8/19/2017 G.R. No.

165287

SECONDDIVISION


ARMANDOBARCELLANO, G.R.No.165287
Petitioner, Present:

CARPIO,J.,
Chairperson,
BRION,
versus ABAD,*
PEREZ,and
SERENO,JJ.

Promulgated:
DOLORES BAAS, represented
byhersonandAttorneyinfact September14,2011
CRISPINOBERMILLO,
Respondent.

xx

DECISION

PEREZ,J.:

[1] [2]
BeforetheCourtisanappealbycertiorari fromtheDecision oftheFifteenthDivision
oftheCourtofAppealsinCAG.R.CVNo.67702dated26February2004,grantingthepetitionof
[3]
DoloresBaas,hereinrespondent,toreverseandsetasidetheDecision ofthelowercourt.
Thedispositiveportionoftheassaileddecisionreads:

WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered,theinstantappealisherebyGRANTED.Thedecisionof
the court a quo is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and in its stead another one is rendered
GRANTINGtopetitionerappellantstherighttoredeemthesubjectpropertyfortheamountofPhp
60,000.00withinthirty(30)daysfromthefinalityofthisdecision.


Thefactsasgatheredbythecourtfollow:

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RespondentBaasisanheirofBartolomeBaaswhoownsinfeesimpleLot4485,PLS722D
situated in Hindi, Bacacay, Albay. Adjoining the said lot is the property of Vicente Medina
(Medina), covered by Original Certificate of Title No. VH9094, with an area of 1,877 square
meters.On17March1997,Medinaofferedhislotforsaletotheadjoiningownersoftheproperty,
the heirs of Bartolome Baas, including herein respondent Dolores Baas, Crispino Bermillo
[4]
(Bermillo)andIsabelaBermilloBeruela(Beruela) CrispinoBermillo,astherepresentativeofhis
[5]
family,agreedtotheofferofMedina,thesaletotakeplaceaftertheharvestseason.
On 3 April 1997, Medina sold the property to herein petitioner Armando Barcellano for
P60,000.00. The following day, the heirs of Baas learned about the sale and went to the house of
[6]
Medina to inquire about it. Medina confirmed that the lot was sold to Barcellano. The heirs
conveyedtheirintentiontoredeemthepropertybutMedinarepliedthattherewasalreadyadeedof
[7]
saleexecutedbetweentheparties. Also,theBaasheirsfailedtotendertheP60,000.00redemption
[8]
amounttoMedina.

[9]
Aggrieved,theheirswenttotheOfficeoftheBarangayCouncilon5April1997. Medina
sentonlyhistenanttoattendtheproceeding.On9April1997,theBaasheirsandBarcellano,with
neitherMedinanorhistenantinattendance,wenttotheOfficeoftheBarangayCounciltosettlethe
dispute.AccordingtooneoftheBaasheirs,Barcellanotoldthemthathewouldbewillingtosellthe
[10]
propertybutforahigherpriceofP90,000.00. Becausethepartiescouldnotagreeontheprice
[11]
andforfailuretosettlethedispute,theLuponissuedaCertificationtoFileAction.

On24October1997,DoloresBaasfiledanactionforLegalRedemptionbeforetheRegionalTrial
Court.However,on5February1998,thepetitionwaswithdrawnonthegroundthat:

xxxconsideringthepresentworseeconomicsituationinthecountry,petitioneroptedthattheamount
theyaresupposedtopayfortheredemptionbereadilyavailablefortheirimmediateandemergency
needs.

[12]
On 11 March 1998, Dolores Baas, as represented by Bermillo, filed another action for Legal
Redemption. It was opposed by Barcellano insisting that he complied with the provisions of Art.
1623oftheNewCivilCodebutBaasfailedtoexerciseherrightwithintheperiodprovidedbylaw.

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Trialensued.On15March2000,thetrialcourtdismissedthecomplaintoftheBaasheirsfor
their failure to comply with the condition precedent of making a formal offer to redeem and for
failure to file an action in court together with the consignation of the redemption price within the
[13]
reglementaryperiodof30days. Thedispositiveportionreads:

WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered,thecomplaintisherebyorderedDISMISSED.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the ruling of the lower court and
grantedtheheirstherighttoredeemthesubjectproperty.Theappellatecourtruledthatthefilingof
acomplaintbeforetheKatarungangPambarangayshouldbeconsideredasanoticetoBarcellano
andMedinathattheheirswereexercisingtheirrightofredemptionoverthesubjectpropertyandas
[14]
havingsetinmotionthejudicialprocessoflegalredemption. Further,theappellatecourtruled
that a formal offer to redeem, coupled with a tender of payment of the redemption price, and
consignationareproperonlyiftheredemptionerwishestoavailhimselfofhisrightofredemptionin
thefuture.Thetenderofpaymentandconsignationbecomeinconsequentialwhentheredemptioner
[15]
filesacasetoredeemthepropertywithinthe30dayperiod.

Hence,thisPetitionforReviewonCertiorari.

Inthispetition,Barcellanoquestionstherulingoftheappellatecourtforbeingcontrarytothe
admittedfactsonrecordandapplicablejurisprudence.

TheCourtsRuling

BarcellanomaintainsthatthewrittennoticerequiredunderArt.1623tobegiventoadjoiningowner
was no longer necessary because there was already actual notice. Further, he asserts that the
appellatecourterredinrulingthatthetenderofpaymentoftheredemptionpriceandconsignation
are not required in this case, effectively affirming that the respondents had validly exercised their
right of redemption. Lastly, he questions as erroneous the application of Presidential Decree No.
1508, otherwise known as Establishing a System of Amicably Settling Disputes at the Barangay
Level, thereby ruling that the filing by the heirs of the complaint before the Barangay was an
exerciseofrightofredemption.
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WeneedonlytodiscusstherequirementofnoticeunderArt.1623oftheNewCivilCode,which
providesthat:

Therightoflegalpreemptionorredemptionshallnotbeexercisedexceptwithinthirtydays
fromthenoticeinwritingbytheprospectivevendor,orbythevendor,asthecasemaybe.Thedeedof
sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the
vendorthathehasgivenwrittennoticethereoftoallpossibleredemptioners.

Nothingintherecordsandpleadingssubmittedbythepartiesshowsthattherewasawrittennotice
senttotherespondents.Withoutawrittennotice,theperiodofthirtydayswithinwhichtherightof
legalpreemptionmaybeexercised,doesnotstart.

TheindispensabilityofawrittennoticehadlongbeendiscussedintheearlycaseofConejero
[16]
v.CourtofAppeals, pennedbyJusticeJ.B.L.Reyes:

Withregardtothewrittennotice,weagreewithpetitionersthatsuchnoticeisindispensable,
and that, in view of the terms in which Article of the Philippine Civil Code is couched, mere
knowledge of the sale, acquired in some other manner by the redemptioner, does not satisfy the
statute.ThewrittennoticewasobviouslyexactedbytheCodetoremovealluncertaintyastothesale,
itstermsanditsvalidity,andtoquietanydoubtsthatthealienationisnotdefinitive.Thestatutenot
havingprovidedforanyalternative,themethodofnotificationprescribedremainsexclusive.

[17]
ThisisthesamerulinginVerdadv.CourtofAppeals:

Thewrittennoticeofsaleismandatory.ThisCourthaslongestablishedtherulethatnotwithstanding
actualknowledgeofacoowner,thelatterisstillentitledtoawrittennoticefromthesellingcoowner
inordertoremovealluncertaintiesaboutthesale,itstermsandconditions,aswellasitsefficacyand
status.

[18]
Lately,inGosiengfiaoGuillenv. the Court of Appeals, this Court again emphasized the
mandatorycharacterofawrittennoticeinlegalredemption:

Fromthesepremises,weruledthat[P]etitionerheirshavenotlosttheirrighttoredeem,forin
theabsenceofawrittennotificationofthesalebythevendors,the30dayperiodhasnotevenbegun
torun.ThesepremisesandconclusionleavenodoubtaboutthethrustofMariano:Therightofthe
petitionerheirstoexercisetheirrightoflegalredemptionexists,andtherunningoftheperiod
foritsexercisehasnotevenbeentriggeredbecausetheyhavenotbeennotifiedinwritingofthe
factofsale.(Emphasissupplied)


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The petitioner argues that the only purpose behind Art. 1623 of the New Civil Code is to
ensurethattheowneroftheadjoininglandisactuallynotifiedoftheintentionoftheownertosell
hisproperty.Toadvancetheirargument,theycitedDestritov.CourtofAppealsascitedinAlonzov.
[19]
Intermediate Appellate Court, where this Court pronounced that written notice is no longer
necessaryincaseofactualnoticeofthesaleofproperty.

TheAlonzocasedoesnotapplytothiscase.There,wepronouncedthatthedisregardofthe
mandatorywrittenrulewasanexceptionduetothepeculiarcircumstanceofthecase.Thus:

Inthefaceoftheestablishedfacts,wecannotaccepttheprivaterespondents'pretensethatthey
were unaware of the sales made by their brother and sister in 1963 and 1964. By requiring written
proofofsuchnotice,wewouldbeclosingoureyestotheobvioustruthinfavoroftheirpalpablyfalse
claimofignorance,thusexaltingtheletterofthelawoveritspurpose.Thepurposeisclearenough:to
makesurethattheredemptionersaredulynotified.Wearesatisfiedthatinthiscasetheotherbrothers
andsisterswereactuallyinformed,althoughnotinwriting,ofthesalesmadein1963and1964,and
thatsuchnoticewassufficient.

Now,whendidthe30dayperiodofredemptionbegin?

Whilewedonotheredeclarethatthisperiodstartedfromthedatesofsuchsalesin1963and
1964,wedosaythatsometimebetweenthoseyearsand1976,whenthefirstcomplaintforredemption
wasfiled,theothercoheirswereactuallyinformedofthesaleandthatthereafterthe30dayperiod
started running and ultimately expired. This could have happened any time during the interval of
thirteen years, when none of the coheirs made a move to redeem the properties sold. By 1977, in
other words, when Tecla Padua filed her complaint, the right of redemption had already been
extinguishedbecausetheperiodforitsexercisehadalreadyexpired.

Thefollowingdoctrineisalsoworthnoting:

Whilethegeneralruleis,thattochargeapartywithlachesintheassertionofanallegedright
it is essential that he should have knowledge of the facts upon which he bases his claim, yet if the
circumstancesweresuchasshouldhaveinducedinquiry,andthemeansofascertainingthetruthwere
readilyavailableuponinquiry,butthepartyneglectstomakeit,hewillbechargeablewithlaches,the
sameasifhehadknownthefacts.
ItwastheperfectlynaturalthingforthecoheirstowonderwhythespousesAlonzo,whowere
not among them, should enclose a portion of the inherited lot and build thereon a house of strong
materials.Thisdefinitelywasnottheactofatemporarypossessororameremortgagee.Thiscertainly
looked like an act of ownership. Yet, given this unseemly situation, none of the coheirs saw fit to
object or at least inquire, to ascertain the facts, which were readily available. It took all of thirteen
[20]
yearsbeforeoneofthemchosetoclaimtherightofredemption,butthenitwasalreadytoolate.

xxxx

Thecoheirsinthiscasewereundeniablyinformedofthesalesalthoughnonoticeinwriting
wasgiventhem.Andthereisnodoubteitherthatthe30dayperiodbeganandendedduringthe14
yearsbetweenthesalesinquestionandthefilingofthecomplaintforredemptionin1977,withoutthe
coheirsexercisingtheirrightofredemption.Thesearethejustificationsforthisexception.

TheCourtclarifiedthat:
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Werealizethatinarrivingatourconclusiontoday,wearedeviatingfromthestrictletter
of the law, which the respondent court understandably applied pursuant to existing
jurisprudence.Thesaidcourtactedproperlyasithadnocompetencetoreversethedoctrines
laiddownbythisCourtintheabovecitedcases.Infact,andthisshouldbeclearlystressed,we
ourselvesarenotabandoningtheDeConejeroandButtledoctrines.Whatwearedoingsimply
isadoptinganexceptiontothegeneralrule,inviewofthepeculiarcircumstancesofthiscase.
[21]
(Emphasissupplied)

Without the peculiar circumstances in the present case, Alonzo cannot find application. The
impossibilityinAlonzoofthepartiesnotknowingaboutthesaleofaportionofthepropertythey
wereactuallyoccupyingisnotpresentedinthiscase.Thestrictletterofthelawmustapply.Thata
departure from the strict letter should only be for extraordinary reasons is clear from the second
sentenceofArt.1623thatThedeedofsaleshallnotberecordedintheRegistryofProperty,unless
accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all possible
redemptioners.

Justice Edgardo Paras, referring to the origins of the requirement, would explain in his
commentariesontheNewCivilCodethatdespiteactualknowledge,thepersonhavingtherightto
redeemisSTILLentitledtothewrittennotice.BoththeletterandthespiritoftheNewCivilCode
argue against any attempt to widen the scope of the written notice by including therein any other
kind of notice such as an oral one, or by registration. If the intent of the law has been to include
verbalnoticeoranyothermeansofinformationassufficienttogivetheeffectofthisnotice,there
wouldhavebeennonecessityorreasontospecifyinthearticlethatsaidnoticebeinwriting,for
[22]
undertheoldlaw,averbalnoticeormereinformationwasalreadydeemedsufficient.

Timeandtimeagain,ithasbeenrepeatedlydeclaredbythisCourtthatwherethelawspeaks
in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation. There is only room for
[23]
application. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied
according to its express terms, and interpretation should be resorted to only where a literal
interpretationwouldbeeitherimpossibleorabsurdorwouldleadtoaninjustice.Thelawisclearin
thiscase,theremustfirstbeawrittennoticetothefamilyofBaas.

Absolute Sentencia Expositore Non Indiget, when the language of the law is clear, no
[24]
explanationofitisrequired.

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Wefindnoneedtoruleontheotherissuespresentedbythepetitioner.TherespondentBaas
hasaperfectrightofredemptionandwasneverindangeroflosingsuchrighteveniftherewasno
redemptioncomplaintfiledwiththebarangay,notenderofpaymentornoconsignation.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The 26 February 2004 Decision of the Court of
AppealsinCAG.R.CVNo.67702,grantingtopetitionerappellantstherighttoredeemthesubject
propertyfortheamountofPhp60,000.00withinthirty(30)daysfromthefinalityofthisdecisionis
herebyAFFIRMED.Nocost.

SOORDERED.



JOSEPORTUGALPEREZ
AssociateJustice


WECONCUR:





ANTONIOT.CARPIO
AssociateJustice
Chairperson




ARTUROD.BRIONROBERTOA.ABAD
AssociateJusticeAssociateJustice







MARIALOURDESP.A.SERENO
AssociateJustice



ATTESTATION
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IattestthattheconclusionsintheaboveDecisionhadbeenreachedinconsultationbeforethecase
wasassignedtothewriteroftheopinionoftheCourtsDivision.




ANTONIOT.CARPIO
AssociateJustice
Chairperson




CERTIFICATION


PursuanttoSection13,ArticleVIIIoftheConstitution,andtheDivisionChairpersonsAttestation,it
isherebycertifiedthattheconclusionsintheaboveDecisionwerereachedinconsultationbeforethe
casewasassignedtothewriteroftheopinionoftheCourtsDivision.





RENATOC.CORONA
ChiefJustice

*PerSpecialOrderNo.1077Adated12September2011.
[1]
UnderRule45ofthe1997RulesofCivilProcedure.
[2]
PennedbyAssociateJusticeRodrigoV.CosicowithAssociateJusticesVicenteQ.RoxasandMarianoC.DelCastillo(nowamemberof
thisCourt),concurring.Rollo,pp.108112.
[3]
Dated26February2004.
[4]
TestimonyofIsabelaBeruela.TSN,16February1999,p.6.
[5]
TestimonyofVicenteMedina.TSN,14July1999,p.6.
[6]
Id.TestimonyofIsabelaBeruela.TSN,16February1999,p.6.
[7]
Id.at7.
[8]
TestimonyofVicenteMedina.TSN,14July1999,p.6.
[9]
TestimonyofIsabellaBeruela.TSN,16February1999,p.8.
[10]
Id.
[11]
Id.at910.
[12]
TheactionwasoriginallytitledasHeirsofBartolomeBaasv.ArmandoBarcellanoandVicenteMedinabutitwaslateramendedas
Dolores Baas v. Armando Barcellano and Vicente Medina because the Original Certificate of Title was issued in the name of

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DoloresBaasmarriedtoBartolomeBaasonly.
[13]
DecisionofRTC.Rollo,p.56.
[14]
CADecision.Id.at112.
[15]
Id.at113.
[16]
123Phil.605,610(1966).
[17]
326Phil.601,607(1996).
[18]
G.R.No.159755,18June2009,589SCRA399.
[19]
234Phil.267(1987).
[20]
Id.at274275.
[21]
Id.at275.
[22]
EdgardoL.Paras,BookV,CIVILCODEOFTHEPHILIPPINES,pp.280281(19982000).
[23]
CebuPortlandCementCo.v.MunicipalityofNaga,133Phil.695,699(1968)RubenE.Agpalo,STATUTORYCONSTRUCTION,p.
62(2003).
[24]
RolandoA.Suarez,STATUTORYCONSTRUCTION,p.171(2007).

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