1. OCAMPO V. TIRRONA
Tirona claims she has never stopped paying her rent to Maria Lourdes Breton-
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
The good faith of Tirona is put in question in her preference for Maria Lourdes Breton-
Mendiola. As a stakeholder, Tirona should have used reasonable diligence in hailing the
contending claimants to court. Tirona need not have awaited actual institution of a suit
by Ocampo against her before filing a bill of interpleader. An action for interpleader is
proper when the lessee does not know the person to whom to pay rentals due to
conflicting claims on the property.
The action of interpleader is a remedy whereby a person who has property whether
personal or real, in his possession, or an obligation to render wholly or partially,
without claiming any right in both, or claims an interest which in whole or in part
is not disputed by the conflicting claimants, comes to court and asks that the
persons who claim the said property or who consider themselves entitled to demand
compliance with the obligation, be required to litigate among themselves, in order
to determine finally who is entitled to one or the other thing. The remedy is afforded
not to protect a person against a double liability but to protect him against a double
vexation in respect of one liability. When the court orders that the claimants litigate
among themselves, there arises in reality a new action and the former are styled
interpleaders, and in such a case the pleading which initiates the action is called a
complaint of interpleader and not a cross-complaint.
FACTS:
Ocampo alleged that he is the owner of a parcel of land (subject land) described in
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 134359.
Ocampo bought the subject land from Rosauro Breton, heir of the subject lands
registered owner Alipio Breton Cruz. Possession and administration of the subject land
are claimed to be already in Ocampos management even though the TCT is not yet in
his name. Tirona, on the other hand, is a lessee occupying a portion of the subject land.
According to Ocampo, upon acquisition of ownership of the subject premises, a formal
written notice was given to Tirona which was received by the latter on 9 March 1995. In
recognition of Ocampos right of ownership over the subject premises, Tirona paid some
monthly rentals due, however, on July 5, 1995, Ocampo received a letter from Callejo
Law Office stating among others, that, in view of the fact that the subject premises was
declared under area for priority development, Tirona is invoking her right of first refusal
and Tirona will temporarily stop paying her monthly rentals until and unless the National
Housing Authority have processed the pertinent papers as regards the amount due to
Ocampo by reason of the implementation of the above law.
Ocampo filed a complaint for unlawful detainer
Tirona maintained that Ocampo is not the owner of the subject land. She stated that the
certificate of title to the subject land is not even registered under Ocampos name. Tirona
also alleged that she has a right of first refusal in case of sale of the land, pursuant to
Presidential Decree (PD) Nos. 1517, 1893 and 1968. The area where the subject land is
located was certified as an area under priority development.
MTC - Tirona does not have any reason to suspend payment of rents
Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola, who claimed to be the owner of the subject land, filed
a motion with leave to file intervention before the RTC.
For the first time, Tirona disclosed that Alipio Breton is the registered owner of the
subject land and that he is her landlord since 1962. When Alipio Breton died in 1975,
his children, Rosauro Breton and Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola, inherited the subject
land.
Mendiola. Tirona also stated that Rosauro Breton could not transfer ownership to the
subject land to Ocampo. On 14 July 1978, Rosauro Breton executed a deed of
conveyance and waiver in favor of his sister, Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola. Rosauro
Breton executed another deed of conveyance and waiver in favor of Maria Lourdes
Breton-Mendiola on 9 March 1995. Thus, Tirona claims, Ocampo cannot legally acquire
title from Rosauro Breton in view of the waivers. Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola is
Tironas lessor, and is the only person who can validly file an ejectment suit against
Tirona.
RTC affirmed MTC
CA set aside the decision
ISSUE(S):
W/N the Unlawful Detainer case will prosper;
W/N an action for Interpleader should have been filed before the suit of Ocampo. (as a sign
of good faith)
HELD: Yes; Yes
RATIO:
The sale of a leased property places the vendee into the shoes of the original lessor to whom
the lessee bound himself to pay. The vendee acquires the right to evict the lessee from the
premises and to recover the unpaid rentals after the vendee had notified the lessee that he had
bought the leased property and that the rentals on it should be paid to him, and the lessee
refused to comply with the demand.
There was a violation of the lease agreement. (Non-payment of rentals)
Unlawful detainer cases are summary in nature. The elements to be proved and resolved in
unlawful detainer cases are the fact of lease and expiration or violation of its terms. To support
their conclusion that there was an existing lease, the MTC and RTC found that:
Ocampo informed Tirona through a letter dated 1 March 1995 that he bought the
subject land, upon which Tironas house stands, from the previous owner and lessor
Rosauro Breton;
Tironas continued occupancy of the subject land signifies Tironas acceptance of
Ocampos conditions of lease stated in the 1 March 1995 letter; and
In asserting her right to possess the subject land, Tirona admitted that Ocampo is
her lessor.
Contrary to Tironas position, the issue of ownership is not essential to an action for unlawful
detainer. The fact of the lease and the expiration of its term are the only elements of the action.
The defense of ownership does not change the summary nature of the action. The affected
party should raise the issue of ownership in an appropriate action, because a certificate of title
cannot be the subject of a collateral attack. Although a wrongful possessor may at times be
upheld by the courts, this is merely temporary and solely for the maintenance of public order.
The question of ownership is to be settled in the proper court and in a proper action.
Unlawful detainer being a summary proceeding, it was error for the appellate court to include
the issue of ownership. Had the appellate court limited its ruling to the elements to be proved
in a case of unlawful detainer, Ocampo need not even prove his ownership. When the
appellate court ruled that the case of unlawful detainer had to wait for the results of the
partition proceedings, it effectively put ownership as the main issue in the case.
Interpleader
The good faith of Tirona is put in question in her preference for Maria Lourdes Breton-
Mendiola. As a stakeholder, Tirona should have used reasonable diligence in hailing the
contending claimants to court. Tirona need not have awaited actual institution of a suit by
Ocampo against her before filing a bill of interpleader. An action for interpleader is proper
when the lessee does not know the person to whom to pay rentals due to conflicting claims
on the property.

The action of interpleader is a remedy whereby a person who has property whether
personal or real, in his possession, or an obligation to render wholly or partially, without
claiming any right in both, or claims an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed
by the conflicting claimants, comes to court and asks that the persons who claim the said
property or who consider themselves entitled to demand compliance with the obligation,
be required to litigate among themselves, in order to determine finally who is entitled to
one or the other thing. The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against a double
liability but to protect him against a double vexation in respect of one liability. When the court
orders that the claimants litigate among themselves, there arises in reality a new action and
the former are styled interpleaders, and in such a case the pleading which initiates the action
is called a complaint of interpleader and not a cross-complaint.
2. RCBC V. METRO CONTAINER NOTES: the Unlawful Detainer Case. Both were dismissed for lack of merit, MRs denied as well
Emergency recit: LEYCON secured a so METROCAN sought relief from CA.
mortgage which was foreclosed hence CAs decision: GRANTED METROCANs PETITION.
transferring to RCBC the ownership. RCBCs MR was denied hence the case.
METROCAN (lessee) filed an Interpleader
against LEYCON as previous owner ISSUE(S): W/N METC decision rendered the Interpleader case moot and academic
(debtor/mortgagor) and RCBC as the new HELD: yes
owner due to the confusion to whom to pay RATIO:
the rent over mortgaged property. Court ruled It is undisputed that METROCAN filed the interpleader action because LEYCON was
that Interpleader became moot when in the claiming payment of the rentals as lessor and RCBC was making a demand by virtue of
Interpleader case (initially filed by the consolidation of the title of the property in its name.
LEYCON), MeTC ordered that the payments The Supreme Court said that the unlawful detainer case involves issue of material
should be given to LEYCON. Therefore, no possession and not of ownership, therefore, the reason for the interpleader ceased
more conflicting claims, so no more case for when the lower court rendered judgment ordering METROCAN to pay LEYCON.
Interpleader While RCBC (not a party in the unlawful detainer case) could not be bound by the
judgment however METROCAN is bound by it,
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: It should be remembered that an action of interpleader is METROCAN has no other alternative left but to pay the rentals to LEYCON. Since there
afforded to protect a person not against double liability but against double vexation in respect was already a judicial flat to METROCAN, there was no need to continue the
of one liability. It requires, as an indispensable requisite, that "conflicting claims upon the Interpleader Case which was why METROCAN moved for its dismissal since there
same subject matter are or may be made against the plaintiff-in-interpleader who claims no was no more need to pursue such action.
interest whatever in the subject matter or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed It should be remembered that an action for interpleader is afforded to protect a
by the claimants." person not against double liability but against double vexation in respect of one
liability.
FACTS: It requires, as an indispensable requisite, that "conflicting claims upon the same
Sept 26, 1990: Ley Construction Corporation (LEYCON) contracted a loan from RCBC subject matter are or may be made against the plaintiff-in-interpleader who claims
in the amount of 30 M. no interest whatever in the subject matter or an interest which in whole or in part
Loan was secured by a REM over property located in Barrio Ugong, Valenzuela (TCT- is not disputed by the claimants."
V-17223)
The Unlawful Detainer case resolved the conflicting claims insofar as payment of
LEYCON failed to settle its obligations so RCBC instituted an extrajudicial proceeding
rental was concerned.
against LEYCON.
RCBC cannot compel METROCAN to pursue the Interpleader case and it has
Foreclosure took place and RCBC was highest bidder (Dec. 28, 1992.)
other avenues to prove its claim. The Court said that the issue of ownership can be
LEYCON filled an action for Nullificatoin of Extrajudicial Foreclosure Sale and
very well threshed out in the case for Nullification of Extrajudicial Foreclosure Sale and
Damages against RCBC (Civi Case No. 4037-V-93) but eventually RCBC was able to
Damages filed by LEYCON against RCBC.
consolidate its ownership over the property due to LEYCONs failure to redeem it
within the 12-month redemption period and TCT V-332432 was issued in favor of the
bank.
Metro Container Corporation (METROCAN) was leasing the property from LEYCON
was demanded by RCBC to make rental payments.
LEYCON, on the other hand, filed an action for Unlawful Detainer against
METROCAN.
May 27, 1994: METROCAN filed a complaint for Interpleader (Civil Case No. 4398-
V-94) against LEYCON and RCBC to compel them to interplead and litigate their
several claims among themselves and to determine which among them shall rightfully
receive the payment of monthly rentals.
During pre-trial in the Interpleader case, an amicable settlement was made between
METROCAN and LEYCON with respect to back rentals so the court ordered for its
dismissal.
METC: In the Unlawful Detainer case, METROCAN was order to pay LEYCON
whatever rentals were due. This became final and executory.
METROCAN and LEYCON moved that the Interpleader Case be dismissed for having
been moot and academic due to the amicable settlement and because of the decision for
3. Eternal Gardens Memorial Park v. IAC Land Development Agreement with a reputable bank to be designated by the respondent
and Mission: court.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
The essence of an interpleader, aside from the disavowal of interest in the property in HELD: No. Petition denied. Remanded to the lower court for further proceedings.
litigation on the part of the petitioner, is the deposit of the property or funds in
RATIO:
controversy with the court.
In the case at bar, a careful analysis of the records will show that Eternal Gardens
It is a rule founded on justice and equity: that the plaintiff may not continue to benefit
admitted among others in its complaint in Interpleader that it is still obligated to pay
from the property or funds in litigation during the pendency of the suit at the expense of
certain amounts to Mission; that it claims no interest in such amounts due and is willing
whoever will ultimately be decided as entitled thereto.
to pay whoever is declared entitled to said amounts.
In the light of the willingness, expressly made before the court, Eternal Gardens will pay
FACTS:
whatever is due on the Land Development Agreement to the rightful owner/owners, there
October 6, 1976, Eternal Gardens and PR-Mission executed a Land Development
is no reason why the amount due on subject agreement has not been placed in the custody
Agreement wherein former undertook to introduce and construct at its own expense and
of the Court.
responsibility necessary improvements on the property owned by PR-Mission into a
And after having asked for the assistance of the lower court by filing a complaint for
memorial park. Out of the proceeds from the sale, private respondent is entitled to receive
interpleader where the deposit of aforesaid amounts is not only required by the nature of
40% of the net gross collection from the project. On the same date private respondent
the action but is a contractual obligation of the petitioner under the Land Development
executed in petitioner-Eternal Gardens favor a Deed of Absolute Sale with Mortgage.
Program.
All went well until Maysilo Estate asserted its claim of ownership over the parcel of land
in question. Confronted with such conflicting claims, Eternal Gardens as plaintiff filed a
complaint for interpleader against private respondent MISSION and Maysilo Estate.
According to Eternal Gardens, that in view of the conflicting claims of ownership of the
defendants (herein private respondent and Maysilo Estate) over the properties subject
matter of the contracts, over which plaintiff corporation (herein petitioner) has no claim
of ownership except as a purchaser thereof. And to protect the interests of plaintiff
corporation which has no interest in the subject matter of the dispute and is willing to
pay whoever is entitled or declared to be the owners of said properties, the defendants
should be required to interplead and litigate their several claims between themselves.
An order was issued requiring Mission and Maysilo estate to interplead.
February 13, 1984, Mission presented a motion for the placing on judicial deposit the
amounts due and unpaid from petitioner. Acting on such motion, the trial court denied
judicial deposit in its order.
Said Orders were assailed twice in the IAC (Court of Appeals) and in the Supreme Court.
Mission filed a motion to dismiss the Interpleader and the claims of the Maysilo Estate
and the Intervenors and to order the Eternal Gardens to comply with its Land
Management with Mission. RTC granted the MTD.
Maysilo Estate filed an MR. MR was granted. In spite of the order, Mission filed a
motion for a writ of execution. It was denied.
It was elevated on certiorari and mandamus in the IAC. It was dismissed again.
In the case at bar, Mission filed a petition for certiorari with the IAC praying that the
February 13, 1984 order and subsequent amended order of the RTC denying its motion
for the placing on judicial deposits be set aside. And that an order be issued to deposit in
court or in a depositor/ trustee bank of any and all payments, plus interest thereon, due
the private respondent MISSION under the Land Development Agreement, said amounts
deposited to be paid to whomever may be found later to be entitled
At first, IAC denied Missions petition, however, in another resolution (September 5,
1985) it reversed its decision. Eternal Gardens filed an MR. MR was denied.

ISSUE(S): WON the CA abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in

reconsidering its resolution of February 27, 1985 and in requiring instead in the resolution of
September 5, 1985, that Eternal Gardens deposit whatever amounts are due from it under the
04 Reyes v. Lim
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: Plaintiff could not continue to benefit from the property or funds
in litigation during the pendency of the suit at the expense of whomever the court might
ultimately adjudge as the lawful owner.
FACTS:
Reyes filed before the trial court a complaint for annulment of contract and damages
against the Respondents.
Reyes as seller and Lim as buyer entered into a contract to sell a parcel of land located
along F.B. Harrison Street, Pasay City. Harrison Lumber occupied the Property as lessee
with a monthly rental of P35K.
The complaint claimed that Reyes had informed Harrison Lumber to vacate the Property
before the end of January 1995. Further, Reyes alleged that Lim and Harrison Lumber
connived not to vacate the property.
However, according to Keng and Harrison Lumber alleged that Reyes approved their
request for an extension of time to vacate the Property due to their difficulty in finding a
new location for their business. Harrison Lumber claimed that as of March 1995, it had
already started transferring some of its merchandise to its new business location in
Malabon.
On 9 March 1995, Reyes offered to return the P10 million down payment to Lim because
Reyes was having problems in removing the lessee from the Property. Lim rejected
Reyes offer and proceeded to verify the status of Reyes title to the Property. Lim
learned that Reyes had already sold the Property to Line One Foods Corporation (Line
One) on 1 March 1995 for P16,782,840. The Register of Deeds issued a TCT in favor
of Line One.
Lim prayed for the cancellation of the Contract to Sell and for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment against Reyes. The trial court denied the prayer for a writ of
preliminary attachment
Lim requested in open court that Reyes be ordered to deposit the P10 million down
payment with the cashier of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque. The trial court
granted this motion.
On 25 March 1997, Reyes filed a Motion to Set Aside said Order. Trial Court denied the
Motion. In the same order, the trial court directed Reyes to deposit the P10 million down
payment with the Clerk of Court.
Reyes filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA. Reyes prayed that the Orders of the
trial court be set aside for grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
CA dismissed the petition.
of the suit at the expense of whomever the court might ultimately adjudge as the lawful
owner.
There is also no plausible or justifiable reason for Reyes to object to the deposit of the
P10 million down payment in court. The Contract to Sell can no longer be enforced
because Reyes himself subsequently sold the Property to Line One. Both Reyes and Lim
are now seeking rescission of the Contract to Sell.
Rescission is possible only when the person demanding rescission can return whatever
he may be obliged to restore. A court of equity will not rescind a contract unless there is
restitution, that is, the parties are restored to the status quo ante.
Thus, since Reyes is demanding to rescind the Contract to Sell, he cannot refuse to
deposit the P10 million down payment in court. Such deposit will ensure restitution of
the P10 million to its rightful owner. Lim, on the other hand, has nothing to refund, as
he has not received anything under the Contract to Sell.
Sub-Issue on Unjust Enrichment
Thus, the trial court in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction may validly order the deposit
of the P10 million down payment in court. The purpose of the exercise of equity
jurisdiction in this case is to prevent unjust enrichment and to ensure restitution.
To subscribe to Reyes contention will unjustly enrich Reyes at the expense of Lim.
Reyes sold to Line One the Property even before the balance of P18 million under the
Contract to Sell with Lim became due on 8 March 1995. He also signed a Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of Line One. And the Register of Deeds issued a TCT in favor of
Line One. In fact, Reyes reiterated in his Comment reiterated his offer to return to
Lim the P10 million down payment.
Reyes cannot claim ownership of the P10 million down payment because Reyes had
already sold to another buyer the Property for which Lim made the down payment. In
fact, in to use, possess and enjoy unless the court orders its preliminary attachment.
the P10 million as its owner.

ISSUE(S): Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding the trial court could issue the
questioned Orders dated March 6, 1997, July 3, 1997 and October 3, 1997, requiring petitioner
David Reyes to deposit the amount P10,000,000.00 during the pendency of the action, when
deposit is not among the provisional remedies enumerated in Rules 57 to 61 of the 1997 Rules
on Civil Procedure.

HELD: No. Petition denied.

RATIO:
Main Issue:
As ruled in Eternal Gardens Memorial Parks Corp. v. IAC, this Court held the plaintiff
could not continue to benefit from the property or funds in litigation during the pendency
5. WACK WACK GOLF & COUNTRY NOTES: Appeal from the order of CFI of
CLUB, INC. v. LEE E. WON alias Rizal
RAMON LEE and BIENVENIDO A. In case this is asked:
TAN Rule 62 of old RoC interpleader available
regardless of the nature of the subject matter
of the controversy
Rule 120 of Code of Civil Procedure -
interpleader is proper only if the subject
matter of the controversy is personal property
or relates to the performance of an obligation
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: The action of interpleader, under section 120 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, is a remedy whereby a person who has personal property in his possession,
or an obligation to render wholly or partially, without claiming any right to either, comes to
court and asks that the persons who claim the said personal property or who consider
themselves entitled to demand compliance with the obligation, be required to litigate among
themselves in order to determine finally who is entitled to tone or the one thing. The remedy
is afforded to protect a person not against double liability but against double vexation in
respect of one liability.
FACTS:
Wack Wack Golf & Country Club, Inc. is a non-stock, civic and athletic corporation
duly organized under the laws of the Philippines, with principal office in Mandaluyong,
Rizal. In its complaint of October 23, 1963 it stated
o 1st cause of action: The membership fee certificate 201-serial no. 1199 held by
the defendant Bienvenido Tan, and the membership fee certificate 201-serial
No. 1478 issued to the defendant Ramon Lee, proceed from the same
membership fee certificate 201, originally issued in the name of "Swan,
Culbertson and Fritz".
Lee Won his certificate by virtue of an order from a separate civil
case (civil case 26044 of the CFI of Manila: Lee E. Won alias
Ramon Lee v. Wack Wack Golf & Country Club, Inc.).
Tan got his as an assignee of S,C, and F.
2nd cause of action: Membership fee certificate 201-serial no. 1478 issued by
the deputy clerk of court of court of the CFI of Manila in behalf of the
Corporation is null and void because issued in violation of its by-laws, which
require the surrender and cancellation of the outstanding membership fee
certificate 201 before issuance may be made to the transferee of a new
certificate duly signed by its president and secretary
The Corporation prayed that (a) an order be issued requiring Lee and Tan to interplead
and litigate their conflicting claims; and (b) judgment be rendered, after hearing,
declaring who of the two is the lawful owner of membership fee certificate 201, and
ordering the surrender and cancellation of membership fee certificate 201-serial no. 1478
issued in the name of Lee.
In separate motions the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint upon the grounds of
res judicata, failure of the complaint to state a cause of action, and bar by prescription.
CFI: Dismissed the complaint on the grounds of bar by prior judgment and failure to
state a cause of action.
ISSUE(S): Whether or not interpleader is a proper and timely remedy given the facts and
circumstances.
HELD: No. The dismissal is affirmed.
RATIO:
A stakeholder (a person entrusted with the custody of property or money that is subject
of litigation or of contention between rival claimants in which the holder claims no right
or property interest) should use reasonable diligence to hale the contending claimants to
court. He need not await actual institution of independent suits against him before filing
a bill of interpleader. He should file an action of interpleader within a reasonable time
after a dispute has arisen without waiting to be sued by either of the contending
claimants. Otherwise, he may be barred by laches or undue delay.
Summary by ponente (yey):
o The instant interpleader suit cannot prosper because the Corporation had
already been made independently liable in civil case 26044 and, therefore, its
present application for interpleader would in effect be a collateral attack upon
the final judgment in the said civil case;
o The appellee Lee had already established his rights to membership fee
certificate 201 in the aforesaid civil case and, therefore, this interpleader suit
would compel him to establish his rights anew, and thereby increase instead of
diminish litigations, which is one of the purposes of an interpleader suit, with
the possiblity that the benefits of the final judgment in the said civil case might
eventually be taken away from him;
o And because the Corporation allowed itself to be sued to final judgment in the
said case, its action of interpleader was filed inexcusably late, for which reason
it is barred by laches or unreasonable delay.
Other important points:
o It has been held that a stakeholder's action of interpleader is too late when
filed after judgment has been rendered against him in favor of one of the
contending claimants, especially where he had notice of the conflicting
claims prior to the rendition of the judgment and neglected the opportunity to
implead the adverse claimants in the suit where judgment was entered. This
must be so, because once judgment is obtained against him by one claimant he
becomes liable to the latter.
o The remedy by interpleader is afforded to protect the party from the
annoyance and hazard of two or more actions touching the same property
or demand; but one who, with knowledge of all the facts, neglects to avail
himself of the relief, or elects to take the chances for success in the actions at
law, ought to submit to the consequences of defeat.
o It is generally held by the cases it is the office of interpleader to protect a
party, not against double liability, but against double vexation on account
of one liability.
6. Marcelo Mesina v IAC, Jose Go and
Albert Uy
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: Interpleader is proper when there is showing of conflicting
claims
FACTS:
Jose Go maintains an account with Associated Bank. He needed to transfer P800,000.00
from Associated Bank to another bank but he realized that he does not want to be
carrying that cash so he bought a cashiers check from Associated Bank worth
P800,000.00. Associated Bank then issued the check but Jose Go forgot to get the check
so it was left on top of the desk of the bank manager. The bank manager, when he found
the check, entrusted it to Albert Uy for the later to safe keep it. The check was however
stolen from Uy by a certain Alexander Lim.
Jose Go learned that the check was stolen so he made a stop payment order against the
check. Meanwhile, Associated Bank received the subject check from Prudential Bank
for clearing. Associated Bank eventually dishonoured the check. It then received from
Atty. Navarro a letter which demands payment on the check in question. However, Atty.
Navarro refused to reveal the name of his client and threatened to sue if payment is not
made.
Unsure of what to do on the matter, Associated Bank filed an action for Interpleader.
Naming as respondent, Jose Go and one John Doe, Atty. Navarros then unnamed client.
On even date, Associated Bank received summons and copy of the complaint for
damages of a certain Marcelo Mesina (Petitioner) from the RTC of Caloocan City.
Jose Go and Albert Uy filed their answers to the Interpleader case. However, Petitioner
Mesina, instead of filing his answer to the complaint in the interpleader, he filed an
Omnibus Motion to Dismiss alleging lack of jurisdiction in view of the absence of an
order to litigate, failure to state a cause of action and lack of personality to sue.
The trial court in the interpleader case issued an order denying the motion to dismiss of
Petitioner Mesina and ruling that Associated Banks complaint sufficiently pleaded a
cause of action for interpleader. Motion for Reconsideration was also denied. Therefore,
Petitioner Mesina filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction before the
IAC seeking to set aside the order of the RTC denying his Omnibus Motion to Dismiss.
The IAC dismissed the said petition. Hence, this petition to the SC.
RATIO:
In this case, Petitioner Mesina insists that there is no showing of conflicting claims and
interpleader is out of the question. However, the SC said that there is enough evidence
to establish the contrary.
Considering the aforementioned facts, Associated Bank merely took the necessary
precaution not to make a mistake as to whom to pay and therefore interpleader was its
proper remedy. It has been shown that the interpleader suit was filed by respondent bank
because Petitioner Mesina and Jose Go were both laying their claims on the check,
petitioner asking payment thereon and Jose Go as the purchaser or owner.
The allegation of Petitioner Mesina that Associated Bank had effectively relieved itself
of its primary liability under the check by simply filing a complaint for interpleader is
belied by the willingness of Associated Bank to issue a certificate of time deposit in the
amount of P800,000 representing the cashier's check in question in the name of the Clerk
of Court of Manila to be awarded to whoever will be found by the court as validly entitled
to it. Said validity will depend on the strength of the parties' respective rights and titles
thereto.
Associated Bank filed the interpleader suit because Petitioner Mesina is laying claim to
the same check that Go is claiming. On the very day that the bank instituted the case in
interpleader, it was not aware of any suit for damages filed by petitioner against it as
supported by the fact that the interpleader case was first entitled Associated Bank vs. Jose
Go and John Doe, but later on changed to Marcelo A. Mesina for John Doe when his
name became known to respondent bank.

ISSUE(S): Whether the IAC erred in affirming the RTCs decision of granting the action for
Interpleader by the Associated Bank

HELD: No.