Aries Joseph A.

Hegina Political Science 178

2010-35566 March 31, 2014

Political parties in Indonesia

The political landscape of Indonesia has been heavily influenced by its history. Having been
subjected to two dictatorships that spanned decades, Indonesian contemporary politics is
hinged on its past experiences. Having said such, it is noteworthy to see the evolution of its
electoral politics before delving into the particular characteristics of its political parties and
current issues and trends that surround it.

Historicizing Indonesian electoral politics

Being freed from its colonial master, Indonesia sets its sight in establishing a government
system that will be able to accommodate the plurality of perspectives and the clash of ideologies
in the then largest Muslim state. According to Sulistyo (n.d), the first general election in
Indonesia was held in 1955, ten years after gaining independence from the Dutch. The 1955
election featured an election in a parliamentary system of government which utilized the
proportional representation system. This mode of election toppled the then presidential system
enshrined in its 1945 Constitution. The results of the 1955 general election were perceived as
democratic yet it did not merit political stability. Sulistyo (n.d) furthered that the parliament
system was doomed to fail as the struggle between different ideological camps, between
parliament and cabinet, as well as between communal groups, created a highly unstable
political situation. Thus, this pushed President Sukarno to declare Martial Law in 1957 which
abolished the parliament and implemented a Guided Democracy that solidified his clout by
appointing legislators to their posts.

The 1971 election under the military strongman Suharto is a move to legitimize and favor his
New Order regime. During his time, the GOLKAR (Golongan Karya or Functional Group)
became the ruling party. The roots of GOLKAR can be traced from being established as a united
front of different social and state actors to fight the rise of communism in Indonesia. (Sulistyo,
n.d) The GOLKAR dominated all the general elections during the Suharto regime (1977, 1982,
1987, 1992, 1997) making the political party system under the Suharto regime hegemonic.
(Sartori, 1976 as cited in Sulistyo, n.d) The other two independent parties under Suharto were
the United Development Party and the Indonesian Democratic Party which only became
satellite parties after being overpowered by GOLKAR. With the triumph of GOLKAR, the
electoral system became a means of political mobilization rather than political participation
(Sulistyo, n.d) as the parliament became a rubber stamp legislature which abides to the dictates
of Suharto. Moreover, there was no genuine political competition of ideologies and programs
that transpired during the Suharto regime, only exacerbating the lack of legitimacy and
accountability of the electoral and party system under the rule of the military strongman.
The fall of Suhartos regime ushered the reform of the countrys electoral and political system.
President B.J Habibie implemented the most fair and free general election since 1955 where 48
political parties participated.

Post-Suharto elections have seen the flourishing of the electoral politics in Indonesia. Yet,
various stark characteristics could be seen and will form part in analyzing the political parties in
Indonesia.

Delving into the Indonesian political party system

What is obvious in the Indonesian party politics dynamic is that the parties could be divided
into two groups: the parties which are Islamic/Islamist parties which could be further broken
down into secular Islamic groups and conservative Islamic groups; and the parties which are
secular in nature. (Ufen, n.d)

To provide further analysis on the parties, Burkin (2013) elaborated the origins, platforms, and
projected win of the political parties that will participate in the 2014 general elections:

A. Secular parties

1. The ruling party: Democratic Party (Partai Demokrat)

The Democratic party was established in 2001 as a political machine to support
current President of Indonesia Susilo Bamabang Yudhoyono. It calls itself a
moderate, centrist party yet is said to support Western-oriented policies like
 economic liberalization, political and cultural pluralism, and an internationalist
outlook.

2. Champion of neoliberalism: GOLKAR (Party of the Functional Groups)

GOLKAR prides itself as being secular nationalist. It is the oldest operating party
in Indonesia, being the official government party during the Suharto regime. After
the ouster of Suharto, it made reforms to distance itself from original pro-Suharto
image and military. It champions technocracy in government and does not revolve
around a single political personality.

3. The ruling opposition: PDI-P (Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle)

It voices itself as populist, pro-poor, secular-nationalist and has a strong stance on
religious tolerance. It became ruling party during Megawati Sukarnoputris term as
president yet failed to deliver its promise of reforms resulting to loss of followers. It
upholds economic nationalism instead of economic liberalization.

4. Rise of the political machine: Gerindra (Great Indonesia Movement Party),

Gerindra was established as a political vehicle for defeated presidential candidate
former lieutenant general Prabowo Subianto. The party upholds fierce nationalism
and defense of unitary state. It absorbs smaller parties to attain a broad coalition. Its
early years were marked with hazy and contradictory principles, resulting from
being a political machine for a running candidate

5. Fulfilling a presidential candidates ambition: Hanura (Peoples Conscience Party)

Hanura was founded in 2006 for the presidential candidacy of Wiranto. It regards
itself as nationalist yet the said ideology is vague and non-specific. It targets
eastern parts of Indonesia as its mass base.

6. Armed forces ally: PKPI (Indonesian Justice and Unity Party)

PKPI is said to be firmly secular and nationalist. It backs anti-pornography bill
to manifest its conservative stance and is supported by Suhartos vice president Try
Sutrisno.
 7. Prodigal Son of the Golkar: NasDem (Nasional Demokrat)
NasDem was founded by former Golkar party leaders in 2012. The chances of
winning in 2014 polls depend on Indonesian media mogul financial support and
organizational strength.

B. Islamic parties

1. Bearer of modern, pragmatic Islamic ideology: PKS (Prosperous Justice Party)

The PKS is a pragmatic party with socially conservative policies. It is known
educated, political savvy leaders who convey modern, pragmatic Islamic ideology. It
banks in well-developed organizational and electoral strategies. Yet, it struggled to
court both urban and rural Muslims and recently adopted ultraconservative
Wahhabdism ideology.

2. Most moderate Islamic party: PAN (National Mandate Party)

PAN was established in 1998 and is unofficially affiliated with the Muhammadiyah
movement, the more modernist of Indonesias two largest and oldest Muslim
organizations (the other being Nahdlatul Ulama). It supported Christian candidates
and the only Muslim party represented in Christian-majority Papua. It rejects
standard Islamic dichotomy, claiming to be an open party based on the Pancasila
ideology.

3. Traditional and socially-conservative Islamic party: PPP (United Development

Party)
PPP is an Islamic hardliner which favors inclusion of religion in public education. It
rejected Pancasila as main ideology and replaced with Islam. It is also a Suharto-era
party.

4. Moderate Islamic party on the margins: PKB (National Awakening Party)

PKB was established in 1998 and has no clear-cut party platform and weak
organizational structure. It supported Miss World 2013 in Indonesia despite strong
 opposition from other Muslim groups. Its most famous party personality is former
Indonesian president Abdurrahman Wahid.

5. Small conservative newcomer: PBB (Crescent Star Party)

PBB is a newcomer in 2014 elections and favors bottom-up implementation Sharia
Law. It is weakened by internal turbulence and for the 2014 general elections, it is
seen that it will not reach 1% of national population.

Issues surrounding the Indonesian political party system

A. Philippinisation and Presidentialisation of Indonesian political parties

Ufen (2006) described that contemporary Indonesian party politics mirror that of the
Philippine political system. He posited that Philippine political parties manifest a lack
of meaningful platforms, by the high frequency of party-switching, short-term coalition-
building, factionalism, as well as numerous dissolutions and re-emergences. (Ufen,
2006) Also, Philippine political parties are instituted to forward the political ambition of
a presidential candidate, making it as an avenue to jumpstart its political moves. And
somehow, these attributes of the Philippine political part are now manifested in the
Indonesian political party landscape. One example of this in the Indonesian context is
the rise of the Partai Demokrat (Democratic Party) which ushered current president
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono into power. Ufen (2006) claims that PD has no political
platform, lacks organizational strength, and will subsists only as long as Yudhoyono is
at the helm of power.

On the other hand, Kawamura (2013) states that there is no correlation between
institutuing a presidentialized political party as an offshoot of having a presidential
system. Kawamura furthered that personal parties instituted by powerful politicians
cannot logically be presidentialized because the party leader him/herself is the
principal.

B. Lack of political dividend for Islamic parties

 Woischnik and Mller (2013) claims that Islamic political parties in Indonesia, though an
important aspect in the cleavage of parties in the said country, have lost touch with their
target voters as the Islam votes failed to translate into political victories. According to
them, the increasing social Islamisation since the reformasi or the reform age during
Habibies time, was not utilized by the Islamic parties for their political gain. Woischnik
and Mller (2013) elaborated the following reasons which may have affected the loss of
Islamic political parties: programmatic openingup of traditionally secularnationalist
parties; lack of innovative concepts in the area of economic policy to build credibility,
trust and governing competence; and the contemporary political culture in Indonesia
which places perimacy on the individual personality in parties rather than party lines
and programs.

This claim was supported by a study of Vaughn in 2011 where he cited that there is an
apparent lack of resonance of of Islamist messages with Indonesian voters as
evidenced by the decline of the share of votes that Islamic parties gained in the 2009
general elections. He also claimed that various factors contributed to the shift in voters
attitudes with regard to choosing Islamic parties. These factors include the internal
division and political stagnation that hound Islamic parties and the inability of Islamic
parties to translate ideologocal identity to concrete programs. (Vaughn, 2011)

C. 2014 general elections issues and concerns

According to The Economist (2013), the most likely candidate to win in the nest
presidential elections in Indonesia is the 54 year old governor of Indonesia, Jokowi. He
banks on the platform of reforming the government, a stark and bold move to oppose
the stagnant rul of Yudhoyono in his two terms as the current president. Also, the PDI
might favor him over the party chairman, former president Megawati Sukarnoputri, as
the next candidate of tha party. It is also seen that the PDI will form a coalition
government with PDI so as to obtain victory.
 Political parties in Indonesia are also facing an issue with regard to the financing of their
parties. According to Kleden (2014), who discusses the possibility of the state in
financing the operations of the political party, states that if a political party will opt to
choose private sponsorship in financing their parties, it might lead to oligarchization
of political parties and on the other hand, if the party chooses to let the state finance it,
this might liead to cartelization of political parties.

Lastlty, corruption scandals rocked the legitimacy of the parties and this might affect
their vitory in the polls. Kruniawati (2014) elaborated that the following parties have
been tarnished by corruption allegations: Democrat Party, Golkar Party, Prosperous
Justic Party and the PDI-P.

References

Bulkin, N. (2013). Indonesias Political Parties.Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Retrieved from: http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/10/24/political-parties/gr88.

SECULAR PARTIES

Democratic Party (Partai Demokrat), ruling party chaired by President Yudhoyono

 Golkar (Party of the Functional Groups), large party known for neoliberal economic policies

PDI-P (Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle), large party known for populist policies

Gerindra (Great Indonesia Movement Party), strongly nationalist party led by former lieutenant general Prabowo

Hanura (Peoples Conscience Party), strongly nationalist party led by retired general Wiranto

PKPI (Indonesian Justice and Unity Party), small party affiliated with the armed forces

NasDem (Nasional Demokrat), new party that splintered off from Golkar

ISLAMIC PARTIES

PKS (Prosperous Justice Party), pragmatic party with socially conservative policies

PAN (National Mandate Party), moderate party with relatively progressive policies

PPP (United Development Party), traditional party with socially conservative policies

PKB (National Awakening Party), rural-based party with mainly moderate policies

PBB (Crescent Star Party), small party with conservative policies

SECULAR PARTIES

Democratic Party (Partai Demokrat)

The secular-nationalist Democratic Party was established in 2001 as a political vehicle to carry Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to the presidency in

the 2004 elections. Intellectuals, academics, and nationalist politicians supported the initiative. It met success in 2004, winning 55 seats. In the

2009 elections, it nearly tripled this number to 148 seatsneither an easy nor a typical feat for an Indonesian political party. It has also served as

a model for other aspiring presidential candidates to form their own political parties.

Hoping to appeal to the most Indonesians possible, the Democratic Party calls itself a moderate, centrist party. It has been so committed to this

label that it can be difficult to discern a consistent ideology in the partys policies. Yudhoyonos record, however, reveals that the party supports

economic liberalization, political and cultural pluralism, and an internationalist outlook.

The Democratic Party has not had an easy last few years. Since its victory in 2009, it has become the target of numerous corruption

investigations. As a result, several of its leading members (including the party chairman and party treasurer) have resigned. Other parties have

taken advantage of the graft and kickback scandals to criticize the Democratic Party, noting that Yudhoyono made combating corruption one of

his primary objectives in the 2009 elections.

Now that Yudhoyono has nearly completed two successful terms as president, he wants to make the Democratic Party a viable political

organization in its own right, partly as a way of protecting his legacy. To achieve this, the party is holding a convention for eleven nominees who

have been short-listed to become its presidential candidate. The shortlist includes the Indonesian ambassador to the United States, Dino Patti

Djalal, Trade Minister Gita Wirjawan, State-Owned Enterprises Minister Dahlan Iskan, and former Indonesian army chief of staff Pramono

Edhie Wibowo, who is also Yudhoyonos brother-in-law and, for now, the rumored front-runner. The winner of the convention will be

determined by three national polls, although some suspect that Yudhoyono, as the new party chairman, will make the final determination. The
decision is expected to be finalized by May 2014 at the latest, after the legislative elections for the lower house of parliament, the House of

Representatives, have concluded.

The Democratic Partys support is distributed across Indonesia and concentrated in urban areas and the middle class, but this support is

dwindling. As a result, the party is not projected to maintain its position as the biggest party in parliament in 2014, although it will likely stay

within the top five.

Golkar (Party of the Functional Groups)

Golkar, a large secular-nationalist party, is the oldest operating party in Indonesia. During the New Order, or the era of former Indonesian

president Suharto, who presided over a centralized, authoritarian government for three decades and was forced out in 1998, it was the official

government party and thus controlled parliament. All government employees were expected to vote for Golkar, and Golkar always supported

Suhartos policies.

The party has held its own surprisingly well in the three elections since Suhartos ouster. Pivotal to this success has been its effort to reform its

image and sideline politicians considered too close to Suharto and the military. Economic development through liberalization is Golkars chief

policy, and its claim to legitimacy is based on its cadres technical expertise and business experience (although it still uses populist programs to

boost its popularity in rural areas). It is secular in its outlook and has typically erred on the side of religious tolerance. Its vertical and horizontal

organization has meant that of all political parties in the country, Golkar enjoys support that is spread most evenly across all the regions.

Golkar has yet to nominate a winning candidate for president, but it was the largest party in the House of Representatives in 2004 and the

second-largest party in 2009 (after the Democratic Party). It is poised for strong results again in 2014.

As a party with a long history and strong institutional roots, Golkar does not revolve around a single personality. It is also one of very few

Indonesian parties to consistently hold conventions to determine a presidential candidate. This means that Golkars fortunes are unlikely to rise

and fall with those of a single candidate and that it is unlikely to depart from the national political scene anytime soon.

But factional conflicts within the party have eroded its unity, and it struggles to come together behind a chosen candidate. The three newest

parties in parliamentGerindra, Hanura, and NasDemwere all created by dissatisfied ex-Golkar politicians.

PDI-P (Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle)

During Yudhoyonos decade-long tenure as president, PDI-P has consistently represented itself as the populist, secular-nationalist, pro-poor

voice of the opposition. PDI-Ps support is based primarily in Java, which is heavily Muslim, but the party has been consistently vocal in its

support for religious tolerance and pluralism and its opposition to policies that appear to impose Islam as a state ideology.

PDI-P grew out of the Indonesian Democratic Party, which was the primary opposition party to the ruling Golkar during Suhartos New Order.

It moved from opposition to ruling party when its current chairwoman, Megawati Sukarnoputri, was president (20012004), but PDI-Ps

inability to drive reforms as the ruling party in parliament disappointed its followers.

There are notable differences between PDI-Ps policies during its stint in power and those it has pursued as an opposition party. Economic

nationalism, for example, has formed a significant plank of the partys policy platform throughout Yudhoyonos rule. When the president enacted
fuel hikes in 2005 and 2013, PDI-P strongly objected on the grounds that these policies would burden the poor. However, PDI-P pursued a fuel

subsidy reduction while it was in power in 2003. Similarly, as an opposition party, PDI-P has been a strong critic of the military, but when it

was the ruling party it regularly used military force to crack down on separatist movements.

PDI-P is not quite a personal vehicle for its matriarch, Megawati, but it does draw heavily upon her star power. The memory of her

father, Sukarno, who was Indonesias charismatic first president, remains very prominent in PDI-P.

In 2014, the party faced a big decision: nominate Megawati for the fourth time or undergo a changing of the guard and nominate the popular

Jakarta governor Joko Widodo, known as Jokowi. On March 14, PDI-P chose to nominate Jokowi, hoping to capitalize on his widespread appeal

during the parliamentary as well as the presidential elections.

With 94 seats in the House of Representatives, PDI-P is currently the third-largest party in parliament. Nonetheless, it claims to be ready to

return to a position of leadership in 2014, and polls indicate that the party could land in first or second place in the lower house elections. By

choosing to nominate Jokowi, PDI-P has substantially increased its chances of driving Indonesia's future.

Gerindra (Great Indonesia Movement Party)

Gerindra is the hot new party in Indonesias political landscape. It is a secular party whose chief ideology appears to be fierce nationalism and

defense of the unitary state. On economic policy, the partys chief patron, former lieutenant general Prabowo Subianto, claims to desire a balance

between populist national interests, foreign investment, and subsidy cuts.

Gerindra was established in 2008 as Prabowos political vehicle after he failed to win the 2004 presidential nomination of his original party,

Golkar. Gerindras policy platform remains hazy and at times contradictory since its primary purposes are to facilitate Prabowos presidential

campaign and appeal to as many Indonesians as possible.

Gerindra has substantial financial resources provided by Prabowos brother, Hashim Djojohadikusomo, one of Indonesias richest men. This

allows Gerindra to operate well-designed public relations campaigns to boost its profile. In 2009, the party won 26 seats in parliament, and it is

likely to improve on that result in 2014.

To further enhance its chances of success, Gerindra began absorbing smaller parties from across the political spectrum as early as 2011.

However, Gerindras singular devotion to Prabowo will make it difficult to fashion a broad coalition of interests and develop extensive

nationwide networks.

Hanura (Peoples Conscience Party)

Just like the Democratic Party and Gerindra, Hanura is a political party created to fulfill an individuals presidential ambitions. Its patron is

former general Wiranto, wholike Prabowofailed to find success within Golkar, which prompted him to establish Hanura in 2006.

Also like Gerindra, Hanura has spent the past five years as an opposition party and promotes a highly nationalist ideology lacking in specifics. It

sets itself apart by targeting parts of eastern Indonesiaparticularly Sulawesias a voting base. Wirantos Christian and Chinese running

mate could also bolster Hanuras popularity beyond the Muslim strongholds of Java and Sumatra.

Hanura was the smallest party in parliament in 2009, when it won seventeen seats and 3.8 percent of the national vote. This is just above the

new parliamentary threshold for the 2014 elections, which requires a party to receive 3.5 percent of the national vote in order to be eligible for
parliamentary representation. Most surveys suggest Hanura will increase its share and make the cutoff. The recent addition of media tycoon

Hary Tanoesoedibjo as the partys chief patron will boost Hanuras resources. So far, however, Wirantos presidential campaign has been eclipsed

by Prabowos.

PKPI (Indonesian Justice and Unity Party)

PKPI, a firmly secular and nationalist party that has vocally supported Yudhoyonos Democratic Party since 2004, splintered from Golkar in

1999 on the grounds that Golkar was drifting toward accommodating Islamic interests. It is strongly affiliated with the armed forces and has the

backing of Suhartos vice president, former general Try Sutrisno. Its focus on maintaining national unity has even been used to justify its

support for passage of a conservative anti-pornography bill.

PKPI was initially excluded by the General Elections Commission on the grounds that it had not offered sufficient proof of nationwide support, a

decision that was later overruled by the Election Supervisory Body.

NasDem (Nasional Demokrat)

NasDem began as a civic mass organization founded by several Golkar leaders in 2010. In July 2011, the NasDem Party was forged out of this

organization by media mogul Surya Paloh. Thanks to its organizational strength and Palohs wealth, this brand-new secular-nationalist party

had no difficulty qualifying for the 2014 elections, although it may still pursue partnership with PDI-P.

Despite projections that NasDem will win seats in parliament, the cohesion of its leadership is still very much in flux. A number of high-profile

politicians have left NasDem since its inception, with Palohs tight grip over the party possibly being at the root of these disputes.

ISLAMIC POLITICAL PARTIES

PKS (Prosperous Justice Party)

PKS is known for its educated, politically savvy leaders, its well-developed organizational and electoral strategies, and its modern, pragmatic

Islamic ideology. When it burst onto the national scene in 2004, going from seven to 45 seats in the House of Representatives, international

observers wondered if the party represented the future of political Islam in Indonesia. PKS seemed positioned to transform the landscape of

Indonesian politics.

The party won 57 seats in 2009, but its credibility took a big hit in January 2013 when its chairman and other staffers became implicated in a

graft scandal. The credibility of other Islamic parties implicated in the scandal was also damaged as all had made moral leadership a central pillar

in their campaigns.

Since then, PKS has tried to repair its reputation but appears to have lost its way. Despite being in the ruling coalition, PKS opposed the

Yudhoyono governments fuel price increase in an apparent play to populism, prompting Democratic Party leaders to urge PKS to leave the

ruling coalition.

The party has also struggled to appeal to both conservative, rural Muslims and progressive, urban Muslims. PKS has supported the

implementation of sharia law, but it recently decided against adopting the ultraconservative Wahhabism ideology. It has showed very poorly in

opinion polls, which indicates that PKS may not even meet the national electoral threshold required to join the House of Representatives in 2014.

PAN (National Mandate Party)

PAN is an Islamic political party, and it is by far the most moderate of all the religious parties that will be competing in 2014. It was established

by democratic reformist Amien Rais in 1998 and is unofficially affiliated with the Muhammadiyah movement, the more modernist of Indonesias

two largest and oldest Muslim organizations (the other being Nahdlatul Ulama).

Of the Muslim parties, PAN also has the most evenly distributed support across the nation: it is the only Muslim party with a representative in

the lower house from Papua, and it has also sponsored several Christian candidates. Since the 1970s, Indonesian parties have been categorized as

either Islamic or secular-nationalist, depending on whether the party explicitly identifies itself as Muslim and grounds its policies in Islamic

teachings. PAN rejects this standard Islamic-secular dichotomy, claiming to be an open party based on Indonesias pluralist national

philosophy, the Pancasila.

The party has supported Yudhoyonos ruling coalition since 2004. Its current chair, Hatta Rajasa, is also Indonesias coordinating minister for

economic affairs, and his daughter is married to Yudhoyonos son.

PANs electoral fortunes have been fairly stable since 1999. It won 46 seats in the 2009 legislative elections. The 2014 electoral threshold is

higher than it has been in previous years, so PAN will likely join forces with smaller parties that have been deemed ineligible to compete for the

election, including the Prosperous Peace Party, a moderate Christian party. In the past, PAN has competed with PKS for the votes of urban,

middle-class Muslims. PKS appeared to be winning this contest, but its corruption-related travails may give PAN an advantage.

PPP (United Development Party)

Like PDI-P, PPP is the direct descendant of a Suharto-era partyin 1973, all of Indonesias Islamic parties were forcibly merged under one

umbrella called PPP. Now, PPP has become a conservative Islamic party that supports the inclusion of religion in public education. In 1998, the

party replaced Pancasila with Islam as its ideological foundation.

PPP appears to be assuming a more hardline stance with time, especially where minorities are concerned. The chairman of PPP, Minister of

Religious Affairs Suryadharma Ali, has proclaimed both Shia Islam and the Ahmadiyya sect, an Islamic movement that began in the late

nineteenth century, to be heretical. He has also praised the vigilanteIslamic Defenders Front, which has attacked churches, sinful businesses,

and Ahmadiyya communities.

Suryadharma argues that dialogue with radical groups is more effective than alienating them politically. For the 2014 elections, PPP even

nominated a spokesman from the Islamic Defenders Front, Munarman, for a House of Representatives seat, although the party rescinded the

nomination when it did not meet the requirements of the Election Commission.

PPPs shift toward hardline Islam has not been rewarded by voters. Its political fortunes have been on the decline since 1999, and it lost twenty

parliamentary seats between 2004 and 2009, bringing its total to 38. In a bid to recover lost ground, PPP has moderated its most extreme

stances, such as the demand for including the Jakarta Charter (which requires Indonesian Muslims to follow sharia law) in the amended

constitution. It has also invited all other Muslim parties to join its campaign in 2014except for PKS and PAN, which it does not consider

truly Islamic.

PKB (National Awakening Party)

Though it was only established in 1998, PKB has deep roots in Nahdlatul Ulama, Indonesias largest Muslim organization. This connection has

linked PKB to a voter base of rural, traditionalist Javanese Muslims. Yet the partys policies have generally skewed closer to moderate Islam.
Unlike Nahdlatul Ulama, for example, PKB does not advocate that Indonesia become an Islamic state, and it supported Indonesias controversial

decision to host the 2013 Miss World contest.

As a result of these competing influences, PKB leaders have not been able to articulate a consensus on a clear party platform, an issue that is

exacerbated by the partys failure to develop a vertical and horizontal organization independent of the personal factions of its leaders.

The partys most famous leader was the eccentric former president Abdurrahman Wahid, who envisioned the party as secular-nationalist and

whose leadership prompted two splits within PKB. These splits eroded confidence in the party, and its seat allocation has dwindled from over 50

in both 1999 and 2004 to 28 in 2009.

In 2014, PKB is highly unlikely to field a presidential candidate, but its two would-be nominees represent the divergent strains within the party:

Mohammad Mahfud MD, a well-respected former chief justice of the Constitutional Court who refused an invitation to join the Democratic

Party convention, and Rhoma Irama, a pop star who has made inflammatory racial and religious comments.

PBB (Crescent Star Party)

PBB is the smallest Islamic party competing in the 2014 elections as well as one of the most conservative. The central platform of its campaign is

the bottom-up implementation of sharia law.

Since its creation in 1998, however, PBB has been bedeviled with splits and turbulence. Its most visible parliamentary candidate in 2014 is graft

convict Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin. The party had also nominated another highly visible graft convict, former police general Susno Duaji.

Although his conviction was upheld by the Supreme Court, Susno defied attempts by the attorney generals office to take him into custody. He

eventually turned himself in and is now in jail, and PBB promptly replaced him with his daughter on its list of candidates.

Polls suggest that PBB will not win more than 1 percent of the national vote. No doubt sensing the need for partners, PBB has expressed interest

in joining a coalition of Islamic parties and in 2010 floated the possibility of a strategic merger with Hanura.

Kawamura, K. (2013). Presidentialism and Political Parties in Indonesia: Why not all political parties
are presidentialized?. IDE Discussion Paper No. 409. Retrieved from:
http://ir.ide.go.jp/dspace/bitstream/2344/1237/1/ARRIDE_Discussion_No.409_kawamura.p
df.
Kleden, I. (2014). Insight: Political parties and the question of financing. The Jakarta Post. Retrieved
from: http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/02/14/insight-political-parties-and-
question-financing.html.

Insight: Political parties and the question of financing by Ignas Kleden, Jakarta | Insight |

Fri, February 14 2014, 9:54 AM

Political parties are still the most important agents of indirect democracy. Despite declining public trust
in their role and performance not only in Indonesia but also in many industrialized countries there
is no alternative as yet to supersede their position as purveyor of the political aspirations of their
constituents and the realization of peoples participation in political decision-making.

It is therefore a pity if this role becomes neglected simply because the financing of political parties
remains unsettled. The widening scope of malfeasance of politicians in corruption and illegal funding
should be better analyzed from both a subjective and objective point of view. Subjectively, it has
something to do with the moral maturation of an individual, his or her understanding of political
correctness, as well as the possibilities and the limits of political maneuvering allowed by law.
Objectively, one must look at the structural and organizational setup of a political party, its constitution
and bylaws and its relation to the state and civil society.
So, should political parties be financed by the state, by the resources in civil society or by political
parties themselves? For now, business seems to go on as usual but the problem of financing remains
unresolved, with so many unnecessary detrimental implications.

Yet no political party in Indonesia can exist and survive on member fees alone. This is all the more so
considering that many join a political party because they hope to get easy money in a relatively short
time, making use of connections the political parties have with people in power or people with big capital.
Through personal communication and unofficial statements we have learned that political parties used to
take a portion of up to 25 percent from their legislators salaries to pay party expenses.

The state nevertheless provides the political parties with public funds, the amount and arrangement of
which changes from time to time. In 2000, the amount was calculated on the basis of the number of votes
a party got in the previous election X votes times Rp 1,000 (8 US cents). This per capita subvention
went up and down in the course of years until 2005 when President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono decided
through a presidential decree that the state provide Rp 21 million per seat in the House of
Representatives. The new arrangement resulted in a substantial reduction of state subvention to political
parties, which began getting more money from the private sector by offering the position of party
chairman to businesspeople who could make substantial contributions to the political party.

An Indonesianist of the younger generation from the Australian National University, Marcus Mietzner,
calls this change the oligarchization of political parties. The rise of Jusuf Kalla to party chairmanship in
2004, Sutrisno Bachir in 2005, Aburizal Bakrie in 2009 and Hatta Rajasa in 2011, clearly marked this
tendency (Mietzner, Money, Power and Ideology, 2013). According to Mietzner, this development has
resulted in two related effects. On the one hand, the loyalty of party members to their chairmen is
increasing considerably, while on the other, the party chairmen are reluctant to hand over party
financing to the state because this might lessen the loyalty (and the dependency) of party members to
them. One can say that there is a metamorphosis of oligarchization of political parties into personalized
politics by and large.

In case the party chairperson cannot provide the party with sufficient funds, the party leaders are
inclined to seek contributions from private companies. The situation was seriously aggravated by the
highly multiplied frequency of elections ever since the introduction of the direct presidential election in
2004 and direct local elections in 2005. This translates to an enormous increase in election costs.

At the same time, the contribution of a private company to a political party is fixed by the election law.
The challenge posed by shortage of financing became a temptation for political parties to get more funds
in all possible ways. The obligation to pay back the funds given by private companies has gradually led
political parties into a sort of vicious circle. The necessity to get more money can cause them to use illegal
tricks, and the obligation to pay back brings them into the same difficulties.
Considering all these difficulties, the safer way to help political parties is to let the state take over
campaign financing with clear rules and regulations. In many industrialized countries the state
financing for political parties is incorporated into state expenditure and is provided on the basis of the
number of partys paying members and the program and budget proposal submitted to the government.

The Labor Party in the Netherlands received from its government 10 million ($13.6 million) in 2013,
which was allocated for all programs of the party, not only to subsidize election expenses. Thus, there
should be an annual report on the use of the funds along with the rationale of the spending.

However, state financing for political parties faces two possible challenges. First, the idea of state
financing will enable smaller political parties to survive and to develop, something which might not
coincide with the interests of the bigger parties that are more inclined to have fewer competitors by
excluding the smaller parties from political contest. Another challenge is that state funding can become a
means to fabricate an unholy collabora-tion between the state and the political parties, whereby the
bigger parties can make use of and even instrumentalize the state apparatus to serve their own interests.

As far as funding is concerned, the bigger parties could exclude minor parties from the state financing by
introducing a threshold or measure for containment and curtailment through legislation. Political
scientists have coined the term cartelization to indicate this possibility.

Political parties may have to choose between two inevitable evils. If they go for the private sponsorship
they might fall into what Mietzner calls oligarchization of political parties. If they rely on state funding,
this can lead to cartelization of political parties. In view of the state of affairs of political
parties at the present juncture, I would argue that cartelization of political parties is the lesser evil.

The risk of cartelization is still far beyond the political imagination of both the state and the political
parties in Indonesia. Though the government is more inclined to have a limited number of parties, this
inclination is based on the concern of the unitary state and to forestall, to use Mietzners formulation, the
centrifugal tendencies of too many local parties. Cartelization of political parties is still a theoretical risk,
whereas oligarchization of parties is a tendency that is too real to underestimate.

Kurniawati, D. (2014). Indonesia Elections 2014: Political Parties Scramble Through Corruption
Scandals. The Establishment Post. Retrieved from:
http://www.establishmentpost.com/indonesia-elections-2014-political-parties-scramble-
corruption-scandals/.

Indonesia Elections 2014: Political Parties Scramble Through Corruption Scandals BY DEWI KURNIAWATI ON
06 JAN 2014

The Indonesia elections 2014 to be held in April for the legislature, and July for the president will be a
critical moments for the country of 240 million. These elections will decide whether Indonesia will move
on and become the next great democracy free from corruption and conflict or deteriorate and become
known as the country that was once a middle income nation in Southeast Asia.

Corruption is just a foul word everyone in the country is familiar with, but seems to be too
burdensome to tackle. Every now and then, national media would show either a politician, police official,
judge, lawyer, lawmaker, local leader, you name it, arrested by the mighty Corruption Eradication
Commission or Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (KPK), but it seems that this country never runs out of
stock for corruption cases.

It looks as if the KPK is fighting an endless battle.

The joke goes: under the old regime, corruption was done under the table. In the new order, corruption is
done on the table. Now during the so-called reform era, even the table disappears.

The 1999 election done after the fall of former president Suharto in 1998, as many have said, has installed
old wolves disguised as young sheep without changing much of the system. Regional autonomy
practically started being implemented nationwide in 2001, has dispersed once centralised power and
along with it, corruption, into more than 500 regions. It has created local leaders running their own little
fiefdoms, who unfortunately rarely manage to make a difference in terms of improving the welfare of their
people.

One of them, a district chief in East Nusa Tenggara province even blockaded an airport for not getting
an airplane ticket recently.

So the Indonesia elections 2014 are again, a momentous point for Indonesia, and political parties have
prepared themselves for the big event. However, it looks like most of them carry a heavy burden in
winning the peoples trust. Many members of political parties are falling into corruption scandals.

Despite playing opposition in the last ten years, some of the Indonesian Democratic Party for Struggle
(PDI-P) members in parliament were arrested for corruption cases. However, the partys image is
probably saved by the shining star. Mr. Joko Widodo, famously known as Jokowi who might lead a
victorious PDI-P if he runs on their ticket.

Other parties are currently in limbo as their images are tarnished by various corruption scandals.
(See: Indonesian Hero Today: in KPK we trust)

1. The Democrat Party

Despite many of regional leaders coming from Democrat Party have been arrested earlier under
corruption charges; the fall of Democrat Party which was established by President Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono as his political vehicle for the 2004 election surely took place when former treasurer
Muhammad Nazaruddin was arrested in Columbia in 2011, after weeks on the run following corruption
allegations.

He was accused of accepting bribes worth almost US$3 million in connection with tenders for the
Southeast Asian games, hosted by Indonesia in the same year. He was then found guilty and is serving a
seven year jail term.
After his arrest, Mr Nazaruddin started to name names of his fellow Democrat cadres that have led to the
arrest of other well known people including former beauty queen, Ms Angelina Sondakh, who is now
serving a 12-year jail sentence for involvement in various graft cases.

The party also lost its chairman Mr Anas Urbaningrum, after KPK named him as suspect for allegedly
taking up to 100 billion rupiah in kickbacks to rig the awarding of a lucrative contract for building a
sports centre in Hambalang, Bogor. President Yodhoyono had to step in and take the partys chairman
position after Mr. Urbaningrum was named as a suspect.

Former Youth and Sports Minister Mr Andi Malarangeng was one of the important Democrat Party
figures figures arrested by KPK. He had to resign from his post. He is also named as a suspect for his
involvement in the Hambalang sports centre scandal.

With various graft cases dragging its cadres down, it is said that Democrat partys popularity in the
coming election is less than 10 per cent.

2. The Golkar Party

Golkar is the oldest party with almost 50 years of experience in Indonesian politics. The party is always
associated with the new order (as opposed to the old order under Sukarno) and former president Suharto.
Golkar has confirmed its chairman, Mr Aburizal Bakrie will run for the presidential election in 2014,
despite his very low popularity.

Golkar is one of the parties with the strongest chance to win in the legislative election with its deeply
rooted grass roots network. However, according to Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW), in 2012 alone
there are 13 Golkars cadres who are all regional leaders involved in various political scandals.

The partys chance of winning the legislative election is becoming slimmer after the arrest of Bantens
governor Ms. Ratu Atut Chosiyah by the KPK in late December 2013 for her role in the bribery case
involving former Constitutional Court (MK) chief justice Akil Mochtar. Banten has been one of Golkars
strongholds through various elections.

3. The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS)

The arrest of Mr Luthfi Hasan Ishaaq, former president of the Prosperous Justice Party in February last
year on charges of bribery in the beef import case resulted in the public perception of the party as a clean,
religious and trustworthy party to immediately vanish.

The party chairman was previously accused of manipulating Indonesias beef import quota through
favors from PKS members in the Ministry of Agriculture, whose minister Mr Suswono is also a member
of the party.

The scandal has caused the decline in the publics vote for the PKS. It is now the least favoured among
Islamic parties in the coming election.

4. The Democratic Party for Struggle (PDI-P)

According to Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW), in 2012 there are seven PDI-P cadres who are regional
leaders involved in various corruption scandals.
The highlight of the partys corruption case is in 2011, when Mr Panda Nababan a sitting legislator from
the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), and 13 other former and current PDI-P members,
were accused of receiving between 250 million (US$21,000) and 1.45 billion rupiah (US$119,000) in
bribes to make sure Ms Miranda Goeltom was appointed as the Bank Indonesia senior deputy governor.

During the partys national event in October last year, chief patron of the party Ms Megawati
Sukarnoputri said the party will not defend its cadres involved in corruption cases.

Whichever party you look at, there are members implicated in corruption scandal and this cannot bode
well for them in the Indonesia elections 2014. However with most parties tainted with the same brush,
voters will be hard pressed to find a party where all its members are free from the whiff of corruption.

Let the games begin. (2013). The Economist. Retrieved from:

http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21584981-parties-search-presidential-candidate-
ordinary-indonesians-think-only-jokowi-pictured.

Let the games begin

As parties search for a presidential candidate, ordinary Indonesians think only Jokowi
(pictured) has the right stuff

Sep 7th 2013 | JAKARTA | From the print edition

THESE days few Indonesians pay much attention to Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. The president cuts a
forlorn figure: he still has just over a year left in office, but steady underachievement during his two
terms has so diminished him that politicians long ago turned to the more exciting matter of his successor.
Next year the presidential election takes place in July, after parliamentary elections in April. After
months of shadow-boxing, the contest to succeed Mr Yudhoyono is set to become more lively.

Some parties have already nominated their presidential candidate. The nominations of the two most
prominent candidates, Prabowo Subianto and Aburizal Bakrie, were foregone conclusions. Mr Subianto,
after all, heads the party he founded, Gerindra; Mr Bakrie, a dominant businessman, is both chairman of
the Golkar party and a chief financier of it. Both are well-known. Mr Subianto is a former special-forces
commander who contested the vice-presidency in 2009.

By contrast, Mr Yudhoyonos ruling Democrat Party (DP) says it will spice up the race by using a novel
process to choose its candidate: throwing the choice open to the public. The partys high council,
chaired by the outgoing president, has selected ten-odd candidates, many of them senior party members
and ministers. But the DP has also set up another committee, made up entirely of non-party members,
among them an academic and a former head of the anti-corruption agency. Its job is to find other possible
contenders from outside the party. Their names will be added to those from the high council in mid-
September, after which each candidates suitability will be tested in opinion polls over eight months. The
winner will be named after the parliamentary elections.
An inside job?
It sounds good, but for all the appearance of consultation, some claim that Mr Yudhoyono has already
stitched up the nomination, just as the other parties do. He has parachuted the recently retired head of the
army, Pramono Edhie Wibowo, into the top echelons of the DP and put him on the list of the high
councils candidates. Mr Wibowo happens to be the brother-in-law of the president, who presumably
favours him. In recent days several who were invited to join the list of possible independent candidates,
including a former chief justice of the constitutional court, have withdrawn. They cite doubts about the
integrity of the process.

Effendi Gazali, an academic and anti-corruption activist and one of those on the independent committee,
insists that the DPs new process is competitive and open and good for Indonesias political
education. Certainly, it cannot harm the party. After a string of corruption scandals involving party
officials and ministers, its level of support in opinion polls has fallen to single digits.

One person who has already rejected the DPs overtures to put his name in its hat is Joko Widodo,
usually known by his nickname Jokowi. In polls Jokowi, the 52-year-old governor since last year of
Jakarta, the capital, is by a wide margin the favourite choice as the next president. Younger Indonesians
in particular like his more informal style.

Compared with the staid old ways of carrying on politics, exemplified by Mr Subianto and Mr Bakrie,
Jokowi offers a fresh approach. He has a good record from a seven-year stint as mayor of the city of Solo,
in central Java. Mr Yudhoyonos government has abjectly failed to deal with many of the countrys
problems, especially its endemic corruption and lousy infrastructure. Jokowi, the argument goes, could be
just the man to inject much-needed drive and clarity into Indonesias lumbering governmental system.

One problem, however, is that he is not a formal candidate. He insists that he needs to concentrate on
running Jakarta, a big enough job in itself. Yet pressure on him to run will mount, not least from within
his own party, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle, led by Megawati Sukarnoputri, the
daughter of Indonesias first president and herself president from 2001 to 2004. Though she may have
abiding ambitions to take the presidency again, Jokowis popularity means that she is likely to give way to
him. And since coalitions are usual, her party may yet team up with the DP. That is for the future, but it
is exactly the sort of speculation that will shove Mr Yudhoyono deeper into the shade in the coming
months.

Sulistyo, H. (n.d). Electoral Politics in Indonesia: A Hard Way to Democracy. Retrieved from:
http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/01361004.pdf.
Ufen, A. (2006). Political Parties in Post-Suharto Indonesia: Between politik aliran and
Philippinisation. GIGA Working Papers. Retrieved from:
http://edoc.vifapol.de/opus/volltexte/2009/1597/pdf/wp37_ufen.pdf.

Ufen, A. (n.d). Forms of Campaigning and the Transformation of Political Parties in Indonesia.
Retrieved from:
http://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/pdf/SR005/Indo_Ufen.pdf.
Vaughn, B. (2011). Indonesia: Domestic Politics, Strategic Dynamics, and U.S. Interests. Congress
Research Service. Retrieved from: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32394.pdf.

Indonesia: Domestic Politics, Strategic Dynamics, and U.S. Interests

By Bruce Vaughn Specialist in Asian Affairs
January 31, 2011

The apparent lack of resonance of Islamist messages with Indonesian voters appears to have been a key
factor in the parliamentary election results.44 Vote tallies for Islamic parties declined from 38.1% of the
vote in the 2004 election to 27.8% of the vote in 2009. Indonesian Islamic parties received 44% of the
vote in the 1955 election and 37.59% in 1999.45 Some have cautioned that the fortunes of the Prosperous
Justice Party (PKS), the United Development Party (PPP), the National Mandate Party (PAN), the
National Awakening Party (PKB), and other Islamic or
Islamist parties that did not make the representative threshold of 2.5% had stable or declining
performance more because of internal divisions and political stagnation than as a result of a major shift in
voter attitudes. Others also point to the inability of Islamic parties to translate ideological identity into
concrete programs. A politically significant outcome of the parliamentary election is that the Democrat
Party attained sufficient votes and seats to be allowed to nominate its own presidential candidate.
Indonesian election law requires parties to attain 20% of the seats in the 560 Member House of Peoples
Representatives (DPR) or 25% of the national vote to be able to nominate a presidential candidate. The
Democrats strong performance in the parliamentary election, by nearly tripling their vote from their
2004 electoral performance and crossing the 20% nomination threshold with 20.9% of the vote, meant
that President Yudhoyono was in a stronger position on the issue of coalition partners and the selection
of his vice presidential running mate.

Woischnik, J and Philipp Mller. (2013). Islamic Parties and Democracy in Indonesia: Insights from
the Worlds Largest Muslim Democracy. KAS International Reports. Retrieved from:
http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_35685-1522-2-30.pdf?131015121510.