EN BANC

[A.C. No. 5118. September 9, 1999]

MARILOU SEBASTIAN, complainant, vs. ATTY. DOROTHEO CALIS, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
For unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct as well as violation of his oath as lawyer, respondent
Atty. Dorotheo Calis faces disbarment.
The facts of this administrative case, as found by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP),[1] in its Report, are as follows:
Complainant (Marilou Sebastian) alleged that sometime in November, 1992, she was referred to the
respondent who promised to process all necessary documents required for complainants trip to the USA for a
fee of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00).
On December 1, 1992 the complainant made a partial payment of the required fee in the amount of Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), which was received by Ester Calis, wife of the respondent for which a receipt
was issued.
From the period of January 1993 to May 1994 complainant had several conferences with the respondent
regarding the processing of her travel documents. To facilitate the processing, respondent demanded an
additional amount of Sixty Five Thousand Pesos (P65,000.00) and prevailed upon complainant to resign from
her job as stenographer with the Commission on Human Rights.
On June 20, 1994, to expedite the processing of her travel documents complainant issued Planters
Development Bank Check No. 12026524 in the amount of Sixty Five Thousand Pesos (P65,000.00) in favor of
Atty. D. Calis who issued a receipt. After receipt of said amount, respondent furnished the complainant copies
of Supplemental to U.S. Nonimmigrant Visa Application (Of. 156) and a list of questions which would be asked
during interviews.
When complainant inquired about her passport, Atty. Calis informed the former that she will be assuming the
name Lizette P. Ferrer married to Roberto Ferrer, employed as sales manager of Matiao Marketing, Inc. the
complainant was furnished documents to support her assumed identity.
Realizing that she will be travelling with spurious documents, the complainant demanded the return of her
money, however she was assured by respondent that there was nothing to worry about for he has been
engaged in the business for quite sometime; with the promise that her money will be refunded if something
goes wrong.
Weeks before her departure respondent demanded for the payment of the required fee which was paid by
complainant, but the corresponding receipt was not given to her.
When complainant demanded for her passport, respondent assured the complainant that it will be given to her
on her departure which was scheduled on September 6, 1994. On said date complainant was given her
passport and visa issued in the name of Lizette P. Ferrer. Complainant left together with Jennyfer Belo and a
certain Maribel who were also recruits of the respondent.
Upon arrival at the Singapore International Airport, complainant together with Jennyfer Belo and Maribel were
apprehended by the Singapore Airport Officials for carrying spurious travel documents; Complainant contacted
the respondent through overseas telephone call and informed him of by her predicament. From September 6 to
9, 1994, complainant was detained at Changi Prisons in Singapore.
On September 9, 1994 the complainant was deported back to the Philippines and respondent fetched her from
the airport and brought her to his residence at 872-A Tres Marias Street, Sampaloc, Manila.Respondent took
complainants passport with a promise that he will secure new travel documents for complainant. Since
complainant opted not to pursue with her travel, she demanded for the return of her money in the amount of
One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00).
On June 4, 1996, June 18 and July 5, 1996 respondent made partial refunds of P15,000.00; P6,000.00; and
P5,000.00.
On December 19, 1996 the complainant through counsel, sent a demand letter to respondent for the refund of
a remaining balance of One Hundred Fourteen Thousand Pesos (P114,000.00) which was ignored by the
respondent.
Sometime in March 1997 the complainant went to see the respondent, however his wife informed her that the
respondent was in Cebu attending to business matters.
In May 1997 the complainant again tried to see the respondent however she found out that the respondent had
transferred to an unknown residence apparently with intentions to evade responsibility.
Attached to the complaint are the photocopies of receipts for the amount paid by complainant, applications for
U.S.A. Visa, questions and answers asked during interviews; receipts acknowledging partial refunds of fees
paid by the complainant together with demand letter for the remaining balance of One Hundred Fourteen
Thousand Pesos (P114,000.00); which was received by the respondent.[2]
Despite several notices sent to the respondent requiring an answer to or comment on the complaint, there was
no response. Respondent likewise failed to attend the scheduled hearings of the case. No appearance
whatsoever was made by the respondent.[3] As a result of the inexplicable failure, if not obdurate refusal of the
respondent to comply with the orders of the Commission, the investigation against him proceeded ex parte.
On September 24, 1998, the Commission on Bar Discipline issued its Report on the case, finding that:
It appears that the services of the respondent was engaged for the purpose of securing a visa for a U.S.A.
travel of complainant. There was no mention of job placement or employment abroad, hence it is not correct to
say that the respondent engaged in illegal recruitment.
The alleged proposal of the respondent to secure the U.S.A. visa for the complainant under an assumed name
was accepted by the complainant which negates deceit on the part of the respondent. Noted likewise is the
partial refunds made by the respondent of the fees paid by the complainant. However, the transfer of residence
without a forwarding address indicates his attempt to escape responsibility.
In the light of the foregoing, we find that the respondent is guilty of gross misconduct for violating Canon 1 Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that ATTY. DOROTHEO CALIS be SUSPENDED as a member
of the bar until he fully refunds the fees paid to him by complainant and comply with the order of the
Commission on Bar Discipline pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 6 of the Rules of Court.[4]
Pursuant to Section 12, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, this administrative case was elevated to the IBP
Board of Governors for review. The Board in a Resolution[5] dated December 4, 1998 resolved to adopt and
approve with amendment the recommendation of the Commission. The Resolution of the Board states:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution/Decisions as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record
and the applicable laws and rules, with an amendment that Respondent Atty. Dorotheo Calis
beDISBARRED for having been found guilty of Gross Misconduct for engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct.
We are now called upon to evaluate, for final action, the IBP recommendation contained in its Resolution dated
December 4, 1998, with its supporting report.
After examination and careful consideration of the records in this case, we find the resolution passed by the
Board of Governors of the IBP in order. We agree with the finding of the Commission that the charge of illegal
recruitment was not established because complainant failed to substantiate her allegation on the matter. In fact
she did not mention any particular job or employment promised to her by the respondent. The only service of
the respondent mentioned by the complainant was that of securing a visa for the United States.
We likewise concur with the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution, that herein respondent is guilty of gross
misconduct by engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct contrary to Canon 1, Rule 101 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent deceived the complainant by assuring her that he could
give her visa and travel documents; that despite spurious documents nothing untoward would happen; that he
guarantees her arrival in the USA and even promised to refund her the fees and expenses already paid, in
case something went wrong. All for material gain.
Deception and other fraudulent acts by a lawyer are disgraceful and dishonorable. They reveal moral flaws in a
lawyer. They are unacceptable practices. A lawyers relationship with others should be characterized by the
highest degree of good faith, fairness and candor. This is the essence of the lawyers oath. The lawyers oath is
not mere facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must be upheld and keep inviolable.[6] The
nature of the office of an attorney requires that he should be a person of good moral character.[7] This
requisite is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is also
essential for remaining in the practice of law.[8] We have sternly warned that any gross misconduct of a
lawyer, whether in his professional or private capacity, puts his moral character in serious doubt as a member
of the Bar, and renders him unfit to continue in the practice of law.[9]
It is dismaying to note how respondent so cavalierly jeopardized the life and liberty of complainant when he
made her travel with spurious documents. How often have victims of unscrupulous travel agents and illegal
recruiters been imprisoned in foreign lands because they were provided fake travel documents? Respondent
totally disregarded the personal safety of the complainant when he sent her abroad on false assurances. Not
only are respondents acts illegal, they are also detestable from the moral point of view. His utter lack of moral
qualms and scruples is a real threat to the Bar and the administration of justice.
The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess,
and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege.[10] We must
stress that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege to practice
law only during good behavior. He can be deprived of his license for misconduct ascertained and declared by
judgment of the court after giving him the opportunity to be heard.[11]
Here, it is worth noting that the adamant refusal of respondent to comply with the orders of the IBP and his
total disregard of the summons issued by the IBP are contemptuous acts reflective of unprofessional
conduct. Thus, we find no hesitation in removing respondent Dorotheo Calis from the Roll of Attorneys for his
unethical, unscrupulous and unconscionable conduct toward complainant.
Lastly, the grant in favor of the complainant for the recovery of the P114,000.00 she paid the respondent is in
order.[12] Respondent not only unjustifiably refused to return the complainants money upon demand, but he
stubbornly persisted in holding on to it, unmindful of the hardship and humiliation suffered by the complainant.
WHEREFORE, respondent Dorotheo Calis is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ordered stricken from the
Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be FURNISHED to the IBP and the Bar Confidant to be spread on
the personal records of respondent. Respondent is likewise ordered to pay to the complainant immediately the
amount of One Hundred Fourteen Thousand (P114,000.00) Pesos representing the amount he collected from
her.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-
Reyes, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., and Panganiban, J., on official leave.
Xxxxxxxxxxx
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 35 September 30, 1949
In re Attorney FELIX P. DAVID, petitioner.
Felix P. David in his own behalf.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Angelo Bautista and Solicitor Estrella Abad Santos for the Government.
REYES, J.:
The respondent, Felix P. David, a member of a Philippine Bar, is charged with the malpractice for
misappropriating funds entrusted to him by his client, the complainant Briccio S. Henson. Respondent having
answered denying the charge, the complaint was referred to the Solicitor General for investigation. After the
investigation the Solicitor General rendered his report finding the respondent guilty of professional misconduct
and recommending disciplinary action. The Solicitor General reports the following facts to have been
conclusively established:
. . . that on February 15, 1947, respondent obtained P840 from his client Briccio Henson to be applied to the
payment of inheritance and real estate taxes due from the estate of Esteban Henson for 1945, 1946 and 1947
(p. 3, t. s. n.), for which he signed a receipt (Annex 'A'; p. 3, t. s. n.). On several occasions, complainant asked
the respondent to show him the official tax receipt evidencing the payment of said taxes, to which the latter
answered that he had already paid them, but the receipts were left with his friend in San Fernando.
Respondent promised to give the receipt later. Complainant waited patiently for it but it was never delivered.
After the respondent had failed to deliver the receipt, complainant became suspicious and inquired from the
provincial treasurer of Pampanga about the matter. Said official gave the information that the taxes were never
paid. Consequently, complainant requested the respondent to refund the money given him for the payment of
said taxes (p. 7, t. s. n., OSG), but he failed to do so. Respondent made several promises to return the money
which he never complied. Neither had he done anything to transfer the titles of the land in the name of the
heirs of Esteban Henson up to the present (p. 9, t. s. n.). In view of this failure of the respondent, the
complainant was ultimately forced to pay the taxes out of his own pocket (p. 8, t.s.n.).
Required to answer the complaint formulated by the Solicitor General on the basis of his report, respondent
failed to do so. And despite due notice he likewise failed to appear at the hearing before this Court. Indeed, we
note from the Solicitor General's report that respondent, instead of welcoming every opportunity for hearing,
seems to have wanted to avoid it. On this point the report says:
At the hearing held on May 26, 1948, both parties appeared and the complainant had testified, the hearing was
set for continuance the following day. Both parties agreed in the presence of the investigator to postpone said
hearing for June 5, 1948. On June 5, 1948, complainant appeared, but respondent did not show up, so to give
the respondent a chance, the investigator postponed the continuation of the hearing to June 17. Both parties
were duly subpoenaed (attached to the records). On June 15th, respondent sent a letter (attached to the
records) to Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, asking that the hearing be postponed to June 25,
1948. According to the request, both parties were again duly subpoenaed for June 25, 1948 (attached to the
record). In the subpoena sent to respondent, his attention was invited to Rule 127, section 28, of the Rules of
Court, which provides that if he fails to appear and answer the charge, the Solicitor in charge will proceed to
hear the case ex parte. In spite of this, on the morning of June 25, he again sent another letter (attached to the
records) to Assistant Solicitor General Kapunan, asking that the hearing be transferred to July 7, or 8, 1948. In
order that the respondent be given all the chances to defend himself, his request was granted. In the subpoena
sent him setting the hearing for July 8, 1948, as requested, the following remark was stated:
Failure on your part to appear will cause the investigator to proceed with the investigation and to file the
corresponding recommendation to the Supreme Court. No further postponement will be entertained.
It is worthwhile mentioning that every time the case was set for hearing the complainant made his appearance.
On the morning of July 8, 1948, both parties appeared; respondent made a formal request in person to the
investigator asking that the hearing be postponed to 2 o'clock p.m. of the same day. Out of consideration to
him, even to the discomfiture of complainant, respondent's request was again granted. But contrary to his
assurance, the respondent again failed to appear.
There is no question that respondent received from complainant the sum of P840 for the specific purpose of
applying the same to the payment of taxes due from the estate which he was engaged to settle. The receipt
which he issued for said amount as well as for the sum of P110 and a sack of rice paid to him for his expenses
and fee reads as follows: . . .

February 15, 1947.

Received from Mr. Briccio S. Henson the sum of eight hundred and forty (P840) pesos to be paid as follows:

P210 -Inheritance tax of the heirs of the late Don

Esteban Henson.

P630 -Land taxes for 1945-1947.

Failure on my part to deliver to him the official receipts corresponding to the above mentioned amount, I
promise to return to him the whole amount of P840 not later than April 16, 1947 without any obligation on his
part.
A separate amount of one hundred and ten (P110) pesos and a sack of rice was paid to me for my expenses
and fee.

(Sgd.) Atty. FELIX DAVID.

Respondent did not care to testify. But through his unverified answer, he would make it appear that he was
entitled to and had been promised a legal fee for his services and that, as this promise was not complied with,
he "saw it fit to withhold said amount (the P840 for taxes) until he is paid." This explanation is obviously an
afterthought and clearly unfounded. For the established fact is that respondent at first made complainant
believe that the sum in question had already been applied by him to the payment of taxes, and, as testified to
by complainant, for the little that respondent was able to do in connection with the case entrusted to him, he
has already received his fee as shown by the above-copied receipt. The conclusion is therefore irresistible that
respondent misappropriated the money of his client. This makes him guilty of unprofessional conduct.
In view of the gravity of the misconduct committed, the respondent Felix P. David is hereby ordered suspended
from the practice of law for a period of five years from the date this decision become final, without prejudice to
a more severe action if the sum misappropriated is not refunded within one month from the same date.
Moran, C. J., Ozaeta, Feria, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, and Torres, JJ., concur.
Xxxxxxxxxxx
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-12426 February 16, 1959
PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION, petitioner,
vs.
CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office, respondent.
Arturo A. Alafriz for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for respondent.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
This is the petition filed by the Philippine Lawyer's Association for prohibition and injunction against Celedonio
Agrava, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office.
On may 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for June 27, 1957
an examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the
Philippines Patent Office, the said examination to cover patent law and jurisprudence and the rules of practice
before said office. According to the circular, members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons with
sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified to take the said examination. It would appear that
heretofore, respondent Director has been holding similar examinations.
It is the contention of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's Association that one who has passed the bar
examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in good
standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office, and that consequently, the cat of the
respondent Director requiring members of the Philippine Bar in good standing to take and pass an examination
given by the Patent Office as a condition precedent to their being allowed to practice before said office, such
as representing applicants in the preparation and prosecution of applications for patent, is in excess of his
jurisdiction and is in violation of the law.
In his answer, respondent Director, through the Solicitor General, maintains that the prosecution of patent
cases "does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but includes the application of scientific and
technical knowledge and training, so much so that, as a matter of actual practice, the prosecution of patent
cases may be handled not only by lawyers, but also engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and
technical training who pass the prescribed examinations as given by the Patent Office; . . . that the Rules of
Court do not prohibit the Patent Office, or any other quasi-judicial body from requiring further condition or
qualification from those who would wish to handle cases before the Patent Office which, as stated in the
preceding paragraph, requires more of an application of scientific and technical knowledge than the mere
application of provisions of law; . . . that the action taken by the respondent is in accordance with Republic Act
No. 165, otherwise known as the Patent Law of the Philippines, which similar to the United States Patent Law,
in accordance with which the United States Patent Office has also prescribed a similar examination as that
prescribed by respondent. . . .
Respondent further contends that just as the Patent law of the United States of America authorizes the
Commissioner of Patents to prescribe examinations to determine as to who practice before the United States
Patent Office, the respondent, is similarly authorized to do so by our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165.
Although as already stated, the Director of Patents, in the past, would appear to have been holding tests or
examinations the passing of which was imposed as a required qualification to practice before the Patent Office,
to our knowledge, this is the first time that the right of the Director of Patents to do so, specially as regards
members of the bar, has been questioned formally, or otherwise put in issue. And we have given it careful
thought and consideration.
The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to admission to the practice of law
in the Philippines1 and to any member of the Philippine Bar in good standing may practice law anywhere and
before any entity, whether judicial or quasi-judicial or administrative, in the Philippines. Naturally, the question
arises as to whether or not appearance before the patent Office and the preparation and the prosecution of
patent applications, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions and social proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, alladvice to
clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law corporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice as do the
preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained
legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and
having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a
large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of
business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with
court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a
high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult
and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation
to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in
the order, can be drawn between that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of
importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons
possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy
trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3
(1953 ed.), p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices (Mass.), 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar
Assoc. vs. Automobile Service Assoc. (R. I. ) 179 A. 139, 144). (Emphasis ours).
In our opinion, the practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the representation of
applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their oppositions
thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. In the first place, although the transaction of
business in the Patent Office involves the use and application of technical and scientific knowledge and
training, still, all such business has to be rendered in accordance with the Patent Law, as well as other laws,
including the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Patent Office in accordance with law. Not only this,
but practice before the Patent Office involves the interpretation and application of other laws and legal
principles, as well as the existence of facts to be established in accordance with the law of evidence and
procedure. For instance: Section 8 of our Patent Law provides that an invention shall not be patentable if it is
contrary to public order or morals, or to public health or welfare. Section 9 says that an invention shall not be
considered new or patentable if it was known or used by others in the Philippines before the invention thereof
by the inventor named in any printed publication in the Philippines or any foreign country more than one year
before the application for a patent therefor, or if it had been in public use or on sale in the Philippines for more
than one year before the application for the patent therefor. Section 10 provides that the right to patent belongs
to the true and actual inventor, his heirs, legal representatives or assigns. Section 25 and 26 refer to
connection of any mistake in a patent. Section 28 enumerates the grounds for cancellation of a patent; that
although any person may apply for such cancellation, under Section 29, the Solicitor General is authorized to
petition for the cancellation of a patent. Section 30 mentions the requirements of a petition for cancellation.
Section 31 and 32 provide for a notice of hearing of the petition for cancellation of the patent by the Director of
Patents in case the said cancellation is warranted. Under Section 34, at any time after the expiration of three
years from the day the patent was granted, any person patent on several grounds, such as, if the patented
invention is not being worked in the Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the demand for the patented article
in the Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the demand for the patented article in the Philippines is not being
met to an adequate extent and reasonable terms, or if by reason of the patentee's refusal to grant a license on
reasonable terms or by reason of the condition attached by him to the license, purchase or use of the patented
article or working of the patented process or machine of production, the establishment of a new trade or
industry in the Philippines is prevented; or if the patent or invention relates to food or medicine or is necessary
to public health or public safety. All these things involve the applications of laws, legal principles, practice and
procedure. They call for legal knowledge, training and experience for which a member of the bar has been
prepared.
In support of the proposition that much of the business and many of the act, orders and decisions of the Patent
Director involve questions of law or a reasonable and correct evaluation of facts, the very Patent Law, Republic
Act No. 165, Section 61, provides that:
. . . . The applicant for a patent or for the registration of a design, any party to a proceeding to cancel a patent
or to obtain a compulsory license, and any party to any other proceeding in the Office may appeal to the
Supreme Court from any final order or decision of the director.
In other words, the appeal is taken to this Tribunal. If the transaction of business in the Patent Office and the
acts, orders and decisions of the Patent Director involved exclusively or mostly technical and scientific
knowledge and training, then logically, the appeal should be taken not to a court or judicial body, but rather to a
board of scientists, engineers or technical men, which is not the case.
Another aspect of the question involves the consideration of the nature of the functions and acts of the Head of
the Patent Office.
. . . . The Commissioner, in issuing or withholding patents, in reissues, interferences, and extensions, exercises
quasi-judicial functions. Patents are public records, and it is the duty of the Commissioner to give authenticated
copies to any person, on payment of the legal fees. (40 Am. Jur. 537). (Emphasis supplied).
. . . . The Commissioner has the only original initiatory jurisdiction that exists up to the granting and delivering
of a patent, and it is his duty to decide whether the patent is new and whether it is the proper subject of a
patent; and his action in awarding or refusing a patent is a judicial function. In passing on an application the
commissioner should decide not only questions of law, but also questions of fact, as whether there has been a
prior public use or sale of the article invented. . . . (60 C.J.S. 460). (Emphasis supplied).
The Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi-judicial functions, it is reasonable to hold that a
member of the bar, because of his legal knowledge and training, should be allowed to practice before the
Patent Office, without further examination or other qualification. Of course, the Director of Patents, if he deems
it advisable or necessary, may require that members of the bar practising before him enlist the assistance of
technical men and scientist in the preparation of papers and documents, such as, the drawing or technical
description of an invention or machine sought to be patented, in the same way that a lawyer filing an
application for the registration of a parcel of land on behalf of his clients, is required to submit a plan and
technical description of said land, prepared by a licensed surveyor.
But respondent Director claims that he is expressly authorized by the law to require persons desiring to
practice or to do business before him to submit an examination, even if they are already members of the bar.
He contends that our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, is patterned after the United States Patent Law; and
of the United States Patent Office in Patent Cases prescribes an examination similar to that which he
(respondent) has prescribed and scheduled. He invites our attention to the following provisions of said Rules of
Practice:
Registration of attorneys and agents. A register of an attorneys and a register agents are kept in the Patent
Office on which are entered the names of all persons recognized as entitled to represent applicants before the
Patent Office in the preparation and prosecution of applicants for patent. Registration in the Patent Office
under the provisions of these rules shall only entitle the person registered to practice before the Patent Office.
(a) Attorney at law. Any attorney at law in good standing admitted to practice before any United States Court
or the highest court of any State or Territory of the United States who fulfills the requirements and complied
with the provisions of these rules may be admitted to practice before the Patent Office and have his name
entered on the register of attorneys.
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Requirement for registration. No person will be admitted to practice and register unless he shall apply to
the Commissioner of Patents in writing on a prescribed form supplied by the Commissioner and furnish all
requested information and material; and shall establish to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that he is of
good moral character and of good repute and possessed of the legal and scientific and technical qualifications
necessary to enable him to render applicants for patent valuable service, and is otherwise competent to advise
and assist him in the presentation and prosecution of their application before the Patent Office. In order that
the Commissioner may determine whether a person seeking to have his name placed upon either of the
registers has the qualifications specified, satisfactory proof of good moral character and repute, and of
sufficient basic training in scientific and technical matters must be submitted and an examination which is held
from time to time must be taken and passed. The taking of an examination may be waived in the case of any
person who has served for three years in the examining corps of the Patent Office.
Respondent states that the promulgation of the Rules of Practice of the United States Patent Office in Patent
Cases is authorized by the United States Patent Law itself, which reads as follows:
The Commissioner of Patents, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Commerce may prescribe rules and
regulations governing the recognition of agents, attorneys, or other persons representing applicants or other
parties before his office, and may require of such persons, agents, or attorneys, before being recognized as
representatives of applicants or other persons, that they shall show they are of good moral character and in
good repute, are possessed of the necessary qualifications to enable them to render to applicants or other
persons valuable service, and are likewise to competent to advise and assist applicants or other persons in the
presentation or prosecution of their applications or other business before the Office. The Commissioner of
Patents may, after notice and opportunity for a hearing, suspend or exclude, either generally or in any
particular case from further practice before his office any person, agent or attorney shown to be incompetent or
disreputable, or guilty of gross misconduct, or who refuses to comply with the said rules and regulations, or
who shall, with intent to defraud in any matter, deceive, mislead, or threaten any applicant or prospective
applicant, or other person having immediate or prospective applicant, or other person having immediate or
prospective business before the office, by word, circular, letter, or by advertising. The reasons for any such
suspension or exclusion shall be duly recorded. The action of the Commissioner may be reviewed upon the
petition of the person so refused recognition or so suspended by the district court of the United States for the
District of Columbia under such conditions and upon such proceedings as the said court may by its rules
determine. (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent Director concludes that Section 78 of Republic Act No. 165 being similar to the provisions of law
just reproduced, then he is authorized to prescribe the rules and regulations requiring that persons desiring to
practice before him should submit to and pass an examination. We reproduce said Section 78, Republic Act
No. 165, for purposes of comparison:
SEC. 78. Rules and regulations. The Director subject to the approval of the Secretary of Justice, shall
promulgate the necessary rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the conduct of all business in the
Patent Office.
The above provisions of Section 78 certainly and by far, are different from the provisions of the United States
Patent Law as regards authority to hold examinations to determine the qualifications of those allowed to
practice before the Patent Office. While the U.S. Patent Law authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to require
attorneys to show that they possess the necessary qualifications and competence to render valuable service to
and advise and assist their clients in patent cases, which showing may take the form of a test or examination to
be held by the Commissioner, our Patent Law, Section 78, is silent on this important point. Our attention has
not been called to any express provision of our Patent Law, giving such authority to determine the
qualifications of persons allowed to practice before the Patent Office.
Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes every chief of bureau to prescribe forms and make
regulations or general orders not inconsistent with law, to secure the harmonious and efficient administration of
his branch of the service and to carry into full effect the laws relating to matters within the jurisdiction of his
bureau. Section 608 of Republic Act 1937, known as the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, provides
that the Commissioner of Customs shall, subject to the approval of the Department Head, makes all rules and
regulations necessary to enforce the provisions of said code. Section 338 of the National Internal Revenue
Code, Commonwealth Act No. 466 as amended, states that the Secretary of Finance, upon recommendation
of the Collector of Internal Revenue, shall promulgate all needful rules and regulations for the effective
enforcement of the provisions of the code. We understand that rules and regulations have been promulgated
not only for the Bureau of Customs and Internal Revenue, but also for other bureaus of the Government, to
govern the transaction of business in and to enforce the law for said bureaus.
Were we to allow the Patent Office, in the absence of an express and clear provision of law giving the
necessary sanction, to require lawyers to submit to and pass on examination prescribed by it before they are
allowed to practice before said Patent Office, then there would be no reason why other bureaus specially the
Bureau of Internal Revenue and Customs, where the business in the same area are more or less complicated,
such as the presentation of books of accounts, balance sheets, etc., assessments exemptions, depreciation,
these as regards the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and the classification of goods, imposition of customs duties,
seizures, confiscation, etc., as regards the Bureau of Customs, may not also require that any lawyer practising
before them or otherwise transacting business with them on behalf of clients, shall first pass an examination to
qualify.
In conclusion, we hold that under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by this Tribunal to
practice law, and in good standing, may practice their profession before the Patent Office, for the reason that
much of the business in said office involves the interpretation and determination of the scope and application of
the Patent Law and other laws applicable, as well as the presentation of evidence to establish facts involved;
that part of the functions of the Patent director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his
orders and decisions are, under the law, taken to the Supreme Court.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for prohibition is granted and the respondent Director is hereby
prohibited from requiring members of the Philippine Bar to submit to an examination or tests and pass the
same before being permitted to appear and practice before the Patent Office. No costs.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L. and Endencia,
JJ., concur.
Xxxxxxxxxxxx
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991
RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and HON.
GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents.
Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.
Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:p
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal issues are
involved, the Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the political aspect of
our national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be
natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age,
holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately
preceding -elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine
Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which similarly
provides:
There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight Commissioners
who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five
years of age and holders of a college degree. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be
members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis
supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a legal
qualification to an appointive office.
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve
the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the
conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal
advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the
law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be-an attorney,
using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with
opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his associate.
(Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v.
Dworken,129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:
... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or corporations as
to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or
prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by
law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for
the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so
engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice
of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in mattersconnected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the
preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained
legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)
Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and
having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a
large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of
business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with
court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a
high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult
and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation
to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in
the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and
that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the
public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and
skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests
upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion
of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179
A. 139,144). (Emphasis ours)
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975)
listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy, counselling and public service.
One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If what he does exacts
knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession, and
he follows some one or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at law within the
meaning of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which
device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal interpretation of
the term "practice of law."
MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I forgot to do during our review
of the provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a very brief statement?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on Audit. Among others,
the qualifications provided for by Section I is that "They must be Members of the Philippine Bar" I am
quoting from the provision "who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years".
To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are now employed in
the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that this provision on qualifications
regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law outside the COA We
have to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their legal
knowledge or legal talent in their respective work within COA, then they are qualified to be considered for
appointment as members or commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission on Audit.
This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we deem it
important to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made available whenever this provision on
the qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law for at least ten
years is taken up.
MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a law
practice that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it is auditing, will necessarily involve legal
work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are employed in COA now would have the
necessary qualifications in accordance with the Provision on qualifications under our provisions on the
Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer is yes.
MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the practice of law.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Thank you.
... ( Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman and two
Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants with not less
than ten years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied)
Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the word
"lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the majority of
lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career Horizons:
Illinois], [1986], p. 15).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood, means "an
individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice
alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a
partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized as professional
corporations and the members called shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are the
experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled
"associates." (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous,
unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal
Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law is defined as the performance of
any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut
Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn.
325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and
governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar role for lawyers
as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in courtrooms, and a large
percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do
continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role colors much of both the public image and the self perception
of the legal profession. (Ibid.).
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is this
so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the importance of a lawyer as
a business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney
is one who principally tries cases before the courts. The members of the bench and bar and the informed
laymen such as businessmen, know that in most developed societies today, substantially more legal work is
transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-
litigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely
desccribe[d] as business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the
planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in
medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate
Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks, each
involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested
parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually perform at least some legal
services outside their specialty. And even within a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from
one legal task or role such as advice-giving to an importantly different one such as representing a client before
an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).
By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types a
litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to
have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling, advice-giving, document drafting,
and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective
for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very important
ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features of adversarial litigation. Of
these special roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the constraints are
imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to
perform that work. The most common of these roles are those of corporate practice and government legal
service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends in corporate
law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in corporate law practice.
Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those members participating in various legal-policy
decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging trends in corporation law is
indispensable to intelligent decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate understanding of the
nature and implications of the corporate law research function accompanied by an accelerating rate of
information accumulation. The recognition of the need for such improved corporate legal policy formulation,
particularly "model-making" and "contingency planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional
procedures in many decisional contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and weighing of significant
conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of estimating the consequences of given
courses of action, and the need for fast decision and response in situations of acute danger have prompted the
use of sophisticated concepts of information flow theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and
electronic computing equipment. Understandably, an improved decisional structure must stress the predictive
component of the policy-making process, wherein a "model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is
developed to test projected alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and projecting the trends of the
law, the subject of corporate finance law has received relatively little organized and formalized attention in the
philosophy of advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal
research has become a vital necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in the law can be
improved through an early introduction to multi-variable decisional context and the various approaches for
handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master's or doctorate degree in business
administration or management, functioning at the legal policy level of decision-making now have some
appreciation for the concepts and analytical techniques of other professions which are currently engaged in
similar types of complex decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the services of an astute
attorney because of the complex legal implications that arise from each and every necessary step in securing
and maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the "abogado de campanilla."
He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of
business and industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it is that a corporate
lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary with the size and
type of the corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations farm out all their legal problems to private
law firms. Many others have in-house counsel only for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large
enough to handle most legal problems in-house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a corporation. His
areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting out
as corporate secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory agencies
(including the Securities and Exchange Commission), and in other capacities which require an ability to deal
with the law.
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the business of the
corporation he is representing. These include such matters as determining policy and becoming involved in
management. ( Emphasis supplied.)
In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action, or not understanding
how one's work actually fits into the work of the orgarnization. This can be frustrating to someone who needs to
see the results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be more
closely involved in the running of the business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational corporation (MNC).
Some large MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the international
law field. After all, international law is practiced in a relatively small number of companies and law firms.
Because working in a foreign country is perceived by many as glamorous, tills is an area coveted by corporate
lawyers. In most cases, however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys
do their "international practice" in law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow the lines of
Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a good
lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts them." (Business
Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak. No longer are we
talking of the traditional law teaching method of confining the subject study to the Corporation Code and the
Securities Code but an incursion as well into the intertwining modern management issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1) acquisition of
insights into current advances which are of particular significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an introduction
to usable disciplinary skins applicable to a corporate counsel's management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion
to the organization and management of the legal function itself.
These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area linking them.
Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the corporate
counsel's total learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. For that matter, the corporate
lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he
provides counsel for are required to make, and the need to think about a corporation's; strategy at multiple
levels. The salience of the nation-state is being reduced as firms deal both with global multinational entities
and simultaneously with sub-national governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only with public
entities but with each other often with those who are competitors in other arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the corporation is rapidly changing. The
modem corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stakeholder in some cases participating in the
organization and operations of governance through participation on boards and other decision-making roles.
Often these new patterns develop alongside existing legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers.
These trends are complicated as corporations organize for global operations. ( Emphasis supplied)
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the promotion and
management of technology. New collaborative arrangements for promoting specific technologies or
competitiveness more generally require approaches from industry that differ from older, more adversarial
relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence governmental policies. And there are lessons to be
learned from other countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative efforts
between governmental and business Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel comprises a distinct group
within the managerial structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary
groups within organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable factors in the group-context
interaction such as the groups actively revising their knowledge of the environment coordinating work with
outsiders, promoting team achievements within the organization. In general, such external activities are better
predictors of team performance than internal group processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of
corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking ways both to anticipate effective managerial
procedures and to understand relationships of financial liability and insurance considerations. (Emphasis
supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:
First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool for new managerial
thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems. An understanding of the role of feedback
loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of systematic problems physical,
economic, managerial, social, and psychological. New programming techniques now make the system
dynamics principles more accessible to managers including corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied)
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving complexity and uncertainty.
In the context of a law department, it can be used to appraise the settlement value of litigation, aid in
negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis
supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used directly by parties and
mediators in all lands of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide coherent and effective negotiation
support, including hands-on on instruction in these techniques. A simulation case of an international joint
venture may be used to illustrate the point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern three pointed areas of
consideration, thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major part of the general
counsel's responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with
minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at that time when
transactional or similar facts are being considered and made.
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those activities of the firm to
which legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this nation's evolving economic and
organizational fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a global, interdependent environment. The practice
and theory of "law" is not adequate today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a global
economy work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general counsel has emerged in the last
decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The corporate counsel hear responsibility
for key aspects of the firm's strategic issues, including structuring its global operations, managing improved
relationships with an increasingly diversified body of employees, managing expanded liability exposure,
creating new and varied interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally with more complex make or
by decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to make one a good
general corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal system shapes corporate activities. And
even if the corporate lawyer's aim is not the understand all of the law's effects on corporate activities, he must,
at the very least, also gain a working knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only
the basic legal "constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation. "Business Star", "The Corporate Counsel,"
April 10, 1991, p. 4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing knowledge of
financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the
financial law territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer admit
ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate
Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of
the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991.
Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of
having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the
COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of
the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination,
petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said
confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be
declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a
grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its
inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years.
(p. 124, Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law
office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations
officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of
member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon
returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an
investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to
various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General
(1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election
law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy,
Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for
Human Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor
groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the
urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission,
a quast judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional
Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he
was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to
reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for
the House of Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is adequately constituted to
meet the various contingencies that arise during a negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned,
there are the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and an operations officer (such as
an official involved in negotiating the contracts) who comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven,
"Loan Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the
Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down the law as far as the loan
transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5)
fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants;
and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).
In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For aside from performing
the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national development policies as key factors in
maintaining their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper, entitled "Wanted: Development
Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States
Agency for International Development, during the Session on Law for the Development of Nations at the
Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-
31, 1973). ( Emphasis supplied)
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely renegotiation policies, demand
expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a
sovereign lawyer may work with an international business specialist or an economist in the formulation of a
model loan agreement. Debt restructuring contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical language
that they should be carefully drafted and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with
the guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See International Law Aspects of the Philippine
External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321). ( Emphasis
supplied)
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms and conditions which
determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more elements of the contract. A good
agreement must not only define the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state the recourse open to
either party when the other fails to discharge an obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring represents a
devotion to that principle which in the ultimate analysis issine qua non for foreign loan agreements-an
adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry no banners, they beat no drums; but where they are, men
learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and serene mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo,
"The Role of Lawyers in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4,
Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the modern concept of
law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution,
Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of
industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor verily more
than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said:
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested
according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications
required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better
qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which
only the appointing authority can decide. (emphasis supplied)
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744)
where it stated:
It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal requirements are
satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil
Service Law. The Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is
more qualified for a particular position. It also has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its
choice. To do so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An
appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only
condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis supplied)
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1)
nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the
Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its certificate of confirmation, the
President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . .
(Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as Chairman
of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which
provides:
The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission
on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members
shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no
case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the practice of law is the
traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished from the modern concept of the practice of
law, which modern connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent framers of the 1987
Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition would require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps
practised two or three times a week and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten
consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I made use
of a definition of law practice which really means nothing because the definition says that law practice " . . . is
what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as
evident from my statement that the definition of law practice by "traditional areas of law practice is
essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most individuals, in
making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually practicing law. In that sense,
perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar,
who has been practising law for over ten years. This is different from the acts of persons practising law, without
first becoming lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the Philippines, say,
on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an
action or petition be brought against the President? And even assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can
the action be entertained since he is the incumbent President?
We now proceed:
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation,
implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment
rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference
except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
(Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court
interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the
Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or
excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.
Additionally, consider the following:
(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the Supreme Court reverse
the Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the negative.
(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission has confirmed? The answer is
likewise clear.
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides to confirma
Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who was
Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that
No blade shall touch his skin;
No blood shall flow from his veins.
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning white-hot
two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had
happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and fuming with righteous fury, accused the
procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood
flow from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of the agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., I certify that he voted to dismiss the petition. (Fernan, C.J.)
Sarmiento, J., is on leave.
Regalado, and Davide, Jr., J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

NARVASA, J., concurring:

I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the result; it does not
appear to me that there has been an adequate showing that the challenged determination by the Commission
on Appointments-that the appointment of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections
should, on the basis of his stated qualifications and after due assessment thereof, be confirmed-was attended
by error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion and consequently merits nullification by this Court
in accordance with the second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. I therefore vote to DENY
the petition.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition at bar, I voted not only to
require the respondents to comment on the Petition, but I was the sole vote for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order to enjoin respondent Monsod from assuming the position of COMELEC Chairman, while the
Court deliberated on his constitutional qualification for the office. My purpose in voting for a TRO was to
prevent the inconvenience and even embarrassment to all parties concerned were the Court to finally decide
for respondent Monsod's disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the Petition then in relation to established
jurisprudence already showed prima facie that respondent Monsod did not possess the needed qualification,
that is, he had not engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as
COMELEC Chairman.
After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more convinced that the constitutional
requirement of "practice of law for at least ten (10) years" has not been met.
The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration because, ultimately, the core
issue to be resolved in this petition is the proper construal of the constitutional provision requiring a majority of
the membership of COMELEC, including the Chairman thereof to "have been engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten (10) years." (Art. IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions involving the construction of
constitutional provisions are best left to judicial resolution. As declared in Angara v. Electoral Commission, (63
Phil. 139) "upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the
Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries."
The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC Chairman. Among these are that
he must have been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." It is the bounden duty of this
Court to ensure that such standard is met and complied with.
What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to the actual performance or
application of knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of knowledge; it connotes
an active, habitual,repeated or customary action. 1 To "practice" law, or any profession for that matter, means,
to exercise or pursue an employment or profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily.
Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of a nursing aide,
cannot be said to be in the "practice of medicine." A certified public accountant who works as a clerk, cannot
be said to practice his profession as an accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is employed as a business
executive or a corporate manager, other than as head or attorney of a Legal Department of a corporation or a
governmental agency, cannot be said to be in the practice of law.
As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva: 2
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of
acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs- Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864,
42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or
habitually holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State vs.
Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644,647.) ... (emphasis supplied).
It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a Memorandum it prepared,
enumerated several factors determinative of whether a particular activity constitutes "practice of law." It states:
1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public as
a lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when
one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Ney
Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a
manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country
(People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of
acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State
v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).
2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and
continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for
compensation, as a service of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. (People v. Villanueva,
supra). Hence, charging for services such as preparation of documents involving the use of legal knowledge
and skill is within the term "practice of law" (Ernani Pao, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed.,
p. 8 citing People v. People's Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who renders an opinion as to the
proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is to that extent, practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806
citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If compensation is expected, all advice to
clients and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law; are practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette et
al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359)
3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which calls for legal knowledge, training and
experience is within the term "practice of law". (Martin supra)
4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the existence of lawyer-client
relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an activity which requires knowledge of law but involves no
attorney-client relationship, such as teaching law or writing law books or articles, he cannot be said to be
engaged in the practice of his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30). 3
The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining whether or not respondent
Monsod meets the constitutional qualification of practice of law for at least ten (10) years at the time of his
appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
The following relevant questions may be asked:
1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice of law?
2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?
3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY FOR AT LEAST TEN
(10) YEARS prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman?
Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the records, I am persuaded that
if ever he did perform any of the tasks which constitute the practice of law, he did not do so HABITUALLY for at
least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be latitudinarianly considered
activities peculiar to the practice of law, like the drafting of legal documents and the rendering of legal opinion
or advice, such were isolated transactions or activities which do not qualify his past endeavors as "practice of
law." To become engaged in the practice of law, there must be a continuity, or a succession of acts. As
observed by the Solicitor General in People vs. Villanueva: 4
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in
theactive and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the
public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.
ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod as not qualified for the
position of COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to
his appointment to such position.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must dissent just the same. There are
certain points on which I must differ with him while of course respecting hisviewpoint.
To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications of the respondent simply
because his nomination has been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. In my view, this is not a
political question that we are barred from resolving. Determination of the appointee's credentials is made on
the basis of the established facts, not the discretion of that body. Even if it were, the exercise of that discretion
would still be subject to our review.
In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of the appointing authority
tochoose between two claimants to the same office who both possessed the required qualifications. It was that
kind of discretion that we said could not be reviewed.
If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this Court for lack of the required
qualifications, I see no reason why we cannot disqualified an appointee simply because he has passed the
Commission on Appointments.
Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in an appropriate proceeding
notwithstanding that he has been found acceptable by no less than the enfranchised citizenry. The reason is
that what we would be examining is not the wisdom of his election but whether or not he was qualified to be
elected in the first place.
Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that the ponencia may have been too
sweeping in its definition of the phrase "practice of law" as to render the qualification practically toothless. From
the numerous activities accepted as embraced in the term, I have the uncomfortable feeling that one does not
even have to be a lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law as long as his activities involve the application of
some law, however peripherally. The stock broker and the insurance adjuster and the realtor could come under
the definition as they deal with or give advice on matters that are likely "to become involved in litigation."
The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is another business and
he interprets and applies some law only as an incident of such business. That covers every company
organized under the Corporation Code and regulated by the SEC under P.D. 902-A. Considering the
ramifications of the modern society, there is hardly any activity that is not affected by some law or government
regulation the businessman must know about and observe. In fact, again going by the definition, a lawyer does
not even have to be part of a business concern to be considered a practitioner. He can be so deemed when,
on his own, he rents a house or buys a car or consults a doctor as these acts involve his knowledge and
application of the laws regulating such transactions. If he operates a public utility vehicle as his main source of
livelihood, he would still be deemed engaged in the practice of law because he must obey the Public Service
Act and the rules and regulations of the Energy Regulatory Board.
The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the "performance of any acts ... in or
out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law," which tells us absolutely nothing. The decision
goes on to say that "because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and
governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable."
The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be engaged in the
practice of law even if he does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as a lawyer. It is enough that his
activities are incidentally (even if only remotely) connected with some law, ordinance, or regulation. The
possible exception is the lawyer whose income is derived from teaching ballroom dancing or escorting wrinkled
ladies with pubescent pretensions.
The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade me that he has been
engaged in the practice of law for ten years as required by the Constitution. It is conceded that he has been
engaged in business and finance, in which areas he has distinguished himself, but as an executive and
economist and not as a practicing lawyer. The plain fact is that he has occupied the various positions listed in
his resume by virtue of his experience and prestige as a businessman and not as an attorney-at-law whose
principal attention is focused on the law. Even if it be argued that he was acting as a lawyer when he lobbied in
Congress for agrarian and urban reform, served in the NAMFREL and the Constitutional Commission (together
with non-lawyers like farmers and priests) and was a member of the Davide Commission, he has not proved
that his activities in these capacities extended over the prescribed 10-year period of actual practice of the law.
He is doubtless eminently qualified for many other positions worthy of his abundant talents but not as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections.
I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I must regretfully vote
to grant the petition.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as a qualification for public
office would be settled one way or another in fairly definitive terms. Unfortunately, this was not the result.
Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod engaged in the practice of law
(with one of these 5 leaving his vote behind while on official leave but not expressing his clear stand on the
matter); 4 categorically stating that he did not practice law; 2 voting in the result because there was no error so
gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion; one of official leave with no instructions left behind on how he
viewed the issue; and 2 not taking part in the deliberations and the decision.
There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the work of a constitutional
Commission on Appointments whose duty is precisely to look into the qualifications of persons appointed to
high office. Even if the Commission errs, we have no power to set aside error. We can look only into grave
abuse of discretion or whimsically and arbitrariness. Second is our belief that Mr. Monsod possesses superior
qualifications in terms of executive ability, proficiency in management, educational background, experience in
international banking and finance, and instant recognition by the public. His integrity and competence are not
questioned by the petitioner. What is before us is compliance with a specific requirement written into the
Constitution.
Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has never engaged in the
practice of law for even one year. He is a member of the bar but to say that he has practiced law is stretching
the term beyond rational limits.
A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life to the law, if he has not
engaged in an activity where membership in the bar is a requirement I fail to see how he can claim to have
been engaged in the practice of law.
Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but also for appointment to
the Supreme Court and all lower courts. What kind of Judges or Justices will we have if there main occupation
is selling real estate, managing a business corporation, serving in fact-finding committee, working in media, or
operating a farm with no active involvement in the law, whether in Government or private practice, except that
in one joyful moment in the distant past, they happened to pass the bar examinations?
The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." The deliberate choice
of words shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular, not isolated, occasional, accidental,
intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be "engaged" in an activity for ten years requires
committed participation in something which is the result of one's decisive choice. It means that one is occupied
and involved in the enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with intent and attention during the ten-
year period.
I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent Monsod to the Commission on
Appointments, the latter has not been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. In fact, if appears
that Mr. Monsod has never practiced law except for an alleged one year period after passing the bar
examinations when he worked in his father's law firm. Even then his law practice must have been extremely
limited because he was also working for M.A. and Ph. D. degrees in Economics at the University of
Pennsylvania during that period. How could he practice law in the United States while not a member of the Bar
there?
The professional life of the respondent follows:
1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing the Bar examinations in 1961 consist of the
following:
1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of Pennsylvania
2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group Economist, Industry Department; Operations, Latin American Department;
Division Chief, South Asia and Middle East, International Finance Corporation
3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group Executive of various companies, i.e., Meralco Securities Corporation,
Philippine Petroleum Corporation, Philippine Electric Corporation
4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group President, Fil-Capital Development Corporation and affiliated companies
5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila Chief Executive Officer
6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies Chief Executive Officer
7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission Member
8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989 Coup Attempt Member
9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the following companies:
a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.
b. Dataprep, Philippines
c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, Inc.
d. Semirara Coal Corporation
e. CBL Timber Corporation
Member of the Board of the Following:
a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines
b. First Philippine Energy Corporation
c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation
d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation
e. Graphic Atelier
f. Manila Electric Company
g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.
h. Philippine Electric Corporation
i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises
j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation
k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation
l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22)
There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that respondent Monsod has given the
lawenough attention or a certain degree of commitment and participation as would support in all sincerity and
candor the claim of having engaged in its practice for at least ten years. Instead of working as a lawyer, he has
lawyers working for him. Instead of giving receiving that legal advice of legal services, he was the oneadvice
and those services as an executive but not as a lawyer.
The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to equate "engaged in the practice
of law" with the use of legal knowledge in various fields of endeavor such as commerce, industry, civic work,
blue ribbon investigations, agrarian reform, etc. where such knowledge would be helpful.
I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an ordinary layman accepts as
having a familiar and customary well-defined meaning. Every resident of this country who has reached the age
of discernment has to know, follow, or apply the law at various times in his life. Legal knowledge is useful if not
necessary for the business executive, legislator, mayor, barangay captain, teacher, policeman, farmer,
fisherman, market vendor, and student to name only a few. And yet, can these people honestly assert that as
such, they are engaged in the practice of law?
The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." It is not satisfied
with having been "a member of the Philippine bar for at least ten years."
Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows:
The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection with litigation but also services
rendered out of court, and it includes the giving of advice or the rendering of any services requiring the use of
legal skill or knowledge, such as preparing a will, contract or other instrument, the legal effect of which, under
the facts and conditions involved, must be carefully determined.People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Tinkoff,
399 Ill. 282, 77 N.E.2d 693; People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill.
462,176 N.E. 901, and cases cited.
It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of what constitutes the practice of law.
"Practicing law" has been defined as "Practicing as an attorney or counselor at law according to the laws and
customs of our courts, is the giving of advice or rendition of any sort of service by any person, firm or
corporation when the giving of such advice or rendition of such service requires the use of any degree of legal
knowledge or skill." Without adopting that definition, we referred to it as being substantially correct in People ex
rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901. (People v. Schafer,
87 N.E. 2d 773, 776)
For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not only be activities peculiar to the
work of a lawyer, they should also be performed, habitually, frequently or customarily, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him were rather evasive. He was asked whether or not he
ever prepared contracts for the parties in real-estate transactions where he was not the procuring agent. He
answered: "Very seldom." In answer to the question as to how many times he had prepared contracts for the
parties during the twenty-one years of his business, he said: "I have no Idea." When asked if it would be more
than half a dozen times his answer was I suppose. Asked if he did not recall making the statement to several
parties that he had prepared contracts in a large number of instances, he answered: "I don't recall exactly what
was said." When asked if he did not remember saying that he had made a practice of preparing deeds,
mortgages and contracts and charging a fee to the parties therefor in instances where he was not the broker in
the deal, he answered: "Well, I don't believe so, that is not a practice." Pressed further for an answer as to his
practice in preparing contracts and deeds for parties where he was not the broker, he finally answered: "I have
done about everything that is on the books as far as real estate is concerned."
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker he has a lawful right to do any legal
work in connection with real-estate transactions, especially in drawing of real-estate contracts, deeds,
mortgages, notes and the like. There is no doubt but that he has engaged in these practices over the years
and has charged for his services in that connection. ... (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773)
xxx xxx xxx
... An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or employed by another to act in his stead;
an agent; more especially, one of a class of persons authorized to appear and act for suitors or defendants in
legal proceedings. Strictly, these professional persons are attorneys at law, and non-professional agents are
properly styled "attorney's in fact;" but the single word is much used as meaning an attorney at law. A person
may be an attorney in facto for another, without being an attorney at law. Abb. Law Dict. "Attorney." A public
attorney, or attorney at law, says Webster, is an officer of a court of law, legally qualified to prosecute and
defend actions in such court on the retainerof clients. "The principal duties of an attorney are (1) to be true to
the court and to his client; (2) to manage the business of his client with care, skill, and integrity; (3) to keep his
client informed as to the state of his business; (4) to keep his secrets confided to him as such. ... His rights are
to be justly compensated for his services." Bouv. Law Dict. tit. "Attorney." The transitive verb "practice," as
defined by Webster, means 'to do or perform frequently, customarily, or habitually; to perform by a succession
of acts, as, to practice gaming, ... to carry on in practice, or repeated action; to apply, as a theory, to real life; to
exercise, as a profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to practice law or medicine,' etc...." (State v. Bryan, S.E. 522,
523; Emphasis supplied)
In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or a succession of acts. Thus, we
stated in the case of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109 [1965]):
xxx xxx xxx
... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession
of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan.
864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as
customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such
services. ... . (at p. 112)
It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself recognizes habituality as a required component of
the meaning of practice of law in a Memorandum prepared and issued by it, to wit:
l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies customarilyor habitually holding one's self out to the public as a
lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one
sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Noy
Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a
manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country
(People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of
acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 1 09 citing State
v. Cotner, 1 27, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115)
xxx xxx xxx
While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited from his legal knowledge, the
use of such legal knowledge is incidental and consists of isolated activities which do not fall under the
denomination of practice of law. Admission to the practice of law was not required for membership in the
Constitutional Commission or in the Fact-Finding Commission on the 1989 Coup Attempt. Any specific legal
activities which may have been assigned to Mr. Monsod while a member may be likened to isolated
transactions of foreign corporations in the Philippines which do not categorize the foreign corporations as doing
business in the Philippines. As in the practice of law, doing business also should be active and continuous.
Isolated business transactions or occasional, incidental and casual transactions are not within the context of
doing business. This was our ruling in the case of Antam Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of appeals, 143 SCRA
288 [1986]).
Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the Constitutional Commission may
possess the background, competence, integrity, and dedication, to qualify for such high offices as President,
Vice-President, Senator, Congressman or Governor but the Constitution in prescribing the specific qualification
of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years for the position of COMELEC Chairman has
ordered that he may not be confirmed for that office. The Constitution charges the public respondents no less
than this Court to obey its mandate.
I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion in confirming
the nomination of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.
I vote to GRANT the petition.
Bidin, J., dissent

Separate Opinions
NARVASA, J., concurring:
I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the result; it does not
appear to me that there has been an adequate showing that the challenged determination by the Commission
on Appointments-that the appointment of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections
should, on the basis of his stated qualifications and after due assessment thereof, be confirmed-was attended
by error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion and consequently merits nullification by this Court
in accordance with the second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. I therefore vote to DENY
the petition.
Melencio-Herrera, J., concur.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition at bar, I voted not only to
require the respondents to comment on the Petition, but I was the sole vote for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order to enjoin respondent Monsod from assuming the position of COMELEC Chairman, while the
Court deliberated on his constitutional qualification for the office. My purpose in voting for a TRO was to
prevent the inconvenience and even embarrassment to all parties concerned were the Court to finally decide
for respondent Monsod's disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the Petition then in relation to established
jurisprudence already showed prima facie that respondent Monsod did not possess the needed qualification,
that is, he had not engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as
COMELEC Chairman.
After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more convinced that the constitutional
requirement of "practice of law for at least ten (10) years" has not been met.
The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration because, ultimately, the core
issue to be resolved in this petition is the proper construal of the constitutional provision requiring a majority of
the membership of COMELEC, including the Chairman thereof to "have been engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten (10) years." (Art. IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions involving the construction of
constitutional provisions are best left to judicial resolution. As declared in Angara v. Electoral Commission, (63
Phil. 139) "upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the
Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries."
The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC Chairman. Among these are that
he must have been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." It is the bounden duty of this
Court to ensure that such standard is met and complied with.
What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to the actual performance or
application of knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of knowledge; it connotes
an active, habitual,repeated or customary action. 1 To "practice" law, or any profession for that matter, means,
to exercise or pursue an employment or profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily.
Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of a nursing aide,
cannot be said to be in the "practice of medicine." A certified public accountant who works as a clerk, cannot
be said to practice his profession as an accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is employed as a business
executive or a corporate manager, other than as head or attorney of a Legal Department of a corporation or a
governmental agency, cannot be said to be in the practice of law.
As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva: 2
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of
acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs- Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864,
42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or
habitually holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State vs.
Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644,647.) ... (emphasis supplied).
It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a Memorandum it prepared,
enumerated several factors determinative of whether a particular activity constitutes "practice of law." It states:
1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public as
a lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when
one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Ney
Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a
manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country
(People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of
acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State
v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).
2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and
continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for
compensation, as a service of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. (People v. Villanueva,
supra). Hence, charging for services such as preparation of documents involving the use of legal knowledge
and skill is within the term "practice of law" (Ernani Pao, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed.,
p. 8 citing People v. People's Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who renders an opinion as to the
proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is to that extent, practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806
citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If compensation is expected, all advice to
clients and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law; are practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette et
al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359)
3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which calls for legal knowledge, training and
experience is within the term "practice of law". (Martin supra)
4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the existence of lawyer-client
relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an activity which requires knowledge of law but involves no
attorney-client relationship, such as teaching law or writing law books or articles, he cannot be said to be
engaged in the practice of his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30). 3
The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining whether or not respondent
Monsod meets the constitutional qualification of practice of law for at least ten (10) years at the time of his
appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
The following relevant questions may be asked:
1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice of law?
2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?
3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY FOR AT LEAST TEN
(10) YEARS prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman?
Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the records, I am persuaded that
if ever he did perform any of the tasks which constitute the practice of law, he did not do so HABITUALLY for at
least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be latitudinarianly considered
activities peculiar to the practice of law, like the drafting of legal documents and the rendering of legal opinion
or advice, such were isolated transactions or activities which do not qualify his past endeavors as "practice of
law." To become engaged in the practice of law, there must be a continuity, or a succession of acts. As
observed by the Solicitor General in People vs. Villanueva: 4
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in
theactive and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the
public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.
ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod as not qualified for the
position of COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to
his appointment to such position.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must dissent just the same. There are
certain points on which I must differ with him while of course respecting hisviewpoint.
To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications of the respondent simply
because his nomination has been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. In my view, this is not a
political question that we are barred from resolving. Determination of the appointee's credentials is made on
the basis of the established facts, not the discretion of that body. Even if it were, the exercise of that discretion
would still be subject to our review.
In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of the appointing authority
tochoose between two claimants to the same office who both possessed the required qualifications. It was that
kind of discretion that we said could not be reviewed.
If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this Court for lack of the required
qualifications, I see no reason why we cannot disqualified an appointee simply because he has passed the
Commission on Appointments.
Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in an appropriate proceeding
notwithstanding that he has been found acceptable by no less than the enfranchised citizenry. The reason is
that what we would be examining is not the wisdom of his election but whether or not he was qualified to be
elected in the first place.
Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that the ponencia may have been too
sweeping in its definition of the phrase "practice of law" as to render the qualification practically toothless. From
the numerous activities accepted as embraced in the term, I have the uncomfortable feeling that one does not
even have to be a lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law as long as his activities involve the application of
some law, however peripherally. The stock broker and the insurance adjuster and the realtor could come under
the definition as they deal with or give advice on matters that are likely "to become involved in litigation."
The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is another business and
he interprets and applies some law only as an incident of such business. That covers every company
organized under the Corporation Code and regulated by the SEC under P.D. 902-A. Considering the
ramifications of the modern society, there is hardly any activity that is not affected by some law or government
regulation the businessman must know about and observe. In fact, again going by the definition, a lawyer does
not even have to be part of a business concern to be considered a practitioner. He can be so deemed when,
on his own, he rents a house or buys a car or consults a doctor as these acts involve his knowledge and
application of the laws regulating such transactions. If he operates a public utility vehicle as his main source of
livelihood, he would still be deemed engaged in the practice of law because he must obey the Public Service
Act and the rules and regulations of the Energy Regulatory Board.
The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the "performance of any acts . . . in
or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law," which tells us absolutely nothing. The decision
goes on to say that "because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and
governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable."
The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be engaged in the
practice of law even if he does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as a lawyer. It is enough that his
activities are incidentally (even if only remotely) connected with some law, ordinance, or regulation. The
possible exception is the lawyer whose income is derived from teaching ballroom dancing or escorting wrinkled
ladies with pubescent pretensions.
The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade me that he has been
engaged in the practice of law for ten years as required by the Constitution. It is conceded that he has been
engaged in business and finance, in which areas he has distinguished himself, but as an executive and
economist and not as a practicing lawyer. The plain fact is that he has occupied the various positions listed in
his resume by virtue of his experience and prestige as a businessman and not as an attorney-at-law whose
principal attention is focused on the law. Even if it be argued that he was acting as a lawyer when he lobbied in
Congress for agrarian and urban reform, served in the NAMFREL and the Constitutional Commission (together
with non-lawyers like farmers and priests) and was a member of the Davide Commission, he has not proved
that his activities in these capacities extended over the prescribed 10-year period of actual practice of the law.
He is doubtless eminently qualified for many other positions worthy of his abundant talents but not as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections.
I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I must regretfully vote
to grant the petition.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as a qualification for public
office would be settled one way or another in fairly definitive terms. Unfortunately, this was not the result.
Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod engaged in the practice of law
(with one of these 5 leaving his vote behind while on official leave but not expressing his clear stand on the
matter); 4 categorically stating that he did not practice law; 2 voting in the result because there was no error so
gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion; one of official leave with no instructions left behind on how he
viewed the issue; and 2 not taking part in the deliberations and the decision.
There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the work of a constitutional
Commission on Appointments whose duty is precisely to look into the qualifications of persons appointed to
high office. Even if the Commission errs, we have no power to set aside error. We can look only into grave
abuse of discretion or whimsically and arbitrariness. Second is our belief that Mr. Monsod possesses superior
qualifications in terms of executive ability, proficiency in management, educational background, experience in
international banking and finance, and instant recognition by the public. His integrity and competence are not
questioned by the petitioner. What is before us is compliance with a specific requirement written into the
Constitution.
Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has never engaged in the
practice of law for even one year. He is a member of the bar but to say that he has practiced law is stretching
the term beyond rational limits.
A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life to the law, if he has not
engaged in an activity where membership in the bar is a requirement I fail to see how he can claim to have
been engaged in the practice of law.
Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but also for appointment to
the Supreme Court and all lower courts. What kind of Judges or Justices will we have if there main occupation
is selling real estate, managing a business corporation, serving in fact-finding committee, working in media, or
operating a farm with no active involvement in the law, whether in Government or private practice, except that
in one joyful moment in the distant past, they happened to pass the bar examinations?
The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." The deliberate choice
of words shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular, not isolated, occasional, accidental,
intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be "engaged" in an activity for ten years requires
committed participation in something which is the result of one's decisive choice. It means that one is occupied
and involved in the enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with intent and attention during the ten-
year period.
I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent Monsod to the Commission on
Appointments, the latter has not been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. In fact, if appears
that Mr. Monsod has never practiced law except for an alleged one year period after passing the bar
examinations when he worked in his father's law firm. Even then his law practice must have been extremely
limited because he was also working for M.A. and Ph. D. degrees in Economics at the University of
Pennsylvania during that period. How could he practice law in the United States while not a member of the Bar
there?
The professional life of the respondent follows:
1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing the Bar examinations in 1961 consist of the
following:
1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of Pennsylvania
2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group Economist, Industry Department; Operations, Latin American Department;
Division Chief, South Asia and Middle East, International Finance Corporation
3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group Executive of various companies, i.e., Meralco Securities Corporation,
Philippine Petroleum Corporation, Philippine Electric Corporation
4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group President, Fil-Capital Development Corporation and affiliated companies
5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila Chief Executive Officer
6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies Chief Executive Officer
7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission Member
8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989 Coup Attempt Member
9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the following companies:
a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.
b. Dataprep, Philippines
c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, Inc.
d. Semirara Coal Corporation
e. CBL Timber Corporation
Member of the Board of the Following:
a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines
b. First Philippine Energy Corporation
c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation
d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation
e. Graphic Atelier
f. Manila Electric Company
g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.
h. Philippine Electric Corporation
i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises
j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation
k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation
l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22)
There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that respondent Monsod has given the
lawenough attention or a certain degree of commitment and participation as would support in all sincerity and
candor the claim of having engaged in its practice for at least ten years. Instead of working as a lawyer, he has
lawyers working for him. Instead of giving receiving that legal advice of legal services, he was the oneadvice
and those services as an executive but not as a lawyer.
The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to equate "engaged in the practice
of law" with the use of legal knowledge in various fields of endeavor such as commerce, industry, civic work,
blue ribbon investigations, agrarian reform, etc. where such knowledge would be helpful.
I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an ordinary layman accepts as
having a familiar and customary well-defined meaning. Every resident of this country who has reached the age
of discernment has to know, follow, or apply the law at various times in his life. Legal knowledge is useful if not
necessary for the business executive, legislator, mayor, barangay captain, teacher, policeman, farmer,
fisherman, market vendor, and student to name only a few. And yet, can these people honestly assert that as
such, they are engaged in the practice of law?
The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." It is not satisfied
with having been "a member of the Philippine bar for at least ten years."
Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows:
The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection with litigation but also services
rendered out of court, and it includes the giving of advice or the rendering of any services requiring the use of
legal skill or knowledge, such as preparing a will, contract or other instrument, the legal effect of which, under
the facts and conditions involved, must be carefully determined.People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Tinkoff,
399 Ill. 282, 77 N.E.2d 693; People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill.
462,176 N.E. 901, and cases cited.
It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of what constitutes the practice of law.
"Practicing law" has been defined as "Practicing as an attorney or counselor at law according to the laws and
customs of our courts, is the giving of advice or rendition of any sort of service by any person, firm or
corporation when the giving of such advice or rendition of such service requires the use of any degree of legal
knowledge or skill." Without adopting that definition, we referred to it as being substantially correct in People ex
rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901. (People v. Schafer,
87 N.E. 2d 773, 776)
For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not only be activities peculiar to the
work of a lawyer, they should also be performed, habitually, frequently or customarily, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him were rather evasive. He was asked whether or not he
ever prepared contracts for the parties in real-estate transactions where he was not the procuring agent. He
answered: "Very seldom." In answer to the question as to how many times he had prepared contracts for the
parties during the twenty-one years of his business, he said: "I have no Idea." When asked if it would be more
than half a dozen times his answer was I suppose. Asked if he did not recall making the statement to several
parties that he had prepared contracts in a large number of instances, he answered: "I don't recall exactly what
was said." When asked if he did not remember saying that he had made a practice of preparing deeds,
mortgages and contracts and charging a fee to the parties therefor in instances where he was not the broker in
the deal, he answered: "Well, I don't believe so, that is not a practice." Pressed further for an answer as to his
practice in preparing contracts and deeds for parties where he was not the broker, he finally answered: "I have
done about everything that is on the books as far as real estate is concerned."
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker he has a lawful right to do any legal
work in connection with real-estate transactions, especially in drawing of real-estate contracts, deeds,
mortgages, notes and the like. There is no doubt but that he has engaged in these practices over the years
and has charged for his services in that connection. ... (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773)
xxx xxx xxx
... An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or employed by another to act in his stead;
an agent; more especially, one of a class of persons authorized to appear and act for suitors or defendants in
legal proceedings. Strictly, these professional persons are attorneys at law, and non-professional agents are
properly styled "attorney's in fact;" but the single word is much used as meaning an attorney at law. A person
may be an attorney in facto for another, without being an attorney at law. Abb. Law Dict. "Attorney." A public
attorney, or attorney at law, says Webster, is an officer of a court of law, legally qualified to prosecute and
defend actions in such court on the retainerof clients. "The principal duties of an attorney are (1) to be true to
the court and to his client; (2) to manage the business of his client with care, skill, and integrity; (3) to keep his
client informed as to the state of his business; (4) to keep his secrets confided to him as such. ... His rights are
to be justly compensated for his services." Bouv. Law Dict. tit. "Attorney." The transitive verb "practice," as
defined by Webster, means 'to do or perform frequently, customarily, or habitually; to perform by a succession
of acts, as, to practice gaming, ... to carry on in practice, or repeated action; to apply, as a theory, to real life; to
exercise, as a profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to practice law or medicine,' etc...." (State v. Bryan, S.E. 522,
523; Emphasis supplied)
In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or a succession of acts. Thus, we
stated in the case of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109 [1965]):
xxx xxx xxx
... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession
of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan.
864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as
customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such
services. ... . (at p. 112)
It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself recognizes habituality as a required component of
the meaning of practice of law in a Memorandum prepared and issued by it, to wit:
l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies customarilyor habitually holding one's self out to the public as a
lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one
sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Noy
Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a
manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country
(People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of
acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 1 09 citing State
v. Cotner, 1 27, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115)
xxx xxx xxx
While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited from his legal knowledge, the
use of such legal knowledge is incidental and consists of isolated activities which do not fall under the
denomination of practice of law. Admission to the practice of law was not required for membership in the
Constitutional Commission or in the Fact-Finding Commission on the 1989 Coup Attempt. Any specific legal
activities which may have been assigned to Mr. Monsod while a member may be likened to isolated
transactions of foreign corporations in the Philippines which do not categorize the foreign corporations as doing
business in the Philippines. As in the practice of law, doing business also should be active and continuous.
Isolated business transactions or occasional, incidental and casual transactions are not within the context of
doing business. This was our ruling in the case of Antam Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of appeals, 143 SCRA
288 [1986]).
Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the Constitutional Commission may
possess the background, competence, integrity, and dedication, to qualify for such high offices as President,
Vice-President, Senator, Congressman or Governor but the Constitution in prescribing the specific qualification
of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years for the position of COMELEC Chairman has
ordered that he may not be confirmed for that office. The Constitution charges the public respondents no less
than this Court to obey its mandate.
I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion in confirming
the nomination of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.
I vote to GRANT the petition.
Bidin, J., dissent
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993

MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,
vs.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.
R E SO L U T I O N

REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing advertisements similar to
or of the same tenor as that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or
entities from making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed
by law."
The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am 6:00 pm 7-Flr. Victoria Bldg.,
UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE.
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to
Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special
Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil.
US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy CLINIC, INC. 1 Tel. 521-7232;
521-7251; 522-2041; 521-0767
It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champterous, unethical,
demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of the
members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said
advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as hereinbefore quoted.
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisement at its instance, but
claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support services" through
paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent further argues that
assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these services should be
allowed supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona, 2 reportedly decided by the
United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.
Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein, we required the (1)
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3) Philippine Lawyers'
Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Womens Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers Association of the
Philippines (WLAP), and (6) Federacion International de Abogadas (FIDA) to submit their respective position
papers on the controversy and, thereafter, their memoranda. 3 The said bar associations readily responded
and extended their valuable services and cooperation of which this Court takes note with appreciation and
gratitude.
The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services offered by respondent,
The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether the same can
properly be the subject of the advertisements herein complained of.
Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it proper and enlightening to
present hereunder excerpts from the respective position papers adopted by the aforementioned bar
associations and the memoranda submitted by them on the issues involved in this bar matter.
1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to distinguish the two terms,i.e., "legal
support services" vis-a-vis "legal services", common sense would readily dictate that the same are essentially
without substantial distinction. For who could deny that document search, evidence gathering, assistance to
layman in need of basic institutional services from government or non-government agencies like birth,
marriage, property, or business registration, obtaining documents like clearance, passports, local or foreign
visas, constitutes practice of law?
xxx xxx xxx
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with respondent's foreign citations.
Suffice it to state that the IBP has made its position manifest, to wit, that it strongly opposes the view espoused
by respondent (to the effect that today it is alright to advertise one's legal services).
The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to respondent's act of establishing a "legal
clinic" and of concomitantly advertising the same through newspaper publications.
The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this Honorable Court to perpetually restrain
respondent from undertaking highly unethical activities in the field of law practice as aforedescribed. 4
xxx xxx xxx
A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that respondent corporation is being
operated by lawyers and that it renders legal services.
While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the public, the advertisements in
question give the impression that respondent is offering legal services. The Petition in fact simply assumes this
to be so, as earlier mentioned, apparently because this (is) the effect that the advertisements have on the
reading public.
The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced, first of all, to the very name being
used by respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a name, it is respectfully submitted connotes the rendering
of legal services for legal problems, just like a medical clinic connotes medical services for medical problems.
More importantly, the term "Legal Clinic" connotes lawyers, as the term medical clinic connotes doctors.
Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the advertisements subject of the present case, appears
with (the) scale(s) of justice, which all the more reinforces the impression that it is being operated by members
of the bar and that it offers legal services. In addition, the advertisements in question appear with a picture and
name of a person being represented as a lawyer from Guam, and this practically removes whatever doubt may
still remain as to the nature of the service or services being offered.
It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal support services" as claimed by it, or
whether it offers legal services as any lawyer actively engaged in law practice does. And it becomes
unnecessary to make a distinction between "legal services" and "legal support services," as the respondent
would have it. The advertisements in question leave no room for doubt in the minds of the reading public that
legal services are being offered by lawyers, whether true or not.
B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of acts contrary to law, morals, public
order and public policy.
It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in question are only meant to inform
the general public of the services being offered by it. Said advertisements, however, emphasize to Guam
divorce, and any law student ought to know that under the Family Code, there is only one instance when a
foreign divorce is recognized, and that is:
Article 26. . . .
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine Law.
It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as follows:
Article 1. Marriage is special contract of permanent union between a man and woman entered into accordance
with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable
social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relation during the marriage within the limits
provided by this Code.
By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the message being conveyed is that
Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences of a marriage celebrated in accordance with our law, by simply
going to Guam for a divorce. This is not only misleading, but encourages, or serves to induce, violation of
Philippine law. At the very least, this can be considered "the dark side" of legal practice, where certain defects
in Philippine laws are exploited for the sake of profit. At worst, this is outright malpractice.
Rule 1.02. A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.
In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as that shown in Annex "A" of the
Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle with the words "Just Married" on its bumper and seems to
address those planning a "secret marriage," if not suggesting a "secret marriage," makes light of the "special
contract of permanent union," the inviolable social institution," which is how the Family Code describes
marriage, obviously to emphasize its sanctity and inviolability. Worse, this particular advertisement appears to
encourage marriages celebrated in secrecy, which is suggestive of immoral publication of applications for a
marriage license.
If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be concluded that the above impressions
one may gather from the advertisements in question are accurate. The Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion
example alone confirms what the advertisements suggest. Here it can be seen that criminal acts are being
encouraged or committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply because the jurisdiction of Philippine
courts does not extend to the place where the crime is committed.
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal support services" respondent offers do not constitute legal
services as commonly understood, the advertisements in question give the impression that respondent
corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it offers legal services, as earlier discussed. Thus, the only
logical consequence is that, in the eyes of an ordinary newspaper reader, members of the bar themselves are
encouraging or inducing the performance of acts which are contrary to law, morals, good customs and the
public good, thereby destroying and demeaning the integrity of the Bar.
xxx xxx xxx
It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing the publication of the
advertisements in question, or any other advertisements similar thereto. It is also submitted that respondent
should be prohibited from further performing or offering some of the services it presently offers, or, at the very
least, from offering such services to the public in general.
The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research, electronic data gathering, storage and
retrieval, standardized legal forms, investigators for gathering of evidence, and like services will greatly benefit
the legal profession and should not be stifled but instead encouraged. However, when the conduct of such
business by non-members of the Bar encroaches upon the practice of law, there can be no choice but to
prohibit such business.
Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better performed by specialists in other
fields, such as computer experts, who by reason of their having devoted time and effort exclusively to such
field cannot fulfill the exacting requirements for admission to the Bar. To prohibit them from "encroaching" upon
the legal profession will deny the profession of the great benefits and advantages of modern technology.
Indeed, a lawyer using a computer will be doing better than a lawyer using a typewriter, even if both are (equal)
in skill.
Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or tolerate the illegal practice of law in any
form, not only for the protection of members of the Bar but also, and more importantly, for the protection of the
public. Technological development in the profession may be encouraged without tolerating, but instead
ensuring prevention of illegal practice.
There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all of its services, but only if such
services are made available exclusively to members of the Bench and Bar. Respondent would then be offering
technical assistance, not legal services. Alternatively, the more difficult task of carefully distinguishing between
which service may be offered to the public in general and which should be made available exclusively to
members of the Bar may be undertaken. This, however, may require further proceedings because of the
factual considerations involved.
It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's services ought to be prohibited outright, such as
acts which tend to suggest or induce celebration abroad of marriages which are bigamous or otherwise illegal
and void under Philippine law. While respondent may not be prohibited from simply disseminating information
regarding such matters, it must be required to include, in the information given, a disclaimer that it is not
authorized to practice law, that certain course of action may be illegal under Philippine law, that it is not
authorized or capable of rendering a legal opinion, that a lawyer should be consulted before deciding on which
course of action to take, and that it cannot recommend any particular lawyer without subjecting itself to
possible sanctions for illegal practice of law.
If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed exclusively at members of the Bar, with a
clear and unmistakable disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law or perform legal services.
The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But nobody should be allowed to represent
himself as a "paralegal" for profit, without such term being clearly defined by rule or regulation, and without any
adequate and effective means of regulating his activities. Also, law practice in a corporate form may prove to
be advantageous to the legal profession, but before allowance of such practice may be considered, the
corporation's Article of Incorporation and By-laws must conform to each and every provision of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Rules of Court. 5
2. Philippine Bar Association:
xxx xxx xxx.
Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but engaged in giving legal support services to
lawyers and laymen, through experienced paralegals, with the use of modern computers and electronic
machines" (pars. 2 and 3, Comment). This is absurd. Unquestionably, respondent's acts of holding out itself to
the public under the trade name "The Legal Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting employment for its enumerated services
fall within the realm of a practice which thus yields itself to the regulatory powers of the Supreme Court. For
respondent to say that it is merely engaged in paralegal work is to stretch credulity. Respondent's own
commercial advertisement which announces a certain Atty. Don Parkinson to be handling the fields of law
belies its pretense. From all indications, respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." is offering and rendering legal
services through its reserve of lawyers. It has been held that the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases in court, but includes drawing of deeds, incorporation, rendering opinions, and advising clients as to their
legal right and then take them to an attorney and ask the latter to look after their case in court See Martin,
Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1984 ed., p. 39).
It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law, and such limitation cannot be
evaded by a corporation employing competent lawyers to practice for it. Obviously, this is the scheme or
device by which respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the public and solicits employment of its
legal services. It is an odious vehicle for deception, especially so when the public cannot ventilate any
grievance for malpractice against the business conduit. Precisely, the limitation of practice of law to persons
who have been duly admitted as members of the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court) is to subject
the members to the discipline of the Supreme Court. Although respondent uses its business name, the persons
and the lawyers who act for it are subject to court discipline. The practice of law is not a profession open to all
who wish to engage in it nor can it be assigned to another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is a personal right limited to
persons who have qualified themselves under the law. It follows that not only respondent but also all the
persons who are acting for respondent are the persons engaged in unethical law practice. 6
3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:
The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the issues stated herein, are wit:
1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;
2. Such practice is unauthorized;
3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also misleading and patently immoral; and
4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress and punish the Legal Clinic and its corporate
officers for its unauthorized practice of law and for its unethical, misleading and immoral advertising.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of law. It claims that it merely renders "legal support
services" to answers, litigants and the general public as enunciated in the Primary Purpose Clause of its
Article(s) of Incorporation. (See pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's Comment). But its advertised services, as
enumerated above, clearly and convincingly show that it is indeed engaged in law practice, albeit outside of
court.
As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons and Family Relations Law,
particularly regarding foreign divorces, annulment of marriages, secret marriages, absence and adoption;
Immigration Laws, particularly on visa related problems, immigration problems; the Investments Law of the
Philippines and such other related laws.
Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid law, the legal principles and
procedures related thereto, the legal advices based thereon and which activities call for legal training,
knowledge and experience.
Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case, the activities of respondent fall
squarely and are embraced in what lawyers and laymen equally term as "the practice of law." 7
4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:
In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount consideration should be given to the protection
of the general public from the danger of being exploited by unqualified persons or entities who may be
engaged in the practice of law.
At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year course of study on top of a four-year
bachelor of arts or sciences course and then to take and pass the bar examinations. Only then, is a lawyer
qualified to practice law.
While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdiction as an aid to the administration of justice, there
are in those jurisdictions, courses of study and/or standards which would qualify these paralegals to deal with
the general public as such. While it may now be the opportune time to establish these courses of study and/or
standards, the fact remains that at present, these do not exist in the Philippines. In the meantime, this
Honorable Court may decide to make measures to protect the general public from being exploited by those
who may be dealing with the general public in the guise of being "paralegals" without being qualified to do so.
In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from the dangers which may be brought
about by advertising of legal services. While it appears that lawyers are prohibited under the present Code of
Professional Responsibility from advertising, it appears in the instant case that legal services are being
advertised not by lawyers but by an entity staffed by "paralegals." Clearly, measures should be taken to protect
the general public from falling prey to those who advertise legal services without being qualified to offer such
services. 8
A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however, seems to give the impression that
information regarding validity of marriages, divorce, annulment of marriage, immigration, visa extensions,
declaration of absence, adoption and foreign investment, which are in essence, legal matters , will be given to
them if they avail of its services. The Respondent's name The Legal Clinic, Inc. does not help matters. It
gives the impression again that Respondent will or can cure the legal problems brought to them. Assuming that
Respondent is, as claimed, staffed purely by paralegals, it also gives the misleading impression that there are
lawyers involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc., as there are doctors in any medical clinic, when only "paralegals" are
involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc.
Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its President and majority stockholder,
Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight on the structure and main purpose of Respondent corporation in the
aforementioned "Starweek" article." 9
5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:
Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit cases for the purpose of gain which, as
provided for under the above cited law, (are) illegal and against the Code of Professional Responsibility of
lawyers in this country.
Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to solicit cases, but it is illegal in that in
bold letters it announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc., could work out/cause the celebration of a secret marriage
which is not only illegal but immoral in this country. While it is advertised that one has to go to said agency and
pay P560 for a valid marriage it is certainly fooling the public for valid marriages in the Philippines are
solemnized only by officers authorized to do so under the law. And to employ an agency for said purpose of
contracting marriage is not necessary.
No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries the trend is towards allowing lawyers to
advertise their special skills to enable people to obtain from qualified practitioners legal services for their
particular needs can justify the use of advertisements such as are the subject matter of the petition, for one
(cannot) justify an illegal act even by whatever merit the illegal act may serve. The law has yet to be amended
so that such act could become justifiable.
We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret marriages and divorce are
possible in this country for a fee, when in fact it is not so, are highly reprehensible.
It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go about having a secret marriage here,
when it cannot nor should ever be attempted, and seek advice on divorce, where in this country there is none,
except under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines. It is also against good morals and is
deceitful because it falsely represents to the public to be able to do that which by our laws cannot be done
(and) by our Code of Morals should not be done.
In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that solicitation for clients by an attorney by
circulars of advertisements, is unprofessional, and offenses of this character justify permanent elimination from
the Bar. 10
6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:
xxx xxx xxx
1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as management consultancy firms or
travel agencies, whether run by lawyers or not, perform the services rendered by Respondent does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that Respondent is not unlawfully practicing law. In the same vein, however,
the fact that the business of respondent (assuming it can be engaged in independently of the practice of law)
involves knowledge of the law does not necessarily make respondent guilty of unlawful practice of law.
. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a consultant can render effective service unless he is familiar with
such statutes and regulations. He must be careful not to suggest a course of conduct which the law forbids. It
seems . . . .clear that (the consultant's) knowledge of the law, and his use of that knowledge as a factor in
determining what measures he shall recommend, do not constitute the practice of law . . . . It is not only
presumed that all men know the law, but it is a fact that most men have considerable acquaintance with broad
features of the law . . . . Our knowledge of the law accurate or inaccurate moulds our conduct not only
when we are acting for ourselves, but when we are serving others. Bankers, liquor dealers and laymen
generally possess rather precise knowledge of the laws touching their particular business or profession. A
good example is the architect, who must be familiar with zoning, building and fire prevention codes, factory and
tenement house statutes, and who draws plans and specification in harmony with the law. This is not practicing
law.
But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire tower, replies that it is required by the statute. Or
the industrial relations expert cites, in support of some measure that he recommends, a decision of the
National Labor Relations Board. Are they practicing law? In my opinion, they are not, provided no separate fee
is charged for the legal advice or information, and the legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major
non-legal problem.
It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.
If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land to engage a lawyer to advise him and the
architect in respect to the building code and the like, then an architect who performed this function would
probably be considered to be trespassing on territory reserved for licensed attorneys. Likewise, if the industrial
relations field had been pre-empted by lawyers, or custom placed a lawyer always at the elbow of the lay
personnel man. But this is not the case. The most important body of the industrial relations experts are the
officers and business agents of the labor unions and few of them are lawyers. Among the larger corporate
employers, it has been the practice for some years to delegate special responsibility in employee matters to a
management group chosen for their practical knowledge and skill in such matter, and without regard to legal
thinking or lack of it. More recently, consultants like the defendants have the same service that the larger
employers get from their own specialized staff.
The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized profession for which appropriate courses are
offered by our leading universities. The court should be very cautious about declaring [that] a widespread, well-
established method of conducting business is unlawful, or that the considerable class of men who customarily
perform a certain function have no right to do so, or that the technical education given by our schools cannot
be used by the graduates in their business.
In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should consider his work for any particular client or
customer, as a whole. I can imagine defendant being engaged primarily to advise as to the law defining his
client's obligations to his employees, to guide his client's obligations to his employees, to guide his client along
the path charted by law. This, of course, would be the practice of the law. But such is not the fact in the case
before me. Defendant's primarily efforts are along economic and psychological lines. The law only provides the
frame within which he must work, just as the zoning code limits the kind of building the limits the kind of
building the architect may plan. The incidental legal advice or information defendant may give, does not
transform his activities into the practice of law. Let me add that if, even as a minor feature of his work, he
performed services which are customarily reserved to members of the bar, he would be practicing law. For
instance, if as part of a welfare program, he drew employees' wills.
Another branch of defendant's work is the representations of the employer in the adjustment of grievances and
in collective bargaining, with or without a mediator. This is not per se the practice of law. Anyone may use an
agent for negotiations and may select an agent particularly skilled in the subject under discussion, and the
person appointed is free to accept the employment whether or not he is a member of the bar. Here, however,
there may be an exception where the business turns on a question of law. Most real estate sales are
negotiated by brokers who are not lawyers. But if the value of the land depends on a disputed right-of-way and
the principal role of the negotiator is to assess the probable outcome of the dispute and persuade the opposite
party to the same opinion, then it may be that only a lawyer can accept the assignment. Or if a controversy
between an employer and his men grows from differing interpretations of a contract, or of a statute, it is quite
likely that defendant should not handle it. But I need not reach a definite conclusion here, since the situation is
not presented by the proofs.
Defendant also appears to represent the employer before administrative agencies of the federal government,
especially before trial examiners of the National Labor Relations Board. An agency of the federal government,
acting by virtue of an authority granted by the Congress, may regulate the representation of parties before
such agency. The State of New Jersey is without power to interfere with such determination or to forbid
representation before the agency by one whom the agency admits. The rules of the National Labor Relations
Board give to a party the right to appear in person, or by counsel, or by other representative. Rules and
Regulations, September 11th, 1946, S. 203.31. 'Counsel' here means a licensed attorney, and ther
representative' one not a lawyer. In this phase of his work, defendant may lawfully do whatever the Labor
Board allows, even arguing questions purely legal. (Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A. 2d 800, cited in Statsky,
Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at pp. 154-156.).
1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful calling (which may involve knowledge
of the law) is not engaged in the practice of law provided that:
(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem;.
(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the bar; .
(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.
All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client as a whole.
1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of Professional Responsibility succintly
states the rule of conduct:
Rule 15.08 A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation concurrently with the practice of
law shall make clear to his client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.
1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding services (See Annex "A" Petition).
Services on routine, straightforward marriages, like securing a marriage license, and making arrangements
with a priest or a judge, may not constitute practice of law. However, if the problem is as complicated as that
described in "Rx for Legal Problems" on the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion-Richard Gomez case, then
what may be involved is actually the practice of law. If a non-lawyer, such as the Legal Clinic, renders such
services then it is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce, absence, annulment of marriage and visas
(See Annexes "A" and "B" Petition). Purely giving informational materials may not constitute of law. The
business is similar to that of a bookstore where the customer buys materials on the subject and determines on
the subject and determines by himself what courses of action to take.
It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving information, the Legal Clinic's paralegals
may apply the law to the particular problem of the client, and give legal advice. Such would constitute
unauthorized practice of law.
It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which publication of a legal text which purports to say
what the law is amount to legal practice. And the mere fact that the principles or rules stated in the text may be
accepted by a particular reader as a solution to his problem does not affect this. . . . . Apparently it is urged that
the conjoining of these two, that is, the text and the forms, with advice as to how the forms should be filled out,
constitutes the unlawful practice of law. But that is the situation with many approved and accepted texts.
Dacey's book is sold to the public at large. There is no personal contact or relationship with a particular
individual. Nor does there exist that relation of confidence and trust so necessary to the status of attorney and
client. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL PRACTICE THE REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A
PARTICULAR PERSON IN A PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most the book assumes to offer general advice
on common problems, and does not purport to give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a
designated or readily identified person. Similarly the defendant's publication does not purport to give personal
advice on a specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified person in a particular situation in
their publication and sale of the kits, such publication and sale did not constitutes the unlawful practice of law .
. . . There being no legal impediment under the statute to the sale of the kit, there was no proper basis for the
injunction against defendant maintaining an office for the purpose of selling to persons seeking a divorce,
separation, annulment or separation agreement any printed material or writings relating to matrimonial law or
the prohibition in the memorandum of modification of the judgment against defendant having an interest in any
publishing house publishing his manuscript on divorce and against his having any personal contact with any
prospective purchaser. The record does fully support, however, the finding that for the change of $75 or $100
for the kit, the defendant gave legal advice in the course of personal contacts concerning particular problems
which might arise in the preparation and presentation of the purchaser's asserted matrimonial cause of action
or pursuit of other legal remedies and assistance in the preparation of necessary documents (The injunction
therefore sought to) enjoin conduct constituting the practice of law, particularly with reference to the giving of
advice and counsel by the defendant relating to specific problems of particular individuals in connection with a
divorce, separation, annulment of separation agreement sought and should be affirmed. (State v. Winder, 348,
NYS 2D 270 [1973], cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.).
1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory. "It is not
controverted, however, that if the services "involve giving legal advice or counselling," such would constitute
practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is in this light that FIDA submits that a factual inquiry may be necessary
for the judicious disposition of this case.
xxx xxx xxx
2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the impression (or perpetuate the wrong
notion) that there is a secret marriage. With all the solemnities, formalities and other requisites of marriages
(See Articles 2, et seq., Family Code), no Philippine marriage can be secret.
2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second paragraph thereof (which is not
necessarily related to the first paragraph) fails to state the limitation that only "paralegal services?" or "legal
support services", and not legal services, are available." 11
A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent for the proper
determination of the issues raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we note that the clause "practice of law"
has long been the subject of judicial construction and interpretation. The courts have laid down general
principles and doctrines explaining the meaning and scope of the term, some of which we now take into
account.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedures,
knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any kind of service that
involves legal knowledge or skill. 12
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and counsel, and the
preparation of legal instruments and contract by which legal rights are secured, although such matter may or
may not be pending in a court. 13
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal types of
professional activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and obligations,
preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary layman,
and appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess power and authority to determine rights of
life, liberty, and property according to law, in order to assist in proper interpretation and enforcement of law. 14
When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of law. 15 One
who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the business to an attorney and
asks the latter to look after the case in court, is also practicing law. 16 Giving advice for compensation
regarding the legal status and rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of
law. 17 One who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is, to
that extent, practicing law. 18
In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the doctrines in several cases, we laid down the test
to determine whether certain acts constitute "practice of law," thus:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve
the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the
conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal
advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the
law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.(Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v.
Dworken , 129 Ohio St. 23, 193N. E. 650). A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:
. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or corporations
as to their right under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings, pending
or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by
law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative capacity, performs any act or acts
for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in
a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while
so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the
practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S. W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-177),stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters or estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the
preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained
legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and
having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a
large variety of subjects and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of
business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with
court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a
high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult
and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation
to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in
the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and
that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the
public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and
skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests
upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules o Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-666, citing In Re
Opinion of the Justices [Mass], 194 N. E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc.
[R.I.] 197 A. 139, 144).
The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. Applying the
aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and observations of the
aforestated bar associations that the activities of respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice of law."
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously considered
nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the services it has been offering,
to wit:
Legal support services basically consists of giving ready information by trained paralegals to laymen and
lawyers, which are strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory, through the extensive use of computers and modern
information technology in the gathering, processing, storage, transmission and reproduction of information and
communication, such as computerized legal research; encoding and reproduction of documents and pleadings
prepared by laymen or lawyers; document search; evidence gathering; locating parties or witnesses to a case;
fact finding investigations; and assistance to laymen in need of basic institutional services from government or
non-government agencies, like birth, marriage, property, or business registrations; educational or employment
records or certifications, obtaining documentation like clearances, passports, local or foreign visas; giving
information about laws of other countries that they may find useful, like foreign divorce, marriage or adoption
laws that they can avail of preparatory to emigration to the foreign country, and other matters that do not
involve representation of clients in court; designing and installing computer systems, programs, or software for
the efficient management of law offices, corporate legal departments, courts and other entities engaged in
dispensing or administering legal services. 20
While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and technical
knowhow, such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient management of law
offices, or the computerization of research aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to
the general rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its
contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing
information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this
Court that all the respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client,
and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily
have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be
taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for the which services
it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of
"practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not
represent clients in court since law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely giving legal
advice, contract drafting and so forth.
The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January 13, 1991 issue of the
Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippines Star, entitled "Rx for Legal Problems," where an insight into
the structure, main purpose and operations of respondent corporation was given by its own "proprietor," Atty.
Rogelio P. Nogales:
This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic, with offices on the seventh floor of
the Victoria Building along U. N. Avenue in Manila. No matter what the client's problem, and even if it is as
complicated as the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic situation, Atty. Nogales and his staff of lawyers, who, like
doctors are "specialists" in various fields can take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation
and criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation, and family law. These specialist are backed up by a
battery of paralegals, counsellors and attorneys.
Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the medical field toward specialization, it
caters to clients who cannot afford the services of the big law firms.
The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when they come, we start by analyzing the problem. That's
what doctors do also. They ask you how you contracted what's bothering you, they take your temperature, they
observe you for the symptoms and so on. That's how we operate, too. And once the problem has been
categorized, then it's referred to one of our specialists.
There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or follow-up treatment. These The Legal Clinic
disposes of in a matter of minutes. "Things like preparing a simple deed of sale or an affidavit of loss can be
taken care of by our staff or, if this were a hospital the residents or the interns. We can take care of these
matters on a while you wait basis. Again, kung baga sa hospital, out-patient, hindi kailangang ma-confine. It's
just like a common cold or diarrhea," explains Atty. Nogales.
Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are dealt with accordingly. "If you had a rich relative
who died and named you her sole heir, and you stand to inherit millions of pesos of property, we would refer
you to a specialist in taxation. There would be real estate taxes and arrears which would need to be put in
order, and your relative is even taxed by the state for the right to transfer her property, and only a specialist in
taxation would be properly trained to deal with the problem. Now, if there were other heirs contesting your rich
relatives will, then you would need a litigator, who knows how to arrange the problem for presentation in court,
and gather evidence to support the case. 21
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling. What is important is
that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the services it renders which thereby brings it
within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against the advertisements which it has caused to be published
and are now assailed in this proceeding.
Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts sufficiently
establish that the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for various legal
problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple documentation to complex litigation and
corporate undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather,
are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law. 22
It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent which constitute
practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar, or
hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court, and who is in good and
regular standing, is entitled to practice law. 23
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education
and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an individual and limited privilege subject to
withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect
the public, the court, the client and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice
law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the court. 24
The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would wish to draw support for
his thesis. The doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is limited to those who meet the requirements
for, and have been admitted to, the bar, and various statutes or rules specifically so provide. 25 The practice of
law is not a lawful business except for members of the bar who have complied with all the conditions required
by statute and the rules of court. Only those persons are allowed to practice law who, by reason of attainments
previously acquired through education and study, have been recognized by the courts as possessing profound
knowledge of legal science entitling them to advise, counsel with, protect, or defend the rights claims, or
liabilities of their clients, with respect to the construction, interpretation, operation and effect of law. 26 The
justification for excluding from the practice of law those not admitted to the bar is found, not in the protection of
the bar from competition, but in the protection of the public from being advised and represented in legal
matters by incompetent and unreliable persons over whom the judicial department can exercise little
control. 27
We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept in the United States of
paralegals as an occupation separate from the law profession be adopted in this jurisdiction. Whatever may be
its merits, respondent cannot but be aware that this should first be a matter for judicial rules or legislative
action, and not of unilateral adoption as it has done.
Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent, there are schools and
universities there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education, while there are none in the
Philippines.28 As the concept of the "paralegals" or "legal assistant" evolved in the United States, standards
and guidelines also evolved to protect the general public. One of the major standards or guidelines was
developed by the American Bar Association which set up Guidelines for the Approval of Legal Assistant
Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even been proposed to certify legal assistants. There are also
associations of paralegals in the United States with their own code of professional ethics, such as the National
Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and the American Paralegal Association.29
In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may be considered as
paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to practice law are or have been
allowed limited representation in behalf of another or to render legal services, but such allowable services are
limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or regulations granting permission therefor. 30
Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of constitutional or statutory
authority, a person who has not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the proper administration
of justice cannot be hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized and unskilled person into the
practice of law. 31 That policy should continue to be one of encouraging persons who are unsure of their legal
rights and remedies to seek legal assistance only from persons licensed to practice law in the state. 32
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and
objective information or statement of facts. 33 He is not supposed to use or permit the use of any false,
fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his
qualifications or legal services. 34 Nor shall he pay or give something of value to representatives of the mass
media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal business. 35 Prior to the adoption of the code
of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not
resort to indirect advertisements for professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper
comments, or procuring his photograph to be published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has
been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the
importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation. 36
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot,
without violating the ethics of his profession. advertise his talents or skill as in a manner similar to a merchant
advertising his goods. 37 The prescription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business
rests on the fundamental postulate that the that the practice of law is a profession. Thus, in the case of
The Director of Religious Affairs. vs. Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an advertisement, similar to those of respondent
which are involved in the present proceeding,39 was held to constitute improper advertising or solicitation.
The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the ethics of his
profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides
among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru
paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or
skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and
his profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering
them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the
money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective advertisement possible,
even for a young lawyer, . . . . is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and
fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of
Ethics.).
We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and
conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and
catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A
good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily
sees the difference between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of
propaganda. 40
Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the profession enumerate
exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and define the extent to which they may be undertaken.
The exceptions are of two broad categories, namely, those which are expressly allowed and those which are
necessarily implied from the restrictions. 41
The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards
of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative data. "Such data must not be
misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer's name and the names of his professional
associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of
birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational
distinction; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions;
membership and offices in bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal
fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with
their written consent, the names of clients regularly represented." 42
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental
feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally for other purposes. For
that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper,
magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the
conduct, management or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or
to lower the dignity or standing of the profession. 43
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a statement of his
name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of
law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the
partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is not
objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not under a designation of
special branch of law. 44
Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which respondent is being
taken to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said respondent corporation for services
rendered, we find and so hold that the same definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the
above-mentioned exceptions.
The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly invoked and constitutes
the justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case at bar. Foremost is the fact
that the disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an exception to the prohibition
against advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for an initial consultation or the
availability upon request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to be charged for the specific
services. No such exception is provided for, expressly or impliedly, whether in our former Canons of
Professional Ethics or the present Code of Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in
the Bates case contains a proviso that the exceptions stated therein are "not applicable in any state unless and
until it is implemented by such authority in that state." 46 This goes to show that an exception to the general
rule, such as that being invoked by herein respondent, can be made only if and when the canons expressly
provide for such an exception. Otherwise, the prohibition stands, as in the case at bar.
It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the decision in Bates, on the
attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing television commercials, it was found that public opinion
dropped significantly 47 with respect to these characteristics of lawyers:
Trustworthy from 71% to 14%
Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%
Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems, to allow the
publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to aggravate what is already a
deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has consistently been under attack lately by
media and the community in general. At this point in time, it is of utmost importance in the face of such
negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that level of professional conduct which is
beyond reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain the high esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.
In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary action, to advertise his
services except in allowable instances 48 or to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of
law. 49 Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the prime incorporator, major stockholder and
proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded, with a warning
that a repetition of the same or similar acts which are involved in this proceeding will be dealt with more
severely.
While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the purpose/s for which the Legal
Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed upon and determined, we are constrained to refrain from lapsing into
an obiter on that aspect since it is clearly not within the adjudicative parameters of the present proceeding
which is merely administrative in nature. It is, of course, imperative that this matter be promptly determined,
albeit in a different proceeding and forum, since, under the present state of our law and jurisprudence, a
corporation cannot be organized for or engage in the practice of law in this country. This interdiction, just like
the rule against unethical advertising, cannot be subverted by employing some so-called paralegals
supposedly rendering the alleged support services.
The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and province of the
Solicitor General who can institute the corresponding quo warranto action, 50 after due ascertainment of the
factual background and basis for the grant of respondent's corporate charter, in light of the putative misuse
thereof. That spin-off from the instant bar matter is referred to the Solicitor General for such action as may be
necessary under the circumstances.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc.,
from issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form which is of the same
or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from conducting, directly or indirectly,
any activity, operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein.
Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant
and the Office of the Solicitor General for appropriate action in accordance herewith.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and
Quiason, JJ., concur
Xxxxxxxxxxx
PRACTICE OF LAW

Rule 138, Section 1. Who may practice law - Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the
bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this rule, and who is in good and
regular standing, is entitled to practice law.

Concept of the Practice of Law

Generally, to engage in the practice is to do any of those acts which are characteristic of the legal
profession (In re: David, 93 Phil. 46). It covers any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of
law, legal principles, practice or procedure and calls for legal knowledge, training and experience (PLA vs.
Agrava, 105 Phil. 173).

Cayetano vs. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210

***Practice of Law means any activity in or out of court which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which
are characteristics of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of
service, which devise or service requires the use, in any degree, of legal knowledge or skill.

People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 111

***Strictly speaking, the word practice of law implies the customary or habitual holding of oneself to the public
as a lawyer and demanding compensation for his services.

***Private practice in more than an isolated appearance for it consist of frequent customary actions, a
succession of acts of the same kind. An isolated appearance may, however, amount to practice in relation to
the rule prohibiting some persons from engaging in the exercise of the legal profession.

Ulep vs. Legal Clinic Inc. 223 SCRA 378 (1993)

***In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney-at-law generally engages in three principal types of
professional activities:
1. legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and obligations
2. preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary
layman; and
3. appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess power and authority to determine rights of
life, liberty and property according to law, in order to assist in the proper interpretation and enforcement of law.

***Essential criteria enumerated by the C.A. as determinative of engaging in the practice of law:

1)Habituality
2)Compensation
3)Application of law, legal principle, practice, or procedure
4)Attorney-Client relationship

Non-Lawyers authorized to appear in court:

1. In cases before the MTC, a party may conduct his case or litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or
friend appointed by him for that purpose (Sec. 34, Rule 138, RRC).

Before any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally (Ibid)

In a criminal case before the MTC in a locality where a duly licensed member of the Bar is not available, the
judge may appoint a non-lawyer who is
resident of the province, and
of good repute for probity and ability to aid the accused in his defense (Rule 116, Sec. 7, RRC)
A senior law student, who is enrolled in a recognized law schools clinical education program approved by the
Supreme Court may appear before any court without compensation, to represent indigent clients accepted by
the Legal Clinic of the law school. The student shall be under the direct supervision and control of an IBP
member duly accredited by the law school.
Under the Labor Code, non-lawyers may appear before the NLRC or any Labor Arbiter, if (1) they represent
themselves, or if (2) they represent their organization or members thereof (Art. 222, PO442, as amended).
Under the Cadastral Act, a non-lawyer can represent a claimant before the Cadastral Court (Act No. 2259,
Sec. 9).
Any person appointed to appear for the government of the Phil. in accordance with law (Sec. 33 Rule 138).
Limitations of Appearance of non-lawyers
1. He should confine his work to non-adversary contentions.

He should not undertake purely legal work, such as the examination or cross-examination of witnesses, or the
presentation of evidence.
Services should not be habitually rendered.
Should not charge or collect attorneys fees (PAFLU vs. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Co. 42 SCRA 302

Q. A and B who are law students entered their appearances before the Municipal Court
as private prosecutors in a criminal case. This was disallowed by the trial judge. Is
this correct?

A. NO. A non-lawyer may appear as a friend of the party before the Municipal Courts
under Section 34, Rule 138 Rules of Court; he may make such appearances either
as defense counsel or private prosecutor under the control and supervision of the
fiscal. The permission of the fiscal is not necessary for the appearance of a private
prosecutor, although if he so wishes, the fiscal may disallow participation in the trial
by handling the case personally. (Catimbuhan, et al. vs. Hon. Cruz, G.R. No. 51813-
14, Nov.29, 1983)
Public Officials who cannot engage in the private practice of law in the Philippines:

1. Judges and other officials as employees of the Superior Court (Rule 148, Sec. 35, RRC).

Officials and employees of the OSG (Ibid).

Government prosecutors (Peo v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109).

- if permitted by their department head should only be in isolated cases
involving relatives or close family friends

President, Vice-President, members of the cabinet, their deputies and assistants, (Art. VIII Sec. 15, 1987
Constitution).

Chairmen and Members of the Constitutional Commissions (Art. IX-A, Sec. 2, 1987 Constitution).

Ombudsman and his deputies (Art. IX, Sec. 8 (2nd par.), 1987 Constitution).

All governors, city and municipal mayors (R.A. No. 7160, Sec. 90).

Those who, by special law, are prohibited from engaging in the practice of their legal profession

Q. Can a civil service employee engage in the private practice of law?

A. A civil service officer or employee whose duty or responsibility does not require his
entire time to be at the disposal of the government may not engage in private
practice of law without the written permit from the head of the department
concerned. However, government officials who by express mandate of the law are
prohibited from practicing law may not, even with the consent of the department
head, engage in the practice of law. If so authorized by the department head, he
 may, in an isolated case, act as counsel for a relative or close family friend.
A government official forbidden to practice law may be held criminally liable for
doing so. An officer or employee of the civil service who, as a lawyer, engages in
the private practice of law without a written permit from the department head
concerned may be held administratively liable therefor.

Q. The City of Manila hired the services of Atty. Bautista of the ABC Law Offices to
represent it in case pending before the RTC. Can Atty. Bautista validly represent it?

A. NO. A local government unit could not hire a private attorney to represent. The
provisions of Sec. 1683 complemented by Sec. 3 of the Local Autonomy Law, is
clear in providing that only the provincial prosecutor and the municipal attorney can
represent a province or municipality. The provision is mandatory. The municipalitys
authority to employ a private lawyer is expressly limited only to situations where the
provincial prosecutor is disqualified to represent it, as when he represents that
province against a municipality.

Public Officials with Restrictions in the Practice of Law:

Senators and members of the House of Representatives

Members of the Sanggunian
Retired Justice or judge
Civil service officers or employees without permit from their respective department heads (Noriega vs. Sison
125 SCRA 293)

Restrictions in the Practice of Law of Members of the Legislature

No senator or member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any
courts of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administration bodies xxx(Art. VI,
Sec. 14, 1987 Constitution).

A lawyer-member of the legislature is only prohibited from appearing as counsel before any court of justice,
electoral tribunals or quasi-judicial and administrative bodies

The word appearance includes not only arguing a case before any such body but also filing a pleading in
behalf of a client as by simply filing a formal motion, plea or answer. (Ramos vs. Manalac, 89 PHIL. 270)

Neither can he allow his name to appear in such pleading by itself or as part of firm name under the
signature of another qualified lawyer because the signature of an agent amounts to signing of a non-qualified
senator or congressman, the office of an attorney being originally an agency, and because he will, by such act,
be appearing in court or quasi-judicial or administrative body in violation of the constitutional restriction. He
cannot do indirectly what the Constitution prohibits directly. (In re: David 93 PHIL. 461)

Restrictions in the practice of law of members of the Sanngunian

Under the Local Government Code (R.A. 7180, Sec. 90), Sanggunian members may practice their professions
provided that if they are members of the Bar, they shall not:
appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government unit or any unit, agency, or
instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;
appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the national or local government is
accused of an offense committed in relation to his office;
collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the local government unit of which
he is an official; and
use property and personnel of the Government except when the Sanggunian member concerned is defending
the interest of the government.

Restrictions in the practice of law of members of the Judiciary

Under RA 910, Sec. 1, as amended, a retired justice or judge receiving a pension from the government, cannot
act as counsel in any civil case in which the Government, or any of its subdivision or agencies in the adverse
party or in criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the Government is accused of an offense in relation
to his office.
Remedies Against Unauthorized Practice
Petition for Injunction
Declaratory Relief
Contempt of Court
Disqualification and complaints for disbarment
Criminal complaint for estafa who falsely represented to be an attorney to the damage party

Alawi vs. Alauya, A.M. SDC-97-2-P, February 24, 1997

Q. Are persons who pass the Sharia Bar members of the Philippine Bar?

A. Persons who pass the Sharia Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine
Bar, hence may only practice before the Sharia courts. They are also not entitled to
use the title attorney as such is reserved to those who, having obtained the
necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations,
have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members
thereof in good standing

Q. Does scrivening constitute practice of law?

A. NO. Scrivening or the filling of blanks in a standard or stereotyped forms which

involves pure clerical work without need for any legal interpretation. This is not
practice of law.

In re: Joaquin, 241 SCRA 405

Appearance in propia persona is appearance in court by a non-lawyer for himself without the assistance
of a member of the Bar. This is sometimes referred to as pro se practice

While pro se practice is allowed, it is not advisable to do so. Court proceedings are full of technical pitfalls
that may entrap a person unschooled in substantive and procedural law.