2016 NDI Starter Set TPP Aff & Neg

***AFF***
1AC
 Adv 1 -- Trade Regimes
Adv 1 is Trade Regimes
International trade system collapse coming Chinese exclusion from the TPP wrecks
prospects for mega-regional agreements to revamp it
He Fan 15, Senior fellow at the Institute of World Economics and Politics at the Chinese Academy of
Social Sciences, 8/3/2015, Chinas negotiation strategies at the crossroads of international trade, East
Asia Forum, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/08/03/chinas-negotiation-strategies-at-the-
crossroads-of-international-trade/

*GVC = global value chain

With the Doha stalemate, the international trading system is struggling to provide new trade rules that take
into account the way GVCs have changed the shape of global trade and investment. Today production lines
are split across countries with the location of each process based on comparative advantage. Facilitating GVCs is the leading
cause of the proliferation of regional and mega-regional trade negotiations, including the Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP), the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Regional Comprehensive
Economic Partnership (RCEP). In the Pacific Rim, while RCEP and the TPP complement each other in terms
of their membership scope and issue coverage, they are in competition to offer the first update to
the international trade rules of the WTO. In turn, the outlook for the international trade rules varies
greatly. Despite its increasing trade power and enthusiasm to join international trade rule-making, China is
currently excluded from TPP negotiations. Chinese high-level officials have expressed interest in
joining the negotiations to deepen Chinas integration with other economies. But it appears that China will not be
allowed to join. At the same time, some new sensitive issues such as SOEs, the environment and labour
pose challenges for China in 21st century trade negotiations and joining the TPP. Handled badly,
they can also be impediments to genuinely free trade. The environment was once an area in which
Chinese standards once diverged from most developed countries, but today Chinese standards in
many areas exceed those of even some TPP member countries. RCEP serves as an alternative for
China, though negotiating countries have a long way to go to reach an agreement. RCEPs rules will not be as ambitious as the TPPs but could
serve as a middle ground toward consensus on a more ambitious trade package. Another accelerated track lies in China having started
negotiations with ASEAN on an upgraded version of the ChinaASEAN Free Trade Agreement, at the top of Beijings negotiation agenda. China
has also picked up the originally US-proposed FTA for the Asia Pacific (FTAAP). At the bilateral level, China has signed 15
FTAs as of April 2015. Since 2008 the coverage of services and domestic regulation has become more vigorous and comprehensive than
in earlier negotiations. As China becomes an increasingly important outbound investor, it is shifting its negotiation stance on bilateral
investment treaties (BITs). China has signed 145 BITs, many of which were drafted with the aim of protecting Chinas inbound investment
recipient interests. More recent BITs signed in the last decade offer more balance between investor and recipient protections, including
more fully fledged dispute-settlement provisions, as well as progress on national and most-favoured nation treatment. Under the umbrella
of the One Belt, One Road initiative, the negotiations for BITs or for investment chapters within FTAs will be a priority in Chinas future trade
negotiations. All this will also help to ensure Chinas successful transition from government-led to private-led overseas investment. With Chinas
advantage in providing cheap labour diminishing, the potential for a boom in services trade will also drive it to embark on negotiating services
agreements with trade partners. The mega-regionals could either turn out to be a stumbling block for
genuinely global free trade or pave the way to reaching a multilateral deal within the WTOs framework.
Divisions among trading blocs, as reflected in the shape of these mega-regional negotiations, pose
uncertainty for the international trading system and suggest there could be delays in adapting to these trading dynamics.
Current TPP efforts cause competing trade regimes US-led TPP and Chinese-led RCEP
increase political tensions and fragment the system the plan solves
Christopher Tang 15, Distinguished Prof in Business Administration at UCLA School of Management,
9/24/2015, UCLA faculty voice: China isnt afraid of the new Pacific trade deal, UCLA,
http://newsroom.ucla.edu/stories/ucla-faculty-voice-china-isnt-afraid-of-the-new-pacific-trade-deal

Asserting that the TPP can be a counterweight to China might sound good on Capitol Hill and in other policy forums, but
its not an assertion that survives an encounter with economic realities , the pattern of cross-border investments
in Asia, and the existing web of trade agreements already in place. Just follow the supply chains out there, our form of connecting dots as
researchers, and you will see. The dozen nations negotiating the TPP are the United States, Japan, Australia, Peru, Malaysia, Vietnam, New
Zealand, Chile, Singapore, Canada, Mexico, and Brunei Darussalam, which account for 40 percent of global trade. The U.S. already has free
trade agreements with some of these countries (for example, Canada, Chile, Mexico), and many believe that establishing new free trade
relationships with Japan and Vietnam under the TPP framework will thwart Chinas ability to dominate industries such as automobiles, telecom
equipment, and clothing manufacturing. Its
naive to believe that China can be locked out of a preferential
trading network. Despite its present currency and stock market corrections (all part of the transition to a normal market-based
economy), China recently overtook the U.S. as the worlds leading trading nation and it is determined to
become the worlds largest economy this decade. By the end of 2014, China had invested $870 billion worldwide in an
effort to expand its sources for raw materials and industrial components. For example, Chinas investments in Bangladesh ($3.8 billion) and
Pakistan ($17.8 billion) outstripped the loans those countries received from the IMF, which gives it a greater say in those countries economies
and political debates. In another example of how Beijing pursues its commercial and strategic interests, China has asked for a share of Angolas
oil reserves in exchange for its investment in that nations road development. This is in addition to its well-known, aggressive investments in
mining companies across Africa. To support infrastructure construction closer to home in the Asia-Pacific region, and expand its sphere of
influence, China proposed an international financial institution (the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank) in 2013 that was supported by 47
regional and 20 non-regional members, including TPP nations such as Australia, Brunei, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and Vietnam.
China has also been busy establishing its own f ree t rade a greement s . Since 2005, China has
already established such deals with TPP nations Brunei, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, Peru
and Vietnam. This is a crucial point in understanding the flawed logic behind any belief that China could be excluded from a preferred
cross-Pacific trading community. Heres where supply chains come in. Given its investments in other developing countries, China has the
capability to design, develop and produce products that can easily make their way into the U.S. market via TPP intermediaries, thereby reducing
tariffs it might otherwise have to pay. For example, to satisfy certain country-of-origin conditions stipulated in TPP, China can manage the
supply chain operations of cotton shirts as follows: China can import cotton from Pakistan (via its existing free trade agreement with China) and
conduct upstream operations such as fabric design, knitting and dyeing in China. Then China can ship the fabric to Vietnam (via an existing
free trade agreement with China). At the same time, Japan can ship the buttons to Vietnam (via the TPP). Vietnam can perform downstream
operations (sewing) and then ship the finished shirts via TPP agreement to Australia, Japan and the United States, cutting off the 5, 10.9, and
16.5 percent import duties that would have applied if China had dealt directly with these countries. Even
if China failed to
establish trade deals with the remaining five TPP nations and stays out of the partnership itself, the
country can leverage its supply chains to facilitate multilateral trade with minimum tariffs. In fact, some
midsize Chinese companies such as Texhong Textile have already opened facilities in Vietnam in anticipation of the TPP. Much as some of Wal-
Marts internal sourcing from Chinese operations to American consumers are considered Chinese exports to America, Texhongs internal
sourcing of semi-finished garments from China to Vietnam and then onto the U.S. will appear as trade between the three countries, covered by
free trade agreements. Worse than just being unrealistic and uninformed, excluding China from the TPP
exacerbates political tensions between the worlds two leading economic powers. Even as they find a workaround,
Chinas leaders dont exactly appreciate our efforts to exclude them from the trading party. And theyll
make their own moves to outflank the TPP. Already in 2012, to mitigate perceived and real consequences of not being
invited to join the TPP, China launched negotiations for a R egional C omprehensive E conomic P artnership a proposed
free trade agreement between the 10 ASEAN countries (Brunei, Myanmar, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore,
Thailand, Vietnam) and six additional countries (Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand). It
also accelerated its
own bilateral trade negotiations with South Korea, Japan and Australia. The result of all these
diplomatic thrusts and counter moves could very well be the absurd and confusing emergence of
two overlapping trading blocs that need each other economically, but distrust each other intensely. Wouldnt it be far
better to increase economic efficiency and improve political understanding with Beijing by constructing a TPP that
includes China as a charter member?

Trade blocs collapse international stability trade distortion destroys the established
system for settling conflicts
Mark Thirlwell 13, Former Director of the International Economy Program & Fellow at the G20 Studies
Centre at the Lowy Institute for International Policy, Saving Multilateralism: The G20, The WTO, and
Global Trade, June 2013, Lowy Institute for International Policy,
http://www.lowyinstitute.org/files/thirlwell_saving_multilateralism_web_0.pdf

For more than two centuries, international trade has been a spur to productivity growth and innovation
and an important enabler for catch-up growth. As such, it has helped transform living standards across
the globe.1 Since the second half of the twentieth century, the expansion of world trade has been facilitated by a
multilateral system that has helped set and police the rules of the game. As such, the multilateral trading system has
made a major contribution to global prosperity. That system is now in trouble . The most obvious symptom is the
repeated failure to complete the Doha Development Round of world trade talks. But there are other
problems too. Critics rightly complain that many of the worlds most pressing trade policy issues are not even
on the negotiating agenda, and deride the World Trade Organization (WTO)s medieval processes.2 Others
judge the current system as no longer fit for purpose in a world of international supply chains and emerging new trade powers. And while the
global financial crisis and the subsequent collapse in international trade did not trigger a retreat into protectionism,
recent years have
nevertheless seen growing state intervention in trade flows and a gradual, cumulative rise in trade
distortions. Meanwhile, members have been voting with their feet, stepping outside the WTO to negotiate bilateral and regional trade
agreements and, more recently, prospective mega-regional deals. If this trend continues, the rules of the game for
twenty-first century global trade will increasingly be set outside the multilateral system. That might
work out but it represents a risk. After all, the current system has its origins in the chaos of the interwar period and the clear
lesson that the world would do well to avoid the fragmentation and competing trade blocs that
characterised that earlier period. A world economy that found itself splintering into, for example, competing

Chinese- and US-based trading arrangements would not be a world conducive to international
security and stability . It would also be a deeply uncomfortable place for countries like Australia that
have close economic ties with China and strong security ties with the United States .

Escalation -- trade creates a financial incentive for peace and protection

Loren Mooney 14, citing Matthew O. Jackson, William D. Eberle Professor of Economics at Stanford,
and PhD in economics from Stanford Graduate School of Business, May 28 2014, Matthew O. Jackson:
Can Trade Prevent War? http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/insights/matthew-o-jackson-can-trade-prevent-
war

How can humans stop war ? Obviously there's no simple answer, but a new network model analysis of international alliances suggests trade may be that

at least part of the answer . The model, developed by Stanford economist Matthew O. Jackson and economics Ph.D. candidate Stephen Nei, suggests that military alliances alone aren't enough to stop nations from attacking one other, and also that the addition of

multilateral economic trade creates a more stable, peaceful world . While there is considerable existing research on the effects of trade and war, much of it has looked at

bilateral relationships. This model focuses on multilateral interactions and considers various incentives for countries to attack, form alliances with, and trade with one another. In an attempt to understand what's necessary to achieve a stable network with no incentive for war, Jackson
and Nei first explored an alliance scenario based solely on military defense considerations, excluding trade. "The fundamental difficulty we find is that alliances are costly to maintain if there's no economic incentive," says Jackson. So networks remain relatively sparse, a condition in w hich
even a few shifting allegiances leaves some countries vulnerable to attack. "Stability is not just a little bit elusive; it's very elusive." Economic trade , however, makes a significant difference . "Once you

bring in trade, you see network structures densify," he says. Nations form a web of trading alliances , which creates financial incentive not
only to keep peace with trading partners, but also to protect them from being attacked so as not to disrupt trade. "In the

context of the alliances we have analyzed, trade motives are essential to avoiding wars and sustaining stable networks," the authors wrote in their paper, Networks of Military Alliances, Wars, and

International Trade. Their findings coincide with major global trends two since World War II: From 1950 to 2000, the incidence of
interstate war has decreased nearly tenfold compared with the period from 1850 to 1949. At the same time , since 1950 international trade networks
increased nearly fourfold,
have becoming significantly more dense. "In the period before World War II, it was hard to find a stable set of alliances," says Jackson. The probability of a lasting alliance was about 60%. "You have almost a coin-flip
chance that the alliance won't still be there in five years," he says. In Europe in the 1870s, for example, German chancellor Otto von Bismarck sought peace with "balance of power" diplomacy, which crumbled leading up to World War I. "Then in the past 50 years or so, there's been a
surprising global stability." The impact of economic interdependence is especially apparent in Europe, Jackson says, where the Eurozone has promoted not only peace and increased trade among nations, but also labor mobility. Very costly wars still occur, of course, but Jackson notes

that the most war-torn places in recent history have tended to be those with fewer global trade alliances . For example, the Second Congo War from

1998 to 2003 and beyond, which killed more than four million people and is the deadliest war since World War II, involved eight African nations with relatively few trade ties. "Then look at the Kuwait situation," says Jackson, referring to U.S. intervention in the first Gulf War to protect oil
supplies. "Economic interest drives a lot of what goes on in terms of where nations are willing to exercise military strength."

The US/China fight is key their competing trade regimes encompass a monumental
amount of GDP
Mara Fernanda Prez Argello 16, MA in International Law and Human Rights, UN University for
Peace, Program Assistant at the Atlantic Council, 3/26/2016, TPP and RCEP: are we witnessing a regional
trade bloc war?, http://latinamericagoesglobal.org/2016/03/2870/
A few years ago, The Economist published an article on a currency war being waged between China and the rest of the world. The main premise
of the article was that countries blame each other for distorting global demand, with weapons that range from quantitative easing (printing
money to buy bonds) to currency intervention and capital controls. That war had a main culprit: the growing presence of the Yuan in the global
economy. Recent dynamics in global trade integrationor lack thereofraise a different question: Are we witnessing a regional
trade bloc war ? In an era of mega regional agreements and trade partnerships, an innovative
approach to trade regulations is necessary. Though not yet in force, the Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP) was signed on February 4, 2016 by its twelve member countries: Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico,
New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, United States and Vietnam. Faced with being encircled by new trade bloc, China did not stay quiet and formed
its own the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) as an alternative. RCEP, on the other hand, launched its
negotiations in November 2012 at the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit in Cambodia. China brought
Brunei, Myanmar, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam
and the six states with which ASEAN has existing free trade agreementsAustralia, India, Japan,
South Korea and New Zealandin the group. The leaders of each participating country have already endorsed the Guiding
Principles and Objectives for Negotiating the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. How will certain nations, which
are part of both agreements, reconcile the differing trade models? Moreover, is reconciliation necessary? The truth
is that both regional initiatives are monumental in scope and historic in importance. With 40 percent of
global GDP in the TPP and 30 percent in the RCEP, both trade blocs will change the rules of global
trade and likely lead to the creation of new trade standards . But it will be a while until these trade agreements are
finally in place and operational. What will happen until then, and what does this mean going forward?

The plan is key to regional integration in East Asia solves the noodle bowl of
conflicting trade agreements without forcing members to pick sides
Peter A. Petri 14, Professor of International Finance at Brandeis University, 2014, Chapter 2 - Can RCEP
and the TPP be path ways to FTAAP?*, State of the Region Report, https://www.pecc.org/state-of-the-
region-report-2014/265-state-of-the-region/2014-2015/595-chapter-2-can-rcep-and-the-tpp-be-path-
ways-to-ftaap
The vision of free trade in the Asia Pacific has remarkable staying power. Nearly fifty years after it was first
proposed (Regional free trade was formally proposed at a 1967 conference organized by Professor Kiyoshi Kojima of Hitotsubashi University.
The conference led to the creation of the Pacific Trade and Development Forum (PAFTAD) in 1968 and, indirectly, the Pacific Economic
Cooperation Council (PECC) in 1980. These set the stage for the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) initiative in 1989 (Patrick, 1996)), it
is gaining traction due to the emergence of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)
and Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) initiatives and the continuing stalemate in global trade
negotiations. As host of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in 2014, China has made the Free Trade Area
of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP) a priority. A wide regional agreement could generate large benefits and help
to overcome stubborn challenges to economic integration in the region and the world. RCEP and the TPP are
criticaland arguably indispensablesteps toward FTAAP, but will not guarantee its realization. They
will promote economic integration among members, but will not offer comprehensive regional
coverage or, at first, broadly acceptable rules. Since neither negotiation includes both China and the United
States, much of the economic and political benefits of regional economic integration would be still
unrealized. At worst, the two agreements could establish conflicting standards that are difficult to reconcile and

would make the noodle bowl of overlapping trade agreements more intractable. Intensified discussions of
FTAAP could help to turn the current negotiations, into stepping stones rather than stumbling blocks on the path toward it.

Competing trade regimes bifurcate and collapse ASEAN outweighs serves as a

conflict dampener
Stephen Nagy 15, Associate Professor of Politics and International Studies at the International Christian
University, Tokyo, PhD in IR from Waseda University, September 2015, The Geopolitics of the TPP,
http://www.worldcommercereview.com/publications/article_pdf/1003

The bifurcation into the high growth, TPP member states and the low growth, non-TPP member states
will weaken the importance of ASEAN as an economic, political and culture regional framework7 .
Geopolitically, this division will weaken Chinas influence on the region and enhance the USs and core
TPP member states influence on the region. It strengthens the rationale for further economic, political
and security ties within the region. The potential division of ASEAN countries into high and low
performers has important consequences for regional integration in East Asia based on economic
interdependence. The so-called ASEAN way will become increasingly difficult to maintain as socio-
economic develop differences become more apparent. ASEAN is often seen as the model for East
Asian integration with its respect for sovereignty and consensus making decision process. It is also
seen as the driver behind East Asian integration allowing the big economies in the region, namely
China, Japan and South Korea to act as the engine of integration thus diffusing potential conflict in
terms of leadership of the integration process. This role will be severely weakened as economic
divisions manifest. Consensus-based decision making will produce minimum results leading to
member states questioning the raison dtre of a regional institution that cannot meet their needs.

ASEAN key to solve overfishing coordination is possible and overcomes capacity

issues
Kheng-Lian Koh 16, Professor Emeritus of the Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore, and a
founder and the Director of the Asia - Pacific Centre for Environmental Law, PhD and LLM, 2016, Asean
Environmental Legal Integration: Sustainable Goals?, pg 63-66
The ASEAN region's marine environment constitutes a major resource of over-arching importance . In
essence, the waters and coasts of the archipelagos and marine seas characterize ASEAN's region. The
seas are the paths for coastal transport; interregional and international shipping and trade; a source
of fish and other living resources of the oceans; and the access to the hydrocarbons and mineral resources of the seabed.
The maps of ASEAN are characterized as much by water as by land. There are extant sea border disputes between ASEAN
member states, such as Vietnam and the Philippines, with the People's Republic of China. There are straits for navigation
under the terms of the UN Law of the Sea Convention for free navigation through the territorial seas
and exclusive economic zones, for example through the waters of Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and
the Philippines. The marine environment is a prime concern of ASEAN member states and there are
ten-sions stemming from illegal fishing. Despite complaints from its neighbors, Indonesia sank thirty-three of thirty-eight for-
eign vessels illegally fishing in its territorial waters between 2007 and 2012; thirty-two of these foreign ships were from Vietnam. The
Indonesian navy now blows up the fishing boats, after confiscating the ships and arresting the crew.5 Notwithstanding its importance, the
marine envir-onment of ASEAN is not a separate featured theme in the Fourth ASEAN State of the Environment Report (it is com-bined with
freshwater ecosystems). The fish harvest from the ASEAN region has grown from 17,000 metric tons in 2000
to 26,000 in 2007. The ASEAN State of the Environment report notes that overfishing is a major problem . The coral
reefs support more than 1,300 reef-associated fish species. Coral is at risk, and there is no regional
assurance that the growing exploitation of finfish is at sustained yield levels. It is likely that depletion of fish
species will preclude continuous increases in harvest. ASEAN summarizes threats to coastal and mar-ine resources as follows: (a) land-based
sources of pollution degrade marine water quality (red tides exist along the coasts of the Philippines and Sabah, Malaysia); (b) prawn culture
and aquaculture activities along the coastline degrade the marine environment; (c) unplanned development of coastal land uses, without the
benefit of coastal zone management plans; (d) shipping and sea-based activities, including oil spills, sludge disposal, ballast water changes, and
mining in coastal areas; and (e) off-shore oil and gas exploration and production. These environmental problems are all subject to
environmental laws, at international and national levels, and yet the states in the ASEAN region do not have the capacity to implement the
laws. The enormous extent of the ASEAN seacoasts explains this problem in part. It is a vast area to
regulate. Moreover, the watersheds of rivers encompass a vast inland area, whose cascading waters eventually pollute the marine
environments' Regionally, and through its member states, ASEAN has significant capacity to address issues
of coastal and mar-ine resources. The Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center (SEAFDEC) is an autonomous
intergovernmental body established in 1967.52 Its mandate is "to develop and manage the fisheries potential of the
region by rational utilization of the resources for providing food security and safety to the people and
alleviating poverty through transfer of new tech-nologies, research and information dissemination
activities." Though not an ASEAN initiative, SEAFDEC established links with ASEAN and is supported by ASEAN in the
imple-mentation of some of its activities, such as sustainable fisher-ies, to reduce disparities among countries in the region.
SEAFDEC comprises eleven member countries: the ten countries of ASEAN as well as Japan, which provides financial and technical support. The
Center operates through its Secretariat located in Thailand and has four technical departments: the Training Department; the Marine Fisheries
Research Department; the Aquaculture Department; and the Marine Fishery Resources Development and Management Department. The
declaration of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) in the region requires SEAFDEC to play a more active role in assisting member countries to
develop and manage the marine fisheries in the waters within the extended jur-isdiction of their respective EEZs. It acknowledges that this task
needs to be tackled on a regional basis. Examples of regional
action on fisheries issues is illustrated by each of SEAFDEC's four
technical depart-ments. They demonstrate that regional cooperation is both valued and pursued, albeit not directly
through the ASEAN Working Group. This may be because these technical depart-ments predate the ASEAN Working Group on ASEAN Seas and
the Marine Environment.

East Asia is an overfishing hotspot multilateral management is key to avoid ocean

destruction
Marc Kaufman 11, science writer and national editor for The Washington Post, Predator Fish in
Oceans on Alarming Decline, Experts Say, The Washington Post, February 20, 2011,
https://www.globalpolicy.org/world-hunger/trade-and-food-production-
system/49865.html?ItemId=1018
Over the past 100 years,some two-thirds of the large predator fish in the ocean have been caught and consumed by humans, and
in the decades ahead the rest are likely to perish, too. In their place, small fish such as sardines and anchovies are flourishing in the absence of the tuna,

grouper and cod that traditionally feed on them, creating an ecological imbalance that experts say will forever change the
oceans. "Think of it like the Serengeti, with lions and the antelopes they feed on," said Villy Christensen of University of British Columbia's Fisheries Centre. "When all the lions are

gone, there will be antelopes everywhere. Our oceans are losing their lions and pretty soon will have nothing but antelopes." This grim reckoning was presented at the American
Association for the Advancement of Science's annual meeting Friday during a panel that asked the question: "2050: Will there be fish in the ocean?" The panel predicted that while there
would be fish decades from now, they will be primarily the smaller varieties currently used as fish oil, fish meal for farmed fish and only infrequently as fish for humans. People, the experts

said, will have to develop a taste for anchovies, capelins and other smaller species. That the oceans are being overfished has been
documented before, and the collapse of species such as cod and Atlantic salmon is also well known. The new research attempts to quantify the overall decline in larger fish,
based on data from more than 200 ecological systems studied since 1880. Those results were then modeled across the globe. One startling conclusion: More than 54 percent of the

decrease in large predator fish has taken place over the past 40 years. "It's a question of how many people are fishing, how they are fishing, and where they are fishing," Christensen said .
A majority of the catch, and now of the decline, involves East Asia , which has witnessed dramatic overall economic growth. In describing the likely
explosion of small fish, Christensen's team differed with a 2006 report in the journal Science that warned of an ocean without fish for humans by mid-century. But they say that

absent predators, the fisheries will be out of balance and more subject to mass die-offs from disease
and from boom-and-bust cycles that, over time, can lead to algae or bacteria blooms that take the oxygen
out of the waters and make them uninhabitable. Jacqueline Alder from the U.N. Environment Program suggested that the number of fishing
boats and days they fish have to be restricted. "If we can do this immediately, we will see a decline in fish catches. However, that will give an opportunity for the fish stocks to rebuild and

expand their populations," she said. In an effort to stabilize some fish populations, national and international
organizations and governments have placed quotas on the yearly catches of some species, and have banned the
taking of endangered fish entirely in some areas. Some regulations have also been placed on the kind of netting and trawling that can be used in sensitive areas. But the fishing

fleets are growing in size and sophistication, said University of Tasmania scientist Reg Watson. "Humans have always fished," he said. "We are just much
much better at it now." Examining 2006 catch results, his team found that 76 million tons of commercial seafood were hauled in - which he said equates to 7 trillion individual fish.

Watson said fishing activity has been growing quickly over the past several decades, with increasingly more energy and effort exerted to bring in equal or
smaller catches. Nations also are paying substantial subsidies to their fishermen, he said, especially in East Asia .
"It looks like we are fishing harder for the same or less result and this has to tell us something about the oceans' health,"
he said. " We may in fact have hit peak fish at the same time we are hitting peak oil." Yet demand is
growing fast, again most dramatically in East Asia . According to I nternational F ood P olicy R esearch I nstitute research
the rise in demand is largely being driven by China. Almost 50 percent of the increase in the
fellow Siwa Msangi,

world's fish consumption for food comes from Eastern Asia, and "42 percent of that increase is coming from China itself," he said.
"China is a driver of both the demand and the supply side. That is really why the management issue
becomes so important ," Msangi said. "Projections about future fish populations decline further, however, when coupled with forecasts about the impact of climate
change," which is expected to warm the oceans considerably.

Overfishing-induced environmental collapse causes extinction

Callum Roberts 15, professor of marine conservation at the University of York, Our seas are being
degraded, fish are dying but humanity is threatened too, 9/19/15,
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/sep/20/fish-are-dying-but-human-life-is-threatened-
too

Studies like that of the WWF/ZSL list climate change high among the threats that afflict ocean life. While this
is certainly true now, and it will become increasingly problematic in future, the primary driver of decline to date is
overfishing. To get a true picture of fishings impact, you have to take the long view . Ask an EU official for the
latest stock estimate of common skate, and you would get a puzzled look. We no longer fish commercially for species such as common skate
because there are hardly any left, so we no longer bother counting them and their disappearance goes unremarked. But fishing carried on long
after the skates, halibut, wolf-fish, angel sharks, bluefin tuna, thresher sharks, porbeagle, sturgeon and wild salmon the list is a long one
dwindled to irrelevance.
What is not widely known among those outside the fishing industry is that managers deliberately aim to reduce stock sizes of the fish we eat.
Cutting the amount of fish in a stock frees up resources for the others, so they grow faster. This theory, developed in the mid-20th century, says
that maximum productivity is reached when you reduce a stock by half, a point called the maximum sustainable yield. Fishing at MSY was
recently embedded in the reformed European fisheries policy, which should have been a good thing given that stocks have been so depleted.
But behind the scenes, fisheries scientists have gradually eroded target stock levels, arguing that for many stocks MSY is reached when they
have been reduced by 70% or 80%. At these low levels though, we are on dangerous ground.

When life is brought low, there are unwanted and unanticipated knock-on effects . Predators like tuna,
sharks, porpoises and whales are not mere embellishments , nice to have but not critical if lost. They once regulated the
abundance of their prey and weeded out diseased and parasite-laden creatures before populations became

seriously affected. They were important in cycling nutrients through ocean ecosystems, shuttling them
from the depths to the surface where sunshine and plants could turn them into the energy that feeds all life in the sea. Seabed
life, those waving fields of invertebrates swept aside by trawls, captured carbon and sequestered it into the
sediments. They kept the water clean, boosting photosynthesis, and removed pathogens and pollutants we put
in the sea.

So if you are wondering whether it matters that life in the sea has gone down, the answer is yes . In the
long term, it is a matter of life and death to all of us . The oceans are vast. Once we thought they were too big to suffer
anything other than minor damage at our hands. We know that is no longer true. Human influence reaches every part of the
ocean , from the distant high seas to the deepest abyss. What we are just beginning to understand is that they are
too big for us to let them fail . The oceans have colossal importance in keeping our planet habitable .
If they fail, so do we .
 Adv 2 Relations
Continued push of Chinas exclusion from the TPP promotes US-Sino competition and
a US containment strategy instead of an engagement one.
Huang, 2015 (Carly, South China Morning Post, 11-6-2015, It's the geopolitics, stupid: US-led TPP
trade pact less about boosting economies than about containing China's rise
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/1876024/its-geopolitics-stupid-us-led-tpp-
trade-pact-less-about)

Yet from the start, this particular trade pact has been as much about geopolitics as economics . President Barack Obama, who has
pushed for the trade pact as a centrepiece of his "Pivot to Asia " policy, did not hide US motives - saying the
pact was important because "we can't let countries like China write the rules of the global economy".
Some Chinese officials view the pact as a US conspiracy aimed at the economic containment of the mainland. The US-led free-

trade agreement, joined by Japan, Canada, Mexico, Chile, Peru, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Brunei, Vietnam and Malaysia, represents 40 per cent of global gross domestic product, 30 per cent of global exports, 25 per cent of imports and 793 million consumers. The
exclusion of China, the world's largest merchandise trader with combined exports and imports worth US$4.3 trillion last year, speaks volumes. It is more than just a trade "

agreement and it represents a large market led by the US Ferchen, a ," said Jianguang Shen, chief economist with Mizuho Securities Asia. Matt

resident scholar at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Centre for Global Policy, in Beijing, said: Geopolitically, and "

especially in terms of US versus Chinese influence in the Asia Pacific, the TPP deal is important
because it is the most tangible economic element of America's 'pivot' towards Asia ." Analysts said the sheer size of the bloc's total

. Led by the US,

economy was not the only important elementand Japan the TPP would become the world's most
the world's No 1 economy, , the No 3 economy,

important platform for setting new rules and norms for global trade and commerce . Like other multilateral trade organs, such as the

China has much to lose because of its exclusion.

World Trade Organisation, the TPP will prove very powerful. Clearly, Gary Hufbauer, an international trade expert at the US-based Peterson Institute for

This is why
International Economics, estimated the pact would deprive China of about US$100 billion of exports annually. Ma Jun, chief economist of the People's Bank of China's research bureau, said China would lose 2.2 percentage points in GDP if it did not join.

some Chinese officials regard the pact as a US conspiracy aimed at containing China : the club seems
welcome to anyone but the world's second-largest economy. After initially dismissing the TPP, Chinese officials have now
expressed some interest in joining . But China does not want only to follow the rules, but also to set them. So Beijing has responded to America's plan to form a trade bloc with its own regional initiatives. It has also moved

quickly to adapt to the new trends in international trade to engage in regional free trade agreements. China is actively pushing to negotiate the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), involving members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations plus China, Japan,
South Korea, New Zealand, Australia, and India, but also excluding the US. Beijing is also leading the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation-based Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific, featuring Pacific Rim nations. These Asian-centric free-trade agreements have been touted as alternatives to
the TPP. President Xi Jinping has also introduced the New Silk Road strategy. Also known as "One Belt, One Road", the development strategy comprises the New Silk Road Economic Belt, which will link China with Europe through central and western Asia, and the 21st century Maritime
Silk Road, which will connect China with Southeast Asian countries, Africa and Europe. China has also recently launched two multinational financial institutions - the New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) to help developing countries in Asia and

China-led institutions are seen as a challenge to the post-second world war,

elsewhere finance their badly needed infrastructure projects. Both

US-centric international institutions - the Washington-based International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and regional bodies, such as the Asian Development Bank. Fifty-seven countries - many of them America's allies,
including Britain, Germany, and Australia - signed up to the AIIB as founding members despite opposition from Washington. Some observers see the TPP and AIIB as symbols of the US and China's battle for control of global trade. "The [TPP] pact is a win for the United States in its contest
with China for clout in Asia," said Alicia Garca-Herrero, an economist and special adviser to the non-resident faculty at China-Europe International Business School in Shanghai. However, Chengxin Pan, a professor of international relations at Deakin University in Australia, said the
influence of the AIIB or the TPP might well be offset by further "counter-measures" and "counter-initiatives" by either side. "The larger point here is that in the age of increasingly networked economic activities across national boundaries, attempts to use traditional-alliance politics to
build exclusive clubs are going to be rather blunt instruments and unlikely to be effective," Pan said. Kamel Mellahi, an expert on China business at Warwick Business School in Britain, said the TPP had many advantages, but the Silk Road strategy was a better fit for China as "its vision,
goals and objectives are aligned more closely with China's economic goals than the TPP". Analysts said the TPP aimed to redirect trade to the US and solidify America's economic position in Asia by pressuring China into adhering to Washington's rules and standards. Indeed, the TPP, more
than a trade pact, also contains a variety of economic-policy matters that China, should it wish to join, would force it to carry out radical reforms. All but five of the TPP's total 29 draft chapters set rules on non-trade issues, such as regulatory directives and standards about the protection
of intellectual property, labour, and the environment, and standards about the equal treatment of state-run enterprises. Some rules and standards are apparently too politically sensitive for the Communist Party to make any compromise in order to accept. For instance, joini ng the TPP
would require opening up markets to foreign investors in areas such as the internet and media, which, up to now, have been under strict state-control. Some provisions such as the investor-state dispute resolution, that enables companies to contest national government policies at supra-
national courts, are not acceptable under the mainland's party-ruled political system, in which the ruling party is superior to law. The toughest challenge is a rule about the privatisation of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). China has the world's largest collection of SOEs, which dominate
every strategic business sector, such as banking, insurance, energy, ports, aviation and railways, and form the political foundations of the nation's system of one-party rule. Despite the party leadership's repeated pledges to reform the socialist sector, a crucial party blueprint for reform
passed in late 2013 makes clear that state ownership must still play a "leading role" in the economy. Analysts said the high standards set by the TPP would rewrite the rules of regional trade in a way that boosted the economies of the US and its allies in proportion to the economy of

Washington's primary geopolitical rival, China. Fitch Ratings said that the TPP's most significant consequence would be in setting the pact's rules and guidelines. "This will, in turn, set a powerful precedent for other global trade and investmen t protocols," Fitch said. Obama
is said to consider China's rise as the single most significant geopolitical challenge facing his nation
since the end of the Cold War. The Cold War featured a political and military rivalry between the US-led Western alliance and the former Soviet-led socialist block. But at that time the US-led industrialised world still dominated the

some analysts believe China has

global economy. Three decades ago, Japan also challenged US industrial leadership, but, as a staunch ally, it had no interest in challenging Washington's sphere of influence in geopolitics. However,

a different agenda Washington believes the US cannot

, while others suggest the US is in inexorable decline and that its global influence will inevitably diminish to the benefit of China.

risk China eclipsing its status as the premier global power. Under Xi, China has ramped up its global
influence through expanded trade, aid, investment and soft power. Benjamin Herscovitch, a research manager at China Policy, a Beijing-based research and advisory company, said the TPP agreement was first and foremost a massive diplomatic victory for the US.

"The deal will obviously benefit the United States economically, but its real significance is the strategic
signal it sends to Asia," he said. "In particular, it is a powerful demonstration of its commitment to leading the region and setting international norms." US foreign policy is often themed around free trade, freedom and democracy. The TPP intends

to advance such ideals - not as a demand but as an inevitable outcome of a free and open market. The pact will strengthen US political and military leadership in the
region, amid the escalating maritime disputes flaring up across the South China Sea and East China
Sea between China and several of its neighbours, the perennial friction between China and Taiwan, and the growing tensions over
North Korea's nuclear stockpile. With the TPP, the US will be more inclined to intervene in a serious spat over territorial claims in the region if a situation threatens its growing trade interests. The pact has, in effect, helped to

reassert US influence in the region and shore up the long-term foundations of American power. The Nobel Prize-winning American economist Thomas Schelling noted that "trade is what most of international relations is about. For that reason trade policy is national security policy". In this

sense, the TPP is not only US trade policy, but is also America's national security policy. Furthermore, it is a
product of the Sino-US rivalry for control of trade and finance the foundation of today's global -

politics, as well as the global economy.

That decimates US-China relations which inhibits resolutions over territorial disputes
and cyber attacks
Zhou, 2015 (Steven, Al-Jazeera Columnist, 11-6-2015, The TPP risks making US-China relations worse
http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2015/11/the-tpp-risks-making-us-china-relations-worse.html)

Much discussion regarding the TPP focused on the absence from the pact of China
has , the largest economy in the Asia-Pacific region. President Barack Obama has
portrayed the exclusion as an attempt by the U.S. and its allies to write the rules in the region
before China does. But this kind of antagonism does nothing to push U.S.-China relations perhaps the most important
bilateral relationship in the world toward anything productive The increasing anti-China rhetoric . that

has accompanied the Obama administrations Asian pivot will result in fewer opportunities to partner on major global initiatives and hurt both nations

economically. While the U.S. and China have cooperated on a number of important issues , including a notable recent agreement on climate change,

Xi
geopolitical tensions persist. President pushed for a new brand of nationalism that emphasizes the projection
Jinping, who has led China since 2012, has

of Chinese power in Asia. This has gotten China into territorial disputes with its neighbors, which in
turn have looked to the U.S. for help. Chinas periodic alignment with Syria, Iran and Russia set it at odds has

with the Obama administrations strategy in the Middle East . Finally Washington has serious ,

concerns about Chinese cyberattacks on U.S. businesses. ven all this, Chinas ruling Communist Party Gi

has been very nervous about the TPP from the beginning . The Obama administration is selling the TPP to Congress and to the United States international partners as an opportunity

to get a jump on China in writing global trade rules. The TPP includes Chinas neighbors and major trading partners such as Japan and Australia, and the
Chinese leadership is worried about losing regional influence . On the other hand, moderate voices in China such as Long Yongtu, who negotiated

Chinas entry into the World Trade Organization, have viewed the TPP as a possible way to encourage the Chinese leadership to carry out systemic

reforms. For instance, the TPP contains clauses regarding the environment that could influence Chinese policies in a progressive manner. He even argued in 2014 that the TPP would have to include China sooner or later. But the Obama
administrations domestic considerations have eclipsed this possibility, as it uses China as a foil to
persuade Democrats and Republicans to accept the accord. If the U.S. and China continue to use
trade as a weapon against each others influence, both countries will suffer, along with the rest of
the world. The U.S. has portrayed and marketed the TPP as a way to position itself independently of
China in the geopolitics of Asia. This kind of rhetoric has helped push China to pursue a similar path of
independent development, irrespective of U.S. concerns Instead of accepting U.S. containment, .

China has looked to expand its power and influence . China has ongoing territorial disputes in the
 South China Sea with Indonesia, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam. These countries allege that China is infringing on their
maritime sovereignty China is also locking horns with Japan . over islands that both countries claim as theirs. Meanwhile, China has found other ways to throw its weight around in

Asia. It has made huge investments into trade projects such as the Silk Road Economic Belt, along with closely related networks like the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. It has established the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, which now has more than 50 signatories, including the

The saddest aspect of the widening U.S.-China gap is that the TPPs specific clauses
United Kingdom, against U.S. wishes.

arent necessarily aimed at antagonizing or containing China . The country remains one of Americas biggest trading partners and is the biggest trading partner of Vietnam, Japan,

It would have benefited the U.S. and China if the two countries could have come
New Zealand and Australia, all signatories of the TPP.

together to write the international rules on trade . That ship has likely sailed, unless Chinas recent economic struggles can direct its leadership to join the TPP or at least form a strategic partnership
with the bloc.

Territorial disputes in the ECS escalates miscalc makes China-Japan war likely
Erickson and Liff 15 (Andrew Erickson, Associate Professor in the Strategic Research Department at
the U.S. Naval War College and an Associate in Research at Harvard Universitys Fairbank Center for
Chinese Studies, and Adam Liff, Associate Professor in the Strategic Research Department at the U.S.
Naval War College and an Associate in Research at Harvard Universitys Fairbank Center for Chinese
Studies,3-23-2015, Crowding the Waters The Need for Crisis Management in the East China Sea
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/143285/adam-p-liff-and-andrew-s-erickson/crowding-the-
waters#)

Meanwhile, dangerous encounters have also occurred in the air. On two separate occasions in 2014, Chinese Su-27 fighter
aircraft approached within 200 feet of Japanese military reconnaissance aircraft in international airspace. Though
no collision
occurred, these incidents echo the fatal and easily avoidable 2001 Hainan Island incident between
China and the United States, which triggered a tense, ten-day diplomatic standoff between Washington and
Beijing. Chinas attempts to overturn the status quo have created crowded waters and airspace
surrounding the islands, thus increasing the risk of a miscalculation or unintended collision, either of
which could escalate. Beijing is now sending Chinese coast guard vessels into Japans de facto territorial waters, actively challenging
Tokyos decades-old effective administration of the islands. Such entrances by official Chinese government ships have surged from a total of
nine in 31 years to more than 350 instances between September 2012 and February 2015 alone. And in the air, between 2009 and late 2013,
Japanese emergency scrambles against approaching Chinese planes increased from less than one per week (roughly 40 per year) to nearly ten
per week (more than 400). In November 2013, Tokyo
cried foul after Beijings unilateral announcement of an Air
Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over
a large area of the East China Seaincluding the contested islands
and nearly half of Japans own, decades-old ADIZand criticized Chinas nonstandard description of
its ADIZ as tantamount to a declaration of territorial airspace. The increase in air intercepts continues
today: in the last quarter of 2014, JMSDF scrambles against Chinese planes reached their highest
levels since record-keeping began in 1958. While the likelihood of any single encounter escalating to
a military conflict is low, the drastic increase of encounters since September 2012 increases overall
risk significantly . COMMUNICATION BREAKDOWN An unintended clash between China and Japan that precipitated a military crisis
would be a disaster. Eurasia Group political risk expert Ian Bremmer deemed it the worlds greatest
geopolitical danger of 2014. Even Chinese and Japanese military leaders express concerns about the risks of crisis escalation.
Overwrought or not, these are serious concerns. It would appear obvious that the two sides have a shared interest in ensuring that robust
emergency communication channels exist and remain open regardless of political winds. Yet after September 2012, precisely when the risk of a
crisis was peaking, China punished Japan by unilaterally shutting down diplomatic channels, including even the negotiations over a mechanism
to manage maritime crises. Tokyo had been pushing for the creation of a hot line since 2007, and negotiations had been
on the verge of culminating in summer 2012. Yet Beijing suspended high-level talks for more than two yearsduring
which many of the aforementioned close encounters occurred. As Sino-Japanese relations began to thaw following the November 2014 Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation summit, Beijing finally agreed to resume working-level talks on a maritime communication mechanism with
Tokyo and has placed an aerial component on the table as well. The first round of the restarted meetings between China and Japan took place
this past January, and the first bilateral security dialogue in four years occurred just last week. Better late than never. But
restarting
talks is just a first step down a long road. Next would come an actual signed agreement with effective
and credible implementation. In the interim, aerial crisis management is most important . Effective
operationalization of the Sea-Air Contact Mechanism proposed in January 2015 would be particularly encouraging. Components reportedly
under negotiation include a hot line between defense authorities, annual meetings, and a common radio frequency for ship and aircraft
communications. Although whats needed is obvious, political will remains in doubt. Chinas continued deployments
and apparent disagreements about the statements that each government has already made remain key obstacles. Furthermore, Beijing
may now be returning to the negotiating table only because it believes its actions have established a
new normal of shared administrative control. This suggests that from its perspective, establishing
bilateral crisis management mechanisms may be a tool primarily for extracting Japanese concessions,
rather than inherently valuable for ensuring stability in the East China Sea. Since recognition of a
dispute remains a nonstarter in Tokyo, actual implementation of a hot line may therefore continue to
be out of reach. Furthermore, hot lines are only as good as their use in practice. Here, Beijings track
record also urges caution: at the time of the 2001 Hainan Island incident, the United States and China
had similar mechanisms in place, but Beijing ignored former Secretary of State Colin Powells phone
calls for two days. Further, any proposed annual meetings will only be as useful as they are substantive. For years, the U.S.-China
Military Maritime Consultative Agreement remained a talk shop where Beijing largely restated its opposition to mainstream views of
international law. The
cost of any military conflict between China and Japan would be immense, and
neither side wants a war. Yet even if the probability of any single encounter resulting in an incident
remains low, the frequency of plane and ship traffic in the region increases the likelihood of an
incident that could escalate to a military crisis if not managed rapidly and effectively by both sides. To
this day, despite seven years of negotiations, the two sides still lack robust bilateral crisis
management mechanisms. In the stormy waters and airspace of the East China Sea, hope is not a
strategy. Fail-safes and firebreaks are needed now to ensure that a war that no one wants, never
erupts.

US vulnerable to Chinese grid attacks

Barker 1-27 (Daniel, Staff writer for Natural News, 1-27-2016, China has cyber capability to take
down U.S. power grid, warns NSA
http://www.naturalnews.com/052769_cyber_attack_China_power_grid.html)

The U.S. is vulnerable to cyber attacks from China and other countries capable of shutting down the
power grid and disabling vital infrastructure, according to Admiral Michael Rogers, head of both the
National Security Agency and the U.S. Cyber Command. Rogers recently warned the House Intelligence
Committee: "We're seeing multiple nation-states invest in those kinds of capabilities." Cybersecurity
firm Mondiant confirmed that China had hacked into U.S. utility systems and has the knowledge
potential to exploit vulnerabilities and shut down or disrupt them. Rogers says this could allow Chinese
hackers "to shut down very segmented, very tailored parts of our infrastructure that forestall the ability
to provide that service to us as citizens." Expert agrees with predictions of major cyber attack in the next
ten years Such an attack could have catastrophic effects, to say the least. Rogers agreed with recent
predictions that a major cyber attack will occur within the next decade: "It is only a matter of the when,
not the if, that we are going to see something traumatic."
Cyber attacks result in retaliation causes a miscalculated nuclear war
Tilford 12 (Robert, Graduate US Army Airborne School, Ft. Benning, Georgia, Cyber attackers could
shut down the electric grid for the entire east coast 2012, http://www.examiner.com/article/cyber-
attackers-could-easily-shut-down-the-electric-grid-for-the-entire-east-coa ***we dont agree with the
ableist language)

a cyber attack that can take out a civilian power grid, for example could also
To make matters worse

cripple [hinder]the U.S. military. The senator notes that is that the same power grids that supply cities and towns, stores
and gas stations, cell towers and heart monitors also power every military base in our country. Although bases would be prepared to
weather a short power outage with backup diesel generators, within hours, not days, fuel supplies would run out, he said. Which means
military command and control centers could go dark. Radar systems that detect air
threats to our country would shut Down completely. Communication between commanders and their
troops would also go silent. And many weapons systems would be left without either fuel or electric power, said Senator Grassley. So in
a few short hours or days, the mightiest military in the world would be left scrambling to maintain base functions, he said. We contacted
the Pentagon and officials confirmed the threat of a cyber attack is something very real. Top national
security officialsincluding the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Director of the National Security Agency, the Secretary of Defense, and the
CIA Director have said, preventing a cyber attack and improving the nations electric grids is among the most urgent priorities of our
country (source: Congressional Record). So how serious is the Pentagon taking all this? Enough to start, or end a war over it, for sure. A
cyber attack today against the US could very well be seen as an Act of War and could
be met with a full scale US military response. That could include the use of nuclear
weapons, if authorized by the President.

The TPP is the cornerstone for US-Sino Relations Only bringing China into the TPP
can allow for an effective long term strategy for maintaining cooperative relations
Carpenter 2015 (Ted, Senior Fellow at the CATO institute, The Trans-Pacific Partnership:
Washingtons Unwise Exclusion of China http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/trans-pacific-
partnership-washingtons-unwise-exclusion-china)

Notably missing from the membership of the TPP, however, is China, the worlds second largest economy and the single most important economy in East Asia.
The United States, in its role as the leader of the TPP negotiations, quite deliberately excluded Beijing from the diplomatic
project, although Obama administration officials insist that the door remains open to Chinese
membership at a later date. For their part, Chinese officials have long viewed the TPP with suspicion and were especially
annoyed that their country was not invited to be a part of the proceedings. The exclusion of China from the TPP is consistent with the overall
US approach to relations with that country. The two nations maintain a vigorous bilateral trade relationship , but
that aspect cannot conceal Washingtons growing suspicions that China is intent on becoming the
dominant power in East Asia, and that those ambitions pose a threat to important American interests . Although US
the United States seems increasingly intent on curbing Chinas diplomatic,
leaders rarely concede the point publicly,

economic, and military influence. The much-discussed pivot or rebalancing of US military forces to East Asia is the centerpiece of a de
facto containment policy directed against Beijing. But there have been other manifestations of that attitude as well. Using the TPP as an instrument of a
containment policy is extremely unwise. Washington has interpreted its defense treaty with Japan to cover the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, which are the focus of a bitter territorial

dispute between China and Japan. Similarly, the Obama administration has escalated US involvement in the multi-sided territorial quarrels between China and its neighbors regarding the South China Sea. Washingtons tilt toward
Vietnam, the Philippines, and other rival claimants has become increasing apparent in recent years. Indeed, the attitude of the US government concerning those complex, murky disputes seems to be anybody but China. As
Beijing has pressed its claims, including by building a number of artificial islands and reefs in the South China Sea, Washington has reacted with growing hostility. Recently, US military officials even asserted the right to conduct air
and sea surveillance missions in the disputed waters, despite the danger of confrontations with Chinese forces. Washingtons de facto containment policy has not been confined to security measures. The Obama administration
openly opposed the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, urging US allies to reject involvement in the AIIB. That diplomatic campaign produced surprisingly anemic results, however. Although some close American
allies (most notably Japan) did respect Washingtons wishes, other prominent allies, including Great Britain, defied the Obama administration and joined the AIIB. Moreover, the attempt to sabotage the bank was anything but

subtle, and Beijing deeply resented the US diplomatic maneuvers. The TPP is consistent with that larger policy of trying to curb Chinas
influence. US allies in East Asia certainly appear to interpret the trade agreement in that fashion. In an editorial, Japans Yomuri Shimbun asserted that the pact would have not only important economic benefits but
long-term security benefits. If the presence of the United States and Japan in the Asia-Pacific region is enhanced through the TPP, the editors concluded, it will be able to contain Chinas moves to pursue hegemonic influence in
the region. The editorial specifically noted the creation of the AIB and portrayed the TPP as an important counter to that initiative. It is not surprising that such a conclusion would be expressed openly in Japan, Chinas principal
regional rival. Using the TPP as an instrument of a containment policy is extremely unwise. The importance of the bilateral trade relationship should cause US officials to exercise greater caution. So, too, should the fact that China
holds some $1.3 trillion of US Treasury debt and is now the single largest foreign purchaser of such debt. It is generally not a good idea for individuals to antagonize their banker, and a similar principle applies to the behavior of

nations. Chinas own conduct is causing understandable concern, though. Beijings breathtakingly broad territorial claims in the South China
Sea (encompassing nearly 90% of that body of water) and its increasingly aggressive pursuit of those claims has especially
provoked neighboring countries and encouraged hawks in the United States to advocate a
confrontational stance. Chinas assertiveness in the South China Sea, along with Beijings challenge to
Japan regarding the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, is consistent with the behavior of a rising power that is
determined to exercise greater influence in its immediate neighborhood. And Beijing can back up those ambitions with
growing economic and military capabilities. The recent slowdown in Chinas economy may alter the pace of that assertiveness, but it does not change the fundamental reality
that China is a rising power with ambitions to match. That development poses a difficult test for US foreign policy . The historical

record of relations between rising great powers and incumbent hegemons is not reassuring. Too
often, the result has been intense hostility and even outright warfare. The inability of Great Britain
and France to accommodate the rise of Imperial Germany in the early twentieth century is a
cautionary tale of the potential for disaster if such a relationship is mishandled . Accommodating a
rising China without allowing that country to run roughshod and become the unchallenged hegemon
of East Asia is the task now facing US policymakers. It is not an easy task, but American officials need
to be more flexible and conciliatory than they have been to this point. A good first step would be to
commence immediate negotiations to bring China into the TPP instead of using that agreement as
merely the latest component of a hostile containment policy.

Only bringing China into the TPP can solve and uphold international institutions which
allow for effective Sino-US cooperation.
Gross, 2013 (Donald, senior associate at the Pacific Forum of the Center for Strategic and International
Studies, 7-9-2013, Welcoming China to the Trans-Pacific Partnership
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/donald-gross/trans-pacific-partnership-china_b_3562801.html)

When senior officials from the United States and China meet this week in Washington for a new round of their Strategic and Economic Dialogue, the U.S. has
an excellent opportunity to overcome a deeply divisive economic issue complicating relations with
Beijing by welcoming Chinas participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). At the time President Obama declared his strong support

Obama and U.S. officials coupled their

for creating this new Asia Pacific trade bloc in November 2011, the administration envisioned it as a way of countering Chinas economic rise as part of the U.S. pivot to Asia.

advocacy of the TPP with a warning that the U.S. was growing increasingly impatient and frustrated
with...Chinese economic policy and the evolution of the U.S.-China economic relationship. They called on China to play

by the rules and criticized it for gaming the system. In the words of David Pilling, a leading columnist for the Financial Times, the U.S. vision for the TPP amounted to an anyone-
but-China club which had the unstated aim of creating a trade area that excludes the worlds second biggest economy. As a comprehensive high-level agreement among the 12 countries now in negotiations, the TPP would cover about 40 percent of

global output and about one-third of world trade. Not surprisingly, many Chinese commentators initially saw the TPP as an instrument
for containing China . Beijing reacted to the U.S. announcement in the fall of 2011 by accelerating its own efforts to build a new free trade pact called the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership among the 10 ASEAN countries plus five

countries that have current free trade agreements with ASEAN South Korea, Japan, India, Australia, and New Zealand. China also pushed ahead on negotiations to reach a trilateral trade ag reement with Japan and South Korea as well as a bilateral agreement with Seoul. The
risk of the United States and China moving toward competitive Asian trade blocs peaked in March 2013, when
the U.S. persuaded Japan to join the TPP negotiations at a time of mounting conflict with China over
disputed island territories in the East China Sea . Prime Minister Shinzo Abe declared that joining the TPP would strengthen Japans security and emphasized the shared values of freedom,

democracy, basic human rights and the rule of law among TPP members. Abe failed to mention that the U.S. previously invited Vietnam and Malaysia to join the TPP negotiations, though their governments infringe human rights and curtail democracy as well as rely heavily on the state
subsidies, controlled prices and state-owned enterprises that are antithetical to the purposes of the new trade agreement. In late May, during the run-up to the summit between President Obama and President Xi Jinping, China broke the vicious cycle leading toward separate Asian trade
blocs when the Ministry of Commerce announced it would study whether to participate in the TPP negotiations. According to the Ministry, China will analyze the pros and cons as well as the possibility of joining the TPP, based on careful research and according to principles of equality

and mutual benefit. And we also hope to exchange information and materials with TPP members on the negotiations. Chinas recently declared interest in the TPP reflects its
desire to improve relations with the United States, reduce government involvement in the private sector and help shape the rules of the Trans-Pacific Partnership. If China seeks membership in

the TPP after the regional free trade agreement is completed, it would have to accept all the terms that were previously negotiated. By inviting China to join the negotiations for the TPP at the

Strategic and Economic Dialogue, the United States would strengthen the likelihood of the U.S. benefiting both from
Chinas long-term economic growth and its support for international institutions on which the U.S. relies. As Professor John Ikenberry of

Princeton University puts it: The United States cannot thwart Chinas rise, but it can help ensure that Chinas power is
exercised within the rules and institutions that the United States and its partners have crafted ... that
can protect the interests of all states in the more crowded world of the future. Most importantly, including China in the TPP would advance

crucial objectives of American economic policy obtaining greater access to the Chinese market for U.S. goods and services, significantly reducing the Chinese g overnments role in the private sector, protecting intellectual property, and fostering greater foreign investment in both China

and the United States. This weeks Strategic and Economic Dialogue is an opportune time to make it manifestly clear the United States welcomes Beijings participation in the Trans-Pacific
Partnership in so doing, resolve an issue that has hurt U.S. relations with China for far too long .
and,

Independently a strong US-China relationship solves a laundry list of threats climate

change, nuclear proliferation, terrorism, anti-disease response, natural disasters and
drug trafficking key to survival of humankind and international peace
Jianmin 15 (Wu, Former President of China Foreign Affairs University; Member, Berggruen Institutes
21st Century Council, 4-16-2015, Cooperation on Curbing Nukes and Climate Change Strengthens U.S.-
China Link http://www.huffingtonpost.com/wu-jianmin/china-us-nukes-climate-
change_b_7079932.html)

Three Dimensions of Cooperation China-U.S. cooperation is multi-dimensional . It covers three areas: global challenges;
bilateral trade, economic, cultural and educational cooperation; and military exchanges and security cooperation. The common

challenges facing mankind have never been so daunting as they are today -- climate change , nuclear weapons
proliferation , terrorism , pandemics , natural disasters , drug trafficking , just to name a few. No country, no
matter how powerful it is, is able to meet these challenges alone. Common challenges bring people together. Mankind is
bound to unite for its survival. When China and the U.S., the world's two largest economies, cooperate, it
makes a difference . In November 2014, President Xi Jinping and President Obama made a joint pledge on reducing
pollution and carbon gas emissions. As a result, the upcoming U nited N ations conference on climate change
to be held in Paris from Nov. 30th to Dec. 11th this year, looks much more promising. Nuclear weapons proliferation
also poses a serious threat to international peace and security. Of all the global challenges it is the most complicated.

The North Korean nuclear issue is the other major concern along with Iran. The Six-Party Talks on this issue
have so far stalled for six years and at present show no sign of resuming any time soon. Even so, the fact that China and the
U.S. have agreed to pursue the goal of denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula has kept the issue from getting
out of control . The year 1950 witnessed violent confrontation between China and U.S. in the Korean theater, but 2015 is a long way from
1950. China-U.S. cooperation has been a significant factor in keeping the lid on this conflict. Such
cooperation, whether on Iran, North Korea or climate change, is an important building block for the new model of the major countries
relationship. The way to conceive of this relationship is as a big house. It has to be built gradually, block by block. The more
building blocks laid, the faster that house will be built. As President Xi Jinping has put it: "A sound China-U.S. cooperation can
become a ballast stone of world stability and a booster of world peace. "
 Plan
The United States federal government should extend Trans-Pacific Partnership
membership toward the Peoples Republic of China.
 Solvency
The US should extend a invitation to the TPP to China theyll say yes
Yu Xiang 15, Director of American Economic Studies, 10/10/2015, Institute of American Studies, China
Institute of Contemporary International Relations,
http://english.cntv.cn/2015/10/10/ARTI1444466006678681.shtml

Although the deal still has yet to be ratified in all 12 countries, the TPP may likely become the law of the land . For some
strategic analysts, the deal creates a huge economic annular zone or the C shape, China, the second biggest economy in the region as well as
in the world is right in the gap of the C shape. The TPP represents the US pivot to Asia, intended to balance
Chinas rise. The TPP seems to be a Cold War-style geopolitical stratagem. In order to inject a positive
impetus to bilateral relations, the US should compromise on TPP. According to the Entering only with Invitation
principle, Beijing can only participate in TPP negotiations if invited. Therefore an invitation from the US can refute a
perspective that the TPP is curbing China's rise. China's entrance would ensure that TPP becomes more inclusive. Lets not
forget that one of the most important achievements during Chinese President Xi Jinping's first state visit to the US on Sept.22-25 had been to
convince Washington on the significance of building a new type of major country relationship. Xi
invited the US to take part in
the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and pledged to cooperate with the US on issues of
common concern, dispelling Washingtons fears that Beijing is squeezing the US out of the Asia Pacific
sphere of influence. It's time for Washington to take positive action on TPP. Excluding China from international or
regional trade arrangements is unrealistic. Although China has come to grips with a currency and stock market correction, the short term
fluctuations won't change its status as one of the largest trading and economic powers for the many years ahead. Currently, China is
the
world's second-largest economy and the largest exporter. China should be included in the TPP, it
would make a combined GDP stand at more than 50 per cent of global GDP. Furthermore, China has signed
numerous free trade agreements with other countries, including TPP member states. China and US Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT)
negotiations are accelerating as well. Trade facilitating negotiations between Beijing and Tokyo remain under the framework of the China-
Japan-South Korea free trade agreement. China has supported more negotiations with existing TPP participants, which could undermine the
TPP's impact. China is too important to be ignored and too large to be contained. The US should invite
China to the TPP as soon as possible. This would symbolize a second opening up for the nation after gaining entry into the
World Trade Organization. Beijings trade interests are also in line with US interests. The
Chinese Commerce Ministry
announced recently that Beijing is open to any mechanism that follows World Trade Organization
rules and boosts economic integration of the Asia-Pacific. Additionally, China may take defensive
measures, if it feels isolated from the TPP sphere. Such actions could destabilize the region.
Trade Regimes Adv
 Ext-- Regionalism Now
Squo causes dual track trade regimes Chinese exclusion results in a battle to set
trade standards
Monika Ermert 15, MA, East Asia Studies, University of Tubingen, 4/3/2015, Trade Outlook In 2015:
The Race Of The Mega-Regionals, http://www.ip-watch.org/2015/03/04/trade-outlook-in-2015-the-
race-of-the-mega-regionals/

Certainly 2015 must be seen as the year of the mega-regionals. TPP and TTIP standard setting is driven by competition from
mega-regionals on the negotiating tables in the capitals of Asia. One is the Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership (RCEP) negotiated by the 10 member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its FTA partners, Australia,
China, India, Japan, Korea and New Zealand. Mustapa Mohamed, Malaysias minister for international trade and industry, confirmed during
the recent World Economic Forum that the partners are committed to conclude RCEP in 2015. Three more negotiating rounds for 2015 are
listed on the official ASEAN calendar for April, May/June and September, with a high-level ministerial in August. After the seventh round in
February, reports also spoke of a summit. The ASEAN Economic Community and RCEP plus six will be our priority, Mohamed told a panel on
mega-regionals, underlining that it will be easier to finalise if ambitions are not too high. Malaysia and three other members also are
negotiating the TPP. US Trade Representative Michael Froman during the same debate pointed out that with TPP we are very much in the
endgame, but acknowledged that there were still some hurdles. The meeting in early March will again try to get a breakthrough. Chinas

absence from the TPP table supports the perception that there is a battle about who will set the
standards for trade integration in the Pacific. According to the WEF study on the mega-regionals,
geopolitics contribute in part to mega-regionalism , in particular with the US proponents of the TPP
seeing it as a way of thwarting the emergence of a China-centred East Asia economic bloc. Sherry
Stephenson, senior fellow at the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) said in the WEF study that a potential
future TPP and RCEP, and possibly a CJK (China Japan Korea) FTA, could serve as models for the WTO. While Wan
Meng, dean of the
School of Law, Beijing Foreign Studies University, was clear about the race, saying: If the TPP is not
well received by participating members, China would be in a comfortable position to build on its
economic leverage to participate in norm setting, and to channel the TPP into an RTA [regional trade agreement] based more on a set of
compromised terms. This may lead to the rise of a politically driven divergent dual-track : China taking the
lead through the Asian track and the US taking the lead through the TPP track. Chinas promotion of
RCEP and the additional three-party FTA talks between China, Japan and Korea (CJK) are a
strategic response to TPP , Korean Researcher Kim Tae Kyong has concluded. For Korea, as for some other
Asian countries, it is still open which of the mega-regionals they will join, TPP or RCEP (or both). Korea is
considering (as is Japan) becoming the bridge country between TTP and RCEP countries. Last week, China and Korea started bilateral talks, away
from the mega-regionals. Nobody wants to stay away from the trade deal monopoly.

Trade blocs collapse trade liberalization prevents harmonization of new rule based
order
Kevin Rudd 16, president of the Asia Society Policy Institute amd former Prime Minister of Australia,
interviewed by Murits Elen, 2/18/2016, Interview: Kevin Rudd, The Diplomat,
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:llaFN3TIsBUJ:thediplomat.com/2016/02/inter
view-kevin-rudd-2/+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us

Kevin Rudd: The future of the world order is the central question of international relations. Strategic
thinkers in Beijing and Washington understand this. But reconciling the vastly different Chinese and
Western notions of order remains a core challenge. Beijing has not yet articulated a clear blueprint for the future of the
global order, but its outlines are clear. In unusually sharp language, Xi Jinping announced that China was engaged in a struggle for the
international order in 2014. Xi lays great emphasis on multipolarity, understood as a transition away from the United States brief unipolar
moment. We are not yet in a bipolar world order, as existed during the Cold War. But the danger of a bifurcation of world
order into two camps is real and growing . A long-term power shift from West to East would
challenge almost every preconception Westerners have grown up with. Above all, it would challenge
Washington and Beijing to work together to sustain, strengthen, and reform the existing global rules-
based order against forces seeking to erode it. One of the first things you did as prime minister of Australia was to sign the
Kyoto Protocol. Last December, the Paris Climate Agreement was signed, marking a good example of how global powers can forge a common
future together. In what other specific areas do you think it is important for the U.S. and China to join hands to shape a more stable 21st
century? The growing U.S.-China partnership helped make the Paris Agreement possible, and shaped what it ultimately became. Since late
2014 the U.S. and China have pursued increasingly cooperative steps to reduce their emissions, and in doing so they are sending signals to their
peers that they take climate change very seriously. Given the size of the American and Chinese economies and their capacities to lead
innovation, scaling up the U.S.-China partnership is among the single greatest imperatives for facing the global climate change challenge. They
can do so by working to remove intellectual property barriers to technology sharing, advancing trade in renewable energy sectors, and
continuously ramping up their emissions reduction goals. The American dream, and more recently the Chinese dream, are well known. You
have spoken about a dream for all humankind. What is your vision on this dream and how does it relate to China? The spirit of the American
dream is well-known, the Chinese Dream has begun to emerge, and how China and the U.S. can work together to achieve a Dream for All
would be of significant relevance for us all. How Beijing and Washington shape their future does not just affect those two countries. It affects all
of us, in ways perhaps we have never thought of: the air we breathe, the water we drink, the fish we eat, the quality of our oceans, the
languages we speak in the future, the jobs we have, the political systems we choose, and of course, the great question of war and peace.
How can we craft a basis for a common future between these two? I argue simply this: we can do it on the basis of a
framework of constructive realism for a common purpose. Such a framework would allow the U.S. and China to be realistic about the things
that they disagree on and keep those matters from sparking conflict or otherwise harming the relationship. Even
though the U.S. and
China cannot resolve all their differences in the short term, they can still be constructive in areas of
the bilateral, regional, and global engagement. If they can do that, then they can realize a dream for
all humankind. In your view, how ought Australia respond to the shifting great power dynamics in the Asia-Pacific? Can the nation
serve as a stabilizing factor between the U.S. and China? How would you define Australias role in a bipolar world order? To your first point,
Australias role, at its best, is to represent the East in the West, and the West in the East. The greatest geopolitical transformation since the
Second World War is happening on Australias doorstep. Regarding U.S.-China relations, Australia should not aspire to act as an intermediary in
their bilateral relations. Rather, it should seek to minimize the areas of strategic competition with respect to its own diplomatic actions, for
example by acting as a bridge for defense diplomacy to build confidence, trust, and transparency. On your final point, it is premature to speak
of a bipolar world order. Bipolarity certainly characterized the world order during the Cold War, with colossal military, economic, and political
might concentrated in Washington, Moscow, and their respective camps. This is not true of 2016, which is
moving toward greater
multipolarity in international affairs. It is the role of every prudent state, including Australia, to ensure that
the world order does not return to the bipolar structure and zero-sum logic of the Cold War. Australia
has signed the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which was initiated by the U.S. Australia is also part of negotiations with
its lesser known equivalent, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). China has
been seen as the key driver of the RCEP. What does Australias participation in both trade pacts say about its stance in the Asia-
Pacific, as there seems to be a competition between the TPP and RCEP? The bifurcation of trading blocs

in the Asia-Pacific is a significant challenge for regional integration. Traditionally, the liberalization of
trade has been a unifying force in world politics. Now, the proliferation of alternative trade agendas,
including the TPP and RCEP, raises the risk of further fracturing Asia economically and, ultimately,
geopolitically. For this reason, the Asia Society Policy Institute, which I head, is working on proposals to ensure that the region is not
pulled apart by centrifugal economic forces. Australia, like other regional middle powers, has a decisive interest to ensure that this not be the
case. Its not
a choice between the TPP and RCEP. The choice is between economic integration and
disintegration.
 Ext -- Plan Solves Trade Blocs
Inclusion in the TPP solves encourages plurilateralism that fosters cooperation over
competition
Kati Suominen 16, Assistant Adjunct Professor, January 2016, Enhancing Coherence and Inclusiveness
in the Global Trading System in the Era of Regionalism, Interantioanl Centre for Trade and Sustainable
Development,
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/E15/WEF_Regional%20trade%20Agreements_2015_1401.pdf
New geography of integration: RTAs of the past 20 years have been negotiated among relatively small groups of players and they have yet to be
concluded among the largest trading powers. However, the
TPP (which reached agreement in October 2015) and the TTIP (in which
negotiations are ongoing) are changing the geography of formal trade integration. Looking further into the
future, additional transformations could unfold. For example, the TPP and TTIP will almost de facto merge into a super-
deal. After all, the US and EU already have bilateral agreements with several common partners in the TPPPeru, Colombia, Chile, Australia,
Singapore, Canada, and Mexico (the EU and Japan are also in the process of negotiating a bilateral FTA). It would thus not be a major leap to
merge in some way the two agreements. As gatekeepers to markets with two-thirds of global spending power, the two agreements, alone and
certainly combined, would also be attractive docking stations for outsiders. For example, if China and Brazil were to join, a TTIP-TPP super-
deal would cover 80% of global output. In this scenario, the WTO and (a large) part of its membership would be marginalized, and all
meaningful action on trade policy-making would move to the RTA spherewhere questions such as outsider treatment and the management
of disputes would become central. Unfolding geoeconomics of trade: Even though the US, EU, and Japan will remain central to the world
economy and trade flows for the foreseeable future, new dynamics in North-South and South-South trade are poised
to gain in significance over the coming years. In all probability, China in particular will play an increasingly
important role in world trade, the trade policy and geoeconomic considerations of individual nations,
and in developments at the multilateral level. Some analysts have suggested that China may opt for a division of
labour (or perhaps for the creation of spheres of influence) where China leads an Asian track of trade
integration while the US pursues its pivot to Asia via the TPP. Others have proffered an alternative scenario
where China decides to join the TPP so as to secure the rights and benefits the agreement confers to its members. Perhaps the
likeliest scenario lies somewhere in between, especially given the considerable overlap between TPP and RCEP membership. In the
scenario where China decides to work with, rather than against, the TPP, and use it to supplement the
RCEP, plurilateral initiatives could become easier to realize.

The TPP is key it shapes Chinese motivations to pursue economic counterweights

Laura He 15, MA in Journalism, Stanford, 6/23/2015, China and U.S. vie for global trade dominance in a
Great Game replay, Market Watch, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/china-and-us-vie-for-global-
trade-dominance-in-a-great-game-replay-2015-06-23
China is pursuing a grand strategy of building stronger trade and investment ties with its Asian neighbors, IHS Inc.s chief Asia economist, Rajiv
Biswas, told MarketWatch. Biswas said this strategy includes forming a new trade architecture through bilateral FTAs and the pursuit of the
RCEP and FTAAP, as well as through new institutions, such as the recently founded, World Banklike Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank and a
Silk Road Fund meant to boost economic exchange with Chinas historical trade partners in Southeast Asia and in Central Asia. But perhaps the

root of Chinas proliferation of trade deals and multinational organizations is yet another set of
initials, emanating from Washington: the TPP . The TPP is the U.S. governments Trans-Pacific Partnership, currently under
negotiation by the Obama administration, with 12 countries in the Asia-Pacific arena but not China. In a way, its
like a modern
version of the so-called Great Game of the 19th century, in which the British and Russian empires
competed for dominance in the resource-rich and highly strategic Central Asia region. While neither side has openly
declared an FTA race President Obama even said that China has shown interest in joining the TPP at some point many

observers see the TPP and Chinas RCEP as rivals. It is indeed commonly perceived that the TPP is designed to exclude
China, said Francis Lui, director of Hong Kong University of Science & Technologys Center for Economic Development. Certainly, theres
a good deal of overlap between the two proposed trading spheres, with Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Singapore,
Malaysia, Vietnam and Brunei all marked for inclusion in both the TPP and RCEP. And in seeking to promote the TPP in the U.S., Obama warned
in April that if the trade group isnt set up, then China will write the trade rules for the region. Lui said Chinas
rush to sign trade
pacts and set up the RCEP is Beijings counterweight to the TPP, and the emergence of this large
number of FTAs shows that [the U.S.s TPP] strategy can be mitigated easily. If China can sign
individual FTAs with many members of TPP, then the American goal of using it to isolate China would
no longer be of any significance, Lui said. The fact is that many members of the TPP indeed have the
incentive to go into FTAs with China. Likewise, Beijings top government think tank, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, said
in a report late last year that Chinas entry into the TPP was unrealistic in the short term given its requirements in terms of industrial
development and on other metrics. Instead, the report said, China should pursue its own trade agreements. The RCEP and TPP are
apparently a pair of rivals. Whichever succeeds first will have a demonstration effect, and whichever has a bigger benefit of scale will
be more likely to have a leading position, the report quoted senior Foreign Ministry official Wang Shuai as saying. Despite acknowledging the
competitive nature of the two proposed trade blocs,
however, the report said it was in Chinas interest to launch specific
reform measures that would meet the TPP criteria, since such measures are nonetheless in line with
future international trade rules and trends of Chinas reform. And in any case, it said, conforming to some
of the TPP rules would keep Chinas options open if it decides it wants to join the TPP at some point in
the future. From the archives: Is the Shanghai Free-Trade Zone the real deal? Still, China is taking the possibility of a TPP
very seriously. In fact, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences vice president, Li Yang, went so far as to say
that the TPP was a direct reason for the launch of the Shanghai Free-Trade Zone, modeled on the special
economic zone established in the southern city of Shenzhen in the 1980s and touted as an area freed of red tape and other constraints on
industry.

The plan is key Chinese exclusion from the TPP results in competing trade blocks
Deborah Elms 16, 5/4/2016, Executive Director at the Asian Trade Centre, PhD in Political Science from
the University of Washington, WHO WRITES THE RULES FOR TRADE?,
http://www.asiantradecentre.org/talkingtrade/2016/5/4/who-writes-the-rules-for-trade

Second, and perhaps more important, bringing China into the equation as the bad guy is going to do
substantial long-term harm . This is damaging to the United States, to China, to the TPP and to the
global economy. The long-term objective is to connect China and the United States together in a
trade agreement that meets the high standards that Obama discusses in his article. Such an outcome will never be met if
China is painted from the outset as somehow outside the bounds of such behavior. This is a particular shame,
since there have been many signals in the past few years that many Chinese have begun to realize that
TPP membership may be in Chinas own interest in the medium term. Chinas economic growth is also
faltering. For China to push through domestic reforms, it too may need to hook to an external
agreement like the TPP. For global trade, it certainly does no good at all for the United States and China
to build competing trade blocks . In an increasingly interconnected world of value or supply chains,
this makes even less sense.
 AT: No Trade Blocs
Yes trade blocs only getting China to hop on the TPP bandwagon solves the
geopolitical ambitions that prevent RCEP and TPP from merging
Benny cheng Guan 16, Professor of International Relations, Universiti Sains Malaysia, PhD, 3/22/2016,
Japan, China and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) as a Strategic Tool of Choice,
http://www.apu.ac.jp/rcaps/uploads/fckeditor/publications/workingPapers/RWP_15003.pdf

China will most likely speed up negotiations in the RCEP (pushed by China and excludes the US) which is scheduled
to be completed by the end of 2016 . This comes after China managed to reinstate the FTAAP idea as host of the APEC summit in
November 2014 despite strong objections from the US to exclude it from the joint communique for fear that it would derail progress made in
the TPP (Davis, 2014). The importance of realizing an FTAAP was once again reiterated by Beijing at the APEC
summit in November 2015. 5 The main reason for China to keep the FTAAP concept alive is to prevent the TPP from becoming the
ultimate vehicle for the realization of an Asia-Pacific wide FTA since it would mean acceding to the TPPA and hence subscribing to American
leadership (Solis, 2014). If
China decides not to hop on the TPP bandwagon, a possible outcome would be a
competition in rule-making between the RCEP and the TPP towards the aim of achieving an Asia-Pacific wide FTA
(FTAAP). While a convergence between the RCEP and the TPP would be an ideal solution, [d]ifferences

not only in levels of ambition, but also in the nature of those ambitions , loom as potentially the largest obstacles to
convergence between the TPP and the RCEP (Scollay, 2014: 243-244). This differences is aptly elaborated by Terada Takashi
when he commented that [a]s ASEAN has also shown an interest in RCEP, in which the speed and level of liberalisation would be based on the
standard that developing countries generally prefer, the dissimilarities in these integration models in the Asia Pacific region make any future
merger of TPP and RCEP difficult. This also means the
US and China will continue to compete against each other over
trade and investment rule-making in East Asia and the Pacific (Takashi, 2013).

No rapprochement US wont make concessions necessary to solve trade blocs in the

squo
Hanns Gunther Hilpert 15, Head of the Research Division at the German Institute for International and
Security Affairs, February 2015, Asia-Pacific Free Trade Talks Nearing the Finish Line, https://www.swp-
berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2015C07_hlp.pdf

Although the prospects for the successful conclusion of the TPP or RCEP negotiations remain uncertain for
the time being, a definitive failure of these trans-regional free trade initiatives is even less likely . The trade
policy ambitions of the countries in the region already go beyond the TPP and the RCEP. Back in 2010 the
Pacific heads of state and government at their APEC meeting in Yokohama officially approved the trade policy initiatives TPP, ASEAN+3 and
ASEAN+6 as appropriate preliminary stages on the path towards a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP). At the last APEC meeting in
Beijing in
2014 China proposed, not entirely unselfishly, an FTAAP feasibility study to pave the way for actual
negotiations. Although this proposal was not taken up, due to US resistance, there is no question that
all parties share the goal of free trade in the Asia-Pacific area. Nevertheless, there are widely held
concerns that Asia could be split in terms of trade policy, as hopes of a consolidation of the
prospective TPP and RCEP agreements could prove deceptive. First, a rapprochement between China
and the US is extremely difficult to realise due to the geopolitical rivalry between the two blocs.
Second, thecompeting trade policy agreements are not compatible with one another. It is unimaginable
that the industrialised countries of the TPP, particularly the US, would be prepared to make
concessions on their hardwon agreements, in areas such as competition, industrial property rights, labour and environmental
standards. Rather than the TPP and the RCEP being consolidated, it is therefore more likely that the TPP free trade zone will be successively
expanded. South Korea and Thailand have already signalled their interest in joining.

Theyre distinct TPP and RCEP cause overlapping but distinct trade regimes chances
of merging the squo are low
Young-Chan Kim 15, Senior Lecturer in International Business at the University of Greenwich,
12/12/2015, RCEP vs TPP- The pursuit of Eastern Dominance,
http://gala.gre.ac.uk/14477/1/14477_KIM_The_pursuit_of_Eastern_Dominance_2015.pdf

The TPP and the RCEP are often regarded as being substitutes, but that is far from the case . Numerous
ASEAN economies already participate in both negotiationsBrunei, Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnamand one can acknowledge that there is
no rationale to state that other middle-income countries should not do so as well. Regardless
of the fact that certain ASEAN
countries cannot liaise with the current phase of negotiations, the agreement is likely to anticipate
enlargement and set the scene for accession. For countries who are inclined to adhere to both agreements; the idea of dual
membership is compelling due to each schemes merits. However, the TPP and the RCEP offer benefits that are
predominantly interdependentone focuses on profound integration with the Americas, and the
other on improved access to ASEAN markets, to stimulate increased economic activity. Coinciding
memberships further aid to ensure that the two initiatives do not proliferate into competing regional blocs; which is the infamous drawback of
regional FTAs. Countries involved in dual negotiations are most likely to align their provisions in order to simplify their internal policy
adjustments, and to synthesise with the requirements of both schemes. The similarity of the RCEP protocol and its TPP
counterpart have been acknowledged already. This will not always be the case, but nonetheless, a
significant overlap will make it more convenient to consolidate the agreements in the future, or to
proceed from shared provisions into subsequent global negotiations in future years. The ultimatum for new members is the
fact that the TPP template is likely to be more stringent and onerous than its RCEP counterpart, and will,
in part, mirror the interests of countries that are more advanced economically as well as politically (Petri and Plummer 2012). It is perceived
that it will include greatly pressing provisions on services, intellectual property, and competition policy, as well as permitting a fewer number of
exceptions for sensitive sectors. Joining
the TPP will require earlier and more difficult reforms than
participation in the RCEP. At the same time, the benefits under the TPP template are predicted to be
around twice as grand as those under the RCEP, on the basis that they are applied to the same group
of countries. Moreover, the necessary reformations with the ASEAN nations would in many cases
emulate those required for the effective implementation of the AEC. Furthermore, the fundamental difference is
the fact that the TPP puts greater emphasis on a single and comprehensive form, whereas the RCEP pushes for a progressive and sequential
approach, where different components are mediated and implemented under a different time table.
 Ext Protectionism Impact
Protectionism causes war -- escalates low-level conflicts
Michael J. Panzner 8, faculty at the New York Institute of Finance, 25-year veteran of the global stock,
bond, and currency markets who has worked in New York and London for HSBC, Soros Funds, ABN
Amro, Dresdner Bank, and JPMorgan Chase, 2008, Financial Armageddon: Protect Your Future from
Economic Collapse, Revised and Updated Edition, p. 136-138

Continuing calls for curbs on the flow of finance and trade will inspire the United States and other
nations to spew forth protectionist legislation like the notorious Smoot-Hawley bill. Introduced at the start of the
Great Depression, it triggered a series of tit-for-tat economic responses, which many commentators

believe helped turn a serious economic downturn into a prolonged and devastating global
disaster, But if history is any guide, those lessons will have been long forgotten during the next
collapse. Eventually, fed by a mood of desperation and growing public anger, restrictions on trade, finance, investment, and immigration will almost
certainly intensify.

Authorities and ordinary citizens will likely scrutinize the cross-border movement of Americans and outsiders alike, and lawmakers may even call for a general crackdown on
nonessential travel. Meanwhile, many nations will make transporting or sending funds to other countries exceedingly difficult. As desperate officials try to limit the fallout from
decades of ill-conceived, corrupt, and reckless policies, they will introduce controls on foreign exchange, foreign individuals and companies seeking to acquire certain American
infrastructure assets, or trying to buy property and other assets on the (heap thanks to a rapidly depreciating dollar, will be stymied by limits on investment by noncitizens. Those
efforts will cause spasms to ripple across economies and markets, disrupting global payment, settlement, and clearing mechanisms. All of this will, of course, continue to
undermine business confidence and consumer spending. In a world of lockouts and lockdowns, any link that transmits systemic financial pressures across markets through arbitrage
or portfolio-based risk management, or that allows diseases to be easily spread from one country to the next by tourists and wildlife, or that otherwise facilitates
unwelcome exchanges of any kind will be viewed with suspicion and dealt with accordingly.

The rise in isolationism and protectionism will bring about ever more heated arguments and
dangerous confrontations over shared sources of oil, gas, and other key commodities as well as
factors of production that must, out of necessity, be acquired from less-than-friendly nations.
Whether involving raw materials used in strategic industries or basic necessities such as food, water, and energy, efforts to
secure adequate supplies will take increasing precedence in a world where demand seems constantly out of kilter with supply.
Disputes over the misuse, overuse, and pollution of the environment and natural resources will become more
commonplace. Around the world, such tensions will give rise to full-scale military encounters, often
with minimal provocation.

In some instances, economic conditions will serve as a convenient pretext for conflicts that stem from
cultural and religious differences. Alternatively, nations may look to divert attention away from
domestic problems by channeling frustration and populist sentiment toward other countries and cultures. Enabled
by cheap technology and the waning threat of American retribution, terrorist groups will likely boost the frequency and scale

of their horrifying attacks, bringing the threat of random violence to a whole new level.

Turbulent conditions will encourage aggressive saber rattling and interdictions by rogue nations running amok.
Age-old clashes will also take on a new, more healed sense of urgency. China will likely assume an increasingly belligerent

posture toward Taiwan , while Iran may embark on overt colonization of its neighbors in the Mideast.
Israel, for its part, may look to draw a dwindling list of allies from around the world into a growing number of
conflicts. Some observers, like John Mearsheimer, a political scientist at the University of Chicago, have even speculated that an "intense confrontation" between the United
States and China is "inevitable" at some point.

More than a few disputes will turn out to be almost wholly ideological. Growing cultural and religious differences will be transformed from wars of words to battles soaked in

Long-simmering resentments could also degenerate quickly, spurring the basest of human instincts and
blood.

triggering genocidal acts. Terrorists employing biological or nuclear weapons will vie with
conventional forces using jets, cruise missiles, and bunker-busting bombs to cause widespread destruction. Many will interpret
stepped-up conflicts between Muslims and Western societies as the beginnings of a new world war .
 Ext -- Asean Collapse Coming
Trade blocs collapse ASEAN
NWG 14, Neat Working Group, Network of East Asia Think-Tanks, official international organization of
ASEAN+3 countries, August 2014, Accelerating the RCEP Process through Strengthening the APT
Cooperation, http://www.ceac.jp/j/pdf/neat/12wg_1.pdf

Thirdly, political and strategic

factors can impact the RCEP negotiations. The U.S. rebalance toward Asia, with
both security and economic ambitions, is
perceived as an external challenge to the RCEP. The U.S. led FTATPP, has
enlisted seven of the RCEP members, including four ASEAN membersBrunei Darussalam, Malaysia, Singapore and
Vietnam, and three non-ASEAN countriesJapan, Australia and New Zealand. The Republic of Korea, the Philippines and Thailand have also
shown their interest in joining the TPP. Indeedmany countries movement towards the TPP can be explained at
best in political rather than economic terms, reflecting the increasing strategic importance of the United States in the region.
Therefore, they are trying to balance their security and economic interests by balancing between the

RCEP and the TPP. Any competition between the TPP and the RCEP may lead to disunity within
ASEAN, which may undermine the ASEANs centrality in the region. Especially in the short run, the two
parallel negotiations add much pressure on human capital, budget and other country resources to the dual
members. There is also a concern that if TPP negotiations are concluded ahead of the RCEP, some of the dual members may have less desire
to continue their efforts on the RCEP.

Trade blocs split ASEAN force countries to pick sides

Donald K. Emmerson 15, director of the Southeast Asia Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-
Pacific Research Center, 12/1/2015, Stanford scholars weigh in on the Trans-Pacific Partnership
agreement, Institute for International Studies at Stanford, http://fsi.stanford.edu/news/stanford-
scholars-weigh-trans-pacific-partnership-agreement

In strictly economic terms, there

is no exact alternative to the distinctively comprehensive and intrusive TPP .
In loosely economic but mainly geopolitical terms, however, a competitor does exist: the Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). The United States is in the TPP. China is not. In the RCEP, the
reverse is true. The United States has propelled the TPP. China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are driving the
formation of RCEP by all ten ASEAN states plus Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea. Compared with the TPP, RCEP is
far less robust. RCEP
is mainly about straightening the overlapping and sometimes inconsistent free trade
agreements that already complicate Asian regionalismthe tangled contents of Asias noodle bowl
of overlapping FTAs. (Trade agreements in the Asia-Pacific have burgeoned from around 60 ten years ago to some 300 today.) Under
pressure from the more detailed and thoroughgoing TPP, RCEPs would-be progenitors have been trying to expand their agenda to include
more intrusive proposals. Partly for that reason, observers are pessimistic that RCEPs negotiators will be able to proclaim its successful
completion before the end of 2015. ASEAN is divided . Myanmar, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, the Philippines,
and Thailand are inside RCEP but outside the TPP. The other four ASEAN membersBrunei, Malaysia,
Singapore, and Vietnamenjoy the advantage of sitting at both negotiating tables. If only one of the two
projected partnerships fails, these four states would still have the other arrangement to fall back on, and so much the better for them if both
schemes succeed. It is partly for this reason that varying
degrees of interest in joining the TPP have been expressed
by five of the six non-TPP states in Southeast Asia. The exception is Myanmar, but once the structure and character of its
new government have been clarified, its leaders too may wish to consider the TPP. Even Chinas initially hostile view of the TPP has softened.
Given the market-favoring and regulation stipulations of the TPP, new entrants may be unwilling to
accept its detailed, full-spectrum rules. But the Doha Round is dead, and the proposal to replace it
with a scaled-down Global Recovery Round has gone nowhere. For the time being, the best one can
hope for in the Asia-Pacific region is a successful TPP that China could eventually join, or a successful RCEP
that could someday welcome the United States

TPP splits ASEAN hampers integration

Cora Jungbluth 16, PhD in Chinese Studies from Heidelberg University. 5/17/2016, Who will shape the
world trade order of the 21st centuryEast or West?, GED, https://ged-project.de/topics/international-
trade/effects_of_regional_trade_agreements/ftaap/who-will-shape-the-world-trade-order-of-the-21st-
century-east-or-west-2/
The negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) could be regarded as an attempt by the West to mitigate this
development and to become a pioneer in the establishment of deep standards for a new world trade order. Meanwhile, Asian countries
have not been idle either and a number of them are involved in the negotiation of three other mega-
regional trade deals: the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific
(FTAAP) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Whereas the TPP and FTAAP
strive for closer integration of the Asia-Pacific region, the RCEPopts for closer integration between
Asia and Oceania with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as the center. Since the
three mega-regionals differ in the composition of their members, their economic effects consequently
differ with respect to both member states and third countries within Asia. In addition, scenarios are possible
where several agreements exist at the same time. Blogpost_Asia_Grafiken1 The TPP includes the least number of Asian
countries. Also, China, the worlds most important trading nation, is excluded. According to our analysis, this
results in more negative effects on real income in Asia than the other two trade pacts, even though these effects stay within narrow limits.
The TPP could also lead to an economic split among ASEAN states, since only four out of 10 members are
part of the TPP, and might hamper the ASEAN integration process in the long run. It therefore makes sense for
the ASEAN states to push their own integration initiative in the form of the RCEP. Compared to the TPP, the RCEP yields
more positive economic effects for Asian countries, including non-members, and thus is more advantageous for the economic integration
process within Asia. The FTAAP as the most inclusive initiative could have significant positive effects and
provide major momentum for trade in the region and beyond for non-participating Asian countries as
well, especially through the elimination of non-tariff barriers to trade. Considered over the medium to long term,
the FTAAP is consequently a more sustainable path to economic integration for Asia due to its broader inclusiveness.

, or the birth of both arrangements followed by effective steps to render them complementary rather than competitive.
 Ext -- Asean Solves Overfishing
Continued ASEAN effort is key solve overfishing shared marine environment makes
regional action necessary
Kheng-Lian Koh 16, Professor Emeritus of the Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore, and a
founder and the Director of the Asia - Pacific Centre for Environmental Law, PhD and LLM, 2016, Asean
Environmental Legal Integration: Sustainable Goals?, pg 69-70

Notwithstanding the work undertaken through SEAFDEC, effective management

of coastal fisheries that straddle
national and international borders continues to be a challenge for ASEAN. Diminishing coastal fish
stocks is the result of (a) national fisheries policies that address fishing primarily in national and
coastal waters and not migratory fish nor those straddling borders; (b) management and administration that tend to
focus on local waters and not on ASEAN-wide patterns; (c) demersal fish that are associ-ated with different specific habitats during their life
cycle, and conservation laws or policies do not cover the range of the species across its life cycles; and (d) human and material resources that
enforce fishery laws are severely limited and the patrol area is vast, enabling unlawful practices to persist." ASEAN
itself concludes
in the Fourth State of the Environment Report that the slow progress in managing the coastal and
marine environments is due to several factors: "lack of irrefutable and clear information about the nature and extent of the
proven affecting the coastal and marine environment; legal and institutional complexities; non-involvement of local communities; weak multi-
sectoral approaches; including inadequate use of financial incentives, reporting and environmental management systems, weak environmental
impact assessment systems and incomplete legal instruments.56 While these
reasons may be sound, they at a minimum
explain why ASEAN action on marine and coastal issues has made slow progress, but do not explain
why the coastal and marine environment has not been accorded higher priority. ASEAN needs to build
new modalities for linking its policy and law development to capacity-building efforts, such as those of
SEAFDEC. Regional integration is not undertaken only by ASEAN, but ASEAN has the mandate to begin

integrating policy that leads to a common set of legal norms. The shared marine environment of the
region urgently needs strong ASEAN engagement especially regarding fish harvests. Fisheries management cuts across
economic, polit-ical and environmental sectors of ASEAN cooperation. Until the ASEAN ministerial meeting raises the sustainability of the
marine environment to the ASEAN meeting of Heads of State, it is likely that coast, marine and fisheries issues will be char-acterized by
unsustainable practices for some time to come. The marine environment defines the ASEAN region in many ways. The

ASEAN environmental cooperation programs are still at their early stages of exploring how to pro-tect the coastal
and marine environment. Lack of capacity is the primary reason for the apparent relegation of this sector to a lower priority than it warrants in
light of its importance.

The groundwork for effective cooperation has been laid sustaining regionwide
institutions is key to string together individual efforts
PDP Osman Patra 15, Former Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Brunei,
Chapter 7: Strengthening Maritime Cooperation in East Asia, part of Navigating Change: ASEAN-Japan
Strategic Partnership in East Asia and Global Governance, edited by Rizal Sukma and Yoshihide Soeya,
http://www.jcie.or.jp/japan/pub/publst/1461/full_report.pdf

On a more positive note, however, the proliferation of initiatives indicates that important integrative steps are being
advanced in and beyond ASEAN. They are precursors that need to be nurtured as the prospect for
regionwide East Asia cooperation is beginning to take shape. They reinforce each other in scope and
substance. The frameworks elaborated above are at an early stage of development. The scope of the agenda,
phase of work, and even its long-term direction are still very much works in progress. But they all point to the

commitment of countries in East Asia to engage each other in institutionalized settings to address
common concerns . But in Northeast Asia, a dichotomous situation prevails in which robust economic relations among countries there
coexist with historical, political, and strategic divides. Therefore, regional cooperation is occurring at a slower pace and remains at an early
stage. But maritime concerns will certainly figure predominantly in the international affairs of the region.
There have been a number of joint fisheries agreements, including a China-Japan agreement in
November 1997, a Japan-Korea agreement in January 2000, and a China-Korea agreement in June
2001. In addition, the China-Japan principled consensus on cooperation in the East China Sea has been in place since 2008, and though
subject to fluctuations in bilateral relations, it also represents good progress.23 At the regional level, the trilateral China-Japan-ROK
summit, which used to convene on the sidelines of the annual ASEAN Summit, was held on its own for the first time in
Japan in 2008 to discuss trilateral cooperation and matters of regional concern. The trilateral meeting has been
held on an ad hoc basis and a Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat was set up in Seoul in 2011.24 Meetings were not held in 2013 or 2014 due to
political tensions among the three nations, but they resumed in 2015. In the meantime, due to the busy sea lanes in the East China Sea, the
three countries have established an impressive record of search and rescue cooperation.25 Overall, these developments are a
positive sign. Looking at East Asia as a geographic entity, there appears to be no specifically dedicated forum or
mechanismlet alone an overarching regional structurebeing considered to deal comprehensively
with maritime matters. This signals the need for a regionwide institution that can string together the
objectives and substance of those processes described above. Moreover, this should be done in a context
that is linked to the building of an East Asian Community in which countries in the region have shared
strategic interests. On specific maritime issues, the regional experience in Northeast and Southeast
Asia is on an advanced learning curve. ASEAN and China have embarked on a number of potential
processes, and China, Japan, and South Korea have engaged each other from time to time on a
bilateral or trilateral basis as well. The developments cited above are contributing factors consistent
with, as well as supportive of, the creation of a regionwide platform. It begins with the increasing layers of
cooperative institutions that in recent decades have galvanized countries in responding to many serious regional problems collectively.
 Food Security Impact
Overfishing collapses global food security
WWF 15 (World Wildlife Foundation, Failing fisheries and poor ocean health starving human food
supply tide must turn, 16 September 2015, http://wwf.panda.org/wwf_news/?252532)

Populations of fish critical to human food security are in serious decline worldwide with some at risk
of collapse according to the emergency edition of a WWF report released today. WWFs Living Blue Planet Report
finds that much of the activity threatening the ocean is avoidable and solutions do exist to turn the
tide. The updated study of marine mammals, birds, reptiles and fish shows that populations have been reduced on average by half globally in the last four decades, with some fish
declining by close to 75 percent. The latest findings spell trouble for all nations, especially people in the developing

world. To reverse the downward trend, global leaders must ensure that ocean recovery and coastal
habitat health feature strongly in the implementation of the UNs sustainable development goals that will be formally approved later this month. Negotiations on a
new global climate deal are also an important opportunity to forge agreement in support of ocean health. We urgently published this report to provide the most current picture of the

state of the ocean, said Marco Lambertini, Director General of WWF International. In the space of a single generation, human
activity has severely damaged the ocean by catching fish faster than they can reproduce while also
destroying their nurseries. Profound changes are needed to ensure abundant ocean life for future
generations. Research in the WWF report indicates that species essential to commercial and subsistence fishing and
therefore global food supply may be suffering the greatest declines. Underscoring the severe drop in commercial fish stocks, the
a race to catch fish that could
report details the dramatic loss of 74 per cent of the family of popular food fish that includes tunas, mackerels and bonitos. We are in

end with people starved of a vital food source and an essential economic engine. Overfishing, destruction of
marine habitats and climate change have dire consequences for the entire human population, with the poorest

communities that rely on the sea getting hit fastest and hardest. The collapse of ocean ecosystems could trigger
serious economic decline and undermine our fight to eradicate poverty and malnutrition, said Lambertini. The report
shows a decline of 49 per cent of marine populations between 1970 and 2012. The analysis tracked 5,829 populations of 1,234 species, making the data sets almost twice as large as past
studies and giving a clearer, more troubling picture of ocean health. The findings are based on the Living Planet Index, a database maintained and analyzed by researchers at the Zoological
Society of London (ZSL). In response to alarming statistics raised in WWFs Living Planet Report 2014, this special report studies how overfishing, damage to habitat and climate change are

affecting marine biodiversity. Adding to the crisis of falling fish populations, the report shows steep declines in coral reefs, mangroves and
seagrasses that support fish species and provide valuable services to people. Over one-third of fish tracked by the report rely on coral reefs, and these species show a dangerous decline of 34
per cent between 1979 and 2010. Research shows that coral reefs could be lost across the globe by 2050 as a result of climate change. With over 25 per cent of all marine species living in

coral reefs and about 850 million people directly benefiting from their economic, social and cultural services , the loss of coral reefs would be a
catastrophic extinction with dramatic consequences on communities. The ocean is an integral part
of our lives. We are kept alive by the clean air, food and other services it provides . More than that, we are simply
drawn to the ocean and its wildlife, whether a trip to the seaside or an encounter with the penguins at the ZSL London Zoo. This report suggests that billions of animals have been lost from the
worlds oceans in my lifetime alone. This is a terrible and dangerous legacy to leave to our grandchildren, said Ken Norris, Director of Science at ZSL.

Causes global nuclear war

FDI 12
Future Directions International, a Research institute providing strategic analysis of Australias global
interests; citing Lindsay Falvery, PhD in Agricultural Science and former Professor at the University of
Melbournes Institute of Land and Environment, Food and Water Insecurity: International Conflict
Triggers & Potential Conflict Points, http://www.futuredirections.org.au/workshop-papers/537-
international-conflict-triggers-and-potential-conflict-points-resulting-from-food-and-water-
insecurity.html
There is a growing appreciation that the conflicts in the next century will most likely be fought over a
lack of resources. Yet, in a sense, this is not new. Researchers point to the French and Russian revolutions as
conflicts induced by a lack of food. More recently, Germanys World War Two efforts are said to have been
inspired, at least in part, by its perceived need to gain access to more food. Yet the general sense among those that attended FDIs recent
workshops, was that the scale of the problem in the future could be significantly greater as a result of population pressures,

Lindsay
changing weather, urbanisation, migration, loss of arable land and other farm inputs, and increased affluence in the developing world. In his book, Small Farmers Secure Food,

Falvey, a participant in FDIs March 2012 workshop on the issue of food and conflict, clearly expresses the problem and why countries across the globe are starting to
take note. . He writes (p.36), if people are hungry, especially in cities, the state is not stable riots, violence, breakdown of law and order and

migration result. Hunger feeds anarchy. This view is also shared by Julian Cribb, who in his book, The Coming Famine, writes that if large regions of
the world run short of food, land or water in the decades that lie ahead, then wholesale, bloody wars are liable to follow.
He continues: An increasingly credible scenario for World War 3 is not so much a confrontation of super powers and their allies, as a
festering , self-perpetuating chain of resource conflicts. He also says: The wars of the 21st Century are less likely to be global conflicts with
sharply defined sides and huge armies, than a scrappy mass of failed states, rebellions, civil strife, insurgencies, terrorism and genocides, sparked by bloody competition over dwindling
resources. As another workshop participant put it, people do not go to war to kill; they go to war over resources, either to protect or to gain the resources for themselves. Another

observed that hunger results in passivity not conflict. Conflict is over resources, not because people are going hungry. A study by the I nternational P eace
R esearch I nstitute indicates that where food security is an issue, it is more likely to result in some
form of conflict . Darfur, Rwanda, Eritrea and the Balkans experienced such wars. Governments, especially in developed
countries, are increasingly aware of this phenomenon. The UK Ministry of Defence, the CIA, the US C enter for S trategic and I nternational
S tudies and the Oslo Peace Research Institute, all identify famine as a potential trigger for conflicts and possibly
even nuclear war .

Specifically true in Asia fishery collapse risks massive instability

Christopher Baker 13, leading editor of the CISS Food Security in Asia Project sponsored by the
MacArthur foundation and lecturer at the University of Sydney in both the Sydney Business School and
the Department of Government and International Relations, FOOD SECURITY IN ASIA: A REPORT FOR
POLICYMAKERS, Feb,
https://sydney.edu.au/arts/ciss/downloads/CISS_Food_Security_Policy_Report.pdf
In terms of actual food security and contribution to economic development, the Philippines and Vietnam are much more dependent on fish
than China.93 Southeast
Asians rely more heavily on fish as a primary source of dietary protein than any
other people in the world.94 The result is that the Chinese claims of sovereignty over the fisheries resources and features of the
S outh C hina S ea, and Chinas willingness to enforce this, are having a real impact on food security in both the
Philippines and Vietnam.95 The state of fisheries and the strategic competition surrounding them in
littoral Asia is reflective of the overall challenges of understanding and dealing with food security
issues. Reflecting the siloed nature of research on food, and security more generally, most of the concerns about food and security in the
academic literature have focused on the economics of supply and demand and the science of increasing production, monitoring or
environmental factors. Food security intersects these issues and, as the examples above demonstrate, overlaps with strategic concerns and
policy decisions at a national and regional level. Better fish management practices are clearly central not only to
the problem of fish depletion but also the geopolitical tensions that arise when states fear a loss of
a valuable resource to competitors. The key is to find a better balance between the legitimate needs of fishing nations, the
important contribution that wild fish makes to the global food market and fishing practices which are sustainable in an era of rising fish
consumption. Moreover, claimant states must understand that by pushing their claims in the contested waters of Asia, although they may
stand to gain in terms of extended sovereignty, energy and increases in fish supply in the short-term, they have
much to lose in the
medium to long-term, not only through significant losses to food security from the risk of collapse of the regions
fisheries, but also from the likelihood of increased tensions and the risks of conflict . Policymakers and other
actors must be cognisant of the fact that international norms and values need to be abided by to ensure the long-
term sustainability of fisheries resources, regional peace and stability and food security and
livelihoods for millions of Asians. The depletion of fish stocks in Asia illustrates three broader points about the connections
between food scarcity and security. First, even local and relatively short-term food shortages can generate social
and political tensions within states that may become the precursors of more serious conflict . Second, the
relationship between food and security is more complex and dynamic than often recognised: foodshortages have rarely been a primary
cause of major conflict between states; they can, however, contribute to instability and aggravate interstate tensions
by stimulating migration flows and resource conflicts . Third, food shortages are generally symptomatic of flawed
political and economic systems, policy failures, and a lack of access because of the uneven distribution of food or income inequalities. Elites
rarely suffer from hunger even in the poorest countries. There has been insufficient political commitment and policy coordination to avert what
could turn into a full-blown fish crisis in the coming two decades. Without a new approach to managing this critical food resource, the

decline in Asian fish stocks will only accelerate, causing widespread political strife and social
disruption in fish-dependent communities and states, while aggravating resource tensions.
Relations Adv
 Ext -- TPP K2 Relations

US-China relations based on TPP

Antoine Martin 16, Associate Researcher at The Chinese University of Hong Kong, PhD in International
Economics Law and International Relations from the University of Surrey, 1/21/2016, Asia-Pacific trade
policy: from trade Opera to game of thrones?, The Political Economy Circle,
http://www.politicaleconomycircle.org/#!AsiaPacific-trade-policy-from-trade-Opera-to-game-of-
thrones/cmbz/56972ab20cf263fc5a8a77e6

Overall, the decision to leave China out of TPP negotiations somehow plays against the U.S, politically
speaking at least. Legally speaking, of course, the TPP Agreement is a very significant piece of regional
trade law which will bring credit to U.S diplomacy. Most likely, in fact, TPP eventually came out of the
box because large countries such as China, Brazil or India (and their demands) were actually left aside.
Politically, however, the decision to leave China out of TPP negotiations has awakened a trade dragon.
First, China left as an observer had simply no choice but to support a counter-agreement to preserve its
regional political and policymaking influence and its share of the Asia-Pacific trade cake. Second, China
not being invited into the TPP trade negotiations means that the Agreement loses grip on a part of
international trade that would have obviously given it a major representativeness and power. Third, by
not inviting a major stakeholder to the table U.S diplomats secured a major legal agreement but lost a
chance to present themselves as coordinators of the worlds major economies, as well as a chance to set
up one of the most significant trade agreements in terms of GDP shares. In fact, numbers that
commonly circulate suggest that TPP could accounts for 40% of global GDP while Chinese-led RCEP and
FTAAP would respectively account for nearly 30% and 57% of global GDP. Fourth, China could therefore
be playing two different leagues at the same time with RCEP being already en route and FTAAP being
considered by local actors as the future of TPP (see the APEC Trade Opera Part 1), i.e. less strict while
integrating more partners and covering more of the region than TPP and RCEP together. Last but not
least, in addition to being considered as a possibly premature arrangement, the newborn TPP is already
described by some as a pathway to realizing the FTAAP (together with RCEP) while the (so far
theoretical) Chinese initiative is being granted promising credentials by the same token. A king in the
East? By excluding China from TPP, overall, the U.S diplomacy secured an important legal instrument for
regional trade in the Asia-Pacfic region but, as far as regional policymaking and politics are concerned, it
somehow shot itself in the foot. Yes, TPP is a strong piece and the U.S deserves credit for this. But as far
as international trade politics are concerned, the APEC trade Opera has already conferred China a dose
of political authority which will add up when FTAAP and OBOR materialize. If these ever work, China will
appear as the mastermind of trade diplomacy in APEC. Meanwhile, the country is likely to enjoy a
comfortable position in the Asia-Pacific game of thrones.

Exclusion of China from the TPP is viewed as containment and undermines effective
cooperation
Chen, 2015 (Dingding, The Diplomat, 10-7-2015, Not So Fast: The TPP Might Be Good News for
China http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/not-so-fast-the-tpp-might-be-good-news-for-china/)
This landmark deal could have huge economic, political, and geopolitical consequences. For example, many prominent economists have already
decried the deal for giving unfair advantages to big corporations. The most interesting implication, however, is how this landmark deal could affect
U.S.-China relations. Indeed, as U.S. President Barack Obama has said before, the TPP deal is meant to demonstrate that the United
States, not China, should write the rules for global trade. Many also see the TPP deal as a centerpiece
of Americas pivot to Asia strategy, aimed at pressuring China . Whatever the main purpose of the TPP, most Chinese
analysts view it as a containment strategy directed at Beijing, trying to exclude China from the global
trade network and hurt its economy.

Only inclusion can allow for effective integration and relations the alternative is a
hostile build up militarily by China.
Xiang, 2015 (Yu, division of American economic studies, associate research fellow, Institute of
American Studies, U.S. should invite China to join TPP
http://english.cntv.cn/2015/10/10/ARTI1444466006678681.shtml10/10 )

Top trade negotiators of the United States and 11 other Pacific Rim countries have reached a deal on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) free trade pact,
which is hailed as a historic accord. US President Barack Obama emphasized the deal would eliminate or reduce more than 18,000 tariffs that participating countries impose on US exports. The reduction of tariffs will lower prices for international consumers. According to the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), the 12 TPP countries account for a combined GDP (Gross Domestic Product) of approximately $30 trillion, about 40 per cent of global GDP and a population of 800 million. Although the deal still has yet to be ratified in all 12 countries, the TPP may likely become the

The TPP represents the

law of the land. For some strategic analysts, the deal creates a huge economic annular zone or the C shape, China, the seco nd biggest economy in the region as well as in the world is right in the gap of the C shape.

US pivot to Asia, intended to balance Chinas rise. The TPP seems to be a Cold War-style geopolitical
stratagem In order to inject a positive impetus to bilateral relations, the US should compromise on
.

TPP. According to the Entering only with Invitation principle, Beijing can only participate in TPP
negotiations if invited Therefore an invitation from the US can refute a perspective that the TPP is
.

curbing China's rise. China's entrance would ensure that TPP becomes more inclusive Lets not forget .

that one of the most important achievements during Chinese President Xi Jinping's first state visit to
the US on Sept.22-25 had been to convince Washington on the significance of building a new type of
major country relationship . Xi invited the US to take part in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and pledged to cooperate with the US on
issues of common concern , dispelling Washingtons fears that Beijing is squeezing the US out of the Asia Pacific sphere of influence. It's time for Washington to take
positive action on TPP. Excluding China from international or regional trade arrangements is unrealistic. Although China has come to grips with a currency and stock market correction, the

short term fluctuations won't change its status as one of the largest trading and economic powers for the many years ahead. Currently, China is the world's second-largest economy and the largest exporter. China should be included in the TPP, it would make a combined GDP stand at
more than 50 per cent of global GDP. Furthermore, China has signed numerous free trade agreements with other countries, including TPP member states. China and US Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) negotiations are accelerating as well. Trade facilitating negotiations between Beijing

China is too important to be

and Tokyo remain under the framework of the China-Japan-South Korea free trade agreement. China has supported more negotiations with existing TPP participants, which could undermine the TPP's impact.

ignored and too large to be contained. The US should invite China to the TPP as soon as possible. This
would symbolize a second opening up for the nation after gaining entry into the World Trade Organization. Beijings trade interests are also in line with US interests. The Chinese

Commerce Ministry announced recently that Beijing is open to any mechanism that follows World Trade Organization rules and boosts economic integration of the Asia-Pacific. Additionally, China may take defensive
measures, if it feels isolated from the TPP sphere. Such actions could destabilize the region .
China in the TPP erases the zero sum relationship the US and China has in the region-
allows for cooperation between the super powers
Sike 15 (Wu, Member of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chinese Peoples Political Consultative
Conference, 10-19-2015, Why the TPP Is an Economic NATO http://www.huffingtonpost.com/wu-
sike/tpp-economic-nato_b_8328014.html)

China, a major country in the Asia-Pacific region and the second-largest economy in the world, is not a
TPP member. Several Chinese economists and scholars observed that the TPP and the parallel
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership still under negotiation naturally constitute a
decelerator in checking Chinas influence in global trade. On the one hand, the TPP has created a complete de-
Sinicized industrial chain. In the upstream of this chain, Malaysia, Brunei, Chile, the United States, Australia, New Zealand and Canada could
provide raw materials and mineral resources; in the middle stream, South Korea, Japan, the United States and Canada are all manufacturing
powerhouses; and in the downstream, the TPP has the zero-tariff arrangements among the member countries in terms of sales and marketing.
In the Asia-Pacific region, if the United States makes use of resources from Australia, Chile and Canada, teams up with Japan and South Korea in
high-end manufacturing, and offers support to Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia in low-end industries, it will inevitably pose grave
economic and trade challenges to China. On the other hand, upon the opening of the financial sector, the partnership aims to construct a core
financial system that will be dominated by the U.S. dollar, so as to guarantee the future position for the dollar in the world. Financial capital of
the 12 members will undergo deep integration under the TPP framework and will be mutually pegged. This is one of the important reasons why
the TPP, compared with the arrangements for the opening of financial services in other international trade agreements, is more profound and
significant. Some people believe that through integrating the factors for economic, trade and financial development under the TPP framework,
the United States could accomplish its goal of containing China. In fact, Chinas development strategy and path are clearly defined and
transparent. On the domestic front, China works to modernize the state governance system, carries out reform and opening up to the outside
world, adheres to rule of law, and enforces strict disciplines of the Party in the entire process of building a comprehensive well-off society. On
the international front, China will play its role as a responsible country, adhere to the road of peaceful
development, abide by the principles for win-win outcomes and mutual benefits, and assume
international obligations that are commensurate with its actual strength. China and the United States
should seek to better understand each other, eliminate mistrust and misunderstanding, and surmount
the zero-sum mindset. They should also build up confidence in their friendly cooperation and
development, face up to their disagreements, engage in frank communications, and work together to
unleash positive energy for the construction of bilateral relations. In the face of challenges for the global
economy, China and the United States should consider regional and global interests, abide by the preset
rules, and make joint endeavors to build economic and trade relations. The two should seek to become
the twin engines driving the growth of the world economy, and two major players in promoting reforms
in the global governance system. For China and the United States, a new type of economic and trade
relationship is in the best interest of the two major powers, and they should work towards this end.
Recently, the two sides have further deepened cooperation in a range of areas, including the mutually
reciprocal and beneficial economic and trade ties, more open and inclusive regional economic
cooperation, a policy environment favorable to innovation and cooperation, and sectors such as energy,
climate change, medical services, infrastructure and financial services. Among the steps already taken,
the most important include pushing to complete at the earliest date possible the Bilateral Investment
Treaty negotiations, to start at an appropriate time the feasibility study on the Bilateral Investment and
Trade Treaty and officially launch negotiations when conditions are ripe. The United States could help
China join the TPP while China helps the United States join the Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership, and China and the United States jointly promote the construction of the Asia-Pacific Free
Trade Zone and try to complete the construction of the worlds largest free trade zone by around 2030.
To be specific, the measures include: to reach a high-standard bilateral investment treaty to encourage
mutual investment; to promote trade liberalization and facilitation in the Asia-Pacific region; to continue
to promote market-oriented financial reforms; to promote innovation and cooperation in sectors such
as energy, environmental protection, medical services, high technology, infrastructure and connectivity;
to elevate cooperation in agriculture; and to make progress in cyber and information security. All these
are areas that matter to the interests and well-being of both China and the United States, and all
countries in the Asia-Pacific region.
 Ext -- Relations Solve ECS
Effective relations can mitigate territorial disputes
Sun 13 (Yun, Brookings Global Economy and Development, Africa Growth Initiative nonresident fellow,
1-31-2013, March West: Chinas Response to the U.S. Rebalancing
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/01/31-china-us-sun)

March West would benefit China greatly. It would provide China with an alternative geographical
area, one that is free from U.S. dominance to expand its influence. By returning to its roots as a continental power,
China hopefully will avoid further competition/confrontation with the U.S. in East Asia, foster
stability, and build a better relationship with Washington through cooperation in the West and on
issues such as Afghanistan and Pakistan. Internally, March West would accelerate the Grand Western
Development (), a national strategy launched in 2000 to promote the growth of Chinas
western provinces in light of its unbalanced development compared to the eastern coastal provinces .
It would facilitate better economic integration between these two areas while strengthen the
security of Chinas western borders and provinces. It should be noted that by March West, Wang is not proposing an
abandonment of East Asia, just like the U.S. pivot does not indicate Washingtons abandonment of the Middle East. In fact, what he argues is
Chinas own rebalancing between its historical, singular emphasis on East Asia and another
geographical angle to advance Chinas rise, a parallel pursuit of both sea power and land power. Indeed,
with the unstable hotspots such as Taiwan, North Korea and the maritime disputes in East and South
China Seas, East Asia is not a region China could withdraw from . To mitigate the current tensions,
Chinese policy analysts are actively promoting a reset of U.S.-China relations . This would inevitably
translate into certain tacit concessions on Chinas contentious and assertive moves in the region to
reduce tension, distrust and potential confrontation .
 Ext -- ECS Goes Nuclear
Nuclear use is likely---neither side has escalation dominance so theres no cap on tit-
for-tat retaliation
White 14 (Hugh, professor of strategic studies at the Australian National University in Canberra,
former Australian Deputy Secretary for Strategy and Intelligence, 7-5-2014, Asia's Nightmare Scenario:
A War in the East China Sea Over the Senkakus, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/asias-nightmare-
scenario-war-the-east-china-sea-over-the-10805

It is clear that an armed clash between Japan and China over the Senkaku /Diaoyu islands is a real possibility . If that happens

Washington would face a very serious choice. Failing to support Japan militarily would fatally weaken the US-Japan alliance, torpedo President Obamas Pivot, and undermine Americas whole position in Asia. But supporting Japan would mean going to war with China. Whether that

would be wise depends, as much as anything, on how a US-China war over the Senkakus would play out. Of course no one knows for sure. There has not been a serious maritime conflict for decades, nor war between two

nuclear-armed states so we cannot be sure how the fighting would go. Nor do we have any real experience of war between nuclear-armed states , so that factor too adds to uncertainty .

But there are some broad judgments that can be offered. If these judgments seem even moderately likely to be right, the implications for Americas choice about war over the Senkakus are rather sobering. They suggest that this would be a war
that America would not win, could not control , and should not undertake. And that of course has huge implications for Americas position in Asia. Suppose that fighting starts between China and Japan with a small armed clash near

the islands, in which losses are sustained by both sides. It is possible this kind of incident could be quickly contained without further fighting, but only if both Tokyo and Beijing acted with tact, forbearance and political courage. No one would bet on that, so it is at least equally likely that
the clash would escalate, and if so Japan would quickly ask America to help. What happens next if America joins the fight depends first on the strategic aims of each side? Chinas primary aim might be to land forces to take control of the islands, and at the minimum it would want to
exclude Japanese and US forces from the air- and sea-space around them. Americas and Japans aims might well look the same. Tokyo might decide that the time had come to put its control of the islands beyond dispute by stationing forces on them, and at a minimum it would want to
prevent further challenges of the kind we have seen recently by excluding Chinese forces from around the islands. What operational objectives would flow for each side from these strategic aims? Let us first suppose that each side decides t o limit the geographic scope of the conflict to
the areas around the disputed islands. To achieve their primary aims by deploying and sustaining occupation forces on the islands, either side would need to establish a high degree of sea and air control around them. That is likely to prove impossible for either of them: neither China nor
the Allies have any serious chance of achieving the sea and air control required to securely deploy and sustain occupation forces on the disputed islands against the other sides formidable sea and air denial capabilities. So as long as both sides limit their operations to the area around the
islands, neither would be able to take control of the islands by establishing forces on them. The situation is much less clear when we look at the two sides minimum aims. To prevent each other operating near the disputed islands they would only need to impose sea and air denial
around them. Each side could probably deny the waters surrounding the islands to the others surface forces. Neither side could prevent the other sustaining a substantial submarine presence there. But a battle for air superiority over and around the islands might be more evenly

as long as
balanced. Allied advantages in quality and perhaps in tactics could be offset by Chinese advantages in numbers and proximity, leading to a protracted and inconclusive air campaign in which losses on both sides would be quite high. This suggests that

operations were limited to the immediate area under contention, the most likely outcome would be
an inconclusive stalemate: both sides could deny the waters around the islands to the others surface
ships, but neither can exclude the others submarine and air forces It is hard to see how either from the disputed area.

side would consider this satisfactory a basis to conclude hostilities. Neither would have to improve their position in relation to the islands enough to justify the costs of the fighting. Both would be trapped in an indefinite and

This
costly campaign, especially in the air, with no way to end the conflict. Quite apart from any other considerations, this would prolong the extraordinary disruption of the conflict to each sides economy, a nd convey a message of weakness to each sides public.

means both sides would have strong incentives to seek a quicker and more decisive result by
broadening the conflict beyond the disputed area itself . That could happen in several ways. Some people have suggested that America could prevail in this kind of situation by imposing a

distant blockade of China which would bring its highly trade-dependent economy to its knees. Others have suggested that cyber-attacks or attacks on Chinas satellites could compel China to back off. Certainly Washington has these options, but so does Beijing. America is just as
vulnerable as China to attacks on its sea-borne trade, cyber systems and satellites, and Chinas capacity to mount such attacks is quite formidable. Moreover China may have options to damage Americas economy through its immense holdings of US debt. This suggests that on balance
neither side would see much to gain in opening these kinds of new fronts. They would therefore be more likely to look for advantage by extending conventional military operations beyond the disputed area itself. They could try to degrade one anothers air and naval strength around
the islands by attacking forces and bases beyond that primary Area of Operations. This is what Americas Air-Sea Battle concept is all about, of course, but two can play at that game. China has plenty of options to attack US and Japanese forces and bases too. US and Japanese submarine
and precision land-strike forces could certainly sink a lot of Chinese ships and destroy a lot of air bases, but Chinese short- and medium- range ballistic missiles could likewise do a lot of damage to US and Japanese bases, and China too could sink a lot of allied ships. So again it is hard to

see how one side or the other could win a decisive advantage this way. That means further escalation might then seem the only way to achieve acceptable
strategic outcomes for both sides. But neither side has escalation dominance : any step by one side
can be matched by the other. Both sides might nonetheless be impelled to escalate further because
the cost of relinquishing their strategic objectives will have increased as the scale and cost of the
conflict has grown. The longer and more bitter the fight becomes, the harder it becomes to step back,
and the more dangerous each step forward becomes At the top of this ladder of escalation looms the .

possibility of an intercontinental nuclear exchange , which would, or at least should, weigh heavily on both sides calculations right from the start. During the Cold War, the p ossibility of a large-

scale nuclear exchange affected the calculations of the superpowers whenever there was a risk of even the smallest-scale skirmishes between their forces. That was because each superpower recognized how hard it would be to contain an escalating conflict before it reached the nuclear
level, because they both saw the danger that neither of them would back down and accept defeat even to avoid a nuclear exchange. War was avoided becaus e both sides understood that their opponents were as grimly resolved as they were.

Japan-China war goes nuclear deterrence and interdependence dont check.

Ayson and Ball 14 (Robert, Professor of Strategic Studies at Victoria University of Wellington, and
Desmond, emeritus Professor in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre in the ANU College of Asia,
Can a Sino-Japanese War Be Controlled?, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy Volume 56, Issue 6,
November 2014)
It has been decades since the last war between major powers in Asia, but there is no guarantee that the region will always be able to avoid
conflict. The
greatest strain on the peace is in North Asia, where there has been rising tension between
China and Japan. What begins as a minor skirmish between China and Japan could conceivably
escalate into a more serious conflict that involved the United States and, in the worst case, the use of
nuclear weapons by Beijing and Washington. Even a major conventional conflict (between just Japan and China, or involving
all three) could be devastating for North Asia and the wider region, leading to a significant loss of life and widespread political, institutional and
economic damage. This article considers whether an initially limited outbreak of armed conflict between Japan and China could be controlled,
or whether the incentives to escalate would become irresistible. Is there, moreover, any real possibility that the US would stay on the sidelines
of such a war, given its close connections with Japan and perceptions of China? And would the prospect of America's participation in an
escalating conflict encourage Sino-Japanese restraint or precipitate more aggressive behaviour? Rising concern about a North Asian war
Concern about the possibility of a war in Asia has been growing as the contest of words and actions between Japan and China has become more
serious. The immediate focus of this anxiety has often been the territorial dispute over the five features in the East China Sea referred to as the
Senkaku Islands by Japan, the administering power, and the Diaoyu Islands by China, which claims them as its own. More
frequent and
assertive patrols by Chinese vessels and aircraft in the vicinity of the islands have caused alarm in
Japan, and have led Washington to publicly reassure Tokyo that they are covered by the bilateral
Treaty of Mutual Security and Cooperation, which promises US support in the event of an attack on Japanese
territories or armed forces. Tensions grew further in late 2013 with China's surprise announcement of an
Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) that included the airspace over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands (as well as territories claimed
by South Korea). Aircraft entering the zone were required to identify themselves, maintain contact with the Chinese authorities while flying
through it, report their flight plans and follow instructions. Failure to do so, the Chinese warned, could elicit emergency defensive measures.
This created the possibility of threats to non-compliant civilian aircraft. Singapore's Kishore Mahbubani observed that: we are moving toward a
more dangerous world if we permit every country the right to create air defence zones with distinct and different rules. A multiplicity of rules
will lead to confusion for civilian airlines and pilots.1 But the wider implications were also clear. Japan,
the US and their strategic-
dialogue partner Australia all expressed concern about the ADIZ's establishment, labelling it a
unilateral act of coercion designed to change the status quo. Of course, there are other factors in the worsening
strategic relationship between China and Japan. The ire of Beijing (and Seoul) was provoked by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's December
2013 visit to the highly controversial Yasukuni Shrine, which commemorates Japanese soldiers and military leaders from a range of conflicts,
including a number of Class A war criminals from the Second World War. Abe's visit, which also drew a rare rebuke from the US, lent credence
to Beijing's assertions that Japan was returning to an earlier pattern of militarism from which it had failed to sufficiently distance itself. Japan
and China seem locked in a battle of honour and status, with neither willing or able to back down. The negative and sometimes hostile views of
Japan that play strongly with the Chinese public (as do reciprocal views among Japanese nationalists) limit the room for negotiation. While
some official contact between the two has been maintained beyond the security arena, including in discussions over trade integration, formal
interactions between the top leaderships have been rare in Abe's second term. Different readings of history, competing national identities and
the quest for control over natural resources all figure in this contest. But this problem is also about a changing distribution of power in Asia that
increasingly favours China, a shift that is the main external reason why Japan
has pursued a more active foreign and
defence policy. Tokyo's new approach includes enhancing both the material capabilities of the Japan Self-
Defense Forces (JSDF) and ensuring that its activities are less restricted by long-standing constitutional
provisions. But, with a sluggish economy, depressing demographics and concerns about the closing gap between American and Chinese
military power, Japan has only limited time in which to address this challenge. Meanwhile, as China's leaders become more confident about
their country's standing in the world, while remaining nervous about domestic stability, the temptation to put direct, coercive pressure on
Japan appears to be growing. The way out of this situation is unclear. At least for Japan, an accommodation between the US and China is not a
recipe for security but a sign of abandonment by its sole formal ally and security guarantor. And although Washington has welcomed and
encouraged the normalisation of Japan's security policy, and wants Tokyo to develop greater self-reliance in defence, Beijing continues to
expect that the US will restrain its top Asian ally without expanding its own capacity to balance Chinese power. The prospect of miscalculation is
built into this fluid set of power relations, in which the public perception that China is strong and Japan has languished does not always reflect
their actual capabilities. Not everyone is convinced that even a limited North Asian war is especially
plausible. But some of the arguments that such a conflict is unlikely, including those made in these pages by Richard
Bitzinger and Barry Desker just a few years ago, are being tested.2 There is growing support for the view that war between Japan and
China is a possibility that needs to be taken seriously. As 2014 approached, ominous comparisons were being drawn between contemporary
tensions in North Asia and the guns of August in Europe 100 years earlier.3 The analogy itself became a matter of contention between the two
major North Asian powers, when Beijing angrily rejected Abe's suggestion, made at the 2014 World Economic Forum in Davos, that the Sino-
Japanese relationship resembled that of Germany and Britain in the lead-up to the First World War. Given the unceasing academic debate over
the causes of that conflict, the analogy is imperfect. Nonetheless, the centenary served as a reminder of the possibility of catastrophic conflicts
that owe as much to misadventure and miscalculation as they do to wilful aggression and war by design. Such a comparison seems especially
apt because fewobservers of North Asian affairs believe that Japan and China desire a war of any sort.
This is partly because they are so economically intertwined with each other, and so dependent on overseas supply, that
hostilities would be likely to have high costs for both countries. Beijing and Tokyo are also aware that a serious conflict would harm the
peaceful, defensive reputations that they each seek. But these arguments assume that the leaders of Japan and
China will have the opportunity to make rational decisions in a period of calm, rather than face desperate
choices in a more heated moment . A war may occur if one side pushes the other too far due to misplaced confidence that
provocative acts can be continued without crossing the threshold into actual hostilities. It
is tempting to believe that Japan and
China's pushing and prodding of each other in the East China Sea, along with their rhetorical competition, are
theatrical games of bluff and brinkmanship designed to achieve their goals without the use of
violence. In this mode, China may be emboldened by the knowledge that it appears to have displaced the Philippine presence from
Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea without firing a shot. But Japan is not the Philippines, which lacks the armed forces required for
maritime military operations and is much less important to the US in the hierarchy of alliances. Any
military confrontations
between China and Japan have far higher stakes. There have already been a number of close calls
involving Chinese and Japanese naval vessels and aircraft in and above the East China Sea, and some potentially hazardous
interactions between Chinese and American maritime forces. Two particularly significant incidents occurred in January 2013, when ships from
the Chinese navy locked their fire-control radars onto a Japanese helicopter and, later, a Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) destroyer,
the JS Yudachi (DD-103). The radars were only turned on for a matter of minutes, but the confrontations were the closest that the two
countries have come to exchanging fire.4 The Chinese government initially denied that any fire-control radars had been used, while Tokyo
considered releasing recordings of the radar emissions, but decided that this would compromise its capabilities for collecting electronic
intelligence. Chinese officials later admitted that a fire-control radar had in fact been used, but said that it was accidental and the act was not
planned.5 Another near miss occurred in early 2014, when the USS Cowpens was reportedly forced to take evasive action to prevent a collision
with a Chinese landing ship that stopped in its path6 Although the US armed forces have not played up this incident, Washington and Beijing
traded accusations in August 2014, when an American P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft was intercepted in a potentially provocative
manner by a Chinese fighter jet.7 Events such as this provide a possible setting for unplanned acts of violence. And it is unclear whether there
are mechanisms in place to prevent bloodshed. There has been only a limited response to long-standing calls for the establishment of an
incidents-at-sea agreement between China and the US, and of robust communication channels between Tokyo and Beijing. It remains to be
seen how Japan, China or the US would respond to an attack on one of their vessels or aircraft. If such an incident occurred against a backdrop
of relatively calm political relations, a full-blown crisis might be avoided. But if it came at a particularly tense moment in Sino-American or Sino-
Japanese relations, the situation could rapidly deteriorate. In
the most systematic account of the dangers of crisis
instability, Avery Goldstein has charted both the pressures to use force pre-emptively in a Sino-
American crisis and the incentives to initiate the limited use of force to gain bargaining leverage .8 The
focus on relations between China and the US is unsurprising, given the widespread recognition that there is no more important relationship
than that between these two great powers, the assumption that the overall balance of military power in Asia will be decided by relations
between them, and the ongoing importance of both countries to the region's economic and security environment. Among the potential third-
party catalysts for a Sino-American war, the most common scenario posited in the existing literature is a crisis over the Taiwan Strait more
serious than that which occurred in the mid-1990s.9 In a 2012 Survival essay on how a war between China and the US might occur in the
following three decades, James Dobbins nominated in descending order of probabilitychanges in the status of North Korea and Taiwan,
Sino-American confrontation in cyberspace, and disputes arising from China's uneasy relationships with Japan and India.10 The tendency to
order dangers in this way means that rather little analysis has focused on the possibility of a worsening crisis that leads to an armed conflict
between Japan and China, and hostilities that spill over to involve the US. This scenario deserves greater attention, despite the fact that there is
a series of interlocking arguments as to why escalation between them might be thought unlikely. These include the judgements that China
wishes to achieve its objectives in the East and South China seas without the direct use of force by exploiting the bargaining power accrued
through its military build-up, but that Japan would be largely prevented from participating in an exchange of fire with China, and any significant
form of escalation, by the constitutional restraints placed on its forces; and that Washington is unlikely to act first while its deterrence power
restrains Beijing, which is aware that the US enjoys escalation dominance, a fact that reassures its ally Japan, reducing the likelihood that Tokyo
will respond aggressively to Chinese provocation. Escalation: concepts and assumptions The concept of escalation is a metaphor drawn from
the escalators appearing in department stores just as the US began to consider how nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union might be controlled.
It has shortcomings at both ends of its spectrum. The first is its intimation that the process is somehow automatic, and that states can find
themselves in an intensifying crisis or war over which they have no real control. But even states that are subject to extraordinary tension have
agency. Clausewitz argued that while in theory war might tend towards an absolute extreme, in practice it is normally circumscribed by political
decisions. As Lawrence Freedman insists, we should avoid becoming mesmerized by prophecies of rapid and uncontrollable escalation once any
hostilities anywhere begin. Talk of escalators and quagmires of relentless, independent processes encourages the view that after a point,
considered strategic judgements which weigh available military means against desirable political ends become irrelevant.11 At the same time,
however, there are technical and strategic factors that would complicate even the best intentions to
limit a war between China and Japan, and to avoid involving Washington. The material factors include
both countries' reliance on potentially vulnerable command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance
and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems, such as underwater sensors. Dependence on these sensors may encourage early
or pre-emptive military escalation. This is reflected in strategic factors such as the emphasis on swift
and coordinated strikes in Chinese doctrine and the American AirSea Battle concept, as well as the strong
incentives China would have to free its still-limited naval forces from the confines of the first island chain. The second problem with the
escalation metaphor is its intimation that, far from being unable to control the intensification of crisis and war, states can select rungs of the
escalation ladder on which to stabilise the conflict, and are able to impose these choices on the adversary. This optimism is most famously (or
infamously) reflected in the work of Herman Kahn, whose elaborate modelling of nuclear dynamics suggested that there were many discrete
rungs on the ladder of this most catastrophic and confusing form of human conflict. Such an approach manifests today in the quest for
conventional and nuclear escalation dominance, in which one side's over-whelmingly stronger capabilities at a particular level of war are
expected to stop the conflict from intensifying. While
escalation dominance is possible in theory, it relies on
preconditions that cannot be taken for granted in Asia. These include the assumptions that the
various sides have similar perceptions of the strategic balance and that, in keeping with Sun Tzu's advice to subdue
the enemy without fighting, the weaker party will not intensify a conflict in which it is obviously outgunned.
But perceptions of that balance may vary among the parties (especially between China and Japan).
There is little question, for example, that Beijing is aware of the large capabilities gap it would face were it to confront American forces, a view
that has encouraged efforts to equip and train the People's Liberation Army (PLA) for asymmetric operations. China may underrate
the Japanese military by not taking into account Japan's advanced capabilities (including its awareness of the
maritime battlespace) and by misreading Tokyo's willingness to use force should hostilities begin. Both of these problems
are exacerbated by the close links between the Japanese and American armed forces. Moreover, even if all parties shared an
identical view of the strategic balance and a thorough understanding of the costs of escalation, they would still not be
free of escalatory pressure. The effect of crises on incentive structures is such that an option that
initially seemed foolish to all concerned can become a distinct possibility as tensions mount. If either
China or Japan expect the other side to escalate (rightly or not), the incentive to act preemptively becomes
stronger. In this context, neither need be confident that it will achieve the desired political objectives through the careful application of
force. Instead, if escalation seems inevitable, the state need only judge that it will suffer less damage by
acting first than it would by waiting. A related hazard is the possibility that one or both sides will suffer from
overconfidence in their ability to contain the hostilities they have embarked on. It would be destabilising for
China to assume that it had escalation dom-inance due to Japan's reluctance to use force. Such an
assumption could also be inaccurate: in response to the flight of a Chinese drone into Japan's ADIZ (and close to the disputed islands) in
September 2013, the Abe administraion drafted plans authorising its forces to shoot down drones that made similar intrusions.12 Japan
appears to be increasingly willing to take forceful action. It
may be hazardous for Tokyo to assume that potential
support from the much stronger US forces will deter Beijing from escalating, making it safe for Japan
to provoke and fight China at low levels. It would also be problematic for Tokyo, Beijing or
Washington to assume that Chinese and American nuclear weapons set natural boundaries to
conventional war, and by doing so reduce the potential costs of a limited conflict. The stability instability paradox may
therefore operate in several forms to make the danger of escalation seem far less alarming than it
ought to be.
 Ext -- Relations solve Warming
US-China cooperation solves climate change leads to technology transfer and
international agreements BEFORE anthropogenic thresholds are surpassed
Lempert 14 (Robert, is a senior scientist at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation and director
of the Frederick S. Pardee Center for Longer Range Global Policy and the Future Human Condition, 12-
19-2014, http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2014/12/09/us-china-global-warming-
deal-could-signal-shift-on-climate-change

The U.S.-China agreement on limiting g reen h ouse g a s emissions represents a significant and welcome shift in
the international approach to addressing climate change. For the first time , a large developing country
has agreed to limit its greenhouse gas emissions a crucial step since these countries have become the worlds largest

sources. But the agreement also represents an important step in reorienting the international community
toward a new and more constructive role in slowing climate change. Nearly 20 years ago, the worlds governments
committed to preventing dangerous anthropogenic interference with the earths climate. Governments agreed at that time to define
dangerous with a precise number a 2 degrees Celsius (or 3.6 degrees Fahrenheit) global average temperature increase above average
temperatures in the 18th century, before humans began burning significant amounts of fossil fuels. In annual negotiations hosted by the U.N.
since 1995, over 190 countries have been seeking consensus agreement on emissions reduction targets consistent with meeting this 2 degrees
Celsius goal. So far, such a global agreement has proved impossible to reach. The U.S.-China deal represents a
fundamentally different framework . It's a bilateral agreement between two large emitters , rather than a
consensus among nearly 200 nations like that being discussed this week in Lima, Peru. It is also a type of agreement called pledge and
review, that is, individual countries pledge to meet targets and share data so others can review their
progress. Whether either country can actually meet its commitments will become clear in the review process. In addition, the U.S.-
China accord expands technology cooperation , aiming to accelerate the transition to a low-carbon
economy. This agreement between the worlds two largest emitters makes it more likely that the pivotal U.N.-
sponsored Paris 2015 climate negotiations will succeed by adopting the same format . Rather than seek legally
binding regulations, the U.N. climate negotiations could become a forum for mutual pledges and multilateral
technology cooperation, with a formal mechanism for review. A global climate conference organized around a

pledge and review framework is much more likely to lead to agreement than one aiming for legally binding emissions

reductions. But more importantly, such a framework can be expanded to create a dynamic that might actually
reduce emissions fast enough to prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference in the climate. Limiting
climate change will require a sustained, decades-long effort to transform the way societies fuel their homes, businesses, farms and
transportation. To date, no society has ever become or stayed wealthy without burning significant quantities of fossil fuels. Chinas emissions
have skyrocketed in recent decades because they have lifted half a billion people out of poverty. Limiting
climate change requires
a technology revolution that can reconcile economic growth with eliminating carbon emissions. But crafting
policies to launch and sustain such a technology revolution can prove difficult, for at least two reasons. First, technology revolutions follow
unpredictable paths. A large group of mostly cautious governments seeking consensus on legally binding targets will tend to focus on the least,
rather than the most, transformative possibilities. Second, the benefits of less climate change are spread among many people over many
generations, while the costs are disproportionately focused in the short-term on certain sectors of the economy. Those benefiting (today and in
the future) may not prove as vocal as those who suffer the main costs. History offers many examples of policy reforms that have succeeded and
failed when faced with such dynamics. In some cases, major policy reforms persist and grow for decades, while others quickly fade away. The
reforms that persist are often ones that create specific constituencies that strongly favor their continuation. Important examples in the United
States include social security and airline deregulation. The former empowered retirees and the latter airlines, which increased their earnings
with hub and spoke networks that made them strong supporters of the new policies. Recent studies have examined how creating
constituencies could speed a low-carbon technology revolution. Recent RAND work suggests that using revenues from a carbon price to reduce
corporate taxes could significantly speed U.S. decarbonization rates by creating business constituencies that favor an expanding climate policy.
Economist William Nordhaus recently proposed that countries voluntarily group themselves into a climate club,
whose members would set a domestic carbon price on themselves, and impose equivalent carbon tariffs on trade with countries outside the
club. Overtime, more countries would have an incentive to join the club as the costs of remaining
outside it grew. Other policies that create constituencies for reduced emissions include international standards for calculating the carbon
footprints of goods and services as well as financial reporting requirements for the embedded carbon in investments. The former would
empower environmentally conscious consumers and the firms that serve them. The latter would help steer funds to low carbon investments
and create constituencies for strengthening the standards. The current U.S.-China deal includes no explicit climate
constituency expanding measures. But the pact between the two countries does open the door for agreements
that include such measures among small groups of nations in the future . An international process
that empowers small groups of countries to take the lead in creating constituencies for
decarbonization could end up limiting climate change far more effectively than any consensus global
agreement . The U.N.-driven process of international consensus would still have a role in shaping standards for fairness in multilateral
agreements and the rules for what types of carbon tariffs are appropriate, but it would no longer be the driving force for international
agreements. After 20 years, it may be time for a change.

Slowing emissions key to prevent extinction

Bushnell 10 (Dennis M. NASA Langley Research Center chief scientist, has a MS in mechanical engineering, won the Lawrence A. Sperry
Award, AIAA Fluid and Plasma Dynamics Award, the AIAA Dryden Lectureship, and is the recipient of many NASA Medals for outstanding
Scientific Achievement and Leadership, "Conquering Climate Change," The Futurist 44. 3, May/Jun 2010, ProQuest)

Unless we act, the next century could see increases in species extinction, disease, and floods affecting one-third
of human population. But the tools for preventing this scenario are in our hands. Carbon-dioxide levels are now

greater than at any time in the past 650,000 years, according to data gathered from examining ice cores. These increases in CO2
correspond to estimates of man-made uses of fossil carbon fuels such as coal, petroleum, and natural gas. The global climate
computations, as reported by the ongoing Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) studies, indicate that s uch man-made CO2 sources could

be responsible for observed climate changes such as temperature increases, loss of ice coverage, and ocean
acidification. Admittedly, the less than satisfactory state of knowledge regarding the effects of aerosol and other issues make the global climate
computations less than fully accurate, but we must take this issue very seriously. I believe we should act in accordance with the precautionary principle: When

an activity raises threats of harm to human health or the environment, precautionary measures become
obligatory, even if some cause-and-effect relationships are not fully established scientifically. As paleontologist Peter Ward discussed in his book Under a
Green Sky, several "warming events" have radically altered the life on this planet throughout geologic

history. Among the most significant of these was the Permian extinction, which took place some 250 million years ago. This
event resulted in a decimation of animal life, leading many scientists to refer to it as the Great Dying.
The Permian extinction is thought to have been caused by a sudden increase in CO2 from Siberian
volcanoes. The amount of CO2 we're releasing into the atmosphere today, through human activity, is 100 times greater
than what came out of those volcanoes. During the Permian extinction, a number of chain reaction events, or
"positive feedbacks," resulted in oxygen-depleted oceans, enabling overgrowth of certain bacteria,

producing copious amounts of hydrogen sulfide, making the atmosphere toxic, and decimating the ozone
layer, all producing species die-off. The positive feedbacks not yet fully included in the IPCC projections include the
release of the massive amounts of fossil methane, some 20 times worse than CO2 as an accelerator of warming, fossil CO2
from the tundra and oceans, reduced oceanic CO2 uptake due to higher temperatures, acidification and algae
changes, changes in the earth's ability to reflect the sun's light back into space due to loss of glacier ice, changes in land
use, and extensive water evaporation (a greenhouse gas) from temperature increases. The additional effects of these feedbacks
increase the projections from a 4C-6C temperature rise by 2100 to a 10C-12C rise, according to some estimates. At those temperatures,
beyond 2100, essentially all the ice would melt and the ocean would rise by as much as 75 meters, flooding the homes of
one-third of the global population. Between now and then, ocean methane hydrate release could cause major tidal waves, and

glacier melting could affect major rivers upon which a large percentage of the population depends. We'll see increases in flooding, storms,

disease, droughts, species extinctions, ocean acidification, and a litany of other impacts, all as a consequence of man-
made climate change. Arctic ice melting, CO2 increases, and ocean warming are all occurring much faster than previous IPCC forecasts, so, as dire as the

forecasts sound, they're actually conservative.

US-China cooperation solves climate change leads to broad renewable energy

development, technology transfer, and a model for international agreements
CNTV 6/24/15 China, US agree to boost climate change cooperation
http://english.cntv.cn/2015/06/24/VIDE1435137603348288.shtml

During the China-US Strategic and Economic Dialogue in Washington, the two sides have agreed to broaden
cooperation on tackling climate change. "We began our cooperation on controlling climate change last year. We set up
new and specialized working groups, and confirmed the lead departments of both countries, that are tasked with
drawing up plans, raising money and selecting projects. We will start to work on the specific projects
after this dialogue ," said Xie Zhenhua, climate representative of National Development and Reform Commission. The
key players at the talks are Chinese Vice Premier Wang Yang, State Councillor Yang Jiechi, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Treasury
Secretary Jacob Lew. Wang described combating climate change as "humanity's common task". He called
on all people to conserve resources and the environment , and avoid luxurious and wasteful
lifestyles . And he called on the U.S. to relax controls on advanced tech nologies and on energy-saving and
emission reductions. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry praised the sound cooperation between the US and China in fighting climate

change. He mentioned the joint declaration in Beijing by Chinese President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Barack Obama last year,
which clarified their respective climate targets after 2020 and he said the US and China could lead the way
on the issue of climate change, within the international arena.
 AT: Cant solve Warming
TPP accommodates Chinas wait and see policy- elastic enough to allow for
adjustment time for enviro regulations
Dasgupta 4-22 (Saibal, Staf writer for the Voice of America, 4-22-2016, China Edging Closer to
Accepting TPP Reality http://www.voanews.com/content/china-edging-closer-to-accepting-tpp-
reality/3298082.html)

At the Asia Pacific Council of American Chambers of Commerce in Beijing this month, a U.S. official made
it clear that Washington was interested in attracting both China and India into the TPP system. This is in
contrast to the impression among Chinese experts who think the U.S. has either resisted Beijing's entry
or planned to use the TPP to isolate China from a major part of world trade. Even if Beijing makes a
formal decision to join the TPP, it will be a challenging task for it to meet some of the stiff environmental
and labor standards laid out in the agreement. A vast section of Chinese industry has grown without any
regard to environmental damage, and are often accused of denying workers some of their rights. But
Diane Farrell, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Asia at the U.S. Department of Commerce, does not agree.
She explained the TPP is elastic enough to accommodate the different conditions of different countries,
and give each new member sufficient time to adjust to the standards. "The TPP has been designed to
accommodate economies at different stages of development. The standards have to be implemented in
a phased manner, and every country will get sufficient time to implement them. This is why Malaysia is
in it," Farrell said.

Tpp strengthens multinational environmental projects- more effective

King 15 (Blair, Environmental Scientist, 10-6-2016, Why the TPP Doesn't Spell Doom for the
Environment http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/blair-king/tpp-environment_b_8247440.html)

under the TPP multilateral environment agreements(MEAs) are further

On the other side of the ledger,
strengthened. Enforcement of the Montreal Protocol , the International Convention for the Prevention
of Pollution from Ships and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna
and Flora will all be strengthened for exactly same reason that individual action is discouraged. In order
for competition to be considered fair every country is expected to live up to its international
environmental obligations. MEAs set a baseline that every member of the TPP must meet, to do
otherwise results in penalties. A country trying to shirk its environmental duties would be punished and
forced to improve environmental performance to group norms. Thus in this case the environment
benefits from the agreement. From these examples you can see the issue. When a single country wants
to make a unilateral advance in environmental regulation, the TPP is going to slap it down, or failing that
the industries in the affected country are going to become less competitive. However, when the global
community agrees on a common environmental goal the foot-draggers and slow movers are punished.
Thus international trade agreements like the TPP are intended to discourage independent action while
encouraging international cooperation and movement towards common international goals. To
discourage foot-draggers from stopping all environmental advances, typically once an agreed upon
percentage of the trade partners take a side on a MEA everyone has to jump on board or suffer the
consequences. If the TPP had been in effect when Kyoto was signed Canada may not have been able to
drag its heels in implementing the plan because its trade partners would have been there to force
Canada to do its part or suffer the consequences of failing to act.
 AT: Warming Irreversible
Its not too late---reductions can avoid and delay catastrophic impacts
Chestney 13 Nina, senior environmental correspondent, 1/13, Climate Change Study: Emissions
Limits Could Avoid Damage By Two-Thirds, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/13/climate-
change-study-emissions-limits_n_2467995.html

The world could avoid much of the damaging effects of climate change this century if greenhouse gas emissions
are curbed more sharply, research showed on Sunday. The study, published in the journal Nature Climate Change, is the
first comprehensive assessment of the benefits of cutting emissions to keep the global temperature
rise to within 2 degrees Celsius by 2100, a level which scientists say would avoid the worst effects of climate
change. It found 20 to 65 percent of the adverse impacts by the end of this century could be avoided. "Our
research clearly identifies the benefits of reducing greenhouse gas emissions - less severe impacts on flooding and crops are two areas of particular benefit," said
Nigel Arnell, director of the University of Reading's Walker Institute, which led the study. In 2010, governments agreed to curb emissions to keep temperatures from
rising above 2 degrees C, but current emissions reduction targets are on track to lead to a temperature rise of 4
degrees or more by 2100. The World Bank has warned more extreme weather will become the "new normal" if global temperature rises by 4
degrees. Extreme heatwaves could devastate areas from the Middle East to the United States, while sea levels could rise by up to 91 cm (3 feet), flooding cities in
countries such as Vietnam and Bangladesh, the bank has said. The latest research involved scientists from British institutions including the University of Reading, the
Met Office Hadley Centre and the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change, as well as Germany's Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research. It examined a range of
emissions-cut scenarios and their impact on factors including flooding, drought, water availability and crop productivity. The strictest scenario kept
global temperature rise to 2 degrees C with emissions peaking in 2016 and declining by 5 percent a
year to 2050. FLOODING Adverse effects such as declining crop productivity and exposure to river flooding could be
reduced by 40 to 65 percent by 2100 if warming is limited to 2 degrees, the study said. Global average sea level rise could
be reduced to 30cm (12 inches) by 2100, compared to 47-55cm (18-22 inches) if no action to cut emissions is taken, it said. Some adverse climate impacts

could also be delayed by many decades. The global productivity of spring wheat could drop by 20 percent by
the 2050s, but the fall in yield could be delayed until 2100 if strict emissions curbs were enforced.
"Reducing greenhouse gas emissions won't avoid the impacts of climate change altogether of course, but our research

shows it will buy time to make things like buildings, transport systems and agriculture more resilient to climate
change," Arnell said.

Can mitigate the worst impacts

Pew Center 11 Pew Center on Global Climate Change, The Pew Center on Global Climate Change is as
a non-profit, non-partisan, and independent organization dedicated to providing credible information,
straight answers, and innovative solutions in the effort to address global climate change. The Center
engages business leaders, policy makers, and other key decision makers at the international, national,
regional, and state levels to advance meaningful, cost-effective climate policy and action, Climate
Change 101: Understanding and Responding to Global Climate Change, January
The GHGs that are already in the atmosphere because of human activity will continue to warm the planet for decades to come. In other words,
some level of continued climate change is inevitable, which means humanity is going to have to take action to adapt to a
warming world. However, it is still possibleand necessaryto reduce the magnitude of climate change. A
growing body of scientific research has clarified that climate change is already underway and some dangerous
impacts have occurred. Avoiding much more severe impacts in the future requires large reductions in human-
induced CO2 emissions in the coming decades. Consequently, many governments have committed to reduce their countries
emissions by between 50 and 85 percent below 2000 levels by 2050. Global emissions reductions on this scale will reduce the costs
of damages and of adaptation, and will dramatically reduce the probability of catastrophic outcomes.
 Terror Add On
US-China cooperation is key to effective counter-terrorism data-sharing, law
enforcement initiatives, and anti-bomb initiatives
Yunbi 15 (Zhang, staffwriter for China Daily, 8-5-2015, China and US discuss ways to fight terror
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2015-08/05/content_21502489.htm)

Nations agree on enhanced cooperation, information sharing and law enforcement Senior diplomats from China and the
U nited S tates met in Beijing on Tuesday for the second China-US consultation on anti-terrorism issues as the world's
two largest economies vowed to boost cooperation in anti-terror information sharing and law
enforcement. Terrorism struck China recently when a suicide bombing hit a hotel housing the Chinese embassy in Somalia in July, killing

one and injuring four embassy staff members. Both sides agreed that "the China-US efforts in enhancing bilateral and
multilateral anti-terror cooperation serve the shared interests of both countries", according to a release on
Tuesday by the Chinese Foreign Ministry following the second China-US counterterrorism consultation. They said Tuesday's talks were helpful
in creating a positive atmosphere for the next stage of interactions, and agreed to hold a third round in the US "at an appropriate time". Vice-
Foreign Minister Cheng Guoping and Tina Kaidanow, coordinator for counterterrorism at the US State Department, co-chaired the talk. Jin
Canrong, a professor of i nternational r elations at Renmin University of China, observed that China has
witnessed changes in terrorist threats against it recently. "In the past, China's major terror threats came from within

the country. As China's interests overseas are expanding, a growing number of terrorist attacks focus on
such interests," he said. Jin also noted an increasing common ground between China and the US when they are analyzing terrorist
threats, which echoes the necessity for stronger teamwork. In July last year, Cheng and Kaidanow co-hosted the first consultation in

Washington, and the two sides " achieved broad consensus ", Xinhua News Agency said. China stressed the terrorist nature of
the "East Turkestan Islamic Movement" and urged Washington to "energetically support and coordinate China's efforts in fighting against ETIM
terrorist forces". According to a news release on June 24, Chinese government officials and industry experts accepted a
US invitation to discuss best practices on stemming the illicit flow of chemical precursors and dual-
use bomb components used by terrorists worldwide in improvised explosive devices. Fu Xiaoqiang, an
expert on South Asian studies at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, said the two countries should "reach a strategic
consensus" on curbing terror organizations that have global reach. Pragmatic China-US cooperation to crack ETIM is necessary because the fight
against regional terrorist groups is the precondition for reining in global organizations, Fu said. Anti-terrorism
has also been high
on the agenda of law enforcement departments. On April 9, State Councilor and Public Security Minister Guo
Shengkun and visiting US Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson co-chaired the first ministerial
meeting between the Chinese Ministry of Public Security and the US Homeland Security Department in Beijing. They agreed to
fortify cooperation in "anti-terrorism information exchanges involving foreign terrorists, border
controls, anti-terrorism financing, cyberspace anti-terrorism and the fight against violent
extremism".

Extinction
Morgan 09 (Dennis, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, World on fire: two scenarios of the
destruction of human civilization and possible extinction of the human race Futures, Volume 41, Issue
10, December)
In a remarkable website on nuclear war, Carol Moore asks the question Is Nuclear War Inevitable?? In Section , Moore points out what most terrorists obviously
already know about the nuclear tensions between powerful countries. No doubt, theyve
figured out that the best way to escalate
these tensions into nuclear war is to set off a nuclear exchange. As Moore points out, all that militant
terrorists would have to do is get their hands on one small nuclear bomb and explode it on either
Moscow or Israel. Because of the Russian dead hand system, where regional nuclear commanders would be given full
powers should Moscow be destroyed, it is likely that any attack would be blamed on the United States Israeli

leaders and Zionist supporters have, likewise, stated for years that if Israel were to suffer a nuclear attack, whether from
terrorists or a nation state, it would retaliate with the suicidal Samson option against all major Muslim cities in the Middle

East. Furthermore, the Israeli Samson option would also include attacks on Russia and even anti-

Semitic European cities In that case, of course, Russia would retaliate, and the U.S. would then retaliate
against Russia. China would probably be involved as well, as thousands, if not tens of thousands, of nuclear warheads, many of

them much more powerful than those used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, would rain upon most of the major cities in the Northern Hemisphere. Afterwards,

for years to come, massive radioactive clouds would drift throughout the Earth in the nuclear fallout,
bringing death or else radiation disease that would be genetically transmitted to future generations in
a nuclear winter that could last as long as a 100 years, taking a savage toll upon the environment and fragile ecosphere as well. And
what many people fail to realize is what a precarious, hair-trigger basis the nuclear web rests on. Any accident, mistaken communication,

false signal or lone wolf act of sabotage or treason could, in a matter of a few minutes, unleash the
use of nuclear weapons, and once a weapon is used, then the likelihood of a rapid escalation of
nuclear attacks is quite high while the likelihood of a limited nuclear war is actually less probable
since each country would act under the use them or lose them strategy and psychology; restraint
by one power would be interpreted as a weakness by the other , which could be exploited as a
window of opportunity to win the war . In other words, once Pandora's Box is opened, it will spread quickly, as it will be the signal for
permission for anyone to use them. Moore compares swift nuclear escalation to a room full of people embarrassed to cough. Once one does, however, everyone
else feels free to do so. The bottom line is that as long as large nation states use internal and external war to keep their disparate factions glued together and to
satisfy elites needs for power and plunder, these nations will attempt to obtain, keep, and inevitably use nuclear weapons. And as long as large nations oppress
groups who seek self-determination, some of those groups will look for any means to fight their oppressors In other words, as long as war and aggression are
backed up by the implicit threat of nuclear arms, it is only a matter of time before the escalation of violent conflict leads to the actual use of nuclear weapons, and
it is very likely that many, if not all, will be used, leading to horrific scenarios of
once even just one is used,

global death and the destruction of much of human civilization while condemning a mutant human
remnant, if there is such a remnant, to a life of unimaginable misery and suffering in a nuclear winter .
In Scenarios, Moore summarizes the various ways a nuclear war could begin: Such a war could start through a reaction to terrorist

attacks, or through the need to protect against overwhelming military opposition, or through the use of small battle field tactical nuclear weapons meant to
destroy hardened targets. It might quickly move on to the use of strategic nuclear weapons delivered by short-range or inter-continental missiles or long-range
bombers. These could deliver high altitude bursts whose electromagnetic pulse knocks out electrical circuits for hundreds of square miles. Or they could deliver
nuclear bombs to destroy nuclear and/or non-nuclear military facilities, nuclear power plants, important industrial sites and cities. Or it could skip all those steps
and start through the accidental or reckless use of strategic weapons
Solvency
 Solvency Say Yes2AC
Beijing says yes recent cooperation over the AIIB and ministry announcements show
motivation is there -- thats Xiang

Postdating matterstheyve switched their view on membership because of regional

pressures
Michael J. Green 16, Senior Vice President for Asia and Japan Chair at the CSIS, Chair, Modern and
Contemporary Japanese Politics and Foreign Policy at Georgetown, Winter 2016, After TPP: the
Geopolitics of Asia and the Pacific, The Washington Quarterly,
https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/TWQ_Winter2016_Green-
Goodman.pdf

Even China is feeling TPPs tug. Views of the initiative in Beijing since formal negotiations began in 2010
have swung from disdain to suspicion to cautious embrace . Initially seen as little more than a trade negotiation between the
United States and Brunei, TPP took on the sinister aura of being an effort by Washington to exclude China from regional economic affairs
never mind that this made no sense given the vital trade and investment ties between all TPP members and China.9 When
Japan made
clear in early 2013 that it intended to join the negotiations, the consensus in Beijing flipped 180 degrees;
China could not maintain a standoffish posture toward an arrangement that brought together 40
percent of the worlds economy and would likely write a new generation of rules for global trade and
investment. Moreover, the Xi Jinping administration saw value in the mere specter of TPP as a tool to drive
difficult economic reforms at home. Conclusion of a TPP agreement in early October has sparked a
lively debate in Beijing, with the weight of elite opinion seeming to tilt toward eventual membership ; for
example, the head of the Chinese-sponsored Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), Jin Liqun, announced his support
during a speech in Washington shortly after the TPP deal was announced.10 TPP is likely to have other
incentive effects in the region and beyond. It has already given renewed impetus to trade
negotiations among China, Japan, and Korea that have languished for several years over political
tensions. TPPs comprehensive and high-standard results may raise the sights of that trilateral deal as well as Asias other mega-regional
arrangementthe Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)and produce higher-quality agreements. Despite the potential
tradediversion effects of arrangements that it is not party to, the United States can support these other efforts if they promote deeper regional
economic integration and better rules. Outside Asia, TPP may also give a nudge to the stalled Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
(TTIP) between the United States and the European Union.
 Solvency Say Yes -- AT: Cant Join
Its feasible Beijings reform agenda makes it joining possible
Patrick Mendis 16, Senior Fellow at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University,
4/26/2016, When the TPP and One Belt, One Road meet, East Asia Forum,
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/04/26/when-the-tpp-and-one-belt-one-road-meet/

Although China is excluded from the TPP at the moment, Beijings bilateral economic agenda shows
striking convergence with the US-led trade package. Beijing has signed bilateral investment treaties with several TPP
members, including Australia and South Korea, and there are on-going trade negotiations with Japan. A
USChina bilateral
investment treaty is also in the making, while the forward-looking, newly-established Shanghai Free
Trade Zone attempts to make the Hong Kong financial district history. From a strictly commercial point of view,
Chinas entrance into the TPP would be an act with mutual benefits . Beijing would significantly
increase the gains of the TPP through technology proliferation while also providing advantages in the
US market for Chinese exports and investment opportunities. This could be a decisive factor in favour
of cooperation if both China and the US choose to prioritise commerce above political
complications . Certainly, the history of hegemonic shifts in international relations projects gloomy times ahead for SinoAmerican
relations. It
would be naive to expect China and the United States to avoid collision out of pure
benevolence. Yet it may not be inherently conflictual for the two countries to act according to their
self-interest, if these interests lie in economic growth. If we add the growth of commercial bonds
between the United States and China to the international trade puzzle, it becomes plausible that
political ideologies will be trumped in favour of commercial prosperity.
 Solvency Say Yes Experts
Expert analysis proves joining is possible and preferable for China
Min Ye 15, 12/8/2015, Associate Professor of International Relations, Boston University, PhD from
Princeton, China and Competing Cooperation in Asia-Pacific: TPP, RCEP, and the New Silk Road, Asia
Security Journal, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14799855.2015.1109509
Behind these aspirations are also questions like how TPP is going to shape China and how China will react to its exclusion from this agreement.
American policy specialists have argued that TPP is not at odds with enlightened national interest in
China and that Beijing is likely to implement domestic reforms and make concessions to join TPP
down the road. The US-led TPP is compatible with opener and friendlier China, argues Brian Jackson of HIS
Global Insight, China joining the TPP would offer immediate reputational benefits and plant the seeds for
boosted economic activities.4 Matthew Goodman, senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS), observes that China would come to the TPP track, citing the Chinese
Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM)s announcement to seriously study TPP in May, 2013 and President Xi
Jinpings US visit in June 2013.5 Bernard Gordon reached a similar conclusion that China is coming closer to the
TPP membership.6 First, China is no longer dismissive about TPP as in the past. Second, Chinas leaders
recognize that TPP will set the future rules on how the global economy develops, and China cannot
afford to be left out. Third, like the US, China is frustrated with WTO and is open to alternative
regimes.
 Solvency Say Yes Standards
Says yes -- China wants the TPP to help set environmental regs
East Asia Forum 2-17 (Analysis of economics, politics and public policy in East Asia and the Pacific, 2-
17-2016, Does the TPP Need China, and Vice Versa? http://www.economywatch.com/features/Does-
the-TPP-Need-China-and-Vice-Versa0217.html)

Obviously, China would have to negotiate with the United States to join the TPP. This would likely be a
long and difficult process. However, China has already been through a WTO accession. It knows what to
expect. There is perhaps one more reason for China to think about the TPP. The 17th National Congress
of the Communist Party of China in 2007 committed China to the concept of an ecological civilization.
China will need to acquire much greater regulatory capacity if it is to implement the goals implicit in this
idea. Scandals linked to poor regulation such as the contamination of milk powder by the toxic
compound melamine, which affected an estimated 300,000 infants have drastically reduced
consumer confidence. Within China, there will likely be a technocratic constituency that will see the TPP
as a source of external pressure for improving domestic regulatory standards in areas such as food and
environmental regulation. Groups within China may welcome the TPP if it helps China to adopt
international best practice, since this will generally be an improvement on current regulatory standards.
In addition, this could provide the best defence against investorstate actions.
 Solvency -- AT: TPP Wont Pass Domestic
Not key to solve aff advantages the plan is an olive branch that signals US
commitment to Chinese inclusion in multilateral institutions, reversing its hostility to
China rise -- regardless of whether the TPP passes thats Xiang

Yes will pass they underestimate democratic loyalty

Christi Parsons 16, Correspondent, LA Times, MSL (Master of Studies in Law) at Yale Law, 5/25/2016,
Obama races to cement the big Pacific Rim trade deal that all his potential successors oppose, LA Times,
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-fi-obama-vietnam-trade-20160525-snap-story.html
The White House says neither the U.S. nor the other signatories are willing to reopen the agreement to make changes that might bring
additional political support here. But by
beginning the implementation work with countries like Vietnam, they can
take steps that could help
make wary members of Congress more confident that U.S. partners will abide by
the terms of the agreement reached last fall. Some critics in Congress were particularly skeptical of
what they saw as overly generous terms for Vietnam to comply with new labor and environmental standards of the deal, as well as an extended
timeline that it was granted to begin setting up independent trade unions. And a report from the International Trade Commission released last
week, which found that the deal would boost U.S. annual real income by only a modest $57.3 billion by 2032, gave ammunition to opponents in
organized labor who said its potential impact on U.S. manufacturing was too severe. "[The] report is so damaging that any reasonable
observer would have to wonder why the administration or Congress would spend even one more day trying to turn this disastrous proposal
into a reality," AFL-CIO President Richard Trumka said. The administrations ability to continue addressing lawmakers' concerns will be key to
the timing of any vote, said House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Kevin Brady (R-Texas), who supports what he calls an imperfect
agreement. The Trans-Pacific Partnership trade pact: What's in it for the U.S.? We cannot move forward until the administration has
addressed member concerns on key aspects of the agreement, he said, demanding reassurance from the White House that trade partners
comply with the deal and that it will benefit the U.S. Towin support in Congress, the Obama administration is
making a familiar case that boils down to one question: What will China do? During its full-court press on
Capitol Hill to secure passage of a key preliminary measure, administration officials found that raising the specter of China writing
the rules for international trade was among their most successful arguments. Their case goes like this: The
pact as written raises standards in places where the U.S. already does significant business, while
dropping tariffs that inhibit the sale of U.S. goods in those countries. And if the U.S. were to back
away, China would likely swoop into the void and forge its own accord, potentially expanding its
influence while diminishing the United States'. Vietnams burgeoning middle class is a fertile market for U.S. goods,
particularly for machinery and automotive exports. On Monday, Obama was on hand as U.S. firms including Boeing and GE signed commercial
deals worth $16 billion in Vietnam. In an address to the Vietnamese people, Obama said he strongly supported the deal so that you'll also be
able to buy more of our goods, made in America. Without
mentioning China by name, he alluded to the pact's
important strategic benefits, saying it would allow Vietnam to be less dependent on any one trading partner and enjoy broader
ties with more partners, including the United States. So we now have to get it done for the sake of our economic prosperity and our
national security, he said. Obama's
argument makes use of the political climate, pitting Donald Trump's
harsh criticism about China against Trump's nationalist and anti-trade rhetoric, an odd political dance
but one that congressional supporters of the deal have also embraced. You hear a lot of the rhetoric from the
presidential candidates, that they want to create 'Fortress America,' they want to build walls, said Rep. Ron Kind of Wisconsin, leader of a bloc
of the trade pacts Democratic supporters in Congress. We can be at the table, shaping the rules of globalization or it will be done to us. And
thats really the decision we face. The most optimistic timeline in Congress appears to be for the deal to come to a vote in the lame duck
session. Obama predicted recently lawmakers might vote after at least the primary election season had ended. Not so fast, warned one
Democratic leader. He has a more optimistic view of the [deals] chances than I do at the moment, said Sen. Richard J. Durbin of Illinois, the
minority whip, adding that the agreement would have a difficult time passing the Senate now. Anything can happen in the lame-duck
session after the November election, Durbin said. But when I think of how many issues are being saved for the lame duck, youre putting a lot
of burden on those frail wings. Administration officials are heartened, though, by the fact that Democrats
in particular who
have supported the TPP so far have not suffered political consequences, despite a vow by labor
groups last year to challenge them in primaries. Ten of the 28 Democrats who voted to support the preliminary fast-
track legislation in June have already won primaries, all by significant margins or without any opposition at all. More than half of the
remaining Democrats face no opposition in primaries to come. Until theres a vote scheduled, it
would not be surprising that many members will hedge their bets and stay neutral, or maybe nitpick
certain provisions, Kind said. But I think when judged in its totality, thats when reality comes home.
2AC Blocks
AT: T Bilateral
 2AC T Bilateral
We meet the result of the plan is trade through and negotiations over the TPP

C/I engagement promotes contacts diplomatic engagement includes state

membership in international institutions and economic engagement includes trade
promotion
Evan Resnick 01, PhD student, Political Science at Columbia University, Spring 2001, Journal of
International Affairs, Vol. 54, No. 2, Rogue States: Isolation vs. Engagement in the 21st Century,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/24357749

In order to establish a more effective framework for dealing with unsavory regimes, I propose that we
define engagement as the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state through the
comprehensive establishment and enhancement of contacts with that state across multiple issue-areas
(i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, cultural). The following is a brief list of the specific forms that such
contacts might include:

DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS

Extension of diplomatic recognition; normalization of

diplomatic relations

Promotion of target-state membership in

international institutions and regimes

Summit meetings and other visits by the head of state

and other senior government officials of sender state

to target state and vice-versa

MILITARY CONTACTS

Visits of senior military officials of the sender state to

the target state and vice-versa

Arms transfers

Military aid and cooperation

Military exchange and training programs

Confidence and security-building measures

Intelligence sharing

ECONOMIC CONTACTS
 Trade agreements and promotion

Foreign economic and humanitarian aid in the form

of loans and/or grants

We meetthe plan promotes trade by inviting China to the TPP

Prefer our interpretation

Aff limits they overlimit it by defining economic engagement as only trade this
creates stale controversies because every trade debate would boil down to the same
mechanisms and advantage areas. Independently, no aff is topical under their
interpretation of diplomatic engagement because every aff has the possibility of zero
bilateral negotiations if China says no

Aff ground the TPP is a core controversy and the crux of Obamas economic pivot
they reduce the number of meaningful debates on the topic

Prefer reasonability---competing interpretations create a moral hazard which causes

the neg to arbitrarily go for T to limit out the aff, instead of making debates better
 Ext Aff Limits
The negs vision of the topic unreasonably reduces aff ground
First, no aff is topical under their definition of diplomatic engagement because the
topic requires China to say yes, the possibility of say no always means uncertainty
over the likelihood of negotiations this turns all of their ground and limits offense
inevitable because people can read say no advantages to affs which denies the
possibility of bilateral ground

Second, limiting economic engagement to only trade is stale because it subjects the aff
to the same mechanism overlimiting kills reciprocity because the neg has hundreds
of mechanisms at its diposal and also makes debate uneducational. Independently
turns their limits arguments because it pushes affs to find the smallest parts of the
topic rather than horizontally innovate within a large, but well-defined lit base

No aff is topical under their interpretation because every aff has the possibility of no
bilateral negotiation if China says no this aff is no different
 Ext Aff Ground
Their vision limits out one of the most salient controversies over the Asia-pacific now
the TPP was the center-piece of Obamas economic pivot and was recently
negotiated limiting it out reduces the quality of aff ground which means were not
well prepared to debate them
 Ext Economic Engagement is Trade Promotion
Economic engagement includes giving a country access to international institutions
like the TPP
Richar Haass 00, Meghan OSullivan, Senior Fellows in the Brookings Institution Foreign Policy Studies
Program, 2000, Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy, p. 5-6

Architects of engagement strategies have a wide variety of incentives from which to choose. Economic
engagement might offer tangible incentives such as export credits, investment insurance or
promotion, access to technology, loans, and economic aid.2 Other equally useful economic incentives involve
the removal of penalties, whether they be trade embargoes, investment bans, or high tariffs that have
impeded economic relations between the United States and the target country. In addition, facilitated entry into the global

economic arena and the institutions that govern it rank among the most potent incentives in todays global
market.
AT: Relations Adv CP
 2AC Relations Adv CP
Permutation do both

Cant solve relations the TPP is a prerequisite Chinese exclusion has increased
antagonism and unwilligness to work together to solve global threats our Zhou
evidence connects the dots -- how the TPP is framed affects willigness to collaborate
on cyber security and the risk of territorial disputes in the ESC

Ratifying LOST makes disputes worse by sanctioning Chinas vision of UNCLOS only
the plans diplomacy solves
Dan Blumenthal 12, director of Asian Studies at the American Enterprise Institute, 2/17/2012, Why to
Forget UNCLOS, The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2012/02/why-to-forget-unclos/

Herein lies a major danger in U.S. ratification of UNCLOS. In adopting, promoting, and acting on new interpretations of
international law, China is attempting to upset the status quo and establish new norms of maritime behavior. By
signing up to UNCLOS, the United States might unintentionally signal approval of these errant
interpretations. In 2009, China asserted indisputable sovereignty over the islands of the South China Sea and the adjacent waters and
claimed to enjoy sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof. In support of these
claims, Beijing submitted to the U.N. Commission on the Law of the Sea a map featuring the now-
famous U-shaped line, which encompasses almost the entirety of the South China Sea and skirts the
coasts of the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Vietnam. UNCLOS makes a distinction between islands and other
features, such as rocks. An island is defined as a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide. Islands
are entitled to a 200 nautical mile EEZ. Other features found at sea including rocks, reefs, islets, and sandbanks were not given this
entitlement: rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental
shelf. China appears to be claiming a series of rocks and reefs calling them islands so that it can also claim the EEZs around them. Call
it creeping territorial expansionism. If it works, China will have established the legal basis for claiming most of the South China Sea as its
territory. China has compelling reasons to claim control over this wide expanse of waters. The South China Sea is thought to be resource-rich.
The numbers vary, but high-end Chinese estimates suggest that the sea contains over 200 billion barrels of oil and 2 quadrillion cubic feet of
natural gas. The sea is home to rich fishing grounds as well. If Beijing were to succeed in establishing its claims to features throughout the South
China Sea, the resulting EEZ would allow China and China alone to harvest those resources. China likewise has security interests in its
extensive South China Sea claims. As noted above, Beijing has reinterpreted international law to assert that it can deny access to its EEZ by
foreign military vessels. Successful realization of Chinas claims is the first step toward keeping foreign military assets out of those waters. There
are three broad reasons why it wishes to do so. Firstly, sovereignty over the South China Sea would grant China significant, additional strategic
depth. At present, from Chinas point of view, its coastal cities key centers of economic activity are vulnerable to attack from the sea.
Keeping foreign warships and military aircraft distant from Chinas shores would make it easier for the PLA to defend Chinas southern
coastline. It would also enable China to more easily project power close to its neighbors shores and thus threaten U.S. allies like the Philippines
and friends such as Singapore and Indonesia. Second, China is highly dependent on resource imports from the Middle East. In 2010, 47 percent
of Chinas oil imports came from the Middle East; 30 percent came from Africa[AJH2] . These imports pass through chokepoints that China
doesnt control, notably the Malacca Strait, but also the Lombok and Sunda Straits in Indonesian waters. Chinese defense officials have referred
to this situation as the Malacca dilemma. Chinese sovereignty over the South China Sea would allow it to more easily project power into
those straits and, on the flip side, make it more difficult for the United States to do so. This would make it more difficult for the United States to
conduct operations in these vital waters against China, while making it easier for China to operate against the United States and our allies
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. It would also enable the Chinese navy to more easily project power into the Indian Ocean, where American
and Indian vessels have long operated unimpeded. Third, Chinese control over the South China Sea would make it easier for the PLA Navy to
project power into the Pacific Ocean. Such control would, in particular, make it more difficult for the United States to monitor Chinese
submarines deploying from their underground base at Hainan Island. A Chinese Navy that can more easily sail into the Pacific is one that can
more easily threaten U.S. assets and U.S. territories in the region. The United States clearly has an interest in seeing China fail to make its
South China claims a reality even if it somehow did so without resorting to force. The question is, how does the United States succeed?
Proponents of UNCLOS ratification claim that the United States cant counter Chinas claims without
ratifying UNCLOS itself. Yet the United States already acts in accordance with international law and
custom, whereas China, which has ratified UNCLOS, uses UNCLOS to flaunt the law. By twisting the
UNCLOS into pretzels, China is changing the rules of the game. The liberal order made rules to
accommodate the rights and interests of those who decided to participate in it. It turns out China
doesnt much like those rules and is attempting to overturn them especially those rules that protect freedom of
navigation and those that make it difficult for China to pursue its territorial ambitions in Asia. Ratifying UNCLOS isnt an effective

way to combat that effort. These disputes are about power politics and neither China nor the United
States will allow them to be settled in court UNCLOS approved or otherwise. Rather, the United States must
continue doing what it has always done. It should continue to operate naval vessels in international waters including in other countries EEZs
where and when it wants to do so. Operations should run the gamut of peaceful activities surveillance activities, exercises, and so on. And
Washington must clearly state its intention to continue abiding by centuries-old customary international law pertaining to freedom of the seas
including provisions of UNCLOS that are consistent with those practices. In interactions with Chinese counterparts, American diplomats should
repeatedly and consistently restate the American position there should be no question as to where the United States stands. As it does so,
the U.S. should engage China in diplomacy , pointing out among other matters that China itself
conducts military activity in other countries EEZs. We need rules of the road with China to manage
competition, not wishful thinking about what U.N. bodies can resolve. It has always been practice
that has determined international law of the oceans. China understands this, and is working to shift
law and custom through its own practices. Only by continuing to act on the high seas as it always has
can the United States hope to maintain a system of international rules that serves its own interests.
Ratifying UNCLOS could very well have the opposite effect.

The plan is key green financing is insufficient alone

Gwynne Taraska 16, Associate Director of Energy Policy at the Center for American Progress, PhD from
the University of Washington, former research director of the Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy
at GMU, 1/12/2016, Finance for Climate Resilience in the Dawn of the Paris Era, Center for American
Progress, https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/report/2016/01/12/128749/finance-for-
climate-resilience-in-the-dawn-of-the-paris-era/

The realityis more complicated than either of these claims. Private-sector engagement in international climate
resilience could certainly be scaled up and is necessary to close the vast gap in resilience finance. It is insufficient,
however, to close the gap on its own. Private finance is not equally drawn to all sectors or regions.
Nations struggling with basic development needswhich are the nations to which the Paris
agreement seeks to target resilience fundingare unlikely to have the capacity to attract and absorb private-
sector finance. The Pilot Program for Climate Resilience, which prioritizes funding toward the most vulnerable and least-developed countries, is
receiving only 1 percent of its co-financing from the private sector, which the program attributes to the challenging business environments in
those countries. In addition, the World Bank points out that it can take 10 years to 15 years for new insurance
markets to become commercially viable, underscoring the importance of support from governments
and multilateral efforts, even as innovative and affordable insurance becomes a key measure for
decreasing climate vulnerability and a growth opportunity for insurance firms. Industrial
countries with financial capacity
such as the United States, Japan, and EU countries, as well as major economies that are expanding
international infrastructure investments, such as Chinatherefore have a critical role and ongoing responsibility

with respect to increasing, strengthening, and coordinating their support for resilience in the worlds climate-vulnerable regions.
Multiplank counterplans are a voting issue unmanageable 2AC burden because the
aff has to answer every plank and the neg can proliferate in depth on one or two in
the block infinitely worse when conditional because of the permutation of 2NR
options we cant predict

Too many obstacles to info-sharing businesses will resist it every step of the way
Luke Penn-Hall 15, MA, Strategic Studies & International Economics, Johns Hopkins, Cyber and
Technology Producer at The Cipher Brief, 1/24/2015, Will Information Sharing Improve Cybersecurity,
The Cipher Brief, http://thecipherbrief.com/article/information-sharing-whats-tradeoff

CISA = Act that already encourages information-sharing

How then, is
information sharing supposed to actually improve security? The underlying premise behind
information sharing is the fact that hackers tend to use the same methods and programs against
multiple targets. For example, they will write up a phishing email, attach a malware-infected document, and send it to hundreds or
thousands of people. Even though most people wont open it, the few that do give them the access they need to accomplish whatever their
goal is. This economy of scale approach is what makes cybercrime so profitable, and greatly increases the odds of network breaches for cyber-
espionage purposes. However, if the first victim of that phishing email was able to tell all other potential targets to avoid that message, then
the entire approach would fail. That is the
core mechanic of information sharing: by spreading the word about
how hackers are attacking, everyone in the community can proactively protect themselves and net
security increases across the board. That being said, this idealized version of the information sharing
process tends to encounter some serious problems when put into practice. To begin with, improved
security is not always enough of an incentive for businesses to share information with each other.
Information sharing efforts are usually industry specific , and so they amount to working with
competitors in a way that some businesses believe will hurt them more than any given hack could. Beyond that,
information sharing between businesses and the government are often complicated by the difficult
process that government agencies must go through to share information with private entities. As a result,
many businesses view information sharing with the government as being a one-way street, with no
reciprocation for them. Finally, there are serious concerns about privacy. The passage of the CISA legislation was so difficult due to
concerns from privacy advocates that the information being shared with the government was not sufficiently anonymized. The fear was that
information sharing, in this context, was de facto mass surveillance - and therefore violated the civil liberties of the American people.
Although CISA is now law and ISACs have been established in many industries, these barriers still represent a
significant problem for information sharing efforts overall.

Cyber defenses fail confronting Chinese cyber aggression through foreign policy is
the only proactive measure
Arthur Herman 16, Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute, 2/11/2016, Wanted: A Real National Cyber
Action Plan, National Review, http://www.nationalreview.com/article/431121/cyber-defense-what-
were-missing

The second is that the Action Plan is entirely focused on defensive cyber-security
measures judging from news reports,
measures that will
cost up to $19 billion, including $3.1 billion to replace outdated government computer
systems. Throw in Obamas proposed cyber czar or federal information security officer, to be housed at the
Department of Homeland Security and you have a formula for investing still more money in a cyber-security
strategy that the government, as well as private industry, has pursued for more than a decade and a half ,
with less than satisfactory results. Certainly the costs have been enormous. Trying to stop cyber attacks by
safeguarding information systems has become a multi-billion-dollar industry in the U.S. private sector alone,
the cyber-security market will grow to $170 billion by 2020. Over the past decade, the federal government has spent $100 billion on cyber
security, and yet as we learned last year with the cyber break-in at the Office of Personnel Management, when 22 million Americans had
their personal information stolen the government remains as vulnerable to attack as ever. In fact, the real
problem isnt money but mindset . In cyber-war terms, weve been pouring money and resources into a
World War Onestyle trench-warfare defensive strategy, while cyber attackers large and small have
been practicing a World War Twostyle Blitzkrieg offense and making full use of two other
advantages the cyber attacker enjoys, namely anonymity and deniability. In the cyber sphere, all experts agree,
the attacker will always be one step ahead of the defender. While the cyber-security engineer has to
be able to plug every leak or vulnerability, the hacker needs only one successful exploit to steal the
data he wants or shut down the system he wants to disable. Therefore, its time for Washington to
move to a new, more proactive approach to threats in the cyber realm. It is time to focus on how to deter
cyber aggressors before they strike, and to take the necessary steps to persuade them not to attack at all.
 XT AT: UNCLOS Plank
UNCLOS cant solve disputes addressing motivations is key
Julian Ku 14, JD at Yale Law, Professor of Constitutional Law at Hofstra Law, 1/6/2014, Will Ratifying
UNCLOS Help the U.S. Manage China? I Doubt It, Opinio Juris, http://opiniojuris.org/2014/01/16/will-
ratifying-unclos-help-u-s-manage-china/

I understand the force of this argument. The U.S. already adheres the key principles in UNCLOS, so joining UNCLOS will
allow the U.S. to push back more effectively against Chinas aggressive and expansionary activities. But is there really any
evidence that formal accession would change Chinas view of the U.S. position on UNCLOS issues?
China is already a member of UNCLOS and other countries (like Japan and the Philippines) are also
members of UNCLOS. But I dont think UNCLOS has really bolstered their effectiveness in pushing back
against China. Moreover, as Professor Dutton explains, China has a radically different interpretation of its
authority to regulate foreign ships and aircraft in its Exclusive Economic Zone under UNCLOS. How will
joining UNCLOS help the U.S. change Chinas interpretation of UNCLOS? As a practical matter,
UNCLOS does have a way of compelling member states to conform their interpretations: mandatory dispute
settlement in the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea or in Annex VII arbitration. But as China and Russia have
demonstrated in recent years, these mechanisms are not likely to be a serious constraint, especially
on questions that touch sovereignty (which is how China frames most of its activities). I suppose if the U.S.
joins UNCLOS, and subjects itself to UNCLOS dispute settlement, that might make a difference. But I dont think it would be a very large one
Japan, China, and the Philippines are all already subject to UNCLOS dispute settlement, which
(after all,
has accomplished little so far).
 XT AT: Info Sharing
Info sharing fails leaves cyber security one step behind attackers
Bill Udell 15, Senior Managing Director for Crisis and Security Consulting, 2/13/2015, The Limits Of
Cyber Threat Information Sharing, Forbes, http://www.forbes.com/sites/riskmap/2015/02/13/the-
limits-of-cyber-threat-information-sharing/#44b08f8eeba7

To understand the limits of private-public

cyber threat information sharing, it is helpful to first understand what these
efforts entail. These partnerships
are meant to facilitate information from private entities to the
government, from the government to private entities, and among private entities themselves. They are predominantly the
former, a means for the Department of Homeland Securitys National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center to maintain as
complete a picture of the threat landscape as possible. This is not to say that the government does not reciprocate. It does, providing specific,
actionable threat information, often in machine-readable format that allows for an almost instantaneous response by recipients who are
properly equipped to handle it. To a lesser degree, it also issues information about threat trends in unclassified formats. To promote
information among private sector entities, the government supports a number of Information Sharing and Analysis
Centers, or ISACs as theyre called inside the Beltway. Each ISAC focuses on a different sector, providing a venue for tracking threats and
trends in a more tailored way. Every ISAC is different: some are well-established and serve as an indispensible resource to companies in that
sector; others are still getting their bearings and are more promising for their future potential than their current value. Public-private

information sharing on cyber threats is no panacea; at its best its a mixed bag . The technical threat indicators
that get sharedlists of malicious IP addresses or the digital fingerprints associated with new kinds of malwarecan be incredibly helpful to
companies that are set up to respond to them. This is especially true for companies that have the ability to share machine-readable information
and respond in real time. But ultimately this information is tactical rather than strategicit basically speeds up
the hand holding the mallet in a giant game of digital whack-a-mole . Once a company has a clear
picture of the threat it faces, only then can it develop a system of defenses that address the areas of
greatest risk. Information sharing networks could be a considerable part of the defense posture, but they are no
replacement for more strategic, business-specific threat intelligence.
AT: India Trade Blocs DA
 2AC Other Agreements Solve
Other agreements solve impact of RCEP TPP and APECC
Pankaj Jha 15, Director with the Indian Council of World Affairs, PhD from the Centre of Southeast Asia
and Southwest Pacific Studies, Jawaharlal University, 12/7/2015, India and China in Southeast Asia: An
Evolving Theatre of Competition?, http://www.e-ir.info/2015/12/07/india-and-china-in-southeast-asia-
an-evolving-theatre-of-competition/
The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, which involves ASEAN nations and the six dialogue partners, has seen tangible forward
movement. For India, in the case of Japan and Korea, there has been a sizeable reduction in tariffs agreed, but with regard to China, the tariffs
have remained pegged in the 40-45 percent bracket. RCEP, it is expected, will open new avenues for creating a regional
economic trade bloc, but India is equally interested in becoming a member of Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC). For India, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is a very strict trans-regional trading
arrangement, seen more as a WTO plus agreement. But it has not completely ignored this forum. However, two
important issues such as Yarn Fibre Rule, rules of origin and issue of accession to the TPP are being closely studied by
Indias economic experts. Given the fact that China is not a member of TPP, India hopes to align with
the TPP member countries such as Vietnam, Singapore and Malaysia to draw indirect benefits in the future.
 1AR Other Agreements Solve
No offense India isnt left out of global trade can join the TPP and is a part of
multiple regional trade agreements
TOI 15, Times of India, 10/6/2015, India needs to be integrated into global trade pacts: USIBC,
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/India-needs-to-be-integrated-into-global-
trade-pacts-USIBC/articleshow/49237502.cms

Aghi said recent study by the Peterson Institute for International Economics demonstrates that if
India were to complete its
domestic reforms and join an ambitious TPP agreement that included all of the APEC countries, it
could potentially expand exports by more than USD 500 billion per year. "On the other hand, if it were to stand outside the
negotiations, while other countries entered a regional trade agreement, the Peterson study forecasts export losses of USD 50 billion per year,
as trade is diverted away from India," Aghi said. However Indian officials argue that India is not left out of such
international trading agreements. In Washington last month, the Commerce Minister Nirmala Sitharaman refuted that India is
being left out. "If you looking at India being left out. That's not really true," she told a Washington audience when
asked about India not being part of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, of which India is not a part. "We are very actively engaged in
ARSEP (Asean Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership) which consists of ASEAN and ASEAN
FTA countries. So we actually in ARSEP are moving faster along with other members," Sitharaman said during
a panel discussion on India-US economic ties organised by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a top American think tank.
---AT Growth Turn---
 2AC Growth Turn
RCEP kills growth worse for most Indian sectors floods the market with Chinese
goods
FE 14, Financial Express, 12/2/2014, In regional economic pact, India faces a Chinese import risk, The
Financial Express, http://www.financialexpress.com/article/economy/in-regional-economic-pact-india-
faces-a-chinese-import-risk/14635/

The proposed regional comprehensive economic partnership ( RCEP) that involves India, China and 14 other countries in the Asia-Pacific region could be
detrimental to many sectors of the Indian economy, analysts feel. RCEP, unless negotiated with caution and keen
attention to details, could result in entry of Chinese goods into the Indian market, escaping import taxes.

Many segments of the Indian manufacturing sector which are in the throes of acquiring
competitiveness could be adversely impacted as RCEP could potentially lead to influx of duty-free Chinese goods through the back door,
they say. Abhijit Das, head and professor, Centre for WTO Studies, Indian Institute of Foreign Trade, said India should try to see what type of investment linkages
can be built in with tariff reduction when it comes to China so that Indian industry doesnt lose out. He said that unless
India manages to
improve its infrastructure, it will be difficult to get investments into sectors such as manufacturing as
part its Make in India campaign. Incidentally, India has no direct free-trade agreement with China as vast sections of the domestic industry

are not equipped to take on competition from Chinese companies. Indias proposal for one set of schedule of
duty concessions for China (including a different implementation period for the duty cuts) and another single set of such concessions for 14 other member

countries of the RCEP grouping has not been accepted so far, official sources said. There are certain concerns with respect to China and we are
trying to address those, a government official said. Already, citing factors such as its lack of transparency in minimum wages, property rights, government
subsidies and loan rates, as well as absence of proper business accounting standards/ principles, India has declined to grant China the coveted full-fledged market
economy status.
 1AR Growth Turn
No growth or integration impacts RCEP hampers Indian stability and causes
blowback over its negotiation strategy
Vaishnavi Sharma 15, research scholar at the Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research,
10/15/2015, India and the largest trading bloc in the making,
http://www.governancenow.com/views/columns/india-largest-trading-bloc-making

Though the RCEP negotiations seem like a win-win game for India, the actual scenario is not that
simple . RCEP has been criticised for lack of transparency in the context of IPRs and life-saving
medicines. In this respect, India had to face a lot of criticism on the domestic front. It is being argued that some
member-nations of the RCEP, especially Japan and South Korea, have been pushing for stronger IPR provisions in
the trade agreement which, if accepted, would severely impact the affordability of life-saving drugs in
the developing countries. This would hamper the overall social and economic development of India. But this
issue, it is hoped, is going to be taken care of as assured by the government. On
the foreign front, India faces criticism from
the member-nations of RCEP for offering low market openings. India wants to commit to tariff cuts on
less than half the goods but other member-nations consider it too little. India does not want to throw open a
majority of sectors for countries with whom it does not have FTAs yet, such as China, Australia and New Zealand.
India has so far signed FTAs with ASEAN, South Korea, Japan, Singapore and Malaysia and is negotiating pacts with New Zealand and Australia.
It has not signed an FTA with China yet to avoid giving greater access to Chinese goods in India fearing the impact on manufacturing industry
here.
 2AC Indian Econ Growing
Projections of growth are high and resilient prefer World Bank analysis over fear-
mongering
Liu Chuen Chen 16, India Today journalist, 1/7/2016, India will remain the fastest growing economy in
2016: World Bank, India Today, http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/india-to-grow-at-7-8-per-cent-in-
2016-world-bank/1/564427.html

The World Bank on Wednesday projected that India will grow by a robust 7.8 per cent in 2016 and 7.9 per
cent in the next two years. World Bank also predicted that India will be the fastest growing economy in the
world in the next three years and would outpace China. With the recent fall in oil prices, India remains the bright spot
of the global economy as Chinese growth is predicted to slow further. According to its latest Global Economic Prospect report which
is released bi-annually, the World Bank reduced India's growth rate by a slight 0.2 per cent in 2015 and 0.1 per cent in both 2016 and 2017.
The World Bank estimates that China grew at an estimated 6.9 per cent in 2015 (0.3 per cent less than its June projection). The same report
also said that China is estimated to grow at 6.7 per cent in 2016 and 6.5 per cent each in 2017 and 2018. The growth rate projections is 0.3 per
cent in 2016 and 0.4 per cent in 2017. Meanwhile, Russia and Brazil are projected to remain in recession in 2016. "In contrast to
other
major developing countries, growth in India remained robust, buoyed by strong investor sentiment
and the positive effect on real incomes of the recent fall in oil prices," the World Bank said. India's currency
and stock markets were largely resilient over the past year, even during bouts of volatility in global
financial markets, the report said. Reserve Bank of India, it said, has rebuilt reserves while net FDI flows
have remained positive. Ongoing fiscal consolidation in India has reduced the central government's fiscal deficit to close to 4 per cent
of GDP (on a 12-month rolling basis), down from a peak of 7.6 per cent in 2009. In the report, South Asia is projected to be a bright spot in the
outlook for emerging and developing economies, with growth speeding up to 7.3 per cent in 2016 from 7 per cent in the year just ended. The
region has smaller trade links with China than other regions, and is a net importer of oil and will benefit from lower global energy prices. For
FY 2016-17, India, the dominant economy in the region, is projected to grow at a faster 7.8 per cent and growth in Pakistan (on a factor cost
basis) is expected to accelerate to 4.5 per cent, the report said.
 1AR Indian Econ Growing Investment
Indian economy growing strong reforms and leadership lock in gains
Ian Bremmer 16, president of Eurasia Group, a political risk group, PhD in Poli Sci at Stanford,
6/23/2016, Indias Success is Built to Last, Time, http://time.com/4379476/indias-success-is-built-to-
last/

But theres no need to raise alarms for India. Early reports suggest his successor will be a credible figure with a distinguished
rsum, and all signs point to continued policy progress on Indias most pressing problems. To
appreciate Indias positive
outlook, compare the country with its emerging-market peers. In China, growth has slowed
dramatically in recent years, the debts of local governments and Chinese companies have ballooned, and the central government is
struggling to implement reform. In Russia, deep dependence on energy exports, endemic corruption, Western
sanctions and the Kremlins determination to blame foreigners for all serious problems prevent the
political and economic reforms that might finally make the countrys economy more dynamic. Brazil faces
its deepest recession in decades, a widening political scandal, the Zika virus and an Olympic Games for which the country doesnt seem
prepared. India
remains the emerging-market worlds most positive story, in large part because Prime Minister
Narendra Modi and his Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) lead the countrys strongest government in 30 years.
Modi has lowered barriers
to foreign investment across sectors as diverse as defense, railways and real estate. India became the
worlds leading recipient of greenfield foreign investment in 2015. By streamlining regulation and cutting red tape,
Modis government has made it easier to do business at both the national and the state level. Opposition parties still hold a majority in Indias
upper house and have stalled legislation on sensitive subjects like labor and land reform. But a
plan to dramatically simplify the
tax system will probably pass this year, and Modi has accomplished more without Parliament. The BJP has also pushed state
governments to adopt reforms of their own. These gains are likely to last , but two longer-term risks deserve particular attention.
India faces serious water shortages, and its fragmented legal systems make it hard to coordinate water management. In addition, rapid
economic growth isnt yet generating enough jobs for the million people who enter Indias workforce each month. But Modi has set
India on a promising pathand it will take more than a central-banking rock star leaving the stage to knock the country off course.
 2AC No Indo Pak War
Indo/Pak deterrence stability will hold --- past crises prove
David Karl 14, President of the Asia Strategy Initiative, an analysis and advisory firm, former Director of
Studies at the Pacific Council on International Policy, Nuclear South Asia Is More Stable Than You
Think, May 28, Foreign Policy, http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/05/28/nuclear-south-asia-is-more-stable-
than-you-think/

All of these are serious concerns and yet the outlook for deterrence stability in South Asia is not as bleak as Chansoria and
many others make out. The bulk of the analysis about nuclear proliferation in the region has long suggested that strategic factors unique to
the India-Pakistan nuclear rivalry the relationships crisis-prone character combined with the lack of reliable early-warning capabilities and
the short time-to-target distances involved in South Asia would inevitably impel them to adopt counterforce strategies and preemptive or

time-sensitive postures that are liable to precipitous overreaction in the heat of a serious confrontation. These
predictions have not yet come to pass for either country some 16 years after both became overt
nuclear weapons powers and even after two serious military confrontations :the 1999 Kargil conflict and the 2001-02
"Twin Peaks" crisis, in which general hostilities seemed nigh and the possibility of nuclear use appeared ominous. Indeed, Pakistan is even more of a puzzle on this
score than India, given its constrained strategic geography, conspicuous anxiety about its conventional military shortcomings vis--vis its nemesis, and the profound

influence of a military establishment renowned for worst-case strategizing. Yet Pakistan continues to maintain a relatively relaxed
operational posture for its nuclear forces. As a normal practice, it does not deploy ready-to-use systems in
the field or in alert mode, and though the evidence is not entirely clear, Pakistan in all likelihood has not even primed
its nuclear capabilities during earlier periods of crisis with India. While Pakistani officials stress that weapons can be
made ready at short notice, warheads are not thought to be mated with their delivery vehicles and by most accounts the warheads are maintained in a
disassembled state, with fissile cores stored separately from explosive triggers. As long as Pakistan continues to refrain from
postures in which nuclear weapons are operationally deployed, the development of t actical n uclear
f orce s will not have as deleterious an impact on crisis stability that many fear. Pakistani military officials contend
that there are no plans to deploy the Nasr in the field or shift to an explicit doctrine of nuclear war-fighting. Rather, Pakistans
investments on this
front appear at this point to be based on a strategy of manipulating Indian risk assessments. As one expert argues:
"Pakistans battlefield capability seems presently configured as a force-in-being rather than a

warfighting arsenal. Unlike the US-NATO posture during the Cold War, there is little evidence that Pakistani doctrine or
strategy assumes battlefield use of a nuclear device. Instead, Pakistans strategy appears designed to manipulate the risk of use so
that it increases with the severity of the conflict." The possibility of accidental and inadvertent conflict inheres in the very possession of nuclear arsenals, and the
concerns raised by those pessimistic about the fragility of nuclear deterrence in South Asia may well turn out to be tragically accurate. But the
logic of
their argument about future dangers would be a whole lot stronger were they to offer a better
explanation for why similar warnings in the past have fallen short.
 1AR No Indo Pak War
Three major crises all prove deterrence will hold
A. Vinod Kumar 6/30/13 MPhil in disarmament studies and an Associate Fellow at Institute for Defense
Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, 6/30/13, "Nuclear Deterrence Works in Indo-Pak Ties,"
http://www.indepthnews.info/index.php/global-issues/1650-nuclear-deterrence-works-in-indo-pak-ties

NEW DELHI (IDN | IDSA) - For over two decades, a dominant section of western analysts harped on the volatilities of
the India and Pakistan nuclear dyad, often overselling the South Asia as a nuclear flashpoint axiom, and
portending a potential nuclear flare-up in every major stand-off between the two countries. The turbulence in the sub-continent

propelled such presages , with one crisis after another billowing towards serious confrontations, but eventually
easing out on all occasions . While the optimists described this as evidence of nuclear deterrence gradually consolidating in this dyad,
the pessimists saw in it the ingredients of instability that could lead to a nuclear conflict. Though there is no denial of the fact
that the three major crises since the 1998 nuclear tests Kargil (1999), the Parliament attack and
Operation Parakram (2001-2002) and the Mumbai terror strike (2008) brought the two rivals
precariously close to nuclear showdowns, not once had their leaderships lost complete faith in the
efficacy of mutual deterrence .
 AT: Terror Impact No Retaliation
No nuclear retaliation, even if the materials attributed to a state
Meggaen Neely 13, research intern for the Project on Nuclear Issues, CSIS, 3/21/13, Doubting
Deterrence of Nuclear Terrorism, http://csis.org/blog/doubting-deterrence-nuclear-terrorism

Yet, lets think about the series of events that would play out if a terrorist organization detonated a
weapon in the United States. Lets assume forensics confirmed the weapons origin, and lets assume, for
arguments sake, that country was Pakistan. Would the United States then retaliate with a nuclear strike? If a nuclear attack
occurs within the next four years (a reasonable length of time for such predictions concerning current international and domestic politics), it

seems unlikely.

Why? First, theres the problem of time. Though nuclear forensics is useful, it takes time to analyze the data and
determine the country of origin. Any justified response upon a state sponsor would not be swift .
Second, even if the United States proved the country of origin, it would then be difficult to determine
that Pakistan willingly and intentionally sponsored nuclear terrorism. If Pakistan did, then nuclear retaliation
might be justified. However, if Pakistan did not, nuclear retaliation over unsecured nuclear materials would be a
disproportionate response and potentially further detrimental. Should the United States launch a nuclear strike at
Pakistan, Islamabad could see this as an initial hostility by the United States, and respond adversely. An obvious choice, given current tensions
in South Asia, is for Pakistan to retaliate against a U.S. nuclear launch on its territory by initiating conflict with India, which could turn nuclear
and increase the exchanges of nuclear weapons.

Hence, it seems more likely that, after the international outrage at a terrorist groups nuclear detonation, the United
States would attempt to stop the bleeding without a nuclear strike . Instead, some choices might include
deploying forces to track down those that supported the suicide terrorists that detonated the weapon,
pressuring Pakistan to exert its sovereignty over fringe regions such as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, and
increasing the number of drone strikes in Waziristan. Given the initial attack, such measures might understandably
seem more of a concession than the retaliation called for by deterrence models, even more so by the
American public.
---AT Integration---
 2AC Integration Turn
RCEP talks backfire cause divisions between members and India
Amitendu Palit 16, 5/12/2016, Senior Research Fellow and Research Lead at the Institute of South
Asian Studies, Can India negotiate a new trade strategy?, East Asia Forum,
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/05/12/can-india-negotiate-a-new-trade-strategy/

Indias approach to negotiating FTAs has become focused on apparent non-negotiables that have made its

posture overly defensive and unproductive. The RCEP negotiations are a good example. Variousnegotiating partners within
RCEP want India to reduce tariffs on agricultural and dairy products. RCEP members such as Australia,
Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and New Zealand have strong comparative advantage in these sectors and want
greater access to Indias large domestic market. India considers slashing import tariffs in these sectors non-negotiable for
domestic political reasons. While most RCEP members know this, the lure of the large Indian market at a time when
Chinese demand could wane compels their negotiators to keep demanding greater access from India
with no success. For its part, India has established comparative advantage in service exports. A lot of these exports involve Indian
professionals travelling overseas and working onsite on IT and software projects. Indian service providers are also filling up skills gaps in the
labour markets of many advanced countries, particularly in industries like medical services and higher education as well as finance and human
resources. This large expatriate community has been a major source of inward remittances for India. As a result, India
keeps
demanding easy access for its professionals from negotiating partners in RCEP. But for many
countries, granting access to foreign professionals is politically sensitive and likewise non-negotiable.
Focusing on supposed non-negotiables in RCEP wont yield meaningful outcomes so long as both sides remain inflexible. The prospective EU
deal faces similar problems. The European Unions demand for lower import duties on automobiles and their components is being vociferously
resisted by Indian industry, in turn forcing the government to stay firm on tariffs. The European Union, similar to the RCEP parties, is reluctant
to allow easier entry to Indian professionals given political demands for it to protect local jobs. It is easy to figure out why many
RCEP members consider India obstructionist . Despite sharing several members with the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)
Australia, Brunei, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and Vietnam RCEP is seen as a less ambitious trade agreement. So far it has failed
to sufficiently engage with many complex, new generation trade issues (such as government procurement, the role of state-owned
enterprises, labour and the environment) that the TPP embraced. But, within its scope, RCEP is still aiming to achieve greater market access
than is available to members through existing FTAs. Eliminating tariffs among members is a major objective of RCEP. It is generally expected to
remove at least 95 per cent of tariffs. This is not difficult for most RCEP members, since their average tariffs are already less than 5 per cent.
Indias applied average tariffs are around 15 per cent. Eliminating tariffs would mean much greater cuts for India than the rest. It would also
mean Indias giving up much greater market access than what it seems likely to get in return. This makes tariff elimination a more politically
difficult prospect for India than other RCEP members. Making non-negotiables fundamental to trade negotiations is
counterproductive and threatens to isolate India from participating in the development of global and regional trade rules.

Prolonging talks with RCEP partners and the European Union in the name of defending politically sacred
tariffs is depriving Indian apparel, pharmaceuticals and jewellery exporters of greater access to Asia-Pacific and European
markets. Demanding more access for Indian professionals complicates matters further at a time when immigration is a sore issue in
developed countries politics.
 1AR Integration Turn Obstruction Ext.
RCEP talks cause backlash increase tensions over Indias protectionist stance
Prachi Priya 16, corporate economist, Aditya Birla Group, 6/2/2016, Protectionist: India gets
ultimatum from RCEP countries to cut tariffs or leave bloc, The Financial Express,
http://www.financialexpress.com/article/fe-columnist/column-indias-rcep-conundrum/271657/

India has received a lot of backlash in the last few RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership agreement)
negotiation rounds. According to reports, India got an ultimatum from the RCEP countries to either cut
tariffs or leave the bloc. They were irked by its protectionist attitude towards domestic industry, and
this further delayed negotiations . The commerce ministry later refuted the allegations and clarified that India very much remains
a part of the trade pact. The pact has already missed its 2015 deadline and members expect to seal the deal by the end of this year. In the next
round, in Auckland, between June 12-18, India may face enormous pressure to reduce tariff rates beyond the initial offer it made in Busan last
year. RCEP is a proposed free trade agreement (FTA) between 10 ASEAN countries and their six FTA partners, namely Australia, China, India,
Japan, Korea and New Zealand. It accounts for 25% of global GDP, 30% of global trade, 26% of FDI flows and 45% of the total population. After
submitting the initial offer on goods trade,
India is now reluctant to further dismantle tariff rates unless some of
its demands are met. The reason for Indias aggressive stance is largely due to its past experiences
with other trade agreements, where it did not gain much. What are Indias pain points? Based on its learnings from
previous FTAs, it wants to strike a fair deal for its domestic industry. It has raised concerns related to
quantum of tariff elimination, threat of cheap Chinese imports, market access for services, rules of
origin requirement and a stricter IPR regime. First, opening its domestic industry for Chinese imports is
the biggest concern. Indias trade deficit with China has risen thirteen-fold in the past decade. In fact, China now accounts for over 40%
of Indias trade deficit, as imports have grown at an annual rate of 30% while exports have risen only by 14%. India Inc. claims that cheap
Chinese imports have hurt domestic players. This is evident from the fact that India has registered the maximum number of anti-dumping cases
against China (134/545 cases).
Under RCEP, India has negotiated a different tariff liberalisation schedule with
China, giving concessions only on 42.5% of the tariff lines. It is not comfortable reducing tariffs,
especially on textiles, metals, etc. China, of course, is not very happy.
 2AC Alt Causes Integration
Obstacles kill cred of India-Asia Integration lack of political will, trade imbalances
Sampa Kundu 16, researcher at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, PhD, 4/8/2016, Indias
ASEAN Approach: Acting East, http://thediplomat.com/2016/04/indias-asean-approach-acting-east/.
On the economic front, the rising two-way trade between India and ASEAN is noteworthy. It grew from $13 billion to $74 billion between 2003-
04 and 2013-14. (See Table 1). However trade data between India and ASEAN shows a negative balance against
India. The government had to face criticism for signing its Free Trade Agreement with ASEAN on the
grounds that, though imports from ASEAN to India have been mounting, Indias exports to the region
are not experiencing the same trajectory. ASEAN, as a collective, occupies the fourth largest position in Indias total external
trade, while India was only ASEANs 10th largest trading partner as of June 2015. As of 2015-2016, Indias exports to ASEAN stood at 9.79
percent of its total exports, and its imports from the region were approximately 10.51 percent of its total imports. So far as investment is
concerned, as of 2014, Indias outward investment to Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam stood at a record $128
billion, which is even higher than Indian investment in China, some $119.56 billion. At the same time, approximately 12.5 percent of Indias
total inflows of foreign investment come from ASEAN. Table 1: Indias Trade with East Asia, Australia and New Zealand (All values in USD
million) Politics Geopolitically, India has attempted to demonstrate its ability to play a dynamic role in
the region. India sent a strong signal to China by mentioning the importance of maintaining freedom of navigation in the South China Sea in
the joint statement released by President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Narendra Modi during the latters 2014 U.S. visit. The idea of U.S.-
India joint patrols in South China Sea has also been floated, after Defense Minister Manohar Parikkars visit to the U.S. Pacific Command in
Hawaii in late 2015 (this has, however not been confirmed from the Indian side). Freedom of navigation in the South China Sea is essential for
India in order to ensure that its sea-bound trade continues uninterrupted. Through these gestures and the Indian Navys proven capabilities in
handling natural disasters such as the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, India has embarked on a path of greater involvement in the affairs of
Southeast and East Asia. In this regard, it is to be noted that Indias interests in the region converge with the interests of countries like Japan,
Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan and, to some extent, Brunei and Indonesia. The very fact that all these countries share territorial disputes with
China (or, in Indonesias case, uncertainty over an exclusive economic zone) stimulates them to forge closer relationships. Further, it has also
become imperative for India to cultivate relationships in the Indo-Pacific region because of the economic and strategic benefits that China is
likely to gain with even a partial materialization of its One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative. On December 31, 2015, ASEAN officially
declared the establishment of ASEAN Community. There are certain reservations about Indias
prospective benefits from the ASEAN Community building process, just as the advantages of the India-
ASEAN FTA are still unclear from Indias perspective. The ASEAN Community itself is marred with problems like intra-
ASEAN divides based on the South China Sea disputes; the lack of an ASEAN identity; developmental gaps that prevailing within ASEAN; and
many more. For India,
another challenge is that the government has not been able to decide the extent of
exposure it wants to provide to its remote northeast through connectivity projects designed to create
linkages between South Asia (vis--vis northeast India) and East Asia. Furthermore, the delays in
completing the India-Myanmar-Thailand trilateral highway, the Kaladan Multimodal Transit and
Transport Project, and the Moreh-Mandalay Bus Services have created negative perceptions in the
region about Indias political will. India needs to be more watchful, as a balance between domestic concerns and its larger national
interests is a prerequisite for India enabling itself for a greater extra-regional role.
 1AR Alt Causes Capacity
Alt causes to integration no capacity to follow through on coordinating
Prashanth Parameswaran 14, PhD in International Relations, Tufts, Associate Editor for the Diplomat,
8/23/2014, India and ASEAN: Beyond Looking East, The Diplomat,
http://thediplomat.com/2014/08/india-and-asean-beyond-looking-east/

Indias relationships with pivotal Southeast Asian countries are also gaining steam. New Delhis ties with
Singapore, its strongest in the region, are expected to grow even tighter as both sides agreed to step up their defense partnership on August
19. Relations with Vietnam are also on the uptick, with Hanoi renewing Indias lease of two oil blocks in the South China Sea for another year
before Swarajs first visit there next week. And Myanmar, the only ASEAN country that shares a physical land border with India, is in a league of
its own in Modis eyes since it is New Delhis gateway to Southeast Asia. Modi himself is expected to visit both Vietnam and Myanmar by the
end of 2014. But as is often the case with ASEAN-India relations, the problem is not the lack of ideas but
the inability to follow through on them. Take Indias relations with Myanmar. Earlier this month, Indias
former ambassador to Myanmar VS Seshadri warned in a report that two key infrastructure projects
the Trilateral Highway and the Kaladan Multi-modal Transit need to be completed on time by 2016 in
order to realize the full promise of bilateral ties. Judging from past experience, this is far from assured. For all the talk of
Indias Look East Policy, formal India-Myanmar land border trade is still a measly $35 million. At the sub-
regional level, countless reports including one I authored back in 2010 have encouraged India to revitalize
groupings like the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation
(BIMSTEC) and the Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (MGC), but to no avail. Perhaps a Modi government, with its
neighborhood focus, will finally take steps in this direction. Look East has been the paradigm used to frame Indias
approach to ASEAN since the days of Narasimha Rao in the 1990s. But given the gap between
rhetoric and reality in ASEAN-India relations in the past, I have preferred to say that New Delhis strategy in the coming years should
be to Act East more concertedly, following the remarks former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton delivered on a visit there back in 2011.
As India prepares to draft the next five-year plan of action for ASEAN-India relations beginning in 2016, it should
keep in mind that it
will be judged less on the platitudes in that document than on its ability to deliver on specific
initiatives on the ground in Southeast Asia.
 AT: India Rise Impact
Indias rise is impossible---slew of factors
Eric S. Edelman 10, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, was Principal Deputy Assistant to
the Vice President for National Security Affairs, 2010, Understanding Americas Contested Primacy,
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments

India, however, is also beset by an array of demographic, economic, social, political and security
problems that are daunting to say the least. India, from a demographic perspective, is a divided society with a low birth rate in
the south, which is home to the economic engine of Indias growth and a high birth rate in the largely Hindi-speaking north. As the NIC
report notes, by 2025, much of Indias work force growth will come from the most poorly educated, impoverished, and crowded districts
of rural northern India. This is what Nicholas Eberstadt calls a tale of two countries. He notes that some projections show perhaps as
much as a third of Indians twenty-five years or older could be virtually illiterate and concludes that if health and aging are the great
inhibitor to Russian economic growth, seriously
inadequate educational opportunity for all too much of the population
looks to be the Achilles Heel for India.93

The Goldman Sachs analysts, in a recent list of ten key things India needs to do to realize its potential, have
placed better governance, enhanced educational attainment and increased quantity and quality of higher education at
the top of the list. In addition, there is a fairly long inventory of other policy items including fiscal discipline, financial
liberalization, increased regional trade, improved infrastructure, as well as greater agricultural productivity
and enhanced environmental quality. The last two are linked by the difficulties created by Indias shrinking water supply.
Success in resolving all these issues would be a high bar for any country, but how well a country like
India, known for its rigid bureaucracy, will do is an open question. It is easy, therefore, to agree with Edward
Luces judgment that Indias rise in the early 21st century is widely expected, but it is not yet fully assured.94

The economic difficulties, including the continuing issue of poverty alleviation (about 25 percent of the Indian population is still
desperately poor and the percentage below the poverty line could be well over 40 percent using the upwardly revised norms of the World
Bank), corruptionand the health care challenges of widespread HIV/AIDS would be enough to test any nation
or governments mettle, but India also faces security challenges, both domestic and regional, that
complicate its future prospects . Inter-communal religious violence between Muslims and Hindus and politically-inspired
violence represent serious internal security challenges. The government must also deal with separatist movements in the Northeast and a
long-running radical leftist insurgency, the Naxalites, that Prime Minister Singh has characterized as the single biggest internal security
challenge ever faced by our country. Kashmir is a long-festering crisis which has sparked serious terrorist incidents such as the assault on
Parliament and the Mumbai attacks, which have periodically threatened to provoke a war between India and its nuclear-armed neighbor
Pakistan. The failure to resolve the Kashmir dispute is unlikely to derail Indian economic growth but does impose costs on the nation.
Finally, India
lives in a difficult neighborhood of weak or failing states including Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nepal, Sri
Lanka, Bangladesh and Burma. All
represent a set of complex policy challenges for India including the possibility of
terrorism, narcotics smuggling, crime, broader regional instability and potential outside
intervention.95
 AT: Asia War Impact
No escalation or great-power draw-in to Asian wars
Michael Hunzeker 14, postdoctoral fellow at Princeton University and a major in the U.S. Marine
Corps Reserve; and Mark Christopher, senior director and head of the Asia practice at The Arkin Group
and a fellow with the Truman National Security Project, 7/11/14, Why the Next Great War Wont
Happen on Chinas Doorstep, http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2014/07/why-next-great-war-wont-happen-chinas-
doorstep/88549/

This month marks the 100th anniversary of the July Crisis, the event that led to World War I, and if you believe the alarmists then history is
about to repeat itself. Sparked by Archduke Franz Ferdinands assassination, the Crisis saw a regional confrontation escalate into a continental
war that consumed Europes great powers and drew in the United States. In the lead-up to this tragic anniversary, critics of President Barack
Obamas noninterventionism argue that unchecked we stand at the brink of another Great War for ignoring China,
and its potential threat to Asia.

Historical analogies such as these are understandably seductive. They make complex issues seem simple. However, they are also
deeply misleading, drawing parallels that dont exist from a story that didnt happen. History is not
destined to repeat itself , unless those in power create self-fulfilling prophesies by drawing from the wrong lessons.

The first problem with using the 2014 is 1914 analogy is that it doesnt even get the present right. In all the ways that matter, the
Asia-
Pacific region of today is unlike Europe a century ago. Although some international relations theorists point to overarching
similarities China is a rising power seeking to reassert regional dominance and the U.S. is a great power with a preference for the status quo
the specific parallels simply arent there.

Asia today lacks 1914 Europes competing webs of rigid alliances. There is no Serbia-esque regime
yearning to carve an ethnically unified nation-state out of existing political boundaries. China is not
encircled (the protestations of some of its military planners notwithstanding), nor does an insane monarch lead it. Asia is
not swept up in a Cult of the Offensive the shared belief that military technology makes it easier
to attack than to defend. If anything, Beijings acquisition of anti-access/area denial[A2-AD] weapons
systems has convinced most strategists that defenders hold the upper hand . Globalized trade and
production chains have increased the economic costs of war. And finally, for better or worse, we now live in a nuclear
world.
AT: Hegemony DA
 2AC No Link Dependent
No balance of power shift China it too dependent on the US to challenge it globally
Green 16 (Michael J., Senior Vice President for Asia and Japan Chair at the CSIS, Chair, Modern and
Contemporary Japanese Politics and Foreign Policy at Georgetown, Winter 2016, After TPP: the
Geopolitics of Asia and the Pacific, The Washington Quarterly,
https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/TWQ_Winter2016_Green-
Goodman.pdf)

The argument for TPP is not that China sits ready to replace the Bretton Woods system overnight. Like
previous rising powers in
history, China is still dependent on global trade rules, while it demonstrates revisionist ambitions
regionally. For example, Xi Jinping has called for a new regional security order without alliances, to be
decided by Asians among themselves.20 He has backed this vision with his new One Belt, One Road proposal for massive
infrastructure investment in Eurasia and establishment of the AIIB.21 To be sure, China is motivated by the need to export
its capital surpluses and provide new opportunities for underemployed construction firms; and the
rest of Asia does have a significant need for infrastructure that the U.S.- and Japanese-dominated
Asian Development Bank (ADB) has been unable to meet (though Chinese money will not solve the
problem either if the underlying conditions for infrastructure investment are not improved).22 Moreover,
Xis vision of an Asian order defined without the United States is still largely rhetorical, since China itself
remains highly dependent on the U.S. economy. Nevertheless, China is today pushing to accelerate the transition to a new
order in Asia one in which China itself has greater influence over the United States, Japan, and other smaller states in the system.
 1AR No Link Internal Challenges
China cant challenge the US too many domestic challenges but the plan makes it
more likely itll cooperate
Green 16 (Michael J., Senior Vice President for Asia and Japan Chair at the CSIS, Chair, Modern and
Contemporary Japanese Politics and Foreign Policy at Georgetown, Winter 2016, After TPP: the
Geopolitics of Asia and the Pacific, The Washington Quarterly,
https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/TWQ_Winter2016_Green-
Goodman.pdf

While Xi Jinping has proposed an ambitious Sino-centric vision of Asias future, the reality is that
Beijing faces major domestic challenges . The 2014 CSIS survey found that less than 20 percent of strategic
elites in China actually expected the emergence of a Sino-centric system or a U.S.China
condominium.26 Over 50 percent expected continued U.S. leadership for the next decade. China must
undertake a new wave of opening and reform to escape what the World Bank calls the middle income trap and restore prospects for longer-
term growth.27 The debate sparked in Beijing when Japan joined TPP will intensify if Congress and other national
legislatures ratify the treaty in 2016. TPP will emerge as Chinese economic policymakers most useful external tool since negotiations for
membership in the WTO empowered Zhu Rongji to beat back vested interests opposed to economic reform in the 1990s.28 Outsiders
must always remain humble about their ability to change a country as vast and complicated as China,
but historically an inverse correlation has always existed between economic convergence and security revisionism. For example, Japans turn to
militarism in the 1930s was directly related to the collapse of international trade. Liberal advocates of convergence with the global financial and
trade order in the previous decade were entirely discredited as the militarists marginalized or assassinated them and drove a vision of
economic autarky and ethnic nationalism. Worryingly, global trade has grown more slowly than GDP over the past
three years, but a cascading series of agreements over the coming decade that builds from TPP to TTIP, a Free-
Trade Area of the AsiaPacific (FTAAP), and eventually reinvigoration of multilateral negotiations under the WTO would
create incentives for Beijing to adhere to regional and global rules and support economic as well as
eventual political liberalization in China. That is why the geopolitical impact of TPP is not about zero -
sum competition with China, and why comparisons of TPP to weapons systems are misleading. Agreements like TPP are not
comparable to the imperial preferences of the 19th century or the dangerous autarkic trading blocs of
the early 20th century. Competitive trade liberalization incentivizes all economies to lower barriers
and fuse into a larger, wealth-creating, rules-based order. The opponents of TPP have offered no
better pathway to that beneficial future.

Litany of obstacles -- China cant challenge the US no matter how fast it grows
Brooks and Wohlforth 16 (Stephen G, Associate Professor of Government @Dartmouth, William C, Daniel Webster Prof of
Government @Dartmouth, May/June, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-04-13/once-and-future-
superpower?cid=nlc-fatoday-
20160520&sp_mid=51424540&sp_rid=c2NvdHR5cDQzMUBnbWFpbC5jb20S1&spMailingID=51424540&spUserID=MTg3NTEzOTE5Njk2S0&spJo
bID=922513469&spReportId=OTIyNTEzNDY5S0)

After two and a half decades, is the United States run as the worlds sole superpower coming to an end? Many say yes, seeing a rising
China ready to catch up to or even surpass the United States in the near future. By many measures, after all, Chinas
economy is on track to become the worlds biggest, and even if its growth slows, it will still outpace that of the United States for many years. Its
coffers overflowing, Beijing has used its new wealth to attract friends, deter enemies, modernize its military, and aggressively assert
sovereignty claims in its periphery. For many, therefore, the question is not whether China will become a superpower but just how soon. But

this is wishful, or fearful, thinking. Economic growth no longer translates as directly into military power
as it did in the past, which means
that it is now harder than ever for rising powers to rise and established
ones to fall. And Chinathe only country with the raw potential to become a true global peer of the United Statesalso faces a
more daunting challenge than previous rising states because of how far it lags behind technologically . Even
though the United States economic dominance has eroded from its peak, the countrys military superiority
is not going anywhere, nor is the globe-spanning alliance structure that constitutes the core of the
existing liberal international order (unless Washington unwisely decides to throw it away). Rather than expecting a
power transition in international politics, everyone should start getting used to a world in which the United
States remains the sole superpower for decades to come.
 2AC Heg Decline Inev
Only our offense US decline is inev quality of relationships between the US and
China is key
Chelsey 16 (Dennis, PwC Global Risk Consulting Leade, 4/4/2016, Global Power Shift, Strategy &
Business, http://www.strategy-business.com/article/Global-Power-Shift?gko=d56bb

A fundamental change is taking place. The U.S. dollar is losing its exclusive position as the worlds
reserve currency. For the next few decades, no single country will be able to dominate the balance of
payments as the United States has done for more than 70 years. The last time something like this
happened was at the end of World War II, and it was catalyzed by the Bretton Woods Conference in
1944. At that session and in its aftermath, the United States brokered international agreements to
keep financial affairs running smoothly. It has embraced a global leadership role ever since. The
multilateral institutions that emerged then, such as the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, and
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), were subject to strong U.S. influence, and they worked fairly
well for a long time. That isnt to say the sailing was always smooth. When the U.S. unilaterally
abandoned the gold peg in 1971, for example, the Nixon Shock set off two years of negotiations
before major economies agreed to float their currencies against the dollar. But throughout the postwar
period, the U.S. generally sat at the head of the table with other large economies in making key
decisions, with the intent of mutual gain among friendly, mostly democratic, liberalized economies.
During the 70 years after Bretton Woods, the economic prominence of the United States was based on
four strong pillars. The first two were its burgeoning postwar economy and the trade networks that the
U.S. established and dominated. These were also the engines of global growth. The other two pillars
were the dollars status as a global reserve currency and the U.S. influence over multilateral institutions.
These provided stability to the global economy and a platform for international cooperation. Today,
emerging economies are challenging all four pillars. The most notable among the challengers is China,
whose global economic influence has emerged rapidly over the past decade. In 2014, China became
the largest economy in the world, in terms of purchasing power. It was then the fastest-growing G20
economy. One indication of Chinas substantial economic influence is the fact that its recent
slowdown has rippled across global markets. This influence has already weakened the first pillar, the
strength of the postwar U.S. economy. China is also now the worlds largest exporter. Its rapid move into
this role has given it enormous leverage in developing and influencing trade networks, which has
weakened the second pillar. Not coincidentally, the effectiveness of multilateral trade agreements is
deteriorating; witness the fading momentum of the World Trade Organization. In their place, regional
agreements have begun to dominate. The ongoing negotiations over the China-backed Free Trade
Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) are pitted
against the recently completed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), backed by the United States. These
regional deals represent an erosion of the U.S.s ability to set the rules for the whole world, and of any
nation to oversee a global consensus that favors its trade agenda alone. Chinas progress on
establishing the renminbi (RMB) as an international trade-settlement currency, which has undermined
the third pillar, has been even more rapid. The RMBs status as an elite global currency was enshrined in
November 2015, when the IMF decided to include the RMB in the basket of currencies that make up the
IMFs special drawing rights (SDRs). The RMB will have a larger weight in the five-currency SDR basket
than the Japanese yen and the British pound sterling. Over time, the RMBs reserve currency status will
create an alternative to the dollar, with support from the many nations that see an advantage in having
a multipolar global economic order. As for the fourth pillar, China is pushing hard to expand its presence
in existing multilateral institutions and to build new ones of its own. According to the Economist, Chinas
contribution to the United Nations budget doubled between 2010 and 2015, and now represents 5
percent of total U.N. contributions. China is increasingly engaged with U.N. efforts in peacekeeping,
climate change mitigation, and poverty reduction. China also led the creation of the Beijing-based Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which began operations on January 16, 2016. While cooperating
with its counterparts to promote and support sustainable development in the Asia-Pacific region, this
bank will operate on a model designed for the new global economic order lean, clean, and green,
according to its website. A total of 57 nations, which have committed US$100 billion in capital, are
members of the AIIB. Despite the skepticism of the U.S. government, the signatories included four of the
United States G7 partners Germany, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom. China also joined with
Russia, India, Brazil, and South Africa to form the Shanghai-based New Development Bank. Beyond
highlighting the institutional underpinning of the new global economic order, these two multilateral
development banks will amplify Chinas influence on global development finance. How will that
financing be deployed? Chinese president Xi Jinping, as quoted by the state-sponsored Xinhua News
Agency in February 2015, said that the AIIB will finance Chinas ambitious One Belt, One Road
initiative to build overland and maritime infrastructure linking East Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and
Europe. The resulting New Silk Road, as it has been dubbed, will help develop emerging economies,
increase trade between China and the rest of the world, and make use of excess capacity in the Chinese
domestic economy. It will also support Chinas political and economic interests around the world. To be
sure, these efforts may be tempered by the recent decrease in the rate of Chinese economic growth.
The U.S. economy remains strong, and the legacy of its postwar economic dominance continues to
influence the behavior of many globally focused multinational companies and investors. Investors are
also waiting for Chinas capital account to open further before they adopt the RMB. Capital market
investors are also cautious about China because they dont yet see its business environment as friendly
enough to their interests. Nonetheless, the creation of a new global economic order is inevitable.
Although China will not replace the United States, the U.S. will find it increasingly difficult to regain its
position of global economic dominance. Dont forget that other economies are building their power
and influence, too. India, the worlds third-largest economy by purchasing power, is forecast by the
IMF to grow fastest among G20 economies in 2016. It will emerge as an influential economic actor
with its own interests. In this world of dispersed economic power, stability will be more prized than
ever. But the nature of that stability will not be dictated by one or two major players. It will depend
on the quality of economic relationships among leading nations, even those that have different
economic systems. A good example of the new type of relationship is the natural resource investments
made recently by a few countries, including China, in frontier nations. These have caused some concern
over the potential for exploitation. Yet Chinas investments in Africa (as scholars Wenjie Chen and
Heiwai Tang have pointed out) are more diverse than is widely acknowledged. China is popular in many
parts of Africa, and exploitation concerns may be overblown. The ultimate fate of these investments
depends on the ability of the outsiders to build mutual trust with the local communities where they
invest.
 2AC No Heg Impact
Best data concludes no impact to heg
Benjamin H. Friedman et al 13, research fellow in defense and homeland security studies; Brendan
Rittenhouse Green, the Stanley Kaplan Postdoctoral Fellow in Political Science and Leadership Studies at
Williams College; Justin Logan, Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute Fall 2013,
Correspondence: Debating American Engagement: The Future of U.S. Grand Strategy, International
Security, Vol. 38, No. 2, p. 181-199

Brooks et al. argue that the specter of U.S. power eliminates some of the most baleful consequences of anarchy, producing a
more peaceful world. U.S. security guarantees deter aggressors, reassure allies, and dampen security dilemmas (p. 34). By supplying
reassurance, deterrence, and active management, Brooks et al. write, primacy reduces security competition and does so in a way that slows
the diffusion of power away from the United States (pp. 3940). There are three
reasons to reject this logic : security
competition is declining anyway; if competition increases, primacy will have difficulty stopping it; and
even if competition occurred, it would pose little threat to the United States.

an increasingly peaceful world. An

array of research , some of which Brooks et al. cite, indicates that factors other than
U.S. power are diminishing interstate war and security competition .2 These factors combine to make the costs of
military aggression very high, and its benefits low.3

A major reason for peace is that conquest has grown more costly. Nuclear weapons make it nearly suicidal in
some cases.4 Asia, the region where future great power competition is most likely, has a geography of peace: its maritime and
mountainous regions are formidable barriers to conflict.5

Conquest also yields lower economic returns than in the past. Post-industrial economies that rely heavily on human
capital and information are more difficult to exploit.6 Communications and transport technologies aid nationalism and other identity politics
that make foreigners harder to manage. The lowering of trade barriers limits the returns from their forcible
opening.7

Although states are slow learners, they increasingly

appreciate these trends . That should not surprise structural realists.
Through two world wars, the international system "selected against" hyperaggressive states and
demonstrated even to victors the costs of major war. Others adapt to the changed calculus of military
aggression through socialization.8

managing revisionist states. Brooks et al. caution against betting on these positive trends. They worry that if states behave the way
offensive realism predicts, then security competition will be fierce even if its costs are high. Or, if nonsecurity
preferences such as prestige, status, or glory motivate states, even secure states may become aggressive (pp. 36-37).9

These scenarios, however, are a bigger problem for primacy than for restraint . Offensive realist security
paranoia stems from states' uncertainty about intentions; such states see alliances as temporary expedients of last
resort, and U.S. military commitments are unlikely to comfort or deter them .10 Nonsecurity preferences
are, by definition, resistant to the security blandishments that the United States can offer under primacy
Brooks et al.'s revisionist actors are unlikely to find additional costs sufficient reason to hold back, or the threat of those costs to be particularly
credible.

The literature that Brooks et al. cite in arguing that the United States restrains allies actually suggests that offensive realist
and prestige-oriented states will be the most resistant to the restraining effects of U.S. power. These
studies suggest that it is most difficult for strong states to prevent conflict between weaker allies and their rivals when the restraining state is
defending nonvital interests; when potential adversaries and allies have other alignment options;11 when the stronger state struggles to
mobilize power domestically12; when the stronger state perceives reputational costs for non-involvement;13 and when allies have hawkish
interests and the stronger state has only moderately dovish interests.14

In other words, the

cases where it would be most important to restrain U.S. allies are those in which
Washington's efforts at restraint would be least effective. Highly motivated actors, by definition, have strong hawkish
interests. Primacy puts limits on U.S. dovishness, lest its commitments lack the credibility to deter or reassure. Such credibility concerns create
perceived reputational costs for restraining or not bailing out allies. The United States will be defending secondary interests, which will create
domestic obstacles to mobilizing power. U.S. allies have other alliance options, especially in Asia. In short, if
states are insensitive to
the factors incentivizing peace, then the United States' ability to manage global security will be doubtful.
Third-party security competition will likely ensue anyway.

costs for whom? Fortunately, foreign security competition poses little risk to the United States. Its wealth and geography
create natural security. Historically, the only threats to U.S. sovereignty, territorial integrity, safety, or power position have been potential
regional hegemons that could mobilize their resources to project political and military power into the Western Hemisphere. Nazi Germany and
the Soviet Union arguably posed such threats. None exist today.

Brooks et al. argue that "China's rise puts the possibility of its attaining regional hegemony on the table,
at least in the medium to long term" (p. 38). That possibility is remote , even assuming that China sustains its rapid wealth creation.
Regional hegemony requires China to develop the capacity to conquer Asia's other regional powers.
India lies across the Himalayas and has nuclear weapons. Japan is across a sea and has the wealth to quickly build up
its military and develop nuclear weapons. A disengaged United States would have ample warning and time to
form alliances or regenerate forces before China realizes such vast ambitions.

Brooks et al. warn that a variety of states would develop nuclear weapons absent U.S. protection. We agree
that a proliferation cascade would create danger and that restraint may cause some new states to seek nuclear weapons. Proliferation cascades
are nonetheless an unconvincing rationale for primacy. Primacy likely causes more proliferation among adversaries
than it prevents among allies . States crosswise with the United States realize that nuclear arsenals deter U.S. attack and diminish its
coercive power. U.S. protection, meanwhile, does not reliably stop allied and friendly states from building nuclear weapons. Witness British,
French, and Israeli decisionmaking.

Proliferation cascades were frequently predicted but never realized during the Cold War, when security was
scarcer.15 New research argues that security considerations are often a secondary factor in the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and that
states with the strongest appetites for proliferation often lack the technical and managerial capacities to acquire the bomb.16 Finally, even if
proliferation cascades occur, they do not threaten U.S. security. Few, if any, states would be irrational enough to court destruction at the hands
of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, especially if the United States is not enmeshed in their conflicts.
 1AR No Heg Impact
Hegemonys no longer key to peace---decline just means allies fill in
Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman 13, professor of American foreign relations at San Diego State University,
3/4/13, Come Home, America, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/05/opinion/come-home-
america.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=edit_th_20130305&pagewanted=print&_r=0

EVERYONE talks about getting out of Iraq and Afghanistan. But what about Germany and Japan?
The sequester $85 billion this year in across-the-board budget cuts, about half of which will come from the Pentagon gives Americans
an opportunity to discuss a question weve put off too long: Why we are still fighting World War II?

Since 1947, when President Harry S. Truman set forth a policy to stop further Soviet expansion and support free peoples who were
resisting subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures, America has acted as the worlds policeman.

For more than a century, Britain had held the line against aggression in Eurasia, but by World War II it was broke. Only two years after
the Allies met at Yalta to hammer out the postwar order, London gave Washington five weeks notice: Its your turn now. The Greek
government was battling partisans supplied by Communist Yugoslavia. Turkey was under pressure to allow Soviet troops to patrol its
waterways. Stalin was strong-arming governments from Finland to Iran.

Some historians say Truman scared the American people into a broad, open-ended commitment to world security. But Americans were
already frightened: in 1947, 73 percent told Gallup that they considered World War III likely.

From the Truman Doctrine emerged a strategy comprising multiple alliances: the Rio Pact of 1947 (Latin America), the NATO Treaty of 1949
(Canada and Northern and Western Europe), the Anzus Treaty of 1951 (Australia and New Zealand) and the Seato Treaty of 1954
(Southeast Asia). Seato ended in 1977, but the other treaties remain in force, as do collective-defense agreements with Japan, South Korea
and the Philippines. Meanwhile, we invented the practice of foreign aid, beginning with the Marshall Plan.

It was a profound turn even from 1940, when Franklin D. Roosevelt won a third term pledging not to plunge the United States into war.
Isolationism has had a rich tradition, from Washingtons 1796 warning against foreign entanglements to the 1919 debate over the Treaty of
Versailles, in which Henry Cabot Lodge argued, The less we undertake to play the part of umpire and thrust ourselves into European
conflicts the better for the United States and for the world.

World War II, and the relative impotence of the United Nations, convinced successive administrations that America had to fill the breach,
and we did so, with great success. The world was far more secure in the second half of the 20th century than
in the disastrous first half. The percentage of the globes population killed in conflicts between states fell in each decade after
the Truman Doctrine. America experienced more wars (Korea, Vietnam, the two Iraq wars, Afghanistan) but the world,
as a whole, experienced fewer.

We were not so much an empire the empire decried by the scholar and veteran Andrew J. Bacevich and celebrated by the
conservative historian Niall Ferguson as an umpire, one that stood for equal access by nation-states to
political and economic gains; peaceful arbitration of international conflict; and transparency in
trade and business.

But conditions have changed radically since the cold war. When the United States established major bases in West
Germany and Japan, they were considered dangerous renegades that needed to be watched. Their reconstructed governments also
desired protection, particularly from the Soviet Union and China. NATOs first secretary general, Hastings Ismay, famously said the alliance
existed to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.

Today, our largest permanent bases are still in Germany and Japan, which are perfectly capable of
defending themselves and should be trusted to help their neighbors. Its time they foot more of the bill or operate their own
bases. Chinas authoritarian capitalism hasnt translated into territorial aggression, while Russia no
longer commands central and eastern Europe. That the military brass still talk of maintaining the
capacity to fight a two-front war presumably on land in Europe, and at sea in the Pacific speaks to the
irrational endurance of the Truman Doctrine.

Our wars in the Middle East since 2001 doubled down on that costly, outdated doctrine. The
domino theory behind the
Vietnam War revived under a new formulation: but for the American umpire, the bad guys (Al
Qaeda, Iran, North Korea) will win.
Despite his supporters expectations, President Obama has followed a Middle East policy nearly identical to his predecessors. He took us
out of Iraq, only to deepen our commitment to Afghanistan, from which we are just now pulling out. He rejected the most odious
counterterrorism techniques of George W. Bushs administration, but otherwise did not change basic policies. Mr. Obamas gestures
toward multilateralism were not matched by a commensurate commitment from many of our allies.

Cynics assert that the military-industrial complex Dwight D. Eisenhower presciently warned against has primarily existed to enrich and
empower a grasping, imperialist nation. But America was prosperous long before it was a superpower; by 1890, decades before the two
world wars, it was already the worlds largest and richest economy. We do not need a large military to be rich. Quite
the opposite: it drains our resources.

Realists contend that if we quit defending access to the worlds natural resources read, oil nobody
else would. Really? Its not likely that the Europeans, who depend on energy imports far more than the nation that owns Texas and
Alaska would throw up their hands and bury their heads in the sand. Its patronizing and nave to think that America is the
only truly necessary country. Good leaders develop new leaders. The Libyan crisis showed that our allies can do a lot.
The United States can and should pressure Iran and North Korea over their nuclear programs. It must help to reform and strengthen
multilateral institutions like the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. It must champion the right of small
nations, including Israel, to freedom from fear. But there are many ways of achieving these goals, and they dont all involve more
borrowing and spending.

Partisan debates that focus on shaving a percentage point off the Pentagon budget here or there wont take us where we need to go.
Both parties are stuck in a paradigm of costly international activism while emerging powers like
China, India, Brazil and Turkey are accumulating wealth and raising productivity and living standards, as we
did in the 19th century. The long-term consequences are obvious .

America since 1945 has paid a price in blood, treasure and reputation. Umpires may be necessary, but they
are rarely popular and by definition cant win. Perhaps the other players will step up only if we
threaten to leave the field . Sharing the burden of security with our allies is more than a fiscal necessity. Its
the sine qua non of a return to global normalcy .
 AT: SCS Impact
Heg doesnt solve SCS conflict
Junshe 2-2 (Zhang, researcher with the Navy Military Academic Research Institute under the PLA
Navy, 2-2-2016, Hegemony no way to solve South China Sea issue
http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/pla-daily-commentary/2016-
02/02/content_6885205.htm)

The U.S. has proposed many times over the years to take concrete steps to ensure the navigation safety
of vessels of all parties, when concerning its own pledge, however, the U.S. has sent warships and
aircraft into Chinese waters and airspace a number of times regardless of China's repeated objection,
leading to close-range contacts between the naval and air forces of the two sides. Such practices are
extremely unprofessional in operation, highly irresponsible for soldiers of both sides, and result in very
dangerous consequences. China's sovereignty over the Nansha Islands and nearby waters is fully
evidenced by historical and legal documents. China was the first nation to discover, name, develop and
operate the islands in the South China Sea, including the Xisha, Dongsha, Zhongsha and Nansha islands,
and was also the first to persistently exercise sovereign jurisdiction over those islands. Japan occupied
the South China Sea islands during the war of aggression against China, and documents that established
the post-WWII international order such as the Cairo Declaration and Potsdam Proclamation all
demanded Japan to return Chinese territory that it occupied during the war. After the end of WWII, the
Chinese government recovered the South China Sea islands. Then after oil was discovered in the South
China Sea in the late 1960s, countries including the Philippines began to illegally occupy and encroach
upon China's islands and reefs there, making China a victim of the South China Sea issue, but it has
exercised a high level of restraint for the sake of maintaining regional peace and stability. China has
always steadfastly safeguarded peace and stability in the region. While firmly safeguarding its territorial
sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, China, bearing the big picture of regional peace and
stability in mind, has been committed to solving relevant disputes with directly concerned countries
through negotiation and consultation on the basis of respecting historical facts and in accordance with
international laws. Harris' remarks and the American military's actions have done nothing but sowing
discords in the relations between China and other concerned parties and encouraging the Philippines
and other countries that have disputes with China to continue to take provocative actions against China,
which is in no way helpful for peacefully resolving the maritime disputes in the region. The U.S. isn't a
concerned party of the South China Sea issue, and the American government has repeatedly reaffirmed
its policy of taking no sides on the issue. The so-called "freedom of navigation" that the U.S. military has
asserted in global oceans for a long time is essentially a challenge to other countries' sovereignty and
jurisdiction in territorial waters, exclusive economic zones, waters of islands, straits and other sea areas
according to American standards and based on its powerful maritime forces. While the South China Sea
situation has been eased for some time, the intentional actions on America's part in that region to
create China-U.S. tension is downright provocation and reflects the U.S.' usual hegemonistic mindset
and approach. The world today is no longer a place where the U.S. is the dominant pole. China doesn't
wish to create trouble but it isn't afraid of trouble either. China's firm stance on the principle of
safeguarding its territorial and sovereign integrity has never changed and will never change. Whatever
provocative actions the U.S. takes, the Chinese military will take all necessary means to resolutely
defend national sovereignty and security.
***NEG***
T Bilateral
 1NC
Diplomatic engagement must be bilateral it involves entering negotiations
Jos Azel 09, Senior Research Associate at the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies,
University of Miami, 4/6/2009, In Defnese of Carrots and Sticks, Institute for Cuban and Cuban-
American Studies, University of Miami, http://www6.miami.edu/iccas/Docs/Cuba_Brief.pdf
Diplomatic engagement with an adversary rarely, if ever, succeeds by merely appealing to the adversarys higher principles. It is an implausible
strategy with the likes of Ahmadinejad, Kim Jong-il, or Castro, where the vigorous interaction of values and diplomacy are necessary. By
definition, diplomacy and diplomatic engagement are about negotiations to find mutually acceptable
solutions to a common challenge. Giving away all U.S. bargaining positions in return for nothing is not a mutually acceptable
solution. In negotiations, when an unconditional concession is given, the other party pockets it and moves on to its next demand. That is
precisely what the Castro government would do with the recommended giveaways. In the real world, if one arrives at the negotiating table
empty handed, one is sure to leave empty handed.

Economic engagement requires increasing trade or economic interaction the aff is

inducement
Arda Celik 11, M.A in political science and international relations, Uppsala University Sweden,
Economic sanctions and engagement policies, http://www.grin.com/en/e-book/175204/economic-
sanctions-and-engagement-policies
Literature of liberal school points out that economic engagement policies are significantly effective tools for sender and target countries. The effectiveness leans on
mutual economic and political benefits for both parties.(Garzke et al,2001). Ecenomic engagement operates with trade
mechanisms where sender and target country establish intensified trade thus increase the economic
interaction over time. This strategy decreases the potential hostilities and provides mutual gains. Paulson Jr (2008) states that this mechanism is
highly different from carrots (inducements). Carrots work quid pro quo in short terms and for narrow
goals. Economic engagement intends to develop the target country and wants her to be aware of the
long term benefits of shared economic goals. Sender does not want to contain nor prevent the target country with different policies.
Conversely; sender works deliberately to improve the target countries Gdp, trade potential, export-import ratios and national income. Sender acts in purpose to
reach important goals. First it establishes strong economic ties because economic integration has the capacity to change the political choices and behaviour of
target country. Sender state believes in that economic linkages have political transformation potential.(Kroll,1993)

Violation:
The plan text mandate is a unilateral offer not bilateral negotiations and that creates
the conditions for trade but does not mandate it

Vote negative for limits and ground the aff justifies a plethora of uni-directional affs
that expand the scope of diplomatic and economic engagement and deny the neg
predictable DA links to bilateral ground
 2NC Overview
Our interpretation is that diplomatic engagement requires the aff to increase bilateral
negotiations and economic engagement requires intensifying trade thats Azel and
Celik

This creates a manageable amount of affirmatives like reducing the trade deficit,
increasing steel trade to fix the glut, climate negotiations, regional conflict de-
escalation talks, and diplomatic engagement over cyber policy

The affirmative doesnt meet this they are a unilteral inducement that extends an
offer to China to shape its behavior -- but dont mandate any immediate bilateral
collaboration

Prefer our interpretation Azel and Celik have an intent to define and Celik is doing a
review of engagement literature which means this is the most comprehensive,
predictable definition of the topic this is key it shapes pre-season research and
reflects the lit base which is necessary for preparedness
 AT: We Meet Diplomatic Engagement
The aff does not meet our interpretation of diplomatic engagement -- the plan texts
extends an offer rather than entering into sustained, back-and-forth exchanges
 AT: We Meet Economic Engagement
The plan doesnt meet it creates the possibility of trade without mandating any
trade which is effects topical causes an explosion of unpredictable advantage ground
kills neg preparation

Our Celick evidence situates the aff best in the literature its an inducement which
can influence Chinas behavior in the short term. An invitation to the TPP could act as
stand-alone diplomatic pressure that shapes Chinese behavior whereas mandating
trade requires long term linkages
 AT: Resnick
Their interpretation is not predictable Resnick was a PhD student at the time
redefining engagement prefer our interpretations which accurately represent the
consensus of literature

Resnick links to the limits DA:

Virtually anything political could be trade promotion because it frames the intent of
the action theres no clear limit
 Ext Dip Engagement
Diplomatic engagement must be bilateral
Daniel Silander 13, Associate Professor. Department of Political Science , Linnaeus University,
Responsibility to Protect and Prevent: Principles, Promises and Practicalities, Anthem Press, 2014, pg 16
The state sovereignty norm may be defined by distinguishing its two components of internal sovereignty and external sovereignty.'6 Internal
sovereignty is the state's authority over its territory, population and resources. Based on the state-centric model it is up to everyone to support
the centralized power of the state in order to provide domestic security. An essential ingredient of internal sovereignty was, and remains, the
monopolization of force. External sovereignty relates to the state's military capacity to protect its territorial borders and its capacity to engage
in diplomatic relations.
Diplomatic engagement includes the right to make treaties and to seek other forms of
reciprocity designed to enhance the security of the state.
 Ext Limits Impact
Unilateral offers explode the topic unilateral offers to participate in multilateral
forums and new agreements and forums explode advantage ground by entangling a
proliferation of actors within the scope of the plan bilateral engagement in existing
forums sets a hard cap

Err neg on the magnitude of the link on this topic, T will be about small differences
because terms like diplomatic engagement are fundamentally vague but affs that
push the limits add up to create a huge neg burden
 Ext Ground Impact
The aff denies us the certainty of bilateral engagement links by being able to read
advatanges and add-ons about the mere nature of US action this is key to good
ground -- bilateral engagement is more significant in scope by involving long and long-
term actions by other foreign actors
 AT: Trade = Bad Ground
False plenty of core, new trade dilemmas exist that allow the aff to increase trade
through existing channels or to diplomatically engage over trade reducing the trade
deficit, completing BIT negotiations

Theres good UQ for the aff the US and China just concluded high level dialogue and
came away with key issues steel, aluminum, renminbi transactions, BIT
Peter Bittner 6/10, Editorial Assistant at The Diplomat , 6/10/2016, US-China Strategic and Economic
Dialogue: Key Takeaways, The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/us-china-strategic-and-
economic-dialogue-key-takeaways/
On the final day of the two-day dialogue, a Chinese J-10 fighter jet conducted what the U.S. Department of Defense called an unsafe intercept
of an American reconnaissance plane over international waters in the East China Sea, allegedly passing within 100 feet of the U.S. aircraft at
high speed. No meaningful progress was made in regards to the continuing tensions over the disputed territories, reinforcing how difficult it is
for each country to see eye-to-eye on the matter. Onthe economic front, many U.S. companies were disappointed with the
used the dialogue to voice their continued frustration over doing business in China.
outcomes of the talks and
Many foreign businesses are increasingly gloomy in their outlooks on conducting operations in China,
partially due to Chinas struggling economy but also due to discontent with what many see as protectionism. At the talks, U.S.
representatives pressured China to curtail its unparalleled glut of steel , which has caused global
indignation due the damaging effects of decreased prices upon U.S and E.U. producers. The U.S. recently slapped
countervailing subsidies and anti-dumping duties on Chinese steel. At the opening of the two-day event, Lew voiced strong
criticism of Chinas overproduction, citing its damaging and distorting effects on international markets. Implementing policies to
substantially reduce production in a range of sectors suffering from overcapacity, including steel and aluminum, is critical to the function and
stability of international markets, said Lew. In his own opening remarks, President Xi Jinping promised
to redouble efforts to
reduce overcapacity of steel but announced no new initiatives or specific measures. No agreements were reached in
regards to Chinas overcapacity of aluminum either. Chinas finance minister, Lou Jiwei, emphasized the role of market forces
as an impetus to curb overproduction and reiterated that Chinas economy will respond to global price changes. Some Western observers are
skeptical of Beijings intimations to drastically decrease production, which could mean laying off millions of workers. One
of the few
tangible results of the dialogue was a major development in international finance. China for the first time included the
United States in a plan allowing American banks to clear renminbi-denominated transactions, allowing a
quota of up to $52 billion under its Renminbi Qualified Foreign Institutional Investment program. According to a fact sheet published by the
U.S. Treasury Department, the United States and China reiterated their previous pledges on exchange rates, including refraining from
competitive devaluation and targeting exchange rates for competitive purposes. The U.S. Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), a key
determiner of monetary policy, assured China it would conduct its policies in a manner sensitive to the effects on the international financial
system. China
meanwhile promised to continuously deepen reform, promote economic structural
adjustments, and expand domestic demand by increasing household consumption, increasing the service sectors proportion
of the economy, and ensuring investment is high quality and driven by the private sector. In May, Chinas exports fell 4.1 percent, a sign of
weak global demand, but its imports surpassed experts expectationssuggesting Chinas domestic demand may be picking up. Chinas central
bank recently forecast its 2016 economic growth at 6.8 percent, higher than many outside analysts figures. The United States is widely
believed to be recovering from the 2008 global economic crisis; however, May unemployment figures were weaker than anticipated. With the
United States in the throes of the 2016 elections, Chinese officials are wary of anti-China rhetoric, especially talk of protectionist trade policies.
Washington., meanwhile, hopes the elections will spur China to liberalize foreign investment policies. Next
week, China is
expected to release a newly revised list of sectors barred from international investors, a so-called
negative listpart of the ongoing negotiations over a Bilateral Investment Treaty.
 AT: Aff Education Pivot
Discussions over US presence in East Asia are discussions of the pivot which is their
best education offense but Chinese exclusion from the TPP is a UQ arg that allows
the neg to engage the case and debate the sufficiency of dialogue and negotiation
 AT: Reasonability
Theyre not reasonable---that was above
Limits DA---they force us to prep for the sum of all reasonable interpretations which is
unmanageable
Reasonability causes judge intervention since it requires arbitrary gut check about
how bad is bad enough instead which topic you prefer
Competing interpretations causes a race to the top where both sides need a
defensible interp---predictability arguments solve their offense because the aff can
beat arbitrary interps
Relations Adv CP
 1NC
The United States federal government should:
-increase its engagement over green financing with the Peoples Republic of China
-ratify the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea
-increase national cyber security defenses and allocate resources to faciliate
information sharing between American companies targeted in cyber attacks

The CP solves the relations advantage

Melanie Hart 15, PhD in political Science from University of California at San Diego, Senior Fellow and
Director of China Policy at American Progress, 9/29/2015, Assessing American Foreign Policy Toward
China, Center for American Progress,
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/report/2015/09/29/122283/assessing-american-
foreign-policy-toward-china/

Under the Obama administration, the United States is conducting the U.S-China relationship along
multiple parallel tracks. The administration formulates China policy on an issue - by - issue basis . Where
interests converge, the administration seeks to expand concrete cooperation.
Where interests diverge and China pursues
actions that impose direct or indirect costs on the United States, the administration seeks to counter
and deter those actions. This multitrack approach enables the United States to push back against
problematic actions as needed without curtailing overall U.S.-China cooperation. This is a realpolitik,
eyes-wide-open approach to engagement. Engagement need not be predicated on the assumption that
China will not seek to undermine U.S. interests in some areas. The United States can work
constructively with China while accepting that we have different principles, that we are not perfectly
aligned. We can work along multiple tracks at the same time: expanding cooperation in one area while confronting differences
and exchanging threats in another. That dynamic was on display through the most recent U.S.-China presidential summit, which aimed to
achieve three distinct goals. First, where
interests converge, aim to work constructively on concrete initiatives
that provide tangible benefits for both nations and lay groundwork for even bigger and more
beneficial cooperation in the future. Successes from the recent summit include: Securing a $3.1 billion
climate finance commitment from China that exceeds what the United States has pledged thus far via
the Green Climate Fund, or GCF. In addition, prior to the official presidential meeting, U.S. and Chinese climate negotiators convened
a climate leadership summit during which 11 Chinese city- and provincial-level governments formed an Alliance of Peaking Pioneer Cities, or
APPC, under which all are committing to peak carbon emissions earlier than the nationwide 2030 target announced last November. Since China
issued its commitment to peak in 2030 and to make its best efforts to peak earlier, new economic data have opened the possibility that China
could peak well before the current deadline and possibility as early as 2025. All of the APPC cities believe that with the right policy mix, they can
beat the 2030 target and serve as models for the rest of the nation. Early-peak targets vary by location based on individual capabilities. Beijing,
Guangzhou, and Zhenjiang have committed to peak around 2020, 10 years ahead of Chinas official national target. Working collaboratively
with China to expand the international reconstruction effort in Afghanistan. Afghanistans peace and stability are critical to both U.S. and
Chinese national security objectives. The United States and China co-chaired a high-level U.N. General Assembly meeting on Afghan
reconstruction during which Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi called on other nations to join the United States and China in supporting Afghan
peace, development, and integration into the global community. The United States and China are already partnering on capacity-building
programs in Afghanistan, and China has committed to provide $150 million in development assistance. Such collaborative efforts are bringing
China forward on the diplomatic and development stage at a time when U.S. funding is diverted to other pressing crises. Furthermore, such
collaboration should become the foundation for greater Chinese development assistance to Afghanistans long-term development. Second,
where interests diverge, take actions that decrease the risk of inadvertent conflict with China and increase the costs China pays for problematic
behavior. Successes from the recent summit include: Establishing new annexes on air-to-air safety and crisis communication under the
military-to-military confidence-building measure, or CBM, framework launched in November 2014. The 2001 collision of a U.S. EP-3 and a
Chinese J-8 aircraft and recent incidents between U.S. and Chinese aircraft underscore the need to establish better operational standards and
best practices for military aircraft and military vessels operating in close proximity in the Asia-Pacific region. Launching
a new high-
level dialogue on cybercrime and securing what appears to be a new presidential-level commitment
on commercial cyberespionage. The new high-level dialogue will hold its first meeting before the end of 2015 and, if the
mechanism works as intended, will give U.S. officials new tools for investigating and prosecuting cyberattacks and intrusions attributed to
Chinese actors. In addition, according to the U.S. fact sheet on the recent summit meetings, the two presidents agreed that neither the United
States nor China will conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property, including trade secrets or other confidential
business information, with the intent of providing competitive advantages to companies or commercial sectors. This agreement is not
likely to completely eliminate those activities on the Chinese side, but if the White House did secure a
personal commitment from President Xi on this issue, that will increase the reputational damage
Chinese leaders will face if their nation continues to engage in commercial cybertheft and those
activities are reported by the United States. Within China, a presidential-level commitment of this
nature would likely add new administrative restrictions on these activities. Chinese leaders will have
an incentive to improve their awareness of and control over what is happening at the operational
level. They may apply new restrictions and require higher-level approvals for cyberspace intrusions targeting U.S. commercial entities. If so,
those controls may reduce the scope of this activity and therefore reduce the associated harm to U.S. commercial interests. Third, when
Chinese behavior poses a direct and serious threat to American interests, take actions, as necessary,
to signal that the United States will not withhold punitive action in one issue area to pursue promising
opportunities in another. When pursuing U.S.-China relations among multiple tracks, there is a risk that China will assume that if
there are good cooperative opportunities on the table, the United States will not risk losing those opportunities by taking punitive action on
more-controversial issues. Clear U.S.-China communication is necessary to avoid this dangerous misperception, which could lead Beijing to
underestimate the probability the United States will take punitive actions in response to provocative behavior. In the run-up to the most recent
summit, the Obama administration utilized public and private channels to signal that the United States was seriously considering levying
cybersanctions against China and that the White House was willing to issue those sanctions right before the September presidential summit
regardless of the impact that would have on President Xis state visit. Beijing took those threats seriously and dispatched a high-level delegation
to Washington to discuss cyber issues two weeks before the official presidential visit. This presummit communication likely played a role in the
new U.S.-China cybercrime mechanism and new commercial espionage commitment mentioned above. Expanding the tactical toolkit The
current U.S. engagement strategy is achieving breakthrough cooperation on issues of common interest ranging from climate change to
development cooperation. Where interests diverge, however, progress is more incremental. Going forward, the United States
should maintain current momentum on the cooperative side and simultaneously seek to expand its
toolkit for addressing problematic areas of U.S.-China relations. If progress on difficult issues does not become more
concrete, those problems are likely to fester and undermine positive cooperation. For example, if China does not take steps to
substantially reduce the scope and frequency of its commercial cyberespionage activities, those
activities will likely reduce U.S. willingness to engage in joint technology development projects that
benefit both nations but also give Chinese companies more knowledge about and access to U.S.
technology development projects. U.S. experience with prior difficult issues in U.S.-China relations suggests that three
approaches can be particularly effective at deterring problematic behavior. 1. Using smart statecraft and institution-building to expand
common interests and turn a difficult area of the relationship into a new pillar of cooperation The climate arena provides an excellent model
to follow. Climate change started out as an area of U.S.-China contention rather than cooperation. When U.S. and Chinese leaders met to
discuss climate change during the first round of the Kyoto Protocol negotiations in the mid-1990s, the United States was on one side of a global
divide, China was on the other side, and the two nations struggled to figure out how to work in concert. That dynamic persisted through the
Copenhagen climate negotiations in 2009. However, since then, U.S. and Chinese leaders have worked proactively to change that dynamic.
Leaders on both sides made a critical observation: Although the two nations were always on opposite sides of a developed versus developing
country divide in multilateral negotiations, the United States and China had many common interests on energy and climate issues at the
bilateral level. U.S. and Chinese leaders decided to nurture and expand those common interests by identifying a set of common goals in this
space and launching a new framework of bilateral mechanisms designed to rally U.S. and Chinese officials, businesses, and nongovernmental
experts to work together to achieve those goals. That effort has been enormously successful. Over the past few years, bilateral
energy and climate projects have helped both nations expand clean energy deployment and reduce
climate pollution. Progress at the bilateral level has also made it possible for the two nations to
redefine their roles in multilateral negotiations and work together to shape a new global climate
regime. The increasingly positive U.S.-China energy and climate dynamic reflects a natural interest alignment between the two nations.
However, careful diplomacy was required to identify those commonalities and lay the groundwork for joint action. The United States should
apply this model in other areas of the U.S.-China relationship. 2. Working multilaterally with other nations and, where available, through
international institutions to address issues that affect not only the United States but also a broader array of international interest groups The
United States should not rely on the bilateral U.S.-China relationship to solve problems that are multilateral in nature. Where Chinese behavior
is a common concern for multiple nations, the best way to address that behavior is to make the issue a broader multilateral discussion. In the
past, it has been much easier to change Chinese behavior on issues relating to international norms rather than a U.S.-specific complaints. When
the United States is the only party challenging a particular action, Chinese officials often suspect that the United States is doing so as a tactic to
block or contain Chinas rise. That can lead China to harden its positioning rather than accommodate American interests. When the United
States works in concert with other nations, the dynamic changes, and Beijing can view the issue as a wide-ranging problem rather than a U.S.
containment strategy. For example, on the commercial front, engaging partners in Europe and the United Kingdom played a critical role in
convincing China to table a controversial cyberbanking law earlier this year. To be clear, this is not about the United States furthering its own
interests through third parties; rather, this is about recognizing that when an issue affects multiple parties, it is generally not helpful to frame
that issue as a U.S.-China problem. In
the maritime domain, ratifying the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea
would better enable the United States to work with other countries to push back against Chinas
unlawful actions in the South China Sea. Until the United States does so, we stand outside the international
system and have a limited capacity to leverage international law to counter Chinese actions. 3.
Shoring up defenses and strengthening capacity at home to reduce U.S. vulnerabilities to and costs
from problematic Chinese actions Cybersecurity is now a high-priority issue in U.S.-China relations. It is important to do what is
possible to reduce the frequency and scope of Chinese intrusions, and the U.S.-China relationship appears to be making progress in that
direction. However, if
hackers are breaking into U.S. networks on a regular basis, then better security is
necessary. Improving security should be a top priority for federal government systems, as well as for
the private sector. Americans should not be receiving multiple notices every year telling them that their information has been stolen.
This is a problem. It is a U.S. problem and a global problem. This is not just a sticky issue in the U.S.-China relationship. The U.S. federal
government needs to do a better job at driving progress in this area at home. China and Russia are hacking into U.S. federal government
networks, and that is a concern, but what happens if a group such as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, or ISIS, develops those capabilities?
If policymakers do not close these loopholes, then they leave the nation open to unacceptable security risks. One
of the most
important steps the U.S. Congress could take to strengthen U.S. cyber response capabilities is to pass
cybersecurity legislation that facilitates information sharing between the American companies
targeted in these attacks and the U.S. government agencies with the expertise and capacity to assist.
Closing current security loopholes should be the first priority. Figuring out how to respond to these attacks should be
the next priority, and that is where this becomes a U.S.-China issue.
 2NC OV
The affs understanding of US/China relations is wrong the success of cooperation is
compartmentalized which means beginning with holistic sticking points like the TPP is
wrong prefer the CPs strategy of taking an issue by issue approach -- thats Hart

The CP is sufficient and necessary to solve the relations advantage it does 3 things:
1) increase US/China coop over green financing to scale up the necessary investment
to solve their climate impacts
2) ratifies the UNCLOS which lets the US credibly use international law to contest
Chinas territorial claims in the ECS to defuse the dispute
3) increases public-private info-sharing on cyber attacks and critical infrastructure
defenses to bolster cyber security solves their cyber terror impact
 AT: TPP Key
The TPP isnt key
1) Cooperation and competition arent zero sum -- Diverging interests are
inevitable China is a rising power with competing geopolitical ambitions but
cooperation is ongoing and successful climate action has been pursued
2) Their Zhou evidence is rhetorically powerful but substantively bunk on spillover
claims the US and China havent been trending toward isolationism, proven
by collaboration in Afghanistan, cooperation on the Green Climate fund, and
new confidence building measures thats Hart
 AT: Perm Do Both
Permutation links to the net benefits:
1) Links to the trade regimes impact turns because the CP doesnt solve that
advantage
2) Links to the Heg DA because the links are about including China in the TPP
which only the plan does
 XT Solvency General
Pursuing issue by issue cooperation solves resolving sticking points like the TPP isnt
key
Melanie Hart 15, PhD in political Science from University of California at San Diego, Senior Fellow and
Director of China Policy at American Progress, 9/29/2015, Assessing American Foreign Policy Toward
China, Center for American Progress,
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/report/2015/09/29/122283/assessing-american-
foreign-policy-toward-china/

The United States has pursued an engagement strategy toward China for almost four decades.
Regardless of party affiliation, every U.S. president since Nixon has aimed to integrate China into the
international system. That decision has been and continues to be one of the greatest American
foreign policy successes of the post-World War II era. The U.S. engagement strategy toward China and
alliance relationships in the Asia-Pacific region made it possible for Asia-Pacific nations to focus on
economic development at home instead of strategic competition abroad. Now, nearly 37 years after U.S.-China
normalization, China is an upper-middle-income nation. Chinas economic growth is allowing it to expand its military capabilities and foreign
policy ambitions. That is a natural expansion. Beijing is increasingly unwilling to sit on the sidelines and watch other nations shape international
norms. Today, instead
of biding their time, Chinese leaders are experimenting with new ways to use their
nations growing strengths to shape the international environment in Chinas favor. On some issues,
those efforts dovetail with U.S. interests, so Chinas new assertiveness is opening up new
opportunities for cooperation. Where U.S.-China interests are not aligned, however, Chinese actions
are reheating old frictions and creating new ones. Those frictionsmost notably in the South China
Seaare triggering new debates in the United States about overall foreign policy strategy toward
China. Some U.S. observers discount the new opportunities for cooperation and argue that because
some challenges in the U.S.-China relationship appear difficult to navigate, the United States should
scrap the entire engagement strategy and begin treating China as a strategic rival. Those arguments
are misguided . The fundamentals of the U.S.-China relationship are the same today as they were in
the 1970s when the United States first reached out to turn this former rival into a strategic partner.
Chinese leaders still prioritize domestic economic growth and stability above all other policy goals; they still view
the U.S.-China bilateral as Chinas most important foreign policy relationship and want that
relationship to be peaceful and cooperative. The Chinese military still focuses first and foremost on
defending the Chinese Communist Partys right to govern the Chinese mainland and its territories.
These fundamentals have not changed. What has changed in recent years is Chinas capabilities and the tools Beijing is using to further its
domestic and foreign policy interests. Those changes call for some tactical adjustments on the U.S. side. Those changes do not warrant an
abandonment of the engagement strategy that has brought, and can continue to bring, decades of enduring peace and economic growth for all
Asia-Pacific nations, including the United States. My testimony will cover four main points: Economic and political challenges within China are
still Beijings top priority, and those challenges trigger a new assertiveness from Beijing. Chinas new assertiveness is constructive in some
areas of U.S.-China relations and problematic in others. The
current U.S. engagement strategy excels at expanding
cooperation in constructive areas and is achieving incremental progress in problematic areas. The
United States should maintain this engagement strategy but expand its tactical toolkit for addressing
problematic Chinese behavior.
 XT SolvencyESC
Ratifying UNCLOS solves the ESC shields US arguments from rhetorical attacks on
credibility
Christopher Mirasola 15, JD/MPP Candidate at the Harvard Law School and a member Harvards
National Security Research Committee, 3/15/2015, Why the US Should Ratify UNCLOS: A view from the
South and East China Seas, Harvard Law School National Security Journal,

One of the most important reasons for ratification, perhaps least discussed in popular media, is UNCLOS pivotal
role in mediating territorial disputes in the South and East China Seas. Territorial disputes between
China and its neighbors implicate most of Southeast Asia, including the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and
Taiwan. Chief among them are contested claims to the Parcel Islands (Vietnam), Scarborough Shoals (Philippines), and widespread
disagreement over the legitimacy of Chinas claims to great swaths of the South China Sea through the 9-dash line. Moreover, there has
been little progress in resolving these disputes through bilateral U.S. China negotiations, including the
Strategic and Economic Dialogue. Scholars have cited UNCLOS as a potential mechanism for mitigating these
issues in House Foreign Affairs Committee and Armed Services Subcommittee on Sea Power briefings, among others. Ratifying
UNCLOS is essential to American regional interests for four reasons. First, the U.S. has repeatedly
emphasized that territorial disputes should be addressed multilaterally and has repudiated efforts, led
by the Chinese, to address problems with individual Southeast Asian nations. As pointed out by the Center for
New American Security, however, American arguments in favor of multilateralism are robbed of moral
authority when the U.S. refuse to support the most comprehensive mechanism for multilateral
resolution of maritime disputes. By not ratifying UNCLOS, American arguments regarding the regions
most complex issues are all too easily left open to rhetorical attack by those opposed to multilateralism. More
importantly, it betrays a dangerous ambiguity about Americas commitment to opposing unilateral solutions. Second, ratifying UNCLOS
will allow us to participate in and help shape dispute resolution mechanisms like the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. Military officers and Bush administration national security staff have highlighted the importance of
shaping norms that define these territorial disputes. The Philippines, in the International Tribunal, has already raised key issues regarding
Chinas 9-dash line and a preliminary decision is expected sometime in 2015. Professor Dutton from the U.S. Naval War College has further
emphasized that Chinasinterpretation of key UNCLOS provisions is part of a coordinated legal campaign
to extend maximal security jurisdiction over the East China Sea and the international airspace above
it. It is true that some dispute whether ratifying UNCLOS would materially change Chinas
understanding of these territorial rights. However, the U.S. cannot sit on the sidelines as ITLOS creates
precedent that will become binding on 166 of the 193 states recognized by the United Nations.
Customary international law is, by its very nature, subject to change with developments in state practice and understandings of legal obligation
(opinio juris).[1] In a foundational case, the International Court of Justice found that treaty provisions become customary law when they are
followed by specially affected states. By not signing UNCLOS, the US, certainly a specially affected state, robs its decisions of any potency as a
source of customary law. Those who assert that America can depend on the strength of its navy and existing customary international law need
to face the twin realities that China is increasing its military expenditures and that American forces are overstretched in the face of sharp
budget cuts. The
U.S. cannot assume that China will adhere to traditional interpretations of customary
international law, principles that they had little hand in crafting and do not necessarily serve Chinas
national interest. Indeed, China has already begun to push back against the customary freedom of
navigation afforded to military craft (mainly American) in its exclusive economic zone. The U.S. should take
an active role in supporting traditional interpretations of customary international law by engaging in a variety of fora, including the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, lest the U.S. cripple itself in this essential debate. Third, aside from ad hoc diplomacy and
negotiations within Association for South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), whose decisions require unanimity, UNCLOS
is one of the few
multilateral mechanisms that can directly address territorial disputes in the seas. General Dempsey, Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, noted that ratifying UNCLOS, gives us another tool to effectively resolve conflict at every level. While it is true that
ratifying UNCLOS hasnt vindicated Japan, for example, in its dispute with China, the treaty has only enjoyed widespread
support for sixteen years. Given this short history, it is almost surprising that the Philippines has
already asserted this type of claim against China through UNCLOS to bolster its relatively weak
strategic position. UNCLOS, therefore, is useful insofar as it provides another venue through which the
U.S. could press its claims in the region. American treaty obligations with both Japan and the Philippines give us a strong
interest in legitimizing and shaping these new multilateral dispute resolution mechanisms.
 XT Solvency Cyber Info Sharing
Info sharing solves cyber additional resources overcome pitfalls
Brian Harrell 16, Director of Security and Risk Management at Navigant, MA in Homeland Security at
Penn State, 2/12/2016, Public-private cyber threat intelligence sharing necessary in electricity industry,
IDG, http://www.csoonline.com/article/3032347/security/public-private-cyber-threat-intelligence-
sharing-necessary-in-electricity-industry.html

President Barack Obama recently stated that the

country needs to integrate intelligence to combat cyber threats, just as
we have done to combat terrorism." While the United States government has nearly limitless resources and the

ability to conduct offensive operations, this statement still rings true for private sector businesses.
Near real-time intelligence sharing can enable critical infrastructure owners and operators to block rapidly
emerging threats and mitigate targeted attacks against utility infrastructure. The complexity of the cyber operational domain, the
speed with which activity and operations take place, and the supposed inherent advantage of the attacker has been discussed among utilities and the NERC
Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center (E-ISAC). The E-ISAC, which establishes situational awareness, incident management, and coordination for
security events within the electricity sector, has been the prime advocate for the need to feed real-time intelligence updates to stakeholders. By beginning to
define the overall environment and the problem set in manageable threat stream products and emphasizing the importance of integrating sound and time-tested
intelligence thinking and methodology into the equation, it becomes easier to address the problem. This
intelligence is meant to help
reduce uncertainty for the decision-maker and prevent surprise. It is no revelation that the majority
of infrastructure in North America is owned and operated by the private sector. Because of this, it is vital
that the public and private sectors work together to protect these assets. Over the past few years, the
FBI, DHS, and the Department of Energy have made considerable strides in improving information
sharing and giving classified access to intelligence products such as bulletins, alerts, and secret level
briefings. These data points have been used to mitigate threats, reduce cyber risk, and update internal
security policies. Additionally, this data flow has enhanced communications between security teams, management, and board members by providing
authoritative threat warnings, which ultimately drive better investment strategies by more directly connecting security priorities with business risk management
priorities. Ultimately,
information and intelligence sharing is a two-way street. Private sector entities
must remove the words compliance risk from their lexicon and readily share relevant information as
it happens. Nobody knows their systems better than they do. Nobody knows how the worlds largest machine works better
than the dedicated engineers within the electricity sector. Thus, cyber alerts coming from utility cybersecurity professionals are imperative to the collaborative
exchange process. Concurrently, federal
intelligence partners must alert those within the sector who actually
have the ability to stop the cyber-bleeding. The electricity sector has been hiring security
professionals with military, law enforcement, and intelligence backgrounds, so actionable information
that has been compiled, analyzed and validated by federal intelligence partners, should be
disseminated to the sector for action once available. Utility CISOs and CIOs must continue to raise the cybersecurity intelligence
information issue with their state fusion centers, FBI Cyber Watch liaisons, and other intelligence professionals within DHS and DOE. A mature cybersecurity
program integrates baseline compliance, risk management, trained professionals, and the continuous recognition that theres a threat of compromise.
 XT Solvency CyberDefenses
Defending critical infrastructure solves their cyber impact only the counterplan is
guaranteed to solve other actors
Cory Bennett 15, MS in Journalism from Columbia, Cybersecurity Reporter for the Hill, 11/26/2015,
Congress struggles to secure nations power grid, The Hill,
http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/261310-congress-struggles-to-secure-power-grid

And according to researchers, the

industry isnt fully prepared to stymie sophisticated hackers. There are
definitely some risks and some gaps, said Boyer, whose company rates cybersecurity preparedness at thousands of firms,
including many within the energy and utilities sector. Those that are making policy decisions need to account for that when were trading off
where were going to make investments. In recent years, cyber spies and overseas hackers have increasingly turned
their attention to the U.S. power grid. In 2014, the energy sector was the most targeted of the
nations critical infrastructure industry sectors, accounting for a third of cyber incidents, according to a
government report. National Security Agency (NSA) Director Adm. Michael Rogers acknowledged in a congressional hearing that China and
likely one or two other countries are currently sitting on the grid, with the ability to literally turn out
the lights if they wanted to. Rogers said these states, which likely include Russia and possibly Iran, are
deterred only by the fear of U.S. retaliation. But, he added, We can't count on the fact that less rational
actors might also gain access to those critical systems. The comment was a reference to the growing cyber capabilities
of unpredictable states like North Korea which was blamed for the bruising cyberattack on Sony Pictures Entertainment last year and
digitally savvy extremist groups like the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). A top Department of Homeland Security (DHS) official recently told
energy firm executives at a conference that ISIS is beginning to perpetrate cyberattacks. And the results could be catastrophic. Researchers
at the University of Cambridge and insurer Lloyds of London recently estimated that a grid blackout across 15 states and Washington, D.C.,
would cost the economy hundreds of billions of dollars, raise mortality rates at failing hospitals and disrupt the countrys water supply as
electric pumps shut down. Industry officials are well aware of this threat. But Boyer said an assessment of energy generation companies from
security firm BitSight revealed concerning deficiencies. Out of all sectors BitSight analyzed, the energy and utilities sector had the largest
percentage of servers with encryption problems, Boyer said. For example, the sector trails others in eradicating the potentially catastrophic
Heartbleed security bug, a widely publicized encryption flaw uncovered over a year ago that left much of the Internets sensitive data exposed
to hackers. Overall cybersecurity, energy and utilities firms ranked down near the healthcare industry, which is coming off a year of mega
breaches at top health insurers like Anthem and Premera Blue Cross. It was also graded slightly worse than the retail sector, which touched off
the wave of high-profile breaches with hacks at Target and Home Depot. Are
they not understanding what their assets
are? Are they not responding? Are they just not aware? Boyer asked. I dont know all those reasons. The energy
industry argues it is aggressively moving to keep pace with cyber threats. The Electricity Information Sharing and
Analysis Center (E-ISAC) is one of the country's few long-established ISACs sector-specific hubs that compile, assess and disseminate data on
hacking threats. Last week, more than 350 companies came together for a two-day stress test of the power grids ability to detect and deflect
the worst-case physical and digital attacks. It was the industrys third exercise in the last five years, and drew a wide range of participants,
including electric generators, transmission companies, law enforcement officials and federal government agencies. In every successive
exercise, cyberattacks have become a more prominent part of the exercise. Threats
are constantly changing and
emerging, and our ongoing cyber and physical security efforts help assure the system is more secure,
said Gerry Cauley president of the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), which organized the stress test in a statement.
A report detailing the outcome of the test is expected sometime early next year. Meanwhile, grid security has started to catch
the attention of lawmakers and presidential candidates alike. On the campaign trail, Democratic front-runner Hillary Clinton
released a sweeping plan to upgrade the power grid that would create a new presidential team to coordinate cyber threat assessment and
response efforts between the government and energy industry. On Capitol Hill, Congress is locked in a funding battle that some say is
vital to ensuring the grids security. Lawmakers face a Dec. 11 deadline to move a slate of spending bills, including the Energy
and Water Development appropriations bill. The measure funds an Energy Department program, known as the Cybersecurity for Energy
Delivery Systems, to research and develop tools to shield the grid from digital assaults.
 XT Solvency Climate
Green financing is key to sustian any path forward collaboration is already
happening but the CP is a prereq to solve the impacts
Melanie Hart 16, PhD in political Science from University of California at San Diego, Senior Fellow and
Director of China Policy at American Progress, 6/13/2016, Green Finance: The Next Frontier for U.S.-
China Climate Cooperation, Center for American Progress,
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/report/2016/06/13/139276/green-finance-the-next-
frontier-for-u-s-china-climate-cooperation/

The effectiveness of these and other new policies remains to be seen, but there is wide recognition that
any path forward will require scaled-up investment . When Chinese officials speak of green
financewhich they do increasingly frequentlythey are referring precisely to the public and
private investment that China will require to meet its environmental challenges, which include its climate
targets. According to the latest estimates, China will need to invest up to $6.7 trillion in low-carbon industries by 2030, or around $300 billion to
$445 billion per year over the next 15 years to meet its goals under the Paris Agreement. According to Chinas Institute of Finance and Capital
Markets, at most, only 10 percent to 15 percent of that investment will come from public funds; the vast majority will need to come from the
private sector. Meanwhile, in the absence of comprehensive energy and climate legislation, the
Obama administration is
working to implement a series of policies and regulations needed to put the United States on a track
to achieve its Paris commitment of 26 percent to 28 percent reduction in greenhouse gas pollution
below 2005 levels by 2025. As of 2015, U.S. emissions were 12 percent below 2005 levels, so the trajectory is consistent with the
target. At the federal level, this includes the Clean Power Plan, which will for the first time regulate greenhouse gas emissions from power
plants; performance standards for motor vehicles; regulations on methane emissions from new oil and gas sources; and reforms to U.S. policy
on coal leasing on public lands, all of which are being complemented by action at the state and local levels. All
told, the United
States and China are making significant efforts to reduce domestic emissions. Both countries are
demonstrating strong leadership on domestic climate policy, and that has opened up new
opportunities for mutually beneficial bilateral and multilateral cooperation. The United States and
China are already collaborating through the Climate Change Working Group, which has launched multiple
collaborative projects under the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, or S&ED; the U.S.-China Clean Energy Research
Center, which brings U.S. and Chinese experts together for joint clean energy technology development; and the Mission
Innovation initiative, which aims to raise research and development funding across multiple sectors, including clean energy sectors in
the United States and China. U.S. and Chinese officials also are engaged in a Domestic Policy Dialogue, formally
established at the 2015 S&ED, which is a bilateral forum for sharing lessons learned from each nations climate policy experiences to date.
Going forward, there is room to expand these initiatives. Possible areas for enhanced cooperation on domestic policy include reducing non-
carbon dioxide greenhouse gas emissions, improving measurement capabilities for land-use and forestry-sector climate impacts and for policies
for the power sector, technological innovation, and resilience policy. Mobilizing green financing to meet domestic investment needs
Despite the array of collaborative exchanges that are already underway, the United States and China
are not yet collaborating in any significant manner on one of their most important shared challenges: how to mobilize
private-sector investment to achieve their emission reduction goals. Building out a new clean energy economy
requires significant investment capital. Going forward, both nations will try out different approaches to catalyze those investments. Domestic
climate policy and investment policy are mutually reinforcing. Without clear, stable, and consistent climate policies,
private firms cannot easily finance investments in low-carbon technologies. Understandably, banks are unwilling
to make loans to projects where a reasonable return on investment cannot be expected. This is where policies such as
Production Tax Credits, or PTCs; feed-in tariffs for renewables; performance standards; carbon taxes;
or emissions trading programs come into play by creating economic return for cleaner technology
industries. Such policies create markets for low-carbon technologies and thereby spur greater
investment in clean energy. Even so, barriers to financing still can exist for newer technologies that are perceived as risky. Here
again, smart renewable investment incentives delivered though Investment Tax Credits, or ITCs; Production Tax Credits, or PTCs; or loan
guarantees can help firms obtain financing that otherwise would be unavailable through private capital markets.
Trade Blocs India DA
 Note
Can be read as a turn on the Trade Regimes Adv or as a separate off
 1NC India Growth Turn
Trade blocs good RCEP is key to Indias economy stops it from getting locked out of
global trade
Bipul Chatterjee 15, Deputy Executive Director of the Consumer Unity & Trust Society, MA in
Economics, Dehli School of Economics, 4/8/2015, Why the RCEP is the opportunity India needs, East Asia
Forum, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/04/08/why-the-rcep-is-the-opportunity-india-needs/

As two mega-regional preferential trade agreements the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) loom closer to completion, India must move
towards higher trade standards. Trade diversion from non-member countries of these mega-regional
trade agreement s is likely to occur and could be detrimental. This is a serious concern for developing countries cut
out of the talks. India could lose out in some key areas. A number of export areas could be affected, including
grains and other crops, processed food, textiles and apparel, and both light and heavy manufacturing. Imports are expected to slow down,
affecting the competitiveness of many domestic industries. And there will be negative impacts on inward and outward
foreign direct investment. This will have consequences for Indias outputs, product prices and income
generation. In this context, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), a proposed
comprehensive trade agreement among 16 nations in the Asia Pacific, is exactly the kind of opportunity India needs.
Through the RCEP, India can develop the higher trade standards promoted in mega-regional
agreements, while ensuring support for its domestic constituencies. But many of the negotiating members of these
mega-regional agreements, including some of those in RCEP, already have low tariff rates. In contrast, India has to maintain relatively high
tariffs because of high cost of inputs. What would India gain if its partners tariffs are already low? Especially as India will be pressed to lower its
own tariffs and further open its market. The challenge before India is about balancing its negotiations with RCEP partners, and utilising both
promotional and conditional offers in a number of sectors. India can showcase to its regional partners, and indeed the world, that some of its
domestic producers are ready for greater competition especially those that have a comparative or competitive advantage and can connect
with global value chains. This should include linking Indias high-quality information technology sector with manufacturing and commodity
processing in regional value chains. At the same time, due
to greater flexibility in the RCEP, India can continue to
support its domestic industry to give certain sectors the time to prepare for greater foreign
competition. This should be done through a sensitive list approach, product-specific rules of origin criteria and offer extended phases for
tariff reductions.

India growth key to solve Indo Pak and nuke terror

Marhsall Bouton 10, President of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, PhD in Political Science from
the University of Chicago, Americas Interests in India, Oct 2010, CNAS Working
Paper, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_USInterestsinIndia_ Bouton.pdf

In South Asia, the most immediately compelling U.S. interest is preventing terrorist attacks on the U.S.
homeland originating in or facilitated by actors in South Asia, particularly in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
To avert that possibility, the United States also has an interest in the stability and development of
both countries. At the same time, the United States has a vital interest in preventing conflict between
Pakistan and India, immediately because such a conflict would do great damage to U.S. efforts in
Afghanistan and Pakistan (such as the diversion of Pakistani military attention away from the
insurgency) and because it would pose the severe risk of nuclear escalation. Finally, the United States
has an interest in peace and stability in South Asia as a whole. Instability and violence in nearly every
one of Indias neighbors, not to mention in India itself, could, if unchecked, undermine economic and
political progress, potentially destabilizing the entire region . At present, a South Asia dominated by a
politically stable and economically dynamic India is a hugely important counterweight to the
prevalent instability and conflict all around Indias periphery. Imagining the counterfactual scenario, a
South Asian region, including India, that is failing economically and stumbling politically, is to imagine
instability on a scale that would have global consequences , including damage to the global economy,
huge dislocations of people and humanitarian crisis, increasing extremism and terrorism, and much
greater potential for unchecked interstate and civil conflict .

Low-threshold for escalatory Indo-Pak nuclear war --- extinction

Russ Wellen 12-9-14, editor of Foreign Policy In Focus Focal Points blog for the Institute of Policy
Studies, The Threshold for Nuclear War Between Pakistan and India Keeps Dropping,
http://fpif.org/threshold-nuclear-war-pakistan-india-keeps-dropping/

Most people think that, since the end of the Cold War, chances that a nuclear war will break out are slim to none. Though some
nervousness has surfaced since the Ukraine crisis, its true that, barring an accident, the United States and Russia are unlikely to attack each other with nuclear weapons. Southeast Asia is
another matter, as Gregory Koblentz warns in a report for the Council of Foreign Relations titled Strategic Stability in the Second Nuclear Age. Interviewed about the report by Deutsche Welle,
Koblentz pointed out: The only four countries currently expanding their nuclear arsenals are China, India, Pakistan and North Korea. China, for example, is developing mobile intercontinental

by 2020, Pakistan
ballistic missiles to prevent its stationery ICBMs from becoming sitting ducks, as well as submarines capable of launching ballistic missiles. Meanwhile,

could have enough nuclear material to build 200 nuclear weapons, about as many as Great Britain currently has. Koblentz told
Deutsche Welle: Altogether, Pakistan has deployed or is developing eleven different nuclear delivery systems including

ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and aircraft. As if terrorism , such as the Mumbai attacks of 2008, and
territorial disputes , such as over Jammu and Kashmir, dont make relations between Pakistan and India volatile
enough, a new element has been introduced. Pakistan is now seeking to develop low-yield t actical
n uclear w eapon s (as opposed to strategic the big ones) to compensate for its inferiority to India in conventional
weapons and numbers of armed forces. Koblentz told Deutsche Welle: Since the conventional military imbalance between India and Pakistan is expected to grow thanks to Indias
larger economy and higher gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate, Pakistans reliance on nuclear weapons to compensate for its

conventional inferiority will likely be an enduring feature of the nuclear balance in South Asia. What
makes tactical weapons so dangerous is that, by blurring the distinction between nuclear and
conventional weapons , they turn nuclear weapons from unthinkable to thinkable . Equally as dangerous, Koblentz
explains: The introduction of t actical n uclear w eapon s may lead Pakistan to loosen its highly centralized command and
control practices. Due to their short-ranges (the Nasr/Hatf-IX has a range of about 60 kilometers), these types of weapons need to be deployed close to the front-lines and
ready for use at short-notice. Thus are lower-ranking officers granted greater authority and capability to arm and
launch nuclear weapons which raises the risk of unauthorized actions during a crisis . Another risk
is inadvertent escalation. There is the potential for a conventional conflict to escalate to the
nuclear level if the commander of a forward-deployed, nuclear-armed unit finds himself in a use it
or lose it situation and launches the nuclear weapons under his control before his unit is overrun. Its
all too vertiginous for words. Some in the United States might think thats not our problem. Pakistan and India are digging their own grave let them lie in it. But, of course, nuclear
war in Southeast Asia has the potential to turn the entire world into a grave . To wit: Summary of
Consequences of Regional nuclear war between India and Pakistan (from studies done at Rutgers, the University of Colorado-Boulder
and UCLA) If War is fought with 100 Hiroshima-size weapons (currently available in India-Pakistan arsenals), which have half of 1 percent (0.05%) of the total explosive power of all

currently operational and deployed U.S.-Russian nuclear weapons 20 million people die from the direct effects of the weapons , which is
equal to nearly half the number of people killed during World War II Weapons detonated in the largest
cities of India and Pakistan create massive firestorms which produce millions of tons of smoke 1 to 5
million tons of smoke quickly rise 50 km above cloud level into the stratosphere The smoke spreads
around the world , forming a stratospheric smoke layer that blocks sunlight from reaching the surface
of Earth Within 10 days following the explosions, temperatures in the Northern Hemisphere would
become colder than those experienced during the pre-industrial Little Ice Age This cold weather would also cause a 10%

25-40% of the protective ozone layer would be

decline in average global rainfall and a large reduction in the Asian summer monsoon.

destroyed at the mid-latitudes, and 50-70% would be destroyed at northern high latitudes.Massive
increases of harmful UV light would result, with significantly negative effects on human, animal and
plant life. These changes in global climate would cause significantly shortened growing seasons in the
Northern Hemisphere for at least years. It would be too cold to grow wheat in most of Canada. World grain stocks, which already are at historically low levels, would

be completely depleted. Grain exporting nations would likely cease exports in order to meet their own food needs. Some medical experts predict that ensuing
food shortages would cause hundreds of millions of already hungry people, who now depend upon food imports, to
starve to death during the years following the nuclear conflict. When it comes to nuclear weapons, we truly are all in it
together. Many claim that whatever leadership the United States and the West might demonstrate in disarmament would be lost on Asian nuclear-weapon states. But they fail to take
into account how disarmament is becoming a norm all over the world including in Asia.
 2NC Overview
Indo-pak war causes extinction Pakistans tactical nukes create the conditions for
loose command and control and use it or lose it pressures that causes escalation
thats Wellen.

We subsume their defense -- it relies on regionally stabilizing forces like India

exclusion from mega-regional trade wrecks regional stability and the prospects for de-
escalation thats Bouton

Independently theyve conceded a stable India is key to solve terror attacks on the US

Retaliatory attacks escalate to great power nuclear war

Ayson 10 (Robert, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New
Zealand Victoria University of Wellington, After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic
Effects, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 33(7), July)

A Catalytic Response: Dragging in the Major Nuclear Powers

A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily
represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever
be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe
that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant
numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a
general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states
have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking
place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worldsa non-state actor nuclear
attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange are not necessarily separable . It is just possible that
some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading
to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In
this context, today's and tomorrow's terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors
of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These
risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may
require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead
to such a massive inter-state nuclear war . For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might
well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered
as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that
sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For
example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had
come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear
material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting
from a nuclear explosion would be spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable,
and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important some
indication of where the nuclear material came from.41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and
American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all)
suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors . Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and
France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of
North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely
ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a
backdrop of existing tension in Washington's relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats
had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the
worst ? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of
limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these
developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during
a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise
domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington's early response to a
terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear
aided) confrontation with Russia and /or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the
immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the
country's armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a high er stage of alert . In such a tense environment, when careful
planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S.
intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might
grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response
to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or

nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that
group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia
and/or China might interpret such
action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on
their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main
aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the
Chechen insurgents' long-standing interest in all things nuclear.42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise
alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to
provide.

Turns trade and ASEAN RCEP increases prosperity, peace and rewrites the rules of
the trade order prefer our issue specific ev over their generic impacts about trade
blocs
Peter Drysdale 16, Emeritus Professor of Economics, Australia National University, Recipient of the
Asia Pacific Prize , 4/26/2016, The regional trade deal with China and India that's twice the size of TPP,
Financial Review, http://www.afr.com/opinion/the-regional-trade-deal-with-china-and-india-thats-
twice-the-size-of-tpp-20160426-goeyzj

Lost in the hype around the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade treaty has been the fact that Australia has quietly been
negotiating what could be a more important trade deal , potentially double the size, with a "rival" bloc, which
includes India and China. Beginning in Perth on Wednesday, is another round of negotiations on the Regional Comprehensive
Economic Partnership, RCEP. This meeting follows a ministers meeting in Malaysia last year, which trade minister Andrew Robb attended, and
could set the final timetable for wrapping up the deal. It is expected a deal could be inked as early as next January. Initiated by ASEAN in
response to the US-led Trans Pacific Partnership, it is, in part, designed to leverage more value out of the existing five ASEAN free trade
agreements with other RCEP countries and the plethora of bilateral FTAs negotiated over the past 15 years among the RCEP countries
themselves. But RCEP
has the potential to be much more than simply another mega-regional free trade
agreement. While the Asian economies are already highly integrated, it is an interdependence which
has grown under the current global trading regime, not through bilateral or regional trading
arrangements. Staggeringly, ASEAN, Japan, China, Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand which comprise the RCEP group
already had a bigger share of global GDP measured in real terms than the TPP countries in 2007. Bluntly put,
the RCEP group is where the global economic dynamism is, and it is a massive opportunity for Australia and for the
region. Because China, India, Indonesia and other developing countries in Asia will have trouble joining the TPP in the
foreseeable future, an ambitious and high-quality RCEP can help integrate the entire Asia Pacific
region. But if it is to really maximise the value of economic integration and free trade, RCEP governments will need to go beyond negotiating
a single-undertaking trade deal along TPP lines. A comprehensive RCEP can aspire to be a model for a global set of
principles-based rules for managing trade and other forms of international commerce in the 21st
century.
 XT RCEP K2 Indian Econ
RCEP is key to Indian growth decisive factor in determining its economic status
insulates it from market uncertainties
Bipul Chatterjee 15, Deputy Executive Director of the Consumer Unity & Trust Society, MA in
Economics, Dehli School of Economics, 3/3/2015, Why RCEP is Vital for India, The Diplomat,
http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/why-rcep-is-vital-for-india/

Mega regional trade deals are in vogue in an otherwise fragile global economy . In an environment of falling
aggregate demand, these trade deals are seen as a means to insulate economies from market uncertainties.
Three important mega regionals are currently under negotiation: the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership of Asia and the Pacific
(RCEP), the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP),
and the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). It is expected that these
agreements, once concluded and implemented, will set the stage for a new generation of global trade and

investment rules. From Indias point of view, the RCEP presents a decisive platform which could
influence its strategic and economic status in the Asia-Pacific region and bring to fruition its Act East Policy. It is
expected to be an ambitious agreement bringing the five biggest economies of the region Australia, China, India, Japan and South Korea into
a regional trading arrangement. It would be the worlds largest trading bloc covering a broad spectrum of issues such as
trade in goods, services, investment, competition, intellectual property rights, and other areas of economic and technical cooperation.
Together, the RCEP group of countries accounts for a third of the worlds gross domestic product, and 27.4 per cent and 23.0 per cent of the
worlds goods and services trade, respectively. It is interesting to note that, compared with the TPP and TTIP groups of countries, Indias trade
share with the RCEP group of countries as a percentage of its total trade has increased over the past decade and half, underlining the
importance of its trade with key countries in this group. Untitled Source: International Trade Centres Trade Map Database, 2014 For India,
the RCEP offers ample opportunity. There are three immediate benefits that its trade policymakers should note. First, the
RCEP
agreement would complement Indias existing free trade agreements with the Association of South
East Asian Nations and some of its member countries, as it would deals with Japan and South Korea. It
can address challenges emanating from implementation concerns vis--vis overlapping agreements,
which is creating a noodle bowl situation obstructing effective utilization of these FTAs. It is interesting
to note that, compared with the TPP and TTIP groups of countries, Indias trade share with the RCEP group of countries as
a percentage of its total trade has increased over the past decade and half, underlining the importance of its
trade with key countries in this group. For India, the RCEP offers ample opportunity. There are three immediate benefits that
its trade policymakers should note. In this respect, the RCEP would help India streamline the rules and regulations of
doing trade, which will reduce trade costs. It will also help achieve its goal of greater economic
integration with countries East and South East of India through better access to a vast regional market ranging from Japan
to Australia. The RCEP can be a stepping stone to Indias Act East Policy. This is particularly important
because India is not a party to two important regional economic blocs: the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation and the Trans-Pacific Partnership. The RCEP would enable India to strengthen its trade ties with Australia, China,
Japan and South Korea, and should reduce the potential negative impacts of TPP and TTIP on the Indian economy. Second, the RCEP will
facilitate Indias integration into sophisticated regional production networks that make Asia the
worlds factory. The RCEP is expected to harmonize trade-related rules, investment and competition
regimes of India with those of other countries of the group. Through domestic policy reforms on these areas, this
harmonization of rules and regulations would help Indian companies plug into regional and global value chains and would unlock the true
potential of the Indian economy. There would be a boost to inward and outward foreign direct investment, particularly export-oriented FDI.
Third, India enjoys a comparative advantage in areas such as information and communication technology, IT-enabled services, professional
services, healthcare, and education services. In addition to facilitating foreign direct investment, the RCEP
will create opportunities
for Indian companies to access new markets. This is because the structure of manufacturing in many of these countries is
becoming more and more sophisticated, resulting in a servicification of manufacturing. India is well placed to contribute to
other countries in RCEP through its expertise in services, not only consolidating the position of the
region as the worlds factory but also developing it as the worlds hub for services.
 AT: Econ High
Their defense doesnt assume a world where India is excluded from major trade deals
encompassing the US and Chinas gdp sends the economy spiraling

Indian economy declining RCEP key to revitalize it

East Asia Forum 16, 2/8/2016, India is off to a Slow Start, Undercutting Growth Projections, Economy
Watch, http://www.economywatch.com/features/India-is-off-to-a-Slow-Start-Undercutting-Growth-
Projections0208.html

Indias declining exports are a key indicator of the countrys waning economic vitality . The last
financial year was one of the worst years for the global economy since the global financial crisis of 2008, with
global trade growth collapsing to almost 0 percent in 2015. As a result, Indias exports growth fell to 5 percent with the
cumulative value of exports down by 18.5 percent for AprilNovember 2015 compared to the previous year. These figures depict a
scenario even worse than 200809. The countrys corporate sector is reeling Indias top 500
companies experienced zero revenue growth in 2015. The profits of Sensex (Indias major stock index) companies rose by
only 1 percent during the AprilJune quarter, compared with 24 percent growth in the same period a year earlier. Profit growth in
2016, as forecasted by Morgan Stanley Investment Management, is likely to be negative for the financial year.
According to these indicators, Indias prospects of achieving the predicted growth rate seem very grim
indeed. Rupee depreciation is another indicator that contradicts the GDP growth forecast. The rupee, which weakened by 5 percent against
the US dollar in 2015, is forecast to fall below 70 rupees to the dollar in 2016. Despite its strong fundamentals, the US rate hike, turmoil in
Chinese markets and deflationary pressure in advanced economies will hurt the rupee. It is possible that spillover effects from these global
slowdowns will lead to slower growth, lower corporate earnings and more volatility in Indias currency market. Slowdown in the Chinese
economy and yuan depreciation will continue to adversely affect Indian markets, as noted by Reserve Bank of India governor Raghuram Rajan.
This will cause further damage to the GDP growth rate in 2016. Indias substandard banking system is also impeding growth. Credit growth,
which was 25 percent in 2007, has fallen dramatically to 9 percent in 2015. This is mainly due to growing levels of bad loans as well as non-
performing and stressed assets held by public sector banks. accounted for more than 14 percent of all assets, compared with just 4.8 percent
for the more disciplined and profit-motivated private sector banks. This is concerning as Indias private banks account for only a quarter of all
lending. As debt continues to grow, core sectors such as infrastructure, mining, iron, steel and power will continue to face a credit crunch. In
late June last year, bad loans and stressed assets together India is becoming one of the most
protectionist countries in the world. According to the Centre for Economic Policy Research, the United
States, India and Russia have imposed the most trade distorting measures since 2008. India, like
Russia, has hit nine of the other top 20 global economies with protectionist measures more than 150 times
since November 2008. India imposed 504 protectionist measures between 2008 and 2015. This surge in protectionist measures saps trade,
hampering Indias economic growth. It must be rectified urgently. The success of Indias economy in the years ahead depends on a few key
factors. Trade liberalisation and banking system reforms are urgently needed. The government needs to make proactive and
sustained efforts to aid export sector growth, integrate India into global value chains and improve ease of doing business in the country. On the
political front, parliamentary polarisation must be overcome if India is to implement important policies like the goods and services tax (GST)
and land acquisition reform. Indias economy will not live up to expectations in 2016 unless the necessary steps are taken soon.
 AT: Econ Resilient
Economys not resilienta couple of bad moves could send it crashing
Gaurav S. Iyer 16, research analyst at Lombardi Financial, 6/24/2016, India Economic Outlook: This
Could Spell Trouble in 2016, Profit Confidential, http://www.profitconfidential.com/economy/india-
economic-outlook-trouble-in-2016/

Mr. Rajans warning was probably directed at his own government as much as investors. Narendra Modi is a supposed economic
guru, but hes not invulnerable. Brazil was in Indias position a little more than a year ago. Since then
the country has had a dramatic decline in economic growth, forcing rating agencies to downgrade its debt.
The countrys bonds are now ranked as junk, the lowest possible rating a country can get. (Source: The
New York Times, September 10, 2015.) The downgrade means Brazils borrowing costs are rising. A greater portion of the
countrys budget must go towards interest payments on its debt at a time when tax receipts are
falling. A repetition of this pattern in India is what Mr. Rajan fears. Its possible to grow too fast with substantial
stimulus, as we did in 2010 and 2011, only to pay the price in higher inflation, higher deficit and no growth in 2013 and 2014, Mr. Rajan said.
Our own experience suggests that we have to be careful.
 AT: RCEP Bad Indian Econ
The turn is wrong exports and comparative advantages domestically solve Chinese
market flood generates income gains
Ganeshan Wignaraja 15, Director of Research at the Asian Development Bank Institute, Dphil in
Economics, Oxford, 2/3/2015, Indias Economic Potential in Looking East, East-West Center,
http://www.eastwestcenter.org/sites/default/files/private/apb300.pdf

Developing trade preferences and regional, rulesbased trade with China offers important advantages to India.
However, some business sectors in India, parcularly in manufacturing, are concerned about expanding IndiaChina
trade. There is a fear that Indian businesses will be adversely affected because they cannot match the
quality and price of Chinas cheap manufactured goods. Concerns have also been raised about opening sensive
economic sectors and infrastructure to FDI from China, parcularly investment from stateowned enterprises that may unfairly benefit from
government subsidies. Yet the preoccupation with the absolute advantage of Chinese traders and investors is
misplaced. Simulations using a computable general equilibrium model indicate India can achieve
potential income gains of 2.4% by implemennting the RCEP. India has a comparative advantage in
services sectors and RCEP provides inroads for Indian services in China and the rest of East Asia. India
has also shown growth in manufacturing sectors in world markets including pharmaceuticals,
automobiles, textiles, and food processing, and this trend is likely to continue under RCEP. FDI inflows from Japan,
China, and Korea could result in technology transfers and marketing connections with overseas markets which
are vital to the development of a competive manufacturing sector in India. Moreover, India has emerged
as an important destination for tourists from the Asia Pacific region, presenng further opportunies for Indian
businesses.
 2NC India Integration Turn
Sino-indian push for RCEP key solves Indian rise
Serge Granger 16, Associate Professor at the University of Sherbrooke, School of Applied Policy, PhD
in Asian Studies, Concordia University, India and the TPP, missed opportunity or postponed
engagement?, 2016 ISA Asia-Pacific Hong Kong Conference.
http://web.isanet.org/Web/Conferences/AP%20Hong%20Kong%202016/Archive/f57252f9-f14f-4ced-
b445-3f42f395b675.pdf
Some commentators who oppose Indians entrance to the TPP would prefer to see the country engage more thoroughly in RCEP negotiations
so that it can minimize losses occurred by the TPP. For that purpose, Banga argues that remaining out of TPP trading bloc can benefit India
more than joining the bloc. The trade diversion is not substantial but joining TPPA may lead to a much higher rise in imports as compared to
exports. The investment potential and opportunities become more viable by remaining outside TPPA16 . Similarly to Banda, Sahu confirms that
It may be better for India to keep out of TPP and negotiate with the rest of the world by going along with
RCEP ( ...) The majority view is that this deal would adversely affect India's trade and welfare. Yet India not becoming a party to the
agreement is a right choice at this stage 17 . Kumar and Singh point out that Indias tariff are not ready for the TPP18 but
India and China must find ways to overcome their differences and come up with a trade deal that will
compete with American standards. As Shiro Armstrong point out, once standards are set, others must follow and they'll be
forced to join on terms set by largely the United States and Japan and other neighbours19 . Also for Hamanaka, India is a late comer and has no
capacity to modify trading practices and standards of incumbents, Reasons to choose the RCEP are threefold : (i) an increased presence in
Southeast and East Asian markets, (ii) closer relations with ASEAN as an institution, and (iii) increased connectivity with North Asia and
Oceania20 . By being one of the initial promoters, India also offers China a tool to limit American influence in Asia. The
RCEP, therefore,
provides a feasible forum for India and China to come together in a regional trade arrangement. ...
(The) RCEP is a positive allencompassing regional configuration that allows for the economic
dynamism of both India and China to contribute to regional trade creation prospects, the negotiations
must be fast, taking into consideration the differential levels of member economies, to outdo the
competition posed by the TPP. What is worth noting is that the TPP pushes China and India to accelerate
negotiations into a first free trade agreement with ASEAN, divided also on membership towards the TPP. Yet, ASEAN
promotes a non-interference attitude which does not entail golden standards such as the TPP. India is unlikely to join TPP in its current form
because it compels members to amend their rules and norms with regard to climate change, the environment, and human rights (ibid).
Therefore, India
would not be comfortable being socialized by TPP accession22 . It may also find ASEAN
partners which would prefer to follow RCEP rules rather than TPP standards. In this regional
stratagem, ChinaIndia relations may witness new dynamics and power politics in East Asia or in the
broader Asia-Pacific region. It may also open a new window of opportunity for Indias greater
integration with the East Asia region. India needs to analyse carefully the efficacy and implications of both RCEP and TPP to see
how far they serve New Delhis own regional interests. RCEP may eventually facilitate Indias Look East policy more

effectively than TPP. The

fact that the process of Indian integration is sp far a success lays the tracks for more
assertiveness in Asia. Kristy Hsu explains that a strong political will behind the RCEP initiative is driven by the desire to push forward
the stagnate integration process that is hindering economic growth after the global financial crisis in 200824. India has to put forward a greater
imprint on the conditions of trade and Asia seems the best and most effective place to do so. For
India, the agreement provides
an opportunity to reflect on its approach to multilateral trade talks25 , As Geethanjali Nataraj argues (i)f India
wants to grow to such economic and geopolitical heights , it must become more integrated26.
 ImpactIndia Rise
A successful Indian rise solves all existential threats
Mira Kamdar 7, World Policy Institute, Planet India: How the fastest growing democracy is
transforming America and the world, 2007, pp. 3-5

No other country matters more to the future of our planet than India . There is no challenge we face, no
opportunity we covet where
India does not have critical relevance. From combating global terror to finding cures for
dangerous pandemics, from dealing with the energy crisis to averting the worst scenarios of global warming,
from rebalancing stark global inequalities to spurring the vital innovation needed to create jobs and improve lives India is now a pivotal player .
The world is undergoing a process of profound recalibration in which the rise of Asia is the most important factor. India holds the
key to this new world. India is at once an ancient Asian civilization, a modern nation grounded in Enlightenment
values and democratic institutions, and a rising twenty-first-century power. With a population of 1.2 billion, India is the worlds

largest democracy. It is an open, vibrant society. Indias diverse population includes Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, Christians, Buddhists, Jains, Zoroastrians,
Jews, and animists. There are twenty-two official languages in India. Three hundred fifty million Indians speak English. India is the world in

microcosm. Its geography encompasses every climate, from snowcapped Himalayas to palm-fringed beaches to deserts where nomads and camels roam. A
developing country, India is divided among a tiny affluent minority, a rising middle class, and 800 million people who live on less than $2 per day. India faces all the
critical problems of our timeextreme social inequality, employment insecurity, a growing energy crisis, severe water shortages, a degraded environment, global

warming, a galloping HIV/AIDS epidemic, terrorist attackson a scale that defies the imagination. Indias goal is breathtaking in scope :
transform a developing country of more than 1 billion people into a developed nation and global
leader by 2020, and do this as a democracy in an era of resource scarcity and environmental degradation. The world has to cheer India on. If India
fails , there is a real risk that our world will become hostage to political chaos, war over dwindling resources, a
poisoned environment, and galloping disease. Wealthy enclaves will employ private companies to supply their needs and private militias
to protect them from the poor massing at their gates. But, if India succeeds , it will demonstrate that it is possible to lift
hundreds of millions of people out of poverty. It will prove that multiethnic, multireligious democracy
is not a luxury for rich societies. It will show us how to save our environment, and how to manage in a
fractious, multipolar world. Indias gambit is truly the venture of the century .
 ImpactStability
Solves Asia-Pacific great power war
Rahul Mishra 14, Research Fellow at the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA) New Delhi, PhD ,
Jawaharlal Nehru University, 12/1/2014, From Look East to Act East: Transitions in Indias Eastward
Engagement, The Asan Forum, http://www.theasanforum.org/from-look-east-to-act-east-transitions-in-
indias-eastward-engagement/

Indias Look East Policy, rechristened as the Act East Policy by Prime Minister Narendra Modi-led National Democratic Alliance
(NDA) Government,1 has been lauded as the countrys most successful foreign policy initiative taken in the
past two decades.2 Modi expanded its scope and focus after sensing that Phase I and Phase II of the Look East Policy could not achieve
their fullest potential, despite being success stories. Through the Act East Policy, India is not only striving to engage ASEAN
member countries, but also the countries of the wider Asia-Pacific region in political, strategic,
cultural, and economic domains. This is manifested in ongoing attempts to strengthen ties with Australia, Japan, and South Korea
among others. Modis Japan and Australia tours may be seen as steps in that direction. The swiftly changing security
dynamics of the Asia-Pacific region have overarching influence on the countries of the region, and India
has not remained aloof from them. Chinas
extraordinary ascendance to the world stage and its gradually intensifying
competition with the United States and Japan have led to tectonic shifts in Asia-Pacific politics. US
Rebalancing towards Asia, Japans Democratic Security Diamond, and Chinas Maritime Silk Road all have
political-strategic grand-designs to shape the regional architecture in their own way. In that context, Indias
greater role and participation in stabilizing the security architecture of the region is pivotal .

Asian war goes nuclear---no defense---interdependence and institutions dont check

C. Raja Mohan 13, distinguished fellow at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi, March
2013, Emerging Geopolitical Trends and Security in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the
Peoples Republic of China, and India (ACI) Region, background paper for the Asian Development Bank
Institute study on the Role of Key Emerging Economies,
http://www.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/PE/2013/10737.pdf

Three broad types of conventional conflict confront Asia. The first is the prospect of war between great
powers . Until a rising PRC grabbed the attention of the region, there had been little fear of great power rivalry in the region. The fact that
all major powers interested in Asia are armed with nuclear weapons , and the fact that there is growing economic
interdependence between them, has led many to argue that great power conflict is not likely to occur. Economic interdependence,
as historians might say by citing the experience of the First World War, is not a guarantee for peace in Asia . Europe saw great
power conflict despite growing interdependence in the first half of the 20th century. Nuclear weapons are surely a larger inhibitor of great
power wars. Yet we have seen military tensions build up between the PRC and the US in the waters of the Western
Pacific in recent years. The contradiction between the PRCs efforts to limit and constrain the presence of other powers in its maritime
periphery and the US commitment to maintain a presence in the Western Pacific is real and can only deepen over time.29 We also know from
the Cold War that while nuclear weapons did help to reduce the impulses for a conventional war between great powers, they did not
prevent geopolitical competition. Great power rivalry expressed itself in two other forms of conflict during the Cold War: inter-
state wars and intra-state conflict. If the outcomes in these conflicts are seen as threatening to one or other
great power, they are likely to influence the outcome. This can be done either through support for one of the parties in
the inter-state conflicts or civil wars. When a great power decides to become directly involved in a conflict the
stakes are often very high . In the coming years, it is possible to envisage conflicts of all these types in the ACI
region.
Asia has barely begun the work of creating an institutional framework to resolve regional security
challenges. Asia has traditionally been averse to involving the United Nations (UN) in regional security arrangements. Major powers like the
PRC and India are not interested in internationalizing their security problemswhether Tibet; Taipei,China; the South China Sea; or
Kashmirand give other powers a handle. Even lesser powers have had a tradition of rejecting UN interference in their conflicts. North Korea,
for example, prefers dealing with the United States directly rather than resolve its nuclear issues through the International Atomic Energy
Agency and the UN. Since its founding, the involvement of the UN in regional security problems has been rare and occasional.

The burden of securing Asia, then, falls squarely on the region itself. There are three broad ways in which a security system in Asia might
evolve: collective security, a concert of major powers, and a balance of power system.30 Collective security involves a system where all stand
for one and each stands for all, in the event of an aggression. While collective security systems are the best in a normative sense, achieving
them in the real world has always been difficult. A more achievable goal is cooperative security that seeks to develop mechanisms for
reducing mutual suspicion, building confidence, promoting transparency, and mitigating if not resolving the sources of conflict. The ARF and
EAS were largely conceived within this framework, but the former has disappointed while the latter has yet to demonstrate its full potential.

A second, quite different, approach emphasizes the importance of power, especially military power, to deter ones adversaries and the building
of countervailing coalitions against a threatening state. A balance of power system, as many critics of the idea point out,
promotes arms races , is inherently unstable , and breaks down frequently leading to systemic wars .
There is growing concern in Asia that amidst the rise of Chinese military power and the perception of American decline, many large and
small states are stepping up their expenditure on acquiring advanced weapons systems. Some analysts see this as a
structural condition of the new Asia that must be addressed through deliberate diplomatic action. 31 A third approach involves cooperation
among the great powers to act in concert to enforce a broad set of normsfalling in between the idealistic notions of collective security and
the atavistic forms of balance of power. However, acting in concert involves a minimum level of understanding between the major powers. The
greatest example of a concert is the one formed by major European powers in the early 18th century through the Congress of Vienna after the
defeat of Napoleonic France. The problem of adapting such a system to Asia is the fact that there are many medium-sized powers who would
resent any attempt by a few great powers to impose order in the region.32 In the end, the system that emerges in Asia is likely to have
elements of all the three models. In the interim, though, there are substantive disputes on the geographic scope and the normative basis for a
future security order in Asia.
 Impact Laundry List
Indian-East ASia integration solves a laundry list of existential threats
Asif Ahmed 12, Assistant Professor. Defence & Strategic Studies, Kurukshetra University, 7/9/2012,
INDIA ASEAN RELATIONS IN 21ST CENTURY: STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA ANALYSIS, Eurasia
Review, http://drtktopecollege.in/pol/sites/default/files/university%20question%20papers/India%20-
%20ASEAN%20Relations%20In%2021st%20Century_%20Strategic%20Implications%20For%20India%20-
%20Analysis%20-%20Eurasia%20Review.pdf

Defence and Security is a major area of future co-operation between India and ASEAN. No longer is security of South Asia and
Southeast Asia separate. Both the region has suffered from new threat of terrorism . Thus, to get rid of it, a
global alliance for Counter Terrorism is need of the hour, where both India and ASEAN can play the major role. The
tsunami in the recent years has brought the issue of Disaster Mitigation as another possible area of cooperation.

Besides, other
transnational crimes such as trafficking particularly in women and children, cyber crimes, international
economic crimes, environmental
crimes, sea piracy and money laundering needs to be checked through effective
institutional linkages and programmes of cooperation giving priority to information exchange and capacity building. Making this
cooperation more interesting at the 14th annual meeting of the ARF in 2nd August 2007 in Manila, External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee
offers a training module on Maritime Security, specifically for the ARF member-states, with themes of antipiracy, search-and-rescue [missions],
offshore and port security, anti-smuggling and narcotics control and anti-poaching operations. The
nucleus of the module would
be capacitybuilding for these and related aspects of maritime security. Thus, the prospect of cooperation in this area
is tremendous. Another convergence of interest to foster closer cooperation in reforming of and democratizing the
UN and its institution by making them more reflective of the contemporary realities, might strengthen the bond between India and ASEAN in
21st century. In fact, both sides are eager for a multilateral world order with genuine role of the UN. Emphasizing the importance of
multilateralism in ASEAN Business Advisory Council at Kula Lumpur, Indian PM Dr ManMohan Singh said regional building block of
multilateralism in an increasingly globalilsed world. Besides their co-operation in multilateral forum, particularly the WTO and in addressing the
challenges of economic, food, human and energy security will bring these two region more closer than ever before. Thus, the
two sides
have to work for more space for the developing and the least developed countries in the WTO. It is also
expected that, India might convince all the ASEAN members to support its candidature for the permanent
membership in Security Council.
 AT: No Link China Not Key s
The aff has spotted us the link that post-plan, trade regimes get consolidated because
China hops onto the TPP bandwagon and abandons its efforts at a parallel trade
regime, the RCEP this locks India out of the megaregional trade system because it
cant meet the TPPs high standards -- thats all their 1AC evidence

Chinas key its TPP membership creates billion dollar loses for India even if the RCEP
doesnt totally collapse
TRAM UPENDRA DAS 15, Professor at the Research and Information System for Developing Countries,
PhD in Economics, 12/8/2015, rans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), India And Asian Regionalism Analysis,
Eurasia Review, http://www.eurasiareview.com/08122015-trans-pacific-partnership-tpp-india-and-
asian-regionalism-analysis/

It is in this sense that the

Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) could prove to be a model
regional cooperation agreement, ensuring that the weaknesses of the TPP agreement do not spill into
its negotiation process. This could happen if the RCEP includes trade in goods, trade in services and investment in a comprehensive
manner but does not include IPRs, Competition policy, labour and environmental standards. These could be left to countries to upgrade in
consonance with their respective stage of development. The
subject of joining or not joining TPP has been a
debatable issue. A study by Peterson Institute for International Economics shows that if China and the rest of the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum join a second stage of the TPP that continues to exclude India,
Indias annual export losses will approach $50 billion. By contrast, India could experience huge export gains of more than
$500 billion per year from joining an expanded TPP or participating in a comprehensive Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP), now being
considered by the APEC. Looking at different possibilities of welfare and trade gains our estimates suggest that out of the various scenarios of
TPP with or without India and RCEP with or without India, maximum economic gains accrue from RCEP which includes
India. If India puts its weight in RCEP , this may be economically more welfare enhancing as compared to TPP. So, its not
much of a loss if we dont join TPP as South Korea and China are also not a part of it and are members in
RCEP. India could also supplement its strategy of supporting the RCEP, which is potentially the biggest mega-grouping, by increasing its
investment-presence in the Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar Vietnam (CLMV) region, whereby it can access the TPP market via Vietnam and the rest
of dynamic TPP members via the RCEP.
 AT: TPP Solves
India cant join the TPP standards are too high and challenge its policy of protecting
domestic industries the only scenario for not getting locked out of global trade is the
RCEP thats Chatterjee

Cant join the TPP and other agreements dont solve

Rachit Ranjan 15, 10/9/2015, Should India Join the TPP?, The Diplomat,
http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/should-india-join-the-tpp/

There is awareness in Indian bureaucratic, political, and policymaking circles that the world is moving towards
a new trade order and India must respond. This is reflected in the statements of Commerce Ministry officials, the prime
minister, the president. In fact, the need for a counter strategy has also found mention in the Economic Survey 2014-15. However, the response
has either been slow or else marked by a classic case of bureaucratic ambivalence. While efforts have been made in both the Economic Survey
and new Foreign Trade Policy for 2015-2020 in identifying reforms needed to make India a favorable destination for doing business, these
reforms have yet to be fully initiated. For example, the Economic Survey 2013-14 found that India must look to trade diversification, build
export infrastructure, and focus on useful free trade agreements (FTAs), which can address the inverted duty structure, rationalize export
promotion schemes, and ensure trade facilitation in order to realize her medium term goals. On all these fronts, Indias progress
has been extremely tardy . India is currently negotiating 10 FTAs. All are at different stages of
negotiation, but none are close to being finalized. The Economic Survey 2014-15 highlights the issues identified
by Harsha V. Singh and explores the option of integration with TPP, while recognizing that integration may be ambitious, as
the terms of the deal remain uncertain. However, judging by the leaked IP chapter, it is clear that the terms as they
stand currently contradict Indias stated policies. For India to either become party to the TPP or to
sustain the shocks caused by its exclusion, the model of reforms must change from aspirational to one
based on aggressive action. It would be extremely difficult and economically burdensome for India to
expeditiously initiate and execute the reforms that would be expected if it decided to join the TPP. Further, the political climate
limits the chances of wider consensus on the need to accelerate the pace of reforms in the labor,
export infrastructure, environment, banking and taxation spaces. Thus, reforms would have to be
phased, something that might not be possible if India joined TPP, even though it is believed that the TPP would allow
a 20-year transition period for developing economies. Even assuming that a substantial transition period is allowed
and India considers joining the TPP, it can be readily argued that the U.S. and its allies will exert
considerable pressure on India to forego certain traditional and principled stances, including food security and
the stated intent of not entering into TRIPS Plus arrangements (TRIPS refers to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights), which would not be in its national interest.
Hegemony DA
 1NC
The TPP is boosting the US-led international regime inviting China in creates a
duopolistic order that causes international backlash and crushes US hegemony
Tellis 15 (Ashley J., senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 3-2-2015,
The geopolitics of the TTIP and the TPP
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Tellis_Geopolitics_TTIP_TPP.pdf)
For all its benefits, however, the strategy of duopolistic management of the international order has dangerous downsides for the US. For
starters, the idea of cooperation between China and the US may simply not survive if American power continues to weaken in relative terms.In
other words, the
gains of the G2 system could vanish to American disadvantage if the duopoly becomes
increasingly lopsided as a result of accumulating Chinese power. Even the possibility of such an outcome
should deter the US from embarking on any duopolistic arrangements prematurely ; in fact, it may be
in Washingtons interests to hold out until China becomes a genuine peer and then, depending on its
behaviour at that point, make the decision about engaging China in managing the international system
while recognising that such a deal might not survive a longer-term shift in the two states relative power.
Most problematic of all, however, is the fact that a duopolistic approach to managing international politics would run
afoul of the interests of many other Asian and European partners of the US: many of the former especially Japan
and India have little interest in being subordinated to a hegemonic China in Asia or in becoming secondary players in a Sino-American
managed global order. Consequently, any efforts by Washington to construct such a duopoly would rend asunder
the Asian geopolitical system, with unpredictable consequences for American and Chinese interests. Thus,
whatever its appeal to Chinese policymakers today, a duopolistic approach is far less attractive to the US as a long-
term solution. If neither leaving well alone nor making a deal advances Americas interests in preserving
its apex power position The geopolitics of the TTIP and the TPP protecting the international regime that
it sired in the postwar period, Chinas continued accumulation of power even if at a slower rate
might require the US to consider carefully the third grand strategic option: Constrain Chinese Success.
Whether implemented in its more minimalistic form of simply limiting Chinas growing capacity to
undermine American interests or in its more maximalist version, which requires the US to actively
undermine Chinas rise, exercising this grand strategic option would in effect be a Machiavellian solution
to seeing inconveniences from afar. Throughout the Cold War, depending on circumstances, Washington toggled between both
types of containment strategy against the Soviet Union, although it was clear since its articulation in NSC-6813 that the US sought to ultimately
undermine its communist adversary through all means short of war

U.S. hegemony is vital to global stability --- decline causes nuclear great power war ---
best scholarship proves
Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth 13 (Stephen, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth
College, John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at
Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and
International Affairs, William C. Wohlforth is the Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of
Government at Dartmouth College Dont Come Home America: The Case Against Retrenchment,
International Security, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Winter 2012/13), pp. 751)

A core premise of deep engagement is that it prevents the emergence of a far more dangerous global security
environment. For one thing, as noted above, the United States overseas presence gives it the leverage to restrain partners
from taking provocative action . Perhaps more important, its core alliance commitments also deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony
from contemplating expansion and make its partners more secure, reducing their incentive to adopt
solutions to their security problems that threaten others and thus stoke security dilemmas. The contention that engaged U.S. power dampens the baleful
effects of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the American Pacifier is

provided in the works of John Mearsheimer, who forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete with security
competition, arms races, nuclear proliferation and associated preventive war temptations, regional
rivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and full-scale great power war . 72 How do retrenchment advocates, the bulk of
whom are realists, discount this benefit? Their arguments are complicated, but two capture most of the variation: (1) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or (2)
prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a U.S. interest. Each response is connected to a different theory or set of theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on a complex future counterfactual (what
would happen to Eurasias security setting if the United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, each of these responses is nonetheless a weaker argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge.
The first response flows from defensive realism as well as other international relations theories that discount the conflict-generating potential of anarchy under contemporary conditions. 73 Defensive realists maintain that the high
expected costs of territorial conquest, defense dominance, and an array of policies and practices that can be used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasias major states could manage regional multipolarity peacefully
without the American pacifier. Retrenchment would be a bet on this scholarship, particularly in regions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories point tosuch as democratic governance or dense institutional
linkagesare either absent or weakly present. There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however, that might give decisionmakers pause before making this bet. First is regional expertise. Needless to say, there is no
consensus on the net security effects of U.S. withdrawal. Regarding each region, there are optimists and pessimists. Few experts expect a return of intense great power competition in a post-American Europe, but many doubt

The result might be a Europe that is

European governments will pay the political costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military outlays. 74

incapable of securing itself from various threats that could be destabilizing within the region and
beyond (e.g., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s Balkan wars), lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might
want European participation, and is vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. What about the other parts of
Eurasia where the United States has a substantial military presence? Regarding the Middle East, the balance begins to swing toward pessimists concerned that states currently backed by

Washington notably Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabiamight take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would

intensify security dilemmas. And concerning East Asia, pessimism regarding the regions prospects
without the American pacifier is pronounced. Arguably the principal concern expressed by area experts is that Japan and South Korea are
likely to obtain a nuclear capacity and increase their military commitments, which could stoke a
destabilizing reaction from China. It is notable that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan moved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing
so by a still-engaged United States. 75 The second body of scholarship casting doubt on the bet on defensive realisms sanguine portrayal is all of the research that undermines its conception of state preferences.

Defensive realisms optimism about what would happen if the United States retrenched is very much dependent on its particularand highly restrictiveassumption about state preferences;
once we relax this assumption, then much of its basis for optimism vanishes. Specifically, the prediction of post-American tranquility throughout Eurasia rests on the assumption that security is the only relevant state preference,
with security defined narrowly in terms of protection from violent external attacks on the homeland. Under that assumption, the security problem is largely solved as soon as offense and defense are clearly distinguishable, and

offense is extremely expensive relative to defense. Burgeoning research across the social and other sciences, however, undermines that
core assumption: states have preferences not only for security but also for prestige, status, and other
aims, and they engage in trade-offs among the various objectives. 76 In addition, they define security not just in terms of territorial protection but in view of many and varied milieu goals. It follows that even
states that are relatively secure may nevertheless engage in highly competitive behavior. Empirical
studies show that this is indeed sometimes the case. 77 In sum, a bet on a benign postretrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major countries will never allow these
nonsecurity preferences to influence their strategic choices. To the degree that these bodies of scholarly knowledge have predictive leverage, U.S. retrenchment would result in a
significant deterioration in the security environment in at least some of the worlds key regions. We have
Offensive realism predicts that the withdrawal of the American
already mentioned the third, even more alarming body of scholarship.

pacifier will yield either a competitive regional multipolarity complete with associated insecurity,
arms racing, crisis instability , nuclear proliferation, and the like, or bids for regional hegemony, which may be beyond
the capacity of local great powers to contain (and which in any case would generate intensely competitive
behavior, possibly including regional great power war). Hence it is unsurprising that retrenchment advocates are prone to focus on the second argument noted
above: that avoiding wars and security dilemmas in the worlds core regions is not a U.S. national interest. Few doubt that the United States could survive the return of insecurity and conflict among Eurasian powers, but at what
cost? Much of the work in this area has focused on the economic externalities of a renewed threat of insecurity and war, which we discuss below. Focusing on the pure security ramifications, there are two main reasons why

overall higher levels of conflict make the world a more

decisionmakers may be rationally reluctant to run the retrenchment experiment. First,

dangerous place. Were Eurasia to return to higher levels of interstate military competition, one would see overall higher levels of military
spending and innovation and a higher likelihood of competitive regional proxy wars and arming of
client statesall of which would be concerning, in part because it would promote a faster diffusion of military power away from
the United States. Greater regional insecurity could well feed proliferation cascades , as states such as
Egypt, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia all might choose to create nuclear forces. 78 It is unlikely
that proliferation decisions by any of these actors would be the end of the game: they would likely generate pressure locally for more proliferation. Following Kenneth Waltz, many retrenchment advocates are proliferation

Proliferation
optimists, assuming that nuclear deterrence solves the security problem. 79 Usually carried out in dyadic terms, the debate over the stability of proliferation changes as the numbers go up.

optimism rests on assumptions of rationality and narrow security preferences. In social science, however, such
assumptions are inevitably probabilistic. Optimists assume that most states are led by rational leaders, most will overcome organizational problems and resist the temptation to
preempt before feared neighbors nuclearize, and most pursue only security and are risk averse. Confidence in such probabilistic assumptions declines if the

world were to move from nine to twenty, thirty, or forty nuclear states. In addition, many of the other dangers noted by analysts who are concerned about the
destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferationincluding the risk of accidents and the prospects that some new nuclear powers will not have
truly survivable forcesseem prone to go up as the number of nuclear powers grows. 80 Moreover, the risk of unforeseen

crisis dynamics that could spin out of control is also higher as the number of nuclear powers increases. Finally, add to these concerns the enhanced danger of nuclear leakage,
and a world with overall higher levels of security competition becomes yet more worrisome. The argument that maintaining Eurasian peace is not a U.S. interest faces a second problem. On widely accepted realist assumptions,

acknowledging that U.S. engagement preserves peace dramatically narrows the difference between retrenchment and deep engagement. For many supporters of retrenchment, the

optimal strategy for a power such as the United States, which has attained regional hegemony and is separated from other great powers by oceans, is offshore balancing: stay over the horizon and pass the buck to local powers to
do the dangerous work of counterbalancing any local rising power. The United States should commit to onshore balancing only when local balancing is likely to fail and a great power appears to be a credible contender for regional
hegemony, as in the cases of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union in the midtwentieth century. The problem is that Chinas rise puts the possibility of its attaining regional hegemony on the table, at least in the medium to long

term. As Mearsheimer notes, The United States will have to play a key role in countering China, because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by
themselves. 81 Therefore, unless Chinas rise stalls, the United States is likely to act toward China similar to the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War. 82 It follows that the United States should take no
action that would compromise its capacity to move to onshore balancing in the future. It will need to maintain key alliance relationships in Asia as well as the formidably expensive military capacity to intervene there. The

implication is to get out of Iraq and Afghanistan, reduce the presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia just what the United States is doing. 83 In sum, the argument that U.S. security
commitments are unnecessary for peace is countered by a lot of scholarship , including highly influential realist scholarship. In
addition, the argument that Eurasian peace is unnecessary for U.S. security is weakened by the potential for a large number of nasty security consequences as well as the need to retain a latent onshore balancing capacity that
dramatically reduces the savings retrenchment might bring. Moreover, switching between offshore and onshore balancing could well be difcult. Bringing together the thrust of many of the arguments discussed so far underlines

the degree to which the case for retrenchment misses the underlying logic of the deep engagement strategy. By supplying reassurance, deterrence, and active management, the United States lowers
security competition in the worlds key regions , thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse
atmosphere for growing new military capabilities. Alliance ties dissuade partners from ramping up and also provide leverage to prevent military transfers to
potential rivals. On top of all this, the United States formidable military machine may deter entry by potential rivals. Current great power military expenditures as a percentage of GDP are at historical lows, and thus far other major
powers have shied away from seeking to match top-end U.S. military capabilities. In addition, they have so far been careful to avoid attracting the focused enmity of the United States. 84 All of the worlds most modern militaries
are U.S. allies (Americas alliance system of more than sixty countries now accounts for some 80 percent of global military spending), and the gap between the U.S. military capability and that of potential rivals is by many measures
growing rather than shrinking. 85
 Ext. Link Plan Kills Heg
Incorporating China into the TPP fails and shifts the international order
Tellis 15 (Ashley J., senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 3-2-2015,
The geopolitics of the TTIP and the TPP
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Tellis_Geopolitics_TTIP_TPP.pdf)
Although the US has championed free-trade universalism since its founding, its commitment to free trade was always subordinated to politics.
For most of American history, Washingtons approach to international trade was formed by internal politics
influenced by business cycles, interest groups, regional divides and shifting party positions. In the aftermath
of the Second World War, the US once again launched an effort to construct a global economic order based on
free-trade universalism, but settled for a more circumscribed system of managed free trade, centred on
reciprocity. This limited framework served the US well during the Cold War. It enabled the alliance partners to rapidly
resuscitate themselves, while simultaneously permitting the Western coalition to enjoy substantial gains
from trade relative to its adversaries. These benefits supplemented the enormous internal productivity
of the American economy, which in turn produced the superior economic growth that enabled the US to
outrun the Soviet Union and provoke its collapse. The American triumph in the Cold War led to a further
expansion of the global trading order to finally formally include China, despite Beijings continued
pursuit of statist policies. As a result of the disproportionate gains from imbalanced trade that ensued, Chinas growth has
been even more meteoric than it might otherwise have been. What is most unsettling, however, is that
Beijing has used its gains from trade to rapidly modernise its military forces, and to begin to threaten
most of its major regional trading partners as well as the guardian of the larger international order, the
US itself. While Chinas economic strategy of international integration is thus increasingly at odds with its
geopolitical strategy of increasing its coercive capabilities directed against its major trading partners,
Washingtons own post-Cold War strategy is also afflicted by the awkward contradiction of sustaining an
international economic regime that produces great benefits for the US and others while simultaneously
fuelling the growth of what could be its most significant rival. Three of the four possible grand strategies
aimed at mitigating this dilemma leaving China alone, making a duopolistic deal with Beijing and
constraining Chinese success all fail to limit the dangers posed by a rising China to the US and its
friends. Only the fourth strategy, centred not on inhibiting Chinas growth but on improving Americas
strategic performance, cuts the Gordian knot to enable the US to protect its global hegemony while
continuing Chinas integration into the liberal international order. The policy of incorporating RTAs into the existing
multilateral trading system accordingly provides Washington with the opportunity to secure both increased absolute gains and increased
relative gains vis--vis China, thereby protecting its international position. The US should not shrink from pursuing such self-interested
modifications to the global trading order because, as its own history reveals, American trade policy has always been shaped by political
imperatives rather than the dogmas of neoclassical economics. In an era of rising Chinese ascendency, protecting American strategic interests
through new mega-RTAs does not constitute a geo-economic containment of China a losing proposition at its best. Rather, it represents an
effort to leapfrog Beijing in the race to success during yet another long cycle in world politics.
 Ext. Link TPP Key
The TPP is key allows the US to increase relative gains over China and solidy its
power
Tellis 15 (Ashley J., senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 3-2-2015,
The geopolitics of the TTIP and the TPP
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Tellis_Geopolitics_TTIP_TPP.pdf)

Admittedly, as neoclassical economists would correctly argue, such RTAs are less efficient than their universal counterparts for increasing
overall growth, because their tradediversion effects distort the patterns of comparative advantage and they make only some states better off in
comparison to not trading.25 Yet these agreements represent the only alternative at a time when the
multilateral trading system is failing to produce the maximum gains from trade possible due, ironically, to
an excess of democracy in the negotiating regime.26 In a purely economic sense, therefore, it is useful to conceptualise these
FTAs as transitional endeavours that would promote liberalisation in order to eventually enlarge the
global system of exchange.27 Whether this vision is ultimately realised or not, RTAs, by debarring
competitors or by compelling them to liberalise and end their asymmetric advantages, offer the US a
strategic opportunity to elevate its relative gains vis--vis China . The success of this approach, however,
will hinge on keeping China out of these regional agreements for as long as possible, or at least until
the US can buy back the relative gains it has lost as a result of Chinas entry into the multilateral trading system. If US
policymakers pursue the selective deepening of globalisation as a means of elevating future American
growth in this way, they will have to reject any present Chinese overtures about joining agreements such as
the TPP. To date, US officials have equivocated. Recently, National Security Advisor Susan Rice blandly stated, We
welcome any nation that is willing to live up to the high standards of this agreement to join and share in the
benefits of the TPP, and that includes China.28 While the diplomatic necessity for appearing inclusive is
understandable, the strategic necessity for excluding China is overwhelming.
 Ext. Heg Impact

Perception of decline prompts trade conflicts, protectionism and hegemonic lash-out--

-turns their impact before they can solve
Michael Beckley 11, Fellow at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
and a Fellow at the Miller Center at the University of Virginia, Winter, International Security, Chinas
Century? http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00066
Change is inevitable, but it is often incremental and nonlinear. In the coming decades, China may surge out of its unimpressive condition and close the gap with the United States. Or China
might continue to rise in placesteadily improving its capabilities in absolute terms while stagnating, or even declining, relative to the United States. At the time of this writing, the United
States remains mired in the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression and carries the largest debt in its history. Moreover, the recent partisan standoff over raising the debt ceiling
suggests the American political system is losing the capacity for compromise on basic issues, let alone on large-scale problems. It is impossible to say whether the current malaise is the
beginning of the end of the unipolar era or simply an aberration. The best that can be done is to make plans for the future on the basis of long-term trends; and the trends suggest that the
United States economic, technological, and military lead over China will be an enduring feature of international relations, not a passing moment in time, but a deeply embedded condition that
will persist well into this century. In recent years, scholars main message to policymakers has been to prepare for the rise of China and the end of unipolarity. This conclusion is probably
wrong, but it is not necessarily bad for Americans to believe it is true. Fear can be harnessed in the service of virtuous policies. Fear of the Soviet Union spurred the construction of the
interstate highway system. Perhaps unjustified fears about the decline of the United States and the rise of China can similarly be used in good cause. What could go wrong? One danger is that

declinism could prompt trade conflicts and immigration restrictions. The results of this study suggest that the United States
benefits immensely from the free flow of goods, services, and people around the globe; this is what allows American
corporations to specialize in high-value activities, exploit innovations created elsewhere, and lure the brightest minds to the
United States, all while reducing the price of goods for U.S. consumers. Characterizing Chinas export expansion as a loss for the United States is not just bad economics; it blazes a trail for
jingoistic and protectionist policies. It would be tragically ironic if Americans reacted to false prophecies of decline by cutting themselves off from a potentially vital source of American power.

Another danger is that declinism may impair foreign policy decisionmaking . If top government officials come to
believe that China is overtaking the United States, they are likely to react in one of two ways, both of which
are potentially disastrous . The first is that policymakers may imagine the United States faces a closing window of
opportunity and should take action while it still enjoys preponderance and not wait until the
diffusion of power has already made international politics more competitive and unpredictable. 158
This belief may spur positive action, but it also invites parochial thinking, reckless behavior, and preventive war . 159 As Robert Gilpin and
others have shown, [H]egemonic struggles have most frequently been triggered by fears of ultimate decline
and the perceived erosion of power. 160 By fanning such fears, declinists may inadvertently promote the type of violent overreaction that they seek to

prevent. The other potential reaction is retrenchmentthe divestment of all foreign policy obligations save those linked to vital interests, defined in a narrow
and national manner. Advocates of retrenchment assume, or hope, that the world will sort itself out on its own; that whatever

replaces American hegemony, whether it be a return to balance of power politics or a transition to a

postpower paradise, will naturally maintain international order and prosperity. Order and prosperity,
however, are unnatural. They can never be presumed. When achieved, they are the result of determined action by

powerful actors and, in particular, by the most powerful actor, which is, and will be for some time, the United States. Arms buildups, insecure sea-
lanes, and closed markets are only the most obvious risks of U.S. retrenchment . Less obvious are
transnational problems, such as global warming, water scarcity, and disease, which may fester
without a leader to rally collective action . Hegemony, of course, carries its own risks and costs. In particular, Americas global military presence might
tempt policymakers to use force when they should choose diplomacy or inaction. If the United States abuses its power, however, it is not because it is too engaged with the world, but because
its engagement lacks strategic vision. The solution is better strategy, not retrenchment. The first step toward sound strategy is to recognize that the status quo for the United States is pretty
good: it does not face a hegemonic rival, and the trends favor continued U.S. dominance. The overarching goal of American foreign policy should be to preserve this state of affairs. Declinists
claim the United States should adopt a neomercantilist international economic policy and disengage from current alliance commitments in East Asia and Europe. 161 But the fact that the
United States rose relative to China while propping up the world economy and maintaining a hegemonic presence abroad casts doubt on the wisdom of such calls for radical policy change.
 2NC SCS Impact
American hegemony deescalates South China Sea conflicts
NYT 15 (New York Times: Editorial Board, 5-29-2015, Pushback in the South China Sea
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/30/opinion/pushback-in-the-south-china-sea.html)

The United States has good reason to push back more forcefully against Chinas grab for power in the
South China Sea, as Defense Secretary Ashton Carter did on a trip to Asia this week. Beijing has repeatedly ignored earlier
warnings to moderate the aggressive behavior that is unsettling its regional neighbors and further
undermining its relations with the United States. On Friday, American officials disclosed that China had installed two mobile artillery
vehicles on an artificial island it is building in the sea, which is rich in natural resources like oil and gas and where China clearly hopes to establish some form of
hegemony. The weapons are not considered a threat to American naval forces. Still, they reinforce fears that China intends to militarize the Spratly Islands, a
collection of reefs and rocks also claimed by the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Taiwan, and use them to control the waterways shipping lanes and dominate its
smaller neighbors. Chinas
ambitions have become increasingly clear since 2012 when it publicly asserted a
claim to 80 percent of the South China Sea. In recent months, photographic evidence from commercial satellites and American spy planes
has left little doubt that China is moving with alarming speed to turn the Spratlys into more substantial land masses, complete with runways and harbors. Some
American officials now believe China regards its claims in the South China Sea as nonnegotiable. If so,
thats terrible news for the region but also ultimately for China, which claims it prizes stability but will find it impossible to realize its economic goals if Asia is in
constant tension. Chinas bullying on the South China Sea has already caused many Asian countries to forge
closer defense ties with the United States. Now, the Obama administration has decided to more firmly underscore Americas intention to
remain a Pacific power and to ensure that the region and its waters remain accessible to all nations. That is a role the United States has

played constructively for decades, promoting a stability that has allowed Japan, South Korea and
other countries, including China, to develop. There should be no mistake: the United States will fly,
sail and operate wherever international law allows, as forces do around the world, Mr. Carter said in his

speech. He also called for an immediate and lasting halt to land reclamation by all claimants. Although
the administration would obviously prefer a peaceful resolution of all South China Sea disputes, it
cannot allow Chinas claims to go unchallenged . It sent a surveillance plane close to one of Chinas artificial islands, is considering air
and sea patrols that could go closer to disputed reefs and shoals, and is expanding military exercises with regional partners. President Obama and President Xi
Jinping of China plan to meet later this year. In the meantime, American officials and their Chinese counterparts must avoid any miscalculation that could lead to a
direct confrontation.

SCS conflicts escalate leads to nuclear war

Tan 15 (Andrew, New South Wales social sciences professor, Preventing the next war in East Asia, in
Security and Conflict in East Asia, ed. Tan, p. 228-230)

The absence of effective regional institutions , regimes, norms and laws that could regulate tensions and
conflicts between states has meant that the geostrategic environment in East Asia is reminiscent of that in
Europe before the world wars, characterized by changing power balances and the outbreak of
serious inter-state crises . A regional war in East Asia would have devastating global consequences .
Three of the key players, namely the USA, China and Japan, are, in that order, the three largest economies in the world. More
seriously, any conflict could escalate rapidly into nuclear war , as the conventional war capabilities of
the USA could compel North Korea and China to resort to weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear missiles
and biological and chemical weapons. By 2013 the possibility of open warfare in East Asia had been taken seriously, with widespread warnings that tensions
between China and Japan, for instance, had reached the highest levels since the end of the Second World War. Due to the possibility of
misperception and miscalculation, accidental war could break out - however implausible from a rational perspective that
might sound. What can be done to prevent possible conflict in East Asia? One of the key lessons of the previous two world wars is the need for strong international
institutions, regimes, norms and laws which could better manage the inevitable conflicts of interests between states. Another important lesson, taken from the Cold
War in Europe, has been the need for a long process of confidence and security building measures - such as the Conventional Forces in Europe process - which
would improve transparency and build trust, to accompany the parallel processes of deep dialogue, engagement and cooperation. This could eventually lead to
more intrusive forms of regionalism which could reduce tensions, resolve or manage disputes without resort to violence, and more generally keep the peace among
the main regional powers. While the imperative to take regionalism seriously is there, it remains to be seen whether there is tar-sighted leadership among the key
state actors in East Asia to do so, even when the terrible consequences of a regional conflict are obvious and no one actually wants such a conflict to occur. Much
depends on the two key players in East Asia, namely the USA and China. While the USA faces serious economic and financial difficulties, and its long-term decline is
evident, it remains a key player in the region. China must thus realize that unless it arrives at an accommodation with the USA as well as its allies in managing
regional security, it cannot hope to maintain regional stability in the long term, which it needs for its economic modernization and development. While it believes
that the balance of power is shifting in its favour, it has to understand that effective regional influence ultimately has to be earned, not imposed. Similarly, the
reality of China's rise means that Washington must learn to accommodate it - the alternative being a dangerous and destabilizing amis race that would bankrupt the
USA and lead to unpalatable outcomes, such as a general conflict. Learning to live with a peer competitor requires leadership, engagement and dialogue, rather
than instinctively reaching out for a Cold War containment strategy. The two countries must therefore begin a broad-ranging dialogue to manage not just their
relations but also regional security, as they are key players in ensuring stability in the region. In this respect, a glimmer of hope can be discerned from China's
unusual silence and lack of open support for its traditional ally. North Korea, even as it carried out its unprecedented brinkmanship since the young Kim took power.
China has also openly criticized North Korea for its nuclear tests and has supported United Nations sanctions, and there are clear signs of disarray in China's
traditional policy of uncritical support for North Korea, as its behaviour could lead to unpalatable outcomes for China, such as an unwanted war on the Korean
peninsula, or the acquisition of nuclear arms by Japan and South Korea. In April 2013, for instance, President Xi Jinping obliquely criticized North Korea, stating that
'no one should be allowed to throw a region and even the whole world into chaos for selfish gains ... while pursuing its own interests, a country should
accommodate the legitimate interests of others' (Washington Post 2013). Media reports also indicate a flurry of visits by US officials to Beijing in early 2013 to
discuss the situation in North Korea (New York Times 2013a). The surprise purge and execution in late 2013 of Kim Jong-un's powerful uncle, Jang Song-thaek, who
had been the key interlocutor in China's relations with North Korea, has also demonstrated that China is not in control of events in North Korea (New York Times
2013b). Thus, there is the possibility that China and the USA could in fact cooperate in managing regional security, such as over the Korean peninsula. The high
tensions and historical animosities between China and Japan are more difficult to resolve, but these require strong and capable foreign policy leadership on the part
of both countries, which appear to be lacking at this time. China, in particular, needs to understand that the long-term consequences of its promotion of nationalism
by arousing anti-Japanese sentiments domestically would lead to an unstable regional neighbourhood and ultimately conflict with Japan, surely an undesirable
outcome given that the two countries are each other's major trading partners with much to gain from joint cooperation. On Japan's part, the failure by its leaders,
particularly conservative right-wing politicians, to come to terms with its role in the Second World War has led to various controversial statements which have only
played to anti-Japanese nationalism in China and South Korea. As CNN noted in an opinion piece in May 2013, 'nearly 68 years after surrender, some Japanese
conservatives are engaged in counterproductive battles over history- that make Japan appear weak and undignified, unable to take the measure of its history* (CNN
2013a). As an analyst noted regarding Shinzo Abe's performance as Prime Minister, Abe has in fact undermined Japan's interest by 'preserving redundant renderings
of Japan in the 21st century, negating the positive and responsible record of Japan as a post-war nation-state' (Kersten 2013: 50). The high tensions in 2013-14
between the two countries, which are both now on a quasi-war footing, points to the urgent need for conflict and crisis management mechanisms to be
immediately implemented to hold tensions in check. Ultimately, both governments would need to stop fuelling nationalist sentiments, and instead focus on
maintaining stability as well as preserving the benefits arising from the deep economic interdependence between the two countries. The long-term decline of the
USA's influence in the region, despite the fact that it has pledged to maintain or even increase its military presence in East Asia, is probably unavoidable. However,

an effective US presence and role in the region remains essential . Through deterrence as well as
engagement as an equal power, China could be persuaded to take part in dialogue about the
management of regional security instead of making unilateral military moves which raise tensions and
might spark conflict. This requires other states in the region to help to shore up regional stability by becoming more effective security partners, first by
investing in their own military capabilities, and second by providing more effective regional security cooperation. The reason for this is not, however,

to contain China, given that much greater efforts will have to be made to engage it, but to ensure the
maintenance of a regional balance of power that would channel foreign policy choices towards more
peaceful means of resolving disputes. Ultimately, however, China and the USA will have to find the strategic wisdom and political will to work
out some form of entente cord idle in East Asia if conflict in the region is to be avoided.
 AT: Heg Low
US heg decline not inevitable strong military and tech advantages
Brooks and Wohlforth 4/13/16 (Stephen G, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth, PhD
from Yale, Former Fellow, International Security Program, and William C, Daniel Webster Professor of
Government at Dartmouth, PhD from Yale University in International Relations, The Once and Future
Superpower, Foreign Affairs, May/June Issue, 2016)

After two and a half decades, is the United States run as the worlds sole superpower coming to an end Many say yes ? ,

seeing a rising China ready to catch up to or even surpass the United States in the near future. By many measures, after all, Chinas economy is on track to become the worlds biggest, and
even if its growth slows, it will still outpace that of the United States for many years. Its coffers overflowing, Beijing has used its new wealth to attract friends, deter enemies, modernize its military, and aggressively assert sovereignty claims in its periphery. For many, therefore, the

question is not whether China will become a superpower but just how soon. But this is wishful, or fearful, thinking Economic growth no longer translates .

as directly into military power as it did in the past, which means that it is now harder than ever for rising powers to
rise and established ones to fall China . And the only country with the raw potential to become a true global peer of the United Statesalso faces a more daunting
challenge than previous rising states because of how far it lags behind technologically . Even though the United
States economic dominance has eroded from its peak, the countrys military superiority is not going anywhere nor is the globe-spanning ,

alliance structure that constitutes the core of the existing liberal international order (unless Washington unwisely decides to throw it

away). Rather than expecting a power transition in international politics, everyone should start getting used to a world in
which the United States remains the sole superpower for decades to come. Lasting preeminence will help
the United States ward off the greatest traditional international danger war between the worlds ,

major powers . And it will give Washington options for dealing with nonstate threats such as terrorism
and transnational challenges such as climate change . But it will also impose burdens of leadership and force choices among competing priorities, particularly as finances grow more straitened.

In forecasts of Chinas
With great power comes great responsibility, as the saying goes, and playing its leading role successfully will require Washington to display a maturity that U.S. foreign policy has all too often lacked. THE WEALTH OF NATIO NS

position much has been made of the countrys pressing domestic challenges slowing economy
future power , : its ,

polluted environment widespread corruption perilous financial markets nonexistent social safety net
, , , ,

rapidly aging population , and restive middle class. But as harmful as these problems are, Chinas true Achilles heel on the world stage is something else: its low level of
technological expertise compared with the United States . Relative to past rising powers, China has a much wider
technological gap to close with the leading power Half . China may export container after container of high-tech goods, but in a world of globalized production, that doesnt reveal much.

of all Chinese exports consist of what economists call processing trade meaning that parts are ,

imported into China for assembly and then exported And the vast majority of these are afterward. Chinese exports

directed not by Chinese firms but by corporations from more developed countries. When looking at measures of technological prowess

that better reflect the national origin of the expertise, Chinas true position becomes clear. World Bank data on payments for the use of intellectual property, for example, indicate that the United States is far and away
the leading source of innovative technologies , boasting $128 billion in receipts in 2013 more than four times as much as the
country in second place , Japan. China , by contrast, imports technologies on a massive scale yet received less than
$1 billion in receipts in 2013 for the use of its intellectual property. Another good indicator of the technological gap is the number
of so-called triadic patents , those registered in the United States, Europe, and Japan. In 2012, nearly 14,000 such patents originated in the United States, compared with just under 2,000 in China. The distribution
of highly influential articles in science and engineering those in the top one percent of citations, as measured by the National Science Foundation tells the same
story, with the United States accounting for almost half of these articles, more than eight times Chinas share. So does the breakdown of Nobel Prizes in Physics, Chemistry, and Physiology

or Medicine. Since 1990, 114 have gone to U.S.-based researchers. China-based researchers have received two. Precisely because the Chinese economy is so unlike the U.S. economy, the measure fueling expectations of a power shift, GDP greatly ,
 underestimates the true economic gap between the two countries . For one thing, the immense destruction that
China is now wreaking on its environment counts favorably toward its GDP even though it will reduce ,

economic capacity over time by shortening life spans and raising cleanup and health-care costs. For another thing, GDP was originally designed to measure mid-twentieth-century manufacturing economies, and so the more

knowledge-based and globalized a countrys production is, the more its GDP underestimates its economys true size. A new statistic developed by the UN suggests the degree to which GDP inflates Chinas relative power. Called inclusive wealth, this measure represents economists
most systematic effort to date to calculate a states wealth. As a UN report explained, it counts a countrys stock of assets in three areas: (i) manufactured capital (roads, buildings, machines, and equipment), (ii) human capital (skills, education, health), and (iii) natural capital (sub-soil
resources, ecosystems, the atmosphere). Added up, the United States inclusive wealth comes to almost $144 trillion4.5 times Chinas $32 trillion. The true size of Chinas economy relative to the United States may lie somewhere in between the numbers provided by GDP and inclusive

wealth, and admittedly, the latter measure has yet to receive the same level of scrutiny as GDP. The problem with GDP, however, is that it measures a flow (typically, the value of

goods and services produced in a year), whereas inclusive wealth measures a stock. As The Economist put it, Gauging an economy by its GDP is like judging a company by its
quarterly profits , without ever peeking at its balance-sheet. Because inclusive wealth measures the pool of resources a government can conceivably draw on to achieve its strategic objectives, it is the more useful metric when thinking about geopolitical

competition. But no matter how one compares the size of the U.S. and Chinese economies, it is clear that the United States is far more capable of converting its
resources into military might the past, rising states had . In levels of technological prowess similar to those of leading ones. During the late

nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, for example, the United States didnt lag far behind the United Kingdom in terms of technology, nor did Germany lag far behind the erstwhile Allies during the interwar years, nor was the Soviet Union backward technologically compared with the

United States during the early Cold War. This meant that when these challengers rose economically, they could soon mount a serious military challenge to the dominant power. Chinas relative technological
backwardness today , however, means that even if its economy continues to gain ground it will not be easy ,

for it to catch up militarily technological and economic

and become a true global strategic peer, as opposed to a merely a major player in its own neighborhood. BARRIERS TO ENTRY The

differences between China and the United States wouldnt matter much if all it took to gain
superpower status were the ability to use force locally. what makes the United States a superpower But

is its ability to operate globally , and the bar for that capability is high. It means having what the political scientist Barry Posen has called command of the
commons that is, control over the air, space, and the open sea , along with the necessary infrastructure for managing these domains. When one measures the 14 categories of systems that create this capability

(everything from nuclear attack submarines to satellites to transport aircraft), what emerges is an overwhelming U.S. advantage in each area, the result of decades of advances on multiple fronts. It would take a very long time for China to approach U.S. power on any of these fronts, let

alone all of them. For one thing, the United States has built up a massive scientific and industrial base . China is rapidly enhancing its technological inputs, increasing its

there are limits to how fast any country can leap forward in such
R & D spending and its numbers of graduates with degrees in science and engineering. But

matters, and there are various obstacles in Chinas way such as a lack of effective intellectual property protections and inefficient methods of allocating capitalthat will be extremely

China is chasing a moving target the United States spent $79 billion
hard to change given its rigid political system. Adding to the difficulty, . In 2012, on military R & D,

more than 13 times as much as Chinas estimated amount , so even rapid Chinese advances might be insufficient to close the gap. Then there are the decades the United States has

spent procuring advanced weapons systems, which have grown only more complex over time. In the 1960s, aircraft took about fiv e years to develop, but by the 1990s, as the number of parts and lines of code ballooned, the figure reached ten years. Today, it takes 15 t o 20 years to design
and build the most advanced fighter aircraft, and military satellites can take even longer. So even if another country managed to build the scientific and industrial base to develop the many types of weapons that give the United States command of the commons, there would be a lengthy
lag before it could actually possess them. Even Chinese defense planners recognize the scale of the challenge. Command of the commons also requires the ability to supervise a wide range of giant defense projects. For all the hullabaloo over the evils of the military-industrial complex and
the waste, fraud, and abuse in the Pentagon, in the United States, research labs, contractors, and bureaucrats have painstakingly acquired this expertise over many decades, and their Chinese counterparts do not yet have it. This kind of learning by doing experience resides in

organizations, not in individuals. It can be transferred only through demonstration and instruction, so cybertheft or other forms of espionage are not an effective
shortcut for acquiring it. Chinas defense industry is still in its infancy , and as the scholar Richard Bitzinger and his colleagues have concluded, Aside from a few pockets of excellence such as

ballistic missiles, the Chinese military-industrial complex has appeared to demonstrate few capacities for
designing and producing relatively advanced conventional weapon systems. For example, China still cannot mass-
produce high-performance aircraft engines , despite the immense resources it has thrown at the effort, and relies instead on second-rate
Russian models Beijing has not even bothered competing
. In other areas, . Take undersea warfare. China is poorly equipped for
antisubmarine warfare and is doing very little to improve. And only now is the country capable of producing nuclear-powered attack submarines that are comparable in quietness to the kinds that the U.S.

Navy commissioned in the 1950s. Since then, however, the U.S. government has invested hundreds of billions of dollars and six deca des of effort in its current generation of Virginia-class submarines, which have achieved absolute levels of silencing. Finally, it takes a
very particular set of skills and infrastructure to actually use all these weapons Employing them is .

difficult not just because the weapons themselves tend to be so complex but also because they
typically need to be used in a coordinated manner . It is an incredibly complicated endeavor, for example, to deploy a carrier battle group; the many associated ships and aircraft must work together
in real time. Even systems that may seem simple require a complex surrounding architecture in order to be truly effective. Drones, for example, work best when a military has the highly trained personnel to operate them and the technological and organizational capacity to rapidly gather,

process, and act on information collected from them. Developing the necessary infrastructure to seek command of the commons would take any military a very long time. And since the task places a high premium on flexibility and delegation, Chinas
centralized and hierarchical forces are particularly ill suited for it. THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT In the 1930s alone, Japan escaped the depths of depression and morphed

into a rampaging military machine, Germany transformed from the disarmed loser of World War I into a juggernaut capable of conquering Europe, and the Soviet Union recovered from war and revolution to become a formidable land power. The next decade saw the United States own

sprint from military also-ran to global superpower, with a nuclear Soviet Union close on its heels. Today few seriously anticipate another world war
, , or even another cold war, but
many observers argue that these past experiences reveal just how quickly countries can become
dangerous once they try to extract military capabilities from their economies. But what is taking place now is not
your grandfathers power transition . One can debate whether China will soon reach the first major milestone on the journey from great power to superpower: having the requisite economic resources. But a
giant economy alone wont make China the worlds second superpower nor would , overcoming the next big hurdle,

attaining the requisite technological capacity After that lies the challenge of transforming all this .

latent power into the full range of systems needed for global power projection and learning how to use them. Each of
these steps is time consuming and fraught with difficulty . As a result, China will, for a long time, continue to hover somewhere between a great power and a superpower. You might

call it an emerging potential superpower: thanks to its economic growth, China has broken free from the great-power pack, but it still has a long way to go before it might gain the economic and technological capacity to become a superp ower. Chinas quest for superpower status is

The United States owes its far-reaching military capabilities to the

undermined by something else, too: weak incentives to make the sacrifices required.

existential imperatives of the Cold War . The country would never have borne the burden it did had policymakers not faced the challenge of balancing the Soviet Union, a superpower with the potential to dominate

China faces nothing like the Cold War

Eurasia. (Indeed, it is no surprise that two and a half decades after the Soviet Union collapsed, it is Russia that possesses the second-greatest military capability in the world.) Today,

pressures that led the United States to invest so much in its military . The United States is a far less threatening superpower than the Soviet Union was: however

the United States has few

aggravating Chinese policymakers find U.S. foreign policy, it is unlikely to engender the level of fear that motivated Washington during the Cold War. Stacking the odds against China even more,

incentives to give up power thanks to the web of alliances it has long boasted A list of U.S. allies reads
, .

as a whos who of the worlds most advanced economies, and these partners have lowered the price of maintaining the United
States superpower status . U.S. defense spending stood at around three percent of GDP at the end of the 1990s, rose to around five percent in the next decade on account of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and has now fallen back to close

to three percent. Washington has been able to sustain a global military capacity with relatively little effort
thanks in part to the bases its allies host and the top-end weapons they help develop . Chinas only steadfast ally is North Korea, which is often

more trouble than it is worth. Given the barriers thwarting Chinas path to superpower status, as well as the low incentives for trying to overcome them, the future of the international system hinges
most on whether the United States continues to bear the much lower burden of sustaining what we
and others have called deep engagement, the globe-girdling grand strategy it has followed for some 70 years. And

barring some odd change of heart that results in a true abnegation of its global role (as opposed to overwrought, politicized charges sometimes made about its already having done so), Washington
will be well positioned for decades to maintain the core military capabilities alliances and , ,

commitments that secure key regions, backstop the global economy, and foster cooperation on
transnational problems The benefits . of this grand strategy can be difficult to discern especially in light of the United ,

States foreign misadventures in recent years. Fiascos such as the invasion of Iraq stand as stark reminders of the difficulty of using force to alter domestic politics abroad. But

power is as much about preventing unfavorable outcomes as it is about causing favorable ones , and here

Washington has done a much better job than most Americans appreciate. For a largely satisfied power leading the international system,

having enough strength to deter or block challengers is in fact more valuable than having the ability to
improve ones position A crucial objective of U.S. grand strategy over the decades has been to
further on the margins.

prevent a much more dangerous world from emerging its success , and in this endeavor can be measured largely by
the absence of outcomes common to history important regions destabilized by severe security :

dilemmas tattered alliances , unable to contain breakout challengers, rapid weapons proliferation great-power arms races and , ,

a descent into competitive economic or military blocs Were Washington to truly pull back from the .

world more of these challenges would emerge and transnational threats would likely loom even
, ,

larger than they do today the task of addressing them would become immeasurably
. Even if such threats did not grow,

harder if the United States had to grapple with a much less stable global order at the same time. And as difficult as it sometimes is today for the
United States to pull together coalitions to address transnational challenges, it would be even harder to do so if the country abdicated its leadership role and retreated to tend its garden, as a growing number of analysts and policymakersand a large swath of the publicare now calling
for.
Trade Regimes Adv Answers
 1NC No Trade Blocs
No regionalism trade blocs are are not exclusive with each other were moving
toward global convergence
Billy Araujo 16, LLM in International Economic Law from the University of Warwick, Lecturer at the
School of aw, Queens University Belfast, SETTING THE RULES OF THE GAME: DEEP INTEGRATION IN
MEGAREGIONAL AND PLURILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE ROLE OF THE WTO ,
http://www.iilj.org/courses/documents/IILJ2016MeloAraujoDraft.pdf

The materialization of an international trading system divided along the lines of the interests and
preferences of major economic powers fits neatly with Burke-Whites contention that the international
legal system is veering towards a multi-hub structure131 . In this structure, various states can exercise leadership and
shape the development of international legal rules by putting forward distinct views of international law, which reflect their national
preferences132. As less powerful states naturally gravitate towards hubs that best address their own interests, a new form of substantive
pluralism will develop which enhances flexibility and contests the unitary vision of international law based on the preferences of the US and the
EU133 . Applied to the context of the international trading system, the multi-hub system suggests the development of - at the very least - two
hubs articulating differing views of what international trade law should look like in the twenty-first century. On the one hand, the EU and US-
backed vision of a trading system that protects assets and facilitates the movement of goods, services, capital and persons in global value
chains and, on the other hand, the BRIC-backed vision of a trading system which echoes GATT 1947 by placing the emphasis on state
sovereignty and regulatory autonomy. However,
where the multi-hub system fails to capture recent
developments in international trade relations is that the competing normative visions being offered
by the different hubs are not necessarily exclusive. Subscribing to the rules of one particular hub does
not impair ones ability to participate in a separate hub. It is indeed perfectly possible for a state to
simultaneously participate in both hub systems, as demonstrated by the fact that many of the TTPs
parties are also willing partakers in the negotiations of the RCEP and that China itself has expressed a
desire to be involved in the negotiations of plurilaterals such as the TiSA and has countenanced the
possibility of joining the TPP. The hubs provided by the large emerging economies are therefore
unlikely to shield weaker states from the push towards deeper integration because of their bargaining power,
the EU, the US as well as other advanced economies will likely be able to gradually impose their regulatory preferences on such states.
Instead of the emergence of competing regulatory blocs which would undermine multilateralism,
what we may be seeing is a trend towards global convergence in line with the EU/US model, with the exception of
those countries whose economies are large enough to resist134. Viewed from this perspective, the supposed race to set the global rules of
international trade is not much of a race at all; rather, it is a slow ineluctable process of grinding down the opposition, one bilateral, one mega-
regional and one plurilateral agreement at a time.
 2NC No Trade Blocs Dual Membership
No trade blocs self interest means countries will sign up for both agreements
Ganeshan Wignaraja 16, Adviser in the economic research and regional cooperation department of
the Asian Development Bank, 6/2/2016, A tale of two trade pacts in Asia: TPP and RCEP, Nikkei Asian
Review, http://asia.nikkei.com/Viewpoints/Viewpoints/Ganeshan-Wignaraja-A-tale-of-two-trade-pacts-
in-Asia-TPP-and-RCEP?page=2

These differences notwithstanding, the TPP and RCEP are better seen as complementary pathways to a rules-
based regional trading system in Asia. First, some Asian economies enjoy certain advantages by being
party to both trade pacts. These so-called "overlapping members" include four ASEAN members (Brunei,
Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam) as well as Japan. For instance, their companies could enjoy TPP tariff preferences
when selling to the U.S., and also RCEP tariff preferences when sourcing parts and components from
China or India. Clearer regional trade rules including those on investment and dispute settlement
would also be available. Eliminating tariffs and streamlining business regulations can translate into real cost advantages for companies
in global value chains. Moreover, if one agreement were to be derailed, the other could still be available. It
seems thus advisable for Asian countries to sign up to both agreements. Open accession seems to be
a feature in both pacts. The number of overlapping members could increase. From Asia, South Korea,
Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand have expressed interest in joining the TPP. For the RCEP, any
ASEAN FTA partner that was not a member of the initial negotiations can join later, provided it meets terms
agreed with other participating economies. For example, the U.S. might conclude an FTA with ASEAN as a group and initiate RCEP
membership. The hope that China and possibly India might eventually join the TPP would strengthen the coverage and economic benefits of the
agreement. After all, China and India are gradually implementing their own long-overdue structural reforms. China has begun reforming its
state-owned enterprises though mixed ownership of state firms and efforts to improve their corporate governance. India is loosening its
regulations on equity limits for foreign investors. Second, it
is possible that the TPP and RCEP could be merged into a
region-wide FTA -- a Free Trade Agreement of Asia and the Pacific. At the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation Summit in Beijing in November 2014, leaders launched a collective study on issues
related to the realization of the region-wide FTA; the results of the exercise will be reported at the
APEC Summit in Peru in November. Interestingly, this collective study is being co-chaired by China and
the U.S., which bodes well for the future of Asia-Pacific trade. Negotiations for a China-U.S. bilateral
investment treaty are also reportedly nearly complete.
 2NC No Trade Blocs Complementary
No trade blocs overlapping membership is set to increase because its advantageous
to be in both takes out the imapct of trade blocs which assumes isolated
membership thats Wignaraja

Theyre complementary the TPP fills in the gaps of the more-vague Chinese
agreement
Andy Morimoto 16, research associate at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, where he focuses on
the global economy. He is also a junior non-resident fellow at the Center for the National Interest,
3/17/2016, Should America Fear Chinas Alternative to the TPP?, The Diplomat,
http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/should-america-fear-chinas-alternative-to-the-tpp/
One of the key arguments used by the Obama administration to support the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is that if the United States doesnt
write the rules on trade, China will. Theres some truth here: China
is, in fact, leading an effort to negotiate a massive
trade agreement across the Asia-Pacific one that excludes the United States and that will have
markedly different rules and standards than those written in the TPP. But should America be worried? Lets start with a
bit of background. The Chinese-led agreement, known as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), includes ASEAN plus six
other regional states: China, Japan, Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and India. Together they account for nearly 27 percent of global GDP.
Negotiations launched in 2013 and the latest round was held last month in Brunei*. Similar to the TPP, RCEP will cover goods and services
trade, investment and dispute settlement. However, the
agreement will be less comprehensive. RCEP is unlikely to
include any provisions on issues such as labor, food safety, and the environment, or on sensitive
political areas like government procurement. But while the TPP and RCEP are different, they are hardly
incompatible. Rather than competing with one another, the two agreements would ideally
complement each other. Rather than fearing Chinas efforts to complete RCEP, the U.S. should encourage them. To understand why,
consider first one of the more frustrating problems in international economic policy. The problem is
called the noodle bowl effect, and it arises when more and more states create overlapping bilateral
trade deals with complex and often conflicting rules. This problem is acute in the Asia-Pacific, where
free trade agreements have proliferated in recent years in 2015 there were 126 FTAs in force in Asia alone, according to
the World Trade Organization. RCEP would help solve this problem by consolidating trade standards throughout Asia. Specifically, the deal
would unify the five free trade agreements that already exist between ASEAN and its six partners. While
its possible that RCEP
and TPP could create standards that are difficult to reconcile, its not inevitable; such hurdles could be
avoided given open discussion and clear-eyed thinking from trade negotiators. Indeed, rather than
being stumbling blocks, RCEP and the TPP could form the essential pillars of a broader agreement for
the entire Asia-Pacific region. Chinese Premier Li Keqiang said last year that TPP and RCEP cancontribute to the
joint goal of establishing an Asia-Pacific free trade zone. Similarly, U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman has noted
the TPP could serve as a building block for a Free Trade Agreement of the Asia Pacific.
 1NC Protectionism Defense
Trade and interdependence dont prevent war
Zachary Keck 13, Associate Editor of The Diplomat, monthly columnist for The National Interest,
7/12/13, Why China and the US (Probably) Wont Go to War, http://thediplomat.com/2013/07/why-
china-and-the-us-probably-wont-go-to-war/

Xinhua was the latest to weigh in on this question ahead of the Strategic and Economic Dialogue this
week, in an article titled, China, U.S. Can Avoid Thucydides Trap. Like many others, Xinhuas
argument that a U.S.-China war can be avoided is based largely on their strong economic relationship.

This logic is deeply flawed both historically and logically. Strong economic partners have gone to war
in the past, most notably in WWI, when Britain and Germany fought on opposite sides despite being
each others largest trading partners.

More generally, the notion of a capitalist peace is problematic at best. Close trading ties can raise
the cost of war for each side, but any great power conflict is so costly already that the addition of a
temporarily loss of trade with ones leading partner is a small consideration at best.

And while trade can create powerful stakeholders in each society who oppose war, just as often trading
ties can be an important source of friction. Indeed, the fact that Japan relied on the U.S. and British
colonies for its oil supplies was actually the reason it opted for war against them. Even today, Chinas
allegedly unfair trade policies have created resentment among large political constituencies in the
United States.
 2NC Protectionism Defense Institutions Chec
Trade doesnt solve war---empirics go neg---trading partners have gone to war
throughout history---Britain and Germany were each others biggest trading partners
during World War 1. Trade is a minor factor in leaders decision calculus because war
is already so costly---thats Keck

No trade wars---international institutions check

Ben Fordham 12, professor of political science at Binghamton University, International Economic
Institutions and Great Power Peace, 8/12/12, http://gt2030.com/2012/08/15/international-economic-
institutions-and-great-power-peace/

I enjoyed Jack Levys comments on how the world would have looked to people writing in 1912. As part of my current research, Ive been spending a lot of time
thinking about the three decades before World War I. As Levy pointed out, this last period of great power peace has some interesting parallels with the present one.
Like today, the international economy had become increasingly integrated. For good reason, some even refer to this period as the first age of globalization. The

period also saw the emergence of several new great powers, including Japan, Germany, and the United States.
Like emerging powers today, each of these states sought to carve out its own world role and to find, as the German Foreign Secretary put it, a place in the sun.
Like Levy, I
dont think these parallels we are doomed to repeat the catastrophe of 1914. I want to highlight the
different institutional rules governing the international economic system today. The dangers discussed in the NIC
report are real, but there is reason for hope when it comes to avoiding great power war . The rules of the game governing
the first age of globalization encouraged great powers to pursue foreign policies that made political and
military conflict more likely. Declining transportation costs, not more liberal trade policies, drove economic integration. There was no web of

international agreements discouraging states from pursuing protectionist trade policies. As Patrick McDonalds recent book,
The Invisible Hand of Peace, explains nicely, protectionism went hand-in-hand with aggressive foreign policies. Many of the

great powers, including the emerging United States, sought to shut foreign competitors out of their home markets even
as they sought to expand their own overseas trade and investment. Even though markets and investment opportunities in less
developed areas of the world were small, great power policy makers found these areas attractive because they would not export manufactured products. As one
American policy maker put it in 1899, they preferred trade with people who can send you things you ant and cannot produce, and take from you in return things
they want and cannot produce; in other words, atrade largely between different zones, and largely with less advanced
peoples. Great powers scrambled to obtain privileged access to these areas through formal or informal
imperial control. This zero-sum competition added a political and military component to economic
rivalry. Increasing globalization made this dangerous situation worse, not better, in spite of the fact that it also increased the likely cost of a great power war. In
large part because of the international economic institutions constructed after World War II, present day great

powers do not face a world in which protectionism and political efforts to secure exclusive market
access are the norm. Emerging as well as longstanding powers can now obtain greater benefits from
peaceful participation in the international economic system than they could through the predatory
foreign policies that were common in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. They do not need a large
military force to secure their place in the sun. Economic competition among the great powers continues, but it
is not tied to imperialism and military rivalry in the way it was in 1914.
 2NC Protectionism Defense Backwards
Their authors have causality backward---war prevents trade---prefer our evidence
because theirs doesnt account for simultaneity bias
Omar M. G. Keshk 10, senior lecturer in the Political Science Department at, and PhD in Political
Science from, Ohio State University; Rafael Reuveny, prof of international political economy and
ecological economics at and PhD from Indiana University; and Brian M. Pollins, emeritus Associate Prof
of Political Science at Ohio State; Trade and Conflict: Proximity, Country Size, and Measures, Conflict
Management and Peace Science 2010 27: 3, SAGE journals

In all, any signal that trade brings peace remains weak and inconsistent , regardless of the way proximity is
modeled in the conflict equation. The signal that conflict reduces trade, in contrast, is strong and consistent . Thus,
international politics are clearly affecting dyadic trade, while it is far less obvious whether trade
systematically affects dyadic politics, and if it does, whether that effect is conflict dampening or conflict amplifying. This is what we have termed in KPR (2004) The Primacy of Politics. 7. Conclusion
This study revisited the simultaneous equations model we presented in KPR (2004) and subjected it to four important challenges. Two of these challenges concerned The specification of the conflict equation in our model regarding
the role of inter- capital distance and the sizes of both sides in a dyad; one questioned the bilateral trade data assumptions used in the treatment of zero and missing values, and one challenge suggested a focus on fatal MIDs as an
alternative indicator to the widely used all-MID measure The theoretical and empirical analyses used to explore proposed alternatives to our original work were instructive and the empirical results were informative, but there
are certainly other legitimate issues that the trade and conflict research community may continue to ponder. For example, researchers may continue to work on questions of missing bilateral trade data, attempt to move beyond
the near- exclusive use of the MIDs data as we contemplate the meaning of military conflict, and use, and extend the scope of, the Harvey Starr GIS-based border data as one way to treat contiguity with more sophistication than
the typical binary variable. The single greatest lesson of this study is that future work studying the effect of international trade on international military conflict needs to employ a simultaneous specification of the relationship

between the two forces. The results we obtained under all the 36 SEM alternatives we estimated yielded an important, measurable effect of
conflict on trade . Henceforth, we would say with high confidence that any study of the effect of trade on conflict that ignores this
reverse fact is practically guaranteed to produce estimates that contain simultaneity bias. Such
studies will claim that trade brings peace, when we now know that in a much broader range of
circumstances, it is peace that brings trade . Our message to those who would use conflict as one factor in a single-equation model of trade is only slightly less
cautionary. They too face dangers in ignoring the other side of the coin. In one half of the 36 permutations we explored, the likelihood of dyadic military conflict was influenced by trade flows. In most tests where this effect
surfaced, it was positive, that is, trade made conflict more likely. But the direction of this effect is of no consequence for the larger lesson: trade modelers ignore the simultaneity between international commerce and political
enmity at their peril. They too run no small risk of finding themselves deceived by simultaneity bias. Our empirical findings show clearly that international politics pushes commerce in a much broader range of circumstances than

the reverse. In fact, we could find no combination of model choices, indicators, or data assumptions that failed to yield the result that dyadic conflict reduces dyadic trade. Liberal claims regarding
the effect of dyadic trade on dyadic conflict simply were not robust in our findings . They survived in only 8 of the 36 tests we
ran, and failed to hold up when certain data assumptions were altered, and were seriously vulnerable to indicator choices regarding inter-capital distance, conflict, and national size.
 1NC ASEAN Alt Causes
Weak ASEAN is inevitable geopolitical ambitions polarize its members
Reena Marwah 16, Senior Academic Consultant Indian Council of Social Science Research, PhD in
International Business, 1/5/2016, Thailands Increasing Closeness To China: What It Implies For ASEAN
Analysis, Eurasia Review, http://www.eurasiareview.com/05012016-thailands-increasing-closeness-to-
china-what-it-implies-for-asean-analysis/

On the flip side however, there strong views by several critics that ASEAN is becoming a theatre of super-power rivalry and

several countries have been competing for influence in ASEAN. As a result, ASEAN member countries are not speaking in one
voice at ASEAN Summit meetings, including the one at Pnom Penh in November 2012. As stated by Kaplan, China maintains the ability to

exploit divisions within ASEAN (Kaplan 2014). Chinas aggressive partnership with some countries of ASEAN
especially Laos and Cambodia and its bilateral rather than multilateral engagement approach with
ASEAN member countries is creating a divide within ASEAN.16 In fact, all the three pillars of ASEAN (ASEAN Political-Security, ASEAN
Economic and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community) are being compromised. The economic pillar is compromised when preferential treatment for trade between China
and only certain countries (such as Laos, Cambodia, Thailand) is given. In
addition, ASEAN countries do not have a united stand
on key issues such as the South China Sea (SCS) dispute as a result of which the political-security pillar is compromised. In September
2015, Ambassador Nina Hachigian, US Ambassador to ASEAN at the 4th Maritime Institute of Malaysia South China Sea Conference emphasized on the dual nature
of the SCS dispute. Illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing in the area interact with the unstable political situation in the SCS to create a vicious cycle.
Claimants want to assert sovereignty over islands because of the marine resources in the surrounding waters, but more than one country claims the islands, which
makes the issue even more complex. In addition to this, the
lack of multilateral binding agreement on fishing regulations in
the SCS has led to the lack of also a united stand on the issue among ASEAN countries in turn affecting
the political-security pillar.17 Indeed, even world leaders have emphasized, since a while now, on the
need for moving in an organized manner with regards to the issue. For instance, in August 2011, while addressing ASEAN
members at the 44th ASEAN anniversary, H.E. Dr. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, President of the Republic of Indonesia gave the clarion call to move toward agreeing
on a legally binding Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, since this was and is still, of immense significance to help resolve the dispute.18 The conflicts that
arise as a result of compromise on the economic and political-security pillar lead to reduced degree of freedom among ASEAN nations which negatively affect the
socio-cultural pillar as well.
 2NC ASEAN Alt Causes Internal Disagreements
Alt causes kill ASEAN Cooperation political divisions on China and the SCS our
Marwah evidence is causal and says that this causes a lack of regulations on
overfishing takes out their scenario

Alt causes to weak ASEAN internal disagreements over territory and leadership
weaken its ability to solve the aff impacts
Amitav Acharya 15, Professor of International Relations at American University, 8/24/2015, Is ASEAN
Losing Its Way?, Yale Global, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/asean-losing-its-way

With an expanded membership, agenda and area of concern, its only natural that ASEAN will face more
internal disagreements. Its thus not surprising that one of the most serious breakdowns of consensus have
involved its new members. Cambodia, as ASEANs chair, disastrously refused to issue a joint ASEAN
communique in 2012 to please China its new backer and aid donor rejecting the position of fellow members, Philippines and
Vietnam, on the South China Sea dispute. Compounding challenges is the uncertain leadership of Indonesia. There
are signs that the Jokowi government has downgraded Indonesias leadership role in ASEAN especially as
the de facto consensus-builder of ASEAN on both intra- and extra-ASEAN conflicts, including the South China
Sea. Jokowis less multilateralism, more national interest foreign policy approach, in sharp contrast to his predecessor Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyonos active leadership of ASEAN, could change. If not, the danger is that if the democratic, economically dynamic and stable Indonesia
does not take ASEAN seriously neither will the world at large. Without doubt, ASEANs main security challenge is the
territorial disputes in the South China Sea. While not a new problem, the disagreement has telescoped due
to recent Chinese activities. The most recent example: Chinas reclamation activities in the Fiery Reef claimed by Vietnam and
Mischief Reef and surrounding areas also claimed by the Philippines. This reflects a shift in Chinas approach. While the Chinese military has
pressed for land reclamation for some time, the leadership of Hu Jintao had resisted such moves. That restraint ended under the leadership of
Xi Jinping, who is more prone to seek the PLAs counsel in foreign policy issues related to national security and who has advanced Chinas
assertiveness on economic, diplomatic and military fronts. China is developing the islands further for both area denial and sea-control purposes
and as a staging post for blue-water deployments into the Indian Ocean. These developments challenge ASEANs role and
centrality in the Asian security architecture. The economic ties of individual ASEAN members lead them to adopt varying
positions. Until now, ASEANs advantage was that there was no alternative convening power in the region.
But mere positional centrality is meaningless without an active and concerted ASEAN leadership to
tackle problems, especially the South China Sea dispute.
 2NC ASEAN Alt Causes Overfishing
Our alt causes prove they cant solve overfishing geopolitical concerns create
unmanageable disputes
Reena Marwah 16, Senior Academic Consultant Indian Council of Social Science Research, PhD in
International Business, 1/5/2016, Thailands Increasing Closeness To China: What It Implies For ASEAN
Analysis, Eurasia Review, http://www.eurasiareview.com/05012016-thailands-increasing-closeness-to-
china-what-it-implies-for-asean-analysis/

Third, the relations between the riparian states along the Mekong River are expected to have a
consequential effect on other ASEAN nations. The Mekong river flows southwards through Myanmar, Laos,
Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam. As a result of four big dams constructed by China, the flow of water is under Chinas control.
According to Prof. Likhit Dhiravegin22, The news of four more dams to be built is worrisome for the downstream riparian states. Most
regrettably China does not join the Mekong River Commission (save being a dialogue partner together with Myanmar) despite the fact that the
Mekong River flows through China, downwards to the four riparian states. He added that China also desires to deploy patrol ships in the
Mekong River. Ecological
issues with river banks getting eroded and the number of the giant cat fish
declining have also surfaced. Despite such concerns having been articulated at international forums,
Thailands neighbours in the North and the Junta government itself is not willing to annoy China. This
viewpoint shows that Thailand itself may be keen to further fortify the partnership with China even though there may be negative
consequences of such developments.
 1NC BioD Defense
No bioD impact from overfishing abudance solvestheir data is wrong
Murawski 5 [Steven Murawski1, Richard Methot2, Galen Tromble3, 1Director of Scientific Programs
and Chief Science Advisor, National Marine Fisheries Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, Silver Spring, MD 20910, USA, 2Office of Science and Technology, National Marine
Fisheries Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Seattle, WA 98112, USA, 3Chief,
Domestic Fisheries Division, Office of Sustainable Fisheries, National Marine Fisheries Service, National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Silver Spring, MD 20910, USA, Predictions of the Demise of
Seafood Species Exaggerated
http://www.globefish.org/files/Fisheries%20Response%20to%20Worm%20et%20al_390.doc]

The Research Article Impacts of Biodiversity Loss on Ocean Ecosystem Services, (Worm et al., 3 November, p.787) projects that
100% of seafood-producing species stocks will collapse by 2048. The projection is inaccurate and overly pessimistic. This
paper utilizes a dubious metric of stock collapse. It also fails to consider recent reports using more appropriate fish stock abundance data
demonstrating that the proportion of overfished stocks has stabilized and is declining in the United
States and elsewhere where increasingly effective fishery management is being pursued. Worm et al. define collapse to occur
when the current years catch is 10% of the highest observed in a stocks time series. However, fish catch is rarely an
adequate proxy for fish abundance, particularly for rebuilding stocks under management. A variety of biological,
economic and social factors and management decisions determine catches; low catches may occur
even when stocks are high (e.g., due to low fish prices or the effects of restrictive management practices), and vice versa.
The inadequacy of Worm et al.s abundance proxy is illustrated by the time series of data for Georges Bank haddock (Melanogrammus
aeglefinus). The highest catch for haddock occurred in 1965 at 150,362 t (1). This catch occurred during a period of intense domestic and
international fishing (1). In 2003 haddock catch was 12,576 t, or 8% of the time series maximum. Under
the Worm et al.
definition, the stock would be categorized as collapsed in 2003. However, stock assessment data (1) estimate
the total magnitude of the spawning biomass in 2003 to be 91% of that in 1965. Comparing the estimate of spawning
stock biomass in 2003 to the level producing maximum sustainable yield (MSY), the stock was not
even being overfished in 2003 (2), never mind being collapsed. We therefore question the utility of a metric
that could so utterly misrepresent the status of this and many other important USA fisheries. Since adequate stock measures exist for only
a portion of world fish stocks, this purported world-wide meta analysis required using data that represent the lowest common
denominator of data the total magnitude of the catch. However, if the catch ratio metric is so prone to misrepresentation of the true
status of populations, as illustrated above, a synthesis of world fisheries based on these data is equally flawed. At the least, the authors
should have conducted a calibration of their stock collapse metric with more complete stock abundance data available from the many
worldwide sources where such data exist. The extrapolation of their stock collapse metric to 100% by 2048
does not comport with the recent history of stock status, particularly in the United States . The National
Marine Fisheries Service annually publishes a report to Congress on the status of fishery stocks (2). These data indicate that for
the year 2005 about 26% of stocks were classified as overfished. For most stocks overfished
status occurs when the population size drops below 50% of the population required to support MSY. Even
under this more conservative definition of stock reduction, the proportion of stocks classified as
overfished is actually declining slighly; in 2004 28% of stocks were so classified. Extrapolating a 2% decrease in
the number of overfished stocks per year leads to a prediction that no stocks in USA jurisdiction
would be overfished by the year 2018. However, such a meaningless projection does not incorporate a large number of
complex factors, such as the differing life histories of species, impacts of variable ocean conditions on recruitment and the increasing
effectiveness of management measures, all significant shortcomings of the prediction method and data contained in the Worm et al. paper
as well. Serious
problems of overfishing and stock status are being addressed domestically under the
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, and internationally through the
many regional fishery management organizations (RFMOs). Admittedly, more needs to be done to improve governance
institutions and control measures. This includes eliminating or reducing illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing on the high seas,
and increasing the effectiveness of RFMOs, for example in rebuilding depleted bluefin tuna, Thunnus thynnus, stocks in the Atlantic.
Nevertheless, we believe the future situation regarding the condition of marine fish stocks is far
less bleak than suggested by Worm et al., in the United States and elsewhere.
 2NC BioD Defense Studies
No bioD lossfishing underestimates the abundance of species current stabilization
of stocks proves given that weve been overfishing for years Murawski

No impact to biodiversity loss or the environment --- best scholarship

Kareiva et al. 12
Chief Scientist and Vice President, The Nature Conservancy (Peter, Michelle Marvier --professor and
department chair of Environment Studies and Sciences at Santa Clara University, Robert Lalasz --
director of science communications for The Nature Conservancy, Winter, Conservation in the
Anthropocene, http://thebreakthrough.org/index.php/journal/past-issues/issue-2/conservation-in-the-
anthropocene/)

2. Asconservation became a global enterprise in the 1970s and 1980s, the movement's justification for
saving nature shifted from spiritual and aesthetic values to focus on biodiversity. Nature was
described as primeval, fragile, and at risk of collapse from too much human use and abuse. And indeed,
there are consequences when humans convert landscapes for mining, logging, intensive agriculture,
and urban development and when key species or ecosystems are lost. But ecologists and
conservationists have grossly overstated the fragility of nature, frequently arguing that once an ecosystem is
altered, it is gone forever. Some
ecologists suggest that if a single species is lost, a whole ecosystem will be in
danger of collapse, and that if too much biodiversity is lost, spaceship Earth will start to come apart.
Everything, from the expansion of agriculture to rainforest destruction to changing waterways, has
been painted as a threat to the delicate inner-workings of our planetary ecosystem. The fragility
trope dates back, at least, to Rachel Carson, who wrote plaintively in Silent Spring of the delicate web of life
and warned that perturbing the intricate balance of nature could have disastrous consequences.22 Al
Gore made a similar argument in his 1992 book, Earth in the Balance.23 And the 2005 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment warned darkly that,
while the expansion of agriculture and other forms of development have been overwhelmingly positive for the world's poor, ecosystem
degradation was simultaneously putting systems in jeopardy of collapse.24 The trouble for conservation is that the
data simply do
not support the idea of a fragile nature at risk of collapse. Ecologists now know that the disappearance of one
species does not necessarily lead to the extinction of any others, much less all others in the same
ecosystem. In many circumstances, the demise of formerly abundant species can be inconsequential to
ecosystem function. The American chestnut, once a dominant tree in eastern North America, has been
extinguished by a foreign disease, yet the forest ecosystem is surprisingly unaffected. The passenger
pigeon, once so abundant that its flocks darkened the sky, went extinct, along with countless other species from the
Steller's sea cow to the dodo, with no catastrophic or even measurable effects . These stories of
resilience are not isolated examples -- a thorough review of the scientific literature identified 240
studies of ecosystems following major disturbances such as deforestation, mining, oil spills, and
other types of pollution. The abundance of plant and animal species as well as other measures of
ecosystem function recovered, at least partially, in 173 (72 percent) of these studies .25 While global forest
cover is continuing to decline, it is rising in the Northern Hemisphere, where "nature" is returning to
former agricultural lands.26 Something similar is likely to occur in the Southern Hemisphere, after poor countries achieve a similar
level of economic development. A 2010 report concluded that
rainforests that have grown back over abandoned
agricultural land had 40 to 70 percent of the species of the original forests.27 Even Indonesian orangutans, which
were widely thought to be able to survive only in pristine forests, have been found in surprising numbers in oil palm plantations and degraded
lands.28 Nature is so resilient that it can recover rapidly from even the most powerful human
disturbances. Around the Chernobyl nuclear facility, which melted down in 1986, wildlife is thriving, despite
the high levels of radiation.29 In the Bikini Atoll, the site of multiple nuclear bomb tests, including the 1954
hydrogen bomb test that boiled the water in the area, the number of coral species has actually increased relative to
before the explosions.30 More recently, the massive 2010 oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico was degraded and
consumed by bacteria at a remarkably fast rate.31 Today, coyotes roam downtown Chicago, and peregrine
falcons astonish San Franciscans as they sweep down skyscraper canyons to pick off pigeons for their
next meal. As we destroy habitats, we create new ones: in the southwestern United States a rare and
federally listed salamander species seems specialized to live in cattle tanks -- to date, it has been found in no
other habitat.32 Books have been written about the collapse of cod in the Georges Bank, yet recent trawl
data show the biomass of cod has recovered to precollapse levels.33 It's doubtful that books will be
written about this cod recovery since it does not play well to an audience somehow addicted to
stories of collapse and environmental apocalypse. Even that classic symbol of fragility -- the polar
bear, seemingly stranded on a melting ice block -- may have a good chance of surviving global warming if the
changing environment continues to increase the populations and northern ranges of harbor seals and
harp seals. Polar bears evolved from brown bears 200,000 years ago during a cooling period in Earth's
history, developing a highly specialized carnivorous diet focused on seals. Thus, the fate of polar bears depends on two opposing trends --
the decline of sea ice and the potential increase of energy-rich prey. The history of life on Earth is of species evolving to
take advantage of new environments only to be at risk when the environment changes again. The
wilderness ideal presupposes that there are parts of the world untouched by humankind, but today it
is impossible to find a place on Earth that is unmarked by human activity. The truth is humans have
been impacting their natural environment for centuries . The wilderness so beloved by conservationists -- places
"untrammeled by man"34 -- never existed, at least not in the last thousand years, and arguably even longer.
 2NC BioD DefenseNo Tipping Points
No impact to bio-diversity loss --- their ev is bad science
Hance 13 Jeremy Hance is a senior writer for Mongabay.com, one of the leading sites on the Web
covering tropical forests and biodiversity, Citing research by Barry Brook, Professor at the University of
Adelaide, leading environmental scientist, holding the Sir Hubert Wilkins Chair of Climate Change at the
School of Earth and Environmental Sciences, and is also Director of Climate Science at the University of
Adelaides Environment Institute, author of 3 books and over 250 scholarly articles, Mongabay, March 5,
2013, "Warnings of global ecological tipping points may be overstated",
http://news.mongabay.com/2013/0305-hance-tipping-points.html#r2IbUBDMyux2eU7i.99

There's little evidence that the Earth is nearing a global ecological tipping point, according to a new Trends in Ecology and
Evolution paper that is bound to be controversial. The authors argue that despite numerous warnings that the Earth is headed toward an

ecological tipping point due to environmental stressors, such as habitat loss or climate change, it's
unlikely this will occur anytime soonat least not on land. The paper comes with a number of caveats, including that a global tipping point could occur in marine
ecosystems due to ocean acidification from burning fossil fuels. In addition, regional tipping points, such as the Arctic ice melt or the Amazon rainforest drying out, are still of great concern.

"When others have said that a planetary critical transition is possible/likely, they've done so without any
underlying model (or past/present examples, apart from catastrophic drivers like asteroid strikes)," lead author Barry Brook and Director of Climate Science
at the University of Adelaide told mongabay.com. "Its just speculation and weve argued [...] that this conjecture is not

logically grounded. No one has found the opposite of what we suggestedtheyve just proposed it."
According to Brook and his team, a truly global tipping point must include an impact large enough to spread across the

entire world, hitting various continents, in addition to causing some uniform response. "These criteria,
however, are very unlikely to be met in the real world," says Brook. The idea of such a tipping point comes from ecological research, which has
shown that some ecosystems will flip to a new state after becoming heavily degraded. But Brook and his team say that tipping points in individual ecosystems

should not be conflated with impacts across the Earth as a whole. Even climate change, which some scientists might
consider the ultimate tipping point, does not fit the bill, according to the paper. Impacts from climate change, while global, will not

be uniform and hence not a "tipping point" as such. "Local and regional ecosystems vary considerably in their responses to
climate change, and their regime shifts are therefore likely to vary considerably across the terrestrial biosphere," the authors
write. Barry adds that, "from a planetary perspective, this diversity in ecosystem responses creates an essentially

gradual pattern of change, without any identifiable tipping points." The paper further argues that
biodiversity loss on land may not have the large-scale impacts that some ecologists argue, since invasive
species could potentially take the role of vanishing ones. "So we can lose the unique evolutionary history
but not necessarily the role they impart in terms of ecosystem stability or
(bad, from an intrinsic viewpoint)

provision of services," explains Brook. The controversial argument goes against many scientists' view that decreased biodiversity will ultimately lessen ecological
services, such as pollination, water purification, and carbon sequestration.
 AT: Food Wars
No resource wars cooperation is in everyones interest
Tetrais 12Senior Research Fellow at the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratgique (FRS). Past positions
include: Director, Civilian Affairs Committee, NATO Assembly (1990-1993); European affairs desk officer,
Ministry of Defense (1993-1995); Visiting Fellow, the Rand Corporation (1995-1996); Special Assistant to
the Director of Strategic Affairs, Ministry of Defense (1996-2001).(Bruno, The Demise of Ares,
csis.org/files/publication/twq12SummerTertrais.pdf)
The Unconvincing Case for New Wars Is the demise of war reversible? In recent years, the metaphor of a new Dark Age or Middle Ages
has flourished. 57 The rise of political Islam, Western policies in the Middle East, the fast development
of emerging countries,
population growth, and climate change have led to fears of civilization, resource, and environmental
wars. We have heard the New Middle Age theme before. In 1973, Italian writer Roberto Vacca famously suggested that
mankind was about to enter an era of famine, nuclear war, and civilizational collapse. U.S. economist Robert
Heilbroner made the same suggestion one year later. And in 1977, the great Australian political scientist Hedley Bull also heralded such an age.
58 But the case for new wars remains as flimsy as it was in the 1970s . Admittedly, there is a stronger role of
religion in civil conflicts. The proportion of internal wars with a religious dimension was about 25 percent between 1940 and 1960, but 43
percent in the first years of the 21st century. 59 This may be an effect of the demise of traditional territorial conflict, but as seen above, this has
not increased the number or frequency of wars at the global level. Over the past decade, neither Western governments nor Arab/Muslim
countries have fallen into the trap of the clash of civilizations into which Osama bin Laden wanted to plunge them. And ancestral hatreds are
a reductionist and unsatisfactory approach to explaining collective violence. Professor Yahya Sadowski concluded his analysis of post-Cold War
crises and wars, The Myth of Global Chaos, by stating, most of the conflicts around the world are not rooted in thousands of years
of history --- they are new and can be concluded as quickly as they started . 60 Future resource wars
are unlikely. There are fewer and fewer conquest wars. Between the Westphalia peace and the end of World War II,
nearly half of conflicts were fought over territory. Since the end of the Cold War, it has been less than 30 percent. 61 The invasion of
Kuwait a nationwide bank robbery may go down in
history as being the last great resource war. The U.S.-led intervention of 1991 was partly driven by the need to maintain the free flow of oil, but
not by the temptation to capture it. (Nor was the 2003 war against Iraq motivated by oil.) As for the current tensions between the two Sudans
over oil, they are the remnants of a civil war and an offshoot of a botched secession process, not a desire to control new resources. Chinas
and Indias energy needs are sometimes seen with apprehension: in light of growing oil and gas scarcity, is there not a risk of military clashes
over the control of such resources? This seemingly consensual idea rests on two fallacies. One is that there is such a thing as oil and
gas scarcity, a notion challenged by many energy experts. 62 As prices rise, previously untapped reserves
and non-conventional hydrocarbons become economically attractive. The other is that spilling blood is a
rational way to access resources. As shown by the work of historians and political scientists such as Quincy Wright, the economic
rationale for war has always been overstated . And because of globalization, it has become cheaper to
buy than to steal. We no longer live in the world of 1941, when fear of lacking oil and raw materials was a key motivation for Japans

decision to go to war. In an era of liberalizing trade, many natural resources are fungible goods. (Here, Beijing behaves as
any other actor: 90 percent of the oil its companies produce outside of China goes to the global market, not to the domestic one.) 63 There may
be clashes or conflicts in regions in maritime resource-rich areas such as the South China and East China seas or the Mediterranean, but they
will be driven by nationalist passions, not the desperate hunger for hydrocarbons.
Relations Adv Answers
 1NC No ESC war
No risk of conflict in the East China Sea
Beauchamp 14 (Zack, Editor of TP Ideas and a reporter for ThinkProgress.org. He previously
contributed to Andrew Sullivans The Dish at Newsweek/Daily Beast, and has also written for Foreign
Policy and Tablet magazines. Zack holds B.A.s in Philosophy and Political Science from Brown University
and an M.Sc in International Relations from the London School of Economics, Why Everyone Needs To
Stop Freaking Out About War With China http://thinkprogress.org/world/2014/02/07/3222021/china-
japan-war/)

Chinas been out of the news lately the State of the Union only have mentioned it twice but Americas allies are getting antsy
about it. Just this Wednesday, Filipino President Benigno S. Aquino III compared China to Nazi Germany, telling the world to remember that
the Sudetenland was given in an attempt to appease Hitler to prevent World War II when it thinks about Chinese territorial claims
in Asian waters. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe recently reached back to the other world war, repeatedly warning the Davos
summit in January that East Asia, much like Europe pre-World War I, was a violent tinderbox primed to explode after one bad incident. Of the
two, Abes comparison is by far more reasonable, and he did dispatch a deputy to say Japan absolutely did not beleive war was coming, but
the damage was done. Asia experts are warning about the risk of a new Cold War between Japan and China and others are terrified by the
prospect of a hot one. This is all dramatically overblown . War between China and Japan is more than unlikely : it
would fly in the face of most of what we know about the two countries, and international relations more broadly. Its not that a replay of 1914
is impossible. Its just deeply, vanishingly unlikely. Power One of the easiest ways to evaluate the risks of Sino-Japanese war is by reference to
three of the most important factors that shape a governments decision to go to war: the balance of power, economic incentives, and ideology.
These categories roughly correspond to the three dominant theories in modern international relations (realism, liberalism, and constructivism),
and theres solid statistical evidence that each of them can play a significant role in how governments think about their decisions to use military
force. So lets take them in turn. The main source of tension is an East China Sea island chain, called the Senkakus in Japan and Diaoyus in China.
While there are other potential flashpoints, the current heightened tensions are centered on the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute. Japan currently
controls the islands, but China claims them, and the Chinese military has made increasingly aggressive noises about the islands of late. But
theres one big factor shaping the balance of power in East Asia that means the talk is likely to remain just that:
nuclear weapons . The tagline for World War I in 1914 The War To End All Wars would have a decidedly different meaning in
2014, as wars end would be accomplished by the worlds end. So whereas, in 1914, all of the European powers thought they
could win the war decisively, East Asias great powers recognize the risk of a nuclear exchange
between the U nited S tates and China to be catastrophic . Carleton Universitys Stephen Saideman calls
this the end of the preemption temptation; nobody thinks they can win by striking first anymore .
Indeed, despite the words of some of its military leaders, China (at least nominally) has a no-clash-with-Japan policy in
place over the islands. That also helps explain why the most commonly-cited Senkaku/Diaoyu spark, accidental
escalation, isnt as likely as many suggest . When The Wall Street Journals Andrew Browne writes that theres a real risk of
an accident leading to a standoff from which leaders in both countries would find it hard to back down in the face of popular nationalist
pressure, hes not wrong. But it wont happen just because two planes happen across each other in the sky. In 2013, with tensions
running high the whole year, Japan scrambled fighters against Chinese aircraft 433 times. Indeed, tensions
have flared up a number of times throughout the years (often sparked by nationalist activists on side of the other)
without managing to bleed over into war . Thats because, as MIT East Asia expert M. Taylor Fravel argues, there are deep
strategic reasons why each side is, broadly speaking, OK with the status quo over and above nuclear deterrence.
China has an interest in not seeming like an aggressor state in the region, as thats historically caused
other regional powers to put away their differences and line up against it. Japan currently has control over the
islands, which would make any strong moves by China seem like an attempt to overthrow the status quo power balance. The U nited
S tates also has a habit of constructive involvement, subtly reminding both sides when tensions are spiking
that the U nited S tates and its rather powerful navy would prefer that there be no fighting between the two
states . Moreover, the whole idea of accidental war is also a little bit confusing . Militaries dont just start
shooting each other by mistake and then decide its time to have a war. Rather, an incident thats truly accidental
say, a Japanese plane firing on a Chinese aircraft in one of the places where their Air Defense Identification Zones (ADIZs) overlap changes
the incentives to go to war, as the governments start to think (perhaps wrongly) that war is inevitable and the only way to win it is to escalate.
Its hard to envision this kind of shift in calculation in East Asia, for all of the aforementioned reasons. Money Its wrong to talk about incentives
to go war in purely military terms. A key component of the Senkaku/Diaoyou is economic: the islands contain a ton of natural
resources, particularly oil and gas. But far more valuable are the trade ties between the two countries . China is
Japans largest export market, so war would hurt Japan more than China, but itd be pretty painful for both. Proponents of the
World War I parallel find a lot to criticize about this point. They like to cite Norman Angell, a pre-World War I international relations theorist
famous for arguing that war was becoming economically obsolete. Angell is now often used interchangeably with Dr. Pangloss in international
relations talk, a symbol of optimism gone analytically awry. But Angell gets a bad rap. He didnt actually say war was impossible; he merely
claimed that it no longer was worth the cost (if you remember the aftermath of World War I, he was right about that). The real upshot of
Angells argument is that, unless theres some other overwhelming reason to go to war, mutually profitable trade ties will
serve as a strong deterrent to war. Angell may have been wrong about Europe, but hes probably right about East Asia. M.G.

Koo, a political scientist at Chung-Ang University, surveyed several Senkaku-Diaoyu flareups between 1969 and 2009.
He found that economic ties between the two countries played an increasingly large role in defusing
tensions as the trade relationship between the two countries deepened. The 1978 crisis over the islands is a
good example. Bilateral trade had grown substantially since the end of the last big dispute (1972), but they had entered into a new phase after
Chinese Premier Deng Xiaopings economic reforms began in 1978. A key part of the early modernization plan was the Peace and Friendship
Treaty (PFT) with Japan, a diplomatic treaty that (among other things) facilitated a rush of Japanese firms into the Chinese market. According
to Koo, policy circles in China and Japan had increasingly recognized that the [Senkaku/Diaoyu] sovereignty issue could possibly jeopardize
the PFT negotiations, thus undermining economic gains. The leadership tamped down tensions and, afterwards, shelving territorial claims for
economic development seemingly became the two countries diplomatic leitmotif in the treatment of the island dispute. Theres reason to
believe todays China and Japan arent bucking the historical pattern . Despite a year of heated rhetoric and economic
tensions over the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute, bilateral trade has been recovering nicely of late. Quartzs Matt Phillips, looking over the numbers,
concluded that the China-Japan trade war is pretty much over. Sure, Chinese business leaders are making some nationalistic
noises, but Phillips points out that the lack of mass, nationalistic protests in China suggests the powers-that-be

have decided theres no need for that to hurt an important business relationship. Trade really does
appear to be calming the waves in the East China Sea. Nationalism The last thing people worried
about war between China and Japan cite is ideology. Specifically, a growing nationalism, linked to the history of
antagonism between the two traditional East Asian powers, that threatens to overwhelm the overwhelming military and economic rationales
that militate against war. At its root, Asia experts Tatsushi Arai and Zheng Wang write, the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute is an identity-based
conflict in which the divergent memories, perceptions, attitudes, and aspirations of the two national communities combine in volatile
combinations. The gist of the problem is that both countries believe they have historical claims to the islands that extend at least back to 1895;
Chinese books date its control way back in the Ming Dynasty. Japan claims it formally annexed the Senkakus after World War II; China claims
that Japan should have handed the Diaoyus back as part of its post-World War II withdrawal from Chinese territory. This historical conflict cuts
across modern lines of tension in particularly dangerous ways. Japan, always threatened by Chinas overwhelming size, is baseline skeptical of
Chinas military and economic rise. Aggressive moves in the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute suggest to Japanese citizens that Chinas plan is to eclipse
and ultimately dominate Japan. China, by contrast, still has deep, visceral memories of the brutal Japanese occupation during World War II, and
its history books cast Japan as the enemy responsible for its subordinate status in the past two centuries of global politics. Japanese defenses of
the Senkakus come across as, once again, an attempt to keep China down. To
some observers, the risk that these
nationalist impulses pressure leaders into military escalation during a crisis is the greatest risk of war .
The toxic mix of two rising nationalisms and unresolved mutual resentments makes the risks of an accidental conflict becomes
uncomfortably real, Isabel Hilton writes in The Guardian. Times Michael Crowley agrees, writing that national pride and historical grievance
threaten to drag in the U.S. into a Pacific war. But the importance of nationalism as a driving force on both the
Chinese and Japanese side has been overblown . In fact, a deeper look at the prevailing ideological winds in both China and
Japan suggest much more pacific forces are likely to carry the day. First, while its easy to see China as an
aggressive expansionist power bent on retaking its rightful place in East Asia by force, thats simply inconsistent with
Chinas track record to date. In an influential 2003 article, Iain Alasdair Johnston, a professor of China in World
Affairs at Harvard, argued that theres overwhelming evidence China is more-or-less happy with the current
international order. Johnston tested various measures of Chinese interest in upending the global
order like its willingness to work inside the U.N. and internal dialogues within PRC strategists about overtaking the United States and
found very little evidence of China seeking to overturn the global structure, including the U.S.JapanKorea

alliance system that sets the terms in East Asia. The

regime appears to be unwilling, according to Johnston, to bear the
economic and social costs of mobilizing the economy and militarizing society to balance seriously against
American power and influence in the region, let alone globally. The Chinese leaderships ideology is better understood, in Johnstons
view, as centering on expanding Chinas power inside the international order rather than overturning through gambles like military aggression
in the Senkaku/Diaoyu chain. In the face of 2013s flurry of headlines about a newly aggressive China, Johnston revisited his thesis. He found
basically no evidence that the Chinese leadership had changed its tune. Panicked writers, in Johnstons analysis, were focusing on minor
changes in Chinese policy to the exclusion of major continuities (like continued and deepening economic ties with the United States). They were
also consistently misinterpreting Beijings thinking during major so-called aggressive moves. Take the 2010 Senkaku-Diaoyu flareup, after a
Chinese trawler tried to ram some Japanese coast guard ships near the islands. Johnston found no evidence of serious Chinese escalation the
most serious such step reported, an embargo on shipping rare earth metals to Japan, was either very weakly enforced or never happened.
Moreover, Beijing took explicit steps to tamp down anti-Japanese nationalism , placing anti-war editorials
in major party outlets and shutting up the most anti-Japanese voices on the Chinese web during the most
diplomatically sensitive time in the dispute. In short, Chinas track record in the past ten years suggests the government doesnt share the
hardline nationalist sentiment it occasionally indulges in. Rather, the Chinese government is interested in very moderate
regional advances that stop well short of war , and is capable of shutting down the sort of nationalist
outburst from its population that might goad the government into war well before such protests
might start affecting policy. What about Japan? Its true that Abe himself holds some fairly hardline nationalist views. For instance,
he wont admit that Japan waged an aggressive war during World War II, which is a pretty gobsmacking bit of revisionism if you think about it.
In December, Abe visited a shrine that honors (among others) Japanese war criminals from that era, a move that contributed to the recent bout
of nationalistic strife. But there are a number of reasons to think that the resurgent Japanese nationalism Abe represents
isnt going to force war during a crisis. For one thing, his governments coalition partners would do their
damndest to block escalation . New Komeito, whose support keeps Abe and his Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in
power, is an odd duck: pacifict Buddhist libertarians is way oversimplified, but it gets the point across. Regardless, they are extremely
serious about their pacifism its at the core of their political identity , and it inclines them towards a more
generous stance towards Beijing. Theyd exert a calming pressure in any crisis. Now, there are rumblings that the LDP and
New Komeito may part political ways. But the cause of the split a disagreement over rewriting or reinterpreting Article 9, the pacifist article
in Japans constitution reveals the broadest check on Japanese nationalism. Simply put, the Japanese people still retain much of the nations
post-World War II pacifist core, and Abes government has governed accordingly. Mike Mochizuki, the Japan-U.S. Relations Chair at George
Washington University, took a hard look at Japanese opinion about militarization in the Abe era. He and his coauthor, Samuel
Porter, found enormous Japanese opposition to anything resembling a significant return to active
military status . For instance, 56 percent of Japanese voters supported seeing the treaty as prohibiting collective self-defense (meaning
defense of its allies when attacked). A miniscule 7 percent wanted to see Japanese troops fighting on the
frontlines with the U.S. military. So why did they support Abes aggressive LDP? In a word, the economy. Japans
citizens arent deeply aligned with the LDP philosophy 83 percent, according to Mochizuki and Porter, felt that a party that can effectively
oppose the LDP is necessary in government. Rather, they threw out the previous government because the economy
was in tatters. Sixty percent of Japanese voters want Abe to focus on the economy, while only 9
percent see foreign policy as the priority. Abes government, nationalist stunts aside, isnt unaware of this
reality . Because China is Japans number one trading partner, reviving Japans economy will be
inordinately difficult if
fractious political relations with China are allowed to damage JapanChina
economic relations, Mochizuki and Porter argue. If SinoJapanese relations were to deteriorate further and
lead to a more precipitous drop in Japanese exports to China, this would jeopardize Abes growth strategy
and thereby threaten his political survival. As a consequence, they conclude, the Prime Ministers approach to the Senkaku
dispute will be measured and will not entail full-blown militarization, let alone short term escalation. Abe and the LDP rank militaristic
nationalism a distant second to the nations economic health. Of course its possible that, at one point in the future, all of this changes. Chinese
hard power continues to grow, Japan remilitarizes in a big way, and the United States pulls back it security guarantee. In that world, a
combination of security competition and nationalist fever might well swamp the economic incentives against war. But its important to
remember that were nowhere close to that reality. Too often, our political discourse dramatically inflates the

threats facing the United States, leading to distorted, paranoid policy responses when something more measured would do.
 2NC No ESC War
No ESC war
1) Deterrence -- neither side thinks it can win if it pre-emptively strikes
2) No accidental escalation -- empirically denied in 433 previous scuttles thats
Beauchamp

Zero chance of Senkaku conflict

Allen Carlson 13, Associate Professor of Govt @ Cornell, China Keeps the Peace at Sea, Foreign
Affairs, Feb 21, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139024/allen-carlson/china-keeps-the-peace-at-
sea?page=show

At times in the past few months, China and Japan have appeared almost ready to do battle over the Senkaku
(Diaoyu) Islands --which are administered by Tokyo but claimed by both countries -- and to ignite a war that could be bigger than any since World War
II. Although Tokyo and Beijing have been shadowboxing over the territory for years, the standoff reached a new low in the fall, when the Japanese government
nationalized some of the islands by purchasing them from a private owner. The decision set off a wave of violent anti-Japanese demonstrations across China. In the
wake of these events, the conflict quickly reached what political scientists call a state of equivalent retaliation -- a situation in which both countries believe that it is
imperative to respond in kind to any and all perceived slights. As a result, it may have seemed that armed engagement was
imminent. Yet, months later, nothing has happened . And despite their aggressive posturing in the
disputed territory, both sides now show glimmers of willingness to dial down hostilities and to
reestablish stability. Some analysts have cited North Korea's recent nuclear test as a factor in the countries' reluctance to engage in military conflict.
They argue that the detonation, and Kim Jong Un's belligerence, brought China and Japan together, unsettling them and placing their differences in a scarier
context. Rory Medcalf, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, explained that "the nuclear test gives the leadership in both Beijing and Tokyo a chance to focus
on a foreign and security policy challenge where their interests are not diametrically at odds." The nuclear test, though, is a red herring in terms of the conflict over
the disputed islands. In truth, the roots of the conflict -- and the reasons it has not yet exploded -- are much deeper. Put simply, China cannot afford military conflict
with any of its Asian neighbors. It is not that China believes it would lose such a spat; the country increasingly enjoys strategic superiority over the entire region, and
it is difficult to imagine that its forces would be beaten in a direct engagement over the islands, in the South China Sea or in
the disputed regions along the Sino-Indian border. However, Chinese officials see that even the most pronounced victory would be

outweighed by the collateral damage that such a use of force would cause to Beijing's two most
fundamental national interests -- economic growth and preventing the escalation of radical
nationalist sentiment at home. These constraints, rather than any external deterrent, will keep Xi Jinping, China's new leader, from
authorizing the use of deadly force in the Diaoyu Islands theater. For over three decades , Beijing has
promoted peace and stability in Asia to facilitate conditions amenable to China's economic
development. The origins of the policy can be traced back to the late 1970s, when Deng Xiaoping repeatedly contended that to move beyond the
economically debilitating Maoist period, China would have to seek a common ground with its neighbors. Promoting cooperation in the region would allow China to
spend less on military preparedness, focus on making the country a more welcoming destination for foreign investment, and foster better trade relations. All of this
would strengthen the Chinese economy. Deng was right. Today, China's economy is second only to that of the United States. The fundamentals of Deng's grand

economic strategy are still revered in Beijing. But any war in the region would erode the hard-won , and precariously
held, political capital that China has gained in the last several decades. It would also disrupt trade
relations, complicate efforts to promote the yuan as an international currency, and send shock waves
through the country's economic system at a time when it can ill afford them. There is thus little
reason to think that China is readying for war with Japan. At the same time, the specter of rising
Chinese nationalism, although often seen as a promoter of conflict, further limits the prospects for
armed engagement. This is because Beijing will try to discourage nationalism if it fears it may lose
control or be forced by popular sentiment to take an action it deems unwise. Ever since the Tiananmen Square
massacre put questions about the Chinese Communist Party's right to govern before the population, successive generations of Chinese leaders have carefully
negotiated a balance between promoting nationalist sentiment and preventing it from boiling over. In the process, they cemented the legitimacy of their rule. A

war with Japan could easily upset that balance by inflaming nationalism that could blow back against
China's leaders. Consider a hypothetical scenario in which a uniformed Chinese military member is killed during a firefight with Japanese soldiers.
Regardless of the specific circumstances, the casualty would create a new martyr in China and, almost as quickly, catalyze popular protests against Japan.
Demonstrators would call for blood, and if the government (fearing economic instability) did not extract enough, citizens would agitate against Beijing itself. Those
in Zhongnanhai, the Chinese leadership compound in Beijing, would find themselves between a rock and a hard place. It is possible that Xi lost track of these basic
facts during the fanfare of his rise to power and in the face of renewed Japanese assertiveness. It is also possible that the Chinese state is more rotten at the core
than is understood. That is, party elites believe that a diversionary war is the only way to hold on to power -- damn the economic and social consequences. But Xi
does not seem blind to the principles that have served Beijing so well over the last few decades. Indeed, although he recently warned unnamed others about
infringing upon China's "national core interests" during a foreign policy speech to members of the Politburo, he also underscored China's commitment to "never
pursue development at the cost of sacrificing other country's interests" and to never "benefit ourselves at others' expense or do harm to any neighbor." Of course,
wars do happen -- and still could in the East China Sea. Should either side draw first blood through accident or an unexpected move, Sino-Japanese relations would

be pushed into terrain that has not been charted since the middle of the last century. However, understanding that war would be a no-
win situation, China has avoided rushing over the brink . This relative restraint seems to have surprised everyone. But it shouldn't.
Beijing will continue to disagree with Tokyo over the sovereign status of the islands, and will not budge in its negotiating position over disputed territory. However,
it cannot take the risk of going to war over a few rocks in the sea. On the contrary, in the coming months it will quietly seek a way to shelve the dispute in return for
securing regional stability, facilitating economic development, and keeping a lid on the Pandora's box of rising nationalist sentiment. The ensuing peace, while
unlikely to be deep, or especially conducive to improving Sino-Japanese relations, will be enduring.

No escalation even if clashes occur

Paul Dibb 14, emeritus professor of strategic studies @ The Australian National University, Why A
Major War In Asia Is Unlikely, March 31, East Asia Forum, Economy Watch,
http://www.economywatch.com/features/why-a-major-war-in-asia-is-unlikely.31-03.html

The risingtensions between China and Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands has led some experts to draw
parallels with the Sarajevo incident, which sparked off World War I in Europe. Yet while is a significant risk that the conflict will
result in a military confrontation, an all-out war is unlikely given economic reasons. The Jeremiah prophets are coming out of the
woodwork to predict that there will be an outbreak of war between the major powers in Asia, just like in Europe 100 years ago. The idea is that
a rising China will inevitably go to war with the United States, either directly or through conflict with Japan. Some commentators are even
suggesting that the Sarajevo incident that provoked World War I will be replicated between China and Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in
the East China Sea. Former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd has likened this situation to what he calls a 21st-century maritime redux of
the Balkans a century ago a tinderbox on water. My colleague Hugh White recently proclaimed that the risk of war between China and Japan
is now very real. There is undoubtedly a significant risk that Chinas increasing aggressiveness in the East China Sea
and the S outh C hina S ea over its territorial claims will result in a military confrontation, either by miscalculation or
design. But a sunk warship or military aircraft collision is a long way from all-out war. These sorts of
incidents have occurred in the past and have not escalated for example, the North Korean sinking in 2010 of
a South Korean warship, and the collision in 2001 by a Chinese fighter plane with a US reconnaissance
aircraft. Unfortunately, however, a military incident between China and Japan might be more serious.
 1NC Warming Inev
Dangerous climate change is inevitable-2 degrees is locked in and that will trigger
ecosystem tipping points that will cause 4 degree warming.
Spratt 13
(David,Carbon equity co-founder, Is climate change already dangerous (5): Climate safety and an
unavoidably radical future, 9-26, http://www.climatecodered.org/2013/09/is-climate-change-already-
dangerous-5.html, ldg)

The research evidence and expert elicitations demonstrate that climate conditions are dangerous
now according to the generally accepted safe boundary, five concerns and tipping point metrics. The 350 ppm
safe boundary for atmospheric CO2 has already been exceeded by 50 ppm. In 2007, at around +0.76C
warming (equivalent to ~335 ppm CO2 at equilibrium), Arctic
sea-ice passed its tipping point. The Greenland Ice Sheet may
not be far behind, as the Arctic moves to sea-ice-free conditions in summer, triggering further tipping elements. Around +1.5C warming
may be the tipping point for the Greenland Ice Sheet and for the large-scale release of Arctic carbon permafrost stores. At
+1.5C, coral reefs would be reduced to remnant systems. The paleo-climate record shows that the
current level of atmospheric CO2 at 400 ppm is enough to produce sea-level rises of 2040 metres ; is around

the tipping point for large-scale release of Arctic carbon permafrost ; and is sufficient to trigger
powerful amplifying polar feedbacks . Holocene CO2 levels have varied between 270 and 330 ppm. The
higher figure occurred in the early Holocene around 10,000 years ago when temperatures were around 0.5C warmer (known as the Holocene maximum) than pre-

industrial levels, when the CO2 level was around 280 ppm. A safe climate would not exceed the Holocene maximum. The
notion that +1.5C is a safe target is contradicted by the evidence, and even +1C degree is not safe
given what we now know about the Arctic. Emission reduction challenges The dominant climate policy frame I have observed goes along
these lines: Lets hope its not as bad as you say Even if you are right about the Arctic holding the system to +2C will be very difficult and a huge political and
economic challenge but its the best we can hope for and while it might be dangerousthats a hell of a lot better than +3 or 4C which would be
catastrophic. The discussion on doing the maths for the carbon budget is about the total emissions available without exceeding 2C of warming. This task is very
much more challenging than policy-makers accept, as Anderson and Bows demonstrate in their 2008 and 2011 papers on emission reduction scenarios. They make
some optimistic assumptions about de-afforestation and food-related emissions for the rest of the century, and then ask what emission reduction scenarios would
be compatible with holding warming to +2C, and find that: Of the 18 scenarios tested, ten cannot be reconciled with ~450
ppm CO2e. If emissions to do not peak till 2025, no scenarios are available. 450 ppm CO2e requires energy
emissions to be stabilised by 2015 , then decline annually by 6-8 per cent for 20202040, with full de-
carbonisation by 2050. A five per cent annual reduction in emissions from a 2020 peak (and a 67 per cent annual
reduction in energy and process emissions) correlates near 550 ppm CO2e, or +3C of warming. If the emissions reduction after a
2020 peak is three per cent, this correlates near 650 ppm CO2e, or +4C of warming. And looking at equity issues: if non-
Annex 1 (developing) nation emissions grow three per cent a year to 2020 and then peak in 2025,
there is no carbon budget available for Annex 1 (developed nations) after 2015 , for the IPCCs low-emissions
carbon budget. Research
published in August 2013 finds that terrestrial ecosystems absorb approximately
11 billion tons less CO2 every year as the result of the extreme climate events than they could if the
events did not occur. That is equivalent to approximately a third of global CO2 emissions per year. As
extreme events increase in scale and frequency with more warming, this may negatively affect the amount of emissions available for the carbon budgets discussed
above. Two degrees, or four? In June 2013, a German research institute which advises Angela Merkels government concluded that policy makers must come up
with a new global target to cap temperature gains because the current goal limiting the increase in temperature to 2C since industrialization is unrealistic. It
recommended that world leaders either allow the 2C goal to become a benchmark that can be temporarily overshot, accept a higher target, or give up on such an
objective altogether. International Energy Agency Chief Economist Fatih Birol calls the 2C goal a nice Utopia: It is becoming extremely challenging to remain
below 2C. The prospect is getting bleaker. That is what the numbers say. The prevailing climate policy-making framework now poses a choice between a
dangerous but liveable 2C of warming and the catastrophe of 4C or more, as reflected in the statement by John Holdren that opens this paper. The

World Bank and PriceWaterhouseCoopers have recently published reports which complement a wide
range of scientific research which concludes that the world is presently heading for 4C or more of
warming this century, and as soon as 2060. Reuters correspondent Michael Rose (2012) quotes IEA
Chief Economist, Fatih Birol as saying that emission trends are perfectly in line with a temperature
increase of 6C, which would have devastating consequences for the planet. Anderson says there is a widespread
view amongst scientists that a 4C future is incompatible with an organised global community, is likely to be beyond adaptation, is devastating to the majority of
eco-systems and has a high probability of not being stable. Yet the
2C goal is not an option either, because, with climate and
carbon cycle positive feedbacks in full swing, it is less a stable destination than a signpost on a
highway to a much hotter place. The real choice now is to try and keep the planet under a series of big tipping points by getting it back to a
Holocene-like state, or accept that a 3-6C catastrophe is at hand.
 2NC Warming Inev
Warming inevitable current sea level rises trigger tipping points for permafrost and
polar feedbacks research contradicts the 2 degree hypothesis thats Spratt

Even if all emissions are cut catastrophic warming is inevitable

Anthony Chavez 13, Associate Professor, Salmon P. Chase College of Law, Northern Kentucky
University, A Napoleonic Approach to Climate Change: The Geoengineering Branch, Washington and
Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment 5.1, 9/1/13,
http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1078&context=jece

[Graphs omitted]

Even if we eliminate the anthropogenic sources27 of global warming immediately and completely , the
global temperature will continue to rise for decades before it stabilizes.28 Several factors will cause this
continued rise.29 First, carbon dioxide (CO2), which remains in the atmosphere for centuries, will continue to trap heat.30
Second, the thermal inertia of the
Earths oceans means that they absorb heat and radiate it gradually, for hundreds
of years.31 Second, feedbacks increase the rate of global warming. First, although natural processes, such as photosynthesis and
absorption by ocean waters, remove some of the anthropogenic CO2 that is released into the atmosphere, these processes cannot
remove all such CO2, meaning that CO2 will continue to accumulate in the atmosphere.33 Moreover, natural processes become less
successful at removing CO2 as emissions increase,34 and climate change itself suppresses carbon absorption by both land and ocean
processes. Second, because of the thermal inertia of the Earths oceans, the global temperature will
continue to rise, even if carbon emissions were to cease .36 Thus, the warming currently experienced is only about sixty
percent of the warming that would be expected at the atmospheres current level of CO2 concentration.37 For this reason, were society
to stop emitting all carbon today, the planets temperature would not immediately return to pre-industrial levels or
even stabilize.38 Actually, the temperature would continue to increase for a few decades,39 and only then remain

at that new level for at least one thousand years. Third, not only will global warming continue for several decades, but the rate of
warming will increase due to carbon-cycle feedback cycles that accelerate warming.41 Indeed, models
suggest that feedbacks
will more than double the direct effect of increasing CO2 levels without
feedbacks.42 For example, feedbacks are accelerating the rate at which the Arctic ice cap melts.43 As the global
temperature has warmed, less snow has fallen on the Arctic ice cap.44 Because snow reflects approximately eighty-five percent of the sunlight
that it receives,45 snow acts as sunscreen for ice. The decline in snowfall has exposed ice to sunlight, which increases melting.46 As the melting
increases, the planetary surface albedo47 decreases, thus prompting greater melting.48 Ocean waters absorb almost ten times more solar
radiation than does sea ice, thereby increasing temperatures. Additional
feedbacks will accelerate the rate at which the
atmosphere warms.51 Such feedbacks include, among others, the increase of water vapor,52 the weakening of
carbon sinks,53 and the impairment of terrestrial hydrology and its impact on vegetation.54 C. Mitigation Alone Is
Unlikely to Avert Significant Climate Change For several reasons, mitigation alone is unlikely to be sufficient to prevent
significant climate change. First, international agreements to reduce emissions have had limited success,
and are unlikely to be successful in the future.55 Second, implementation of alternative energy technologies is unlikely
to take effect soon enough to avert significant temperature increases.56 Finally, scientists now believe that initial targets for
acceptable warming were too lenient, necessitating a stronger response to climate change than previously anticipated.57 To avoid
catastrophic climate change, international agreements have set goals to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.58
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)59 set an overall framework for intergovernmental efforts to address
climate change.60 In 1997, the parties to the UNFCCC developed the Kyoto Protocol,61 which committed industrialized nations to achieve
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions by 2012.62 These countries committed themselves to collective reductions averaging more than five
percent from 1990 emissions levels.63 Unfortunately, emissions
have continued their upward trajectory.64 As of 2007,
their collective emissions had dropped only 1.4% below their 1990 emissions.65 At the same time, emissions
from the non-industrialized countries had increased by 100.6% over 1990 levels, so that combined global
emissions had increased by 34.7% since 1990.66 As discussed below in Part IV, similar efforts are likely to be unsuccessful in the future.
Second, even if nations decide to reduce CO2 emissions, structural aspects of the energy industry, which generates one-
quarter of global greenhouse gases,67 will require decades to convert a significant portion of the industry to
clean technologies.68 Although society adopts certain technologies with lightning rapidity,69 conversion to new energy technologies
occurs much more slowly.70 Indeed, two laws of energy technology development dictate that the energy industry requires
several decades to adopt and implement new technologies.71 On average, energy technologies have
required thirty years to advance from being technically available to reaching materiality.72 This pattern was
consistent across all technologies, including nuclear power, natural gas, biofuels, wind, and solar photovoltaic. Figure 274 below illustrates
that several energy technologies grew during the last century in accordance with these laws: Adoption of new technologies in the energy
field requires significant time because of several inherent characteristics of the power industry. First, historical patterns show that the industry
needs almost a full decade to build and test new technologies: three years to build a demonstration plant, one year to commence operations,
and two to five years to identify problems and reach satisfactory operability.75 Second, massive amounts of capital must be
invested to alter significantly the mix of energy sources,76 amounts that dwarf the scale of the
industry.77 Third, once a technology reaches materiality, growth rates flatten (see Figure 3).78 This growth trend results in part from the
nature of energy infrastructure. Power plants have average lives of twenty-five to fifty years, though some have operational lives of up to 100
years.79 Consequently, only two to four percent of existing sources require replacement in a given year.80 Besides replacing power plants,
conversion to renewable energy systems will often require other developments, such as land
acquisitions, different transmission methods, enabling technologies, market systems, and other
changes, which may not yet be foreseeable. Royal Dutch Shell projected that renewable sources of energy could reach
materiality by 2030, sooner than others have forecast.82 Royal Dutch Shell further projected that by 2050 total energy demand would be one-
third lower than a business-as-usual scenario.83 Even if these projections are correct, CO2 concentrations would not stabilize until they reached
550 ppm.84 Not only are we unlikely to meet current emissions targets, but scientists now believe that even these targets are
not stringent enough .85 Despite mitigation efforts during the past three decades, atmospheric CO2
concentrations have risen steadily.86 Figure 387 presents the atmospheric concentration of CO2 since 1980 During this period,
atmospheric CO2 increased from 338.7 ppm to 393.8 ppm, a rise of 16.3%.88 Atmospheric CO2 increased every year.89 Furthermore, the
annual increase in CO2 is actually rising.90 Since 2002, annual CO2 concentrations have increased on average by 2
ppm per year.91 Thus, not only are targets in international agreements too difficult to achieve,92 they may also be too lenient.93 The
following example illustrates the obstacles that prevent abatement of atmospheric levels of CO2. At the 2010 UN Climate Change Summit in
Cancun, the delegates agreed to limit warming to a global mean temperature increase of two degrees Celsius,94 which requires an atmospheric
content of 450 ppm of CO2. 95 To achieve this target, global emissions immediately need to begin declining by more than one percent per
year,96 in contrast to the annual global increase.97 Small delays in emissions cuts, moreover, necessitate much larger reductions in future
emissions.98 Delay causes the atmospheric CO2 to peak higher and later, thus necessitating much sharper
cuts to attain the same level.99 For this reason, stabilization at 450 ppm appears to be virtually
impossible even if aggressive mitigation were to begin today. Thus, not only are targets in international agreements
too difficult to achieve,101 these targets may also be too lenient.102 Scientists have set a rise of two
degrees Celsius as a target to
avert catastrophic consequences. Recent analyses, however, suggest that this rise would be too high.104 Comparison to prehistoric
records indicate that the current level of CO2 (approximately 394 ppm) is already too high to maintain current
planetary conditions.105 Indeed, current analyses suggest that 2 C warming may cause significant sea-level rises,
storms, floods, droughts, and heat waves.106 Maintaining climate conditions comparable to those of the Holocene Era, during
which civilization developed, requires reducing the atmospheric CO2 level to 350 ppm.10
 1NC No China Cyber Impact
Cyber impacts are hype-cant take out our assets.
Lindsay 15 (Jon, UCSD research scientist, "Exaggerating the Chinese Cyber Threat", May,
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/25321/exaggerating_the_chinese_cyber_threat.html)

Policymakers in the United States often portray China as posing a serious cybersecurity threat. In 2013 U.S.
National Security Adviser Tom Donilon stated that Chinese cyber intrusions not only endanger national security but also threaten U.S. firms with the loss of
competitive advantage. One U.S. member of Congress has asserted that China has "laced the U.S. infrastructure with logic bombs." Chinese critics, meanwhile,
denounce Western allegations of Chinese espionage and decry National Security Agency (NSA) activities revealed by Edward Snowden. The People's Daily
newspaper has described the United States as "a thief crying 'stop thief.'" Chinese commentators increasingly call for the exclusion of U.S. internet firms from the
Chinese market, citing concerns about collusion with the NSA, and argue that the institutions of internet governance give the United States an unfair advantage.
The rhetorical spiral of mistrust in the Sino-American relationship threatens to undermine the mutual
benefits of the information revolution. Fears about the paralysis of the United States' digital
infrastructure or the hemorrhage of its competitive advantage are exaggerated. Chinese cyber
operators face underappreciated organizational challenges, including information overload and
bureaucratic compartmentalization, which hinder the weaponization of cyberspace or absorption of
stolen intellectual property. More important, both the United States and China have strong incentives
to moderate the intensity of their cyber exploitation to preserve profitable interconnections and
avoid costly punishment. The policy backlash against U.S. firms and liberal internet governance by China and others is ultimately more worrisome for
U.S. competitiveness than espionage; ironically, it is also counterproductive for Chinese growth. The United States is unlikely to
experience either a so-called digital Pearl Harbor through cyber warfare or death by a thousand cuts through industrial espionage.
There is, however, some danger of crisis miscalculation when states field cyberweapons. The secrecy of cyberweapons' capabilities and the uncertainties about their
effects and collateral damage are as likely to confuse friendly militaries as they are to muddy signals to an adversary. Unsuccessful preemptive cyberattacks could
reveal hostile intent and thereby encourage retaliation with more traditional (and reliable) weapons. Conversely, preemptive escalation spurred by fears of
cyberattack could encourage the target to use its cyberweapons before it loses the opportunity to do so. Bilateral
dialogue is essential for
reducing the risks of misperception between the United States and China in the event of a crisis. THE U.S.
ADVANTAGE The secrecy regarding the cyber capabilities and activities of the United States and China

creates difficulty in estimating the relative balance of cyber power across the Pacific. Nevertheless,
the United States appears to be gaining an increasing advantage. For every type of purported
Chinese cyber threat, there are also serious Chinese vulnerabilities and growing Western strengths.
Much of the international cyber insecurity that China generates reflects internal security concerns. China
exploits foreign media and digital infrastructure to target political dissidents and minority populations. The use of national censorship architecture (the Great
Firewall of China) to redirect inbound internet traffic to attack sites such as GreatFire.org and GitHub in March 2015 is just the latest example of this worrisome
trend. Yet prioritizing political information control over technical cyber defense also damages China's own cybersecurity. Lax law enforcement and poor cyber
defenses leave the country vulnerable to both cybercriminals and foreign spies. The fragmented and notoriously competitive nature of the Communist Party state
further complicates coordination across military, police, and regulatory entities. There is strong evidence that China continues to engage in aggressive cyber
espionage campaigns against Western interests. Yet it struggles to convert even legitimately obtained foreign data into competitive advantage, let alone make
sense of petabytes of stolen data. Absorption is especially challenging at the most sophisticated end of the value chain (e.g., advanced fighter aircraft), which is
dominated by the United States. At the same time, the United States conducts its own cyber espionage against China , as the Edward Snowden leaks dramatized,
which can indirectly aid U.S. firms (e.g., in government trade negotiations). China's uneven industrial development, fragmented cyber defenses, erratic cyber

tradecraft, and the market dominance of U.S. technology firms provide considerable advantages to the United States. Despite high levels of
Chinese political harassment and espionage, there is little evidence of skill or subtlety in China's
military cyber operations . Although Chinese strategists describe cyberspace as a highly asymmetric
and decisive domain of warfare, China's military cyber capacity does not live up to its doctrinal
aspirations. A disruptive attack on physical infrastructure requires careful testing, painstaking
planning, and sophisticated intelligence. Even experienced U.S. cyber operators struggle with these
challenges. By contrast, the Chinese military is rigidly hierarchical and has no wartime experience
with complex information systems. Further, China's pursuit of military "informatization" (i.e.,
emulation of the U.S. network-centric style of operations) increases its dependence on vulnerable
networks and exposure to foreign cyberattack. To be sure, China engages in aggressive cyber
campaigns, especially against nongovernmental organizations and firms less equipped to defend
themselves than government entities. These activities, however, do not constitute major military
threats against the United States, and they do nothing to defend China from the considerable
intelligence and military advantages of the United States. PROTECTION OF INTERNET GOVERNANCE Outmatched by
the West in direct cyber confrontation yet eager to maintain the global connectivity supporting
economic growth, China (together with Russia and other members of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization) advocates for internet governance reform. These changes, predicated on so-called internet sovereignty, would
replace the current multistakeholder system and its liberal norms of internet openness with a formal international regulator, such as the United Nations'
International Telecommunication Union, and strong norms of noninterference with sovereign networks. Chinese complaints of U.S. internet hegemony are not
completely unfounded: the internet reinforces U.S. dominance, but it does so through a light regulatory touch that relies on the self-interest of stakeholders
academic scientists, commercial engineers, government representatives, and civil society organizations. The internet expands in a self-organized fashion because
adopters have incentives to pursue increasing returns to interconnection. The profit-driven expansion of networks and markets through more reliable and
voluminous transactions and more innovative products (e.g., cloud services, mobile computing, and embedded computing) tends to reinforce the economic
competitiveness of the United States and its leading information technology firms. Many
Western observers fear that cyber reform
based on the principle of internet sovereignty might legitimize authoritarian control and undermine
the cosmopolitan promise of the multistakeholder system. China, however, benefits too much from
the current system to pose a credible alternative. Tussles around internet governance are more likely
to result in minor change at the margins of the existing system, not a major reorganization that shifts
technical protocols and operational regulation to the United Nations. Yet this is not a foregone
conclusion, as China moves to exclude U.S. firms such as IBM, Oracle, EMC, and Microsoft from its
domestic markets and attempts to persuade other states to support governance reforms at odds with
U.S. values and interests. CONCLUSION Information technology has generated tremendous wealth and
innovation for millions, underwriting the United States' preponderance as well as China's meteoric
rise. The costs of cyber espionage and harassment pale beside the mutual benefits of an
interdependent, globalized economy. The inevitable frictions of cyberspace are not a harbinger of
catastrophe to come, but rather a sign that the states inflicting them lack incentives to cause any real
harm. Exaggerated fears of cyberwarfare or an erosion of the United States' competitive advantage
must not be allowed to undermine the institutions and architectures that make the digital commons
so productive.
 2NC No China Cyber Impact
No China cyber impact threats are all rhetorical actual implementation is
constrained by skill and military structure thats Lindsay

China wouldnt instigate cyber war-they know they would lose

Sarkar 15
(Dibya, Fierce Government IT reporter, China's military still struggling with its cyber and electronic
warfare capabilities, new RAND report says. 2-25, http://www.fiercegovernmentit.com/story/chinas-
military-still-struggling-its-cyber-and-electronic-warfare-capabilit/2015-02-25)

While China's military has made great strides over the last two decades to modernize itsel f, struggles
still persist in several areas including its cyber and electronic warfare capabilities , according to a new study from RAND
Corp. The study examined the People's Liberation Army, or PLA, weaknesses in the areas of human
capital and organizational areas, defense research and industrial complex, and combat areas at on
land, sea, air, space, cyber and electromagnetic regions. Chinese space, cyber and electronic warfare capabilities collectively was
an area that authors said needed improvement. "Although most attention devoted to Chinese cyberactivities focuses on

Chinese cyberespionage and the theft of intellectual property, PLA analysts actually view China as
potentially very vulnerable to enemy cyberactions," noted RAND's authors in the study (pdf) published Feb. 16.

Additionally, the study said that shortcomings both organizational and technological in the PLA's
command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, or
C4ISR, systems could hinder the speed, reliability and effectiveness of the military's targeting
capabilities. Another weakness centers around the potentiality of "unintended effects or inadvertent escalation." As prior research has pointed out, PLA
analysts "accentuate the positive offensive outcomes of information warfare while ignoring its limitations and unintended consequences," according to the study.
The authors noted that China does see space, cyber and electronic warfare capabilities as essential in defeating technologically advanced adversaries and PLA is
making those areas a priority. However, it views
"itself as occupying a relatively disadvantageous position" in cyber
reconnaissance, cyberattack and defense, and cyber deterrence. As PLA increasingly becomes
dependent on systems, it will be a potential weakness because China views offense as much easier
than defense in network warfare. " Consequently, as the PLA becomes more and more networked, it
will become increasingly dependent on technology that is vulnerable to disruption, thus creating a
potential weakness that an adversary could exploit," the report said. The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,
which Congress established in 2000 to monitor and report on the economic and national security dimensions of U.S.-China trade and economic ties, sponsored the
report.

China doesnt have the tech

Lindsay 15 (Jon, UCSD adjunct professor, The Impact of China on Cybersecurity: Fiction and Friction,
Winter, International Security, 39.3,
http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/full/10.1162/ISEC_a_00189#.VvREYOIrJD8)

Although Chinese writers emphasize the revolutionary potential of cyberwarfare, episodes of Chinese
aggression in cyberspace have been more mundane. China's hacker wars flare up during episodes of
tension in Chinese foreign relations, as between Taiwan and the mainland between 1996 and 2004 in the wake of Taiwanese elections,
between the United States and China following the 1999 bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade and the 2001 EP-3 spy plane collision, and between China and
Japan throughout the past decade during controversies involving the Yasukuni Shrine and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.87 Nationalist hackers (as distinguished from
PLA units) deface foreign websites and launch temporary distributed denial of service attacks. Nationalist online outbursts may take place with the tacit consent or
encouragement of the Chinese government, yet patriotic hacktivism is essentially just another form of symbolic protest. There has been speculation that PLA
cyber militias associated with Chinese universities maintain a more potent reserve capability, but one study of open sources suggests that they are oriented
toward more mundane educational and network defense activities.88 The
majority of known PLA cyber operations are CNE for
intelligence rather than computer network attacks to cause disruption.89 Nevertheless, many analysts worry that CNE is
only a keystroke away from CNA, thereby generating dangerous ambiguity between intelligence gathering and offensive operations. Intrusion techniques
developed for industrial espionage might be used to plant more dangerous payload code into sensitive controllers or constitute reconnaissance for future assaults.
Chinese probing of critical infrastructure such as the U.S. power grid is aggressive, to be sure, so a latent potential for the PLA to convert CNE into CNA cannot be
discounted.90 The
discovery of access vectors and exploitable vulnerabilities, however, is only the first step
to achieving effective reconnaissance of a target, and effective reconnaissance is just one step toward
planning and controlling a physically disruptive attack. The most significant historical case of kinetic
CNA to date, the Stuxnet attack on Iran's enrichment infrastructure, suggests that painstaking
planning, careful rehearsals, and sophisticated intelligence are required to control a covert
disruption.91 The U.S. military also considered using cyberattacks to take down Libya's air defense
system in 2011, but reportedly it would have taken too long to develop the option.92 The latency
between CNE and CNA is more complicated than generally assumed. The PLA does have access to
considerable resources, human capital, and engineering skill, so it might in principle overcome
operational barriers to weaponization, but its observed operational focus and experience are
concentrated on intelligence operatio ns. The PLA has considerable organizational infrastructure for cyber operations, most notably in the
Third and Fourth Departments of the PLA General Staff. The Third Department is the Chinese equivalent of the U.S. National Security Agency, with responsibilities
for both signals intelligence and network defense. The Fourth Department (formerly headed by Gen. Dai Qingmin) is primarily responsible for electronic warfare,
but its cyber mission, if any, is less clear. Western
analysts have begun to piece together the bureaucratic
organization of the Third Department through open-source intelligence.93 Meanwhile Western
corporate and governmental cybersecurity experts have had ample opportunity to observe this
organization in action given the routine neglect of operational security by Chinese cyber operators.
Lax tradecraft in CNE does not inspire confidence for the sophistication and attention to detail
required for serious CNA. If the U.S. cyber community with all its experience and technical savvy still
struggles with the weaponization of cyberspace, as difficulties with known U.S. operations suggest,
then the untried PLA should be expected to encounter still more operational challenges in the
implementation and coordination of cyberwarfare. PLA competency in CNA cannot be simply
inferred from high levels of CNE.
 AT: Nuke Terror Add On
No nuclear terrorism-even attempts under optimal conditions have failed.
Bergen 10
(Peter, New York Universitys Center on Law and Security fellow, Reevaluating Al-Qa`idas Weapons of
Mass Destruction Capabilities, CTC Sentinel, September, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-
Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=122242, ldg)

Bin Ladins and al-Zawahiris portrayal of al-Qa`idas nuclear and chemical weapons capabilities in their post-9/11 statements to
Hamid Mir was not based in any reality, and it was instead meant to serve as psychological warfare against the West. There

is no evidence that al-Qa`idas quest for nuclear weapons ever went beyond the talking stage. Moreover, al-
Zawahiris comment about missing Russian nuclear suitcase bombs floating around for sale on the black market is a Hollywood

construct that is greeted with great skepticism by nuclear proliferation experts. This article reviews al-Qa`idas WMD
efforts, and then explains why it is unlikely the group will ever acquire a nuclear weapon. Al-Qa`idas WMD Efforts In 2002,

former UN weapons inspector David Albright examined all the available evidence about al-Qa`idas nuclear weapons
research program and concluded that it was virtually impossible for al-Qa`ida to have acquired any type of

nuclear weapon.8 U.S. government analysts reached the same conclusion in 2002.9 There is evidence, however, that al-
Qa`ida experimented with crude chemical weapons, explored the use of biological weapons such as botulinum, salmonella and anthrax, and also made multiple
attempts to acquire radioactive materials suitable for a dirty bomb.10 After the group moved from Sudan to Afghanistan in 1996, al-Qa`ida members escalated their
chemical and biological weapons program, innocuously code-naming it the Yogurt Project, but only earmarking a meager $2,000-4,000 for its budget.11 An al-
Qa`ida videotape from this period, for example, shows a small white dog tied up inside a glass cage as a milky gas slowly filters in. An Arabic-speaking man with an
Egyptian accent says: Start counting the time. Nervous, the dog barks and then moans. After struggling and flailing for a few minutes, it succumbs to the
poisonous gas and stops moving. This experiment almost certainly occurred at the Darunta training camp near the eastern Afghan city of Jalalabad, conducted by
the Egyptian Abu Khabab.12 Not only has al-Qa`idas research into WMD been strictly an amateur affair, but plots to use these types of weapons have been
ineffective. One example is the 2003 ricin case in the United Kingdom. It was widely advertised as a serious WMD plot, yet the subsequent investigation showed
otherwise. The case appeared in the months before the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, when media in the United States and the United Kingdom were awash in stories
about a group of men arrested in London who possessed highly toxic ricin to be used in future terrorist attacks. Two years later, however, at the trial of the men
accused of the ricin plot, a government scientist testified that the men never had ricin in their possession, a charge that had been first triggered by a false positive
on a test. The men were cleared of the poison conspiracy except for an Algerian named Kamal Bourgass, who was convicted of conspiring to commit a public
nuisance by using poisons or explosives.13 It is still not clear whether al-Qa`ida had any connection to the plot.14 In fact, the only post-9/11 cases where al-Qa`ida
or any of its affiliates actually used a type of WMD was in Iraq, where al-Qa`idas Iraqi affiliate, al-Qa`ida in Iraq (AQI), laced more than a dozen of its bombs with the
chemical chlorine in 2007. Those attacks sickened hundreds of Iraqis, but the victims who died in these assaults did so largely from the blast of the bombs, not
because of inhaling chlorine. AQI stopped using chlorine in its bombs in Iraq in mid-2007, partly because the insurgents never understood how to make the chlorine
attacks especially deadly and also because the Central Intelligence Agency and U.S. military hunted down the bomb makers responsible for the campaign, while
simultaneously clamping down on the availability of chlorine.15 Indeed, a
survey of the 172 individuals indicted or convicted in Islamist
terrorism cases in the United States since 9/11 compiled by the Maxwell School at Syracuse University and the New America Foundation found
that none of the cases involved the use of WMD of any kind. In the one case where a radiological plot was initially allegedthat of
the Hispanic-American al-Qa`ida recruit Jose Padillathat allegation was dropped when the case went to trial.16 Unlikely Al-Qa`ida Will Acquire a Nuclear Weapon
Despite the difficulties associated with terrorist groups acquiring or deploying WMD and al-Qa`idas poor record in the matter, there was a great deal of hysterical
discussion about this issue after 9/11. Clouding the discussion was the semantic problem of the ominous term weapons of mass destruction, which is really a
misnomer as it suggests that chemical, biological, and nuclear devices are all equally lethal. In fact, there is only one realistic weapon of mass destruction that can
kill tens or hundreds of thousands of people in a single attack: a nuclear bomb.17 The congressionally authorized Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of
Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism issued a report in 2008 that typified the muddled thinking about WMD when it concluded: It is more likely than not
that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013.18 The reports conclusion that WMD terrorism
was likely to happen somewhere in the world in the next five years was simultaneously true but also somewhat trivial because terrorist groups and cults have
already engaged in crude chemical and biological weapons attacks.19 Yet the
prospects of al-Qa`ida or indeed any other group having
access to a true WMDa nuclear deviceis near zero for the foreseeable future. If any organization should have
developed a serious WMD capability it was the bizarre Japanese terrorist cult Aum Shinrikyo, which not
only recruited 300 scientistsincluding chemists and molecular biologistsbut also had hundreds of millions of dollars at its
disposal.20 Aum embarked on a large-scale WMD research program in the early 1990s because members of the cult believed that Armageddon was fast-
approaching and that they would need powerful weapons to survive. Aum acolytes experimented with anthrax and botulinum toxin and even hoped to mine
uranium in Australia. Aum
researchers also hacked into classified networks to find information about nuclear facilities
in Russia, South Korea and Taiwan.21 Sensing an opportunity following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Aum recruited thousands
of followers in Russia and sent multiple delegations to meet with leading Russian politicians and scientists in the
early 1990s. The cult even tried to recruit staff from inside the Kurchatov Institute, a leading nuclear research center in Moscow. One of Aums leaders, Hayakawa
Kiyohide, made eight trips to Russia in 1994, and in his diary he made a notation that Aum was willing to pay up to $15 million for a nuclear device.22 Despite

its open checkbook, Aum was never able to acquire nuclear material or technology from Russia even in the chaotic
circumstances following the implosion of the communist regime.23 In the end, Aum abandoned its investigations of nuclear
and biological weapons after finding them too difficult to acquire and settled instead on a chemical weapons operation, which climaxed in the group releasing sarin
gas in the Tokyo subway in 1995. It is hard to imagine an environment better suited to killing large numbers of people than the Tokyo subway, yet only a dozen died
in the attack.24 Although Aums WMD program was much further advanced than anything al-Qa`ida
developed, even they could not acquire a true WMD. It is also worth recalling that Iran, which has had an
aggressive and well-funded nuclear program for almost two decades, is still some way from developing
a functioning nuclear bomb. Terrorist groups simply do not have the resources of states. Even with access to nuclear technology, it is next to
impossible for terrorist groups to acquire sufficient amounts of highly enriched uranium (HEU) to make a nuclear bomb. The total of all the known

thefts of HEU around the world tracked by the International Atomic Energy Agency between 1993 and 2006 was just less than eight
kilograms, well short of the 25 kilograms needed for the simplest bomb;25 moreover, none of the HEU thieves during this period
were linked to al-Qa`ida. Therefore, even building, let alone detonating, the simple, gun-type nuclear device of the

kind that was dropped on Hiroshima during World War II would be extraordinarily difficult for a terrorist group
because of the problem of accumulating sufficient quantities of HEU. Building a radiological device, or dirty bomb, is far
more plausible for a terrorist group because acquiring radioactive materials suitable for such a weapon is not as difficult, while the construction of such a device is
orders of magnitude less complex than building a nuclear bomb. Detonating a radiological device, however, would likely result in a relatively small number of
casualties and should not be considered a true WMD.

No WMD terrorism-no expertise, storage or delivery capacity.

Mauroni 12 (Al, Air Force senior policy analyst, Nuclear Terrorism: Are We Prepared?, Homeland
Security Affairs, http://www.hsaj.org/?fullarticle=8.1.9, ldg)

Military chemical/biological (CB) warfare agents, radiological material, and nuclear weapons are not
easily obtained, outside of government laboratories. Nation states invest large amounts of people and funds to develop and test
specific unconventional weapons, and if they were to give or sell these weapons to terrorists, one of two things could happen either the weapons

would be traced back to them, or the weapons might be used someplace where the nation-state really
didnt want those weapons used. In theory, scientists recruited by sub-state groups could develop small quantities of military CB warfare agents,
but the lack of access to fissile material would frustrate any ambitious engineer trying to build an

improvised nuclear device. There are other hypotheses as to why sub-state groups have been unable to obtain nuclear weapons and/or fissile
material on the global market. It could be that, despite the available information about nuclear weapons, these

groups havent developed the expertise, skills, or experience to design a nuclear weapon. It takes
time, resources, and a secure facility to successfully develop such a weapon, and international efforts
to combat terrorism may have been successful in stopping such efforts. It could be that the scientists
and engineers who are attracted to sub-state groups are not capable of designing weapons. It is a particularly
challenging task to take a particularly hazardous material, developed in a laboratory, and turn it into a reliable military weapon of mass destruction. Last, it

could be that sub-state groups have been frustrated by the numerous black-market scams and
intelligence sting operations, in which fraudulent persons claimed to have nuclear material.9 Sub-state
groups are interested in chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) hazards, however, because senior political leaders and military leaders publicly state,
over and over again, how dangerous a release of these materials would be to the American public. So
of course terrorists are interested in
CBRN hazards, but they dont have the expertise to produce the specialized military warfare agents,
they dont have any training in handling or storing them, and they dont understand how to deliver
the agents to their targets with any degree of effectiveness. So one might see some attempts to steal
chlorine gas cylinders from water treatment sites, some occasional attempts to produce ricin toxin from castor beans, stories about a few grams of

radioactive material stolen from a facility these are not materials that cause mass casualty event s. But the fear
persists, and so government leaders spend billions every year to reduce the already minute possibility that some sub-state group does develop or steal a nuclear
weapon for the purposes of employing it against the United States. This leads to our public policy discussion: to understand how effectively the USG is performing in
this case.
Odds are one in three billion
Mueller 2010 (John, OSU political science professor, Calming Our Nuclear Jitter, Issues in Science and
Technology http://www.issues.org/26.2/mueller.html, ldg)

In contrast to these predictions, terrorist groups seem to have exhibited only limited desire and even
less progress in going atomic. This may be because, after brief exploration of the possible routes, they, unlike generations of alarmists, have
discovered that the tremendous effort required is scarcely likely to be successful. The most plausible route for terrorists, according to

most experts, would be to manufacture an atomic device themselves from purloined fissile material (plutonium or, more likely,
highly enriched uranium). This task, however, remains a daunting one, requiring that a considerable series of

difficult hurdles be conquered and in sequence. Outright armed theft of fissile material is exceedingly
unlikely not only because of the resistance of guards, but because chase would be immediate. A more
promising approach would be to corrupt insiders to smuggle out the required substances. However, this requires the
terrorists to pay off a host of greedy confederates, including brokers and money-transmitters, any one of whom could
turn on them or, either out of guile or incompetence, furnish them with stuff that is useless. Insiders might also consider the
possibility that once the heist was accomplished, the terrorists would, as analyst Brian Jenkins none too delicately puts it, have every incentive

to cover their trail, beginning with eliminating their confederates. If terrorists were somehow successful
at obtaining a sufficient mass of relevant material, they would then probably have to transport it a long
distance over unfamiliar terrain and probably while being pursued by security forces. Crossing international borders would be
facilitated by following established smuggling routes, but these are not as chaotic as they appear and
are often under the watch of suspicious and careful criminal regulators. If border personnel became suspicious of the
commodity being smuggled, some of them might find it in their interest to disrupt passage, perhaps to collect the bounteous reward money that would probably be
offered by alarmed governments once the uranium theft had been discovered. Once outside the country with their precious booty,
terrorists would need to set up a large and well-equipped machine shop to manufacture a bomb and then
to populate it with a very select team of highly skilled scientists, technicians, machinists, and administrators. The group would have to be

assembled and retained for the monumental task while no consequential suspicions were generated
among friends, family, and police about their curious and sudden absence from normal pursuits back home. Members of the bomb-building team would also have
to be utterly devoted to the cause, of course, and they would have to be willing to put their lives and certainly their careers at high risk, because after their bomb
was discovered or exploded they would probably become the targets of an intense worldwide dragnet operation . Some observers have insisted
that it would be easy for terrorists to assemble a crude bomb if they could get enough fissile material.
But Christoph Wirz and Emmanuel Egger, two senior physicists in charge of nuclear issues at Switzerlands Spiez

Laboratory, bluntly conclude that the task could hardly be accomplished by a subnational group. They
point out that precise blueprints are required, not just sketches and general ideas, and that even with a good blueprint

the terrorist group would most certainly be forced to redesign. They also stress that the work is
difficult, dangerous, and extremely exacting, and that the technical requirements in several fields
verge on the unfeasible. Stephen Younger, former director of nuclear weapons research at Los Alamos Laboratories, has made a similar argument,
pointing out that uranium is exceptionally difficult to machine whereas plutonium is one of the most

complex metals ever discovered, a material whose basic properties are sensitive to exactly how it is processed. Stressing the daunting
problems associated with material purity, machining, and a host of other issues, Younger concludes, to think that a terrorist group,

working in isolation with an unreliable supply of electricity and little access to tools and supplies
could fabricate a bomb is farfetched at best. Under the best circumstances, the process of making a
bomb could take months or even a year or more, which would, of course, have to be carried out in
utter secrecy. In addition, people in the area, including criminals, may observe with increasing curiosity and puzzlement the constant coming and going of
technicians unlikely to be locals. If the effort to build a bomb was successful, the finished product, weighing a ton

or more, would then have to be transported to and smuggled into the relevant target country where it
would have to be received by collaborators who are at once totally dedicated and technically proficient at handling, maintaining, detonating, and perhaps
assembling the weapon after it arrives. The financial costs of this extensive and extended operation could easily
become monumental. There would be expensive equipment to buy, smuggle, and set up and people to pay or pay off. Some operatives might work for
free out of utter dedication to the cause, but the vast conspiracy also requires the subversion of a considerable array of criminals and opportunists, each of whom
has every incentive to push the price for cooperation as high as possible. Any
criminals competent and capable enough to be
effective allies are also likely to be both smart enough to see boundless opportunities for extortion
and psychologically equipped by their profession to be willing to exploit them. Those who warn about the likelihood
of a terrorist bomb contend that a terrorist group could, if with great difficulty, overcome each obstacle and that doing so in each case is not impossible. But
although it may not be impossible to surmount each individual step, the likelihood that a group could surmount a series of them quickly becomes vanishingly small.
Table 1 attempts to catalogue the barriers that must be overcome under the scenario considered most likely to be successful. In contemplating
the
task before them, would-be atomic terrorists would effectively be required to go though an exercise
that looks much like this. If and when they do, they will undoubtedly conclude that their prospects are daunting and accordingly uninspiring or even
terminally dispiriting. It is possible to calculate the chances for success. Adopting
probability estimates that purposely and heavily
bias the case in the terrorists favorfor example, assuming the terrorists have a 50% chance of overcoming
each of the 20 obstaclesthe chances that a concerted effort would be successful comes out to be less than one
in a million. If one assumes, somewhat more realistically, that their chances at each barrier are one in three,
the cumulative odds that they will be able to pull off the deed drop to one in well over three billion.

No means or motive for nuclear terror their authors are hacks.

Weiss 2015 (Leonard, visiting scholar at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at
Stanford University, USA, and a member of the National Advisory Board of the Center for Arms Control
and Non-Proliferation, On fear and nuclear terrorism, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 2015, Vol. 71(2)
7587 )

There is clearly some risk of nuclear terrorism via theft of weapons, but the risk is low, and a successful theft
of a nuclear weapon would likely require a team of insiders working within an otherwise highly secure
environment. There is also some risk that a nuclear-armed country might use a terrorist group to
launch a nuclear attack on an adversary. This possibility is also of low probability, because the sponsor
country would almost inevitably risk nuclear annihilation itself. Finally, a terrorist group might try to
design and build its own weapon, possibly with the help of disaffected persons from a weapon state who might provide them with
nuclear know-how and/or materials. Given all the steps needed to achieve a weapon that is workable with high
probability without being discovered and without suffering an accident this scenario is also fraught
with risk for the terrorists. As a result, terrorists are much more likely to try to achieve their aims
using conventional weapons, which are cheaper, safer, and technically more reliable. Thus, while no
one can discount completely the acquisition by a terrorist group of a nuclear explosive weapon, such
an event appears to be of very low probability over the next decade at least, and can be made still lower using techniques or
policies that do not require constitutionally problematic steps by the federal government or an optional war whose death rate could match or
exceed what the terrorists are capable of. Thereis a tendency on the part of security policy advocates to hype
security threats to obtain support for their desired policy outcomes. They are free to do so in a democratic society,
and most come by their advocacy through genuine conviction that a real security threat is receiving insufficient attention. But there is now
enough evidence of how such advocacy has been distorted for the purpose of overcoming political
opposition to policies stemming from ideology that careful public exposure and examination of data
on claimed threats should be part of any such debate. Until this happens, the most appropriate attitude
toward claimed threats of nuclear terrorism, especially when accompanied by advocacy of policies intruding on individual
freedom, should be one of skepticism. Interestingly, while all this attention to nuclear terrorism goes on, the United States and
other nuclear nations have no problem promoting the use of nuclear power and national nuclear programs (only for friends, of course) that end
up creating more nuclear materials that can be used for weapons. The use of civilian nuclear programs to disguise national weapon ambitions
has been a hallmark of proliferation history ever since the Atoms for Peace program (Sokolski, 2001), suggesting that the real nuclear threat
resides where it always has resided in national nuclear programs; but placing the threat where it properly belongs does not carry the public-
relations frisson currently attached to the word terrorism.
AT: Solvency
 1NC Say No
China says no cant meet TPP standards and politically unfeasible
Chris Russell 16, journalist, 3/21/2016, Standing Apart from the Trans Pacific Partnership, CKSGSB
Knowledge, http://knowledge.ckgsb.edu.cn/2016/03/21/finance-and-investment/international-
trade/standing-apart-from-the-trans-pacific-partnership/

In fact, this
vexing question of reform also touches upon the issue of whether China could join even if it
wanted to. To begin with, many of the provisions of the TPP are onerous, particularly for China. "IP
protection, environmental and labor protection, and also the provisions on state-owned enterprises
those provisions are definitely targeting China,' says Du. "They are actually written with China in mind I

think to some extent:' Amongst these include requirements for countries to allow independent labor unions
here Vietnam and its one-party system may well prove to be an interesting test case from a Chinese perspectivewhile digital trade provisions
prevent signatories from demanding that companies house their servers and data locally and reveal source code. The latter was a contentious
aspect of regulations approved in late 2014 concerning the sale of computer equipment to Chinese banks. An even bigger barrier to
Chinese involvement are requirements in those areas, particularly the ones now dominated by SOEs,
that are amongst the most politically sensitive in China and so would require expending a great deal
of political capital in order to get approved domestically. "They may be simply unable to do it, or rather it might cost so much politically
that in terms of internal political balance they think, 'It's just not worth that much to go and provoke, as it were, a
putsch just to avoid a few tariffs'," says Young. With the gap between China's current economic situation and the goals of TPP so
wide, it won't be signing on to the TTP any time soon both Du and Kennedy rule out any movement in
this area within the next five years.
 2NC Say No AT: Motivations
China says no provisions were written with Chinese exclusion in mind meeting
standards is unadvantageous and would require a lot of political armtwisting thats
Russell

Feasibility outweighs self-interest benefits may be obvious but the consensus is to

reject it
Gordon G. Chang 15, JD, Cornell Law, 10/6/2015, TPP vs. RCEP: America and China Battle for Control of
Pacific Trade, National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/tpp-vs-rcep-america-china-battle-
control-pacific-trade-14021?page=2

The truth is that Chinas leaders know their country has to remain outside the TPP because they cannot
sign onto the high standards that are incorporated into the structure of the pact. Even if China
could somehow meet labor, food safety and environmental rules, it would have to adhere to
restrictions on the business activities of state enterprises, which would mean a fundamental change in
the Chinese economic model and permit wider internet access, which would strike at the heart of the
Communist Partys quasi-monopoly on information. Furthermore, China would have to further open its services sector.
At the moment, Beijing cannot even agree to allow investment in a few protected areas, which has
stalled agreement on the long-awaited Bilateral Investment Treaty with the U.S. Liberalization would be good
for China: a bonanza awaits Beijing should it decide to make the reforms necessary for TPP inclusion. In a 2014 study, Peter Petri of Brandeis
University, Michael Plummer of John Hopkins and Fan Zhai of China Investment Corp. estimate China, if it were to join TPP, could reap income
gains of $809 billion by 2025. If it fails to do so, however, it might lose over $46 billion by that year. This should not be a mystery to Chinese
leaders. Their country reaped large gains after it joined the World Trade Organization in December 2001, due mostly to the reforms required by
its accession agreement. The big story is that today, despite
the obvious benefits of being a signatory to the Trans-
Pacific Partnership agreement, there is no longer a consensus in Beijing to accept liberalizing change.
In fact, there is a consensus to reject it. Many people say Chinese President Xi Jinping is trying to
reform China, but that is misleading. Its true hes responsible for the issuance of an impressive
restructuring plan in November 2013 at the Communist Partys Third Plenum, but since then there has
been little implementation.
 2NC Say NoGaps
China says no too many gaps in understanding between it and TPP members
Bala Ramasamy 16, Professor of Economics at the China Europe International Business School,
University of Nottingham, 4/19/2016, Why China could never sign on to the Trans-Pacific Partnership
http://blogs.nottingham.ac.uk/chinapolicyinstitute/2016/04/19/why-china-could-never-sign-on-to-the-
trans-pacific-partnership/
But are those opportunities enough to get past the hurdles? Since the TPP is an agreement involving both emerging and advanced economies, it
has to be more complex than those between economies at the same level of development; and it has to have sufficient room for bargaining. If
China had chosen to be part of the TPP, the negotiations would have been slow and perhaps would not have
ended with an agreement because of the many sensitive issues involved. Some of the main stumbling blocks
include state-owned enterprises, transparency, labour regulation, market-based competition and
investor state disputes. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) The TPP requires that no subsidies should be provided
to an SOE for its international business expansion. The goal: to ensure competition between an SOE and a private enterprise takes place on
a level playing field inside the host country. But Chinas 150,000 SOEs form the bedrock of the Chinese economy
and therefore have certain privileges. About a thousand SOEs are listed in the Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchanges,
indicating they are commercial in nature. More than 150 of these are managed by the central SASAC, and the list includes some of the largest
companies in the world. The Chinese government assists these SOEs in various ways, including preferential interest rates. Although there have
been exceptions under the TPP (for example New Zealand was able to get exemptions for its powerful cooperative Fonterra), it would have
been an uphill battle for China to negotiate exemptions for so many of its SOEs engaged in various international operations within TPP member
countries. Transparency and anti-corruption The TPP commits partners to writing and enforcing anti-bribery laws. It can be argued that
enforcement would have been a challenge for China. In
Transparency Internationals Corruption Perception index,
which ranks countries based on the degree of corruption in the public sector, only two TPP countries
ranked below China in 2014 Vietnam and Mexico. Although one can argue that membership in the
TPP could raise the bar for Chinas efforts at eradicating corruption, the gap between China and
important partners (the US and Japan) is significant. The TPP could have been yet another platform for critics to accuse
China of lacklustre anti-corruption efforts. Labour The inclusion of labour issues in an FTA is rare since labour rights are considered domestic
issues and interference by external parties jeopardises the sovereignty of individual members. In this regard, the TPP can be considered bold.
The chapter on labour would have been a contentious issue between China and the US. For example
Chinas labour laws, while allowing freedom of association, require all trade unions to be affiliated
with the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, which is an agency of the Chinese Communist Party.
The agreement, meanwhile, requires TPP partners to adopt a legal framework that upholds
fundamental labour rights as recognised by the International Labour Organization.
 1NC No TPP
Wont pass bipartisan opposition and election kills momentum
Muftiah McCartin 16, JD, Georgetown Law, 1/21/2016, Whats Next for TPP: Will Congress Ratify in
2016?, Covington, https://www.globalpolicywatch.com/2016/01/whats-next-for-tpp-will-congress-
ratify-in-2016/

While TPA was a major victory for the President, achieving a vote on the international trade deal before he leaves
office will be another uphill battle . Similar to the TPA vote, trade agreements typically rely heavily on Republican support for
passage. TPP
has been unpopular among many Congressional Democrats, who staunchly believe the
trade deal will have a negative impact on American jobs and wages. Securing TPP approval from the
Republican majority will require the Administration to resolve several outstanding issues over
controversial portions of the trade agreement from key GOP members, including Congressional Leadership. For example, Senate
Majority leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) opposes the agreements exclusion of tobacco products from the investor-state dispute settlement
mechanism; Senate Finance Committee Chairman Orrin Hatch (R-UT) wants stronger language on market exclusivity for biologics; and House
Ways and Means Trade Subcommittee Chairman Dave Reichert (R-WA) opposes the rules that prohibit countries from preventing the free flow
of data or forcing local storage of data because they fail to cover financial data. The
Administration will have a difficult time
maneuvering these and other specific issues without completely unravelling the years of negotiations
with other TPP partners. Outstanding issues could be addressed through side agreements, which are difficult to achieve because they
involve additional obligations that must be accepted by all TPP countries after the original agreement has already been signed. These issues
could also be addressed by side letters, which are common to trade agreements and are used to clarify specific issues. More commonly, the
Administration has addressed issues in its implementation and enforcement plan, and some Members of Congress have even relied on informal
commitments from the Administration to address issues, a difficult task under strained relations between the President and Congress. The
path forward on these specific issues is unclear, but in the event of their resolution the Administration
will need to work with Congress to reach an agreement on the text of the implementing bill. Pre-
agreement on the legislation is essential if the implementing bill is to receive TPAs fast-track consideration through the House and Senate.
This process will likely include hearings and mock markups by the relevant congressional
committees. According to House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Kevin Brady (R-TX) hearings may begin as early as February.
Although the Obama Administration has not identified a specific time-frame for submission of the implementing bill, it has
indicated it would like to submit the bill in July of this year, before Congress adjourns mid-July for the
two national party conventions scheduled this summer. Timing of the implementing bills submission is key, as formal
submission will trigger a series of deadlines for Congressional action, ultimately requiring Congress to act within 90 legislative days.
Relevant Congressional Committee staff seem to disagree with the July timing. They have reported that while
they are making a deliberate attempt neither rushing nor obstructing to work through outstanding TPP issues, they do not believe that
these issues can be resolved by the summer. Even if the outstanding issues could be resolved and an
implementing bill drafted by July, the timing of the formal submission will remain sensitive as some
Members will be reticent to vote for a trade agreement so close to the November election, where the
vote can play into Presidential and Congressional primary and general election politics. Opposition to
TPP from high-profile Presidential candidates in both parties has further politicized the debate over the trade
agreement. All three Democratic Presidential candidates, Hilary Clinton, Bernie Sanders, and Martin OMalley, have come out against TPP
and the leading Republican Presidential candidate Donald Trump has blasted the trade deal. A lack of support for TPP from potential
presidential nominees (who may be at the top of the ticket in November) makes it all the more difficult for incumbent congressional
Republicans and pro-trade Democrats to publicly support and vote for a trade agreement during election season.
 2NC No TPP
TPP wont pass opposition from both sides requires resolving controversial issues
that unravel negotiations Obamas negotiating fails because of election pressures
that outweigh members willingness to position-take and cooperate thats McMartin

Wont pass domestically growing opposition to trade liberalization

Vinod K. Aggarwal 16, Professor of Political Science at Berkeley, March 2016, Mega-FTAs and the
Trade-Security Nexus: The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership (RCEP), East-West Center,
http://www.eastwestcenter.org/system/tdf/private/api123_0.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=35584
Trade negotiations have often reflected both security and economic interests. The GATT, in particular, had important security overtones given
the Cold War context. The bilateral FTAs concluded by the Bush Administration in the 2000s were often created with a clear political and
security intent.18 What differs in this case is that the growing
domestic opposition to trade liberalization has made
selling the TPP very difficult, leading to reliance on oversold strategic claims about the US-China
relationship and broader security concerns in the Pacific.19 In May 2015, a letter from seven former defense secretaries
and ten top military leaders to the House noted: China is already pursuing an alternative regional free trade initiative. TPP, combined with TTIP
[the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership], would allow the United States and our closest allies to help shape the rules and standards
for global trade.20 In concluding, the letter argued: The stakes are clear. There are tremendous strategic benefits to TPP and TTIP, and there
would be harmful strategic consequences if we fail to secure these agreements. In both Asia-Pacific and the Atlantic, our allies and partners
would question our commitments, doubt our resolve, and inevitably look to other partners. Americas prestige, influence, and leadership are on
the line. Current Secretary of Defense Ashton has also emphasized this strategic theme. As he put it: [Y]ou may not expect to hear this from a
Secretary of Defense, but in terms of our rebalance in the broadest sense, passing TPP is as important to me as another aircraft carrier.21
What has been the Chinese reaction to these claims, both economic and security, about balancing against China? Although Chinese academics
and commentators have claimed that the United States is pushing the TPP to contain China,22 Chinese officials have been more measured in
their response. For example, Foreign Ministry spokesman Lu Kang made a statement telling nations not to politicize trade and economic
issues23 and President Xi Jinping at the November 2015 APEC meeting argued that its members should make free trade arrangements open
and inclusive to the extent possible with a view to enhancing economic openness in our region and upholding the multilateral trading
regime.24 Yet with
the US election season underway and with Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton and
the leading Republican contenders already opposing the TPP, passage is not likely to be easy. The
temptation to frame the TPP in economic and strategic balance of power terms in an effort to pass it
may thus divert attention from the specifics of the agreement.