a separate
civil action.
The Court's Ruling
We deny the petition for lack of merit. Preliminary Matters
Classes of Civil Liabilities
An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to several distinct civil liabilities on the part of the offender.23 If the conduct constitutes a
felony, the accused may be held civilly liable under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code (ex delicto).24 This particular civil liability due the offended party is
rooted on facts that constitute a crime.25 Otherwise stated, civil liability arises from the offense charged.26 It is not required that the accused be convicted
to be entitled to civil liability based on delict. As long as the facts constituting the offense charged are established by preponderance of evidence, civil
liability may be awarded.27 Moreover, the civil liability based on delict is deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the
civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.28
The same act or omission, however, may also give rise to independent civil liabilities based on other sources of obligation. Article 1157 of the Civil Code
enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission: (a) law (b) contracts; (c) quasi-
contracts, and (d) quasi-delicts. Among these are the civil liabilities for intentional torts under Articles 3229 and 3430 of the Civil Code and for quasi-delicts
under Article 2176 of Civil Code.31 For conduct constituting defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, the Civil Code likewise grants the offended party the
right to institute a civil action independently of the criminal action under Article-33 of the Civil Code.
Thus, it is entirely possible for one to be free from civil ability directly arising from a violation of the penal law and to still be liable civilly based on contract
or by laws other than the criminal law.32 Such civil actions may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the
criminal action,33 subject however, to the caveat that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission.34
Bernardo's civil liability may be enforced in the present case despite her death.
As a general rule, the death of an accused pending appeal extinguishes her criminal liability and the corresponding civil liability based solely on the offense
(delict). The death amounts to an acquittal of the accused based on the constitutionally mandated presumption of innocence in her favor, which can be
overcome only by a finding of guilt - something that death prevents the court from making.35 In a sense, death absolves the accused from any earthly
responsibility arising from the offense a divine act that no human court can reverse, qualify, much less disregard.36 The intervention of death of the
accused in any case is an injunction by fate itself so that no criminal liability and the corresponding civil liability arising from the offense should be imposed
on him.37
The independent civil liabilities, however, survive death and an action for recovery therefore may be generally pursued but only by filing a separate civil
action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended.38 This separate civil action may be enforced against the estate of
the accused.39
In B.P. 22 cases, the criminal action shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil actions. Instead of instituting two separate cases, only a single suit is
filed and tried.40 This rule was enacted to help declog court dockets, which had been packed with B.P. 22 because creditors used the courts as collectors. As
we observed in Hyatt v. Asia Dynamic Electrix Corp.:41cralawlawlibrary
Because ordinarily no filing fee is charged in criminal cases for actual damages, the payee uses the intimidating effect of a criminal charge to collect his credit
gratis and sometimes, upon being paid, the trial court is not even informed thereof. The inclusion of the civil action in the criminal case is expected to
significantly lower the number of cases filed before the courts for collection based on dishonored checks. It is also expected to expedite the disposition of
these cases. Instead of instituting two separate cases, one for criminal and another for civil, only a single suit shall be filed and tried. It should be stressed
that the policy laid down by the Rules is to discourage the separate filing of the civil action.
As a necessary consequence of this special rule, the civil liabilities arising from the issuance of a worthless check are deemed instituted in a case for
violation of B.P. 22; the death of Bernardo did not automatically extinguish the action. The independent civil liability based on contract, which was deemed
instituted in the criminal action for B.P. 22, may still be enforced against her estate in the present case. We thus rule on the present action to determine
Bumanglag's civil liability.
Substantive Aspect
Bernardo was not denied due process.
We meticulously went over the entire record, and confirmed that Bernardo had not at all been deprived of her day in court. She was afforded ample
opportunity to present evidence in her defense but she did not give this case the serious attention it deserved. For good reason - i.e., the repeated absences
of Bernardo and her counsel - the trial court eventually considered her right to present defense evidence waived.
To be sure, the postponement of the trial of a case to allow the presentation of evidence is a matter that lies with the discretion of the trial court; but it is a
discretion that must be exercised wisely, considering the peculiar circumstances of each case and with a view to doing substantial justice.42 In the present
case, the records show that the RTC took all the steps necessary to safeguard Bernardo's rights and to accord her the opportunity to present whatever
evidence she had in her defense.
In particular, the prosecution formally rested its case on September 21, 1994. Bernardo, through counsel, thereupon moved for leave to file a demurrer to
evidence prompting the RTC to reset the hearing for initial presentation of defense evidence to December 15 and 20, 1994.43 Bernardo filed her demurrer
to evidence on November 10, 1994,44 after previously requesting the RTC for a 10-day extension.
The pendency of the demurrer to evidence prompted several resettings until the RTC finally denied it on March 30, 1995.45 The RTC then set the initial
presentation of defense evidence on April 11, 18, and 25, 1995,46 but these were reset to May 9, 18, and 25, 1995,47 at the motion of Bernardo's counsel
who expressed his desire to seek relief from the CA for the denial of the demurrer.
Despite the RTC's accommodation, Bernardo's counsel failed to appear during the May 9, 1995 hearing as he was busy attending to the canvassing of votes
in Quezon City.48 Eventually, the initial presentation of defense evidence was reset to July 20, 1995, and August 3, 1995.49
Notably, during the July 20, 1995 hearing, Bernardo's counsel again moved for another resetting as he was not prepared to conduct a direct examination.50
Despite this flimsy ground, the RTC granted the request and allowed Bernardo to testify on August 3, 1995.
Bernardo and her counsel, however, failed to appear during the August 3, 1995 hearing despite due notice, prompting the RTC to waive their right to
present defense evidence.51 Bernardo moved for reconsideration and the RTC granted her motion in the interest of substantial justice.52 Thus, the hearing
for the presentation of defense evidence was reset to November 28, 1995.53chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Bernardo and her counsel again failed to appear during the November 28, 1995 hearing, despite due notice, prompting the RTC again to consider that
Bernardo had waived her right to present defense evidence.54chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Bernardo again moved for reconsideration on the ground that it was the first time she and her counsel were absent at the same time.55 Despite this hollow
excuse, the RTC granted the motion in the spirit of compassionate justice and gave Bernardo the final opportunity to present her defense evidence.56 The
parties mutually agreed to set the hearing for initial presentation of defense evidence on April 18, 1996.57chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Bernardo again failed to appear during the scheduled April 18, 1996 hearing.58 Although Bernardo did not offer any excuse for this absence,59 RTC
exercised compassion and permitted Bernardo to testify, as she did in fact testify, on May 9, 1996,60 - one (1) year and eight (8) months after the
prosecution had rested its case. At the conclusion of the cross-examination, the parties mutually agreed to adjourn the hearing for September 4, 1996, for
redirect examination.61
Bernardo's counsel, however, failed to appear during the scheduled September 4, 1996 hearing, prompting the RTC to consider her failure as a waiver on
her part to present additional evidence.62 Bernardo moved for reconsideration; she claimed that her counsel had to attend another hearing in a different
sala. Why Bernardo's counsel accepted another engagement on the same day, which was in conflict with the RTC's hearing dates, was never properly
explained. Nonetheless, the RTC granted the motion to give her the last chance to complete the presentation of evidence on April 3, 17, and 22, 1997.63c
Despite the RTC's warning, Bernardo and her counsel again failed to appear at the April 3,1997 hearing.64 Instead, they filed a motion to reset because
Bernardo's counsel was to attend a wedding in the United States of America.65 This time, the RTC, mindful that there should be a limit to postponements,
ordered the case submitted for decision sans the presentation of evidence from the defense.66
Under these facts, the RTC was clearly driven by Bernardo and her counsel's repeated failure, without justifiable reason, to appear at the scheduled hearing
dates.67 The order considering Bernardo's right to present evidence waived, followed as a necessary and unavoidable consequence. As we held in People v.
Angco:
His failure to appear with counsel of his choice at the hearing of the case, notwithstanding repeated postponements and warnings that failure to so appear
would be deemed a waiver to present evidence in his defense, and that the case would be deemed submitted for judgment upon the evidence presented by
the prosecution, was sufficient legal justification for the trial court to proceed and render judgment upon the evidence before it.
The records show that the RTC leniently granted repeated continuances to safeguard Bernardo's rights as an accused. But Bernardo obviously did not
recognize the need for expeditious handling of her case and was already trifling with judicial process.69
Bernardo failed to adduce sufficient evidence of payment; thus she is civilly liable.
Bernardo's death pending appeal converted the present action to purely an enforcement of the civil liability incurred. In particular, the focal issue in the
present petition is no longer Bernardo's criminal liability for violation of B.P. 22 but her civil liability, which is principally based on contract and the
corresponding damage Bumanglag suffered due to Bernardo's failure to pay. Under these circumstances, Bernardo's B.P. 22 defense (that the checks were
presented beyond the 90-day period and that she never received a notice of dishonor) were no longer relevant.
Jurisprudence tells us that one who pleads payment carries the burden of proving it.70 Indeed, once the existence of an indebtedness is established by
evidence, the burden of showing with legal certainty that the obligation has been discharged by payment rests with the debtor.71 After the debtor
introduces evidence of payment, the burden of going forward with the evidence - as distinct from the general burden of proof - again shifts to the creditor,
who then labors under a duty to produce evidence to show nonpayment.72
In the present case, the existence of the obligation to pay has sufficiently been established through the promissory note73 and the checks74 submitted in
evidence. Notably, Bernardo even confirmed due execution of these instruments during her testimony. During the offer of Bernardo's testimony, her counsel
stated:
ATTY. MIRAVITE:
With the court's permission. Your Honor, we are presenting the witness for the following purposes: to x x x show that she borrowed money from
[Bumanglag] x x x and that in 1991 her total obligation reached Php460,000.000; x x x that all the checks issued by the accused were only as proof of her
obligation to the private complainant x x x.75 [emphasis supplied]chanrobleslaw
In the course of Bernardo's testimony, she even confirmed the issuance of the checks and promissory note. In particular, she stated:
ATTY. MIRAVITE:
Q: I am showing to you this promissory note marked as Exhibit H for the prosecution and Exhibit 2 for the defense. There appears a signature over the name
Paz T. Bernardo at the middle portion thereof, do you know whose signature is that?
A: It is mine sir.
xxxx
Q: This document, Madame Witness, mentions of your loan obligations of Php 460,000.00. Can you tell us, Madame Witness, what is covered by this
promissory note?
xxxx
A: The promissory note covers the principal loan, plus interest and penalties, sir.
Q: So, are you saying that this promissory note of Php 460,000.00 was your total obligation as of June 1991 and includes all other charges?
A: Yes, sir.
x xxx
Q: Madam Witness, can you remember when you issued the checks subject of these cases?
A: It was on June 20, 1991, sir.76chanrobleslaw
Bernardo's principal defense rests on the supposition that she had settled the obligation, which settlement led Bumanglag to return to her the title to the
property.77 A meticulous review, of the records, however, firmly dissuades us from believing Bernardo's bare allegation.
At the outset, the handwritten note78 evidencing that transaction, which was submitted by the prosecution in evidence, states that:
10/28/91
Received original copy of Title No. T-151841 in the name of Mapalad Bernardo for loan purposes to pay Mrs. Carmencita Bumanglag
Sgd
Paz T. Bernardo
10/28/91
The document evidencing this transaction strongly suggests that she asked for the title from Bumanglag to obtain another loan whose proceeds she would
use to pay Bumanglag. Notably, the defense even admitted the genuineness of Bernardo's signature in this document.79 When Bernardo therefore failed to
fulfill her promise to pay, Bumanglag had to request for checks to secure the obligation, which checks were eventually dishonored upon presentment.
Under the circumstances, we find that Bernardo's claim of payment was nothing more than an allegation unsupported by adequate proof. If indeed there
had been payment, she should have redeemed or taken back the checks and the promissory note, in the ordinary course of business.80 Instead, the checks
and the promissory note remained in the possession of Bumanglag, who had to demand the satisfaction of Bernardo's obligation when the checks became
due and were subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank. Bumanglag's possession of the promissory note, coupled with the dishonored checks, strongly
buttresses her claim that Bernardo's obligation had not been extinguished.81
We thus find that the weight of evidence preponderates in favor of Bumanglag's position that Bernardo has not yet settled her
obligation.82chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the August 31, 2007 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.' CR No. 28721 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The
heirs of Paz T. Bernardo are ordered to pay the amount of P460,000.00, with interest at 12% per annum from the time of the institution of criminal charges
in court.
The total amount adjudged shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum on the balance and interest due, from the finality of this Decision until fully paid.
The fine in the amount of P460,000.00 is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.chanrobles
3. Standard Insurance Co, Inc. v. Cuaresma, G.R. No. 200055, September 10, 2014.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 200055, September 10, 2014
STANDARD INSURANCE CO., INC., Petitioner, v. ARNOLD CUARESMA AND JERRY B. CUARESMA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision1 and Resolution,2
dated June 22, 2011 and January 16, 2012, respectively, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 117785.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On March 20, 2004, two vehicles, one driven by Jefferson Cham and insured with petitioner Standard Insurance Co., Inc., and the other owned by
respondent Arnold Cuaresma and driven by respondent Jerry B. Cuaresma, figured in an accident at North Avenue, Quezon City.3 Consequently, the damage
on the vehicle driven by Cham was repaired, the cost of which was borne by petitioner. Cham then executed a Release of Claim in favor of petitioner
subrogating the latter to all his rights to recover on all claims, demands, and rights of action on account of the loss, damage, or injury sustained as a
consequence of the accident from any person liable thereto.4 Based on said document, petitioner, in its letter5 dated April 15, 2004 addressed to
respondents, demanded the payment of the sum spent on repairing the vehicle driven by Cham.
Meanwhile, on August 10, 2004, an Information6 was filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City charging Cham of the crime of Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property docketed as Criminal Case No. 020256. During the pendency thereof, on March 17, 2008, petitioner, claiming
that respondents collided with Cham's vehicle in a reckless and imprudent manner, filed a Complaint7 for Sum of Money with the MeTC of Manila against
respondents, docketed as Civil Case No. 184854, demanding payment of the sum of P256,643.26 representing the cost of repairs on Cham's vehicle.
Respondents, however, were declared in default on December 12, 2008 for failure to file their responsive pleading to petitioner's Complaint despite several
opportunities granted by the MeTC of Manila.8 As a result, petitioner was allowed to present its evidence exparte.
Finding that petitioner sufficiently proved its claims by preponderance of evidence, the MeTC ruled in favor of petitioner in its Decision9 dated January 8,
2010, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW THEREOF, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendants Arnold Cuaresma and Jerry B. Cuaresma, jointly and severally, to:
1. Pay plaintiff the sum of TWO HUNDRED FIFTY-SIX THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FORTY-THREE PESOS AND TWENTY-SIX CENTAVOS (Php256,643.26) with
interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of the filing of the complaint;
2. Pay plaintiff the sum of Php 10,000.00 as and for attorney's fees;
3. Pay the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.
The RTC, however, reversed the ruling of the MeTC in its Decision10 dated September 17, 2010. Contrary to the findings of the MeTC, the RTC found that not
only were there inconsistencies in the evidence presented by petitioner as to its corporate identity as well as the amount of the supposed cost of
indemnification, but petitioner also failed to sufficiently prove that the proximate cause of the damage incurred by Cham's vehicle was respondents' fault or
negligence. In addition, on respondents' argument that the instant case must be consolidated with the prior criminal suit they filed against Cham, the RTC
disagreed and ruled that criminal and civil cases can proceed independently.11cralawlawlibrary
On appeal, the CA likewise found that the evidence proffered by petitioner is insufficient to support its averment of negligence. Consequently, it affirmed
the RTC's Decision and further denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution12 dated January 16, 2012.
Hence, the present petition.
Petitioner essentially invokes the following ground to support its petition:y
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT THAT PETITIONER'S EVIDENCE, SPECIFICALLY THE
TESTIMONY OF ITS ASSURED, JEFFERSON CHAM AND ITS ASSISTANT VICE-PRESIDENT FOR CLAIMS, CLETO D. OBELLO, JR., AS WELL AS THE TRAFFIC
ACCIDENT REPORT, ARE INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE ITS CLAIMS BY THE REQUIRED QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE.
Petitioner contends that the testimonies of its witnesses Cham and Obello sufficiently prove its claims, since the former has personal knowledge on the
events that transpired during the vehicular accident and the latter was in a position to prove the amount incurred for the repair of the damages on Cham's
vehicle. It also argues that its failure to present SPO2 Felicisimo V. Cuaresma, the police investigator who prepared the traffic accident report submitted in
evidence, is not fatal to its cause of action.
In their Comment,13 respondents counter that the bare allegations of Cham on negligence cannot be deemed sufficient to prove petitioner's claim. They
also claim that in order for the traffic accident report to obtain probative value, the police officer who prepared it must be identified in court. On a
procedural matter, respondents allege that petitioner, in failing to disclose the pendency of the criminal suit against its assured Cham, is guilty of forum
shopping.
Prefatorily, We address the issue of forum shopping in saying that the essence of forum shopping is the filing by a party against whom an adverse judgment
has been rendered in one forum, seeking another and possibly a favorable opinion in another suit other than by appeal or special civil action for
certiorari.14 It is the act of filing multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively for the purpose
of obtaining a favorable judgment.15 However, as the RTC already mentioned, there exists no forum shopping herein for the filing of the instant suit is
expressly allowed to proceed independently of the criminal action filed by respondents.
In the similar case of Casupanan v. Laroya,16 wherein as a result of a vehicular accident, a party involved therein filed a criminal case for reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property against the other party, who, in turn, filed a civil suit against the party instituting the criminal action, We held
that the party filing the separate civil action cannot be liable for forum shopping in the following wise:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxx However, there is no forum shopping in the instant case because the law and the rules expressly allow the filing of a separate civil action which can
proceed independently of the criminal action.
Laroya filed the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property based on the Revised Penal Code, while Casupanan and Capitulo filed
the civil action for damages based on Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Although these two actions arose from the same act or omission, they have different
causes of action. The criminal case is based on culpa criminal punishable under the Revised Penal Code, while the civil case is based on culpa aquiliana
actionable under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code. These articles on culpa aquiliana read:
"Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence
under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant."
Any aggrieved person can invoke these articles provided he proves, by preponderance of evidence, that he has suffered damage because of the fault or
negligence of another. Either the private complainant or the accused can file a separate civil action under these articles. There is nothing in the law or rules
that state only the private complainant in a criminal case may invoke these articles.
Moreover, paragraph 6, Section 1, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure ("2000 Rules" for brevity) expressly requires the accused to litigate his
counterclaim in a separate civil action, to wit:
"SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - (a) x x x.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been the
subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action." (Italics supplied)
Since the present Rules require the accused in a criminal action to file his counterclaim in a separate civil action, there can be no forum-shopping if the
accused files such separate civil action.
xxxx
The crucial question now is whether Casupanan and Capitulo, who are not the offended parties in the criminal case, can file a separate civil action against
the offended party in the criminal case. Section 3, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules provides as follows:
"SEC 3. When civil action may proceed independently. - In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the
independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance
of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action." (Italics
supplied)
xxxx
There is no question that the offended party in the criminal action can file an independent civil action for quasi-delict against the accused. Section 3 of the
present Rule 111 expressly states that the "offended party" may bring such an action but the "offended party" may not recover damages twice for the same
act or omission charged in the criminal action. Clearly, Section 3 of Rule 111 refers to the offended party in the criminal action, not to the accused.
Casupanan and Capitulo, however, invoke the ruling in Cabaero vs. Cantos12 where the Court held that the accused therein could validly institute a separate
civil action for quasi-delict against the private complainant in the criminal case. In Cabaero, the accused in the criminal case filed his Answer with
Counterclaim for malicious prosecution. At that time, the Court noted the "absence of clear-cut rules governing the prosecution on impliedly instituted civil
actions and the necessary consequences and implications thereof." Thus, the Court ruled that the trial court should confine itself to the criminal aspect of
the case and disregard any counterclaim for civil liability. The Court further ruled that the accused may file a separate civil case against the offended party
"after the criminal case is terminated and/or in accordance with the new Rules which may be promulgated." The Court explained that a cross-claim,
counterclaim or third-party complaint on the civil aspect will only unnecessarily complicate the proceedings and delay the resolution of the criminal case.
Paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 was incorporated in the 2000 Rules precisely to address the lacuna mentioned in Cabaero. Under this
provision, the accused is barred from filing a counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint in the criminal case. However, the same provision states that
"any cause of action which could have been the subject (of the counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint) may be litigated in a separate civil
action." The present Rule 111 mandates the accused to file his counterclaim in a separate civil action which shall proceed independently of the criminal
action, even as the civil action of the offended party is litigated in the criminal action.17chanrobleslaw
On the basis of the foregoing decision, therefore, petitioner, who is subrogated to the rights of Cham, the accused in the criminal case instituted by
respondents, cannot be guilty of forum shopping for its separate civil action is expressly allowed to proceed independently of the criminal action involved
herein.
It must be noted, however, that notwithstanding the allowance of the instant petition to proceed independently of the criminal action, the claims of
petitioner cannot be sustained in the absence of satisfactory evidence proving its right thereto.
In civil cases, basic is the rule that the party making allegations has the burden of proving them by a preponderance of evidence. He must rely on the
strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defense offered by his opponent. This principle equally holds true, even if the defendant
had not been given the opportunity to present evidence because of a default order.
Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the
term "greater weight of the evidence" or "greater weight of the credible evidence." It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief
than that which is offered in opposition thereto.19 The reason for this is that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof.
Mere allegations, therefore, cannot be deemed as evidence.
To prove the allegations in its complaint, herein petitioner presented testimonies of its assured and its Assistant Vice-President, the Traffic Accident
Investigation Report, and documents evidencing the assured's insurance policy with petitioner as well as the payment of repair expenses. As aptly ruled by
the RTC and the CA, however, the evidence presented by petitioner failed to preponderantly establish negligence on the part of the respondents.
While petitioner may have proven the fact of its payment of the expenses for the repair of Cham's vehicle through the testimony of its Assistant Vice-
President and other supporting receipts and documents, it fell short in proving that the damage caused on said vehicle was due to the fault of the
respondents.
As correctly held by the RTC and the CA, the Traffic Accident Investigation Report21 cannot be given probative weight. Section 44 of Rule 130 provides:
SEC. 44. Entries in official records - Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
Moreover, for the Traffic Accident Investigation Report to be admissible as prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated, the following requisites must be
present:
x x x (a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it was made by the public officer in the
performance of his duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the public officer or other person had
sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through official information.22chanrobleslaw
Regrettably, in this case, petitioner failed to prove the third requisite cited above. As correctly noted by the courts below, while the Traffic Accident
Investigation Report was exhibited as evidence, the investigating officer who prepared the same was not presented in court to testify that he had sufficient
knowledge of the facts therein stated, and that he acquired them personally or through official information.23 Neither was there any explanation as to why
such officer was not presented. We cannot simply assume, in the absence of proof, that the account of the incident stated in the report was based on the
personal knowledge of the investigating officer who prepared it
Thus, while petitioner presented its assured to testify on the events that transpired during the vehicular collision, his lone testimony, unsupported by other
preponderant evidence, fails to sufficiently establish petitioner's claim that respondents' negligence was, indeed, the proximate cause of the damage
sustained by Cham's vehicle.
It bears stressing, as the courts below have explained, that subrogation is ultimately the substitution of one person in the place of another with reference to
a lawful claim or right, so that he who is substituted succeeds to the rights of the other in relation to a debt or claim, including its remedies or securities. The
rights to which the subrogee succeeds are the same as, but not greater than, those of the person for whom he is substituted, that is, he cannot acquire any
claim, security or remedy the subrogor did not have. In other words, a subrogee cannot succeed to a right not possessed by the subrogor. A subrogee, in
effect, steps into the shoes of the insured and can recover only if the insured likewise could have recovered.
Hence, before We can sustain petitioner's argument that its right to be reimbursed for the repair is by operation of law upon mere proof of payment of the
insurance claim, a determination of the liability of respondents vis-a-viz the assured in the vehicular collision must first be made, for petitioner cannot
acquire any claim, security or remedy its assured did not have. Considering, however, the insufficiency of preponderant evidence attributing negligence on
respondents resulting in the damage sustained by the assured's vehicle, it will be unfair to hold respondents liable for the same, payment by petitioner of its
costs, notwithstanding.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution, dated June 22, 2011 and January 16, 2012, respectively, of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 117785 are hereby AFFIRMED.
4. Heirs of Simon v. Chan, G.R. No. 157547, February 23, 2011.
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
HEIRS OF EDUARDO
SIMON,
Petitioners,
-versus -
ELVIN* CHAN AND THE COURT OF APPEALS,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 157547
Promulgated:
February 23, 2011
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
There is no independent civil action to recover the civil liability arising from the issuance of an unfunded check prohibited and punished under Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22).
Antecedents
On July 11, 1997, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MeTC) an information charging the late Eduardo
Simon (Simon) with a violation of BP 22, docketed as Criminal Case No. 275381 entitled People v. Eduardo Simon. The accusatory portion reads:
That sometime in December 1996 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw
and issue to Elvin Chan to apply on account or for value Landbank Check No. 0007280 dated December 26, 1996 payable to cash in the amount of
P336,000.00 said accused well knowing that at the time of issue she/he/they did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of
such check in full upon its presentment, which check when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof was subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for Account Closed and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay said Elvin Chan the amount of
the check or to make arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.
CONTRARY TO LAW. [1]
More than three years later, or on August 3, 2000, respondent Elvin Chan commenced in the MeTC in Pasay City a civil action for the collection of the
principal amount of P336,000.00, coupled with an application for a writ of preliminary attachment (docketed as Civil Case No. 915-00).[2] He alleged in his
complaint the following:
xxx
2. Sometime in December 1996 defendant employing fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation encashed a check dated December 26, 1996 in the amount of
P336,000.00 to the plaintiff assuring the latter that the check is duly funded and that he had an existing account with the Land Bank of the Philippines, xerox
copy of the said check is hereto attached as Annex A;
3. However, when said check was presented for payment the same was dishonored on the ground that the account of the defendant with the Land Bank of
the Philippines has been closed contrary to his representation that he has an existing account with the said bank and that the said check was duly funded
and will be honored when presented for payment;
4. Demands had been made to the defendant for him to make good the payment of the value of the check, xerox copy of the letter of demand is hereto
attached as Annex B, but despite such demand defendant refused and continues to refuse to comply with plaintiffs valid demand;
5. Due to the unlawful failure of the defendant to comply with the plaintiffs valid demands, plaintiff has been compelled to retain the services of counsel for
which he agreed to pay as reasonable attorneys fees the amount of P50,000.00 plus additional amount of P2,000.00 per appearance.
ALLEGATION IN SUPPORT OF PRAYER
FOR PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT
6. The defendant as previously alleged has been guilty of fraud in contracting the obligation upon which this action is brought and that there is no sufficient
security for the claims sought in this action which fraud consist in the misrepresentation by the defendant that he has an existing account and sufficient
funds to cover the check when in fact his account was already closed at the time he issued a check;
7. That the plaintiff has a sufficient cause of action and this action is one which falls under Section 1, sub-paragraph (d), Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of
Court of the Philippines and the amount due the plaintiff is as much as the sum for which the plaintiff seeks the writ of preliminary attachment;
8. That the plaintiff is willing and able to post a bond conditioned upon the payment of damages should it be finally found out that the plaintiff is not
entitled to the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.[3]
On August 9, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City issued a writ of preliminary attachment, which was implemented on August 17, 2000 through the sheriff
attaching a Nissan vehicle of Simon.[4]
On August 17, 2000, Simon filed an urgent motion to dismiss with application to charge plaintiffs attachment bond for damages,[5] pertinently averring:
xxx
On the ground of litis pendentia, that is, as a consequence of the pendency of another action between the instant parties for the same cause before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch X (10) entitled People of the Philippines vs. Eduardo Simon, docketed thereat as Criminal Case No. 275381-CR,
the instant action is dismissable under Section 1, (e), Rule 16, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, xxx
xxx
While the instant case is civil in nature and character as contradistinguished from the said Criminal Case No. 915-00 in the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Manila, Branch X (10), the basis of the instant civil action is the herein plaintiffs criminal complaint against defendant arising from a charge of violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 as a consequence of the alleged dishonor in plaintiffs hands upon presentment for payment with drawee bank a Land Bank Check
No. 0007280 dated December 26, 1996 in the amount of P336,000- drawn allegedly issued to plaintiff by defendant who is the accused in said case, a
photocopy of the Criminal information filed by the Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila on June 11, 1997 hereto attached and made integral part hereof as
Annex 1.
It is our understanding of the law and the rules, that, when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it
separately xxx.
On August 29, 2000, Chan opposed Simons urgent motion to dismiss with application to charge plaintiffs attachment bond for damages, stating:
1. The sole ground upon which defendant seeks to dismiss plaintiffs complaint is the alleged pendency of another action between the same parties for the
same cause, contending among others that the pendency of Criminal Case No. 275381-CR entitled People of the Philippines vs. Eduardo Simon renders this
case dismissable;
2. The defendant further contends that under Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court, the filing of the criminal action, the civil action for recovery
of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action which the plaintiff does not contest; however, it is the
submission of the plaintiff that an implied reservation of the right to file a civil action has already been made, first, by the fact that the information for
violation of B.P. 22 in Criminal Case No. 2753841 does not at all make any allegation of damages suffered by the plaintiff nor is there any claim for recovery
of damages; on top of this the plaintiff as private complainant in the criminal case, during the presentation of the prosecution evidence was not represented
at all by a private prosecutor such that no evidence has been adduced by the prosecution on the criminal case to prove damages; all of these we respectfully
submit demonstrate an effective implied reservation of the right of the plaintiff to file a separate civil action for damages;
3. The defendant relies on Section 3 sub-paragraph (a) Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court which mandates that after a criminal action has been
commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action; however, the defendant overlooks and
conveniently failed to consider that under Section 2, Rule 111 which provides as follows:
In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct
from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of criminal case provided the right is reserved as required in the
preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
In as much as the case is one that falls under Art. 33 of the Civil Code of the Philippines as it is based on fraud, this action therefore may be prosecuted
independently of the criminal action;
4. In fact we would even venture to state that even without any reservation at all of the right to file a separate civil action still the plaintiff is authorized to
file this instant case because the plaintiff seeks to enforce an obligation which the defendant owes to the plaintiff by virtue of the negotiable instruments
law. The plaintiff in this case sued the defendant to enforce his liability as drawer in favor of the plaintiff as payee of the check. Assuming the allegation of
the defendant of the alleged circumstances relative to the issuance of the check, still when he delivered the check payable to bearer to that certain Pedro
Domingo, as it was payable to cash, the same may be negotiated by delivery by who ever was the bearer of the check and such negotiation was valid and
effective against the drawer;
5. Indeed, assuming as true the allegations of the defendant regarding the circumstances relative to the issuance of the check it would be entirely impossible
for the plaintiff to have been aware that such check was intended only for a definite person and was not negotiable considering that the said check was
payable to bearer and was not even crossed;
6. We contend that what cannot be prosecuted separate and apart from the criminal case without a reservation is a civil action arising from the criminal
offense charged. However, in this instant case since the liability of the defendant are imposed and the rights of the plaintiff are created by the negotiable
instruments law, even without any reservation at all this instant action may still be prosecuted;
7. Having this shown, the merits of plaintiffs complaint the application for damages against the bond is totally without any legal support and perforce should
be dismissed outright.[6]
On October 23, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City granted Simons urgent motion to dismiss with application to charge plaintiffs attachment bond for damages,[7]
dismissing the complaint of Chan because:
xxx
After study of the arguments of the parties, the court resolves to GRANT the Motion to Dismiss and the application to charge plaintiffs bond for damages.
For litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, the following requisites must concur: (a) identity of parties or at least such as to represent
the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same acts; and (c) the identity in the
two (2) cases should be such that the judgment, which may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the
other. xxx
A close perusal of the herein complaint denominated as Sum of Money and the criminal case for violation of BP Blg. 22 would readily show that the parties
are not only identical but also the cause of action being asserted, which is the recovery of the value of Landbank Check No. 0007280 in the amount of
P336,000.00. In both civil and criminal cases, the rights asserted and relief prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts, are identical.
Plaintiffs claim that there is an effective implied waiver of his right to pursue this civil case owing to the fact that there was no allegation of damages in BP
Blg. 22 case and that there was no private prosecutor during the presentation of prosecution evidence is unmeritorious. It is basic that when a complaint or
criminal Information is filed, even without any allegation of damages and the intention to prove and claim them, the offended party has the right to prove
and claim for them, unless a waiver or reservation is made or unless in the meantime, the offended party has instituted a separate civil action. xxx The over-
all import of the said provision conveys that the waiver which includes indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages arising under Articles 32, 33,
and 34 of the Civil Code must be both clear and express. And this must be logically so as the primordial objective of the Rule is to prevent the offended party
from recovering damages twice for the same act or omission of the accused.
Indeed, the evidence discloses that the plaintiff did not waive or made a reservation as to his right to pursue the civil branch of the criminal case for
violation of BP Blg. 22 against the defendant herein. To the considered view of this court, the filing of the instant complaint for sum of money is indeed
legally barred. The right to institute a separate civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances
affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation. xxx
Even assuming the correctness of the plaintiffs submission that the herein case for sum of money is one based on fraud and hence falling under Article 33 of
the Civil Code, still prior reservation is required by the Rules, to wit:
In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct
from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of criminal case provided the right is reserved as required in the
preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court resolves to:
1. Dismiss the instant complaint on the ground of litis pendentia;
2. Dissolve/Lift the Writ of Attachment issued by this court on August 14, 2000;
3. Charge the plaintiffs bond the amount of P336,000.00 in favor of the defendant for the damages sustained by the latter by virtue of the
implementation of the writ of attachment;
4. Direct the Branch Sheriff of this Court to RESTORE with utmost dispatch to the defendants physical possession the vehicle seized from him on August
16, 2000; and
5. Direct the plaintiff to pay the defendant the sum of P5,000.00 by way of attorneys fees.
SO ORDERED.
Chans motion for reconsideration was denied on December 20, 2000,[8] viz:
Considering that the plaintiffs arguments appear to be a mere repetition of his previous submissions, and which submissions this court have already passed
upon; and taking into account the inapplicability of the ratio decidendi in the Tactaquin vs. Palileo case which the plaintiff cited as clearly in that case, the
plaintiff therein expressly made a reservation to file a separate civil action, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
On July 31, 2001, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Pasay City upheld the dismissal of Chans complaint, disposing:[9]
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
On September 26, 2001, Chan appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) by petition for review,[10] challenging the propriety of the dismissal of his complaint on
the ground of litis pendentia.
In his comment, [11] Simon countered that Chan was guilty of bad faith and malice in prosecuting his alleged civil claim twice in a manner that caused him
(Simon) utter embarrassment and emotional sufferings; and that the dismissal of the civil case because of the valid ground of litis pendentia based on
Section 1 (e), Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was warranted.
On June 25, 2002, the CA promulgated its assailed decision,[12] overturning the RTC, viz:
xxx
As a general rule, an offense causes two (2) classes of injuries. The first is the social injury produced by the criminal act which is sought to be repaired
through the imposition of the corresponding penalty, and the second is the personal injury caused to the victim of the crime which injury is sought to be
compensated through indemnity which is also civil in nature. Thus, every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
The offended party may prove the civil liability of an accused arising from the commission of the offense in the criminal case since the civil action is either
deemed instituted with the criminal action or is separately instituted.
Rule 111, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which became effective on December 1, 2000, provides that:
(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with
the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institute the civil action prior to the
criminal action.
Rule 111, Section 2 further states:
After the criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment has been entered in the
criminal action.
However, with respect to civil actions for recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code arising from the same act or omission,
the rule has been changed.
In DMPI Employees Credit Association vs. Velez, the Supreme Court pronounced that only the civil liability arising from the offense charged is deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action
prior to the criminal action. Speaking through Justice Pardo, the Supreme Court held:
There is no more need for a reservation of the right to file the independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The reservation and waiver referred to refers only to the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense charged. This does not
include recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission which may be
prosecuted separately without a reservation.
Rule 111, Section 3 reads:
Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently. In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the
independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance
of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.
The changes in the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure pertaining to independent civil actions which became effective on December 1, 2000 are applicable
to this case.
Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. There are no vested rights in the rules of
procedure. xxx
Thus, Civil Case No. CV-94-124, an independent civil action for damages on account of the fraud committed against respondent Villegas under Article 33 of
the Civil Code, may proceed independently even if there was no reservation as to its filing.
It must be pointed that the abovecited case is similar with the instant suit. The complaint was also brought on allegation of fraud under Article 33 of the Civil
Code and committed by the respondent in the issuance of the check which later bounced. It was filed before the trial court, despite the pendency of the
criminal case for violation of BP 22 against the respondent. While it may be true that the changes in the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure pertaining to
independent civil action became effective on December 1, 2000, the same may be given retroactive application and may be made to apply to the case at
bench, since procedural rules may be given retroactive application. There are no vested rights in the rules of procedure.
In view of the ruling on the first assigned error, it is therefore an error to adjudge damages in favor of the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated July 13, 2001 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 108 affirming the
dismissal of the complaint filed by petitioner is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is hereby REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
On March 14, 2003, the CA denied Simons motion for reconsideration.[13]
Hence, this appeal, in which the petitioners submit that the CA erroneously premised its decision on the assessment that the civil case was an independent
civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code; that the CAs reliance on the ruling in DMPI Employees Credit Cooperative Inc. v. Velez[14]
stretched the meaning and intent of the ruling, and was contrary to Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure; that this case was a
simple collection suit for a sum of money, precluding the application of Section 3 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.[15]
In his comment,[16] Chan counters that the petition for review should be denied because the petitioners used the wrong mode of appeal; that his cause of
action, being based on fraud, was an independent civil action; and that the appearance of a private prosecutor in the criminal case did not preclude the
filing of his separate civil action.
Issue
The lone issue is whether or not Chans civil action to recover the amount of the unfunded check (Civil Case No. 915-00) was an independent civil action.
Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
A
Applicable Law and Jurisprudence on the
Propriety of filing a separate civil action based on BP 22
The Supreme Court has settled the issue of whether or not a violation of BP 22 can give rise to civil liability in Banal v. Judge Tadeo, Jr.,[17] holding:
xxx
Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides:
Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Regardless, therefore, of whether or not a special law so provides, indemnification of the offended party may be had on account of the damage, loss or
injury directly suffered as a consequence of the wrongful act of another. The indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part of the
penalty imposed by law for the commission of a crime (Quemel v. Court of Appeals, 22 SCRA 44, citing Bagtas v. Director of Prisons, 84 Phil 692). Every crime
gives rise to a penal or criminal action for the punishment of the guilty party, and also to civil action for the restitution of the thing, repair of the damage,
and indemnification for the losses (United States v. Bernardo, 19 Phil 265).
xxx
Civil liability to the offended party cannot thus be denied. The payee of the check is entitled to receive the payment of money for which the worthless check
was issued. Having been caused the damage, she is entitled to recompense.
Surely, it could not have been the intendment of the framers of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 to leave the offended private party defrauded and empty-handed by
excluding the civil liability of the offender, giving her only the remedy, which in many cases results in a Pyrrhic victory, of having to file a separate civil suit. To
do so may leave the offended party unable to recover even the face value of the check due her, thereby unjustly enriching the errant drawer at the expense
of the payee. The protection which the law seeks to provide would, therefore, be brought to naught.
xxx
However, there is no independent civil action to recover the value of a bouncing check issued in contravention of BP 22. This is clear from Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court, effective December 1, 2000, which relevantly provides:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the
offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under
circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary damages without specifying
the amount thereof in the complaint or information, the filing fees therefor shall constitute a first lien on the judgment awarding such damages.
Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the complaint or information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended
party upon the filing thereof in court.
Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be required for actual damages.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been the
subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action. (1a)
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil
action separately shall be allowed.[18]
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved,
which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate
or exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay the filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these
damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application
with the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of the Rule governing
consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.
Section 3. When civil action may proceed independently. In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the
independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance
of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.
The aforequoted provisions of the Rules of Court, even if not yet in effect when Chan commenced Civil Case No. 915-00 on August 3, 2000, are nonetheless
applicable. It is axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel adversely affected, nor is it
constitutionally objectionable. The reason is simply that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, or arise from, procedural laws.[19] Any new rules
may validly be made to apply to cases pending at the time of their promulgation, considering that no party to an action has a vested right in the rules of
procedure,[20] except that in criminal cases, the changes do not retroactively apply if they permit or require a lesser quantum of evidence to convict than
what is required at the time of the commission of the offenses, because such retroactivity would be unconstitutional for being ex post facto under the
Constitution.[21]
Moreover, the application of the rule would not be precluded by the violation of any assumed vested right, because the new rule was adopted from
Supreme Court Circular 57-97 that took effect on November 1, 1997.
Supreme Court Circular 57-97 states:
Any provision of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the following rules and guidelines shall henceforth be observed in the filing and
prosecution of all criminal cases under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 which penalizes the making or drawing and issuance of a check without funds or credit:
1. The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to necessarily include the corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file
such civil action separately shall be allowed or recognized.[22]
2. Upon the filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing fees based upon the amount of the check
involved which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed, in accordance with the schedule of fees in Section 7 (a) and Section 8 (a), Rule 141 of the
Rules of Court as last amended by Administrative Circular No. 11-94 effective August 1, 1994. Where the offended party further seeks to enforce against the
accused civil liability by way of liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, he shall pay the corresponding filing fees therefor based on
the amounts thereof as alleged either in the complaint or information. If not so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently awarded by the court,
the amount of such fees shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.
3. Where the civil action has heretofore been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon
application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with the pertinent
procedure outlined in Section 2 (a) of Rule 111 governing the proceedings in the actions as thus consolidated.
4. This Circular shall be published in two (2) newspapers of general circulation and shall take effect on November 1, 1997.
The reasons for issuing Circular 57-97 were amply explained in Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corporation v. Asia Dynamic Electrix Corporation,[23] thus:
xxx
We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that upon filing of the criminal cases for violation of B.P. 22, the civil action for the recovery of the amount
of the checks was also impliedly instituted under Section 1(b) of Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Under the present revised Rules, the
criminal action for violation of B.P. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. The reservation to file a separate civil action is no longer
needed. The Rules provide:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.
(a) x x x
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil
action separately shall be allowed.
To repeat, Chans separate civil action to recover the amount of the check involved in the prosecution for the violation of BP 22 could not be independently
maintained under both Supreme Court Circular 57-97 and the aforequoted provisions of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, notwithstanding the allegations of
fraud and deceit.
B
Aptness of the dismissal of the civil action
on the ground of litis pendentia
Did the pendency of the civil action in the MeTC in Manila (as the civil aspect in Criminal Case No. 275381) bar the filing of Civil Case No. 915-00 in the MeTC
in Pasay City on the ground of litis pendentia?
For litis pendentia to be successfully invoked as a bar to an action, the concurrence of the following requisites is necessary, namely: (a) there must be
identity of parties or at least such as represent the same interest in both actions; (b) there must be identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the
reliefs being founded on the same facts; and, (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in one would,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in respect of the other. Absent the first two requisites, the possibility of the existence of the
third becomes nil.[28]
A perusal of Civil Case No. 01-0033 and Criminal Case No. 275381 ineluctably shows that all the elements of litis pendentia are attendant. First of all, the
parties in the civil action involved in Criminal Case No. 275381 and in Civil Case No. 915-00, that is, Chan and Simon, are the same. Secondly, the information
in Criminal Case No. 275381 and the complaint in Civil Case No. 915-00 both alleged that Simon had issued Landbank Check No. 0007280 worth
P336,000.00 payable to cash, thereby indicating that the rights asserted and the reliefs prayed for, as well as the facts upon which the reliefs sought were
founded, were identical in all respects. And, thirdly, any judgment rendered in one case would necessarily bar the other by res judicata; otherwise, Chan
would be recovering twice upon the same claim.
It is clear, therefore, that the MeTC in Pasay City properly dismissed Civil Case No. 915-00 on the ground of litis pendentia through its decision dated October
23, 2000; and that the RTC in Pasay City did not err in affirming the MeTC.
WHEREFORE, we grant the petition for review on certiorari, and, accordingly, we reverse and set aside the decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals on
June 25, 2002. We reinstate the decision rendered on October 23, 2000 by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 45, in Pasay City.

Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved, Costs of suit to be paid by the respondent.
which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate
or exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay additional filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any SO ORDERED.
of these damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the judgment. Sec. 21(a), A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, August 16, 2004 (Revision of Rule 141, Revised Rules of Court Legal Fees).
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application
with the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing SECTION 2. When Separate Civil Action Is Suspended.
consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.
The foregoing rule was adopted from Circular No. 57-97 of this Court. It specifically states that the criminal action for violation of B.P. 22 shall be deemed to 1. Co v. Muoz, Jr., G.R. No. 181986, December 4, 2013.
include the corresponding civil action. It also requires the complainant to pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved. Generally, no
filing fees are required for criminal cases, but because of the inclusion of the civil action in complaints for violation of B.P. 22, the Rules require the payment Republic of the Philippines
of docket fees upon the filing of the complaint. This rule was enacted to help declog court dockets which are filled with B.P. 22 cases as creditors actually SUPREME COURT
use the courts as collectors. Because ordinarily no filing fee is charged in criminal cases for actual damages, the payee uses the intimidating effect of a Manila
criminal charge to collect his credit gratis and sometimes, upon being paid, the trial court is not even informed thereof. The inclusion of the civil action in SECOND DIVISION
the criminal case is expected to significantly lower the number of cases filed before the courts for collection based on dishonored checks. It is also expected G.R. No. 181986 December 4, 2013
ELIZALDE S. CO, Petitioner,
to expedite the disposition of these cases. Instead of instituting two separate cases, one for criminal and another for civil, only a single suit shall be filed and
vs.
tried. It should be stressed that the policy laid down by the Rules is to discourage the separate filing of the civil action. The Rules even prohibit the
LUDOLFO P. MUOZ, JR., Respondent.
reservation of a separate civil action, which means that one can no longer file a separate civil case after the criminal complaint is filed in court. The only
DECISION
instance when separate proceedings are allowed is when the civil action is filed ahead of the criminal case. Even then, the Rules encourage the BRION, J.:
consolidation of the civil and criminal cases. We have previously observed that a separate civil action for the purpose of recovering the amount of the Before us this petition for review on certiorari1 seeking to set asie the decision2 dated January 31, 2007 and resolution3 dated March 3, 2008 of the Court of
dishonored checks would only prove to be costly, burdensome and time-consuming for both parties and would further delay the final disposition of the Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 29355. The CA rulings reversed and set aside the decision4 dated February 24, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
case. This multiplicity of suits must be avoided. Where petitioners rights may be fully adjudicated in the proceedings before the trial court, resort to a Legaspi City, Branch 5, in Criminal Case Nos. 9704, 9705 and 9737, and acquitted respondent Ludolfo P. Munoz, Jr. (Munoz) of three counts of libel.
separate action to recover civil liability is clearly unwarranted. In view of this special rule governing actions for violation of B.P. 22, Article 31 of the Civil Code Factual Antecedents
cited by the trial court will not apply to the case at bar.[24] The case springs from the statements made by the respondent against the petitioner, Elizalde S. Co (Co), in several interviews with radio stations in Legaspi
The CAs reliance on DMPI Employees Credit Association v. Velez[25] to give due course to the civil action of Chan independently and separately of Criminal City. Munoz, a contractor, was charged and arrested for perjury. Suspecting that Co, a wealthy businessman, was behind the filing of suit, Munoz made the
Case No. 275381 was unwarranted. DMPI Employees, which involved a prosecution for estafa, is not on all fours with this case, which is a prosecution for a following statements:
violation of BP 22. Although the Court has ruled that the issuance of a bouncing check may result in two separate and distinct crimes of estafa and violation (a) Co influenced the Office of the City Prosecutor of Legaspi City to expedite the issuance of warrant of arrest against Muoz in connection with the perjury
of BP 22,[26] the procedures for the recovery of the civil liabilities arising from these two distinct crimes are different and non-interchangeable. In case;
prosecutions of estafa, the offended party may opt to reserve his right to file a separate civil action, or may institute an independent action based on fraud (b) Co manipulated the results of the government bidding involving the Masarawag-San Francisco dredging project, and;
pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code,[27] as DMPI Employees has allowed. In prosecutions of violations of BP 22, however, the Court has adopted a policy (c) Co received P2,000,000.00 from Muoz on the condition that Co will sub-contract the project to Muoz, which condition Co did not comply with.5
to prohibit the reservation or institution of a separate civil action to claim the civil liability arising from the issuance of the bouncing check upon the reasons Consequently, Co filed his complaint-affidavit which led to the filing of three criminal informations for libel before the RTC.6
delineated in Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corporation, supra. Notably, Co did not waive, institute or reserve his right to file a separate civil action arising from Muozs libelous remarks against him.7
In his defense,8 Muoz countered that he revealed the anomalous government bidding as a call of public duty. In fact, he filed cases against Co before the
Ombudsman involving the anomalous dredging project. Although the Ombudsman dismissed the cases, Muoz claimed that the dismissal did not disprove
the truth of his statements. He further argued that Co is a public figure considering his participation in government projects and his prominence in the
business circles. He also emphasized that the imputations dealt with matters of public interest and are, thus, privileged.
Applying the rules on privileged communication to libel suits, the prosecution has the burden of proving the existence of actual malice, which, Muoz
claimed, it failed to do.
In its decision, the RTC found Muoz guilty of three counts of libel. The RTC ruled that the prosecution established the elements of libel. In contrast, Muoz
failed to show that the imputations were true and published with good motives and for justifiable ends, as required in Article 361 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC).9
In light of the Ombudsmans dismissal of Muoz charges against Co, the RTC also held that Muoz statements were baseless accusations which are not
protected as privileged communication.10
In addition to imprisonment, Muoz was ordered to pay P5,000,000.00 for each count of libel as moral damages, P1,200,000.00 for expenses paid for legal
services, and P297,699.00 for litigation expense.11
Muoz appealed his conviction with the CA.
The CA Ruling
The CA held that the subject matter of the interviews was impressed with public interest and Muoz statements were protected as privileged
communication under the first paragraph of Article 354 of the RPC.12
It also declared that Co was a public figure based on the RTCs findings that he was a "well-known, highly-regarded and recognized in business circles."13
As a public figure, Co is subject to criticisms on his acts that are imbued with public interest.14
Hence, the CA reversed the RTC decision and acquitted Muoz of the libel charges due to the prosecutions failure to establish the existence of actual
malice.
The Petitioners Arguments
In the present petition, Co acknowledges that he may no longer appeal the criminal aspect of the libel suits because that would violate Muoz right against
double jeopardy. Hence, he claims damages only on the basis of Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court (ROC), which states that the extinction of the penal
action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action. He avers that this principle applies in general whether the civil action is instituted with or
separately from the criminal action.15
He also claims that the civil liability of an accused may be appealed in case of acquittal.16
Co further makes the following submissions:
First, the CA erred when it disregarded the presumption of malice under Article 35417 of the RPC. To overcome this presumption, Muoz should have
presented evidence on good or justifiable motive for his statements.18
On the contrary, the context of Muozs radio interviews reflects his evident motive to injure Cos reputation instead of a sincere call of public duty.19
Second, the CA erred in declaring Co as a public figure based on the RTC findings that he is known in his community. He claims this as a relatively limited
community comprising of his business associates.20
The Respondents Arguments
Muoz argues that Co misunderstood Section 2, Rule 111 of the ROC because, as its title suggests, the provision presupposes the filing of a civil action
separately from the criminal action. Thus, when there is no reservation of the right to separately institute the civil action arising from the offense, the
extinction of the criminal action extinguishes the civil action.
Since Co did not reserve his right to separately institute a civil action arising from the offense, the dismissal of the criminal action bars him from filing the
present petition to enforce the civil liability.21
Muoz further posits that Co is not entitled to recover damages because there is no wrongful act to speak of. Citing De la Rosa, et al. v. Maristela,22 he
argues that if there is no libel due to the privileged character of the communication and actual malice is not proved, there should be no award of moral
damages.23
Lastly, Muoz avers that Co is indirectly challenging the factual and legal issues which the CA has already settled in acquitting him. Muoz explains that this
Court may no longer overturn the CAs findings as the doctrine of double jeopardy has set in.24
The Issues
The parties arguments, properly joined, present to us the following issues:
1. whether a private party may appeal the judgment of acquittal insofar as he seeks to enforce the accuseds civil liability; and
2. whether the respondent is liable for damages arising from the libelous remarks despite his acquittal.
The Court's Ruling
We do not find the petition meritorious.
The private party may appeal the judgment of acquittal insofar as he seeks to enforce the accuseds civil liability.
The parties have conflicting interpretations of the last paragraph of Section 2, Rule 111 of the ROC, which states:
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil action.
However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission
from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. (Emphasis ours)
Muoz claims that the last paragraph of Section 2, Rule 111 of the ROC applies only if the civil liability ex delicto is separately instituted or when the right to
file it separately was properly reserved. In contrast, Co claims that Muoz acquittal of the crime of libel did not extinguish the civil aspect of the case
because Muoz utterance of the libelous remarks remains undisputed. We reject Muoz claim. The last paragraph of Section 2, Rule 111 of the ROC applies
to civil actions to claim civil liability arising from the offense charged, regardless if the action is instituted with or filed separately from the criminal action.
Undoubtedly, Section 2, Rule 111 of the ROC governs situations when the offended party opts to institute the civil action separately from the criminal
action; hence, its title "When separate civil action is suspended." Despite this wording, the last paragraph, by its terms, governs all claims for civil liability ex
delicto.
This is based on Article 100 of the RPC which states that that "[e]very person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable." Each criminal act gives rise to
two liabilities: one criminal and one civil. Reflecting this policy, our procedural rules provide for two modes by which civil liability ex delicto may be enforced:
(1) through a civil action that is deemed impliedly instituted in the criminal action;25
(2) through a civil action that is filed separately, either before the criminal action or after, upon reservation of the right to file it separately in the criminal
action.26
The offended party may also choose to waive the civil action.27
This dual mode of enforcing civil liability ex delicto does not affect its nature, as may be apparent from a reading of the second paragraph of Section 2, Rule
120 of the ROC, which states:
Section 2. Contents of the judgment. x x x In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to
prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or
omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.(Emphasis ours)
If, as Muoz suggests, the extinction of the penal action carries with it the extinction of the civil action that was instituted with the criminal action, then
Section 2, Rule 120 of the ROC becomes an irrelevant provision. There would be no need for the judgment of the acquittal to determine whether "the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist." The Rules precisely require the judgment to declare if there remains a basis to hold the
accused civilly liable despite acquittal so that the offended party may avail of the proper remedies to enforce his claim for civil liability ex delicto.
In Ching v. Nicdao and CA,28 the Court ruled that an appeal is the proper remedy that a party whether the accused or the offended party may avail with
respect to the judgment:
If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court renders judgment on the civil aspect of the criminal case, the prosecution cannot appeal from
the judgment of acquittal as it would place the accused in double jeopardy.
However, the aggrieved party, the offended party or the accused or both may appeal from the judgment on the civil aspect of the case within the period
therefor.
From the foregoing, petitioner Ching correctly argued that he, as the offended party, may appeal the civil aspect of the case notwithstanding respondent
Nicdaos acquittal by the CA. The civil action was impliedly instituted with the criminal action since he did not reserve his right to institute it separately nor
did he institute the civil action prior to the criminal action. (Emphasis ours)
Moreover, an appeal is favored over the institution of a separate civil action because the latter would only add to our clogged dockets.29
To reiterate, the extinction of the penal action does not necessarily carry with it the extinction of the civil action, whether the latter is instituted with or
separately from the criminal action. The offended party may still claim civil liability ex delicto if there is a finding in the final judgment in the criminal action
that the act or omission from which the liability may arise exists. Jurisprudence has enumerated three instances when, notwithstanding the accuseds
acquittal, the offended party may still claim civil liability
ex delicto:
(a) if the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required;
(b) if the court declared that the liability of the accused is only civil; and
(c) if the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted.
We thus now proceed to determine if Cos claim falls under any of these three situations.
The respondent is not civilly liable because no libel was committed.
The CA has acquitted Muoz of libel because his statement is a privileged communication. In libel, the existence of malice is essential as it is an element of
the crime.30
The law presumes that every imputation is malicious;31 this is referred to as malice in law.
The presumption relieves the prosecution of the burden of proving that the imputations were made with malice. This presumption is rebutted if the accused
proved that the imputation is true and published with good intention and justifiable motive.32
There are few circumstances wherein malice in law is inapplicable. For instance, Article 354 of the RPC further states that malice is not presumed when:
(1) a private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty;33 and
(2) a fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of
confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of
their functions.34
Jurisprudence supplements the enumeration in Article 354 of the RPC. In Borjal v. CA,35 we held that in view of the constitutional right on the freedoms of
speech and of the press, fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged. In Guingguing v. CA,36 we ruled that the remarks directed against a
public figure are likewise privileged. In order to justify a conviction in libel involving privileged communication, the prosecution must establish that the
libelous statements were made or published with actual malice or malice in fact the knowledge that the statement is false or with reckless disregard as to
whether or not it was true.37
In other words, our rulings in Borjal and Guingguing show that privileged communication has the effect of destroying the presumption of malice or malice in
law and consequently requiring the prosecution to prove the existence of malice in fact.
In the present case, the CA declared that the libelous remarks are privileged. The legal conclusion was arrived at from the fact that Co is a public figure, the
subject matter of the libelous remarks was of public interest, and the context of Munoz statements were fair comments. Consequently, malice is o longer
presumed and the prosecution has the burden of providing that Munoz acted with malice in fact. The CA found that the prosecution failed in this respect.
Co assails the CAs ruling by raising arguments that essentially require a review of the CAs factual and legal findings. However, the Court cannot, through the
present petition, review these findings without going against the requirements of Rule 45 with respect to factual matters, and without violating Munoz right
against double jeopardy given that the acquittal is essentially anchored on question of fact.
In light of the priviledge nature of Munoz statements and the failure of the prosectionto prove malice in fact, there was no libel that was committed by
Munoz. Without the crime, no civil liability ex delicto may be claimed by Co That can be pursued in the present petition. There is no act from which civil
liability may arise that exists.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 29355 dated January 31, 2007 is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

2. Domingo v. Colina, G.R. No. 173330, June 17, 2013.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 173330 June 17, 2013
LUCILLE DOMINGO, Petitioner,
vs.
MERLINDA COLINA, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision1 and Resolution2
dated August 12, 2005 and May 26, 2006, respectively, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 27090.
The facts are as follows:
In an Information dated March 8, 1999, herein petitioner was charged before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Davao City, with violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22), to wit:
That on or about February 28, 1998 in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused,
knowing fully well that he/she have (sic) no funds and/or credit with the drawee bank, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously issued UCPB Check No. 0014924
dated February 28, 1998 in the amount of P175,000.00 in payment of an obligation in favor of Merlinda Dy Colina; but when the said check was presented
to the drawee bank for encashment, the same was dishonored for the reason "ACCOUNT CLOSED" and despite notice of dishonor and repeated demands
upon him/her to make good the check, he/she failed and refused to make payment or to deposit the face amount of the check, to the damage and prejudice
of herein complainant in the aforesaid amount.3
The case proceeded to trial.
After the prosecution rested its case, the defense filed a Demurrer to Evidence.
On October 25, 2001, the MTCC issued an Order granting the demurrer to evidence holding that:
Taking into consideration the observations of this court that the evidence adduced in court by the prosecution in the records of this case failed to prove
elements nos. 2 and 3 of the crime of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 charged against the accused Lucille Domingo per information in this case, this
court finds and so holds that the demurrer to the evidence adduced in court by the prosecution in the records of this case filed by accused Lucille Domingo
through her counsel with this court is well taken. Accordingly, it is granted. Correspondingly, this case is hereby ordered dismissed. Correlatively, the cash
bond of accused Lucille Domingo in the amount of P20,000.00 under Official Receipt No. 11552806, dated December 2, 1999, deposited with the Office of
the Clerk of Court of this court, is ordered canceled and the herein mentioned office is hereby directed to release the herein stated cash bond upon its
receipt to accused Lucille Domingo.
SO ORDERED.4
The prosecution, through the private prosecutor, then filed a Motion for Reconsideration to the Order of Dismissal and In The Alternative To Reopen the Civil
Aspect of the Case.5 The prosecution contended that even assuming that petitioner did not receive valuable consideration for her bounced check, she is
nonetheless liable to respondent for the face value of the check as an accommodation party and, that petitioner's knowledge of the insufficiency of her
funds in or credit with the bank is presumed from the dishonor of her check.
On November 23, 2001, the MTCC issued another Order denying the prosecution's Motion. The MTCC held, thus:
After a thorough reevaluation of the evidence adduced in court by the prosecution in the records of this case in the light of the arguments proffered by the
accused in support of her demurrer to the evidence adduced in court by the prosecution in the records of this case and of the factual and legal basis of this
court in arriving at its conclusion in ordering the dismissal of this case vis-a-vis the arguments interposed by the prosecution in its motion for
reconsideration of the order issued by this court, dated October 25, 2001, as diluted by the comments of accused Lucille Domingo, through her counsel, of
the herein stated motion for reconsideration of the prosecution, this court finds no cogent reason to justify the reconsideration of the herein stated order.
Correspondingly, the motion for reconsideration of the order of this court dated October 25, 2001 is denied. Correlatively, the alternate prayer of the private
complainant, through her counsel, to reopen the civil aspect of this case is likewise denied. At any rate, although the herein mentioned order did not
categorically state that the accused's act from which his civil liability in favor of the private complainant may arise does not exist in this case, in effect, the
observations and ratiocinations stated by this court in support of its finding that the evidence adduced in court by the prosecution in the records of this case
failed to prove all the elements of the crime of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, speaks for itself.
In deference to the desire of the prosecution, let it be stated herein that the act from which the civil liability of the accused in favor of the private
complainant may arise, does not exist in this case.
SO ORDERED.6
Respondent appealed the civil aspect of the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City.
On September 30, 2002, the RTC rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads, thus:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby MODIFIED, ordering the accused-appellee Lucille Domingo to pay complainant Melinda Colina the civil
liability arising out of the offense charged in the amount of P175,000.00, plus interest of 12% per annum counted from the filing of the complaint and cost
of suit.
SO ORDERED.7
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied it.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for review with the CA.
On August 12, 2005, the CA rendered its assailed Decision dismissing petitioner's petition for review and affirming the RTC Decision in toto.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied via the questioned CA Resolution dated May 26, 2006.
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari based on the following Reasons/Arguments:
(a)
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN UPHOLDING THAT THE RTC-BRANCH 16 OF DAVAO CITY HAS JURISDICTION TO
ENTERTAIN AN APPEAL INTERPOSED WHICH WAS VIOLATIVE OF SECTION 2, RULE 111 OF THE RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE WHEN THE TRIAL COURT
(MTCC-BRANCH 6 OF DAVAO CITY) HAD ALREADY RULED THAT THE ACT FROM WHICH THE CIVIL LIABILITY MAY ARISE DID NOT EXIST.
(b)
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONER'S REQUEST TO ADDUCE EVIDENCE ON THE CIVIL ASPECT AND RULED THAT THE PETITIONER HAS
WAIVED THAT RIGHT DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE FILED WAS WITH PRIOR LEAVE OF COURT.8
The petition lacks merit.
The last paragraph of Section 2, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil action. However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished
if there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.9
Moreover, the second paragraph of Section 2, Rule 120 of the same Rules states that:
In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed
to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did
not exist.10
In the instant case, the Orders of the MTCC, dated October 25, 2001 and November 23, 2001, did not contain any such finding or determination. The Court
agrees with the CA that in acquitting petitioner in its Order dated October 25, 2001, the MTCC did not rule on the civil aspect of the case. While it
subsequently held in its November 23, 2001 Order that "the act from which the civil liability of the accused in favor of the private complainant may arise
does not exist in this case," the MTCC, nonetheless, failed to cite evidence, factual circumstances or any discussion in its October 25, 2001 Decision which
would warrant such ruling. Instead, it simply concluded that since the prosecution failed to prove all the elements of the offense charged, then the act from
which the civil liability might arise did not exist. The MTCC held that its observations and ratiocinations in its October 25, 2001 Order justified its conclusion.
However, after a careful review of the above-mentioned Orders, the Court finds nothing therein which the MTCC could have used as a reasonable ground to
arrive at its conclusion that the act or omission from which petitioner's civil liability might arise did not exist.
On the contrary, the tenor of the Orders of the MTCC is that the dismissal of the criminal case against petitioner was based on reasonable doubt. As may be
recalled, the MTCC dismissed the criminal case on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove the second and third elements of BP 22, i.e., (2) the check
is applied on account or for value and (3) the person issuing the check knows at the time of its issuance that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit
with the bank for the full payment of the check upon its presentment. This only means, therefore, that the trial court did not convict petitioner of the
offense charged, since the prosecution failed to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the quantum of evidence required in criminal cases. Conversely,
the lack of evidence to prove the aforesaid elements of the offense charged does not mean that petitioner has no existing debt with respondent, a civil
aspect which is proven by another quantum of evidence, a mere preponderance of evidence. Moreover, from the above pronouncement of the MTCC as to
the prosecution's failure to prove the second and third elements of the offense charged, it can be deduced that the prosecution was able to establish the
presence of the first and fourth elements, i.e., (1) a person draws and issues a check and (4) the check is dishonored by the bank for insufficiency of funds or
credit. Hence, the fact that petitioner was proven to have drawn and issued a check and that the same was subsequently dishonored for inadequate funds
leads to the logical conclusion that the fact from which her civil liability might arise, indeed, exists. On the basis of the foregoing, the RTC correctly
entertained respondent's appeal of the civil aspect of the case.
With respect to the second argument, the Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the ruling of the CA in its Resolution dated May 26, 2006 that for
petitioner's failure to invoke her right to present evidence, despite the clear ruling by the RTC that she is civilly liable, she is deemed to have waived such
right. Petitioner may not argue that her right to due process was violated, because she was given the opportunity to raise this issue a number of times both
in the RTC and the CA. Petitioner does not dispute that neither in her Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of the RTC nor in her Petition for Review, as
well as in her Memorandum filed with the CA, did she raise the issue of her right to present evidence on the civil aspect of the present case. As correctly
observed by the CA, it was only in her Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Decision that she brought up such matter. Where a party was given the
opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said to have been denied due process of law.11 The essence of due process is to be found in
the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one's defense.12 Where opportunity to be heard, either
through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of due process.13 The question is not whether petitioner succeeded in defending her
rights and interests, but simply, whether she had the opportunity to present her side of the controversy.14
In the instant case, petitioner was able to participate in all the proceedings before the lower courts, and, in fact, obtained a favorable judgment from the
MTCC. She also had a similar opportunity to ventilate her cause in the CA. Simply because she failed to avail herself of all the remedies open to her did not
give her the justification to complain of a denial of due process. She cannot complain because she was given the chance to defend her interest in due 0045315 50,000 Oct. 6, 1997 " "
course, for as stated above, it was such opportunity to be heard that was the essence of due process. 0022546 100,000 Oct. 6, 1997 " "
0088757 100,000 Oct. 6, 1997 " "
Equally settled is the rule that no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the proceedings below.15 Points of law, theories, issues 0089368 50,000 Oct. 6, 1997 " "
and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court, administrative agency or quasi-judicial body, need not be considered by a reviewing court, as 0022739 50,000 Oct. 6, 1997 " "
they cannot be raised for the first time at that late stage.16 For her failure to timely invoke her right to present evidence, petitioner is already estopped. 00894810 150,000 Oct. 6, 1997 " "
00893511 100,000 Oct. 6, 1997 " "
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated August 12, 2005 01037712 100,000 Oct. 6, 1997 " "
and May 26, 2006, respectively, in CA-G.R. CR No. 27090, are AFFIRMED. At about the same time, fourteen (14) other criminal complaints, also for violation of BP 22, were filed against respondent Nicdao by Emma Nuguid, said to
be the common law spouse of petitioner Ching. Allegedly fourteen (14) checks, amounting to P1,150,000.00, were issued by respondent Nicdao to Nuguid
SO ORDERED. but were dishonored for lack of sufficient funds. The Informations were filed with the same MCTC and docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 9458 up to 9471.

At her arraignment, respondent Nicdao entered the plea of "not guilty" to all the charges. A joint trial was then conducted for Criminal Cases Nos. 9433-
3. Ching v. Nicdao, G.R. No. 141181, April 27, 2007. 9443 and 9458-9471.

Republic of the Philippines For the prosecution in Criminal Cases Nos. 9433-9443, petitioner Ching and Imelda Yandoc, an employee of the Hermosa Savings & Loan Bank, Inc., were
SUPREME COURT presented to prove the charges against respondent Nicdao. On direct-examination,13 petitioner Ching preliminarily identified each of the eleven (11)
Manila Hermosa Savings & Loan Bank (HSLB) checks that were allegedly issued to him by respondent Nicdao amounting to P20,950,000.00. He identified the
THIRD DIVISION signatures appearing on the checks as those of respondent Nicdao. He recognized her signatures because respondent Nicdao allegedly signed the checks in
G.R. No. 141181 April 27, 2007 his presence. When petitioner Ching presented these checks for payment, they were dishonored by the bank, HSLB, for being "DAIF" or "drawn against
SAMSON CHING, Petitioner, insufficient funds."
vs.
CLARITA NICDAO and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents. Petitioner Ching averred that the checks were issued to him by respondent Nicdao as security for the loans that she obtained from him. Their transaction
began sometime in October 1995 when respondent Nicdao, proprietor/manager of Vignette Superstore, together with her husband, approached him to
DECISION borrow money in order for them to settle their financial obligations. They agreed that respondent Nicdao would leave the checks undated and that she
would pay the loans within one year. However, when petitioner Ching went to see her after the lapse of one year to ask for payment, respondent Nicdao
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
allegedly said that she had no cash.
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Samson Ching of the Decision1 dated November 22, 1999 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
Petitioner Ching claimed that he went back to respondent Nicdao several times more but every time, she would tell him that she had no money. Then in
G.R. CR No. 23055. The assailed decision acquitted respondent Clarita Nicdao of eleven (11) counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 22, otherwise
September 1997, respondent Nicdao allegedly got mad at him for being insistent and challenged him about seeing each other in court. Because of
known as "The Bouncing Checks Law." The instant petition pertains and is limited to the civil aspect of the case as it submits that notwithstanding
respondent Nicdao's alleged refusal to pay her obligations, on October 6, 1997, petitioner Ching deposited the checks that she issued to him. As he earlier
respondent Nicdaos acquittal, she should be held liable to pay petitioner Ching the amounts of the dishonored checks in the aggregate sum of
stated, the checks were dishonored by the bank for being "DAIF." Shortly thereafter, petitioner Ching, together with Emma Nuguid, wrote a demand letter to
P20,950,000.00.
respondent Nicdao which, however, went unheeded. Accordingly, they separately filed the criminal complaints against the latter.
Factual and Procedural Antecedents
On cross-examination,14 petitioner Ching claimed that he had been a salesman of the La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Manufacturing for almost ten (10) years
already. As such, he delivered the goods and had a warehouse. He received salary and commissions. He could not, however, state his exact gross income.
On October 21, 1997, petitioner Ching, a Chinese national, instituted criminal complaints for eleven (11) counts of violation of BP 22 against respondent
According to him, it increased every year because of his business. He asserted that aside from being a salesman, he was also in the business of extending
Nicdao. Consequently, eleven (11) Informations were filed with the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Dinalupihan-Hermosa, Province of Bataan,
loans to other people at an interest, which varied depending on the person he was dealing with.
which, except as to the amounts and check numbers, uniformly read as follows:
Petitioner Ching confirmed the truthfulness of the allegations contained in the eleven (11) Informations that he filed against respondent Nicdao. He
The undersigned accuses Clarita S. Nicdao of a VIOLATION OF BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 22, committed as follows:
reiterated that, upon their agreement, the checks were all signed by respondent Nicdao but she left them undated. Petitioner Ching admitted that he was
That on or about October 06, 1997, at Dinalupihan, Bataan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused did then and the one who wrote the date, October 6, 1997, on those checks when respondent Nicdao refused to pay him.
there willfully and unlawfully make or draw and issue Hermosa Savings & Loan Bank, Inc. Check No. [002524] dated October 06, 1997 in the amount of
With respect to the P20,000,000.00 check (Check No. 002524), petitioner Ching explained that he wrote the date and amount thereon when, upon his
[P20,000,000.00] in payment of her obligation with complainant Samson T.Y. Ching, the said accused knowing fully well that at the time she issued the said
estimation, the money that he regularly lent to respondent Nicdao beginning October 1995 reached the said sum. He likewise intimated that prior to 1995,
check she did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment in full of the said check upon presentment, which check when
they had another transaction amounting to P1,200,000.00 and, as security therefor, respondent Nicdao similarly issued in his favor checks in varying
presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof, was dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason that it was drawn against
amounts of P100,000.00 and P50,000.00. When the said amount was fully paid, petitioner Ching returned the checks to respondent Nicdao.
insufficient funds and notwithstanding receipt of notice of such dishonor the said accused failed and refused and still fails and refuses to pay the value of the
said check in the amount of [P20,000,000.00] or to make arrangement with the drawee bank for the payment in full of the same within five (5) banking days
Petitioner Ching maintained that the eleven (11) checks subject of Criminal Cases Nos. 9433-9443 pertained to respondent Nicdaos loan transactions with
after receiving the said notice, to the damage and prejudice of the said Samson T.Y. Ching in the aforementioned amount of [P20,000,000.00], Philippine
him beginning October 1995. He also mentioned an instance when respondent Nicdaos husband and daughter approached him at a casino to borrow
Currency.
money from him. He lent them P300,000.00. According to petitioner Ching, since this amount was also unpaid, he included it in the other amounts that
respondent Nicdao owed to him which totaled P20,000,000.00 and wrote the said amount on one of respondent Nicdaos blank checks that she delivered to
CONTRARY TO LAW.
him.
Dinalupihan, Bataan, October 21, 1997.
Petitioner Ching explained that from October 1995 up to 1997, he regularly delivered money to respondent Nicdao, in the amount of P1,000,000.00 until
(Sgd.) SAMSON T.Y. CHING the total amount reached P20,000,000.00. He did not ask respondent Nicdao to acknowledge receiving these amounts. Petitioner Ching claimed that he was
confident that he would be paid by respondent Nicdao because he had in his possession her blank checks. On the other hand, the latter allegedly had no
Complainant cause to fear that he would fill up the checks with just any amount because they had trust and confidence in each other. When asked to produce the piece
of paper on which he allegedly wrote the amounts that he lent to respondent Nicdao, petitioner Ching could not present it; he reasoned that it was not with
The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 9433 up to 9443 involving the following details: him at that time.

Check No. Amount Date Private Complainant Reason for the Dishonor It was also averred by petitioner Ching that respondent Nicdao confided to him that she told her daughter Janette, who was married to a foreigner, that her
0025242 P 20,000,000 Oct. 6, 1997 Samson T.Y. Ching DAIF* debt to him was only between P3,000,000.00 and P5,000,000.00. Petitioner Ching claimed that he offered to accompany respondent Nicdao to her daughter
0088563 150,000 Oct. 6, 1997 " " in order that they could apprise her of the amount that she owed him. Respondent Nicdao refused for fear that it would cause disharmony in the family. She
0121424 100,000 Oct. 6, 1997 " " assured petitioner Ching, however, that he would be paid by her daughter.

Petitioner Ching reiterated that after the lapse of one (1) year from the time respondent Nicdao issued the checks to him, he went to her several times to
collect payment. In all these instances, she said that she had no cash. Finally, in September 1997, respondent Nicdao allegedly went to his house and told
him that Janette was only willing to pay him between P3,000,000.00 and P5,000,000.00 because, as far as her daughter was concerned, that was the only
amount borrowed from petitioner Ching. On hearing this, petitioner Ching angrily told respondent Nicdao that she should not have allowed her debt to
reach P20,000,000.00 knowing that she would not be able to pay the full amount.
Petitioner Ching identified the demand letter that he and Nuguid sent to respondent Nicdao. He explained that he no longer informed her about depositing
her checks on his account because she already made that statement about seeing him in court. Again, he admitted writing the date, October 6, 1997, on all
these checks.
Another witness presented by the prosecution was Imelda Yandoc, an employee of HSLB. On direct-examination,15 she testified that she worked as a
checking account bookkeeper/teller of the bank. As such, she received the checks that were drawn against the bank and verified if they were funded. On
October 6, 1997, she received several checks issued by respondent Nicdao. She knew respondent Nicdao because the latter maintained a savings and
checking account with them. Yandoc identified the checks subject of Criminal Cases Nos. 9433-9443 and affirmed that stamped at the back of each was the
annotation "DAIF". Further, per the banks records, as of October 8, 1997, only a balance of P300.00 was left in respondent Nicdaos checking account and
P645.83 in her savings account. On even date, her account with the bank was considered inactive.
On cross-examination,16 Yandoc stated anew that respondent Nicdaos checks bounced on October 7, 1997 for being "DAIF" and her account was closed the
following day, on October 8, 1997. She informed the trial court that there were actually twenty-five (25) checks of respondent Nicdao that were dishonored
at about the same time. The eleven (11) checks were purportedly issued in favor of petitioner Ching while the other fourteen (14) were purportedly issued
in favor of Nuguid. Yandoc explained that respondent Nicdao or her employee would usually call the bank to inquire if there was an incoming check to be
funded.
For its part, the defense proffered the testimonies of respondent Nicdao, Melanie Tolentino and Jocelyn Nicdao. On direct-examination,17 respondent
Nicdao stated that she only dealt with Nuguid. She vehemently denied the allegation that she had borrowed money from both petitioner Ching and Nuguid
in the total amount of P22,950,000.00. Respondent Nicdao admitted, however, that she had obtained a loan from Nuguid but only for P2,100,000.00 and
the same was already fully paid. As proof of such payment, she presented a Planters Bank demand draft dated August 13, 1996 in the amount of
P1,200,000.00. The annotation at the back of the said demand draft showed that it was endorsed and negotiated to the account of petitioner Ching.
In addition, respondent Nicdao also presented and identified several cigarette wrappers18 at the back of which appeared computations. She explained that
Nuguid went to the grocery store everyday to collect interest payments. The principal loan was P2,100,000.00 with 12% interest per day. Nuguid allegedly
wrote the payments for the daily interests at the back of the cigarette wrappers that she gave to respondent Nicdao.
The principal loan amount of P2,100,000.00 was allegedly delivered by Nuguid to respondent Nicdao in varying amounts of P100,000.00 and P150,000.00.
Respondent Nicdao refuted the averment of petitioner Ching that prior to 1995, they had another transaction.
With respect to the P20,000,000.00 check, respondent Nicdao admitted that the signature thereon was hers but denied that she issued the same to
petitioner Ching. Anent the other ten (10) checks, she likewise admitted that the signatures thereon were hers while the amounts and payee thereon were
written by either Jocelyn Nicdao or Melanie Tolentino, who were employees of Vignette Superstore and authorized by her to do so.
Respondent Nicdao clarified that, except for the P20,000,000.00 check, the other ten (10) checks were handed to Nuguid on different occasions. Nuguid
came to the grocery store everyday to collect the interest payments. Respondent Nicdao said that she purposely left the checks undated because she would
still have to notify Nuguid if she already had the money to fund the checks.
Respondent Nicdao denied ever confiding to petitioner Ching that she was afraid that her daughter would get mad if she found out about the amount that
she owed him. What allegedly transpired was that when she already had the money to pay them (presumably referring to petitioner Ching and Nuguid), she
went to them to retrieve her checks. However, petitioner Ching and Nuguid refused to return the checks claiming that she (respondent Nicdao) still owed
them money. She demanded that they show her the checks in order that she would know the exact amount of her debt, but they refused. It was at this
point that she got angry and dared them to go to court.
After the said incident, respondent Nicdao was surprised to be notified by HSLB that her check in the amount of P20,000,000.00 was just presented to the
bank for payment. She claimed that it was only then that she remembered that sometime in 1995, she was informed by her employee that one of her
checks was missing. At that time, she did not let it bother her thinking that it would eventually surface when presented to the bank.
Respondent Nicdao could not explain how the said check came into petitioner Chings possession. She explained that she kept her checks in an ordinary cash
box together with a stapler and the cigarette wrappers that contained Nuguids computations. Her saleslady had access to this box. Respondent Nicdao
averred that it was Nuguid who offered to give her a loan as she would allegedly need money to manage Vignette Superstore. Nuguid used to run the said
store before respondent Nicdaos daughter bought it from Nuguids family, its previous owner. According to respondent Nicdao, it was Nuguid who regularly
delivered the cash to respondent Nicdao or, if she was not at the grocery store, to her saleslady. Respondent Nicdao denied any knowledge that the money
loaned to her by Nuguid belonged to petitioner Ching.
At the continuation of her direct-examination,19 respondent Nicdao said that she never dealt with petitioner Ching because it was Nuguid who went to the
grocery store everyday to collect the interest payments. When shown the P20,000,000.00 check, respondent Nicdao admitted that the signature thereon
was hers but she denied issuing it as a blank check to petitioner Ching. On the other hand, with respect to the other ten (10) checks, she also admitted that
the signatures thereon were hers and that the amounts thereon were written by either Josie Nicdao or Melanie Tolentino, her employees whom she
authorized to do so. With respect to the payee, it was purposely left blank allegedly upon instruction of Nuguid who said that she would use the checks to
pay someone else.
On cross-examination,20 respondent Nicdao explained that Josie Nicdao and Melanie Tolentino were caretakers of the grocery store and that they manned
it when she was not there. She likewise confirmed that she authorized them to write the amounts on the checks after she had affixed her signature thereon.
She stressed, however, that the P20,000,000.00 check was the one that was reported to her as lost or missing by her saleslady sometime in 1995. She never
reported the matter to the bank because she was confident that it would just surface when it would be presented for payment.
Again, respondent Nicdao identified the cigarette wrappers which indicated the daily payments she had made to Nuguid. The latter allegedly went to the
grocery store everyday to collect the interest payments. Further, the figures at the back of the cigarette wrappers were written by Nuguid. Respondent
Nicdao asserted that she recognized her handwriting because Nuguid sometimes wrote them in her presence. Respondent Nicdao maintained that she had
already paid Nuguid the amount of P1,200,000.00 as evidenced by the Planters Bank demand draft which she gave to the latter and which was subsequently
negotiated and deposited in petitioner Chings account. In connection thereto, respondent Nicdao refuted the prosecutions allegation that the demand
draft was payment for a previous transaction that she had with petitioner Ching. She clarified that the payments that Nuguid collected from her everyday
were only for the interests due. She did not ask Nuguid to make written acknowledgements of her payments.
Melanie Tolentino was presented to corroborate the testimony of respondent Nicdao. On direct-examination,21 Tolentino stated that she worked at the
Vignette Superstore and she knew Nuguid because her employer, respondent Nicdao, used to borrow money from her. She knew petitioner Ching only by
name and that he was the "husband" of Nuguid.
As an employee of the grocery store, Tolentino stated that she acted as its caretaker and was entrusted with the custody of respondent Nicdaos personal
checks. Tolentino identified her own handwriting on some of the checks especially with respect to the amounts and figures written thereon. She said that
Nuguid instructed her to leave the space for the payee blank as she would use the checks to pay someone else. Tolentino added that she could not recall
respondent Nicdao issuing a check to petitioner Ching in the amount of P20,000,000.00. She confirmed that they lost a check sometime in 1995. When
informed about it, respondent Nicdao told her that the check could have been issued to someone else, and that it would just surface when presented to the
bank.
Tolentino recounted that Nuguid came to the grocery store everyday to collect the interest payments of the loan. In some instances, upon respondent
Nicdaos instruction, Tolentino handed to Nuguid checks that were already signed by respondent Nicdao. Sometimes, Tolentino would be the one to write
the amount on the checks. Nuguid, in turn, wrote the amounts on pieces of paper which were kept by respondent Nicdao.
On cross-examination,22 Tolentino confirmed that she was authorized by respondent Nicdao to fill up the checks and hand them to Nuguid. The latter came
to the grocery store everyday to collect the interest payments. Tolentino claimed that in 1995, in the course of chronologically arranging respondent
Nicdaos check booklets, she noticed that a check was missing. Respondent Nicdao told her that perhaps she issued it to someone and that it would just turn
up in the bank. Tolentino was certain that the missing check was the same one that petitioner Ching presented to the bank for payment in the amount of
P20,000,000.00.
Tolentino stated that she left the employ of respondent Nicdao sometime in 1996. After the checks were dishonored in October 1997, Tolentino got a call
from respondent Nicdao. After she was shown a fax copy thereof, Tolentino confirmed that the P20,000,000.00 check was the same one that she reported
as missing in 1995.
Jocelyn Nicdao also took the witness stand to corroborate the testimony of the other defense witnesses. On direct-examination,23 she averred that she was
a saleslady at the Vignette Superstore from August 1994 up to April 1998. She knew Nuguid as well as petitioner Ching.
Jocelyn Nicdao further testified that respondent Nicdao was indebted to Nuguid. Jocelyn Nicdao used to fill up the checks of respondent Nicdao that had
already been signed by her and give them to Nuguid. The latter came to the grocery store everyday to pick up the interest payments. Jocelyn Nicdao
identified the checks on which she wrote the amounts and, in some instances, the name of Nuguid as payee. However, most of the time, Nuguid allegedly
instructed her to leave as blank the space for the payee.
Jocelyn Nicdao identified the cigarette wrappers as the documents on which Nuguid acknowledged receipt of the interest payments. She explained that she
was the one who wrote the minus entries and they represented the daily interest payments received by Nuguid.
On cross-examination,24 Jocelyn Nicdao stated that she was a distant cousin of respondent Nicdao. She stopped working for her in 1998 because she
wanted to take a rest. Jocelyn Nicdao reiterated that she handed the checks to Nuguid at the grocery store.
After due trial, on December 8, 1998, the MCTC rendered judgment in Criminal Cases Nos. 9433-9443 convicting respondent Nicdao of eleven (11) counts of
violation of BP 22. The MCTC gave credence to petitioner Chings testimony that respondent Nicdao borrowed money from him in the total amount of
P20,950,000.00. Petitioner Ching delivered P1,000,000.00 every month to respondent Nicdao from 1995 up to 1997 until the sum reached P20,000,000.00.
The MCTC also found that subsequent thereto, respondent Nicdao still borrowed money from petitioner Ching. As security for these loans, respondent
Nicdao issued checks to petitioner Ching. When the latter deposited the checks (eleven in all) on October 6, 1997, they were dishonored by the bank for
being "DAIF."
The MCTC explained that the crime of violation of BP 22 has the following elements: (a) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply to account
or for value; (b) the knowledge of the maker, drawer or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank
for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and (c) subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit
or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.25
According to the MCTC, all the foregoing elements are present in the case of respondent Nicdaos issuance of the checks subject of Criminal Cases Nos.
9433-9443. On the first element, respondent Nicdao was found by the MCTC to have made, drawn and issued the checks. The fact that she did not
personally write the payee and date on the checks was not material considering that under Section 14 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, "where the
instrument is wanting in any material particular, the person in possession thereof has a prima facie authority to complete it by filling up the blanks therein.
And a signature on a blank paper delivered by the person making the signature in order that the paper may be converted into a negotiable instrument
operates as a prima facie authority to fill it up as such for any amount x x x." Respondent Nicdao admitted that she authorized her employees to provide the
details on the checks after she had signed them.
The MCTC disbelieved respondent Nicdaos claim that the P20,000,000.00 check was the same one that she lost in 1995. It observed that ordinary prudence
would dictate that a lost check would at least be immediately reported to the bank to prevent its unauthorized endorsement or negotiation. Respondent
Nicdao made no such report to the bank. Even if the said check was indeed lost, the MCTC faulted respondent Nicdao for being negligent in keeping the
checks that she had already signed in an unsecured box.
The MCTC further ruled that there was no evidence to show that petitioner Ching was not a holder in due course as to cause it (the MCTC) to believe that
the said check was not issued to him. Respondent Nicdaos admission of indebtedness was sufficient to prove that there was consideration for the issuance
of the checks.
The second element was also found by the MCTC to be present as it held that respondent Nicdao, as maker, drawer or issuer, had knowledge that at the
time of issue she did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment in full of the checks upon their presentment.
As to the third element, the MCTC established that the checks were subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for being "DAIF" or drawn against
insufficient funds. Stamped at the back of each check was the annotation "DAIF." The bank representative likewise testified to the fact of dishonor.
Under the foregoing circumstances, the MCTC declared that the conviction of respondent Nicdao was warranted. It stressed that the mere act of issuing a
worthless check was malum prohibitum; hence, even if the checks were issued in the form of deposit or guarantee, once dishonored, the same gave rise to
the prosecution for and conviction of BP 22.26 The decretal portion of the MCTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the accused is found guilty of violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 in 11 counts, and is hereby ordered to pay the private
complainant the amount of P20,950,000.00 plus 12% interest per annum from date of filing of the complaint until the total amount had been paid. The
prayer for moral damages is denied for lack of evidence to prove the same. She is likewise ordered to suffer imprisonment equivalent to 1 year for every
check issued and which penalty shall be served successively.
SO ORDERED.27
Incidentally, on January 11, 1999, the MCTC likewise rendered its judgment in Criminal Cases Nos. 9458-9471 and convicted respondent Nicdao of the
fourteen (14) counts of violation of BP 22 filed against her by Nuguid.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dinalupihan, Bataan, Branch 5, in separate Decisions both dated May 10, 1999, affirmed in toto the decisions of
the MCTC convicting respondent Nicdao of eleven (11) and fourteen (14) counts of violation of BP 22 in Criminal Cases Nos. 9433-9443 and 9458-9471,
respectively.
Respondent Nicdao forthwith filed with the CA separate petitions for review of the two decisions of the RTC. The petition involving the eleven (11) checks
purportedly issued to petitioner Ching was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 23055 (assigned to the 13th Division). On the other hand, the petition involving the
fourteen (14) checks purportedly issued to Nuguid was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 23054 (originally assigned to the 7th Division but transferred to the 6th
Division). The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its respective comments on the said petitions. Subsequently, the OSG filed in CA-G.R. CR No. 23055 a
motion for its consolidation with CA-G.R. CR No. 23054. The OSG prayed that CA-G.R. CR No. 23055 pending before the 13th Division be transferred and
consolidated with CA-G.R. CR No. 23054 in accordance with the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (RIRCA).
Acting on the motion for consolidation, the CA in CA-G.R. CR No. 23055 issued a Resolution dated October 19, 1999 advising the OSG to file the motion in
CA-G.R. CR No. 23054 as it bore the lowest number. Respondent Nicdao opposed the consolidation of the two cases. She likewise filed her reply to the
comment of the OSG in CA-G.R. CR No. 23055.
On November 22, 1999, the CA (13th Division) rendered the assailed Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 23055 acquitting respondent Nicdao of the eleven (11)
counts of violation of BP 22 filed against her by petitioner Ching. The decretal portion of the assailed CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, being meritorious, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the decision dated May 10, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court, 3rd
Judicial Region, Branch 5, Bataan, affirming the decision dated December 8, 1998, of the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Dinalupihan-Hermosa, Bataan,
convicting petitioner Clarita S. Nicdao in Criminal Cases No. 9433 to 9443 of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another judgment
rendered ACQUITTING her in all these cases, with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.28
On even date, the CA issued an Entry of Judgment declaring that the above decision has become final and executory and is recorded in the Book of
Judgments.
In acquitting respondent Nicdao in CA-G.R. CR No. 23055, the CA made the following factual findings:
Petitioner [respondent herein] Clarita S. Nicdao, a middle-aged mother and housekeeper who only finished high school, has a daughter, Janette Boyd, who is
married to a wealthy expatriate.
Complainant [petitioner herein] Samson Ching is a Chinese national, who claimed he is a salesman of La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Factory.
Emma Nuguid, complainants live-in partner, is a CPA and formerly connected with Sycip, Gorres and Velayo. Nuguid used to own a grocery store now known
as the Vignette Superstore. She sold this grocery store, which was about to be foreclosed, to petitioners daughter, Janette Boyd. Since then, petitioner
began managing said store. However, since petitioner could not always be at the Vignette Superstore to keep shop, she entrusted to her salesladies, Melanie
Tolentino and Jocelyn Nicdao, pre-signed checks, which were left blank as to amount and the payee, to cover for any delivery of merchandise sold at the
store. The blank and personal checks were placed in a cash box at Vignette Superstore and were filled up by said salesladies upon instruction of petitioner as
to amount, payee and date.
Soon thereafter, Emma Nuguid befriended petitioner and offered to lend money to the latter which could be used in running her newly acquired store.
Nuguid represented to petitioner that as former manager of the Vignette Superstore, she knew that petitioner would be in need of credit to meet the daily
expenses of running the business, particularly in the daily purchases of merchandise to be sold at the store. After Emma Nuguid succeeded in befriending
petitioner, Nuguid was able to gain access to the Vignette Superstore where petitioners blank and pre-signed checks were kept.29
In addition, the CA also made the finding that respondent Nicdao borrowed money from Nuguid in the total amount of P2,100,000.00 secured by twenty-
four (24) checks drawn against respondent Nicdaos account with HSLB. Upon Nuguids instruction, the checks given by respondent Nicdao as security for
the loans were left blank as to the payee and the date. The loans consisted of (a) P950,000.00 covered by ten (10) checks subject of the criminal complaints
filed by petitioner Ching (CA-G.R. CR No. 23055); and (b) P1,150,000.00 covered by fourteen (14) checks subject of the criminal complaints filed by Nuguid
(CA-G.R. CR No. 23054). The loans totaled P2,100,000.00 and they were transacted between respondent Nicdao and Nuguid only. Respondent Nicdao never
dealt with petitioner Ching.
Against the foregoing factual findings, the CA declared that, based on the evidence, respondent Nicdao had already fully paid the loans. In particular, the CA
referred to the Planters Bank demand draft in the amount of P1,200,000.00 which, by his own admission, petitioner Ching had received. The appellate court
debunked petitioner Chings allegation that the said demand draft was payment for a previous transaction. According to the CA, petitioner Ching failed to
adduce evidence to prove the existence of a previous transaction between him and respondent Nicdao.
Apart from the demand draft, the CA also stated that respondent Nicdao made interest payments on a daily basis to Nuguid as evidenced by the
computations written at the back of the cigarette wrappers. Based on these computations, as of July 21, 1997, respondent Nicdao had made a total of
P5,780,000.00 payments to Nuguid for the interests alone. Adding up this amount and that of the Planters Bank demand draft, the CA placed the payments
made by respondent Nicdao to Nuguid as already amounting to P6,980,000.00 for the principal loan amount of only P2,100,000.00.
The CA negated petitioner Chings contention that the payments as reflected at the back of the cigarette wrappers could be applied only to the interests
due. Since the transactions were not evidenced by any document or writing, the CA ratiocinated that no interests could be collected because, under Article
1956 of the Civil Code, "no interest shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing."
The CA gave credence to the testimony of respondent Nicdao that when she had fully paid her loans to Nuguid, she tried to retrieve her checks. Nuguid,
however, refused to return the checks to respondent Nicdao. Instead, Nuguid and petitioner Ching filled up the said checks to make it appear that: (a)
petitioner Ching was the payee in five checks; (b) the six checks were payable to cash; (c) Nuguid was the payee in fourteen (14) checks. Petitioner Ching and
Nuguid then put the date October 6, 1997 on all these checks and deposited them the following day. On October 8, 1997, through a joint demand letter,
they informed respondent Nicdao that her checks were dishonored by HSLB and gave her three days to settle her indebtedness or else face prosecution for
violation of BP 22.
With the finding that respondent Nicdao had fully paid her loan obligations to Nuguid, the CA declared that she could no longer be held liable for violation
of BP 22. It was explained that to be held liable under BP 22, it must be established, inter alia, that the check was made or drawn and issued to apply on
account or for value. According to the CA, the word "account" refers to a pre-existing obligation, while "for value" means an obligation incurred
simultaneously with the issuance of the check. In the case of respondent Nicdaos checks, the pre-existing obligations secured by them were already
extinguished after full payment had been made by respondent Nicdao to Nuguid. Obligations are extinguished by, among others, payment.30 The CA
believed that when petitioner Ching and Nuguid refused to return respondent Nicdaos checks despite her total payment of P6,980,000.00 for the loans
secured by the checks, petitioner Ching and Nuguid were using BP 22 to coerce respondent Nicdao to pay a debt which she no longer owed them.
With respect to the P20,000,000.00 check, the CA was not convinced by petitioner Chings claim that he delivered P1,000,000.00 every month to
respondent Nicdao until the amount reached P20,000,000.00 and, when she refused to pay the same, he filled up the check, which she earlier delivered to
him as security for the loans, by writing thereon the said amount. In disbelieving petitioner Ching, the CA pointed out that, contrary to his assertion, he was
never employed by the La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Manufacturing per the letter of Susan Resurreccion, Vice-President and Legal Counsel of the said
company. Moreover, as admitted by petitioner Ching, he did not own the house where he and Nuguid lived.

Moreover, the CA characterized as incredible and contrary to human experience that petitioner Ching would, as he claimed, deliver a total sum of
P20,000,000.00 to respondent Nicdao without any documentary proof thereof, e.g., written acknowledgment that she received the same. On the other
hand, it found plausible respondent Nicdaos version of the story that the P20,000,000.00 check was the same one that was missing way back in 1995. The
CA opined that this missing check surfaced in the hands of petitioner Ching who, in cahoots with Nuguid, wrote the amount P20,000,000.00 thereon and
deposited it in his account. To the mind of the CA, the inference that the check was stolen was anchored on competent circumstantial evidence. Specifically,
Nuguid, as previous manager/owner of the grocery store, had access thereto. Likewise applicable, according to the CA, was the presumption that the person
in possession of the stolen article was presumed to be guilty of taking the stolen article.31
The CA emphasized that the P20,000,000.00 check was never delivered by respondent Nicdao to petitioner Ching. As such, the said check without the
details as to the date, amount and payee, was an incomplete and undelivered instrument when it was stolen and ended up in petitioner Chings hands. On
this point, the CA applied Sections 15 and 16 of the Negotiable Instruments Law:
SEC. 15. Incomplete instrument not delivered. Where an incomplete instrument has not been delivered, it will not, if completed and negotiated without
authority, be a valid contract in the hands of any holder, as against any person whose signature was placed thereon before delivery.
SEC. 16. Delivery; when effectual; when presumed. Every contract on a negotiable instrument is incomplete and revocable until delivery of the instrument
for the purpose of giving effect thereto. As between immediate parties and as regards a remote party other than a holder in due course, the delivery, in
order to be effectual, must be made either by or under the authority of the party making, drawing, accepting or indorsing, as the case may be; and, in such
case, the delivery may be shown to have been conditional, or for a special purpose only, and not for the purpose of transferring the property. But where the
instrument is in the hands of a holder in due course, a valid delivery thereof by all parties prior to him so as to make them liable to him is conclusively
presumed. And where the instrument is no longer in the possession of a party whose signature appears thereon, a valid and intentional delivery by him is
presumed until the contrary is proved.
The CA held that the P20,000,000.00 check was filled up by petitioner Ching without respondent Nicdaos authority. Further, it was incomplete and
undelivered. Hence, petitioner Ching did not acquire any right or interest therein and could not assert any cause of action founded on the
stolen checks.32 Under these circumstances, the CA concluded that respondent could not be held liable for violation of BP 22.
The Petitioners Case
As mentioned earlier, the instant petition pertains and is limited solely to the civil aspect of the case as petitioner Ching argues that notwithstanding
respondent Nicdaos acquittal of the eleven (11) counts of violation of BP 22, she should be held liable to pay petitioner Ching the amounts of the
dishonored checks in the aggregate sum of P20,950,000.00.
He urges the Court to review the findings of facts made by the CA as they are allegedly based on a misapprehension of facts and manifestly erroneous and
contradicted by the evidence. Further, the CAs factual findings are in conflict with those of the RTC and MCTC.
Petitioner Ching vigorously argues that notwithstanding respondent Nicdaos acquittal by the CA, the Supreme Court has the jurisdiction and authority to
resolve and rule on her civil liability. He invokes Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court which, prior to its amendment, provided, in part:
SEC. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted
with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action.
Such civil action includes the recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused. x x x
Supreme Court Circular No. 57-9733 dated September 16, 1997 is also cited as it provides in part:
1. The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to necessarily include the corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file
such civil action separately shall be allowed or recognized. x x x
Petitioner Ching theorizes that, under Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court, the civil action for the recovery of damages under Articles 32, 33,
34, and 2176 arising from the same act or omission of the accused is impliedly instituted with the criminal action. Moreover, under the above-quoted
Circular, the criminal action for violation of BP 22 necessarily includes the corresponding civil action, which is the recovery of the amount of the dishonored
check representing the civil obligation of the drawer to the payee.
In seeking to enforce the alleged civil liability of respondent Nicdao, petitioner Ching maintains that she had loan obligations to him totaling P20,950,000.00.
The existence of the same is allegedly established by his testimony before the MCTC. Also, he asks the Court to take judicial notice that for a monetary loan
secured by a check, the check itself is the evidence of indebtedness.
He insists that, contrary to her protestation, respondent Nicdao also transacted with him, not only with Nuguid. Petitioner Ching pointed out that during
respondent Nicdaos testimony, she referred to her creditors in plural form, e.g. "[I] told them, most checks that I issued I will inform them if I have money."
Even respondent Nicdaos employees allegedly knew him; they testified that Nuguid instructed them at times to leave as blank the payee on the checks as
they would be paid to someone else, who turned out to be petitioner Ching.
It was allegedly erroneous for the CA to hold that he had no capacity to lend P20,950,000.00 to respondent Nicdao. Petitioner Ching clarified that what he
meant when he testified before the MCTC was that he was engaged in dealership with La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Manufacturing, and not merely its sales
agent. He stresses that he owns a warehouse and is also in the business of lending money. Further, the CAs reasoning that he could not possibly have lent
P20,950,000.00 to respondent Nicdao since petitioner Ching and Nuguid did not own the house where they live, is allegedly non sequitur.
Petitioner Ching maintains that, contrary to the CAs finding, the Planters Bank demand draft for P1,200,000.00 was in payment for respondent Nicdaos
previous loan transaction with him. Apart from the P20,000,000.00 check, the other ten (10) checks (totaling P950,000.00) were allegedly issued by
respondent Nicdao to petitioner Ching as security for the loans that she obtained from him from 1995 to 1997. The existence of another loan obligation
prior to the said period was allegedly established by the testimony of respondent Nicdaos own witness, Jocelyn Nicdao, who testified that when she started
working in Vignette Superstore in 1994, she noticed that respondent Nicdao was already indebted to Nuguid.
Petitioner Ching also takes exception to the CAs ruling that the payments made by respondent Nicdao as reflected on the computations at the back of the
cigarette wrappers were for both the principal loan and interests. He insists that they were for the interests alone. Even respondent Nicdaos testimony
allegedly showed that they were daily interest payments. Petitioner Ching further avers that the interest payments totaling P5,780,000.00 can only mean
that, contrary to respondent Nicdaos claim, her loan obligations amounted to much more than P2,100,000.00. Further, she is allegedly estopped from
questioning the interests because she willingly paid the same.
Petitioner Ching also harps on respondent Nicdaos silence when she received his and Nuguids demand letter to her. Through the said letter, they notified
her that the twenty-five (25) checks valued at P22,100,000.00 were dishonored by the HSLB, and that she had three days to settle her ndebtedness with
them, otherwise, face prosecution. Respondent Nicdaos silence, i.e., her failure to deny or protest the same by way of reply, vis--vis the demand letter,
allegedly constitutes an admission of the statements contained therein.
On the other hand, the MCTCs decision, as affirmed by the RTC, is allegedly based on the evidence on record; it has been established that the checks were
respondent Nicdaos personal checks, that the signatures thereon were hers and that she had issued them to petitioner Ching. With respect to the
P20,000,000.00 check, petitioner Ching assails the CAs ruling that it was stolen and was never delivered or issued by respondent Nicdao to him. The issue of
the said check being stolen was allegedly not raised during trial. Further, her failure to report the alleged theft to the bank to stop payment of the said lost
or missing check is allegedly contrary to human experience. Petitioner Ching describes respondent Nicdaos defense of stolen or lost check as incredible and,
therefore, false.
Aside from the foregoing substantive issues that he raised, petitioner Ching also faults the CA for not acting and ordering the consolidation of CA-G.R. CR No.
23055 with CA-G.R. CR No. 23054. He informs the Court that latter case is still pending with the CA.
In fine, it is petitioner Chings view that the CA gravely erred in disregarding the findings of the MCTC, as affirmed by the RTC, and submits that there is more
than sufficient preponderant evidence to hold respondent Nicdao civilly liable to him in the amount of P20,950,000.00. He thus prays that the Court direct
respondent Nicdao to pay him the said amount plus 12% interest per annum computed from the date of written demand until the total amount is fully paid.
The Respondents Counter-Arguments
Respondent Nicdao urges the Court to deny the petition. She posits preliminarily that it is barred under Section 2(b), Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court
which states:
SEC. 2. Institution of separate of civil action. - Except in the cases provided for in Section 3 hereof, after the criminal action has been commenced, the civil
action which has been reserved cannot be instituted until final judgment in the criminal action.
xxxx
(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the
fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.
According to respondent Nicdao, the assailed CA decision has already made a finding to the effect that the fact upon which her civil liability might arise did
not exist. She refers to the ruling of the CA that the P20,000,000.00 check was stolen; hence, petitioner Ching did not acquire any right or interest over the
said check and could not assert any cause of action founded on the said check. Consequently, the CA held that respondent Nicdao had no obligation to make
good the stolen check and cannot be held liable for violation of BP 22. She also refers to the CAs pronouncement relative to the ten (10) other checks that
they were not issued to apply on account or for value, considering that the loan obligations secured by these checks had already been extinguished by her
full payment thereof.
To respondent Nicdaos mind, these pronouncements are equivalent to a finding that the facts upon which her civil liability may arise do not exist. The
instant petition, which seeks to enforce her civil liability based on the eleven (11) checks, is thus allegedly already barred by the final and executory decision
acquitting her.
In any case, respondent Nicdao contends that the CA did not commit serious misapprehension of facts when it found that the P20,000,000.00 check was a
stolen check and that she never made any transaction with petitioner Ching. Moreover, the other ten (10) checks were not issued to apply on account or for
value. These findings are allegedly supported by the evidence on record which consisted of the respective testimonies of the defense witnesses to the effect
that: respondent Nicdao had the practice of leaving pre-signed checks placed inside an unsecured cash box in the Vignette Superstore; the salesladies were
given the authority to fill up the said checks as to the amount, payee and date; Nuguid beguiled respondent Nicdao to obtain loans from her; as security for
the loans, respondent Nicdao issued checks to Nuguid; when the salesladies gave the checks to Nuguid, she instructed them to leave blank the payee and
date; Nuguid had access to the grocery store; in 1995, one of the salesladies reported that a check was missing; in 1997, when she had fully paid her loans
to Nuguid, respondent Nicdao tried to retrieve her checks but Nuguid and petitioner Ching falsely told her that she still owed them money; they then
maliciously filled up the checks making it appear that petitioner Ching was the payee in the five checks and the six others were payable to "cash"; and
knowing fully well that these checks were not funded because respondent Nicdao already fully paid her loans, petitioner Ching and Nuguid deposited the
checks and caused them to be dishonored by HSLB.
It is pointed out by respondent Nicdao that her testimony (that the P20,000,000.00 check was the same one that she lost sometime in 1995) was
corroborated by the respective testimonies of her employees. Another indication that it was stolen was the fact that among all the checks which ended up in
the hands of petitioner Ching and Nuguid, only the P20,000,000.00 check was fully typewritten; the rest were invariably handwritten as to the amounts,
payee and date.
Respondent Nicdao defends the CAs conclusion that the P20,000,000.00 check was stolen on the ground that an appeal in a criminal case throws open the
whole case to the appellate courts scrutiny. In any event, she maintains that she had been consistent in her theory of defense and merely relied on the
disputable presumption that the person in possession of a stolen article is presumed to be the author of the theft.
Considering that it was stolen, respondent Nicdao argues, the P20,000,000.00 check was an incomplete and undelivered instrument in the hands of
petitioner Ching and he did not acquire any right or interest therein. Further, he cannot assert any cause of action founded on the said stolen check.
Accordingly, petitioner Chings attempt to collect payment on the said check through the instant petition must fail.
Respondent Nicdao describes as downright incredible petitioner Chings testimony that she owed him a total sum of P20,950,000.00 without any
documentary proof of the loan transactions. She submits that it is contrary to human experience for loan transactions involving such huge amounts of
money to be devoid of any documentary proof. In relation thereto, respondent Nicdao underscores that petitioner Ching lied about being employed as a
salesman of La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Manufacturing. It is underscored that he has not adequately shown that he possessed the financial capacity to
lend such a huge amount to respondent Nicdao as he so claimed.
Neither could she be held liable for the ten (10) other checks (in the total amount of P950,000,000.00) because as respondent Nicdao asseverates, she
merely issued them to Nuguid as security for her loans obtained from the latter beginning October 1995 up to 1997. As evidenced by the Planters Bank
demand draft in the amount of P1,200,000.00, she already made payment in 1996. The said demand draft was negotiated to petitioner Chings account and
he admitted receipt thereof. Respondent Nicdao belies his claim that the demand draft was payment for a prior existing obligation. She asserts that
petitioner Ching was unable to present evidence of such a previous transaction.
In addition to the Planters Bank demand draft, respondent Nicdao insists that petitioner Ching received, through Nuguid, cash payments as evidenced by the
computations written at the back of the cigarette wrappers. Nuguid went to the Vignette Superstore everyday to collect these payments. The other defense
witnesses corroborated this fact. Petitioner Ching allegedly never disputed the accuracy of the accounts appearing on these cigarette wrappers; nor did he
dispute their authenticity and accuracy.
Based on the foregoing evidence, the CA allegedly correctly held that, computing the amount of the Planters Bank demand draft (P1,200,000.00) and those
reflected at the back of the cigarette wrappers (P5,780,000.00), respondent Nicdao had already paid petitioner Ching and Nuguid a total sum of
P6,980,000.00 for her loan obligations totaling only P950,000.00, as secured by the ten (10) HSLB checks excluding the stolen P20,000,000.00 check.
Respondent Nicdao rebuts petitioner Chings argument (that the daily payments were applied to the interests), and claims that this is illegal. Petitioner
Ching cannot insist that the daily payments she made applied only to the interests on the loan obligations, considering that there is admittedly no document
evidencing these loans, hence, no written stipulation for the payment of interests thereon. On this point, she invokes Article 1956 of the Civil Code, which
proscribes the collection of interest payments unless expressly stipulated in writing.
Respondent Nicdao emphasizes that the ten (10) other checks that she issued to Nuguid as security for her loans had already been discharged upon her full
payment thereof. It is her belief that these checks can no longer be used to coerce her to pay a debt that she does not owe.
On the CAs failure to consolidate CA-G.R. CR No. 23055 and CA-G.R. CR No. 23054, respondent Nicdao proffers the explanation that under the RIRCA,
consolidation of the cases is not mandatory. In fine, respondent Nicdao urges the Court to deny the petition as it failed to discharge the burden of proving
her civil liability with the required preponderance of evidence. Moreover, the CAs acquittal of respondent Nicdao is premised on the finding that, apart from
the stolen check, the ten (10) other checks were not made to apply to a valid, due and demandable obligation. This, in effect, is a categorical ruling that the
fact from which the civil liability of respondent Nicdao may arise does not exist.
The Courts Rulings
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
Notwithstanding respondent Nicdaos acquittal, petitioner Ching is entitled to appeal the civil aspect of the case within the reglementary period
It is axiomatic that "every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable."34 Under the pertinent provision of the Revised Rules of Court, the civil
action is generally impliedly instituted with the criminal action. At the time of petitioner Chings filing of the Informations against respondent Nicdao,
Section 1,35 Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court, quoted earlier, provided in part:
SEC. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted
with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action.
Such civil action includes the recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused.
xxxx
As a corollary to the above rule, an acquittal does not necessarily carry with it the extinguishment of the civil liability of the accused. Section 2(b)36 of the
same Rule, also quoted earlier, provided in part:
(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the
fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.
It is also relevant to mention that judgments of acquittal are required to state "whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt
of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which
the civil liability might arise did not exist."37
In Sapiera v. Court of Appeals,38 the Court enunciated that the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal: (a) where the acquittal is based on reasonable
doubt; (b) where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature; and (c) where the civil liability is not
derived from or based on the criminal act of which the accused is acquitted. Thus, under Article 29 of the Civil Code
ART. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action
for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the
court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it
may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.
The Court likewise expounded in Salazar v. People39 the consequences of an acquittal on the civil aspect in this wise:
The acquittal of the accused does not prevent a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the criminal case where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable
doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declared that the liability of the accused is only civil; (c) the civil liability of the accused
does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted. Moreover, the civil action based on the delict is extinguished if there is
a finding in the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did
not commit the act or omission imputed to him.
If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court renders judgment on the civil aspect of the criminal case, the prosecution cannot appeal from
the judgment of acquittal as it would place the accused in double jeopardy. However, the aggrieved party, the offended party or the accused or both may
appeal from the judgment on the civil aspect of the case within the period therefor.
From the foregoing, petitioner Ching correctly argued that he, as the offended party, may appeal the civil aspect of the case notwithstanding respondent
Nicdaos acquittal by the CA. The civil action was impliedly instituted with the criminal action since he did not reserve his right to institute it separately nor
did he institute the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Following the long recognized rule that "the appeal period accorded to the accused should also be available to the offended party who seeks redress of the
civil aspect of the decision," the period to appeal granted to petitioner Ching is the same as that granted to the accused.40 With petitioner Chings timely
filing of the instant petition for review of the civil aspect of the CAs decision, the Court thus has the jurisdiction and authority to determine the civil liability
of respondent Nicdao notwithstanding her acquittal.
In order for the petition to prosper, however, it must establish that the judgment of the CA acquitting respondent Nicdao falls under any of the three
categories enumerated in Salazar and Sapiera, to wit:
(a) where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required;
(b) where the court declared that the liability of the accused is only civil; and
(c) where the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted.
Salazar also enunciated that the civil action based on the delict is extinguished if there is a finding in the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did not commit the act or omission imputed to him.
For reasons that will be discussed shortly, the Court holds that respondent Nicdao cannot be held civilly liable to petitioner Ching.
The acquittal of respondent Nicdao likewise effectively extinguished her civil liability
A painstaking review of the case leads to the conclusion that respondent Nicdaos acquittal likewise carried with it the extinction of the action to enforce her
civil liability. There is simply no basis to hold respondent Nicdao civilly liable to petitioner Ching.
First, the CAs acquittal of respondent Nicdao is not merely based on reasonable doubt. Rather, it is based on the finding that she did not commit the act
penalized under BP 22. In particular, the CA found that the P20,000,000.00 check was a stolen check which was never issued nor delivered by respondent
Nicdao to petitioner Ching. As such, according to the CA, petitioner Ching "did not acquire any right or interest over Check No. 002524 and cannot assert any
cause of action founded on said check,"41 and that respondent Nicdao "has no obligation to make good the stolen check and cannot, therefore, be held
liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22."42
With respect to the ten (10) other checks, the CA established that the loans secured by these checks had already been extinguished after full payment had
been made by respondent Nicdao. In this connection, the second element for the crime under BP 22, i.e., "that the check is made or drawn and issued to
apply on account or for value," is not present.
Second, in acquitting respondent Nicdao, the CA did not adjudge her to be civilly liable to petitioner Ching. In fact, the CA explicitly stated that she had
already fully paid her obligations. The CA computed the payments made by respondent Nicdao vis--vis her loan obligations in this manner:
Clearly, adding the payments recorded at the back of the cigarette cartons by Emma Nuguid in her own handwriting totaling P5,780,000.00 and the
P1,200,000.00 demand draft received by Emma Nuguid, it would appear that petitioner [respondent herein] had already made payments in the total
amount of P6,980,000.00 for her loan obligation of only P2,100,000.00 (P950,000.00 in the case at bar and P1,150,000.00 in CA-G.R. CR No. 23054).43
On the other hand, its finding relative to the P20,000,000.00 check that it was a stolen check necessarily absolved respondent Nicdao of any civil liability
thereon as well.
Third, while petitioner Ching attempts to show that respondent Nicdaos liability did not arise from or was not based upon the criminal act of which she was
acquitted (ex delicto) but from her loan obligations to him (ex contractu), however, petitioner Ching miserably failed to prove by preponderant evidence the
existence of these unpaid loan obligations. Significantly, it can be inferred from the following findings of the CA in its decision acquitting respondent Nicdao
that the act or omission from which her civil liability may arise did not exist. On the P20,000,000.00 check, the CA found as follows:
True, indeed, the missing pre-signed and undated check no. 002524 surfaced in the possession of complainant Ching who, in cahoots with his paramour
Emma Nuguid, filled up the blank check with his name as payee and in the fantastic amount of P20,000,000.00, dated it October 6, 1997, and presented it to
the bank on October 7, 1997, along with the other checks, for payment. Therefore, the inference that the check was stolen is anchored on competent
circumstantial evidence. The fact already established is that Emma Nuguid , previous owner of the store, had access to said store. Moreover, the possession
of a thing that was stolen , absent a credible reason, as in this case, gives rise to the presumption that the person in possession of the stolen article is
presumed to be guilty of taking the stolen article (People v. Zafra, 237 SCRA 664).
As previously shown, at the time check no. 002524 was stolen, the said check was blank in its material aspect (as to the name of payee, the amount of the
check, and the date of the check), but was already pre-signed by petitioner. In fact, complainant Ching himself admitted that check no. 002524 in his
possession was a blank check (TSN, Jan. 7, 1998, pp. 24-27, Annex J, Petition).
Moreover, since it has been established that check no. 002524 had been missing since 1995 (TSN, Sept. 9, 1998, pp. 14-15, Annex DD, Petition; TSN, Sept.
10, 1998, pp. 43-46, Annex EE, Petition), it is abundantly clear that said check was never delivered to complainant Ching. Check no. 002524 was an
incomplete and undelivered instrument when it was stolen and ended up in the hands of complainant Ching. Sections 15 and 16 of the Negotiable
Instruments Law provide:
xxxx
In the case of check no. 002524, it is admitted by complainant Ching that said check in his possession was a blank check and was subsequently completed by
him alone without authority from petitioner. Inasmuch as check no. 002524 was incomplete and undelivered in the hands of complainant Ching, he did not
acquire any right or interest therein and cannot, therefore, assert any cause of action founded on said stolen check (Development Bank of the Philippines v.
Sima We, 219 SCRA 736, 740).
It goes without saying that since complainant Ching did not acquire any right or interest over check no. 002524 and cannot assert any cause of action
founded on said check, petitioner has no obligation to make good the stolen check and cannot, therefore, be held liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.44
Anent the other ten (10) checks, the CA made the following findings:
Evidence sufficiently shows that the loans secured by the ten (10) checks involved in the cases subject of this petition had already been paid. It is not
controverted that petitioner gave Emma Nuguid a demand draft valued at P1,200,000 to pay for the loans guaranteed by said checks and other checks
issued to her. Samson Ching admitted having received the demand draft which he deposited in his bank account. However, complainant Samson Ching
claimed that the said demand draft represents payment for a previous obligation incurred by petitioner. However, complainant Ching failed to adduce any
evidence to prove the existence of the alleged obligation of the petitioner prior to those secured by the subject checks.
Apart from the payment to Emma Nuguid through said demand draft, it is also not disputed that petitioner made cash payments to Emma Nuguid who
collected the payments almost daily at the Vignette Superstore. As of July 21, 1997, Emma Nuguid collected cash payments amounting to approximately
P5,780,000.00. All of these cash payments were recorded at the back of cigarette cartons by Emma Nuguid in her own handwriting, the authenticity and
accuracy of which were never denied by either complainant Ching or Emma Nuguid.
Clearly, adding the payments recorded at the back of the cigarette cartons by Emma Nuguid in her own handwriting totaling P5,780,000.00 and the
P1,200,000.00 demand draft received by Emma Nuguid, it would appear that petitioner had already made payments in the total amount of P6,980,000.00
for her loan in the total amount of P6,980,000.00 for her loan obligation of only P2,100,000.00 (P950,000.00 in the case at bar and P1,150,000.00 in CA-G.R.
CR No. 23054).45
Generally checks may constitute evidence of indebtedness.46 However, in view of the CAs findings relating to the eleven (11) checks - that the
P20,000,000.00 was a stolen check and the obligations secured by the other ten (10) checks had already been fully paid by respondent Nicdao they can no
longer be given credence to establish respondent Nicdaos civil liability to petitioner Ching. Such civil liability, therefore, must be established by
preponderant evidence other than the discredited checks.
After a careful examination of the records of the case,47 the Court holds that the existence of respondent Nicdaos civil liability to petitioner Ching in the
amount of P20,950,000.00 representing her unpaid obligations to the latter has not been sufficiently established by preponderant evidence. Petitioner Ching
mainly relies on his testimony before the MCTC to establish the existence of these unpaid obligations. In gist, he testified that from October 1995 up to
1997, respondent Nicdao obtained loans from him in the total amount of P20,950,000.00. As security for her obligations, she issued eleven (11) checks
which were invariably blank as to the date, amounts and payee. When respondent Nicdao allegedly refused to pay her obligations despite his due demand,
petitioner filled up the checks in his possession with the corresponding amounts and date and deposited them in his account. They were subsequently
dishonored by the HSLB for being "DAIF" and petitioner Ching accordingly filed the criminal complaints against respondent Nicdao for violation of BP 22.
It is a basic rule in evidence that the burden of proof lies on the party who makes the allegations Et incumbit probatio, qui dicit, non qui negat; cum per
rerum naturam factum negantis probatio nulla sit (The proof lies upon him who affirms, not upon him who denies; since, by the nature of things, he who
denies a fact cannot produce any proof).48 In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence.
Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the
term "greater weight of evidence" or "greater weight of the credible evidence." Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means
probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.49 Section 1,
Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court offers the guidelines in determining preponderance of evidence:
SEC. 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of
evidence. In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and
circumstances of the case, the witnesses manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are
testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their
personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though the
preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number.
Unfortunately, petitioner Chings testimony alone does not constitute preponderant evidence to establish respondent Nicdaos civil liability to him
amounting to P20,950,000.00. Apart from the discredited checks, he failed to adduce any other documentary evidence to prove that respondent Nicdao still
has unpaid obligations to him in the said amount. Bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof under our Rules.50
In contrast, respondent Nicdaos defense consisted in, among others, her allegation that she had already paid her obligations to petitioner Ching through
Nuguid. In support thereof, she presented the Planters Bank demand draft for P1,200,000.00. The said demand draft was negotiated to petitioner Chings
account and he admitted receipt of the value thereof. Petitioner Ching tried to controvert this by claiming that it was payment for a previous transaction
between him and respondent Nicdao. However, other than his self-serving claim, petitioner Ching did not proffer any documentary evidence to prove the
existence of the said previous transaction. Considering that the Planters Bank demand draft was dated August 13, 1996, it is logical to conclude that, absent
any evidence to the contrary, it formed part of respondent Nicdaos payment to petitioner Ching on account of the loan obligations that she obtained from
him since October 1995.
Additionally, respondent Nicdao submitted as evidence the cigarette wrappers at the back of which were written the computations of the daily payments
that she had made to Nuguid. The fact of the daily payments was corroborated by the other witnesses for the defense, namely, Jocelyn Nicdao and
Tolentino. As found by the CA, based on these computations, respondent Nicdao had made a total payment of P5,780,000.00 to Nuguid as of July 21,
1997.51 Again, the payments made, as reflected at the back of these cigarette wrappers, were not disputed by petitioner Ching. Hence, these payments as
well as the amount of the Planters Bank demand draft establish that respondent Nicdao already paid the total amount of P6,980,000.00 to Nuguid and
petitioner Ching.
The Court agrees with the CA that the daily payments made by respondent Nicdao amounting to P5,780,000.00 cannot be considered as interest payments
only. Even respondent Nicdao testified that the daily payments that she made to Nuguid were for the interests due. However, as correctly ruled by the CA,
no interests could be properly collected in the loan transactions between petitioner Ching and respondent Nicdao because there was no stipulation therefor
in writing. To reiterate, under Article 1956 of the Civil Code, "no interest shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing."
Neither could respondent Nicdao be considered to be estopped from denying the validity of these interests. Estoppel cannot give validity to an act that is xxx
prohibited by law or one that is against public policy.52 Clearly, the collection of interests without any stipulation therefor in writing is prohibited by law.
Consequently, the daily payments made by respondent Nicdao amounting to P5,780,000.00 were properly considered by the CA as applying to the principal chanrobles virtual law library
amount of her loan obligations. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED. This case is REMANDED to the court of origin for further
With respect to the P20,000,000.00 check, the defense of respondent Nicdao that it was stolen and that she never issued or delivered the same to proceedings.rbl r l l lbrr
petitioner Ching was corroborated by the other defense witnesses, namely, Tolentino and Jocelyn Nicdao.
All told, as between petitioner Ching and respondent Nicdao, the requisite quantum of evidence - preponderance of evidence - indubitably lies with SO ORDERED.8rll
respondent Nicdao. As earlier intimated, she cannot be held civilly liable to petitioner Ching for her acquittal; under the circumstances which have just been
discussed lengthily, such acquittal carried with it the extinction of her civil liability as well. chanrobles virtual law library
The CA committed no reversible error in not consolidating CA-G.R. CR No. 23055 and CA-G.R. CR No. 23054 Factual Antecedents
During the pendency of CA-G.R. CR No. 23055 and CA-G.R. CR No. 23054 in the CA, the pertinent provision of the RIRCA on consolidation of cases provided:
SEC. 7. Consolidation of Cases. Whenever two or more allied cases are assigned to different Justices, they may be consolidated for study and report to a In February 1999, FR Cement Corporation (FRCC), owner/operator of a cement manufacturing plant, issued several withdrawal authorities9 for the account
single Justice. of cement dealers and traders, Fil-Cement Center and Tigerbilt. These withdrawal authorities state the number of bags that the dealer/trader paid for and
(a) At the instance of any party or Justice to whom the case is assigned for study and report, and with the conformity of all the Justices concerned, the can withdraw from the plant. Each withdrawal authority contained a provision that it is valid for six months from its date of issuance, unless revoked by FRCC
consolidation may be allowed when the cases to be consolidated involve the same parties and/or related questions of fact and/or law.53 Marketing Department.
The use of the word "may" denotes the permissive, not mandatory, nature of the above provision, Thus, no grave error could be imputed to the CA when it
proceeded to render its decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 23055, without consolidating it with CA-G.R. CR No. 23054. Fil-Cement Center and Tigerbilt, through their administrative manager, Gail Borja (Borja), sold the withdrawal authorities covering 50,000 bags of cement to
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Co for the amount of P3.15 million or P63.00 per bag.10 On February 15, 1999, Co sold these withdrawal authorities to Lim allegedly at the price of P64.00
per bag or a total of P3.2 million.11rll
SO ORDERED.
Using the withdrawal authorities, Lim withdrew the cement bags from FRCC on a staggered basis. She successfully withdrew 2,800 bags of cement, and sold
SECTION 3. When Civil Action May Proceed Independently. back some of the withdrawal authorities, covering 10,000 bags, to Co.

1. Lim v. Kou Co Ping, G.R. Nos. 175256 & 179160, August 23, 2012. Sometime in April 1999, FRCC did not allow Lim to withdraw the remaining 37,200 bags covered by the withdrawal authorities. Lim clarified the matter with
Co and Borja, who explained that the plant implemented a price increase and would only release the goods once Lim pays for the price difference or agrees
FIRST DIVISION to receive a lesser quantity of cement. Lim objected and maintained that the withdrawal authorities she bought were not subject to price fluctuations. Lim
sought legal recourse after her demands for Co to resolve the problem with the plant or for the return of her money had failed.
[G.R. NO. 175256 - August 23, 2012]
The criminal case
LILY LIM, Petitioner, v. KOU CO PING a.k.a. CHARLIE CO, Respondent.
An Information for Estafa through Misappropriation or Conversion was filed against Co before Branch 154 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City. The
G.R. No. 179160 accusatory portion thereof reads:rbl r l l lbrr

KOU CO PING a.k.a. CHARLIE CO, Petitioner, v. LILY LIM, Respondent. On or about between the months of February and April 1999, in San Juan, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused,
with intent to defraud Lily Lim, with grave abuse of confidence, with unfaithfulness, received in trust from Lily Lim cash money in the amount of
DECISION P2,380,800.00 as payment for the 37,200 bags of cement, under obligation to deliver the 37,200 bags of cement to said Lily Lim, but far from complying with
his obligation, misappropriated, misapplied and converted to his own personal use and benefit the said amount of P2,300,800.00 [sic] and despite demands,
DEL CASTILLO, J.: the accused failed and refused to return said amount, to the damage and prejudice of Lily Lim in the amount of P2,380,800.00.rbl r l
l lbrr
Is it forum shopping for a private complainant to pursue a civil complaint for specific performance and damages, while appealing the judgment on the civil
aspect of a criminal case for estafa?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary Contrary to Law.12rll

Before the Court are consolidated Petitions for Review assailing the separate Decisions of the Second and Seventeenth Divisions of the Court of Appeals (CA) chanrobles virtual law library
on the above issue. The private complainant, Lily Lim, participated in the criminal proceedings to prove her damages. She prayed for Co to return her money amounting to
P2,380,800.00, foregone profits, and legal interest, and for an award of moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney s fees.13rll
Lily Lim s (Lim) Petition for Review1 assails the October 20, 2005 Resolution2 of the Second Division in CA-G.R. CV No. 85138, which ruled on the above issue
in the affirmative:rbl r l l lbrr On November 19, 2003, the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 154, rendered its Order14 acquitting Co of the estafa charge for insufficiency of evidence. The criminal
court s Order reads:rbl r l l lbrr
Due to the filing of the said civil complaint (Civil Case No. 5112396), Charlie Co filed the instant motion to dismiss [Lily Lim s] appeal, alleging that in filing
said civil case, Lily Lim violated the rule against forum shopping as the elements of litis pendentia are present.rbl r l l lbrr The first and second elements of the crime of estafa [with abuse of confidence under Article 315, paragraph 1(b)] for which the accused is being charged
and prosecuted were not established by the prosecution s evidence.rbl r l l lbrr
This Court agrees.3rll
xxx
xxx
chanrobles virtual law library
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appeal is DISMISSED. In view of the absence of the essential requisites of the crime of estafa for which the accused is being charged and prosecuted, as above discussed, the
Court has no alternative but to dismiss the case against the accused for insufficiency of evidence.15rll
SO ORDERED.4rll
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Demurrer to Evidence is GRANTED, and the accused is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of estafa charged against
chanrobles virtual law library
him under the present information for insufficiency of evidence.
On the other hand, Charlie Co s (Co) Petition for Review5 assails the April 10, 2007 Decision6 of the Seventeenth Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 93395 for ruling
on the same issue in the negative:rbl r l l lbrr Insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned, however, set this case for the reception of his evidence on the matter on December 11, 2003 at 8:30
o clock [sic] in the morning.rbl r l l lbrr
We find no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent judge. The elements of litis pendentia and forum-shopping were not met in this
case.7rbl r l l lbrr SO ORDERED.16rll
chanrobles virtual law library
After the trial on the civil aspect of the criminal case, the Pasig City RTC also relieved Co of civil liability to Lim in its December 1, 2004 Order.17 The 33. Charlie Co s acts of falsely representing to Lily Lim that she may be able to withdraw the cement from FR Cement Corp. caused Lily Lim to incur expenses
dispositive portion of the Order reads as follows:rbl r l l lbrr and losses. Such act was made without justice, without giving Lily Lim what is due her and without observing honesty and good faith, all violative of the law,
more specifically Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code. Such willful act was also made by Charlie Co in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered holding the accused CHARLIE CO not civilly liable to the private complainant Lily policy, in violation of Article 21 of the Civil Code.
Lim.rbl r l l lbrr
34. FR Cement Corporation s unjust refusal to honor the Withdrawal Authorities they issued also caused damage to Lily Lim. Further, FR Cement Corporation
SO ORDERED.18rll s act of withholding the 37,200 bags of cement despite earning income therefor constitutes as an unjust enrichment because FR Cement Corporation
acquired income through an act or performance by another or any other means at the expense of another without just or legal ground in violation of Article
chanrobles virtual law library 22 of the Civil Code.
Lim sought a reconsideration of the above Order, arguing that she has presented preponderant evidence that Co committed estafa against
her.19rbl r l l lbrr 35. Fil-Cement Center, Tigerbilt and Gail Borja s false assurances that Lily Lim would be able to withdraw the remaining 37,200 bags of cement caused Lily
Lim to incur expenses and losses. x x x Moreover, Fil-Cement Center admitted receiving payment for said amount of cement, thus they are deemed to have
The trial court denied the motion in its Order20 dated February 21, 2005. come into possession of money at the expense of Lily Lim without just or legal ground, in violation of Article 22 of the Civil Code.
chanrobles virtual law library THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION:
On March 14, 2005, Lim filed her notice of appeal21 on the civil aspect of the criminal case. Her appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 85138 and raffled to MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES and
the Second Division of the CA. ATTORNEY S FEES AND COSTS OF SUIT22rll

The civil action for specific performance chanrobles virtual law library
Lim prayed for Co to honor his contractual commitments either by delivering the 37,200 bags of cement, making arrangements with FRCC to allow Lim to
On April 19, 2005, Lim filed a complaint for specific performance and damages before Branch 21 of the RTC of Manila. The defendants in the civil case were withdraw the cement, or to pay for their value. She likewise asked that the defendants be held solidarily liable to her for the damages she incurred in her
Co and all other parties to the withdrawal authorities, Tigerbilt, Fil-Cement Center, FRCC, Southeast Asia Cement, and La Farge Corporation. The complaint, failed attempts to withdraw the cement and for the damages they inflicted on her as a result of their abuse of their rights.23rll
docketed as Civil Case No. 05-112396, asserted two causes of action: breach of contract and abuse of rights. Her allegations read:rbl r
l l lbrr Motions to dismiss both actions

ALLEGATIONS COMMON
TO ALL CAUSES OF ACTIONrbl r l l lbrr civil aspect of the estafa case or CA-G.R. CV No. 85138.25 He maintained that the two actions raise the same issue, which is Co s liability to Lim for her
xxx
chanrobles virtual law library
23. Charlie Co obligated himself to deliver to Lily Lim 50,000 bags of cement of P64.00 per bag on an x-plant basis within 3 months from the date of their
transaction, i.e. February 15, 1999. Pursuant to said agreement, Lily Lim paid Charlie Co P3.2 Million while Charlie Co delivered to Lily Lim FR Cement
Withdrawal Authorities representing 50,000 bags of cement.
24. The withdrawal authorities issued by FR Cement Corp. allowed the assignee or holder thereof to withdraw within a six-month period from date a certain
amount of cement indicated therein. The Withdrawal Authorities given to Lily Lim were dated either 3 February 1999 or 23 February 1999. The Withdrawal
Authorities were first issued to Tigerbilt and Fil-Cement Center which in turn assigned them to Charlie Co. Charlie Co then assigned the Withdrawal
Authorities to Lily Lim on February 15, 1999. Through these series of assignments, Lily Lim acquired all the rights (rights to withdraw cement) granted in said
Withdrawal Authorities.
25. That these Withdrawal Authorities are valid is established by the fact that FR Cement earlier allowed Lily Lim to withdraw 2,800 bags of cement on the
basis thereof.
In reaction to the filing of the civil complaint for specific performance and damages, Co filed motions to dismiss the said civil case24 and Lim s appeal in the
inability to withdraw the bags of cement,26 and should be dismissed on the ground of lis pendens and forum shopping.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals Second Division in CA-G.R CV No. 85138
The appellate court (Second Division) favorably resolved Co s motion and dismissed Lim s appeal from the civil aspect of the estafa case. In its Resolution
dated October 20, 2005, the CA Second Division held that the parties, causes of action, and reliefs prayed for in Lim s appeal and in her civil complaint are
identical. Both actions seek the same relief, which is the payment of the value of the 37,200 bags of cement.27 Thus, the CA Second Division dismissed Lim s
appeal for forum shopping.28 The CA denied29 Lim s motion for reconsideration.30rll
Lim filed the instant Petition for Review, which was docketed as G.R. No. 175256.
Ruling of the Manila Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 05-112396
Meanwhile, the Manila RTC denied Co s Motion to Dismiss in an Order31 dated December 6, 2005. The Manila RTC held that there was no forum shopping
because the causes of action invoked in the two cases are different. It observed that the civil complaint before it is based on an obligation arising from
contract and quasi-delict, whereas the civil liability involved in the appeal of the criminal case arose from a felony.

26. However, sometime 19 April 1999 (within the three (3)-month period agreed upon by Charlie Co and Lily Lim and certainly within the six (6)-month Co filed a petition for certiorari, 32 docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 93395, before the appellate court. He prayed for the nullification of the Manila RTC s Order in
period indicated in the Withdrawal Authorities issued by FR Cement Corp.), Lily Lim attempted but failed to withdraw the remaining bags of cement on Civil Case No. 05-112396 for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.33rll
account of FR Cement s unjustified refusal to honor the Withdrawal Authorities. x x xrbl r l l lbrr
Ruling of the Court of Appeals Seventeenth Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 93395
xxx
The CA Seventeenth Division denied Co s petition and remanded the civil complaint to the trial court for further proceedings. The CA Seventeenth Division
chanrobles virtual law library agreed with the Manila RTC that the elements of litis pendentia and forum shopping are not met in the two proceedings because they do not share the
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION: same cause of action.34rbl r l l lbrr
BREACH OF CONTRACT
The CA denied35 Co s motion for reconsideration.36rll
30. Charlie Co committed and is therefore liable to deliver to Lily Lim 37,200 bags of cement. If he cannot, then he must pay her the current fair market
value thereof. chanrobles virtual law library
Co filed the instant Petition for Review, which was docketed as G.R. No. 179160.rbl r l l lbrr
31. FR Cement Corporation is also liable to deliver to Lily Lim the amount of cement as indicated in the Withdrawal Authorities it issued. xxx FR Cement
Corporation has no right to impose price adjustments as a qualification for honoring the Withdrawal Authorities. Upon Co s motion,37 the Court resolved to consolidate the two petitions.38rll

32. Fil-Cement Center, Tigerbilt and Gail Borja as the original holders/ assignees of the Withdrawal Authorities repeatedly assured Lily Lim that the same chanrobles virtual law library
were valid and would be honored. They are liable to make good on their assurances. Kou Co Ping s arguments

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION: Co maintains that Lim is guilty of forum shopping because she is asserting only one cause of action in CA-G.R. CV No. 85138 (the appeal from the civil aspect
ABUSE OF RIGHTS AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT of Criminal Case No. 116377) and in Civil Case No. 05-112396, which is for Co s violation of her right to receive 37,200 bags of cement. Likewise, the reliefs
sought in both cases are the same, that is, for Co to deliver the 37,200 bags of cement or its value to Lim. That Lim utilized different methods of presenting
her case a criminal action for estafa and a civil complaint for specific performance and damages should not detract from the fact that she is attempting to
litigate the same cause of action twice.39rll
Co makes light of the distinction between civil liability ex contractu and ex delicto. According to him, granting that the two civil liabilities are independent of
each other, nevertheless, the two cases arising from them would have to be decided using the same evidence and going over the same set of facts. Thus,
any judgment rendered in one of these cases will constitute res judicata on the other.40rll
In G.R. No. 179160, Co prays for the annulment of the CA Decision and Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 93395, for a declaration that Lim is guilty of forum
shopping, and for the dismissal of Civil Case No. 05-112396.41rll
In G.R. No. 175256, Co prays for the affirmation of the CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 85138 (which dismissed Lim s appeal from the trial court s decision in
Criminal Case No. 116377).42rll
Lily Lim s arguments
Lim admits that the two proceedings involve substantially the same set of facts because they arose from only one transaction.43 She is quick to add,
however, that a single act or omission does not always make a single cause of action.44 It can possibly give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of
the offender (1) ex delicto or civil liability arising from crimes, and (2) independent civil liabilities or those arising from contracts or intentional torts. The
only caveat provided in Article 2177 of the Civil Code is that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission.45 Because the
law allows her two independent causes of action, Lim contends that it is not forum shopping to pursue them.46rll
She then explains the separate and distinct causes of action involved in the two cases. Her cause of action in CA-G.R CV No. 85138 is based on the crime of
estafa. Co violated Lim s right to be protected against swindling. He represented to Lim that she can withdraw 37,200 bags of cement using the authorities
she bought from him. This is a fraudulent representation because Co knew, at the time that they entered into the contract, that he could not deliver what he
promised.47 On the other hand, Lim s cause of action in Civil Case No. 05-112396 is based on contract. Co violated Lim s rights as a buyer in a contract of
sale. Co received payment for the 37,200 bags of cement but did not deliver the goods that were the subject of the sale.48rll
In G.R. No. 179160, Lim prays for the denial of Co s petition.49 In G.R. No. 175256, she prays for the reversal of the CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 85138, for
a declaration that she is not guilty of forum shopping, and for the reinstatement of her appeal in Criminal Case No. 116377 to the CA.50rll
Issue
Did Lim commit forum shopping in filing the civil case for specific performance and damages during the pendency of her appeal on the civil aspect of the
criminal case for estafa?
Our Ruling
A single act or omission that causes damage to an offended party may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender51 - (1) civil
liability ex delicto, that is, civil liability arising from the criminal offense under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,52 and (2) independent civil liability,
that is, civil liability that may be pursued independently of the criminal proceedings. The independent civil liability may be based on "an obligation not
arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony," as provided in Article 31 of the Civil Code (such as for breach of contract or for tort53). It may
also be based on an act or omission that may constitute felony but, nevertheless, treated independently from the criminal action by specific provision of
Article 33 of the Civil Code ("in cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries").
The civil liability arising from the offense or ex delicto is based on the acts or omissions that constitute the criminal offense; hence, its trial is inherently
intertwined with the criminal action. For this reason, the civil liability ex delicto is impliedly instituted with the criminal offense.54 If the action for the civil
liability ex delicto is instituted prior to or subsequent to the filing of the criminal action, its proceedings are suspended until the final outcome of the
criminal action.55 The civil liability based on delict is extinguished when the court hearing the criminal action declares that "the act or omission from which
the civil liability may arise did not exist."56rll
On the other hand, the independent civil liabilities are separate from the criminal action and may be pursued independently, as provided in Articles 31 and
33 of the Civil Code, which state that:rbl r l l lbrr THIRD DIVISION
ART. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. (Emphasis supplied.)
ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be
brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
(Emphasis supplied.)
chanrobles virtual law library
Because of the distinct and independent nature of the two kinds of civil liabilities, jurisprudence holds that the offended party may pursue the two types of
civil liabilities simultaneously or cumulatively, without offending the rules on forum shopping, litis pendentia, or res judicata.57 As explained in Cancio, Jr. v.
Isip:58rbl r l l lbrr
One of the elements of res judicata is identity of causes of action. In the instant case, it must be stressed that the action filed by petitioner is an independent
civil action, which remains separate and distinct from any criminal prosecution based on the same act. Not being deemed instituted in the criminal action
based on culpa criminal, a ruling on the culpability of the offender will have no bearing on said independent civil action based on an entirely different cause
of action, i.e., culpa contractual.
In the same vein, the filing of the collection case after the dismissal of the estafa cases against the offender did not amount to forum-shopping. The essence
of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, to secure a
favorable judgment. Although the cases filed by [the offended party] arose from the same act or omission of [the offender], they are, however, based on
different causes of action. The criminal cases for estafa are based on culpa criminal while the civil action for collection is anchored on culpa contractual.
Moreover, there can be no forum-shopping in the instant case because the law expressly allows the filing of a separate civil action which can proceed
independently of the criminal action.59rll
chanrobles virtual law library
Since civil liabilities arising from felonies and those arising from other sources of obligations are authorized by law to proceed independently of each other,
the resolution of the present issue hinges on whether the two cases herein involve different kinds of civil obligations such that they can proceed
independently of each other. The answer is in the affirmative.
The first action is clearly a civil action ex delicto, it having been instituted together with the criminal action.60rll
On the other hand, the second action, judging by the allegations contained in the complaint,61 is a civil action arising from a contractual obligation and for
tortious conduct (abuse of rights). In her civil complaint, Lim basically alleges that she entered into a sale contract with Co under the following terms: that
she bought 37,200 bags of cement at the rate of P64.00 per bag from Co; that, after full payment, Co delivered to her the withdrawal authorities issued by
FRCC corresponding to these bags of cement; that these withdrawal authorities will be honored by FRCC for six months from the dates written thereon. Lim
then maintains that the defendants breached their contractual obligations to her under the sale contract and under the withdrawal authorities; that Co and
his co-defendants wanted her to pay more for each bag of cement, contrary to their agreement to fix the price at P64.00 per bag and to the wording of the
withdrawal authorities; that FRCC did not honor the terms of the withdrawal authorities it issued; and that Co did not comply with his obligation under the
sale contract to deliver the 37,200 bags of cement to Lim. From the foregoing allegations, it is evident that Lim seeks to enforce the defendants contractual
obligations, given that she has already performed her obligations. She prays that the defendants either honor their part of the contract or pay for the
damages that their breach has caused her.
Lim also includes allegations that the actions of the defendants were committed in such manner as to cause damage to Lim without regard for morals, good
customs and public policy. These allegations, if proven, would constitute tortious conduct (abuse of rights under the Human Relations provisions of the Civil
Code).
Thus, Civil Case No. 05-112396 involves only the obligations arising from contract and from tort, whereas the appeal in the estafa case involves only the civil
obligations of Co arising from the offense charged. They present different causes of action, which under the law, are considered "separate, distinct, and
independent"62 from each other. Both cases can proceed to their final adjudication, subject to the prohibition on double recovery under Article 2177 of the
Civil Code.63rll
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Lily Lim s Petition in G.R. No. 175256 is GRANTED. The assailed October 20, 2005 Resolution of the Second Division of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 85138 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Lily Lim s appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 85138 is ordered REINSTATED and the Court of
Appeals is DIRECTED to RESOLVE the same with DELIBERATE DISPATCH.
Charlie Co s Petition G.R. No. 179160 is DENIED. The assailed April 10, 2007 Decision of the Seventeenth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
93395 is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
2. Casupanan v. Laroya, G.R. No. 145391, August 26, 2002.
[G.R. No. 145391. August 26, 2002]
AVELINO CASUPANAN and ROBERTO CAPITULO, petitioners, vs. MARIO LLAVORE LAROYA, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the Resolution[1] dated December 28, 1999 dismissing the petition for certiorari and the Resolution[2]
dated August 24, 2000 denying the motion for reconsideration, both issued by the Regional Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66, in Special Civil Action No.
17-C (99).
The Facts
Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Mario Llavore Laroya (Laroya for brevity) and the other owned by petitioner Roberto Capitulo (Capitulo for brevity)
and driven by petitioner Avelino Casupanan (Casupanan for brevity), figured in an accident. As a result, two cases were filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court (MCTC for brevity) of Capas, Tarlac. Laroya filed a criminal case against Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property, docketed
as Criminal Case No. 002-99. On the other hand, Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for quasi-delict, docketed as Civil Case No. 2089.
When the civil case was filed, the criminal case was then at its preliminary investigation stage. Laroya, defendant in the civil case, filed a motion to dismiss
the civil case on the ground of forum-shopping considering the pendency of the criminal case. The MCTC granted the motion in the Order of March 26, 1999
and dismissed the civil case.
On Motion for Reconsideration, Casupanan and Capitulo insisted that the civil case is a separate civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal
case. The MCTC denied the motion for reconsideration in the Order of May 7, 1999. Casupanan and Capitulo filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
before the Regional Trial Court (Capas RTC for brevity) of Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66,[3] assailing the MCTCs Order of dismissal.
The Trial Courts Ruling
The Capas RTC rendered judgment on December 28, 1999 dismissing the petition for certiorari for lack of merit. The Capas RTC ruled that the order of
dismissal issued by the MCTC is a final order which disposes of the case and therefore the proper remedy should have been an appeal. The Capas RTC
further held that a special civil action for certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal. Finally, the Capas RTC declared that even on the premise that the
MCTC erred in dismissing the civil case, such error is a pure error of judgment and not an abuse of discretion.
Casupanan and Capitulo filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the Capas RTC denied the same in the Resolution of August 24, 2000.
Hence, this petition.
The Issue
The petition premises the legal issue in this wise:
In a certain vehicular accident involving two parties, each one of them may think and believe that the accident was caused by the fault of the other. x x x
[T]he first party, believing himself to be the aggrieved party, opted to file a criminal case for reckless imprudence against the second party. On the other
hand, the second party, together with his operator, believing themselves to be the real aggrieved parties, opted in turn to file a civil case for quasi-delict
against the first party who is the very private complainant in the criminal case.[4]
Thus, the issue raised is whether an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence can validly file, simultaneously and independently, a
separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private complainant in the criminal case.
The Courts Ruling
Casupanan and Capitulo assert that Civil Case No. 2089, which the MCTC dismissed on the ground of forum-shopping, constitutes a counterclaim in the
criminal case. Casupanan and Capitulo argue that if the accused in a criminal case has a counterclaim against the private complainant, he may file the
counterclaim in a separate civil action at the proper time. They contend that an action on quasi-delict is different from an action resulting from the crime of
reckless imprudence, and an accused in a criminal case can be an aggrieved party in a civil case arising from the same incident. They maintain that under
Articles 31 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the civil case can proceed independently of the criminal action. Finally, they point out that Casupanan was not the
only one who filed the independent civil action based on quasi-delict but also Capitulo, the owner-operator of the vehicle, who was not a party in the
criminal case.
In his Comment, Laroya claims that the petition is fatally defective as it does not state the real antecedents. Laroya further alleges that Casupanan and
Capitulo forfeited their right to question the order of dismissal when they failed to avail of the proper remedy of appeal. Laroya argues that there is no
question of law to be resolved as the order of dismissal is already final and a petition for certiorari is not a substitute for a lapsed appeal.
In their Reply, Casupanan and Capitulo contend that the petition raises the legal question of whether there is forum-shopping since they filed only one
action - the independent civil action for quasi-delict against Laroya.
Nature of the Order of Dismissal
The MCTC dismissed the civil action for quasi-delict on the ground of forum-shopping under Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94. The MCTC did
not state in its order of dismissal[5] that the dismissal was with prejudice. Under the Administrative Circular, the order of dismissal is without prejudice to
refiling the complaint, unless the order of dismissal expressly states it is with prejudice.[6] Absent a declaration that the dismissal is with prejudice, the same
is deemed without prejudice. Thus, the MCTCs dismissal, being silent on the matter, is a dismissal without prejudice.
Section 1 of Rule 41[7] provides that an order dismissing an action without prejudice is not appealable. The remedy of the aggrieved party is to file a special
civil action under Rule 65. Section 1 of Rule 41 expressly states that where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an
appropriate special civil action under Rule 65. Clearly, the Capas RTCs order dismissing the petition for certiorari, on the ground that the proper remedy is an
ordinary appeal, is erroneous.
Forum-Shopping
The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, to
secure a favorable judgment.[8] Forum-shopping is present when in the two or more cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights of action and reliefs
sought.[9] However, there is no forum-shopping in the instant case because the law and the rules expressly allow the filing of a separate civil action which
can proceed independently of the criminal action.
Laroya filed the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property based on the Revised Penal Code while Casupanan and Capitulo filed
the civil action for damages based on Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Although these two actions arose from the same act or omission, they have different
causes of action. The criminal case is based on culpa criminal punishable under the Revised Penal Code while the civil case is based on culpa aquiliana
actionable under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code. These articles on culpa aquiliana read:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence
under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
Any aggrieved person can invoke these articles provided he proves, by preponderance of evidence, that he has suffered damage because of the fault or
negligence of another. Either the private complainant or the accused can file a separate civil action under these articles. There is nothing in the law or rules
that state only the private complainant in a criminal case may invoke these articles.
Moreover, paragraph 6, Section 1, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure (2000 Rules for brevity) expressly requires the accused to litigate his
counterclaim in a separate civil action, to wit:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) x x x.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been the
subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action. (Emphasis supplied)
Since the present Rules require the accused in a criminal action to file his counterclaim in a separate civil action, there can be no forum-shopping if the
accused files such separate civil action.
Filing of a separate civil action
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure (1985 Rules for brevity), as amended in 1988, allowed the filing of a separate civil action
independently of the criminal action provided the offended party reserved the right to file such civil action. Unless the offended party reserved the civil
action before the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution, all civil actions arising from the same act or omission were deemed impliedly instituted
in the criminal case. These civil actions referred to the recovery of civil liability ex-delicto, the recovery of damages for quasi-delict, and the recovery of
damages for violation of Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code on Human Relations.
Thus, to file a separate and independent civil action for quasi-delict under the 1985 Rules, the offended party had to reserve in the criminal action the right
to bring such action. Otherwise, such civil action was deemed impliedly instituted in the criminal action. Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules provided as
follows:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted
with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused.
A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or the reservation of the right to file, any of said civil actions separately waives
the others.
The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made before the prosecution starts to present its evidence and under
circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the accused.
x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules was amended on December 1, 2000 and now provides as follows:

SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the
offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under
circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
xxx
(b) x x x
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application
with the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this rule governing
consolidation of the civil and criminal actions. (Emphasis supplied)
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, what is deemed instituted with the criminal action is only the action to recover civil liability arising from the crime
or ex-delicto. All the other civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code are no longer deemed instituted, and may be filed separately and
prosecuted independently even without any reservation in the criminal action. The failure to make a reservation in the criminal action is not a waiver of the
right to file a separate and independent civil action based on these articles of the Civil Code. The prescriptive period on the civil actions based on these
articles of the Civil Code continues to run even with the filing of the criminal action. Verily, the civil actions based on these articles of the Civil Code are
separate, distinct and independent of the civil action deemed instituted in the criminal action.[10]
Under the present Rule 111, the offended party is still given the option to file a separate civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto by reserving such right
in the criminal action before the prosecution presents its evidence. Also, the offended party is deemed to make such reservation if he files a separate civil
action before filing the criminal action. If the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is filed separately but its trial has not yet commenced, the civil
action may be consolidated with the criminal action. The consolidation under this Rule does not apply to separate civil actions arising from the same act or
omission filed under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code.[11]
Suspension of the Separate Civil Action
Under Section 2, Rule 111 of the amended 1985 Rules, a separate civil action, if reserved in the criminal action, could not be filed until after final judgment
was rendered in the criminal action. If the separate civil action was filed before the commencement of the criminal action, the civil action, if still pending,
was suspended upon the filing of the criminal action until final judgment was rendered in the criminal action. This rule applied only to the separate civil
action filed to recover liability ex-delicto. The rule did not apply to independent civil actions based on Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, which
could proceed independently regardless of the filing of the criminal action.
The amended provision of Section 2, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules continues this procedure, to wit:
SEC. 2. When separate civil action is suspended. After the criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom cannot be
instituted until final judgment has been entered in the criminal action.
If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been instituted, the latter shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found before
judgment on the merits. The suspension shall last until final judgment is rendered in the criminal action. Nevertheless, before judgment on the merits is
rendered in the civil action, the same may, upon motion of the offended party, be consolidated with the criminal action in the court trying the criminal
action. In case of consolidation, the evidence already adduced in the civil action shall be deemed automatically reproduced in the criminal action without
prejudice to the right of the prosecution to cross-examine the witnesses presented by the offended party in the criminal case and of the parties to present
additional evidence. The consolidated criminal and civil actions shall be tried and decided jointly.
During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the period of prescription of the civil action which cannot be instituted separately or whose
proceeding has been suspended shall be tolled.
x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Section 2, Rule 111 of the present Rules did not change the rule that the separate civil action, filed to recover damages ex-delicto, is suspended upon
the filing of the criminal action. Section 2 of the present Rule 111 also prohibits the filing, after commencement of the criminal action, of a separate civil
action to recover damages ex-delicto.
When civil action may proceed independently
The crucial question now is whether Casupanan and Capitulo, who are not the offended parties in the criminal case, can file a separate civil action against
the offended party in the criminal case. Section 3, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules provides as follows:
SEC 3. When civil action may proceed independently. - In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the
independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance
of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action. (Emphasis
supplied)
Section 3 of the present Rule 111, like its counterpart in the amended 1985 Rules, expressly allows the offended party to bring an independent civil action
under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code. As stated in Section 3 of the present Rule 111, this civil action shall proceed independently of the
criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or
omission charged in the criminal action.
There is no question that the offended party in the criminal action can file an independent civil action for quasi-delict against the accused. Section 3 of the
present Rule 111 expressly states that the offended party may bring such an action but the offended party may not recover damages twice for the same act
or omission charged in the criminal action. Clearly, Section 3 of Rule 111 refers to the offended party in the criminal action, not to the accused.
Casupanan and Capitulo, however, invoke the ruling in Cabaero vs. Cantos[12] where the Court held that the accused therein could validly institute a
separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private complainant in the criminal case. In Cabaero, the accused in the criminal case filed his Answer with
Counterclaim for malicious prosecution. At that time the Court noted the absence of clear-cut rules governing the prosecution on impliedly instituted civil
actions and the necessary consequences and implications thereof. Thus, the Court ruled that the trial court should confine itself to the criminal aspect of the
case and disregard any counterclaim for civil liability. The Court further ruled that the accused may file a separate civil case against the offended party after
the criminal case is terminated and/or in accordance with the new Rules which may be promulgated. The Court explained that a cross-claim, counterclaim or
third-party complaint on the civil aspect will only unnecessarily complicate the proceedings and delay the resolution of the criminal case.
Paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 was incorporated in the 2000 Rules precisely to address the lacuna mentioned in Cabaero. Under this
provision, the accused is barred from filing a counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint in the criminal case. However, the same provision states that
any cause of action which could have been the subject (of the counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint) may be litigated in a separate civil action.
The present Rule 111 mandates the accused to file his counterclaim in a separate civil action which shall proceed independently of the criminal action, even
as the civil action of the offended party is litigated in the criminal action.
Conclusion
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with the
criminal action but may be filed separately by the offended party even without reservation. The commencement of the criminal action does not suspend the
prosecution of the independent civil action under these articles of the Civil Code. The suspension in Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers only to the civil
action arising from the crime, if such civil action is reserved or filed before the commencement of the criminal action.
Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or omission. The first a criminal case where the civil action to recover civil liability ex-
delicto is deemed instituted, and the other a civil case for quasi-delict - without violating the rule on non-forum shopping. The two cases can proceed
simultaneously and independently of each other. The commencement or prosecution of the criminal action will not suspend the civil action for quasi-delict.
The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. In most cases, the offended
party will have no reason to file a second civil action since he cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the accused. In some instances,
the accused may be insolvent, necessitating the filing of another case against his employer or guardians.
Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or omission he is accused of in the criminal case. This is expressly allowed in
paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 which states that the counterclaim of the accused may be litigated in a separate civil action. This is only fair
for two reasons. First, the accused is prohibited from setting up any counterclaim in the civil aspect that is deemed instituted in the criminal case. The
accused is therefore forced to litigate separately his counterclaim against the offended party. If the accused does not file a separate civil action for quasi-
delict, the prescriptive period may set in since the period continues to run until the civil action for quasi-delict is filed.
Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke Article 2177 of the Civil Code, in the same way that the offended party can avail of this
remedy which is independent of the criminal action. To disallow the accused from filing a separate civil action for quasi-delict, while refusing to recognize his
counterclaim in the criminal case, is to deny him due process of law, access to the courts, and equal protection of the law.
Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by Casupanan and Capitulo is proper. The order of dismissal by the MCTC of Civil Case No. 2089
on the ground of forum-shopping is erroneous.
We make this ruling aware of the possibility that the decision of the trial court in the criminal case may vary with the decision of the trial court in the
independent civil action. This possibility has always been recognized ever since the Civil Code introduced in 1950 the concept of an independent civil action
under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Code. But the law itself, in Article 31 of the Code, expressly provides that the independent civil action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. In Azucena vs. Potenciano,[13] the Court declared:
x x x. There can indeed be no other logical conclusion than this, for to subordinate the civil action contemplated in the said articles to the result of the
criminal prosecution whether it be conviction or acquittal would render meaningless the independent character of the civil action and the clear injunction in
Article 31 that this action 'may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
More than half a century has passed since the Civil Code introduced the concept of a civil action separate and independent from the criminal action
although arising from the same act or omission. The Court, however, has yet to encounter a case of conflicting and irreconcilable decisions of trial courts,
one hearing the criminal case and the other the civil action for quasi-delict. The fear of conflicting and irreconcilable decisions may be more apparent than
real. In any event, there are sufficient remedies under the Rules of Court to deal with such remote possibilities.
One final point. The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure took effect on December 1, 2000 while the MCTC issued the order of dismissal on December 28,
1999 or before the amendment of the rules. The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure must be given retroactive effect considering the well-settled rule that
-
x x x statutes regulating the procedure of the court will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage.
Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent.[14]
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions dated December 28, 1999 and August 24, 2000 in Special Civil Action
No. 17-C (99) are ANNULLED and Civil Case No. 2089 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
 away from the scene. She further testified that she had no knowledge of any reason why the Lipatas would kill her father, but her fathers death brought her
SECTION 4. Effect of Death on Civil Actions. pain and sadness and anger against the perpetrators of her fathers killing.

1. People v. Lipata, G.R. No. 200302, April 20, 2016. The Defense[s] Evidence

SECOND DIVISION The defense presented a sole witness in the person of appellant himself. According to appellant, he was resting in his house in Sipna Compound, Brgy.
Bagong Silangan, Quezon City on September 1, 2005 at around 6:00 p.m. when two children, namely John Paul Isip and a certain Rommel, called him and
April 20, 2016 told him to help his brother, Larry Lipata. He immediately rushed to his brother and upon arrival he saw Larry being stabbed by the victim. He
instantaneously assisted his brother but the victim continued stabbing Larry, causing Larry to fall to the ground. Thereafter, appellant managed to grab the
G.R. No. 200302 knife from the victim and stab the victim. Then he fled from the scene [of the crime] because he was wounded. Appellants sister-in-law, a certain Lenlen,
brought him to the Amang Medical Center for treatment of his stab wound where he was apprehended by police officers.6
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs. The RTCs Ruling
GERRY LIPATA y ORTIZA, Appellant.
The RTC noted that since appellant raised the justifying circumstance of defense of a relative, he hypothetically admitted the commission of the crime.
DECISION Hence, the burden of proving his innocence shifted to appellant. The RTC found that the defense failed to adequately establish the element of unlawful
aggression on the part of Cueno. There was no actual or imminent danger to the life of appellant or of his brother Larry. On the contrary, the three Lipata
CARPIO, J.:
brothers (appellant, Larry, and Rudy)7 employed treachery and took advantage of their superior strength when they attacked Cueno after Cueno left the
The Case house of his sister-in-law. Cueno suffered 17 stab wounds on his trunk from the Lipata brothers. The existence of multiple stab wounds on the trunk of the
unarmed Cueno is inconsistent with appellants theory of defense of a relative. The RTC, however, ruled that the prosecution failed to show conclusive proof
G.R. No. 200302 is an appeal 1 assailing the Decision2 promulgated on 31May2011 by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04461. The CA of evident premeditation.
affirmed the Decision3 dated 23 March 2010 of Branch 85 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (RTC) in Criminal Case No. Q-05-136584. The RTC found
appellant Gerry Lipata y Ortiza (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion The dispositive portion of the RTCs decision reads:
perpetua. The RTC also ordered appellant to pay damages to the heirs of Rolando Cueno (Cueno).4
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court here[b]y renders judgment finding the accused GERRY LIPATA Y ORTIZA guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of reclusion perpetua from twenty (20) years
The Facts
and one (1) day to forty (40) years.
Appellant was charged with the crime of Murder in an Information which reads as follows:
The accused is hereby adjudged to pay the heirs of Rolando Cueno the following amounts:
That on or about the 1st day of September, 2005, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring, confederating with two (2) other persons whose
true names, identities and definite whereabouts have not as (a) Php 50,000.00 representing civil indemnity ex delicto of the accused;

yet been ascertained and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill and with evident premeditation and treachery, and taking advantage of superior (b) Php 120,550.00 representing the actual damages incurred by the heirs of Rolando Cueno, incident to his death plus 12% interest per annum computed
from 6 September 2005 until fully paid;
strength, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
(c) Php 50,000.00 as moral damages for the mental and emotional anguish suffered by the heirs arising from the death of Rolando Cueno; and
attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one RONALDO CUENO Y BONIFACIO, by then and there stabbing him repeatedly with
bladed weapons, hitting him on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal stab wounds which were the direct and
(d) Php 25,000[.00] as exemplary damages.
immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of Ronaldo Cueno y Bonifacio.
The accused shall be credited with the full period of his preventive imprisonment, subject to the conditions imposed under Article 29 of the Revised Penal
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
Code, as amended.
Appellant was arraigned on 11 October 2005, and entered a plea of not guilty to the charge. Pre-trial conference was terminated on 26 October 2005, and
SO ORDERED.8
trial on the merits ensued.
Appellant, through the Public Attorneys Office (PAO), filed a notice of appeal9 on 6 April 2010. The RTC granted appellants notice in an Order10 dated 19
The CA summarized the parties evidence as follows:
April 2010.
The Prosecution[s] Evidence
The CAs Ruling
Mercelinda Valzado, sister-in-law of the victim Rolando Cueno, testified that on September 1, 2005 at around 6:00 p.m., she was in her house located in [sic]
The CA dismissed appellants appeal and affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA agreed with the RTCs ruling that appellants claim of defense of a relative
Lot 34, Block 4, Sipna Compound, Bagong Silangan, Quezon City. She was about to leave the house to go to the market when she saw appellant, his brother
must fail. There was no actual or imminent threat on the life of appellant or of his brother Larry. There was also no reason for appellant to stab Cueno.
Larry Lipata and a certain [Rudy] attacking the victim by repeatedly stabbing him. She was at a distance of more or less ten (10) meters from the incident.
Cueno was outnumbered by the Lipata brothers, three to one. The requirement of lack of provocation on the part of appellant is negated by the multiple
Shocked at what she had just witnessed, she shouted for help and pleaded the assailants to stop, but they did not stop stabbing the victim. In her account,
stab wounds that Cueno sustained.
she recalled that the assailants, including appellant, used a tres
The CA disagreed with appellants contention that the prosecution failed to establish treachery. The CA pointed out that Cueno was not forewarned of any
cantos, an ice pick and a broken piece of glass of Red Horse [bottle]. At one point, the victim managed to take the knife away from appellant and brandished
impending threat to his life. Cueno was unarmed, and went to his sister-in-laws house to gather malunggay leaves. The Lipata brothers, on the other hand,
the same at his attackers. Thereafter, the victim fell on the ground. Upon seeing the victim fall, appellant and the other assailants left the scene. Through the
were readily armed with tres cantos, an icepick, and a broken piece of glass from a Red Horse bottle. The execution of the Lipata brothers attack made it
help of some neighbors, Mercelinda rushed the victim to a hospital but he was pronounced dead on arrival.
impossible for Cueno to retaliate.
Criz Reymiluz Cueno, daughter of the victim, testified that she saw appellant together with Larry Lipata and Rudy Lipata [stab] her father to death in front of
The CA also disagreed with appellants contention that there was no abuse of superior strength. The three Lipata brothers were all armed with bladed
their house. She recounted that upon arriving at home from work on September 1, 2005 at around 6:00 p.m., her father immediately went to the house of
weapons when they attacked the unarmed Cueno. The Lipata brothers refused to stop stabbing Cueno until they saw him unconscious.
her aunt Mercelinda Valzado, which was located only a block away from their house, to ask for malunggay leaves.
The dispositive portion of the CAs decision reads:
Upon coming home from her aunts house, the victim was attacked by the Lipatas which prompted the victim to run away. Thinking that his assailants were
no longer around, the victim proceeded to their [sic] house but then the Lipatas stabbed him to death. She was at a distance of six (6) to eight (8) meters WHEREFORE, finding the appeal to be bereft of merit, the same is hereby DISMISSED. The appealed decision of the trial court convicting appellant of the
crime of murder is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.11
The PAO filed a notice of appeal12 on behalf of appellant on 10 June 2011. The CA ordered the immediate elevation of the records to this Court in its 30
June 2011 Resolution.13
Appellants Death Prior to Final Judgment
This Court, in a Resolution dated 13 June 2012,14 noted the records forwarded by the CA and required the Bureau of Corrections (BuCor) to confirm the
confinement of appellant. The BuCor, in a letter dated 26 July 2012, informed this Court that there is no record of confinement of appellant as of date. In a
Resolution dated 10 September 2012,15 this Court required the Quezon City Jail Warden to transfer appellant to the New Bilibid Prison and to report
compliance within ten days from notice. The Quezon City Jail Warden, in a letter dated 22 October 2012,16 informed this Court that appellant passed away
on 13 February 2011. The former Quezon City Jail Warden wrote to the RTC about appellants demise in a letter dated 23 February 2011. Attached to the 22
October 2012 letter were photocopies of appellants death certificate and medical certificate, as well as the former Quezon City Jail Wardens letter.17 In a
Resolution dated 7 January 2013,18 this Court noted the 22 October 2012 letter from the Quezon City Jail Warden, and required the parties to submit their
supplemental briefs on the civil aspect of the case if they so desire.
The Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation dated 18 March 2013,19 which stated that it had already exhaustively argued the relevant issues in
its appellees brief. The PAO, on the other hand, filed a supplemental brief on 26 March 2013.20
In view of appellants death prior to the promulgation of the CAs decision, this Court issued a Resolution dated 25 September 2013 which ordered the PAO
"(1) to SUBSTITUTE the legal representatives of the estate of the deceased appellant as party; and (2) to COMMENT on the civil liability of appellant within
ten (10) days from receipt of this Resolution."21
The PAO filed its Manifestation with Comment on the Civil Liability of the Deceased Appellant on 29 November 2013.22 According to the Public Attorneys
Office-Special and Appealed Cases Service, the relatives of the deceased appellant have not communicated with it since the case was assigned to its office
on 29 September 2010. The PAO sent a letter on 4 November 2013 to Lilia Lipata, who was appellants next of kin per official records. Despite receipt of the
letter, the relatives of appellant still failed to communicate with the PAO.
In its Manifestation, the PAO stated that:
xxxx
9. Considering that the civil liability in the instant case arose from and is based solely on the act complained of, i.e. murder, the same does not survive the
death of the deceased appellant. Thus, in line with the abovecited ruling [People v. Jaime Ayochok, G.R. No. 175784, 25 August 2010, 629 SCRA 324, citing
People v. Rogelio Bayotas, G.R. No. 102007, 2 September 1994, 236 SCRA 239], the death of the latter pending appeal of his conviction extinguished his
criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon.
10. This being so, it is respectfully submitted that the necessity to substitute the legal representatives of the estate of the deceased as party does not
arise.23
On 9 July 2014, this Court issued a Resolution which declared that "the [PAO] shall continue as the legal representative of the estate of the deceased
[appellant] for purposes of representing the estate in the civil aspect of this case."24
The Courts Ruling
At the outset, we declare that because of appellants death prior to the promulgation of the CAs decision, there is no further need to determine appellants
criminal liability. Appellants death has the effect of extinguishing his criminal liability. Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Article 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the
offender occurs before final judgment;
xxxx
What this Court will discuss further is the effect of appellants death with regard to his civil liability. In 1994, this Court, in People v. Bayotas,25 reconciled
the differing doctrines on the issue of whether the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his civil liability. We concluded that
"[u]pon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the
accused; the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal."26
We also ruled that "if the private offended party, upon extinction of the civil liability ex delicto desires to recover damages from the same act or omission
complained of, he must subject to Section 1, Rule 111 ([of the then applicable] 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended) file a separate civil action,
this time predicated not on the felony previously charged but on other sources of obligation. The source of obligation upon which the separate civil action is
premised determines against whom the same shall be enforced."27
We proceeded to distinguish the defendants among the different causes of action. If the act or omission complained of arises from quasidelict or, by
provision of law, results in an injury to person or real or personal property, the separate civil action must be filed against the executor or administrator of the
estate pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court.28 On the other hand, if the act or omission complained of arises from contract, the separate civil
action must be filed against the estate of the accused pursuant to Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.29
We summarized our ruling in Bayotas as follows:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by
Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising
from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other
than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or
omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) x x x
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil
action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the
prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the
statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the
Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible deprivation of right by prescription.30 (Emphases supplied)
The promulgation of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure in 2000 provided for the effect of the death of the accused after arraignment and during the
pendency of the criminal action to reflect our ruling in Bayotas:
Sec. 4. Effect of death on civil actions. The death of the accused after arraignment and during the pendency of the criminal action shall extinguish the civil
liability arising from the delict. However, the independent civil action instituted under Section 3 of this Rule or which thereafter is instituted to enforce
liability arising from other sources of obligation may be continued against the estate or legal representative of the accused after proper substitution or
against said estate, as the case may be. The heirs of the accused may be substituted for the deceased without requiring the appointment of an executor or
administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from
notice.1wphi1
A final judgment entered in favor of the offended party shall be enforced in the manner especially provided in these rules for prosecuting claims against the
estate of the deceased.
If the accused dies before arraignment, the case shall be dismissed without prejudice to any civil action the offended party may file against the estate of the
deceased.
Contrary to the PAOs Manifestation with Comment on the Civil Liability of the Deceased Appellant,31 Cueno died because of appellants fault. Appellant
caused damage to Cueno through deliberate acts.32 Appellants civil liability ex quasi delicto may now be pursued because appellants death on 13 February
2011, before the promulgation of final judgment, extinguished both his criminal liability and civil liability ex delicto.
Despite the recognition of the survival of the civil liability for claims under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, as well as from sources of obligation
other than delict in both jurisprudence and the Rules, and our subsequent designation of the PAO as the "legal representative of the estate of the deceased
[appellant] for purposes of representing the estate in the civil aspect of this case,"33 the current Rules, pursuant to our pronouncement in
Bayotas,34 require the private offended party, or his heirs, in this case, to institute a separate civil action to pursue their claims against the estate of the
deceased appellant. The independent civil actions in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176, as well as claims from sources of obligation other than delict, are not
deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be filed separately by the offended party even without reservation.35 The separate civil action proceeds
independently of the criminal proceedings and requires only a preponderance of evidence.36 The civil action which may thereafter be instituted against the
estate or legal representatives of the decedent is taken from the new provisions of Section 16 of Rule 337 in relation to the rules for prosecuting claims
against his estate in Rules 86 and 87.38
2. Cabugao v. People, G.R. Nos. 163879 & 165805, July 30, 2015.
Upon examination of the submitted pleadings, we found that there was no separate civil case instituted prior to the criminal case. Neither was there any
reservation for filing a separate civil case for the cause of action arising from quasi-delict. Under the present Rules, the heirs of Cueno should file a separate Republic of the Philippines
civil case in order to obtain financial retribution for their loss. The lack of a separate civil case for the cause of action arising from quasidelict leads us to the SUPREME COURT
conclusion that, a decade after Cuenos death, his heirs cannot recover even a centavo from the amounts awarded by the CA. Manila

However, for similar cases in the future, we refer to the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court for study and recommendation to the Court En THIRD DIVISION
Banc appropriate amendments to the Rules for a speedy and inexpensive resolution of such similar cases with the objective of indemnifying the private
offended party or his heirs in cases where an accused dies after conviction by the trial court but pending appeal. G.R. No. 163879 July 30, 2014

In Lumantas v. Calapiz,39 this Court declared that our law recognizes that an acquittal based on reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused does not DR. ANTONIO P. CABUGAO, Petitioner,
exempt the accused from civil liability ex delicto which may be proved by preponderance of evidence. This Courts pronouncement in Lumantas is based on vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SPOUSES RODOLFO M. PALMA and ROSARIO F. PALMA, Respondents.
Article 29 of the Civil Code:
x-----------------------x
Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for
damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court
G.R. No. 165805
may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.
DR. CLENIO YNZON, Petitioner,
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it vs.
may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SPOUSES RODOLFO M. PALMA AND ROSARIO F. PALMA, Respondents.

We also turn to the Code Commissions justification of its recognition of the possibility of miscarriage of justice in these cases: DECISION

The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil liability is one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal
system. It has given rise to numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to
the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the criminal offense, when the latter is not
proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.
This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of
demarcation between criminal liability and civil responsibility, and to determine the logical result of the distinction. The two liabilities are separate and
distinct from each other. One affects the social order and the other, private rights. One is for the punishment or correction of the offender while the other is
for reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party. The two responsibilities are so different from each other that article 1813 of the present
(Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: "There may be a compromise upon the civil action arising from a crime; but the public action for the imposition of the legal
penalty shall not thereby be extinguished." It is just and proper that, for the purpose of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense should be
proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of indemnifying the complaining party, why should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable
doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every private right to be proved only by a preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any less
private because the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law?
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court are appeals via Rule 45 from the Decision1 dated June 4, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 27293, affirming the Decision2
dated February 28,2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), convicting appellant Dr. Antonio P. Cabugao (Dr. Cabugao) and Dr. Clenio Ynzon (Dr. Ynzon) of the
crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide.
The Information3 alleged
That on or about June 17, 2000in the City of Dagupan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, DR.
ANTONIO P.CABUGAO and DR. CLENIO YNZON, being then the attending physicians of one RODOLFO PALMA, JR., a minor 10 years old, confederating and
acting jointly with one another, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail through negligence, carelessness and imprudence to perform
immediate operation upon their patient, RODOLFO PALMA, JR. of acute appendicitis, when they, the said physicians, should have been done so considering
that examinations conducted upon their patient Rodolfo Palma, Jr. seriously manifest todo so, causing by such negligence, carelessness, and imprudence the
victim, RODOLFO PALMA JR., to die due to:

For these reasons, the Commission recommends the adoption of the reform under discussion. It will correct a serious defect in our law. It will close up an "CARDIORESPIRATORY ARREST, METABOLIC ENCEPHALOPATHY, SEPTICEMIA (ACUTE APPENDICITIS), CEREBRAL ANEURYSM RUPTURED (?)"
inexhaustible source of injustice a cause for disillusionment on the part of innumerable persons injured or wronged.40
As per Certificate of Death issued by accused Dr. Antonio P. Cabugao, to the damage and prejudice of the legal heirs of said deceased RODOLFO PALMA, JR.
In similar manner, the reform in procedure in these cases to be recommended by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court shall aim to provide and other consequential damages relative thereto.
the aggrieved parties relief, as well as recognition of their right to indemnity. This reform is of course subject to the policy against double recovery.
CONTRARY to Article 365, 1st par. of the Revised Penal Code.
WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the Decision promulgated on 31 May 2011 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04461. The criminal and civil liabilities
ex delicto of appellant Gerry Lipata y Ortiza are declared EXTINGUISHED by his death prior to final judgment. Dagupan City, Philippines, January 29, 2001.

Let a copy, of this Decision be forwarded to the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court. Arising from the same events, the Court resolved to consolidate these cases.4 The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:

SO ORDERED. On June 14, 2000, at around 4 o'clock in the afternoon, ten (10)-year old Rodolfo F. Palma, Jr. (JR) complained of abdominal pain to his mother, Rosario
Palma. At 5 oclock that sameafternoon, Palma's mother and father, Atty. Rodolfo Palma Sr., brought JR to the clinic of accused Dr. Cabugao. Dr. Cabugao, a
general practitioner, specializing in familymedicine gave medicines for the pain and told Palma's parents to call him up if his stomach pains continue. Due to
persistent abdominal pains, at 4:30 in the early morning of June 15, 2000, they returnedto Dr. Cabugao, who advised them to bring JR to the Nazareth
General Hospital in Dagupan City, for confinement. JR was admitted at the said hospital at 5:30 in the morning.5

Blood samples were taken from JR for laboratory testing. The complete blood count conveyed the following result: wbc 27.80 x 10 9/L; lymphocytes 0.10
and neutrophils 0.90. Diagnostic ultrasound was likewise conducted on the patient's lower abdomen by radiologist, Dr. Ricky V. Querubin, with the
following findings:

Normal liver, bile ducts, gallbladder, pancreas, spleen, kidneys and urinary bladder.

There is no free peritoneal fluid.

There is localized tenderness in the paraumbilical region, more so in the supra and right paraumbilical areas.
There is a vague elongated hypoechoic focus in the right periumbilical region roughly about 47 x 18 mm surrounded by undistended gas-filled bowels. This is
suggestive of an inflammatory process wherein appendiceal or periappendiceal pathology cannot be excluded. Clinical correlation is essential."6
Dr. Cabugao did a rectal examination noting the following: "rectal: good sphincter, negative tenderness, negative mass." The initial impression was Acute
Appendicitis,7 and hence, he referred the case to his co-accused, Dr. Ynzon, a surgeon.8 In the later part of the morning of June 15, 2000, Dr. Ynzon went to
the hospital and readthe CBC and ultrasound results. The administration of massive antibiotics and pain reliever to JRwere ordered. Thereafter, JR was
placed on observation for twenty-four (24) hours.
In the morning of June 16, 2000, JR complained again of abdominal pain and his parents noticeda swelling in his scrotum. In the afternoon of the same day,
JR vomitted out greenish stuff three (3) times and had watery bowels also three (3) times. The nurses on-duty relayed JR's condition to Dr. Ynzon who merely
gaveorders via telephone.9 Accused continued medications to alleviate JR's abdominal spasms and diarrhea. By midnight, JR again vomitted twice, had loose
bowel movements and was unable to sleep. The following morning, June 17,2000, JR's condition worsened, he had a running fever of 38C. JR's fever
remained uncontrolled and he became unconscious, he was given Aeknil (1 ampule) and Valium (1 ampule). JR's condition continued to deteriorate that by
2 o'clock in the afternoon, JR's temperature soared to 42C, had convulsions and finally died.
The Death Certificate10 dated June 19, 2000 prepared by Dr. Cabugao indicated the following causes of death:
Immediate cause: CARDIORESPIRATORY ARREST
Antecedent cause: METABOLIC ENCEPHALOPATHY
Underlying cause: SEPTICEMIA (ACUTE APPENDICITIS)
Other significant conditionscontributing to death:
CEREBRAL ANEURYSM RUPTURED (?)
No post-mortem examination was conducted on JR. On February 1, 2001, an Information was filed against accused for reckless imprudence resulting to
homicide. At their arraignment, both accused, duly assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge.
On February 28, 2003, in convicting both the accused, the trial court found the following circumstances as sufficient basis to conclude that accused were
indeed negligent in the performance of their duties:
It is unquestionable that JR was under the medical care of the accused from the time of his admission for confinement at the Nazareth General Hospital until
his death. Upon his admission, the initial working diagnosis was to consider acute appendicitis. To assist the accused in the consideration of acute
appendicitis, Dr. Cabugao requested for a complete blood count (CBC) and a diagnostic ultrasound on JR. The findings of the CBC and ultrasound showed
that an inflammatory process or infection was going on inside the body of JR. Said inflammatory process was happening in the periumbilical region where
the appendix could be located. The initial diagnosis of acute appendicitis appears to be a distinct possibility. x x x.
Dr. Ynzon ordered medications to treat the symptoms being manifested by JR. Thereafter, he ordered that JR be observed for 24 hours. However, the
accused, as the attending physicians, did not personally monitor JR in order to check on subtle changes that may occur. Rather, they left the monitoring and
actual observation to resident physicians who are just on residency training and in doing so, they substituted their own expertise, skill and competence with
those of physicians who are merely new doctors still on training. Not having personally observed JR during this 24-hour critical period of observation, the
accused relinquished their duty and thereby were unable to give the proper and correct evaluation as to the real condition of JR. In situations where
massive infection is going on as shown by the aggressive medication of antibiotics, the condition of the patient is serious which necessitated personal, not
delegated, attention of attending physicians, namely JR and the accused in this case.
xxxx
Throughout the course of the hospitalization and treatment of JR, the accused failed to address the acute appendicitis which was the initial diagnosis. They
did not take steps to find out if indeed acute appendicitis was what was causing the massive infection that was ongoing inside the body of JR even when the
inflammatory process was located at the paraumbilical region where the appendix can be located. x x x
There may have been other diseases but the records do not show that the accused took steps to find outwhat disease exactly was plaguing JR. It was their
duty to find out the disease causing the health problem of JR, but they did not perform any process of elimination. Appendicitis, according to expert
testimonies, could be eliminated only by surgery but no surgery was done by the accused. But the accused could not have found out the real disease of JR
because they were treating merely and exclusively the symptoms by means of the different medications to arrest the manifested symptoms. In fact, by
treating the symptoms alone, the accused were recklessly and wantonly ignoring the same as signs of the graver health problem of JR. This gross negligence
on the part of the accused allowed the infection to spread inside the body of JR unabated. The infection obviously spread so fastand was so massive that
within a period of only two and a half (2 ) days from the day of admission to the hospital on June 15, 2000, JR who was otherwise healthy died [of]
Septicemia (Acute Appendicitis) on June 17, 2000.11
On June 4, 2004, in affirming the accused' conviction, the Court of Appeals gave similar observations, to wit:
The foregoing expert testimony clearly revealed such want of reasonable skill and care on the part of JR's attending physicians, appellants Dr. Cabugao and
Dr. Ynzon in neglecting to monitor effectively and sufficiently the developments/changes during the observation period and act upon the situation after said
24-hour period when his abdominal pain subsisted, his condition even worsened with the appearance of more serious symptoms of nausea, vomiting and
diarrhea. Considering the brief visit only made on regular rounds, the records clearly show such gross negligence in failing to take appropriate steps to
determine the real cause of JR's abdominal pain so that the crucial decision to perform surgery (appendectomy) had even been ruled out precisely because
of the inexcusable neglect to undertake suchefficient diagnosis by process of elimination, as correctly pointed out by the trial court. As has been succinctly
emphasized by Dr. Mateo, acute appendicitis was the working diagnosis, and with the emergence of symptoms after the 24-hour observation (high fever,
vomiting, diarrhea) still, appellants ruled out surgery, not even considering exploratory laparoscopy. Dr. Mateo also expressed the opinion that the decision
to operate could have been made after the result of the ultrasound test, considering that acute appendicitis was the initial diagnosis by Dr. Cabugao after he
had conducted a rectal examination.
Medical records buttress the trial court's finding that in treating JR, appellants have demonstrated indifference and neglect of the patient's condition as a
serious case. Indeed, appendicitis remains a clinical emergencyand a surgical disease, as correctly underscored by Dr. Mateo, a practicing surgeon who has
already performed over a thousand appendectomy. In fact, appendectomy is the only rational therapy for acute appendicitis; it avoids clinical deterioration
and may avoid chronic or recurrent appendicitis. Although difficult, prompt recognition and immediate treatment of the disease prevent complications.
Under the factual circumstances, the inaction, neglect and indifference of appellants who, after the day of admission and after being apprised of the
ongoing infection from the CBC and initial diagnosis as acute appendicitis from rectal examination and ultrasound testand only briefly visited JR once during
regular rounds and gave medication orders by telephone constitutes gross negligenceleading to the continued deterioration of the patient, his infection
having spread in sofast a pace that he died within just two and a half (2 ) days stay inthe hospital. Authorities state that if the clinical picture is unclear a
short period of 4 to 6 hours of watchful waiting and a CT scan may improve diagnostic accuracy and help to hasten diagnosis.Even assuming that JR's case
had an atypical presentation in view of the location of his appendix, laboratory tests could have helped to confirm diagnosis, as Dr. Mateo opined thatthe
possibility of JR having a retrocecal appendicitis should have been a strong consideration. Lamentably, however, as found by the trial court, appellants had
not taken steps towards correct diagnosis and demonstrated laxity even when JR was already running a high fever in the morning of June 17, 2000 and
continued vomiting with diarrhea, his abdominal pain becoming more intense. This is the reason why private complainants were not even apprised of the
progress of appellants' diagnosis appellants have nothing to report because they did nothing towards the end and merely gave medications to address the
symptoms.12
Thus, these appeals brought beforethis Court raising the following arguments:
I
WHETHER THE CAUSE OF ACCUSATION AS CONTAINED IN THE INFORMATION IS "FAILURE TO PERFORM IMMEDIATE OPERATION UPON THE PATIENT
ROFOLFO PALMA JR. OF ACUTE APPENDICITIS;
II
WHETHER THE SUBJECT INFORMATION APPEARS TO HAVE ACCUSED BOTH ACCUSED DOCTORS OF CONSPIRACY AND THE APPEALED DECISION SEEMS TO
HAVE TREATED BOTH ACCUSED DOCTORS TO BE IN CONSPIRACY;
III
WHETHER PETITIONER DR. CABUGAO IS A GENERAL PRACTITIONER (NOT A SURGEON) AND HAVE EXCLUDED SURGERY FROM THE LIMITS OFHIS PRACTICE,
AND IT WAS NOT AND NEVER HIS DUTY TO OPERATE THE PATIENT RODOLFO PALMA JR., THAT WAS WHY HE REFERRED SUBJECT PATIENT TO A SURGEON, DR.
CLENIO YNZON;
IV
WHETHER THE DEFENSE NEVER STATED THAT THERE IS GUARANTEE THAT DOING SURGERY WOULD HAVE SAVED THE PATIENT;
V
WHETHER THE WITNESSES FOR THE PROSECUTION INCLUDING PROSECUTION'S EXPERT WITNESSES EVER DECLARED/TESTIFIED THAT PETITIONER DR.
CABUGAO HAD THE DUTY TO PERFORM IMMEDIATE OPERATION ON RODOLFO PALMA, JR., AND THEY FAILED TO STATE/SHOW THAT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE
OF DEATH OF JR WAS ACUTE APPENDICITIS;
VI
WHETHER THE EXPERT WITNESSES PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION EVER QUESTIONED THE MANAGEMENT AND CARE APPLIED BY PETITIONER DR.
CABUGAO;
VII
WHETHER THE EXPERT WITNESSES PRESENTED BY THE DEFENSE ARE UNANIMOUS IN APPROVING THE METHOD OF TREATMENT APPLIED BY BOTH ACCUSED
DOCTORS ON SUBJECT PATIENT, AND THEY DECLARED/AFFIRMED THAT THEY WOULD FIRST PLACE SUBJECT THE PATIENT UNDER OBSERVATION, AND Q And when to decide the surgery would it be a particular exact time, would it be the same for all surgeons?
WOULD NOT PERFORM IMMEDIATE OPERATION;
A If you are asking acute appendicitis, it would be about 24 hours because acute appendicitis is a 24-hour disease, sir.
VIII
Q. And would it be correct to say that it depends on the changes on the condition of the patient?
WHETHER THE CONVICTION OF PETITIONER DR. YNZON WAS ESTABLISHED WITH THE REQUIRED QUANTUM OF PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THAT
THE PATIENT WAS SPECIFICALLY SUFFERING FROM AND DIED OF ACUTE APPENDICITIS; and A. Yes, sir.

IX Q. So, are you saying more than 24 hours when there are changes?

WHETHER THE FAILURE TO CONDUCT THE SPECIFIC SURGICAL OPERATION KNOWN AS APPENDECTOMY CONSTITUTED CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE. A. If there are changes in the patient pointing towards appendicitis then you have to decide right there and then, sir.

In a nutshell, the petition brought before this Court raises the issue of whether or not petitioners' conviction of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in Q. So if there are changes in the patient pointing to appendicitis?
homicide, arising from analleged medical malpractice, is supported by the evidence on record.
A. It depends now on what you are trying to wait for in the observation period, sir.
Worth noting is that the assigned errors are actually factual in nature, which as a general rule, findings of factof the trial court and the Court of Appeals are
binding and conclusiveupon this Court, and we will not normally disturb such factual findings unless the findings of the court are palpably unsupported by Q. So precisely if the change is a condition which bring you in doubt that there is something else other than appendicitis, would you extend over a period of
the evidence on record or unless the judgment itself is based on misapprehension of facts. Inthe instant case, we find the need to make certain exception. 24 hours?

AS TO DR. YNZON'S LIABILITY: A. It depends on the emergent development, sir.

Reckless imprudence consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice, an act from which material damage results by reason of an inexcusable Q. That is the point, if you are the attending physician and there is a change not pointing to appendicitis, would you extend over a period of 24 hours?
lack of precautionon the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act.13 The elements of reckless imprudence are: (1) that the offender does
A. In 24 hours you have to decide, sir.
or fails to do an act; (2) that the doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary; (3) that it bewithout malice; (4) that material damage results from the
reckless imprudence; and (5) that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender, taking into consideration his employment or xxxx
occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.14
Q. And that is based on the assessment of the attending physician?
With respect to Dr. Ynzon, all the requisites of the offense have been clearly established by the evidence on record. The court a quoand the appellate court
were one in concluding that Dr. Ynzon failed to observe the required standard of care expected from doctors. A. Yes, sir.18

In the instant case, it was sufficiently established that to prevent certain death, it was necessary to perform surgery on JR immediately. Even the Dr. Mateo further testified on cross-examination:
prosecutions own expert witness, Dr. Antonio Mateo,15 testified during cross-examination that he would perform surgery on JR:
ATTY. CASTRO:
ATTY. CASTRO:
Q: So you will know yourself, as far as the record is concerned, because if you will agree with me, you did not even touch the patient?
Q. Given these data soft non-tender abdomen, ambulatory, watery diarrhea, Exhibit C which is the ultrasound result, with that laboratory would you operate
the patient? A. Yes, I based my opinion on what is put on record, sir. The records show that after the observation period, the abdominal pain is still there plus there are
already other signs and symptoms which are not seen or noted.
A Yes, I would do surgery.
Q. But insofar as you yourself not having touched the abdomen of the patient, would you give a comment on that?
Q And you should have done surgery with this particular case?"
A. Yes, based on the record, after 24 hours of observation, the pain apparently was still there and there was more vomiting and there was diarrhea. In my
A Yes, sir.16 personal opinion, I think the condition of the patient was deteriorating.

xxxx Q. Even though you have not touched the patient?

COURT: A. I based on what was on the record, sir.19

Q You stated a while ago doctor thatyou are going to [do] surgery to the patient, why doctor, if you are notgoing to do surgery, what will happen? From the foregoing, it is clear that if JRs condition remained unchecked it would ultimately result in his death, as what actually happened in the present
case. Another expert witness for the defense, Dr. Vivencio Villaflor, Jr. testified on direct examination that he would perform a personal and thorough
A If this would be appendicitis, the usual progress would be that it would be ruptured and generalized peritonitis and eventually septicemia, sir. physical examination of the patient as frequent as every 4 to 6 hours, to wit:
Q What do you mean by that doctor? ATTY. CASTRO:
A That means that infection would spread throughout the body, sir. Q. As an expert doctor, if you were faced with a history of abdominal pain with nausea, vomiting, fever, anurecia (sic), elevated white blood cell count,
physical examination of a positive psoas sign, observation of the sonologist of abdominal tenderness and the ultrasound findings of the probability of
Q If unchecked doctor, what will happen?
appendiceal (sic) pathology, what will you do if you have faced these problems, Doctor?
A It will result to death.17
A. I will examine the patient thoroughly and it will depend on my physical examination and that isprobably every 4 to 6 hours, sir.20
xxxx
On cross-examination, Dr. Villaflor affirmed:
Q And what would have you doneif you entertain other considerations from the time the patient was admitted?
Cross Exam. By Atty. Marteja:
A From the time the patient was admitted until the report of the sonologist, I would have made a decision by then.
Q. x x x However, there are corrections and admissions made at that time, your Honor, do I understand thatT/C does not mean ruled out but rather to
consider the matter?
A. Yes, now that I have seen the records of the patient, it says here, impression and T/C means to consider the appendicitis.
Q. Isn't it that it is worth then to say that the initial working diagnosis on Rodolfo Palma, Jr., otherwise known as JR, to whom I shall now refer to as JR, the
primary consideration then is acute appendicitis, is that correct to say Doctor?
A. I think so, that is the impression.
Q. x x x Now if it is to be considered as the primary consideration in the initial working diagnosis, isn't it a fact that it has tobe ruled out in order to consider
it as not the disease of JR?
A. Yes. Sir.
Q. Isn't it a fact thatto rule out acute appendicitis as not the disease of JR, surgery or operation must be done, isn't it Doctor?
A. You have to correlate all the findings.
Q. Is it yes or no, Doctor?
A. Yes.
Q. So, you are saying then that in order to rule out acute appendicitis there must be an operation, that is right Doctor?
A. No, sir. If your diagnosis is toreally determine if it is an acute appendicitis, you have to operate.21
xxxx
Q. Now Doctor, considering the infection, considering that there was a [symptom] that causes pain, considering that JR likewise was feverish and that he was
vomiting, does that not show a disease of acute appendicitis Doctor?
A. Its possible.
Q. So that if that is possible, are we getting the impression then Doctor what you have earlier mentioned that the only way to rule out the suspect which is
acute appendicitis is by surgery, you have said that earlier Doctor, I just want any confirmation of it?
A. Yes, sir.22
Verily, whether a physician or surgeon has exercised the requisite degree of skill and care in the treatment of his patient is, in the generality of cases, a
matter of expert opinion. The deference of courts to the expert opinions of qualified physicians stems from its realization that the latter possess unusual
technical skills which laymen in most instances are incapable of intelligently evaluating.23 From the testimonies of the expert witnesses presented, it was
irrefutably proven that Dr. Ynzon failed to practice that degree of skill and care required in the treatment of his patient.
As correctly observed by the appellate court, Dr. Ynzon revealed want of reasonable skill and care in attending to the needs of JR by neglecting to monitor
effectively the developmentsand changes on JR's condition during the observation period, and to act upon the situation after the 24-hour period when his
abdominal pain persisted and his condition worsened. Lamentable, Dr. Ynzon appeared to have visited JRbriefly only during regular rounds in the mornings.
He was not there during the crucial times on June 16, 2000 when JR's condition started to deteriorate until JR's death. As the attending surgeon, he should
be primarily responsible in monitoring the condition of JR, as he is in the best position considering his skills and experience to know if the patient's condition
had deteriorated. While the resident-doctors-onduty could likewise monitor the patientscondition, he is the one directly responsible for the patient as the
attending surgeon. Indeed, it is reckless and gross negligence of duty to relegate his personal responsibility to observe the condition of the patient. Again,
acute appendicitis was the working diagnosis, and with the emergence of graver symptoms after the 24-hour observation, Dr. Ynzon ruled out surgery for no
apparent reason. We, likewise, note that the records are devoid of showing of any reasonable cause which would lead Dr. Ynzon tooverrule appendectomy
despite the initial diagnosis of appendicitis. Neitherwas there any showing that he was entertaining another diagnosis nor he took appropriate steps
towards another diagnosis.
Among the elements constitutive of reckless imprudence, what perhaps is most central to a finding of guilt is the conclusive determination that the accused
has exhibited, by his voluntary act without malice, an inexcusable lack of precaution. It is that which supplies the criminal intent so indispensable as tobring
an act of mere negligence and imprudence under the operation of the penal law. This is because a conscious indifference to the consequences of the
conduct is all that is required from the standpoint of the frame of mind of the accused.24 Quasioffenses penalize the mental attitudeor condition behind the
act, the dangerous recklessness, the lack of care or foresight, the "imprudencia punible," unlike willful offenses which punish the intentional criminal act.25
This is precisely where this Court found Dr. Ynzon to be guilty of - his seemingly indifference to the deteriorating condition of JR that he as a consequence,
failed to exercise lack of precaution which eventually led to JR's death.
To be sure, whether or not a physician has committed an "inexcusable lack of precaution" in the treatment of his patient is to be determined according to
the standard of care observed by other members of the profession in good standing under similar circumstances bearing in mind the advanced state of the
profession at the time of treatment or the present state of medical science. In accepting a case, a doctor in effect represents that, having the needed
training and skill possessed by physicians and surgeons practicing in the same field, he will employ such training, care and skill in the treatment of his
patients. He, therefore, has a duty to use at least the same level of care that any other reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a condition under
the same circumstances.26 Sadly, Dr. Ynzon did not display that degree of care and precaution demanded by the circumstances.
AS TO DR. CABUGAO'S LIABILITY:
Every criminal conviction requires of the prosecution to prove two things the fact of the crime, i.e., the presence of all the elements of the crime for
which the accused stands charged, and the fact that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime. Based on the above disquisitions, however, the prosecution
failed to prove these two things. The Court is not convinced with moral certainty that Dr. Cabugao isguilty of reckless imprudence as the elements thereof
were not proven by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt.
Both the trial court and the appellate court bewail the failure to perform appendectomy on JR, or the failure to determine the source of infection which
caused the deterioration of JR's condition. However, a review of the records fail to show that Dr. Cabugao is in any position to perform the required
appendectomy.
Immediately apparent from a review of the records of this case is the fact that Dr. Cabugao is not a surgeon,but a general practitioner specializing in family
medicine;27 thus, even if he wanted to, he cannot do an operation, much less an appendectomy on JR. It is precisely for this reason why he referred JR to Dr.
Ynzon after he suspected appendicitis. Dr. Mateo, the prosecutions expert witness, emphasized the role of the surgeon during direct examination, to wit:
ATTY. MARTEJA:
Q. You had mentioned that under this circumstances and condition, you have mentioned that surgery is the solution, would you have allowed then a 24
hour observation?
A. If there is a lingering doubt, inshort period of observation of 18-24 hours can be allowed provided that there would be close monitoring of the patient, sir.
Q. Would you please tell us who would be doing the monitoring doctor?
A. The best person should be the first examiner, the best surgeon, sir.
Q. So that would you say that it is incumbent on the surgeon attending to the case to have been the one to observe within the period of observation?
A. Yes, because he will be in the best position to observe the sudden changes in the condition of the patient, sir.
Q. And how often would in your experience doctor, how often would the surgeon re-assist (sic) the condition of the patient during the period of
observation?
A. Most foreign authors would recommend every four (4) hours, some centers will recommend hourly or every two hours but here in the Philippines, would
recommend for 4 to 6 hours, sir.28
Dr. Cabugaos supervision does not cease upon his endorsement of his patient to the surgeon. Here, Dr. Cabugao has shown to have exerted all efforts to
monitor his patient and under these circumstances he did not have any cause to doubt Dr. Ynzons competence and diligence. Expert testimonies have been
offered to prove the circumstances surrounding the case of JR and the need to perform an operation. Defense witness, Dr. Villaflor, on cross examination
testified, to wit:
Q. Isn't it a fact that torule out acute appendicitis as notthe disease of JR, surgery or operation mustbe done, isn't it Doctor?
A. You have to [correlate] all the findings.
Q. Is it yes or no, Doctor?
A. Yes.
Q. So, you are saying then that in order to rule out acute appendicitis there must be an operation, that is right Doctor?
A. No, sir. If your diagnosis is to really determine if it is an acute appendicitis, you have to operate.29
xxxx
Q. Now Doctor, considering the infection, considering that there was a [symptom] that causes pain, considering that JR likewise was feverish and that he was
vomitting, does that not show a disease of acute appendicitis Doctor?
A. Its possible.
Q. So that if that is possible, are we getting the impression then Doctor what you have earlier mentioned that the only way to rule out the suspect which is
acute appendicitis is by surgery, you have said that earlier Doctor, I just want any confirmation of it?
A. Yes, sir.30
Neither do we find evidence that Dr. Cabugao has been negligent or lacked the necessary precaution in his performance of his duty as a family doctor. On
the contrary, a perusal ofthe medical records would show that during the 24-hour monitoring on JR, it was Dr. Cabugao who frequently made orders on the
administration of antibiotics and pain relievers. There was also repetitive instructions from Dr. Cabugao to refer JR to Dr. Ynzon as it appeared that he is
suspecting appendicitis. The referral of JR to Dr. Ynzon, a surgeon, is actually an exercise of precaution as he knew that appendicitis is not within his scope of
expertise. This clearly showed that he employed the best of his knowledge and skill in attending to JR's condition, even after the referral of JR to Dr. Ynzon.
To be sure, the calculated assessment of Dr. Cabugao to refer JRto a surgeon who has sufficient training and experience to handle JRs case belies the finding
that he displayed inexcusable lack of precaution in handling his patient.31
We likewise note that Dr. Cabugao was out of town when JR's condition began to deteriorate. Even so, before he left, he made endorsement and notified the
resident-doctor and nurses-on-duty that he will be on leave.
Moreover, while both appeared to be the attending physicians of JR during his hospital confinement, it cannot be said that the finding of guilt on Dr. Ynzon
necessitates the same finding on the co-accused Dr. Cabugao. Conspiracy is inconsistent with the idea of a felony committed by means of culpa.32 Thus, the
accused-doctors to be found guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, it must be shown that both accused-doctors demonstratedan act executed
without malice or criminal intent but with lack of foresight, carelessness, or negligence. Noteworthy, the evidence on record clearly points to the reckless
imprudence of Dr. Ynzon; however, the same cannot be said in Dr. Cabugao's case.
AS TO CIVIL LIABILITY
While this case is pending appeal, counsel for petitioner Dr. Ynzon informed the Court that the latter died on December 23, 2011 due to "multiorgan failure"
as evidenced by a copy of death certificate.33 Thus, the effect of death, pending appeal of his conviction of petitioner Dr. Ynzon with regard to his criminal
and pecuniary liabilities should be in accordance to People v. Bayotas,34 wherein the Court laid down the rules in case the accused dies prior to final
judgment:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by
Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising
from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e.,civil liability ex delictoin senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other
than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation fromwhich the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or
omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) x x x x x x x x x
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil
action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either againstthe
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the
prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the
statute of limitationson the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the
Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription.35
In view of the foregoing, it is clear that the death of the accused Dr. Ynzon pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability. However, the
recovery of civil liability subsists as the same is not based on delictbut by contract and the reckless imprudence he was guilty of under Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code.1wphi1 For this reason, a separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused,
depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based,36 and in accordance with Section 4, Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, we
quote:
Sec. 4. Effect of death on civil actions. The death of the accused after arraignment and during the pendency of the criminal action shall extinguish the civil
liability arising from the delict. However, the independent civil action instituted under section 3 of this Rule or which thereafter is instituted to enforce
liability arising from other sources of obligation may be continued against the estate or legal representative of the accused after proper substitution or
against said estate, as the case may be. The heirs of the accused may besubstituted for the deceased without requiring the appointment of an executor or
administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.
A final judgment entered in favor of the offended party shall be enforced in the manner especially provided in these rules for prosecuting claims against the
estate of the deceased.
If the accused dies before arraignment, the case shall be dismissed without prejudice to any civil action the offended party may file against the estate of the
deceased. (Emphases ours)
In sum, upon the extinction of the criminal liability and the offended party desires to recover damages from the same act or omission complained of, the
party may file a separate civil action based on the other sources of obligation in accordance with Section 4, Rule 111.37 If the same act or omission
complained of arises from quasi-delict,as in this case, a separate civil action must be filed against the executor or administrator of the estate of the accused,
pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court:38
Section 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or administrator. No action upon a claim for the recovery of money or
debtor interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator; but to recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the
estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against him.
(Emphases ours)
Conversely, if the offended party desires to recover damages from the same act or omission complained of arising from contract, the filing of a separate civil
action must be filed against the estate, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed, barred; exceptions. All claims for money against the decent, arising from contract,
express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and expense for the last sickness of the decedent, and
judgment for money against the decent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice; otherwise they are barred forever, except that they may be set
forth as counterclaims in any action that the executor or administrator may bring against the claimants. Where an executor or administrator commencesan
action, or prosecutes an action already commenced by the deceased in his lifetime, the debtor may set forth by answer the claims he has against the
decedent, instead of presenting them independently to the court as herein provided, and mutual claims may be set off against each other in such action;
and if final judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant, the amount so determined shall be considered the true balance against the estate, as though the
claim had been presented directly beforethe court in the administration proceedings. Claims not yet due, or contingent, may be approved at their present
value.
As a final note, we reiterate thatthe policy against double recovery requires that only one action be maintained for the same act or omission whether the
action is brought against the executor or administrator, or the estate.39 The heirs of JR must choose which of the available causes of action for damages
they will bring.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner DR. ANTONIO P. CABUGAO is hereby ACQUITTEDof the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide.
Due to the death of accused Dr. Clenio Ynzon prior to the disposition of this case, his criminal liability is extinguished; however, his civil liability subsists. A
separate civil action may be filed either against the executor/administrator, or the estateof Dr. Ynzon, depending on the source of obligation upon which the
same are based.
SO ORDERED.
3. Asilo, Jr. v. People, G.R. Nos. 159017-18 & 159059. March 9, 2011.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 159017-18 March 9, 2011
PAULINO S. ASILO, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and Spouses VISITACION AND CESAR C. BOMBASI, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 159059
VICTORIA BUETA VDA. DE COMENDADOR, IN REPRESENTATION OF DEMETRIO T. COMENDADOR, Petitioner,
vs.
VISITACION C. BOMBASI AND CESAR C. BOMBASI, Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
At bench are appeals by certiorari1 from the Decision2 of the Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan; (1) finding Demetrio T. Comendador3 (Mayor
Comendador) and Paulino S. Asilo, Jr.4 guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019; (2) dismissing the cases against
accused Alberto S. Angeles;5 (3) ordering the defendants Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna, Demetrio T. Comendador and Paulino S. Asilo, Jr. to pay the
plaintiffs now respondents Visitacion C. Bombasi (Visitacion) and Cesar C. Bombasi damages; and (4) dismissing the cases against the spouses Alida and
Teddy Coroza6 and Benita and Isagani Coronado.7

The factual antecedents of the case are:
On 15 March 1978, Private Respondent Visitacions late mother Marciana Vda. De Coronado (Vda. De Coronado) and the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna
(represented by the then Municipal Mayor Crisostomo P. Manalang) entered into a lease contract whereby the Municipality allowed the use and enjoyment
of property comprising of a lot and a store located at the corner of Coronado and E. Fernandez Sts. at Poblacion, Nagcarlan, Laguna, in favor of the
respondents mother for a period of twenty (20) years beginning on 15 March 1978 until 15 March 1998, extendible for another 20 years.8
The lease contract provided that the late Vda. De Coronado could build a firewall on her rented property which must be at least as high as the store; and in
case of modification of the public market, she or her heir/s would be given preferential rights.
Visitacion took over the store when her mother died sometime in 1984.9 From then on up to January 1993, Visitacion secured the yearly Mayors permits.10
Sometime in 1986, a fire razed the public market of Nagcarlan. Upon Visitacions request for inspection on 15 May 1986, District Engineer Marcelino B.
Gorospe (Engineer Gorospe) of the then Ministry of Public Works and Highways,11 Regional Office No. IV-A, found that the store of Visitacion remained
intact and stood strong. This finding of Engineer Gorospe was contested by the Municipality of Nagcarlan.
The store of Visitacion continued to operate after the fire until 15 October 1993.
On 1 September 1993, Visitacion received a letter12 from Mayor Comendador directing her to demolish her store within five (5) days from notice. Attached
to the letter were copies of Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 15613 dated 30 August 1993 and a Memorandum issued by Asst. Provincial Prosecutor
Marianito Sasondoncillo of Laguna.
The relevant provisos of the Resolution No. 156 states that:
NOW THEREFORE, be it RESOLVED, as it hereby resolved to authorize Hon. Demetrio T. Comendador to enforce and order the Coronados to demolish the
building constructed on the space previously rented to them in order to give way for the construction of a new municipal market building.
RESOLVED FURTHER, to authorize Demetrio T. Comendador, Honorable Mayor of Nagcarlan to file an Unlawful Detainer Case with damages for the expenses
incurred due to the delay in the completion of the project if the Coronados continuously resists the order.
On 3 September 1993, Visitacion wrote a reply letter to Mayor Comendador saying that: (1) the lease contract was still existing and legally binding; (2) she
was willing to vacate the store as long as same place and area would be given to her in the new public market; and (3) in case her proposals are not
acceptable to Mayor Comendador, for the latter to just file an unlawful detainer case against her pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 156.
Pertinent portions of the letter read:
x x x With all due respect to the resolution of the Municipal Council and the opinion rendered by the Laguna Asst. Provincial Prosecutor, it is my considered
view, however, arrived at after consultation with my legal counsel, that our existing lease contract is still legally binding and in full force and effect. Lest I
appear to be defiant, let me reiterate to you and the council that we are willing to vacate the said building provided that a new contract is executed granting
to us the same space or lot and the same area. I believe that our proposal is most reasonable and fair under the circumstance. If you are not amenable to
the said proposal, I concur with the position taken by the Council for you to file the appropriate action in court for unlawful detainer to enable our court to
finally thresh out our differences.141avvphi1
On 15 September 1993, Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Florencio Buyser sent a letter to Visitacion ordering her to vacate the portion of the public market she
was occupying within 15 days from her receipt of the letter; else, a court action will be filed against her.
On 11 October 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Nagcarlan, Laguna issued Resolution No. 183 authorizing Mayor Comendador to demolish the store being
occupied by Visitacion using legal means. The significant portion of the Resolution reads:
Kung kaya ang Sangguniang Bayan ay buong pagkakaisang IPINASIYA: Ang pagbibigay kapangyarihan kay Kgg. Demetrio T. Comendador na ipagiba ang
anumang istrakturang nagiging sagabal sa mabilis at maayos na pagbabangon ng pamilihang bayan.15
On 14 October 1993, Municipal Administrator Paulino S. Asilo, Jr. (Asilo) also sent a letter16 to Visitacion informing her of the impending demolition of her
store the next day. Within the same day, Visitacion wrote a reply letter17 to Asilo, alleging that there is no legal right to demolish the store in the absence of
a court order and that the Resolutions did not sanction the demolition of her store but only the filing of an appropriate unlawful detainer case against her.
She further replied that if the demolition will take place, appropriate administrative, criminal and civil actions will be filed against Mayor Comendador, Asilo
and all persons who will take part in the demolition.
On 15 October 1993, Mayor Comendador relying on the strength of Sangguniang Bayan Resolution Nos. 183 and 156 authorized the demolition of the store
with Asilo and Angeles supervising the work.
Engineer Winston Cabrega (Engineer Cabrega), a licensed civil engineer, estimated the cost of the demolished property as amounting to P437,900.0018
On 19 August 1994, Visitacion, together with her husband Cesar Bombasi (Spouses Bombasi) filed with the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Laguna a
Civil Case19 for damages with preliminary injunction against the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna, Mayor Demetrio T. Comendador, Paulino S. Asilo, Jr., and
Alberto S. Angeles. The complaint was soon after amended to include the Spouses Benita and Isagani Coronado and Spouses Alida and Teddy Coroza as
formal defendants because they were then the occupants of the contested area.
The spouses prayed for the following disposition:
1. RESTRAINING or ENJOINING defendant Municipality and defendant Municipal Mayor from leasing the premises subject of lease Annex "A" hereof, part of
which is now occupied by PNP Outpost and by the Municipal Collectors Office, and the equivalent adjacent area thereof, and to cause the removal of said
stalls;
2. UPHOLDING the right of plaintiffs to occupy the equivalent corner area of the leased areas being now assigned to other persons by defendants
Municipality and/or by defendant Municipal Mayor, and to allow plaintiffs to construct their stalls thereon;
3. MAKING the injunction permanent, after trial;
4. ORDERING defendants to pay plaintiffs, jointly and severally, the following
(a) P437,900.00 for loss of building/store and other items therein;
(b) P200,000.00 for exemplary damages;
(c) P200,000.00 for moral damages;
(d) P30,.00 for attorneys fees and P700.00 for every attendance of counsel in court.
5. GRANTING further reliefs upon plaintiffs as justice and equity may warrant in the premises.20
Spouses Bombasi, thereafter, filed a criminal complaint21 against Mayor Comendador, Asilo and Angeles for violation of Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019
otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" before the Office of the Ombudsman. On 22 February 1996, an Information22 against Mayor
Comendador, Asilo and Angeles was filed, which reads:
That on or about October 15, 1993, at Nagcarlan, Laguna, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, all
public officers, accused Demetrio T. Comendador, being then the Municipal Mayor, accused Paulino S. Asilo, Jr. being then the Municipal Administrator and
accused Alberto S. Angeles being then the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator, all of the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna, committing the
crime herein charged in relation to, while in the performance and taking advantage of their official functions, conspiring and confederating with each other,
and with evident bad faith, manifest partiality or through gross inexcusable negligence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, criminally cause the
demolition of a public market stall leased by the municipal government in favor of one Visitacion Coronado-Bombasi without legal or justifiable ground
therefor, thus, causing undue injury to the latter in the amount of PESOS: FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY SEVEN THOUSAND AND NINE HUNDRED ONLY
(P437,900.00).
Upon their arraignments, all the accused entered their separate pleas of "Not Guilty."
On 4 March 1997, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution ordering the consolidation of Civil Case No. SP-4064 (94)23 with Criminal Case No. 23267
pending before the Third Division pursuant to Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 1606, which pertinently reads:
Any provision of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged shall at all times be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in the same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or
the appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the
filing of such civil action separately from the criminal action shall be recognized; Provided, however, that where the civil action had heretofore been filed
separately but judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said
civil action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court as the case may be, for consolidation and joint determination with the
criminal action, otherwise the separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned.24
During the pendency of the case, Alberto S. Angeles died on 16 November 1997. Accordingly, the counsel of Angeles filed a motion to drop accused Angeles.
On 22 September 1999, the Third Division of Sandiganbayan issued an Order25 DISMISSING the case against Angeles. The germane portion of the Order
reads:
In view of the submission of the death certificate of accused/defendant Alberto S. Angeles, and there being no objection on the part of the Public
Prosecutor, cases against deceased accused/defendant Angeles only, are hereby DISMISSED.
The death of Mayor Comendador followed on 17 September 2002. As a result, the counsel of the late Mayor filed on 3 March 2003 a Manifestation before
the Sandiganbayan informing the court of the fact of Mayor Comendadors death.
On 28 April 2003, the Sandiganbayan rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
In Criminal Case No. 23267, the court finds accused Demetrio T. Comendador and Paulino S. Asilo, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sec. 3(e)
of Republic Act. No. 3019 as amended, and in the absence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, said
accused are sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 6 years and 2 months imprisonment as minimum to 10 years and 1 day as maximum.
The order of the court dated September 22, 1999 dismissing the cases against the accused Alberto S. Angeles, who died on November 16, 1997 is hereby
reiterated.
In Civil Case No. 4064, defendants Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna, Demetrio T. Comendador and Paulino S. Asilo, Jr. are hereby ordered jointly and
severally to pay plaintiff P437,900.00 as actual damages for the destruction of the store; P100,000.00 as moral damages; P30,000.00 as attorneys fees, and
to pay the cost of the suit. The prayer for exemplary damages is denied as the court found no aggravating circumstances in the commission of the crime.
In view of this courts finding that the defendant spouses Alida and Teddy Coroza are lawful occupants of the subject market stalls from which they cannot
be validly ejected without just cause, the complaint against them is dismissed. The complaint against defendant spouses Benita and Isagani Coronado is
likewise dismissed, it appearing that they are similarly situated as the spouses Coroza. Meanwhile, plaintiff Visitacion Bombasi is given the option to accept
market space being given to her by the municipality, subject to her payment of the appropriate rental and permit fees.
The prayer for injunctive relief is denied, the same having become moot and academic.
The compulsory counterclaim of defendant Comendador is likewise denied for lack of merit.26
Within the same day, Asilo, through his counsel, filed a Motion for Reconsideration27 of the Decision alleging that there was only an error of judgment when
he complied with and implemented the order of his superior, Mayor Comendador. He likewise alleged that there is no liability when a public officer commits
in good faith an error of judgment. The Sandiganbayan, on its Resolution28 dated 21 July 2003 denied the Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that
good faith cannot be argued to support his cause in the face of the courts finding that bad faith attended the commission of the offense charged. The Court
further explained that the invocation of compliance with an order of a superior is of no moment for the "demolition [order] cannot be described as having
the semblance of legality inasmuch as it was issued without the authority and therefore the same was patently illegal."29
The counsel for the late Mayor also filed its Motion for Reconsideration30 on 12 May 2003 alleging that the death of the late Mayor had totally extinguished
both his criminal and civil liability. The Sandiganbayan on its Resolution31 granted the Motion insofar as the extinction of the criminal liability is concerned
and denied the extinction of the civil liability holding that the civil action is an independent civil action.
Hence, these Petitions for Review on Certiorari.32
Petitioner Asilo argues that in order to sustain conviction under Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 or "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," the public
officer must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross negligence. He also contended that he and his co-accused acted in good faith in
the demolition of the market and, thereby, no liability was incurred.
On the other hand, Petitioner Victoria argues that the death of Mayor Comendador prior to the promulgation of the decision extinguished NOT ONLY Mayor
Comendadors criminal liability but also his civil liability. She also asserted good faith on the part of the accused public officials when they performed the
demolition of the market stall. Lastly, she contended that assuming arguendo that there was indeed liability on the part of the accused public officials, the
actual amount of damages being claimed by the Spouses Bombasi has no basis and was not duly substantiated.
Liability of the accused public officials
under Republic Act No. 3019
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 provides:
In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and
are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall
apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
The elements of the offense are as follows: (1) that the accused are public officers or private persons charged in conspiracy with them; (2) that said public
officers commit the prohibited acts during the performance of their official duties or in relation to their public positions; (3) that they caused undue injury to
any party, whether the Government or a private party; (4) OR that such injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to the
other party; and (5) that the public officers have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.33
We sustain the Sandiganbayan in its finding of criminal and civil liabilities against petitioner Asilo and petitioner Mayor Comendador as here represented by
his widow Victoria Bueta.
We agree with the Sandiganbayan that it is undisputable that the first two requisites of the criminal offense were present at the time of the commission of
the complained acts and that, as to the remaining elements, there is sufficient amount of evidence to establish that there was an undue injury suffered on
the part of the Spouses Bombasi and that the public officials concerned acted with evident bad faith when they performed the demolition of the market
stall.
Causing undue injury to any party, including the government, could only mean actual injury or damage which must be established by evidence.34
In jurisprudence, "undue injury" is consistently interpreted as "actual." Undue has been defined as "more than necessary, not proper, [or] illegal;" and injury
as "any wrong or damage done to another, either in his person, rights, reputation or property [that is, the] invasion of any legally protected interest of
another." Actual damage, in the context of these definitions, is akin to that in civil law.35
It is evident from the records, as correctly observed by the Sandiganbayan, that Asilo and Mayor Comendador as accused below did not deny that there was
indeed damage caused the Spouses Bombasi on account of the demolition. We affirm the finding that:
xxx. Clearly, the demolition of plaintiffs store was carried out without a court order, and notwithstanding a restraining order which the plaintiff was able to
obtain. The demolition was done in the exercise of official duties which apparently was attended by evident bad faith, manifest partiality or gross
inexcusable negligence as there is nothing in the two (2) resolutions which gave the herein accused the authority to demolish plaintiffs store.
"Evident bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious
wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will.36 [It] contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive or self-
interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes.37
It is quite evident in the case at bar that the accused public officials committed bad faith in performing the demolition.
First, there can be no merit in the contention that respondents structure is a public nuisance. The abatement of a nuisance without judicial proceedings is
possible if it is nuisance per se.38 Nuisance per se is that which is nuisance at all times and under any circumstance, regardless of location and
surroundings.39 In this case, the market stall cannot be considered as a nuisance per se because as found out by the Court, the buildings had not been
affected by the 1986 fire. This finding was certified to by Supervising Civil Engineer Wilfredo A. Sambrano of the Laguna District Engineer Office.40 To quote:
An inspection has been made on the building (a commercial establishment) cited above and found out the following:
1. It is a two-storey building, sketch of which is attached.
2. It is located within the market site.
3. The building has not been affected by the recent fire.
4. The concrete wall[s] does not even show signs of being exposed to fire.41
Second, the Sangguniang Bayan resolutions are not enough to justify demolition. Unlike its predecessor law,42 the present Local Government Code43 does
not expressly provide for the abatement of nuisance.44 And even assuming that the power to abate nuisance is provided for by the present code, the
accused public officials were under the facts of this case, still devoid of any power to demolish the store. A closer look at the contested resolutions reveals
that Mayor Comendador was only authorized to file an unlawful detainer case in case of resistance to obey the order or to demolish the building using legal
means. Clearly, the act of demolition without legal order in this case was not among those provided by the resolutions, as indeed, it is a legally impossible
provision.
Furthermore, the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna, as represented by the then Mayor Comendador, was placed in estoppel after it granted yearly business
permits45 in favor of the Spouses Bombasi. Art. 1431 of the New Civil Code provides that, through estoppel, an admission or representation is rendered
conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon. The representation made by the
municipality that the Spouses Bombasi had the right to continuously operate its store binds the municipality. It is utterly unjust for the Municipality to
receive the benefits of the store operation and later on claim the illegality of the business.
The bad faith of the petitioners completes the elements of the criminal offense of violation of Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. The same bad faith serves
as the source of the civil liability of Asilo, Angeles, and Mayor Comendador.
It must be noted that when Angeles died on 16 November 1997, a motion to drop him as an accused was filed by his counsel with no objection on the part
of the prosecution. The Sandiganbayan acted favorably on the motion and issued an Order dismissing all the cases filed against Angeles. On the other hand,
when Mayor Comendador died and an adverse decision was rendered against him which resulted in the filing of a motion for reconsideration by Mayor
Comendadors counsel, the prosecution opposed the Motion specifying the ground that the civil liability did not arise from delict, hence, survived the death
of the accused. The Sandiganbayan upheld the opposition of the prosecution which disposition was not appealed.
We note, first off, that the death of Angeles and of Mayor Comendador during the pendency of the case extinguished their criminal liabilities.
We now hold, as did the Sandiganbayan that the civil liability of Mayor Comendador survived his death; and that of Angeles could have likewise survived had
it not been for the fact that the resolution of the Sandiganbayan that his death extinguished the civil liability was not questioned and lapsed into finality.
We laid down the following guidelines in People v. Bayotas:46
Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice
Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and
based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of (the) accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other
than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or
omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) Acts or omissions punished by law; and
e) Quasi-delicts. (Emphasis ours)
Where the civil liability survives, as explained [above], an action for recovery therefore may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action47 and
subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the
prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the
statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the
New Civil Code, which should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription.
Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the
accused; the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal.48
The New Civil Code provisions under the Chapter, Human Relations, were cited by the prosecution to substantiate its argument that the civil action based
therein is an independent one, thus, will stand despite the death of the accused during the pendency of the case.
On the other hand, the defense invoked Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Republic Act No. 8249, in support of its argument that
the civil action was dependent upon the criminal action, thus, was extinguished upon the death of the accused. The law provides that:
Any provision of law or the Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charged shall at all times be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in the same proceeding by, the
Sandiganbayan, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of
such action shall be recognized. (Emphasis ours)
We agree with the prosecution.
Death of Mayor Comendador during the pendency of the case could have extinguished the civil liability if the same arose directly from the crime committed.
However, in this case, the civil liability is based on another source of obligation, the law on human relations.49 The pertinent articles follow:
Art. 31 of the Civil Code states:
When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently
of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
And, Art. 32(6) states:
Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of
the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;
xxxx
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to
commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal
prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence.
As held in Aberca v. Ver:
It is obvious that the purpose of the above codal provision [Art. 32 of the New Civil Code] is to provide a sanction to the deeply cherished rights and
freedoms enshrined in the Constitution. Its message is clear; no man may seek to violate those sacred rights with impunity. x x x.50
Indeed, the basic facts of this case point squarely to the applicability of the law on human relations. First, the complaint for civil liability was filed way
AHEAD of the information on the Anti-Graft Law. And, the complaint for damages specifically invoked defendant Mayor Comendadors violation of plaintiffs
right to due process. Thus:
xxxx
In causing or doing the forcible demolition of the store in question, the individual natural defendants did not only act with grave abuse of authority but
usurped a power which belongs to our courts of justice; such actuations were done with malice or in bad faith and constitute an invasion of the property
rights of plaintiff(s) without due process of law.
xxxx
The Court is in one with the prosecution that there was a violation of the right to private property of the Spouses Bombasi. The accused public officials
should have accorded the spouses the due process of law guaranteed by the Constitution and New Civil Code. The Sangguniang Bayan Resolutions as
asserted by the defense will not, as already shown, justify demolition of the store without court order. This Court in a number of decisions51 held that even
if there is already a writ of execution, there must still be a need for a special order for the purpose of demolition issued by the court before the officer in
charge can destroy, demolish or remove improvements over the contested property.52 The pertinent provisions are the following:
Before the removal of an improvement must take place, there must be a special order, hearing and reasonable notice to remove. Section 10(d), Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court provides:
(d) Removal of improvements on property subject of execution. When the property subject of execution contains improvements constructed or planted by
the judgment obligor or his agent, the officer shall not destroy, demolish or remove said improvements except upon special order of the court, issued upon
motion of the judgment obligee after due hearing and after the former has failed to remove the same within a reasonable time fixed by the court.
The above-stated rule is clear and needs no interpretation. If demolition is necessary, there must be a hearing on the motion filed and with due notices to
the parties for the issuance of a special order of demolition.53
This special need for a court order even if an ejectment case has successfully been litigated, underscores the independent basis for civil liability, in this case,
where no case was even filed by the municipality.
The requirement of a special order of demolition is based on the rudiments of justice and fair play. It frowns upon arbitrariness and oppressive conduct in
the execution of an otherwise legitimate act. It is an amplification of the provision of the Civil Code that every person must, in the exercise of his rights and
in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.54
Notably, the fact that a separate civil action precisely based on due process violations was filed even ahead of the criminal case, is complemented by the fact
that the deceased plaintiff Comendador was substituted by his widow, herein petitioner Victoria who specified in her petition that she has "substituted him
as petitioner in the above captioned case." Section 1, Rule III of the 1985 Rules in Criminal Procedure mentioned in Bayotas is, therefore, not applicable.
Truly, the Sandiganbayan was correct when it maintained the separate docketing of the civil and criminal cases before it although their consolidation was
erroneously based on Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606 which deals with civil liability "arising from the offense charged."
We must, however, correct the amount of damages awarded to the Spouses Bombasi.
To seek recovery of actual damages, it is necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent
proof and on the best evidence obtainable.55 In this case, the Court finds that the only evidence presented to prove the actual damages incurred was the
itemized list of damaged and lost items56 prepared by Engineer Cabrega, an engineer commissioned by the Spouses Bombasi to estimate the costs.
As held by this Court in Marikina Auto Line Transport Corporation v. People of the Philippines,57
x x x [W]e agree with the contention of petitioners that respondents failed to prove that the damages to the terrace caused by the incident amounted to
P100,000.00. The only evidence adduced by respondents to prove actual damages claimed by private respondent were the summary computation of
damage made by Engr. Jesus R. Regal, Jr. amounting to P171,088.46 and the receipt issued by the BB Construction and Steel Fabricator to private respondent
for P35,000.00 representing cost for carpentry works, masonry, welding, and electrical works. Respondents failed to present Regal to testify on his
estimation. In its five-page decision, the trial court awarded P150,000.00 as actual damages to private respondent but failed to state the factual basis for
such award. Indeed, the trial court merely declared in the decretal portion of its decision that the "sum of P150,000.00 as reasonable compensation
sustained by plaintiff for her damaged apartment." The appellate court, for its part, failed to explain how it arrived at the amount of P100,000.00 in its
three-page decision. Thus, the appellate court merely declared:
With respect to the civil liability of the appellants, they contend that there was no urgent necessity to completely demolish the apartment in question
considering the nature of the damages sustained as a result of the accident. Consequently, appellants continue, the award of P150,000.00 as compensation
sustained by the plaintiff-appellee for her damaged apartment is an unconscionable amount.
Further, in one case,58 this Court held that the amount claimed by the respondent-claimants witness as to the actual amount of damages "should be
admitted with extreme caution considering that, because it was a bare assertion, it should be supported by independent evidence." The Court further said
that whatever claim the respondent witness would allege must be appreciated in consideration of his particular self-interest.59 There must still be a need
for the examination of the documentary evidence presented by the claimants to support its claim with regard to the actual amount of damages.
The price quotation made by Engineer Cabrega presented as an exhibit60 partakes of the nature of hearsay evidence considering that the person who issued
them was not presented as a witness.61 Any evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal
knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of another person who is not on the witness stand. Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no
probative value unless the proponent can show that the evidence falls within the exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule.62 Further, exhibits do not fall
under any of the exceptions provided under Sections 37 to 47 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Though there is no sufficient evidence to award the actual damages claimed, this Court grants temperate damages for P200,000.00 in view of the loss
suffered by the Spouses Bombasi. Temperate damages are awarded in accordance with Art. 2224 of the New Civil Code when the court finds that some
pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proven with certainty. The amount of temperate or moderated
damages is usually left to the discretion of the courts but the same should be reasonable, bearing in mind that the temperate damages should be more than
nominal but less than compensatory.63 Without a doubt, the Spouses Bombasi suffered some form of pecuniary loss in the impairment of their store. Based
on the record of the case,64 the demolished store was housed on a two-story building located at the markets commercial area and its concrete walls
remained strong and not affected by the fire. However, due to the failure of the Spouses Bombasi to prove the exact amount of damage in accordance with
the Rules of Evidence,65 this court finds that P200,000.00 is the amount just and reasonable under the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision of the Sandiganbayan dated 28 April 2003 is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION.
The Court affirms the decision finding the accused Paulino S. Asilo, Jr. and Demetrio T. Comendador guilty of violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019.
We declare the finality of the dismissal of both the criminal and civil cases against Alberto S. Angeles as the same was not appealed. In view of the death of
Demetrio T. Comendador pending trial, his criminal liability is extinguished; but his civil liability survives. The Municipality of Nagcarlan, Paulino Asilo and
Demetrio T. Comendador, as substituted by Victoria Bueta Vda. De Comendador, are hereby declared solidarily liable to the Spouses Bombasi for temperate
damages in the amount of P200,000.00 and moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00.
Costs against the petitioners-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
4. People v. Bayot, G.R. No. 200030, April 18, 2012.
SECOND DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
- versus -
NELSON BAYOT y SATINA,
Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 200030
Present:
CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
BRION,
PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.
Promulgated:
April 18, 2012
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
RESOLUTION
PEREZ, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision[1] dated 9 May 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-H.C. No. 00269 affirming with modification the
Decision[2] dated 31 July 2000 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kabankalan City, Negros Occidental, 6th Judicial Region, Branch 61, in Criminal Case No.
98-2025, finding herein appellant Nelson Bayot y Satina (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, committed against AAA,[3] thus,
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The appellate court increased the award of indemnity from P40,000.00 to P50,000.00. It also
ordered appellant to pay AAA moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00.
Appellant Nelson Bayot y Satina was charged with Rape in an Information[4] dated 29 December 1997, which reads as follows:
That on or about the 17th day of September, 1997, in the Municipality of XXX, Province of XXX, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named [appellant], by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of and/or sexual intercourse with the [AAA], 44 years old, against her will.[5]
On arraignment, appellant pleaded NOT GUILTY to the crime charged. Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.
In its 31 July 2000 Decision, the RTC convicted appellant of the crime of rape and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay AAA
the amount of P40,000.00 as indemnity with costs. In convicting appellant, the RTC ratiocinated that AAAs testimony as regards her ordeal was simple and
straightforward, unshaken by a rigid cross-examination. There appeared to be no inconsistency in her testimony. Further, AAAs declaration that she was
raped by appellant was corroborated by a medical certificate showing contusion on her vagina at 6:00 oclock quadrant of the crevice, which was explained
by Dr. Rodrigo Cubid to have been caused by forceful vaginal intrusion. The RTC negates the sweet heart defense offered by appellant. It stated that
appellants claim of being AAAs lover was a mere devise to extricate himself from the consequence of his dastardly lust. AAAs immediate response of
reporting the rape incident carries the stamp of truth. Moreover, if, indeed, there was such relationship between appellant and AAA, the latter would not
have pursued this case. It bears stressing that despite appellants repeated plea for the dismissal of the case, AAA remained steadfast in seeking justice for
the violation of her womanhood.[6]
Aggrieved, appellant appealed the aforesaid RTC Decision to this Court by filing a Notice of Appeal dated 6 September 2000.[7] In light, however, of this
Courts pronouncement in People v. Mateo,[8] the case was transferred to the Court of Appeals for intermediate review per Resolution[9] dated 4 October
2004.
In a Decision dated 9 May 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed appellants conviction with the modification increasing the award of indemnity from
P40,000.00 to P50,000.00. It likewise awarded moral damages in favor of AAA in the amount of P50,000.00. The Court of Appeals aptly observed that the
prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that appellant committed the crime of rape against AAA. It further held that other than the self-
serving declaration of appellant that he and AAA were sweethearts; no other evidence was ever presented to substantiate such claim. Even the testimony of
appellants daughter, who claimed that her father and AAA are maintaining an illicit relationship, could not be given any considerable weight. Aside from the
fact that appellants daughter could not point to any other circumstance supporting her claim, except for one incident when she allegedly saw her father and
AAA holding hands during a dance at their barangay fiesta, her testimony could not be stripped of bias and partiality considering that she is the daughter of
appellant. In the same way, her testimony that she saw her father and AAA in the act of sexual intercourse deserves scant consideration as she was not
present at the time of the commencement of the said act. She could not, therefore, be in a position to state with certainty that there was no struggle on the
part of AAA. Hence, her testimony regarding such matter is a mere conclusion of fact.[10]
However, in a letter dated 29 May 2006,[11] Dr. Juanito S. Leopando, Penal Superintendent IV of the New Bilibid Prison, informed the Court of Appeals that
appellant died at the New Bilibid Prison Hospital on 4 December 2004. Attached in his letter is the original copy of appellants Certificate of Death.[12]
Nonetheless, the Public Attorneys Office still appealed, on behalf of appellant, the aforesaid Court of Appeals Decision to this Court via a Notice of
Appeal[13] dated 31 May 2006, which was given due course by the Court of Appeals per Resolution[14] dated 19 January 2007. The Court of Appeals also
directed the Chief of the Judicial Records Division to forward the entire records of the case to this Court.
Taking into consideration appellants death, this Court will now determine its effect to this present appeal.
Appellants death on 4 December 2004, during the pendency of his appeal before the Court of Appeals, extinguished not only his criminal liability for the
crime of rape committed against AAA, but also his civil liability solely arising from or based on said crime.[15]
Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, specifically provides the effect of death of the accused on his criminal, as well as civil, liability. It reads
thus:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the
offender occurs before final judgment; [Emphasis supplied].
Applying the foregoing provision, this Court, in People v. Bayotas,[16] which was cited in a catena of cases,[17] had laid down the following guidelines:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by
Justice Regalado, in this regard, the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising
from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore.
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of [the] accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation
other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same
act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) x x x x x x x x x
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil
action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the
prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the
statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with [the] provisions of Article 1155
of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription.[18]
From the foregoing, it is clear that the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as the civil liability ex
delicto. The rationale, therefore, is that the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused, the civil
action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal case.[19]
Evidently, as this Court has pronounced in People v. Olaco and People v. Paniterce,[20] it is already unnecessary to rule on appellants appeal. Appellants
appeal was still pending and no final judgment had been rendered against him at the time of his death. Thus, whether or not appellant was guilty of the
crime charged had become irrelevant because even assuming that appellant did incur criminal liability and civil liability ex delicto, these were totally
extinguished by his death, following the provisions of Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code and this Courts ruling in People v. Bayotas.
In the same breath, the appealed Decision dated 9 May 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-H.C. No. 00269 finding appellant guilty of the crime
of rape, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to pay AAA P50,000.00 as indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages had become
ineffectual.
WHEREFORE, in view of the death of appellant Nelson Bayot y Satina, the Decision dated 9 May 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-H.C. No.
00269 is SET ASIDE and Criminal Case No. 98-2025 before the RTC of Kabankalan City, Negros Occidental, is DISMISSED. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
SECTION 5. Judgment in Civil Action Not a Bar.
1. Madarang v. CA, G.R. No. 143044, July 14, 2005.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 143044. July 14, 2005]
WILLIAM MADARANG and EVANS KHO, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. OFELIA ARELLANO-MARQUEZ,
Presiding Judge of the METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 32 and JANICE YOUNG-CHUA, respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which seeks the reversal of the Decision,[1] dated April 18, 2000, of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 58038 dismissing petitioners petition for certiorari.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On February 11, 1994, private respondent Janice Young-Chua and her husband, Eduardo Chan-Chua, filed a complaint for replevin and damages against
petitioners William Madarang and Evans Kho in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-94-19266 and raffled to Branch 84 (RTC,
Branch 84). The complaint alleged that private respondent is the owner of a 1990 dark gray Kia Pride car, evidenced by Certificate of Registration No.
08605800[2] dated May 31, 1991; and that on January 29, 1994, petitioners, through force and intimidation, took possession of the subject car by virtue of a
falsified Deed of Sale dated December 3, 1993 allegedly executed by private respondent in favor of petitioner Madarang.[3]
On May 12, 1994, upon complaint of private respondent, petitioner Madarang was charged with Falsification of Public Document in the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Quezon City (MeTC) which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 94-24930 and raffled to Branch 32.[4] On the same date, petitioners were charged
with Grave Coercion in the same MeTC which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 94-24931, also raffled to Branch 32.[5] The cases were consolidated and
jointly tried.
On August 8, 1996, a Motion to Suspend Criminal Proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question was filed by petitioner Madarang in the MeTC, claiming
that the issues presented in the replevin case pending in RTC, Branch 84 are intimately related to the issues pending before the MeTC, the resolution of
which would necessarily determine the guilt of the accused in the criminal case for falsification.[6]
On October 1, 1996, the MeTC denied petitioner Madarangs motion to suspend proceedings on the ground that the decision in the civil case for replevin will
not be determinative of the guilt of the accused in the criminal charge for falsification.[7]
On March 7, 1997, RTC, Branch 84 dismissed the complaint for replevin upon finding that the deed of sale is genuine and that private respondent voluntarily
surrendered possession of the car to the petitioners.[8] Private respondent filed a timely appeal with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 57597.
On June 13, 1997, petitioner Madarang filed a Motion to Dismiss the falsification case on the ground that the decision dismissing the replevin suit in RTC,
Branch 84 involving the same parties absolved him of criminal liability in the falsification case.[9] On January 22, 1998, the MeTC granted the Motion to
Dismiss of petitioner Madarang.[10] On February 27, 1998, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the prosecution on the ground that the dismissal was
unwarranted since the decision dismissing the replevin suit in RTC, Branch 84 is not yet final and executory, as it is pending appeal before the CA and the
accused deliberately omitted to send the private prosecutor a copy of said Motion to Dismiss.[11] On July 27, 1998, the MeTC recalled the dismissal of the
case for falsification.[12]
Petitioners filed a Second Omnibus Motion to Quash Criminal Case Nos. 94-24930 and 94-24931 on the ground that the findings of RTC, Branch 84 that the
signature of private respondent in the deed of sale is not falsified and that private respondent voluntarily surrendered possession of the car to the
petitioners bar the prosecution for falsification and grave coercion. Petitioners alleged that the findings of the RTC are binding and must be given due
respect by the MeTC notwithstanding the appeal taken by private respondent.[13]
In its Opposition, the prosecution alleged that: the motion to quash is a mere scrap of paper as it is contrary to Section 1, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court that
a Motion to Quash must be filed before arraignment of accused and such failure to move to quash before entering his plea, accused is deemed to have
waived his right to file the same; and, the replevin suit is an independent civil action, separate and distinct from these cases for falsification of public
document and grave coercion.[14]
On March 26, 1999, the MeTC denied petitioners motion to quash, ruling that the decision rendered by the RTC, Branch 84 in the replevin case cannot
absolve petitioners of the charges in the criminal cases as said decision has not attained finality since it is pending appeal before the CA; and that petitioners
waived any grounds of a Motion to Quash pursuant to Section 1, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.[15]
Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC, Branch 77, Quezon City (RTC, Branch 77), docketed as Civil Case No. Q-99-37324. They assailed
the MeTCs denial of their motion to quash the informations for falsification of public document and grave coercion and alleged that the MeTC should have
adopted the factual findings of RTC, Branch 84 in the Decision dated March 7, 1997 in the replevin case as res judicata.[16]
On October 8, 1999, the RTC, Branch 77 dismissed petitioners petition for certiorari upon holding that: res judicata cannot be invoked considering that the
Decision dated March 7, 1997 of RTC, Branch 84 in the replevin case is not yet a final and executory judgment, being on appeal; in any event, a final
judgment rendered in a civil action absolving the defendant from civil liability is not a bar to criminal action; the issues of falsification and coercion were not
made the subject of a full-dressed hearing in the replevin case; and, the motion to quash was filed only after their arraignment in violation of the well-
settled doctrine that a motion to quash may be filed only before the accused has entered his plea to the accusatory pleading.[17]
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration[18] but was denied in an Order dated February 29, 2000.[19]
Undaunted, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the CA which, on April 18, 2000, was dismissed. In dismissing the petition, the CA held that the
writ of certiorari is not the proper remedy where a motion to quash an information is denied. It further held that the People of the Philippines was not
impleaded as a respondent in the case nor was the Office of the Solicitor General furnished a copy of the petition when the Informations were filed in the
name of the People of the Philippines and necessarily it is the party interested in sustaining the proceedings in the court.[20]
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari anchored on the following grounds:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED THE ISSUES PRESENTED PROBABLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF
THE SUPREME COURT.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS SO FAR DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS OR SO FAR
SANCTIONED SUCH DEPARTURE BY THE LOWER COURT AS TO CALL FOR AN EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF SUPERVISION.[21]
Petitioners claim that the MeTC Judge committed grave abuse of discretion when she denied their motion to quash the Informations and refused to dismiss
the charges against them since the charges against them pending before her court were obliterated by the positive factual findings of RTC, Branch 84 in its
Decision dated March 7, 1997 that the signature of private respondent in the Deed of Sale dated December 3, 1993 is genuine and she voluntarily
surrendered the car to petitioners. They maintain that such factual findings of RTC, Branch 84 in its Decision dated March 7, 1997 bar their prosecution in
the criminal cases for falsification of public document and grave coercion. They submit that once a court of competent jurisdiction puts to finish an issue of
fact, it cannot be disturbed by the lower court and, accordingly, the factual findings of RTC, Branch 84 cannot be overturned by the MeTC.
The Solicitor General, on the other hand, avers that the decision in the replevin suit cannot foreclose or suspend the prosecution of the criminal cases for
falsification and grave coercion as replevin is an entirely separate and distinct remedy allowed by the rules. He states that res judicata cannot apply for lack
of the essential elements of identity of parties and finality of the decision in the replevin suit.
As for private respondent, she argues that the decision of RTC, Branch 84 can not be conclusive upon the MeTC because it is not a final and executory
judgment, being on appeal in the CA, and, even if final, the rules provide that such final decision does not foreclose prosecution of the criminal action. She
insists that the MeTC Judge did not act beyond her jurisdiction as the denial of the motion to quash was in accordance with law and jurisprudence and, thus,
petitioners resort to certiorari was improper and appropriately dismissed by the RTC and the CA.
At the outset, we observe that while the assigned errors appear to raise errors of judgment committed by the CA, the arguments of the petitioners purely
dwell on the alleged grave abuse of discretion or error of jurisdiction committed by the MeTC in denying the Motion to Quash, the very issue they raised in
the petition for certiorari before the RTC, when the issues that should have been raised in the petition for review on certiorari before us are the errors of
judgment that the CA may have committed in dismissing their petition for certiorari. Petitioners utter failure to bring up the matter concerning the CAs bases
in dismissing their petition shows that they are evading the issues.
Nonetheless, we find that the CA is correct in dismissing petitioners petition for certiorari.
First. We note that the petitions for certiorari in the RTC and CA are defective since petitioners failed to implead the People of the Philippines as respondent
therein. As provided in Section 5,[22] Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, all criminal actions are prosecuted under the direction and control of the
public prosecutor. The prosecution of offenses is thus the concern of the government prosecutors. It behooved the petitioners to implead the People of the
Philippines as respondent in the RTC and in the CA to enable the public prosecutor or Solicitor General, as the case may be, to comment on the petitions.
The failure to implead is fatal to petitioners cause.
Second. It is settled that a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition is not the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash an information.
The established rule is that when such an adverse interlocutory order is rendered, the remedy is not to resort forthwith to certiorari or prohibition, but to
continue with the case in due course and, when an unfavorable verdict is handed down to take an appeal in the manner authorized by law.[23] Only when
the court issued such order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and when the assailed interlocutory order is patently
erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief will certiorari be considered an appropriate remedy to assail an
interlocutory order.[24] No such special circumstances are present in the case at bar.
The declaration of RTC, Branch 84 in its Decision dated March 7, 1997 that the signature of private respondent in the Deed of Sale dated December 3, 1993
is genuine and she voluntarily surrendered the car to petitioners is not res judicata in the criminal cases for falsification and grave coercion because there is
no identity of parties as the People of the Philippines is not a party in the replevin suit and cannot be bound by the factual findings therein. Besides, the
decision of RTC, Branch 84 is still pending appeal with the CA. Hence, at the time the MeTC, the RTC and the CA rendered their assailed order, decision and
resolution, respectively, there existed no special circumstance to warrant a dismissal of the cases pending in the MeTC.
It is noted that during the pendency of the case before us, the CA has rendered a Decision dated April 19, 2005 modifying the Decision dated March 7, 1997
of RTC, Branch 84, in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the application for a Writ of Replevin is hereby DENIED, the plaintiff Janice Chua having executed a Deed of Sale in favor of defendant William
Madarang.
The Deed of Sale is however, hereby declared as an equitable mortgage and, therefore, plaintiff Janice Chua possesses the right of redemption pursuant to
Article 1606 of the New Civil Code.
SO ORDERED.
However, records before us do not show that this decision had become final and executory. As a natural or inherent and inevitable consequence of said
declaration, a decision which has not become final and executory has no conclusive effect.
Third. Section 3, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the governing law at the time of the filing of the indictments, provides the grounds on
which an accused can move to quash the complaint or information. These are: (a) the facts charged do not constitute an offense; (b) the court trying the
case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; (c) the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused; (d) the officer who filed
the information had no authority to do so; (e) the information does not conform substantially to the prescribed form; (f) more than one offense is charged,
except in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses; (g) the criminal action or liability has been extinguished; (h)
the information contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and (i) the accused has been previously convicted or is in
jeopardy of being convicted or acquitted of the offense charged.[25]
Section 8 of the same Rule specifically provides:
SEC. 8. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor. The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to
the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of the
grounds of a motion to quash, except the grounds of no offense charged, lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged, extinction of the offense or penalty
and jeopardy, as provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (f) and (h) of Section 3 of this Rule. (10a)
Thus, a motion to quash may still be filed after pleading to the complaint or information where the grounds are that no offense is charged, lack of
jurisdiction over the offense charged, extinction of the offense or penalty and jeopardy. Nowhere in the enumerated excepted grounds is there any mention
of res judicata as a ground to quash an information.
Fourth. Section 4, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court explicitly recognizes that a final judgment rendered in a civil action absolving the defendant from civil
liability is no bar to a criminal action. [26]
Fifth. Article 33[27] of the Civil Code provides that in cases involving alleged fraudulent acts, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from
the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. It is clear, therefore, that the civil case for replevin may proceed independently of the criminal cases for falsification and grave
coercion, especially because while both cases are based on the same facts, the quantum of proof required for holding the parties liable therein differs.[28]
All told, the petitioners failed to show why the actions of the MeTC, RTC and the CA which have passed upon the same issue should be reversed. We are
thus convinced that the CA committed no reversible error in its challenged Decision.
WHEREFORE, the present petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated April 18, 2000, is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
SECTION 6. Suspension by Reason of Prejudicial Question.
SECTION 7. Elements of Prejudicial Question.
1. People v. Arambulo, Jr., G.R. No. 186597, June 17, 2015.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 186597 June 17, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
VICTORIA R. ARAMBULO and MIGUELARAMBULO, JR., Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to annul the Decision1 and Resolution2 dated 5 February 2008 and 27 February 2009, respectively of the Court
of Appeals, Seventeenth Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 86353 which effectively suspended the criminal proceedings in Criminal Case No. C-62784, an estafa case
against respondents before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 121, Caloocan City.
Records show that respondent Victoria R. Arambulo (Victoria), Emerenciana R. Gungab, Reynaldo Reyes (Reynaldo), Domingo Reyes (Domingo), Rodrigo
Reyes and Oscar Reyes (Oscar) are the heirs of Spouses Pedro C. Reyes and Anastacia Reyes. Anaped Estate Inc. (Anaped) was incorporated as part of the
estate planning or as conduit to hold the properties of the estate of Pedro Reyes for and in behalf of his heirs.
Jose Buban (Buban), as Vice-President and General Manager of Anaped Estate Inc. (Anaped), filed a complaint for estafa against Victoria and her husband
Miguel Arambulo, Jr. (Miguel) before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Caloocan City. He alleged that Victoria failed to remit the rentals collected from the
time the ownership of the commercial apartments was transferred to Anaped.
On 24 April 2001, Assistant City Prosecutor Alvin A. Almora recommended the filing of an Information against respondents. On 1 June 2001, respondents
were charged with estafa committed as follow:
That on [or] about the period from December, 1994 to June, 1997, in the City of Caloocan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court,
the said accused, conspiring together and mutually helping one another, and with unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, after having received rentals from
IMF International Corporation, in the total amount of THREE HUNDRED NINETEEN THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED EIGHTY-EIGHT (P319,888.00)PESOS, under
the express obligation of turning over or remitting the same to ANAPED ESTATE INCORPORATED, once in possession of the said amount and far from
complying with their obligation aforesaid and despite notice [to] that effect, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriate, misapply, and convert the said amount to their own personal use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of ANAPED ESTATE, INC., in the
sum above-aforementioned.3
On 14 April 2003, respondents filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings on the ground of a prejudicial question in view of the pendency of two intra-corporate
cases pending before the RTC of Quezon City and Makati City. SEC Case No. 05-97-5659 is a petition filed by Victorias brother Oscar for accounting of all
corporate funds and assets of Anaped, annulment of sale, injunction, receivership and damages.4 SEC Case No. 03-99-6259 is a petition filed by Victoria and
her brothers Reynaldo and Domingo questioning the authority of their elder sibling Rodrigo Reyes and Emerenciana R. Gungab, as well as the Anaped Board
of Directors and officers, including private complainant Buban to act for and in behalf of the corporation.5
In their motion to suspend proceedings, respondents asserted that the resolution of the SEC cases in their favor particularly the issues of whether of the
group of Rodrigo and Buban are the lawful representatives of the corporation and whether they are duly authorized to make a demand for remittance would
necessarily result in their acquittal in the criminal case.
On 28 August 2003, the trial court, through Presiding Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, granted the motion for suspension of the proceedings. The trial court
reasoned that the issue in the SEC cases, i.e., who between the groups has the right to act for and in behalf of the corporation, has a direct link to the issue
of the culpability of the accused for estafa, thus:
For indeed, if the aforesaid issues are resolved in the [respondents] favor, they cannot be held liable for misappropriation for they possess the authority to
collect rentals and hold the same on behalf of the firm. They would then be justified in not remitting the collections to the group of Jose Buban who would
be then deemed as mere usurpers of authority.6
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner, the trial court issued an Order dated 19 February 2004 setting aside its 28 August 2003 Order
and setting the case for pre-trial. The trial court noted that respondents failed to file an opposition to the motion for reconsideration. Respondents filed an
Omnibus Motion praying that they be allowed to file their Comment/Opposition to the motion for reconsideration and that the pre-trial be held in
abeyance. Respondents claimed that the Order of the trial court to file comment/opposition was served on respondents themselves and not on their
counsel.
On 23 June 2004, the trial court denied respondents Omnibus Motion. The trial court stressed that even if the order was served upon respondents and not
upon their counsel, records show that a copy of the motion for reconsideration was served by registered mail upon counsel. Thus, the trial court stated that
respondents counsel was well aware of the existence of the motion for reconsideration, thus he could have taken the initiative to file his comment thereto
without waiting for any directive from the court.
Aggrieved, respondents filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals asserting that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it
denied them the opportunity to file their comment; when it ruled that respondents counsel should have filed the comment as he was furnished a copy of
the motion for reconsideration; and when it granted petitioners motion for reconsideration.
On 5 February 2008, the Court of Appeals granted the petition. The dispositive portion reads: WHEREFORE, the assailed Orders of the respondent Judge
dated February 19, 2004 and July 23, 2004 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and she is hereby enjoined from hearing the Criminal Case No. C-62784 until the
termination of the SEC Case No. 03-99-6259. The August 28, 2003 Order of the respondent Judge is hereby REINSTATED.7
Preliminarily, on the procedural question, the Court of Appeals pointed out that respondents were given the opportunity to present their side in their
motion to suspend proceedings. The appellate court treated respondents arguments in said motion as their Comment/Opposition to the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by petitioner. That is correct.
The appellate court ruled that in SEC Case No. 03-99-6259:
[T]he issue is the legality of the election of ANAPED Board of Directors, as well as the authority of its officers, which include private complainant Jose Buban,
to act for and in behalf of the corporation. Clearly, it involves facts that are intimately related to those upon which the criminal case is based. The resolution
of the issues raised in this intra-corporate dispute will ultimately determine the guilt or innocence of [respondents] in the crime of estafa initiated by Jose
Buban. It must be remembered that one of the elements of the crime of estafa with abuse of confidence under paragraph 1 (b) of Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code is a demand made by the offended party to the offender. A valid demand must therefore be made by an offended party to the offender.8
The appellate court added that since respondents are challenging the authority of Buban, then the validity of Bubans demand to turn over or remit the
rentals is put in question. The appellate court concluded that if the supposed authority of Buban is found to be defective, it is as if no demand was ever
made, hence the prosecution for estafa cannot prosper.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in a Resolution dated 27 February 2009.
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner raises the lone ground of whether the Court of Appeals erred in declaring that there exists a prejudicial
question which calls for the suspension of the criminal proceedings before the trial court.
Petitioner argues that any decision of the trial court in the SEC cases with respect to the question of who are the lawful officers or directors of Anaped is not
determinative of the liability of respondents to remit the rental collections in favor of Anaped. Petitioner proffers that a corporation has a personality
distinct and separate from its individual stockholders. Petitioner emphasizes that at the time the demand for remittance of the rental collections was made
against respondents, Buban was an officer of Anaped and until such time that his authority is validly revoked, all his previous acts are valid and binding.
Moreover, petitioner avers that the duty of respondents to remit the collection still subsists even during the pendency of the SEC cases as the money
remitted goes directly to the corporation and not to the person who demanded the remittance. Finally, petitioner opines that question pertaining to the
authority of Buban to demand remittance may only be considered as a defense in the estafa case and not as a ground to suspend the proceedings.
A prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which
pertains to another tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the
guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those
upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of
the accused would necessarily be determined.9
Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure prescribes the elements that must concur in order for a civil case to be considered a prejudicial
question, to wit:
Section 7. Elements of prejudicial question. The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action
may proceed.
Aptly put, the following requisites must be present for a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of the criminal
proceedings until the final resolution of the civil case: (1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would
be based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; and (3)
jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal.10
As correctly stated by the Court of Appeals, SEC Case No. 05-97-5659 does not present a prejudicial question to the criminal case for estafa. It is an action for
accounting of all corporate funds and assets of Anaped, annulment of sale, injunction, receivership and damages. Even if said case will be decided against
respondents, they will not be adjudged free from criminal liability. It also does not automatically follow that an accounting of corporate funds and properties
and annulment of fictitious sale of corporate assets would result in the conviction of respondents in the estafa case.
With respect to SEC Case No. 03-99-6259, however, we affirm the Court of Appeals finding that a prejudicial question exists.1wphi1 The Complaint in SEC
Case No. 03-99-6259 prays for the nullification of the election of Anaped directors and officers, including Buban. Essentially, the issue is the authority of the
aforesaid officers to act for and behalf of the corporation.
On the other hand, the issue in the criminal case pertains to whether respondents committed estafa. Under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the RPC, the
elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: (1) that the money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same; (2) that there be
misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender, or denial on his part of such receipt; (3) that such misappropriation or
conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) that there is demand by the offended party to the offender.11
The elements of demand and misappropriation bear relevance to the validity or invalidity of the authority of Anaped directors and officers. In Omictin v.
Court of Appeals,12 we held that since the alleged offended party is the corporation, the validity of the demand for the delivery rests upon the authority of
the person making such a demand on the companys behalf. If the supposed authority of the person making the demand is found to be defective, it is as if
no demand was ever made, hence the prosecution for estafa cannot prosper. The Court added that mere failure to return the thing received for
administration or under any other obligation involving the duty to deliver or return the same or deliver the value thereof to the owner could only give rise to
a civil action and does not constitute the crime of estafa.13
It is true that the accused may be convicted of the felony under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code if the prosecution proves
misappropriation or conversion by the accused of the money or property subject of the Information. In a prosecution for estafa, demand is not necessary
where there is evidence of misappropriation or conversion.14 The phrase, "to misappropriate to ones own use" has been said to include "not only
conversion to ones personal advantage, but also every attempt to dispose of the property of another without right."15 In this case, the resolution of the
issue of misappropriation by respondents depends upon the result of SEC Case No. 03-99-6259. If it is ruled in the SEC case that the present Anaped
directors and officers were not validly elected, then respondent Victoria may have every right to refuse remittance of rental to Buban. Hence, the essential
element of misappropriation in estafa may be absent in this case.
In this connection, we find important the fact, noted by the CA, that:
It appears from the record of the case that Victoria Arambulo for the last twenty (20) years had been tasked with the management and collection of rentals
of the real properties the Reyes siblings inherited from their parents, Ana and Pedro Reyes.16
As earlier mentioned, SEC Case No. 03-99-6259 is a petition filed by Victoria and her brothers Domingo and Reynaldo questioning the very authority of their
elder siblings Rodrigo and Emerenciana, as well as the Anaped Board of Directors and Officers, including Buban to act for and in behalf of the corporation.
We find this issue consonant with the provisions of the Corporation Code which provides in Section 23 that:
Sec. 23. The Board of Directors or Trustees. - Unless otherwise provided in this Code, the corporate powers of all corporations formed under this Code shall
be exercised, all business conducted and all property of such corporations controlled and held by the board of directors or trustees to be elected from
among the holders of stocks, or where there is no stock, from among the members of the corporation, who shall hold office for one (1) year and until their
successors are elected and qualified.
In Valle Verde Country Club, Inc. v. Africa,17 we said that:
The underlying policy of the Corporation Code is that the business and affairs of the corporation must be governed by a board of directors whose members
have stood for election, and who have actually been elected by the stockholders, on an annual basis. Only in that way can the directors continued
accountability to shareholders, and the legitimacy of their decisions that bind the corporations stockholders, be assured. The shareholder vote is critical to
the theory that legitimizes the exercise of power by the directors or officers over properties that they do not own.
From the foregoing, it is clear that, should respondents herein prevail in SEC Case No. 03-99-6259, then Buban, who does not own either by himself or in
behalf of Anaped which is the owner, the property heretofore managed by Victoria, cannot demand remittance of the rentals on the property and Victoria
does not have the obligation to turn over the rentals to Buban.
Verily, the result of SEC Case No. 03-99-6259 will determine the innocence or guilt of respondents in the criminal case for estafa.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 5 February 2008 and 27 February 2009 enjoining the
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 121 from hearing Criminal Case No. C-62784 until the termination of SEC Case No. 03-99-6259, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
2. San Miguel Properties, Inc. v. Perez, G.R. No. 166836, September 4, 2013.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 166836 September 4, 2013
SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES, INC., PETITIONER,
vs.
SEC. HERNANDO B. PEREZ, ALBERT C. AGUIRRE, TEODORO B. ARCENAS, JR., MAXY S. ABAD, JAMES G. BARBERS, STEPHEN N. SARINO, ENRIQUE N. ZALAMEA,
JR., MARIANO M. MARTIN, ORLANDO O. SAMSON, CATHERINE R. AGUIRRE, AND ANTONIO V. AGCAOILI, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The pendency of an administrative case for specific performance brought by the buyer of residential subdivision lots in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board (HLURB) to compel the seller to deliver the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) of the fully paid lots is properly considered a ground to suspend a
criminal prosecution for violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 9571 on the ground of a prejudicial question. The administrative determination is
a logical antecedent of the resolution of the criminal charges based on non-delivery of the TCTs.
Antecedents
Petitioner San Miguel Properties Inc. (San Miguel Properties), a domestic corporation engaged in the real estate business, purchased in 1992, 1993 and April
1993 from B.F. Homes, Inc. (BF Homes), then represented by Atty. Florencio B. Orendain (Orendain) as its duly authorized rehabilitation receiver appointed
by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),2 130 residential lots situated in its subdivision BF Homes Paraaque, containing a total area of 44,345
square meters for the aggregate price of P106,248,000.00. The transactions were embodied in three separate deeds of sale.3 The TCTs covering the lots
bought under the first and second deeds were fully delivered to San Miguel Properties, but 20 TCTs covering 20 of the 41 parcels of land with a total area of
15,565 square meters purchased under the third deed of sale, executed in April 1993 and for which San Miguel Properties paid the full price of
P39,122,627.00, were not delivered to San Miguel Properties.
On its part, BF Homes claimed that it withheld the delivery of the 20 TCTs for parcels of land purchased under the third deed of sale because Atty. Orendain
had ceased to be its rehabilitation receiver at the time of the transactions after being meanwhile replaced as receiver by FBO Network Management, Inc. on
May 17, 1989 pursuant to an order from the SEC.4
BF Homes refused to deliver the 20 TCTs despite demands. Thus, on August 15, 2000, San Miguel Properties filed a complaint-affidavit in the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Las Pias City (OCP Las Pias) charging respondent directors and officers of BF Homes with non-delivery of titles in violation of Section 25,
in relation to Section 39, both of Presidential Decree No. 957 (I.S. No. 00-2256).5
At the same time, San Miguel Properties sued BF Homes for specific performance in the HLURB (HLURB Case No. REM-082400-11183),6 praying to compel
BF Homes to release the 20 TCTs in its favor.
In their joint counter-affidavit submitted in I.S. No. 00-2256,7 respondent directors and officers of BF Homes refuted San Miguel Properties assertions by
contending that: (a) San Miguel Properties claim was not legally demandable because Atty. Orendain did not have the authority to sell the 130 lots in 1992
and 1993 due to his having been replaced as BF Homes rehabilitation receiver by the SEC on May 17, 1989; (b) the deeds of sale conveying the lots were
irregular for being undated and unnotarized; (c) the claim should have been brought to the SEC because BF Homes was under receivership; (d) in
receivership cases, it was essential to suspend all claims against a distressed corporation in order to enable the receiver to effectively exercise its powers
free from judicial and extra-judicial interference that could unduly hinder the rescue of the distressed company; and (e) the lots involved were under
custodia legis in view of the pending receivership proceedings, necessarily stripping the OCP Las Pias of the jurisdiction to proceed in the action.
On October 10, 2000, San Miguel Properties filed a motion to suspend proceedings in the OCP Las Pias,8 citing the pendency of BF Homes receivership
case in the SEC. In its comment/opposition, BF Homes opposed the motion to suspend. In the meantime, however, the SEC terminated BF Homes
receivership on September 12, 2000, prompting San Miguel Properties to file on October 27, 2000 a reply to BF Homes comment/opposition coupled with a
motion to withdraw the sought suspension of proceedings due to the intervening termination of the receivership.9
On October 23, 2000, the OCP Las Pias rendered its resolution,10 dismissing San Miguel Properties criminal complaint for violation of Presidential Decree
No. 957 on the ground that no action could be filed by or against a receiver without leave from the SEC that had appointed him; that the implementation of
the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 957 exclusively pertained under the jurisdiction of the HLURB; that there existed a prejudicial question
necessitating the suspension of the criminal action until after the issue on the liability of the distressed BF Homes was first determined by the SEC en banc
or by the HLURB; and that no prior resort to administrative jurisdiction had been made; that there appeared to be no probable cause to indict respondents
for not being the actual signatories in the three deeds of sale.
On February 20, 2001, the OCP Las Pias denied San Miguel Properties motion for reconsideration filed on November 28, 2000, holding that BF Homes
directors and officers could not be held liable for the non-delivery of the TCTs under Presidential Decree No. 957 without a definite ruling on the legality of
Atty. Orendains actions; and that the criminal liability would attach only after BF Homes did not comply with a directive of the HLURB directing it to deliver
the titles.11
San Miguel Properties appealed the resolutions of the OCP Las Pias to the Department of Justice (DOJ), but the DOJ Secretary denied the appeal on
October 15, 2001, holding:
After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent reason to disturb the ruling of the City Prosecutor of Las Pias City. Established
jurisprudence supports the position taken by the City Prosecutor concerned.
There is no dispute that aside from the instant complaint for violation of PD 957, there is still pending with the Housing and Land Use Resulatory Board
(HLURB, for short) a complaint for specific performance where the HLURB is called upon to inquire into, and rule on, the validity of the sales transactions
involving the lots in question and entered into by Atty. Orendain for and in behalf of BF Homes.
As early as in the case of Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal, 177 SCRA 72, the Supreme Court had ruled that the HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction over cases
involving real estate business and practices under PD 957. This is reiterated in the subsequent cases of Union Bank of the Philippines versus HLURB, G.R.
[No.] 953364, June 29, 1992 and C.T. Torres Enterprises vs. Hilionada, 191 SCRA 286.
The said ruling simply means that unless and until the HLURB rules on the validity of the transactions involving the lands in question with specific reference
to the capacity of Atty. Orendain to bind BF Homes in the said transactions, there is as yet no basis to charge criminally respondents for non-delivery of the
subject land titles. In other words, complainant cannot invoke the penal provision of PD 957 until such time that the HLURB shall have ruled and decided on
the validity of the transactions involving the lots in question.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.12 (Emphasis supplied)
The DOJ eventually denied San Miguel Properties motion for reconsideration.13
Ruling of the CA
Undaunted, San Miguel Properties elevated the DOJs resolutions to the CA on certiorari and mandamus (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 73008), contending that
respondent DOJ Secretary had acted with grave abuse in denying their appeal and in refusing to charge the directors and officers of BF Homes with the
violation of Presidential Decree No. 957. San Miguel Properties submitted the issue of whether or not HLURB Case No. REM-082400-11183 presented a
prejudicial question that called for the suspension of the criminal action for violation of Presidential Decree No. 957.
In its assailed decision promulgated on February 24, 2004 in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 73008,14 the CA dismissed San Miguel Properties petition, holding and ruling
as follows:
From the foregoing, the conclusion that may be drawn is that the rule on prejudicial question generally applies to civil and criminal actions only.
However, an exception to this rule is provided in Quiambao vs. Osorio cited by the respondents. In this case, an issue in an administrative case was
considered a prejudicial question to the resolution of a civil case which, consequently, warranted the suspension of the latter until after termination of the
administrative proceedings.
Quiambao vs. Osorio is not the only instance when the Supreme Court relaxed the application of the rule on prejudicial question.
In Tamin vs. CA involving two (2) civil actions, the Highest Court similarly applied the rule on prejudicial question when it directed petitioner therein to put
up a bond for just compensation should the demolition of private respondents building proved to be illegal as a result of a pending cadastral suit in another
tribunal.
City of Pasig vs. COMELEC is yet another exception where a civil action involving a boundary dispute was considered a prejudicial question which must be
resolved prior to an administrative proceeding for the holding of a plebiscite on the affected areas.
In fact, in Vidad vs. RTC of Negros Oriental, Br. 42, it was ruled that in the interest of good order, courts can suspend action in one case pending
determination of another case closely interrelated or interlinked with it.
It thus appears that public respondent did not act with grave abuse of discretion x x x when he applied the rule on prejudicial question to the instant
proceedings considering that the issue on the validity of the sale transactions x x x by x x x Orendain in behalf of BF Homes, Inc., is closely intertwined with
the purported criminal culpability of private respondents, as officers/directors of BF Homes, Inc., arising from their failure to deliver the titles of the parcels
of land included in the questioned conveyance.
All told, to sustain the petitioners theory that the result of the HLURB proceedings is not determinative of the criminal liability of private respondents under
PD 957 would be to espouse an absurdity. If we were to assume that the HLURB finds BFHI under no obligation to delve the subject titles, it would be highly
irregular and contrary to the ends of justice to pursue a criminal case against private respondents for the non-delivery of certificates of title which they are
not under any legal obligation to turn over in the first place. (Bold emphasis supplied)
On a final note, absent grave abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutorial arm of the government as represented by herein public respondent, courts
will not interfere with the discretion of a public prosecutor in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before him. A public prosecutor, by the nature of
his office, is under no compulsion to file a criminal information where no clear legal justification has been shown, and no sufficient evidence of guilt nor
prima facie case has been established by the complaining party.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus is hereby DENIED. The Resolutions dated 15 October 2001 and 12 July
2002 of the Department of Justice are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 15
The CA denied San Miguel Properties motion for reconsideration on January 18, 2005.16
Issues
Aggrieved, San Miguel Properties is now on appeal, raising the following for consideration and resolution, to wit:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE, SERIOUS AND REVERSIBLE ERRORS WHEN IT DISMISSED PETITIONERS CERTIORARI AND MANDAMUS
PETITION TO ORDER AND DIRECT RESPONDENT SECRETARY TO INDICT RESPONDENTS FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 25, PD. 957 IN THAT:
THE OBLIGATION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS TO DELIVER TO PETITIONER THE TITLES TO 20 FULLY-PAID LOTS IS MANDATED BY SECTION 25, PD 957. IN FACT,
THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT HAD DULY CONFIRMED THE SAME PER ITS DECISION DATED 27 JANUARY 2005 IN O.P. CASE NO. 03-E-203, ENTITLED "SMPI V.
BF HOMES, INC.".
A FORTIORI, PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FAILURE AND/OR REFUSAL TO DELIVER TO PETITIONER THE SUBJECT TITLES CONSTITUTES CRIMINAL OFFENSE PER
SECTIONS 25 AND 39, PD 957 FOR WHICH IT IS THE MINISTERIAL DUTY OF RESPONDENT SECRETARY TO INDICT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS THEREFOR.
IN ANY EVENT, THE HLURB CASE DOES NOT PRESENT A "PREJUDICIAL QUESTION" TO THE SUBJECT CRIMINAL CASE SINCE THE FORMER INVOLVES AN ISSUE
SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM THE ISSUE INVOLVED IN THE LATTER. CONSEQUENTLY, THE HLURB CASE HAS NO CORRELATION, TIE NOR LINKAGE TO THE
PRESENT CRIMINAL CASE WHICH CAN PROCEED INDEPENDENTLY THEREOF.
IN FACT, THE CRIMINAL CULPABILITY OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS EMANATE FROM THEIR MALA PROHIBITA NON-DELIVERY OF THE TITLES TO TWENTY (20)
FULLY-PAID PARCELS OF LAND TO PETITIONER, AND NOT FROM THEIR NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE HLURBS RULING IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASE.
NONETHELESS, BY DECREEING THAT PETITIONERS CRIMINAL COMPLAINT IS PREMATURE, BOTH THE COURT OF APPEALS AND RESPONDENT SECRETARY HAD
IMPLIEDLY ADMITTED THE EXISTENCE OF SUFFICIENT PROBABLE CAUSE AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FOR THE CRIME CHARGED.17
It is relevant at this juncture to mention the outcome of the action for specific performance and damages that San Miguel Properties instituted in the HLURB
simultaneously with its filing of the complaint for violation of Presidential Decree No. 957. On January 25, 2002, the HLURB Arbiter ruled that the HLURB was
inclined to suspend the proceedings until the SEC resolved the issue of Atty. Orendains authority to enter into the transactions in BF Homes behalf, because
the final resolution by the SEC was a logical antecedent to the determination of the issue involved in the complaint before the HLURB. Upon appeal, the
HLURB Board of Commissioners (HLURB Board), citing the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, affirmed the HLURB Arbiters decision, holding that although no
prejudicial question could arise, strictly speaking, if one case was civil and the other administrative, it nonetheless opted to suspend its action on the cases
pending the final outcome of the administrative proceeding in the interest of good order.18
Not content with the outcome, San Miguel Properties appealed to the Office of the President (OP), arguing that the HLURB erred in suspending the
proceedings. On January 27, 2004, the OP reversed the HLURB Boards ruling, holding thusly:
The basic complaint in this case is one for specific performance under Section 25 of the Presidential Decree (PD) 957 "The Subdivision and Condominium
Buyers Protective."
As early as August 1987, the Supreme Court already recognized the authority of the HLURB, as successor agency of the National Housing Authority (NHA), to
regulate, pursuant to PD 957, in relation to PD 1344, the real estate trade, with exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide cases "involving specific
performance of contractual and statutory obligation filed by buyers of subdivision lots against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman," the
HLURB, in the exercise of its adjudicatory powers and functions, "must interpret and apply contracts, determine the rights of the parties under these
contracts and award[s] damages whenever appropriate."
Given its clear statutory mandate, the HLURBs decision to await for some forum to decide if ever one is forthcoming the issue on the authority of
Orendain to dispose of subject lots before it peremptorily resolves the basic complaint is unwarranted, the issues thereon having been joined and the
respective position papers and the evidence of the parties having been submitted. To us, it behooved the HLURB to adjudicate, with the usual dispatch, the
right and obligation of the parties in line with its own appreciation of the obtaining facts and applicable law. To borrow from Mabubha Textile Mills
Corporation vs. Ongpin, it does not have to rely on the finding of others to discharge this adjudicatory functions.19
After its motion for reconsideration was denied, BF Homes appealed to the CA (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 83631), raising as issues: (a) whether or not the HLURB had
the jurisdiction to decide with finality the question of Atty. Orendains authority to enter into the transaction with San Miguel Properties in BF Homes
behalf, and rule on the rights and obligations of the parties to the contract; and (b) whether or not the HLURB properly suspended the proceedings until the
SEC resolved with finality the matter regarding such authority of Atty. Orendain.
The CA promulgated its decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 83631,20 decreeing that the HLURB, not the SEC, had jurisdiction over San Miguel Properties complaint.
It affirmed the OPs decision and ordered the remand of the case to the HLURB for further proceedings on the ground that the case involved matters within
the HLURBs competence and expertise pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, viz:
[T]he High Court has consistently ruled that the NHA or the HLURB has jurisdiction over complaints arising from contracts between the subdivision
developer and the lot buyer or those aimed at compelling the subdivision developer to comply with its contractual and statutory obligations.
Hence, the HLURB should take jurisdiction over respondents complaint because it pertains to matters within the HLURBs competence and expertise. The
proceedings before the HLURB should not be suspended.
While We sustain the Office of the President, the case must be remanded to the HLURB. This is in recognition of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The
fairest and most equitable course to take under the circumstances is to remand the case to the HLURB for the proper presentation of evidence.21
Did the Secretary of Justice commit grave abuse of discretion in upholding the dismissal of San Miguel Properties criminal complaint for violation of
Presidential Decree No. 957 for lack of probable cause and for reason of a prejudicial question?
The question boils down to whether the HLURB administrative case brought to compel the delivery of the TCTs could be a reason to suspend the
proceedings on the criminal complaint for the violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 on the ground of a prejudicial question.
Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
1.
Action for specific performance, even if pending in the HLURB, an administrative agency, raises a prejudicial question BF Homes posture that the
administrative case for specific performance in the HLURB posed a prejudicial question that must first be determined before the criminal case for violation
of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 could be resolved is correct.
A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in the
criminal case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is determinative of the criminal case, but the jurisdiction to try and resolve it is
lodged in another court or tribunal. It is based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but is so intimately connected with the crime that it
determines the guilt or innocence of the accused.22 The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid conflicting decisions.23 The
essential elements of a prejudicial question are provided in Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, to wit: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves
an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not
the criminal action may proceed.
The concept of a prejudicial question involves a civil action and a criminal case. Yet, contrary to San Miguel Properties submission that there could be no
prejudicial question to speak of because no civil action where the prejudicial question arose was pending, the action for specific performance in the HLURB
raises a prejudicial question that sufficed to suspend the proceedings determining the charge for the criminal violation of Section 2524 of Presidential
Decree No. 957. This is true simply because the action for specific performance was an action civil in nature but could not be instituted elsewhere except in
the HLURB, whose jurisdiction over the action was exclusive and original.25
The determination of whether the proceedings ought to be suspended because of a prejudicial question rested on whether the facts and issues raised in the
pleadings in the specific performance case were so related with the issues raised in the criminal complaint for the violation of Presidential Decree No. 957,
such that the resolution of the issues in the former would be determinative of the question of guilt in the criminal case. An examination of the nature of the
two cases involved is thus necessary.
An action for specific performance is the remedy to demand the exact performance of a contract in the specific form in which it was made, or according to
the precise terms agreed upon by a party bound to fulfill it.26 Evidently, before the remedy of specific performance is availed of, there must first be a breach
of the contract.27 The remedy has its roots in Article 1191 of the Civil Code, which reads:
Article 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon him.
The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and the rescission of the obligation, with the payment of damages in either case. He may also seek
rescission, even after he has chosen fulfillment, if the latter should become impossible. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, the injured party may choose between specific performance or rescission with damages. As presently worded, Article 1191 speaks of the
remedy of rescission in reciprocal obligations within the context of Article 1124 of the former Civil Code which used the term resolution. The remedy of
resolution applied only to reciprocal obligations, such that a partys breach of the contract equated to a tacit resolutory condition that entitled the injured
party to rescission. The present article, as in the former one, contemplates alternative remedies for the injured party who is granted the option to pursue, as
principal actions, either the rescission or the specific performance of the obligation, with payment of damages in either case.28
On the other hand, Presidential Decree No. 957 is a law that regulates the sale of subdivision lots and condominiums in view of the increasing number of
incidents wherein "real estate subdivision owners, developers, operators, and/or sellers have reneged on their representations and obligations to provide
and maintain properly" the basic requirements and amenities, as well as of reports of alarming magnitude of swindling and fraudulent manipulations
perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers and operators,29 such as failure to deliver titles to the buyers or titles free from liens and
encumbrances. Presidential Decree No. 957 authorizes the suspension and revocation of the registration and license of the real estate subdivision owners,
developers, operators, and/or sellers in certain instances, as well as provides the procedure to be observed in such instances; it prescribes administrative
fines and other penalties in case of violation of, or non-compliance with its provisions.
Conformably with the foregoing, the action for specific performance in the HLURB would determine whether or not San Miguel Properties was legally
entitled to demand the delivery of the remaining 20 TCTs, while the criminal action would decide whether or not BF Homes directors and officers were
criminally liable for withholding the 20 TCTs. The resolution of the former must obviously precede that of the latter, for should the HLURB hold San Miguel
Properties to be not entitled to the delivery of the 20 TCTs because Atty. Orendain did not have the authority to represent BF Homes in the sale due to his
receivership having been terminated by the SEC, the basis for the criminal liability for the violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 would
evaporate, thereby negating the need to proceed with the criminal case.
Worthy to note at this juncture is that a prejudicial question need not conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused. It is enough for the
prejudicial question to simply test the sufficiency of the allegations in the information in order to sustain the further prosecution of the criminal case. A
party who raises a prejudicial question is deemed to have hypothetically admitted that all the essential elements of the crime have been adequately alleged
in the information, considering that the Prosecution has not yet presented a single piece of evidence on the indictment or may not have rested its case. A
challenge to the allegations in the information on the ground of prejudicial question is in effect a question on the merits of the criminal charge through a
non-criminal suit.30
2.
Doctrine of primary jurisdiction is applicable
That the action for specific performance was an administrative case pending in the HLURB, instead of in a court of law, was of no consequence at all. As
earlier mentioned, the action for specific performance, although civil in nature, could be brought only in the HLURB. This situation conforms to the doctrine
of primary jurisdiction. There has been of late a proliferation of administrative agencies, mostly regulatory in function. It is in favor of these agencies that the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction is frequently invoked, not to defeat the resort to the judicial adjudication of controversies but to rely on the expertise,
specialized skills, and knowledge of such agencies in their resolution. The Court has observed that one thrust of the proliferation is that the interpretation of
contracts and the determination of private rights under contracts are no longer a uniquely judicial function exercisable only by the regular courts.31
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction has been increasingly called into play on matters demanding the special competence of administrative agencies even if
such matters are at the same time within the jurisdiction of the courts. A case that requires for its determination the expertise, specialized skills, and
knowledge of some administrative board or commission because it involves technical matters or intricate questions of fact, relief must first be obtained in an
appropriate administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts although the matter comes within the jurisdiction of the courts. The
application of the doctrine does not call for the dismissal of the case in the court but only for its suspension until after the matters within the competence of
the administrative body are threshed out and determined.32
To accord with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the courts cannot and will not determine a controversy involving a question within the competence of an
administrative tribunal, the controversy having been so placed within the special competence of the administrative tribunal under a regulatory scheme. In
that instance, the judicial process is suspended pending referral to the administrative body for its view on the matter in dispute. Consequently, if the courts
cannot resolve a question that is within the legal competence of an administrative body prior to the resolution of that question by the latter, especially
where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative
agency to ascertain technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute
administered, suspension or dismissal of the action is proper.33
3.
Other submissions of petitioner are unwarranted
It is not tenable for San Miguel Properties to argue that the character of a violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 as malum prohibitum, by
which criminal liability attached to BF Homes directors and officers by the mere failure to deliver the TCTs, already rendered the suspension
unsustainable.34 The mere fact that an act or omission was malum prohibitum did not do away with the initiative inherent in every court to avoid an absurd
result by means of rendering a reasonable interpretation and application of the procedural law. Indeed, the procedural law must always be given a
reasonable construction to preclude absurdity in its application.35 Hence, a literal application of the principle governing prejudicial questions is to be
eschewed if such application would produce unjust and absurd results or unreasonable consequences.
San Miguel Properties further submits that respondents could not validly raise the prejudicial question as a reason to suspend the criminal proceedings
because respondents had not themselves initiated either the action for specific performance or the criminal action.1wphi1 It contends that the defense of
a prejudicial question arising from the filing of a related case could only be raised by the party who filed or initiated said related case.
The submission is unfounded. The rule on prejudicial question makes no distinction as to who is allowed to raise the defense. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguere debemos. When the law makes no distinction, we ought not to distinguish.36
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on February 24, 2004 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP NO. 73008; and ORDERS petitioner
to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
3. Spouses Gabitano v. San Miguel Corp., G.R. No. 188767, July 24, 2013.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 188767 July 24, 2013
SPOUSES ARGOVAN AND FLORIDA GADITANO, Petitioners,
vs.
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
For review on certiorari are the Decision dated 11 March 2008 and Resolution dated 16 July 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88431 which
reversed the Resolutions issued by the Secretary of Justice, suspending the preliminary investigation of I.S. No. 01-4205 on the ground of prejudicial
question.
Petitioner Spouses Argovan Gaditano (Argovan) and Florida Gadiano (Florida), who were engaged in the business of buying and selling beer and softdrinks
products, purchased beer products from San Miguel Corporation (SMC) in the amount of P285, 504.00 on 7 April 2000. Petitioners paid through a check
signed by Florida and drawn against Argovans Asia Trust Bank Current Account. When said check was presented for payment on 13 April 2000, the check
was dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds. Despite three (3) written demands,1 petitioner failed to make good of the check. This
prompted SMC to file a criminal case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and estafa against petitioners, docketed as I.S. No. 01-4205 with the Office of
the Prosecutor in Quezon City on 14 March 2001.
In their Counter-Affidavit, petitioners maintained that their checking account was funded under an automatic transfer arrangement, whereby funds from
their joint savings account with AsiaTrust Bank were automatically transferred to their checking account with said bank whenever a check they issued was
presented for payment. Petitioners narrated that sometime in 1999, Fatima Padua (Fatima) borrowed P30,000.00 from Florida. On 28 February 2000, Fatima
delivered Allied Bank Check No. 82813 dated 18 February 2000 payable to Florida in the amount of P378,000.00. Said check was crossed and issued by
AOWA Electronics. Florida pointed out that the amount of the check was in excess of the loan but she was assured by Fatima that the check was in order
and the proceeds would be used for the payroll of AOWA Electronics. Thus, Florida deposited said check to her joint AsiaTrust Savings Account which she
maintained with her husband, Argovan. The check was cleared on 6 March 2000 and petitioners joint savings account was subsequently credited with the
sum of P378,000.00. Florida initially paid P83,000.00 to Fatima. She then withdrew P295,000.00 from her joint savings account and turned over the amount
to Fatima. Fatima in turn paid her loan to Florida.
Petitioners claimed that on 7 April 2000, the date when they issued the check to SMC, their joint savings account had a balance of P330,353.17.2 As of 13
April 2000, petitioners balance even amounted to P412,513.17.3
On 13 April 2000, Gregorio Guevarra (Guevarra), the Bank Manager of AsiaTrust Bank, advised Florida that the Allied Bank Check No. 82813 for P378,000.00,
the same check handed to her by Fatima, was not cleared due to a material alteration in the name of the payee. Guevarra explained further that the check
was allegedly drawn payable to LG Collins Electronics, and not to her, contrary to Fatimas representation. AsiaTrust Bank then garnished the P378,000.00
from the joint savings account of petitioners without any court order. Consequently, the check issued by petitioners to SMC was dishonored having been
drawn against insufficient funds.
On 23 October 2000, petitioners filed an action for specific performance and damages against AsiaTrust Bank, Guevarra, SMC and Fatima, docketed as Civil
Case No. Q-00-42386. Petitioners alleged that AsiaTrust Bank and Guevarra unlawfully garnished and debited their bank accounts; that their obligation to
SMC had been extinguished by payment; and that Fatima issued a forged check.
Petitioners assert that the issues they have raised in the civil action constitute a bar to the prosecution of the criminal case for violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 and estafa.
On 29 January 2002, the Office of the Prosecutor recommended that the criminal proceedings be suspended pending resolution of Civil Case No. Q-00-
42386. SMC thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration before the Office of the Prosecutor but it was denied for lack of merit on 19 September 2002.
SMC filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) a petition for review challenging the Resolutions of the Office of the Prosecutor. In a Resolution dated 3 June
2004, the DOJ dismissed the petition. SMC filed a motion for reconsideration, which the DOJ Secretary denied in a Resolution dated 15 December 2004.
Undaunted, SMC went up to the Court of Appeals by filling a petition for certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 88431. On 11 March 2008, the Court of
Appeals rendered a Decision granting the petition as follows:
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Department of Justice dated June 3, 2004 and December 15, 2004
are SET ASIDE. In view thereof, let the suspension of the preliminary investigation of the case docketed as I.S. No. 01-4205 with the Office of the Prosecutor
of Quezon City be LIFTED. Accordingly, the continuation of the preliminary investigation until completed is ordered and if probable cause exists, let the
corresponding information against the respondents be filed.4
The Court of Appeals drew a distinction between the civil case which is an action for specific performance and damages involving petitioners joint savings
account, and the criminal case which is an action for estafa/violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 involving Argovans current account. The Court of Appeals
belied the claim of petitioners about an automatic fund transfer arrangement from petitioners joint savings account to Argovans current account.
By petition for review, petitioners assail the ruling of the Court of Appeals on the following grounds:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR AND EXCEEDED THE BOUNDS OF ITS JURISDICTION IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO RESPONDENTS
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING THE RESOLUTIONS DATED JUNE 3, 2004 AND DECEMBER 15, 2004 OF THE DOJ, THERE BEING NO GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE WAS NO PREJUDICIAL QUESTION BELOW BECAUSE TWO DIFFERENT BANK ACCOUNTS ARE
INVOLVED IN THE CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES.
IV. THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN REQUIRING PETITIONERS TO PRESENT EVIDENCE TO PROVE THE PREJUDICIAL QUESTION DURING THE PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION.5
The issues raised by petitioners are divided into the procedural issue of whether certiorari is the correct mode of appeal to the Court of Appeals and the
substantive issue of whether a prejudicial question exists to warrant the suspension of the criminal proceedings.
On the procedural issue, petitioners contend that SMCs resort to certiorari under Rule 65 was an improper remedy because the DOJs act of sustaining the
investigating prosecutors resolution to suspend the criminal proceedings due to a valid prejudicial question was an error in judgment and not of jurisdiction.
Petitioners further assert that nevertheless, an error of judgment is not correctible by certiorari when SMC had a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, which
was to file an appeal to the Office of the President.
The procedure taken up by petitioner was correct.
The Court of Appeals is clothed with jurisdiction to review the resolution issued by the Secretary of the DOJ through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court albeit solely on the ground that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of his discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction.6
In Alcaraz v. Gonzalez,7 we stressed that the resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor is subject to appeal to the Justice Secretary who exercises the power
of control and supervision over said Investigating Prosecutor; and who may affirm, nullify, reverse, or modify the ruling of such prosecutor. Thus, while the
Court of Appeals may review the resolution of the Justice Secretary, it may do so only in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, solely
on the ground that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of his discretion amounting to excess of lack of jurisdiction.8
Also, in Tan v. Matsuura,9 we held that while the findings of prosecutors are reviewable by the DOJ, this does not preclude courts from intervening and
exercising our own powers of review with respect to the DOJs findings. In the exceptional case in which grave abuse of discretion is committed, as when a
clear sufficiency or insufficiency of evidence to support a finding of probable cause is ignored, the Court of Appeals may take cognizance of the case via a
petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.10
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the DOJ abused its discretion when it affirmed the prosecutors suspension of the criminal investigation due to the
existence of an alleged prejudicial question.
We expound.
Petitioners insist that the Court of Appeals erroneously ruled against the existence of a prejudicial question by separately treating their joint savings account
and Argovans current account, and concluding therefrom that the civil and criminal cases could proceed independently of each other.
It is argued that the appellate court overlooked the fact that petitioners had an automatic transfer arrangement with AsiaTrust Bank, such that funds from
the savings account were automatically transferred to their checking account whenever a check they issued was presented for payment.
Petitioners maintain that since the checking account was funded by the monies deposited in the savings account, what mattered was the sufficiency of the
funds in the savings account. Hence, petitioners separate action against AsiaTrust Bank for unlawfully garnishing their savings account, which eventually
resulted in the dishonor of their check to SMC, poses a prejudicial question in the instant criminal proceedings.
Moreover, petitioners argue that they were not required to fully and exhaustively present evidence to prove their claims. The presentation of their
passbook, which confirmed numerous withdrawals made on the savings account and indicated as "FT" or "Fund Transfer," proved the existence of fund
transfer from their savings account to the checking account.
A prejudicial question generally comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an
issue which must be preemptively resolved before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be
determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to
avoid two conflicting decisions.11
Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure states the two elements necessary for a civil case to be considered a prejudicial question, to wit: BERSAMIN,*
Section 7. Elements of prejudicial question. The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or ABAD, and
intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action VILLARAMA, JR.,** JJ.
may proceed. (Emphasis supplied). MARIA CHRYSANTINE
If both civil and criminal cases have similar issues, or the issue in one is intimately related to the issues raised in the other, then a prejudicial question would L. PIMENTEL and PEOPLE Promulgated:
likely exist, provided that the other element or characteristic is satisfied. It must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which the OF THE PHILIPPINES,
criminal prosecution would be based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or Respondents. September 13, 2010
innocence of the accused. If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal action x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
based on the same facts, or if there is no necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal case, the civil case does not involve a
prejudicial question. Neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other.12
The issue in the criminal case is whether the petitioner is guilty of estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, while in the civil case, it is whether
AsiaTrust Bank had lawfully garnished the P378,000.00 from petitioners savings account. DECISION

The subject of the civil case is the garnishment by AsiaTrust Bank of petitioners savings account.1wphi1 Based on petitioners account, they deposited the
CARPIO, J.:
check given to them by Fatima in their savings account. The amount of said check was initially credited to petitioners savings account but the Fatima check
was later on dishonored because there was an alleged alteration in the name of the payee. As a result, the bank debited the amount of the check from
petitioners savings account. Now, petitioners seek to persuade us that had it not been for the unlawful garnishment, the funds in their savings account The Case
would have been sufficient to cover a check they issued in favor of SMC.
Before the Court is a petition for review[1] assailing the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 20 March 2006, in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.
The material facts surrounding the civil case bear no relation to the criminal investigation being conducted by the prosecutor. The prejudicial question in the
civil case involves the dishonor of another check. SMC is not privy to the nature of the alleged materially altered check leading to its dishonor and the
eventual garnishment of petitioners savings account. The source of the funds of petitioners savings account is no longer SMCs concern. The matter is The Antecedent Facts
between petitioners and Asia Trust Bank. On the other hand, the issue in the preliminary investigation is whether petitioners issued a bad check to SMC for
the payment of beer products.
The facts are stated in the Court of Appeals decision:
The gravamen of the offense punished by Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap (private respondent) filed an action for frustrated parricide against Joselito R. Pimentel
presentation for payment.13 Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 punishes the mere act of issuing a worthless check. The law did not look either at the actual ownership (petitioner), docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415, before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, which was raffled to Branch 223 (RTC Quezon City).
of the check or of the account against which it was made, drawn, or issued, or at the intention of the drawee, maker or issuer.14 The thrust of the law is to
prohibit the making of worthless checks and putting them into circulation.15 On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 72 (RTC Antipolo) for the pre-trial and
trial of Civil Case No. 04-7392 (Maria Chrysantine Lorenza L. Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Section 36 of the
Even if the trial court in the civil case declares Asia Trust Bank liable for the unlawful garnishment of petitioners savings account, petitioners cannot be Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.
automatically adjudged free from criminal liability for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, because the mere issuance of worthless checks with knowledge
of the insufficiency of funds to support the checks is in itself the offense.16
On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a
Furthermore, three notices of dishonor were sent to petitioners, who then, should have immediately funded the check. When they did not, their liabilities prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of Civil
under the bouncing checks law attached. Such liability cannot be affected by the alleged prejudicial question because their failure to fund the check upon Case No. 04-7392 would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City.
notice of dishonour is itself the offense.
The Decision of the Trial Court
In the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, deceit and damage are additional and essential elements of the offense.
It is the fraud or deceit employed by the accused in issuing a worthless check that is penalized.17 A prima facie presumption of deceit arises when a check is
dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds.18 Records show that a notice of dishonor as well as demands for payment, were sent to petitioners. The The RTC Quezon City issued an Order dated 13 May 2005[3] holding that the pendency of the case before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that
presumption of deceit applies, and petitioners must overcome this presumption through substantial evidence. These issues may only be threshed out in a warrants the suspension of the criminal case before it. The RTC Quezon City held that the issues in Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 are the injuries sustained
criminal investigation which must proceed independently of the civil case. by respondent and whether the case could be tried even if the validity of petitioners marriage with respondent is in question. The RTC Quezon City ruled:

Based on the foregoing, we rule that the resolution or the issue raised in the civil action is not determinative or the guilt or innocence of the accused in the
criminal investigation against them. There is no necessity that the civil case be determined firrst before taking up the criminal complaints.
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings On the [Ground] of the Existence of a Prejudicial Question is, for lack of
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 11 March 2008 and its Resolution dated 16 July 2000, in CA-G.R. SP
merit, DENIED.
No. 88431, are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. SO ORDERED.[4]

4. Pimentel v. Pimentel, G.R. No. 172060, September 13, 2010.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 22 August 2005 Order,[5] the RTC Quezon City denied the motion.
ECOND DIVISION
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order before the Court of Appeals,
assailing the 13 May 2005 and 22 August 2005 Orders of the RTC Quezon City.

JOSELITO R. PIMENTEL, G.R. No. 172060

Petitioner, The Decision of the Court of Appeals
Present:
In its 20 March 2006 Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals ruled that in the criminal case for frustrated parricide, the
CARPIO, J., Chairperson, issue is whether the offender commenced the commission of the crime of parricide directly by overt acts and did not perform all the acts of execution by
- versus - PERALTA, reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. On the other hand, the issue in the civil action for annulment of marriage is
whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The Court of Appeals ruled that even if the marriage
between petitioner and respondent would be declared void, it would be immaterial to the criminal case because prior to the declaration of nullity, the
alleged acts constituting the crime of frustrated parricide had already been committed. The Court of Appeals ruled that all that is required for the charge of
frustrated parricide is that at the time of the commission of the crime, the marriage is still subsisting.
Petitioner filed a petition for review before this Court assailing the Court of Appeals decision.
frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts of execution which would have killed respondent as a consequence but which,
nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of petitioners will.[16] At the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and
respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage, in case the petition in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is granted, will have no effect on the
alleged crime that was committed at the time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is
annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.

The Issue We cannot accept petitioners reliance on Tenebro v. Court of Appeals[17] that the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned x x x. First, the
issue in Tenebro is the effect of the judicial declaration of nullity of a second or subsequent marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on a criminal
The only issue in this case is whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the
liability for bigamy. There was no issue of prejudicial question in that case. Second, the Court ruled in Tenebro that [t]here is x x x a recognition written into
criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner.
the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences.[18] In fact, the Court declared in that case that a
declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the States penal laws are
The Ruling of this Court concerned.[19]

The petition has no merit. In view of the foregoing, the Court upholds the decision of the Court of Appeals. The trial in Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 may proceed as the resolution
of the issue in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of petitioner in the criminal case.
Civil Case Must be Instituted
Before the Criminal Case WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 20 March 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.
SO ORDERED.
Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure[6] provides:

Section 7. Elements of Prejudicial Question. - The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action 5. Dreamwork Construction, Inc. v. Janiola, G.R. No. 184861, June 30, 2009.
may proceed. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the filing of the criminal action. In this case, the Information[7] for Frustrated Parricide Manila
was dated 30 August 2004. It was raffled to RTC Quezon City on 25 October 2004 as per the stamped date of receipt on the Information. The RTC Quezon
City set Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 for pre-trial and trial on 14 February 2005. Petitioner was served summons in Civil Case No. 04-7392 on 7 February
2005.[8] Respondents petition[9] in Civil Case No. 04-7392 was dated 4 November 2004 and was filed on 5 November 2004. Clearly, the civil case for
annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated parricide. As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on THIRD DIVISION
Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil action was filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal action.

Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Question DREAMWORK G.R. No. 184861

in Criminal Case for Parricide CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
Petitioner, Present:
Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would warrant the suspension of the criminal action. YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - CHICO-NAZARIO,
There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the civil action an issue which must be VELASCO, JR.,
preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of NACHURA, and
the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.[10] A prejudicial question is defined as: PERALTA, JJ.
CLEOFE S. JANIOLA and Promulgated:
HON. ARTHUR A. FAMINI,
x x x one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another Respondents. June 30, 2009
tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the
criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would
DECISION
necessarily be determined.[11]

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of parricide,[12] which punishes any person who shall kill his father,
mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse.[13] The relationship between the offender and
the victim distinguishes the crime of parricide from murder[14] or homicide.[15] However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately
related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender and the victim is not determinative of the guilt or
The Case
innocence of the accused.

The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with
Petitioner Dreamwork Construction, Inc. seeks the reversal of the August 26, 2008 Decision[1] in SCA No. 08-0005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
253 in Las Pias City. The Decision affirmed the Orders dated October 16, 2007[2] and March 12, 2008[3] in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 issued by the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 79 in Las Pias City.
The Facts
On October 18, 2004, petitioner, through its President, Roberto S. Concepcion, and Vice-President for Finance and Marketing, Normandy P. Amora, filed a
Complaint Affidavit dated October 5, 2004[4] for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22) against private respondent Cleofe S. Janiola with the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Las Pias City. The case was docketed as I.S. No. 04-2526-33. Correspondingly, petitioner filed a criminal information for violation of
BP 22 against private respondent with the MTC on February 2, 2005 docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61, entitled People of the Philippines v. Cleofe S.
Janiola.
On September 20, 2006, private respondent, joined by her husband, instituted a civil complaint against petitioner by filing a Complaint dated August 2006[5]
for the rescission of an alleged construction agreement between the parties, as well as for damages. The case was filed with the RTC, Branch 197 in Las Pias
City and docketed as Civil Case No. LP-06-0197. Notably, the checks, subject of the criminal cases before the MTC, were issued in consideration of the
construction agreement.
Thereafter, on July 25, 2007, private respondent filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings dated July 24, 2007[6] in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61, alleging that
the civil and criminal cases involved facts and issues similar or intimately related such that in the resolution of the issues in the civil case, the guilt or
innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. In other words, private respondent claimed that the civil case posed a prejudicial question as
against the criminal cases.
Petitioner opposed the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal cases in an undated Comment/Opposition to Accuseds Motion to Suspend
Proceedings based on Prejudicial Question[7] on the grounds that: (1) there is no prejudicial question in this case as the rescission of the contract upon
which the bouncing checks were issued is a separate and distinct issue from the issue of whether private respondent violated BP 22; and (2) Section 7, Rule
111 of the Rules of Court states that one of the elements of a prejudicial question is that the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action; thus, this element is missing in this case, the criminal case having preceded the civil
case.
Later, the MTC issued its Order dated October 16, 2007, granting the Motion to Suspend Proceedings, and reasoned that:
Should the trial court declare the rescission of contract and the nullification of the checks issued as the same are without consideration, then the instant
criminal cases for alleged violation of BP 22 must be dismissed. The belated filing of the civil case by the herein accused did not detract from the correctness
of her cause, since a motion for suspension of a criminal action may be filed at any time before the prosecution rests (Section 6, Rule 111, Revised Rules of
Court).[8]
In an Order dated March 12, 2008,[9] the MTC denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration dated November 29, 2007.
Petitioner appealed the Orders to the RTC with a Petition dated May 13, 2008. Thereafter, the RTC issued the assailed decision dated August 26, 2008,
denying the petition. On the issue of the existence of a prejudicial question, the RTC ruled:
Additionally, it must be stressed that the requirement of a previously filed civil case is intended merely to obviate delays in the conduct of the criminal
proceedings. Incidentally, no clear evidence of any intent to delay by private respondent was shown. The criminal proceedings are still in their initial stages
when the civil action was instituted. And, the fact that the civil action was filed after the criminal action was instituted does not render the issues in the civil
action any less prejudicial in character.[10]
Hence, we have this petition under Rule 45.
The Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT PERCEIVING GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE INFERIOR COURT, WHEN
THE LATTER RULED TO SUSPEND PROCEEDINGS IN CRIM. CASE NOS. 55554-61 ON THE BASIS OF PREJUDICIAL QUESTION IN CIVIL CASE NO. LP-06-0197.[11]
The Courts Ruling
This petition must be granted.
The Civil Action Must Precede the Filing of the
Criminal Action for a Prejudicial Question to Exist
Under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended by Supreme Court Resolutions dated June 17, 1988 and July 7, 1988, the elements of a prejudicial
question are contained in Rule 111, Sec. 5, which states:
SEC. 5. Elements of prejudicial question. The two (2) essential elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
Thus, the Court has held in numerous cases[12] that the elements of a prejudicial question, as stated in the above-quoted provision and in Beltran v. People,
[13] are:
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an
issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed.
On December 1, 2000, the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, however, became effective and the above provision was amended by Sec. 7 of Rule 111, which
applies here and now provides:
SEC. 7. Elements of prejudicial question.The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action
may proceed. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner interprets Sec. 7(a) to mean that in order for a civil case to create a prejudicial question and, thus, suspend a criminal case, it must first be
established that the civil case was filed previous to the filing of the criminal case. This, petitioner argues, is specifically to guard against the situation wherein
a party would belatedly file a civil action that is related to a pending criminal action in order to delay the proceedings in the latter.
On the other hand, private respondent cites Article 36 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 36. Pre-judicial questions which must be decided before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed, shall be governed by rules of court
which the Supreme Court shall promulgate and which shall not be in conflict with the provisions of this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
Private respondent argues that the phrase before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed must be interpreted to mean that a prejudicial
question exists when the civil action is filed either before the institution of the criminal action or during the pendency of the criminal action. Private
respondent concludes that there is an apparent conflict in the provisions of the Rules of Court and the Civil Code in that the latter considers a civil case to
have presented a prejudicial question even if the criminal case preceded the filing of the civil case.
We cannot agree with private respondent.
First off, it is a basic precept in statutory construction that a change in phraseology by amendment of a provision of law indicates a legislative intent to
change the meaning of the provision from that it originally had.[14] In the instant case, the phrase, previously instituted, was inserted to qualify the nature
of the civil action involved in a prejudicial question in relation to the criminal action. This interpretation is further buttressed by the insertion of subsequent
directly before the term criminal action. There is no other logical explanation for the amendments except to qualify the relationship of the civil and criminal
actions, that the civil action must precede the criminal action.
Thus, this Court ruled in Torres v. Garchitorena[15] that:
Even if we ignored petitioners procedural lapse and resolved their petition on the merits, we hold that Sandiganbayan did not abuse its discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in denying their omnibus motion for the suspension of the proceedings pending final judgment in Civil Case No.
7160. Section 6, Rule lll of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, reads:
Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. - A petition for suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a
civil action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in
court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests.
Sec. 7. Elements of prejudicial question. - The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action
may proceed.
Under the amendment, a prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must precede the criminal action and which requires a decision before a
final judgment can be rendered in the criminal action with which said question is closely connected. The civil action must be instituted prior to the
institution of the criminal action. In this case, the Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan ahead of the complaint in Civil Case No. 7160 filed by the
State with the RTC in Civil Case No. 7160. Thus, no prejudicial question exists. (Emphasis supplied.)
Additionally, it is a principle in statutory construction that a statute should be construed not only to be consistent with itself but also to harmonize with
other laws on the same subject matter, as to form a complete, coherent and intelligible system.[16] This principle is consistent with the maxim, interpretare
et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus or every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a
uniform system of jurisprudence.[17]
In other words, every effort must be made to harmonize seemingly conflicting laws. It is only when harmonization is impossible that resort must be made to
choosing which law to apply.
In the instant case, Art. 36 of the Civil Code and Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court are susceptible of an interpretation that would harmonize both
provisions of law. The phrase previously instituted civil action in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 is plainly worded and is not susceptible of alternative interpretations. The
clause before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed in Art. 36 of the Civil Code may, however, be interpreted to mean that the motion
to suspend the criminal action may be filed during the preliminary investigation with the public prosecutor or court conducting the investigation, or during
the trial with the court hearing the case.
This interpretation would harmonize Art. 36 of the Civil Code with Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court but also with Sec. 6 of Rule 111 of the Civil Code,
which provides for the situations when the motion to suspend the criminal action during the preliminary investigation or during the trial may be filed. Sec. 6
provides:
SEC. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question.A petition for suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a
civil action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in
court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests.
Thus, under the principles of statutory construction, it is this interpretation of Art. 36 of the Civil Code that should govern in order to give effect to all the
relevant provisions of law.
It bears pointing out that the circumstances present in the instant case indicate that the filing of the civil action and the subsequent move to suspend the
criminal proceedings by reason of the presence of a prejudicial question were a mere afterthought and instituted to delay the criminal proceedings.
In Sabandal v. Tongco,[18] we found no prejudicial question existed involving a civil action for specific performance, overpayment, and damages, and a
criminal complaint for BP 22, as the resolution of the civil action would not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. In resolving
the case, we said:
Furthermore, the peculiar circumstances of the case clearly indicate that the filing of the civil case was a ploy to delay the resolution of the criminal cases.
Petitioner filed the civil case three years after the institution of the criminal charges against him. Apparently, the civil action was instituted as an
afterthought to delay the proceedings in the criminal cases.[19]
Here, the civil case was filed two (2) years after the institution of the criminal complaint and from the time that private respondent allegedly withdrew its
equipment from the job site. Also, it is worth noting that the civil case was instituted more than two and a half (2 ) years from the time that private
respondent allegedly stopped construction of the proposed building for no valid reason. More importantly, the civil case praying for the rescission of the
construction agreement for lack of consideration was filed more than three (3) years from the execution of the construction agreement.
Evidently, as in Sabandal, the circumstances surrounding the filing of the cases involved here show that the filing of the civil action was a mere afterthought
on the part of private respondent and interposed for delay. And as correctly argued by petitioner, it is this scenario that Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court seeks to prevent. Thus, private respondents positions cannot be left to stand.
The Resolution of the Civil Case Is Not
Determinative of the Prosecution of the Criminal Action
In any event, even if the civil case here was instituted prior to the criminal action, there is, still, no prejudicial question to speak of that would justify the
suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case.
To reiterate, the elements of a prejudicial question under Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court are: (1) the previously instituted civil action involves an
issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action; and (2) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.
Petitioner argues that the second element of a prejudicial question, as provided in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules, is absent in this case. Thus, such rule
cannot apply to the present controversy.
Private respondent, on the other hand, claims that if the construction agreement between the parties is declared null and void for want of consideration,
the checks issued in consideration of such contract would become mere scraps of paper and cannot be the basis of a criminal prosecution.
We find for petitioner.
It must be remembered that the elements of the crime punishable under BP 22 are as follows:
(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;
(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue there are no sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of
such check in full upon its presentment; and
(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.[20]
Undeniably, the fact that there exists a valid contract or agreement to support the issuance of the check/s or that the checks were issued for valuable
consideration does not make up the elements of the crime. Thus, this Court has held in a long line of cases[21] that the agreement surrounding the issuance
of dishonored checks is irrelevant to the prosecution for violation of BP 22. In Mejia v. People,[22] we ruled:
It must be emphasized that the gravamen of the offense charge is the issuance of a bad check. The purpose for which the check was issued, the terms and
conditions relating to its issuance, or any agreement surrounding such issuance are irrelevant to the prosecution and conviction of petitioner. To determine
the reason for which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their issuance, will greatly erode the faith the public reposes in the stability and
commercial value of checks as currency substitutes, and bring havoc in trade and in banking communities. The clear intention of the framers of B.P. 22 is to
make the mere act of issuing a worthless check malum prohibitum.
Lee v. Court of Appeals[23] is even more poignant. In that case, we ruled that the issue of lack of valuable consideration for the issuance of checks which
were later on dishonored for insufficient funds is immaterial to the success of a prosecution for violation of BP 22, to wit:

Third issue. Whether or not the check was issued on account or for value.

Petitioners claim is not feasible. We have held that upon issuance of a check, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that the same was
issued for valuable consideration. Valuable consideration, in turn, may consist either in some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to the party who
makes the contract, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or some responsibility, to act, or labor, or service given, suffered or undertaken by the other side.
It is an obligation to do, or not to do in favor of the party who makes the contract, such as the maker or indorser.

In this case, petitioner himself testified that he signed several checks in blank, the subject check included, in exchange for 2.5% interest from the proceeds of
loans that will be made from said account. This is a valuable consideration for which the check was issued. That there was neither a pre-existing obligation
nor an obligation incurred on the part of petitioner when the subject check was given by Bautista to private complainant on July 24, 1993 because petitioner
was no longer connected with Unlad or Bautista starting July 1989, cannot be given merit since, as earlier discussed, petitioner failed to adequately prove
that he has severed his relationship with Bautista or Unlad.

At any rate, we have held that what the law punishes is the mere act of issuing a bouncing check, not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and
conditions relating to its issuance. This is because the thrust of the law is to prohibit the making of worthless checks and putting them into circulation.[24]
(Emphasis supplied.)

Verily, even if the trial court in the civil case declares that the construction agreement between the parties is void for lack of consideration, this would not
affect the prosecution of private respondent in the criminal case. The fact of the matter is that private respondent indeed issued checks which were
subsequently dishonored for insufficient funds. It is this fact that is subject of prosecution under BP 22.

Therefore, it is clear that the second element required for the existence of a prejudicial question, that the resolution of the issue in the civil action would
determine whether the criminal action may proceed, is absent in the instant case. Thus, no prejudicial question exists and the rules on it are inapplicable to
the case before us.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT this petition. We hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the August 26, 2008 Decision in SCA No. 08-0005 of the RTC, Branch 253 in Las
Pias City and the Orders dated October 16, 2007 and March 12, 2008 in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 of the MTC, Branch 79 in Las Pias City. We order the
MTC to continue with the proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 with dispatch.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.