VILLANUEVA vs COURT OF APPEALS that it was during the marriage of the

1st couple
FACTS:
3. The cohabitation of a spouse with
1. In this case, during their marriage, a
another person does not severe the tie
couple acquired real properties and all
of a subsisting previous marriage.
improvements. Also, the husband is a
co-owner of a parcel of land which he
4. Petitioner also failed to show proof of
inherited from his parents.
actual contribution by 2nd spouse in the
acquisition of the subject property.
2. Later on, the husband lived separately
with his legitimate family and
cohabited with another woman

3. When the husband suffered from a

stroke, his illegitimate son was the one
receiving the income from his
properties

4. The 1st wife filed an action with written

demands including the illegitimate
family asking for settlements
5. The trial court rendered judgement in
favour of the 1st wife.
6. So the 2nd family who were the
petitioners in this case appealed to the
CA contending that the subject
properties are exclusive properties of
the husband and do not fall under the
conjugal property of the 1st couple. But
the CA upheld the decision of the trial
court with some modification.
7. When the CA denied the petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration, they filed a
petition before the SC
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject properties are
Conjugal
RULING:
1. The SC held that according to Art. 105
of Family Code, the provisions of this
code shall apply to conjugal
partnerships established even before
the Family Code so applying the Art.
116, if the properties are acquired
during the marriage, the presumption
is that they are conjugal.
2. The date also of the acquisition of the
subject property (lot) clearly showed
PINTIANO-ANNO vs ANNO
FACTS:
1. Spouses acquired an agricultural land
and which was declared for tax
purposes solely in the name the
husband.
2. The husband executed two documents
of transfer to certain Suanding covering
the subject land without the consent of
the wife contending that he is the
lawful owner and possessor of the
subject land.
3. So the wife filed a case in the MTC
against her husband and Suanding
alleging that the subject land belongs
to their conjugal partnership with her
husband, thus could not have been
validly conveyed without her written
consent. And the MTC favoured the wife
because both parties failed to prove
the nature of ownership of the subject
land.
4. Suanding then appealed to the RTC and
held that wife failed to show evidence
that the subject land was acquired
during the marriage of the spouses so
conjugal partnership could not be
applied.
 5. The wife filed before the SC when the
CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject land belongs to the
CPG of the spouses
RULING:
1. The SC held the wife failed to prove
that the acquisition of the subject land
was during the marriage so it cannot
be presumed under conjugal
partnership. The wife failed to produce
a preponderance of evidence relying on
the strength of her own evidence
2. Also, it did not show when the property
was acquired by spouses so the
presumption of conjugal nature of
property cannot be applied.
SPOUSES GO vs YAMANE
FACTS:
1. In the case at bar, a disputed property
was owned by spouses Yamane,
registered to the name of the wife.
2. The said property was levied to satisfy
the lien for attorneys fees and was
scheduled to be sold at public auction.
3. The husband then filed a Third-Party
Claim to stop the auction alleging that
the subject property is conjugal
property and should not be held
answerable for the personal obligation
of his wife and her sisters or the Pucay
Sisters. But the auction sale proceeded
and the property was sold to the
petitioner
4. The husband filed a Complaint with RTC
for annulment and cancellation of
auction sale. The petitioners moved to
dismiss the complaint but the motion
was denied by the trial court.
5. Later on, the wife also filed a Complaint
for damages. The complaint filed by
the husband was consolidated by the
complaint filed by the wife, but the
latter was dismissed as the wife was
declared non-suited for failure to
appear.
6. The RTC then rendered a decision that
the property was paraphernal property
of wife and not a conjugal property,
and dismissed the case filed by the
husband.
7. When the motion was denied, he
elevated the case to the CA which
reversed the decision of the RTC, in
favour of the husband.
8. The petitioners then filed a petition
before the SC stating that the subject
property is the exclusive paraphernal
property of the wife, thus conjugal
property cannot answer the charging
lien.
ISSUE:
Whether the subject property is conjugal or
paraphernal.
RULING:
1. The SC ruled in favour of the husband
(respondent).
 2. It held that the governing provisions
are of the New Civil Code and provides
that all property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to husband or wife;
and that the party who invokes the
presumption must first prove the
property was acquired during the
marriage and may be rebutted only
with strong, clear, categorical and
convincing evidence.
3. Evidences showed that spouses
acquired the property during the
marriage and the petitioner failed to
prove that the property was the
exclusive paraphernal property of the
wife.
FERRER vs SPOUSES FERRER
FACTS:
1. A husband applied for a loan to build
improvements including a residential
house and apartment building which
was paid using his and his wifes
conjugal funds.
2. The half-brother of the husband stop
paying rentals for the apartment
alleging that he had acquired
ownership over the property by virtue
of a Deed of Sale allegedly executed by
the husband when he was bedridden.
3. The husband filed a Complaint for
Annulment of the said sale, but it was
dismissed.
4. Later on, the husband died so his
widowed wife filed a complaint for
payment of conjugal improvements,
sum of money, and accounting with the
prayer for injunction and damages
alleging that she had the right to
reimburse the conjugal partnership of
the cost of improvements of her
husbands lot.
5. In response, the half-brothers of the
husband filed a motion to dismiss
contending that the wife had no cause
of action against them but it was
denied by the RTC
6. So the half-brothers or the respondents
of this case filed a petition for certiorari
before the CA which granted the
petition
7. After the wifes petition for Motion of
Reconsideration was denied, she then
petition before the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner state a cause of
action for her complaint
RULING:
1. Yes. The SC found that the wife failed
to state a cause of action and failure to
make sufficient allegation of a cause of
action in the complaint warrants the
dismissal thereof.
2. The wife was not able to show that
there is an obligation on the part of the
half-brothers of her husband to respect
or not to violate her right and that the
obligation to reimburse rests on the
spouse upon whom ownership of the
entire property is vested; there is no
obligation on the part of the purchaser
of property.
MATTHEWS vs TAYLOR
FACTS:
1. A Filipina was married to a British
National, and they acquired a property
situated at Boracay Island.
2. Later on, they separated and the
Filipina Spouse executed a Special
Power of Attorney in favour of her alien
spouse authorizing him to manage and
dispose the said property.
 3. The wife entered into an Agreement of
Lease involving the said property to a
certain Matthews and thereafter took
possession of the property.

4. The alien spouse then instituted an

action for Declaration of Nullity of
Agreement of Lease with damages
claiming that the agreement was null
and void since it was entered into by
the Filipina spouse without his consent.

5. The RTC declared the agreement null

and void since by default however it
was set aside by the CA.

6. In response, Matthews claimed good

faith in transacting the said property
since he believed that the Filipina
Spouse is the owner of the property.

7. The RTC and the CA rendered

judgement in favour of the alien spouse
considering that the subject property is
community property so the consent is
needed from either of the spouses.

8. So Matthews filed a petition for review

on certiorari before the SC.

RULING:

1. The SC reversed and set aside the

decision of the lower courts.

2. Applying the constitutional provision,

aliens are disqualified and absolutely
prohibited from acquiring public and
private lands in the Philippines, for the
conservation of national patrimony. Spouses Buado
3. So the alien spouse has no right to
nullify the Agreement of Lease between 1.Petitioners are entitled for damages from
the FILIPINA Spouse and Matthews. Erlinda for the crime of slander.

2.due to insufficient personal property of

Erlinda, the court levy on real properties.

3.An auction was made, petitioners won the

bidding and were issued certificate of sale.

4. A year later, Erlindas husband filed a

complaint seeking to annul the sale with
injunction against petitioners and the deputy partnership except insofar as they redounded to
sheriff. the benefit of the family.

5. He argued that they defendants connived and
directly levied upon and execute his real
property w/o exhausting the real properties of
Erlinda.
6. Petitioners argued that they acted on the
basis of a valid writ of execution and the
resoindent should file the case where the
branch the decision originated.
12. No stretch of imagination can it be
concluded that the civil obligation arising from
the crime of slander committed by the wife
redounded to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.
13. The filing of a separate action by respondent
is proper. CA decision is affirmed.

7. RTC dismissed the complaint- the case must

be filed to the court issuing the writ.

8.Petitioner has still two options (a)to file a third

party claim (b)a right is reserved to him ti
vindicate his claim over the property by any
proper action.

9. CA reversed the RTC decision, remanded back

to RTC.

10. A third party claimant may resort to an

independent separate action, the object of
which is to recover of ownership or possession
of the property seized by the sheriff, as well as
damages arising from wrongful seizure and
detention of the property.

A third party claim must be filed by a person
other than the debtor or his agent, in other
words, a stranger.
Issue: is the husband, who was not a party to a
suit but whose conjugal property is being
executed on account of the other spouse being
the judgement obligor, considered a stranger?
Metropolitan Bank
1.During the dissolution of marriage; wife was
able to purchase a property; said property was
issued under her name, and she was also
labeled as married therewith to her husband.
2.The marriage was annulled due to P.I. of the
husband

11.Art. 122- the payment of personal debts 3. After judicial decree of nullity, the spouses
contracted by a spouse before or during the were not able to liquidate their properties.
marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal
4.Wife obtained a loan from petitioner; 14. Petitioner erred in its theory that to assume
executed Real Estate Mortgage (REM) including conjugal partnership, the property must be
the property mentioned. acquired using conjugal funds.

5. To procure the loan, she gave the declaration
of nullity by the court and a waiver from
husband waiving his rights to their conjugal
property; however, it did not include the
property in question.
6. Petitioner issued foreclosure; acquired the
property
7. Husband seeks to declare the nullity of the
mortgage of the said property arguing that it is
still part of conjugal property and was
mortgaged w/o his consent.
15. proof of acquisition during the marital
coverture is a sine qua non for the operation of
presumption of conjugal partnership.
16. The properties acquired before the
dissolution of the marriage continues to subsist
as conjugal partnership until after liquidation
17. The waiver bore husbands forged signature;
he did not waive his rights
18. Petitioner is only entitled to of the
disputed property.

8. Petitioner argued that property was

paraphernal in nature.

9. RTC declared REM invalid

10 CA affirmed RTC w/ modifications pertaining

to the award of moral damages & attys fees.

11. Petitioner asserts that under Art. 160 of the

Civil Code applies when there is no proof that
the property was acquired during the marriage,
that the presumption of conjugal partnership to
operate evidence must be adduced to prove Neveras
that the property was acquired using conjugal
funds 1.Spouses are U.S. Citizens w/ properties in U.S.
and Phils.
12. Petitioner cited Francisco vs. CA and Jocson
vs. CA- a property registered in the name of a 2. They got divorced, the court awarded the
certain person w/ a description being married is wife all their properties in the U.S.
no proof that the property was acquired during
the spouses marriage. 3.Wife filed in the Phils petition for judicial
separation of conjugal properties in their Phil
13. Respondent cited de leon case and Wong vs. properties.
IAC- petitioner failed to overcome the legal
presumption that the property is conjugal 4. The divorce decree was presented as
evidence but the required certificates to prove
its authenticity, as well as the pertinent
California law on divorce were not presented.
5. The document had no seal from the office
where the divorce decree was obtained.
6. Absent a valid divorce decree, parties are still
legally married in the Phils.
7. General Rule: marriage settlement must be
made before the celebration; exception I
allowed provided that the modification is
judicially approved and refers only to instances
in Art. 65, 67, 128, 135 &136 of FC
(NOTE: The wife claimed that the husband
agreed to execute a joint affidavit stating that he
shall pay to her 1.1M as proceeds for the
Sampaloc property which the husband sold,
that the husband must indemnify the wife a
sum of money for the redemption of the
property before, that the husband shall
renounce and forfeit all their properties in the
Phils.)

8. Wife grounded petition for judicial separation

of property under par. 4 and 6 of Art. 135 of the
FC- a. abandonment and failure to comply
marital obligations.
b. the spouses had been separated in fact for
one year and reconciliation is improbable.

9. The founding of guilt is enough basis for the

grant of judicial separation of property

10. There was no abandonment for they were

still visiting each other

11. They were separated for one year, the Jovellanos

petition of separation of absolute community
must be granted. 1.Daniel Jovellanos enterend a lease and
conditional sale agreement to Philamlife for a
12. Art. 102, liquidation follows. certain property.

13. Phils did not acquire jurisdiction over
California properties
14. Spouses should have equal share in the
proceeds of their properties.
15.The modification made by the CA is affirmed.
2. At that time, he was married to Leonor Dizon.
3. After the death of the latter, he married
Annette Jovallenos.
4.During the 2nd marriage, Philamlife executed a
deed of absolute sale to Daniel for having
completed the payment of the property.
 15. In order for the petitioner to have vested
5.Daniel donated to petitioner all his rights to right, there must be a transition from potential
the said property. to actual ownership.

6. Daniel died, spawning the present 16. deed of absolute sale was executed during
controversy. the 2nd marriage, it belonged to their conjugal
partnership
7.Respondent argued that the property was
acquired during the second marriage, petitioner 17. Art. 118- any amount advance by the
claimed that it was acquired on the 1 st by virtue partnership shall be reimbursed by the owner or
of the lease & conditional sale agreement. owners of liquidation of property (Anette is
entitled to of the property as her share)
8. The above agreement was a pactum reservatii
dominii or the vendor is still the owner, after the
payment of the complete price can only be the
time that Daniel can be considered the owner.

9. citing the case of pugeda: the certificate of

sale is considered a conveyance of ownership
subject only to the resolutory condition that the
sale may be rescinded of the agreed price has
not been made in full.

10. in the case at bar, payment of the total price

is a condition before ownership.

11. art. 118- PR should reimburse to petitioners

their proportionate shares in the hospitalization
of Daniel
ISSUE: whether or not the lower court erred in Munoz
declaring that the property belonged to 2nd
marriage and whether or not FC applies to this 1.Property is under the name of the wife, she
case. inherited from her parents.

12. The agreement has only the right of 2. husband w/ wifes consent loaned money
possession of the property, not the ownership. from GSIS; mortgaging above property

13. Daniel was declared the owner on the 3. respondent constructed a house to the said
duration of the 2nd marriage. property using the loan

14. Art. 256 is applicable-it did not impair 4. Property was transferred to petitioner by
vested rights of the petitioner (FC applied Deed of absolute sale enacted by Erlinda
retroactively)
5. Respondents filed a complaint to annul the
DOAS, there was no sale, only mortgage
transaction; documents were forged.

6.Petitioner granted a loan to respondents to

pay for GSIS loan

7.The respondents was not able to pay, thus

prompting the petitioner to issue it to his name.

8. Respondents argued that Eliseos signatures

were forged

9. Petitioner argues that the property was a

paraphernal property of the wife and the
consent of the husband is immaterial.

10. Gen. Rule= all properties acquired forms

part of the conjugal property unless provided
otherwise.

11. It is clear that the wife inherited the lot from

her father. It is excluded in the community
property by virtue of Art. 92 and 109 of the FC

12. The lot is wifes exclusive property

13. Art. 120 of the FC- if the improvement

results in the increase of value of the property,
it shall belong to the conjugal partnership,
subject to reimbursement. Otherwise, said Abalos
property shall be retained in ownership of the 1.
owner spouse.

14. The value of the property is more than the

amount paid by the husband to the GSIS

15. Property remains as the exclusive

paraphernal property of the wife.