3A DIGESTS, SY 2016-2017
Cadiz
FILAMER v. IAC (Layno)
Labor responsibility
G.R. No. 175112; August 17, 1992
FACTS
This is an MR filed by respondents heirs of late Potenciano Kapunan from
the 1990 decision of SC that concluded that petitioner Filamer Christian
Institute is not liable for for the injuries caused by Funtecha on the
grounds that the latter was not an authorized driver for whose acts the
petitioner shall be directly and primarily answerable, and that Funtecha
was merely a working scholar who, under Section 14, Rule X, Book III of
the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code is not
considered an employee of the petitioner.
So what happened in the 1990 case on which the facts of this case are
based from:
Private respondent Potenciano Kapunan, Sr., an eighty-two-year old retired
schoolteacher (now deceased), was struck by the Pinoy jeep owned by petitioner
Filamer and driven by its alleged employee, Funtecha, as Kapunan, Sr. was
walking along Roxas Avenue, Roxas City at 6:30 in the evening of October 20,
1977. As a result of the accident, Kapunan, Sr. suffered multiple injuries for which
he was hospitalized for a total of twenty (20) days. Evidence showed that at the
precise time of the vehicular accident, only one headlight of the jeep was
functioning. Funtecha, who only had a student driver's permit, was driving after
having persuaded Allan Masa, the authorized driver, to turn over the wheels to
him. Thereafter, Kapunan, Sr. instituted a criminal case against Funtecha alone in
the City Court of Roxas City for serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence reserving his right to file an independent civil action. The inferior court
and CA found Funtecha guilty as charged.Pursuant to his reservation, Kapunan,
Sr. commenced a civil case for damages before the RTC of Roxas City. Named
defendants in the complaint were petitioner Filamer and Funtecha, and Agustin
Masa, the director and president of Filamer Christian Institute, in his personal
capacity "in that he personally authorized and allowed said Daniel Funtecha who
was his houseboy at the time of the incident, to drive the vehicle in question
despite his knowledge and awareness that the latter did not have the necessary
license or permit to drive said vehicle. RTC rendered decision against the
aforesaid defendants (but said that Agustin Masa not in his personal capacity but
as director of said Institute) including Allan Masa saying that they were all at fault
by reason of their negligence and must pay Kapunan jointly and severally for the
damages. It was only Filamer Institue that appealed. It was its contention in the
CA that it cannot be held responsible for the tortious act of Funtecha on the
ground that there is no existing employer-employee relationship between them.
Filamier in disclaiming liability, invoked the provisions of the Labor Code, 7
specifically Section 14, Rule X of Book III. SC agreed. Morover, SC said that IF it
Arcaina Austria Baadera Coloquio Diploma Fajardo Lim, J. Villarin, L. Villarin, P.
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Atty.
were to concede the status of an employee on Funtecha, still the primary
1 for his wrongdoing cannot be imputed to Filamer for the plain reason
that at the time of the accident, it has been satisfactorily shown that Funtecha was
not acting within the scope of his supposed employment.
Now, in this MR case, the private respondents assert that the
circumstances obtaining in the present case call for the application of
Article 2180 of the Civil Code since Funtecha is no doubt an employee of
the petitioner. The private respondents maintain that under Article 2180
an injured party shall have recourse against the servant as well as the
petitioner for whom, at the time of the incident, the servant was
performing an act in furtherance of the interest and for the benefit of the
petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether there was an employer-employee relationship between
Filamer and Funtecha thereby making Funtecha severally liable for the
injury? - YES
HELD:
It is undisputed that Funtecha was a working student, being a part-time
Janitor and a scholar of petitioner Filamer. He was, in relation to the
school, an employee even if he was assigned to clean the school
premises for only two (2) hours in the morning of each school day. Allan
testified that he was the driver and at the same time a security guard of
the petitioner-school. Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the
school president where both Allan and Funtecha reside is an act in
furtherance of the interest of the petitioner-school. Allan's job demands
that he drive home the school jeep so he can use it to fetch students in
the morning of the next school day.
It is indubitable under the circumstances that the school president had
knowledge that the jeep was routinely driven home for the said purpose.
Moreover, it is not improbable that the school president also had
knowledge of Funtecha's possession of a student driver's license and his
desire to undergo driving lessons during the time that he was not in his
classrooms.
In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of
Allan's house, Funtecha definitely was not, having a joy ride. Funtecha
was not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a "frolic of his own"
but ultimately, for the service for which the jeep was intended by the
petitioner school.
3A DIGESTS, SY 2016-2017 Atty. Cadiz
either in the selection of a servant or employee, or in the supervision over
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him.
Therefore, the Court is constrained to conclude that the act of Funtecha in
taking over the steering wheel was one done for and in behalf of his The Court reiterates that supervision includes the formulation of suitable
employer for which act the petitioner-school cannot deny any rules and regulation for the guidance of its employees and the issuance of
responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond the scope of his proper instructions intended for the protection of the public and persons
janitorial duties. The clause "within the scope of their assigned tasks" for with whom the employer has relations through his employees.In the
purposes of raising the presumption of liability of an employer, includes present case, the petitioner has not shown that it has set forth such rules
any act done by an employee, in furtherance of the interests of the and guidelines as would prohibit any one of its employees from taking
employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of control over its vehicles if one is not the official driver or prohibiting the
the injury or damage. Even if somehow, the employee driving the vehicle driver and son of the Filamer president from authorizing another
derived some benefit from the act, the existence of a presumptive liability employee to drive the school vehicle. Furthermore, the petitioner has
of the employer is determined by answering the question of whether or failed to prove that it had imposed sanctions or warned its employees
not the servant was at the time of the accident performing any act in against the use of its vehicles by persons other than the driver.
furtherance of his master's business.
The liability of the employer is, under Article 2180, primary and solidary.
Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules implementing the Labor Code, However, the employer shall have recourse against the negligent
on which the petitioner anchors its defense from the former case and to employee for whatever damages are paid to the heirs of the plaintiff.
which the SC previously agreed to, was promulgated by the Secretary of
FYR:
Labor and Employment only for the purpose of administering and
enforcing the provisions of the Labor Code on conditions of employment. Sec. 14 Rule X Book III:
In other words, Rule X is merely a guide to the enforcement of the
substantive law on labor. The Court, thus, makes the distinction and Sec. 14. Working scholars. There is no employer-employee
so holds that Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules is not the relationship between students on the one hand, and schools, colleges or
decisive law in a civil suit for damages instituted by an injured universities on the other, where students work for the latter in exchange
person during a vehicular accident against a working student of a for the privilege to study free of charge; provided the students are given
school and against the school itself. The present case does not deal real opportunity, including such facilities as may be reasonable,
with a labor dispute on conditions of employment between an necessary to nish their chosen courses under such arrangement."
alleged employee and an alleged employer. It invokes a claim brought
by one for damages for injury caused by the patently negligent acts of a
person, against both doer-employee and his employer. Hence, the
reliance on the implementing rule on labor to disregard the primary liability
of an employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is misplaced. An
implementing rule on labor cannot be used by an employer as a
shield to void liability under the substantive provisions of the Civil
Code. Funtecha is an employee of petitioner Filamer. He need not have
an official appointment for a driver's position in order that the petitioner
may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act, it being sufficient
that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit
of the petitioner. The petitioner, having the burden of proof, was unable
to rebut the presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part
Arcaina Austria Baadera Coloquio Diploma Fajardo Lim, J. Villarin, L. Villarin, P.

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3A DIGESTS, SY 2016-2017 Atty. Cadiz

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Arcaina Austria Baadera Coloquio Diploma Fajardo Lim, J. Villarin, L. Villarin, P.