GR No L-35377-78 July 31, 1975

PEOPLE, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CAMILO PILOTIN, et.al, defendants-appellants.

Vincent Crisologo through counsel filed a verified motion praying for the transfer to the New
Bilibid Prisons or, alternatively, to Camps Crame, Aguinaldo or Olivas, of the place of trial of
Criminal Case No. 3949 of the Mun Court of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, wherein he, as sole
defendant, is charged with illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions.

As justificatory ground, he alleged that his life would be in jeopardy if he were to be

confined in the Vigan municipal jail during the trial because there are many political enemies
of the Crisologo family in that vicinity; some of the adherents of the Crisologos had in fact
been murdered in Ilocos Sur, and his father, Congressman Floro Crisologo, was shot to
death while hearing mass at the Vigan cathedral.

Asked to comment on the motion, the Provincial Fiscal of Ilocos Sur signified his conformity
to the transfer of the venue of the trial to the New Bilibid Prisons.

Section 5(4), Art X of the Constitution expressly empowers this Court to "order a change of
venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice". Here, what is involved is not merely
a miscarriage of justice but the personal safety of movant Crisologo, the accused. It would
be absurd to compel him to undergo trial in a place where his life would be imperilled.

Present hostile sentiment against the accused at the place of trial is a justification for
transfer of venue

We find Crisologo's motion to be meritorious. The change of venue involves not

merely the change of the place of hearing but also the transfer of the expediente of Criminal
Case No. 3949 to another court. According to Crisologo's motion, the alleged evidence
against him is in the custody of the authorities at Camp Crame, Quezon City. The transfer of
Criminal Case No. 3949 to the City Court of Quezon City and the holding of the trial at Camp
Crame appear to be the most convenient arrangement.

WHEREFORE, the Mun Court of Vigan is directed to transfer the record of Criminal Case No.
3949 to the City Court of Quezon City where it should be re-docketed and raffled to any
Judge thereof. The case may be tried at Camp Crame.

G.R. No. L-56158-64 March 17, 1981

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
MAYOR PABLO SOLA, et.al respondents.

The power of this Tribunal, constitutionally mandated, 1 to order a change of venue to avoid
any miscarriage of justice as well as the procedure ordained in the implementation of the
right to bail are involved in this petition which, even if not so denominated, partakes of the
nature of a certiorari. It must have been the zeal of private prosecutors Francisco Cruz and
Renecio Espiritu, no doubt under the conviction that there was no time to lose, that must
have led them to devote less than that full measure of attention to certain fundamentals.
They ignored the principle that the responsibility for the conduct of the prosecution is with
the public officials concerned. Nonetheless, the importance of the questions raised, the need
for a change of venue and the cancellation of the bail bonds, necessitated that further action
be taken. Accordingly, in a resolution dated February 12, 1981, one day after the filing of
the petition, the Court required the comment of the Solicitor General as well as of the
private respondents, the accused in six pending criminal cases before the CFI of Neg Occ.

On March 4, 1981, the Comment was submitted by Solicitor General Mendoza. It opened
with this preliminary statement: "The present petition was filed by the private prosecutors in
Criminal Cases Nos. 1700-1706, People v. Pablo Sola, et al., pending trial before the CFI of
Neg Occ. Rightly, any petition before this Honorable Court on behalf of PEOPLE can, under
the law, be instituted only by the Solicitor General. The assertion of the petitioner private
prosecutors that they are instituting the action 'subject to the control and supervision of the
Fiscal' will not, therefore, improve their legal standing." Nonetheless, it did not press the
legal point but instead adopted "the two-pronged trusts of the petition: 1. the setting aside,
by certiorari, of the order of the Mun Court of Kabankalan, presided over by Judge Rafael
Gasataya, granting bail to the accused in the criminal cases mentioned above, and 2. the
petition for a change of venue or place of trial of the same criminal cases to avoid a
miscarriage of justice. 7

The facts were therein narrated thus: "On September 15, 1980, acting on the evidence
presented by the PC commander at Hinigaran, Neg Occ, the CFI of that province issued a
search warrant for the search and seizure of tile deceased bodies of seven persons believed
in the possession of the accused Pablo Sola in his hacienda at Sta. Isabel, Kabankalan, Neg
Occ. * * * On September 16, 1980 armed with the above warrant, elements of the of the
332nd PC/INP Company proceeded to the place of Sola. Diggings made in a canefield
yielded two common graves containing the bodies of Fernando Fernandez, Mateo Olimpos,
Alfredo Perez, Custodio Juanica, Arsolo Juanica, Rollie Callet and Bienvenido Emperado. On
September 23 and October 1, 1980, the PC provincial commander of Neg Occ filed seven (7)
separate complaints for murder against the accused Pablo Sola, Francisco Garcia, Ricardo
Garcia, Jose Bethoven Cabral, Florendo Baliscao and fourteen (14) other persons of
unknown names. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 4129, 4130, 4131, 4137,
4138, 4139 and 4140 of the Mun Court of Kabankalan. After due preliminary examination of
the complainant's witnesses and his other evidence, the Mun Court found probable cause
against the accused. It thus issued an order for their a. rest. However, without giving the
prosecution the opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong, the
court granted them the right to post bail for their temporary release. The accused Pablo
Sola, Francisco Garcia, and Jose Bethoven Cabral availed themselves of this right and have
since been released from detention. In a parallel development, the witnesses in the murder
cases informed the prosecution of their fears that if the trial is held at the CFI branch in
Himamaylan which is but 10 kilometers from Kabankalan, their safety could be jeopardized.
At least two of the accused are officials with power and influence in Kabankalan and they
have been released on bail. In addition, most of the accused remained at large. Indeed,
there have been reports made to police authorities of threats made on the families of the
witnesses." 8 The facts alleged argue strongly for the remedies sought, namely a change of
venue and the cancellation of the bail bonds.

On the very next day, March 15, 1981, this Court issued the following resolution: "The Court
Resolved to: (a) [Note] the comment of the Solicitor General on the urgent petition for
change of venue and cancellation of bail bonds, adopting the plea of the petition, namely,
(1) the setting aside, by certiorari, of the order of the Mun Court of Kabankalan, presided
over by Judge Rafael Gasataya, granting bail to the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 4129-
4140, all entitled "PEOPLE v. Mayor Pablo Sola. et al."; (2) the petition for a change of
venue or place of trial of the same criminal cases to avoid a miscarriage of Justice; (b)
[Transfer] the venue of the aforesaid criminal cases to Branch V of the CFI of Neg Occ at
Bacolod City, presided by Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio, considering that District Judge
Ostervaldo Emilia of the CFI, Neg Occ, Branch VI at Himamaylan has an approved leave of
absence covering the period from January 12 to March 12, 1981 due to a mild attack of
cerebral thrombosis and that the said Branch V is the nearest court station to Himamaylan:
and (c) [Await] the comment of respondents on the petition to cancel bail, without prejudice
to the public officials concerned taking the necessary measures to assure the safety of the
witnesses of the prosecution." 9 Thus, the issue of a change of venue has become moot and
academic. The comments respectively submitted by respondent Florendo Baliscao on March
5, 1981, respondent Francisco Garcia on March 11, 1981 and respondent Pablo Sola on
March 16, 1981, dealt solely with the question of the cancellation of the bail bonds. Such
comments were considered as answers, with the case thereafter deemed submitted for
decision.

The sole remaining issue of the cancellation of the bail bonds of respondents, there being a
failure to abide by the basic requirement that the prosecution be heard in a case where the
accused is charged with a capital offense, prior to bail being granted, must be decided in
favor of petitioner. The bail bonds must be cancelled and the case remanded to the sala of
Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio for such hearing. So we rule.

1. It may not be amiss to say a few words on the question of transferring the place of trial,
in this case, from Himamaylan to Bacolod City. The Constitution is quite explicit. The
Supreme Court could order "a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of
justice." 10 The Constitutional Convention of 1971 wisely incorporated the ruling in the
landmark decision of People v. Gutierrez, 11 where Justice J. B. L. Reyes
as ponente vigorously and categorically affirmed: "In the particular case before Us, to
compel the prosecution to proceed to trial in a locality where its witnesses will not be at
liberty to reveal what they know is to make a mockery of the judicial process, and to betray
the very purpose for which courts have been established." 12 Why a change of venue is
imperative was made clear in the Comment of the Solicitor General. Thus: "The exercise by
this Honorable Court of its above constitutional power in this case will be appropriate. The
witnesses in the case are fearful for their lives. They are afraid they would be killed on their
way to or from Himamaylan during any of the days of trial. Because of fear, they may either
refuse to testify or testimony falsely to save their lives. Respondent Florendo Baliscao was
not averse to such transfer, but his preference is for a court anywhere in Metro
Manila. Respondent Francisco Garcia confined his comment to the question of the
cancellation of the bail bonds. Respondent Pablo Sola made clear that he had "no objection
to the transfer. 15 It may be added that there may be cases where the fear, objectively
viewed, may, to some individuals, be less than terrifying, but the question must always be
the effect it has on the witnesses who will testify. The primordial aim and intent of the
Constitution must ever be kept in mind. In case of doubt, it should be resolved in favor of a
change of venue. As a matter of fact, there need not be a petition of this character filed
before this Court. Such a plea could have been done administratively. In this particular case,
however, there is justification for the procedure followed in view of the fact that along with
the change of venue, the cancellation of the bail bonds was also sought.

2. Equally so the cancellation of the bail bonds is more than justified. Bail was granted to
the accused in the Order of the Mun Court without hearing the prosecution That is to
disregard the authoritative doctrine enunciated in People v. San Diego. 16 As pointed out by
Justice Capistrano, speaking for the Court: "The question presented before us is, whether
the prosecution was deprived of procedural due process. The answer is in the affirmative.
We are of the considered opinion that whether the motion for bail of a defendant who is in
custody for a capital offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a
regular trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable
time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court should resolve the
motion for bail. If, as in the criminal case involved in the instant special civil action, the
prosecution should be denied such an opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural
due process, and the order of the court granting bail should be considered void on that
ground." 17 These words of Justice Cardozo come to mind: "The law, as we have seen, is
sedulous in maintaining for a defendant charged with crime whatever forms of procedure
are of the essence of an opportunity to defend. Privileges so fundamental as to be inherent
in every concept of a fair trial that could be acceptable to the thought of reasonable men
will be kept inviolate and inviolable, however crushing may be the pressure of incriminating
proof. But justice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser also. The concept of
fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the balance
true." This norm which is of the very essence of due process as the embodiment of justice
requires that the prosecution be given the opportunity to prove that there is strong evidence
of guilt. It does not suffice, as asserted herein, that the questions asked by the municipal
judge before bail was granted could be characterized as searching. That fact did not cure an
infirmity of a jurisdictional character. 19

WHEREFORE, the assailed order of Judge Rafael Gasataya granting bail to private
respondents is nullified, set aside, and declared to be without force and effect.

G.R. No. L-5221 October 27, 1952

BENITO FERRER Y RODRIGUEZ, petitioner,

vs.
POTENCIANO PECSON, Judge of the CFI of Manila and THE PEOPLE, respondents.

On March 1, 1949, the petitioner Benito Ferrer Y Rodriguez was accused before the Mun
Court of Manila of serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence under criminal case
No. 10050 of said court. The complaint alleged that on February 2, 1949, in the City of
Manila, petitioner, driver of a jeepney, operated it along Dapitan Street in a careless,
reckless and imprudent manner as a result of which said jeepney driven by him sideswiped
another jeepney thereby causing a collision, inflicting on a passenger named Avelino Tiu
physical injuries of fracture compound, communited, middle third, humerus left; fracture
compound, communited, neck, radius, left, fracture, simple, middle third, radius, ulna left,
which injuries have required and will require medical attendance for a period of from six (6)
to eight (8) months and have prevented and will prevent the said offended party from
engaging in his customary labor during the same period of time. After trial the Mun Court of
Manila found him guilty and sentenced him to three (3) months of arresto mayor. Defendant
appealed the case to the CFI of Manila.

On November 27, 1950, petitioner through counsel filed a motion to dismiss the case on the
ground that the Mun Court of Manila had no jurisdiction over the offense and, consequently,
the CFI had no appellate jurisdiction. The motion to dismiss was denied by Judge
Potenciano Pecson presiding over the CFI, but upon motion for reconsideration, the same
judge in his order of June 6, 1951 (Annex D), granted the motion for reconsideration and
dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. On a motion for reconsideration filed by the Fiscal,
Judge Pecson in his order dated August 29, 1951 (Annex E), revoked his order of June 6,
1951 (Annex D) and declared his first order of December 14, 1950, denying the motion to
dismiss as in force. Counsel for defendant Ferrer asked for a reconsideration of this order
and upon denial of his motion by order of the respondent judge dated October 31, 1951
(Annex I), has filed the present petition for certiorari to revoked the order of August 29,
1951 (Annex E), and to reinstate the order of June 6, 1951 (Annex D).

After a careful study of this case, we are inclined to agree with the petitioner. The
jurisdiction of the court to try a criminal case is to be determined by the law at the time of
the institution of the action, (People vs. Pegarum, 58 Phil., 715). At the time that the
complaint in this case was filed on March 1, 1949, in the Mun Court of Manila, the law
penalizing the act imputed to the petitioner was the Revised Motor Vehicle Law (Act No.
3932), section 67 of which provides that if as a result of negligence or reckless or
unreasonably fast driving any accident occurs resulting in death or serious bodily injury to
any person, the one responsible upon conviction shall be punished by imprisonment for not
less than fifteen (15) days nor more than six (6) years in the discretion of the court.

According to a series of cases decided by this court, among them that of Eustaquio vs.
Liwag (86 Phil., 540) and People vs. Moreno (60 Phil., 712), an act of negligence or reckless
or unreasonably fast driving resulting in death or serious physical injuries to any person,
should be prosecuted under section 67 of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law and not under the
RPC.

The criminal jurisdiction of a justice of the peace or a Mun Court as defined in the Judiciary
Act of 1948 approved in June 1948, is confined to offenses in which the penalty is not more
than six (6) months. From this it is clear that the Mun Court of Manila had no jurisdiction
over this case where a maximum penalty of six (6) years may be imposed; and if it had no
original jurisdiction, the CFI presided over by Judge Pecson had likewise no appellate
jurisdiction.

It is true that section 67 of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law (Act No. 3932) was amended by
section 16 of RANo. 587 which went into effect on January 1, 1951, in the sense that acts of
negligence or reckless or unreasonably fast driving resulting in death or serious bodily injury
upon any person shall be prosecuted and punished under the provisions of the RPC. But this
act may not be given retroactive effect so as to confer on the Mun Court jurisdiction which
it did not have when it tried and decided the case against petitioner. It may be true that the
provisions of the penal code are more favorable to the petitioner in this case as regards the
penalty, but when the very accused (herein petitioner) far from invoking the benefits of said
RANo. 587, disregards it and instead, invokes the Revised Motor Vehicle Law (Act No. 3932)
which was in force at the time that the acts imputed to him were committed, at least for
that reason alone the question of retroactivity cannot and will not be considered.

Respondents contend that under the Judiciary Act of 1948 as well as the Charter of the City
of Manila, the Mun Court of Manila is given jurisdiction to try criminal cases of assaults
where the intent to kill is not evident from the evidence, regardless of the penalty attached
to the crime. But it is obvious that acts of negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle
which cause a collision and result in physical injuries can hardly be regarded as assaults
without the intent to kill.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for certiorari is hereby granted and the order of
respondent judge of June 6, 1951 (Annex D) dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction is
hereby reinstated. No costs.
 EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. L-8820 & L-8821. May 25, 1956.]
MARCIAL PUNZALAN, Petitioner-Appellant, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent-Appellee.

We are asked to review on certiorari the decision of the CA in these two cases, which were
decided together by said Court, on the principal ground that the CFI of Quezon Province
which tried the case had no original jurisdiction and, consequently, the CA had no appellate
jurisdiction over the crime charged.
The above two cases were commenced in the CFI of Quezon Province, Marcial Punzalan
being the accused in both cases. In Case No. 11041, the offended party is Moises Escueta,
and in Case No. 11041, the complainant is Isidro Capino. The information in Case No. 11041
is of the same tenor as that in Case No. 11041, with the difference as to the offended party.
Said information reads as follows:.
The undersigned, Provincial Fiscal, accuses Marcial Punzalan of the crime of maltreatment
with physical injuries, defined and punished under Art 235 in connection with Art 266 of the
RPC, committed as follows:.
That on or about the 14th day of November, 1951, in the Municipality of Tiaong, Province
of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Hon. Court, the said accused, being
the Municipal Mayor of said municipality, taking advantage of his official position as such,
without any justifiable motive, and with evident purpose of extorting confession from one
Moises Escueta, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously illtreat the latter, by
then and there assaulting, beating and striking the abdomen, face, breast and arms with an
Automatic Pistol, caliber .45 and his fist, while said Moises Escueta was kept in the Camp of
the Phil. Ground Force (PGF) located in the said municipality, thereby causing injuries in the
different parts of his body which required medical attendance for a period of seven (7) days,
and incapacitated the said offended party from performing his customary labor for the same
period of time.
After joint trial, the Appellant was found guilty of slight physical injuries only, and sentenced
to suffer 30 days of arresto menor with the accessory penalties of the law, and to pay the
costs.
During the trial, the Defendant moved to quash the information on the ground that the
allegations contained therein do not constitute the crime of maltreatment of prisoners, and
that whatever offenses are charged therein do not fall within the jurisdiction of the TC.
The TC, in its decision, denied the motion to quash, but acquitted the Appellant of
maltreatment of prisoners with physical injuries as defined and penalized in Art 235 in
connection with Art 266 of the RPC, and convicted him of slight physical injuries under
paragraph 1 of Art 266 of said Code, sentencing him in each of the two cases to 30 days of
arresto menor.
The Defendant appealed to the CA, which found him guilty of grave coercion, and,
compensating the aggravating circumstance of abuse of authority with the mitigating
circumstance of passion and obfuscation, sentenced him to suffer 2 months and 21 days of
arresto mayor to pay a fine of P150 with the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency and to pay the costs.
In this Court, the Appellant contends that the CFI had no jurisdiction over the crime alleged
in the information, and, consequently, the CA had no appellate jurisdiction and asks for his
acquittal with costs de oficio.
The question at issue is whether the CFI had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case in
view of the allegations of the information.
The first paragraph of the complaint accuses the Appellant of a violation of Art 235 in
connection with Art 266 of the RPC. Under Art 235, it is necessary that the maltreated
prisoner be under the charge of the officer maltreating him. There is no such allegation in
the information above quoted. The prisoners, Moises Escueta and Isidro Capino, according
to the information, were simply kept in the Camp of the Philippine Ground Force in the
municipality of Tiaong; but it is not alleged therein that they were under the charge of
Punzalan as Mayor of Tiaong. Hence, one of the essential elements of the offense under Art
235 was lacking. Had that allegation been made in the information, the punishment being
arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correcional in its minimum period, the CFI of
Quezon Province would have had jurisdiction, and, consequently, the CA , appellate
jurisdiction.
The allegation in the information that the physical injuries suffered by the offended party
required seven days medical attendance with incapacity to work for the same period only
qualifies the crime as slight physical injuries, which come under the jurisdiction of the justice
of the peace court and not of the CFI. However, the Appellant overlook the allegation in the
information that the maltreatment was committed by the accused with evident purpose of
extorting confession from the offended party, while the latter was kept in the Camp of the
Philippine Ground Force in Tiaong. This allegation amounts to grave coercion, which is
within the jurisdiction of the CFI, as it is punished under Art 286 of the RPC with arresto
mayor and a fine not exceeding P500.
The Appellant claims that the coercion was not consummated but frustrated only for the
reason that the offended party did not confess the crime attributed to him. This conclusion
is contrary to the doctrine laid down by this Court in U. S. vs. Cusi, 10 Phil., 413, which
says:..
Coercion. The fact that an individual was maltreated for the purpose of compelling to
confess a crime which was attributed to him, constitute the crime of consummated coercion,
even if the agents of the authorities who carried out the maltreatment did not accomplish
their purpose to draw from him a confession, which it was their intention to obtain by the
employment of such means.
This doctrine was reiterated in the case of U. S. vs. Pabalan, 37 Phil., 352, where it did not
appear that the offended party acceded to the purpose of the coercion. It is unnecessary to
say that inasmuch as the allegations in the information conferred jurisdiction on the CFI, the
fact that the accused was convicted of a lesser crime included within those allegations did
not deprive the court of its jurisdiction.
In view of the foregoing, the decision of the CAis affirmed, with costs against the Petitioner.
It is SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 158763 March 31, 2006

JOSE C. MIRANDA, et.al, Petitioners,

vs.
VIRGILIO M. TULIAO, Respondent.

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
18 December 2002 Decision 1 of the CAin CA-G.R. SP No. 67770 and its 12 June 2003
Resolution denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The dispositive portion of the
assailed decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad to have acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed
Orders, the instant petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition is hereby GRANTED
and GIVEN DUE COURSE, and it is hereby ordered:

1. The assailed Joint Order dated August 17, 2001, Order dated September 21, 2001,
Joint Order dated October 16, 2001 and Joint Order dated November 14, 2001
dismissing the two (2) Informations for Murder, all issued by public respondent
Judge Anastacio D. Anghad in Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and another entered UPHOLDING,
AFFIRMING[,] and REINSTATING the Order dated June 25, 2001 and Joint Order
dated July 6, 2001 issued by the then acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan;

2. Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby ordered REINSTATED in the
docket of active criminal cases of Branch 36 of the RTC of Santiago City, Isabela;
and

3. Public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is DIRECTED to ISSUE forthwith

Warrants of Arrest for the apprehension of private respondents Jose "Pempe"
Miranda, SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon and accused Rodel T.
Maderal in said Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524. 2

The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:

On 8 March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Purok Nibulan, Ramon, Isabela,
which were later identified as the dead bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of
private respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is now under the witness protection program.

Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1 Wilfredo Leao, SPO1 Ferdinand
Marzan, SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2 Alexander Micu, SPO2 Rodel Maderal, and SPO4
Emilio Ramirez in the RTC of Santiago City.

The venue was later transferred to Manila. On 22 April 1999, the RTC of Manila convicted all
of the accused and sentenced them to two counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2
Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at that time, being at large. The case was appealed to
this Court on automatic review where we, on 9 October 2001, acquitted the accused therein
on the ground of reasonable doubt.

Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested. On 27 April 2001, he executed a
sworn confession and identified petitioners Jose C. Miranda, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon, and SPO3
Alberto P. Dalmacio, a certain Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe, as the persons responsible
for the deaths of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao.

Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against petitioners, Boyet dela Cruz,
and Amado Doe, and submitted the sworn confession of SPO2 Maderal. On 25 June 2001,
Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest against petitioners and
SPO2 Maderal.

On 29 June 2001, petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to

reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the warrants of arrest.
In the hearing of the urgent motion on 6 July 2001, Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of
petitioners and issued a Joint Order denying said urgent motion on the ground that, since
the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be properly
heard by the court. In the meantime, petitioners appealed the resolution of State Prosecutor
Leo T. Reyes to the Department of Justice.

On 17 August 2001, the new Presiding Judge Anastacio D. Anghad took over the case and
issued a Joint Order reversing the Joint Order of Judge Tumaliuan. Consequently, he
ordered the cancellation of the warrant of arrest issued against petitioner Miranda. He
likewise applied this Order to petitioners Ocon and Dalmacio in an Order dated 21
September 2001. State Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes and respondent Tuliao moved for the
reconsideration of the said Joint Order and prayed for the inhibition of Judge Anghad, but
the motion for reconsideration was denied in a Joint Order dated 16 October 2001 and the
prayer for inhibition was denied in a Joint Order dated 22 October 2001.

On 25 October 2001, respondent Tuliao filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and
prohibition with this Court, with prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order, seeking to enjoin
Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the case, and seeking to nullify the Orders and
Joint Orders of Judge Anghad dated 17 August 2001, 21 September 2001, 16 October 2001,
and 22 October 2001.

On 12 November 2001, this Court issued a Resolution resolving to grant the prayer for a
temporary restraining order against Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the criminal
cases. Shortly after the aforesaid resolution, Judge Anghad issued a Joint Order dated 14
November 2001 dismissing the two Informations for murder against petitioners. On 19
November 2001, this Court took note of respondents cash bond evidenced by O.R. No.
15924532 dated 15 November 2001, and issued the temporary restraining order while
referring the petition to the CAfor adjudication on the merits.

Respondent Tuliao filed with this Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in Contempt,
alleging that Judge Anghad "deliberately and willfully committed contempt of court when he
issued on 15 November 2001 the Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the
informations for murder." On 21 November 2001, we referred said motion to the CAin view
of the previous referral to it of respondents petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus.

On 18 December 2002, the CArendered the assailed decision granting the petition and
ordering the reinstatement of the criminal cases in the RTC of Santiago City, as well as the
issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal. Petitioners moved for a
reconsideration of this Decision, but the same was denied in a Resolution dated 12 June
2003.

Hence, this petition.

The facts of the case being undisputed, petitioners bring forth to this Court the following
assignments of error:

FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

With all due respect, the Honorable CAgravely erred in reversing and setting aside the Joint
Order of Judge Anastacio D. Anghad dated August 17, 2001, September 21, 2001, October
16, 2001 and November 14, 2001 issued in criminal cases numbered 36-3523 and 36-3524;
and, erred in upholding, affirming and reinstating the Order dated July 6, 2001 issued by
then Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan, on the alleged rule that an accused cannot
seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court.

SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

With all due respect, the Honorable CAgravely erred in directing the reinstatement of
Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and 36-3524 in the docket of Active Criminal Cases of Branch 36
of the RTC of Santiago City, Philippines, and in ordering the public respondent to re-issue
the warrants of arrest against herein petitioners.

THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

With all due respect, the Honorable CAcommitted a reversible error in ordering the
reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 in the docket of active
criminal cases of Branch 36 of the RTC of Santiago City, Philippines, and in ordering the
public respondent to issue warrants of arrest against herein petitioners, the order of
dismissal issued therein having become final and executory.

Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither jurisdiction over the
person of the accused, nor custody of law over the body of the accused.

The first assignment of error brought forth by the petitioner deals with the CA ruling that:

[A]n accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the
jurisdiction of the court. Jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be acquired either
through compulsory process, such as warrant of arrest, or through his voluntary
appearance, such as when he surrenders to the police or to the court. It is only when the
court has already acquired jurisdiction over his person that an accused may invoke the
processes of the court (Pete M. Pico vs. Alfonso V. Combing, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-91-764,
November 6, 1992). Thus, an accused must first be placed in the custody of the law before
the court may validly act on his petition for judicial reliefs.3

Proceeding from this premise, the CAruled that petitioners Miranda, Ocon and Dalmacio
cannot seek any judicial relief since they were not yet arrested or otherwise deprived of
their liberty at the time they filed their "Urgent Motion to complete preliminary investigation;
to reinvestigate; to recall and/or quash warrants of arrest."4

Petitioners counter the finding of the CAby arguing that jurisdiction over the person of the
accused is required only in applications for bail. Furthermore, petitioners argue, assuming
that such jurisdiction over their person is required before the court can act on their motion
to quash the warrant for their arrest, such jurisdiction over their person was already
acquired by the court by their filing of the above Urgent Motion.

In arguing that jurisdiction over the person is required only in the adjudication of
applications for bail, petitioners quote Retired CAJustice Oscar Herrera:

Except in applications for bail, it is not necessary for the court to first acquire jurisdiction
over the person of the accused to dismiss the case or grant other relief. The outright
dismissal of the case even before the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
accused is authorized under Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure and the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure (Sec. 12a). In Allado vs. Diokno
(232 SCRA 192), the case was dismissed on motion of the accused for lack of probable
cause without the accused having been arrested. In Paul Roberts vs. CA(254 SCRA 307), the
Court was ordered to hold the issuance of a warrant of arrest in abeyance pending review
by the Secretary of Justice. And in Lacson vs. Executive Secretary (301 SCRA 1025), the
Court ordered the case transferred from the Sandiganbayan to the RTC which eventually
ordered the dismissal of the case for lack of probable cause.6

In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their person was already acquired by
their filing of the above Urgent Motion, petitioners invoke our pronouncement, through
Justice Florenz D. Regalado, in Santiago v. Vasquez7:

The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his
person, is accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to
quash or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the courts jurisdiction thereover,
appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the
same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot
be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities either
by his arrest or voluntary surrender.

Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the law and
jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon
the application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the
defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the accused.8 Custody of the law is accomplished either by
arrest or voluntary surrender,9 while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired
upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. 10 One can be under the custody of the law but not
yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when a person arrested
by virtue of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other
hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in
the custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody after his trial has
commenced. 11Being in the custody of the law signifies restraint on the person, who is
thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will of
the law. 12 Custody of the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It includes,
but is not limited to, detention.

The statement in Pico v. Judge Combong, Jr., 13 cited by the CAshould not have been
separated from the issue in that case, which is the application for admission to bail of
someone not yet in the custody of the law. The entire paragraph of our pronouncement in
Pico reads:

A person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody of the law or otherwise
deprived of his liberty. A person who has not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
court has no right to invoke the processes of that court. Respondent Judge should have
diligently ascertained the whereabouts of the applicant and that he indeed had jurisdiction
over the body of the accused before considering the application for bail. 13

While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it concerns bail, we clarify
that, as a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to
the jurisdiction of the court. 15 As we held in the aforecited case of Santiago, seeking an
affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary
appearance.
Pico deals with an application for bail, where there is the special requirement of the
applicant being in the custody of the law. In Feliciano v. Pasicolan, 16 we held that "[t]he
purpose of bail is to secure ones release and it would be incongruous to grant bail to one
who is free. Thus, bail is the security required and given for the release of a person who is
in the custody of law." The rationale behind this special rule on bail is that it discourages
and prevents resort to the former pernicious practice wherein the accused could just send
another in his stead to post his bail, without recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his
personal appearance therein and compliance with the requirements therefor. 17

There is, however, an exception to the rule that filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief
constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent submission of ones person to the
jurisdiction of the court. This is in the case of pleadings whose prayer is precisely for the
avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court, which only leads to a special appearance. These
pleadings are: (1) in civil cases, motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant, whether or not other grounds for dismissal are included; 18 (2)
in criminal cases, motions to quash a complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the accused; and (3) motions to quash a warrant of arrest. The first two are
consequences of the fact that failure to file them would constitute a waiver of the defense of
lack of jurisdiction over the person. The third is a consequence of the fact that it is the very
legality of the court process forcing the submission of the person of the accused that is the
very issue in a motion to quash a warrant of arrest.

To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person
of the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an
affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by
impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving special
appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of the court even though there is neither
jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the special
jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the
law.

In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the general rule applies, i.e., the
accused is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court upon seeking
affirmative relief. Notwithstanding this, there is no requirement for him to be in the custody
of the law. The following cases best illustrate this point, where we granted various reliefs to
accused who were not in the custody of the law, but were deemed to have placed their
persons under the jurisdiction of the court. Note that none of these cases involve the
application for bail, nor a motion to quash an information due to lack of jurisdiction over the
person, nor a motion to quash a warrant of arrest:

1. In Allado v. Diokno, 19 on the prayer of the accused in a petition for certiorari on the
ground of lack of probable cause, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining PACC
from enforcing the warrant of arrest and the respondent judge therein from further
proceeding with the case and, instead, to elevate the records to us.

2. In Roberts, Jr. v. CA ,20 upon the accuseds Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to Hold in
Abeyance Issuance of Warrants of Arrest on the ground that they filed a Petition for Review
with the Department of Justice, we directed respondent judge therein to cease and desist
from further proceeding with the criminal case and to defer the issuance of warrants of
arrests against the accused.
3. In Lacson v. Executive Secretary,21 on the prayer of the accused in a petition for certiorari
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Sandiganbayan, we directed the
Sandiganbayan to transfer the criminal cases to the RTC even before the issuance of the
warrants of arrest.

We hold that the circumstances forcing us to require custody of the law in applications for
bail are not present in motions to quash the warrant of arrest. If we allow the granting of
bail to persons not in the custody of the law, it is foreseeable that many persons who can
afford the bail will remain at large, and could elude being held to answer for the commission
of the offense if ever he is proven guilty. On the other hand, if we allow the quashal of
warrants of arrest to persons not in the custody of the law, it would be very rare that a
person not genuinely entitled to liberty would remain scot-free. This is because it is the
same judge who issued the warrant of arrest who will decide whether or not he followed the
Constitution in his determination of probable cause, and he can easily deny the motion to
quash if he really did find probable cause after personally examining the records of the case.

Moreover, pursuant to the presumption of regularity of official functions, the warrant

continues in force and effect until it is quashed and therefore can still be enforced on any
day and at any time of the day and night.22Furthermore, the continued absence of the
accused can be taken against him in the determination of probable cause, since flight is
indicative of guilt.

In fine, as much as it is incongruous to grant bail to one who is free, it is likewise

incongruous to require one to surrender his freedom before asserting it. Human rights enjoy
a higher preference in the hierarchy of rights than property rights,23 demanding that due
process in the deprivation of liberty must come before its taking and not after.

Quashing a warrant of arrest based on a subsequently filed petition for review with the
Secretary of Justice and based on doubts engendered by the political climate constitutes
grave abuse of discretion.

We nevertheless find grave abuse of discretion in the assailed actions of Judge Anghad.
Judge Anghad seemed a little too eager of dismissing the criminal cases against the
petitioners. First, he quashed the standing warrant of arrest issued by his predecessor
because of a subsequently filed appeal to the Secretary of Justice, and because of his
doubts on the existence of probable cause due to the political climate in the city. Second,
after the Secretary of Justice affirmed the prosecutors resolution, he dismissed the criminal
cases on the basis of a decision of this Court in another case with different accused, doing
so two days after this Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining order against further
proceeding with the case.

After Judge Tumaliuan issued warrants for the arrest of petitioners, petitioner Miranda
appealed the assistant prosecutors resolution before the Secretary of Justice. Judge
Anghad, shortly after assuming office, quashed the warrant of arrest on the basis of said
appeal. According to Judge Anghad, "x x x prudence dictates (that) and because of comity,
a deferment of the proceedings is but proper."24

Quashal on this basis is grave abuse of discretion. It is inconceivable to charge Judge

Tumaliuan as lacking in prudence and oblivious to comity when he issued the warrants of
arrest against petitioners just because the petitioners might, in the future, appeal the
assistant prosecutors resolution to the Secretary of Justice. But even if the petition for
review was filed before the issuance of the warrants of arrest, the fact remains that the
pendency of a petition for the review of the prosecutors resolution is not a ground to quash
the warrants of arrest.

In Webb v. de Leon,25 we held that the petitioners therein cannot assail as premature the
filing of the information in court against them on the ground that they still have the right to
appeal the adverse resolution of the DOJ Panel to the Secretary of Justice. Similarly, the
issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners herein should not have been quashed as
premature on the same ground.

The other ground invoked by Judge Anghad for the quashal of the warrant of arrest is in
order if true: violation of the Constitution. Hence, Judge Anghad asked and resolved the
question:

In these double murder cases, did this Court comply or adhere to the above-quoted
constitutional proscription, which is Sec. 2, Art III Bill of Rights; to Sec. 6(a), Rule 112,
Rules of Criminal Procedure and to the above-cited decisional cases? To this query or issue,
after a deep perusal of the arguments raised, this Court, through [its] regular Presiding
Judge, finds merit in the contention of herein accused-movant, Jose "Pempe" Miranda.26

Judge Anghad is referring to the following provision of the Constitution as having been
violated by Judge Tumaliuan:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.27

However, after a careful scrutiny of the records of the case, including the supporting
evidence to the resolution of the prosecutor in his determination of probable cause, we find
that Judge Anghad gravely abused his discretion.

According to petitioners:

In this case, the nullity of the order of Judge Tumaliuan, for the arrest of the petitioners is
apparent from the face of the order itself, which clearly stated that the determination of
probable cause was based on the certification, under oath, of the fiscal and not on a
separate determination personally made by the Judge. No presumption of regularity could
be drawn from the order since it expressly and clearly showed that it was based only on the
fiscals certification.28

Petitioners claim is untrue. Judge Tumaliuans Joint Order contains no such indication that
he relied solely on the prosecutors certification. The Joint Order even indicated the
contrary:

Upon receipt of the information and resolution of the prosecutor, the Court proceeded to
determine the existence of a probable cause by personally evaluating the records x x x.[29]
The records of the case show that the prosecutors certification was accompanied by
supporting documents, following the requirement under Lim, Sr. v. Felix30 and People v.
Inting.31 The supporting documents are the following:

1. Resolution dated 21 June 2001 of State Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes;

2. Affidavit dated 22 May 2001 of Modesto Gutierrez;

3. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Romeo B. Ocon;

4. Joint Counter Affidavit dated 23 May 2001 of Mayor Jose C. Miranda and Reynaldo
de la Cruz;

5. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Alberto Dalmacio;

6. Decision dated 22 April 1999 of the RTC of Manila, Branch 41 in Criminal Case No.
97-160355;

7. Sworn statement dated 27 April 2001 of Rodel Maderal;

8. Information dated 22 June 2001;

9. Affidavit-complaint of Virgilio Tuliao; and

10. Medico-legal Reports of the cadavers of Elezer Tuliao and Vicente Buazon.

Hence, procedurally, we can conclude that there was no violation on the part of Judge
Tumaliuan of Art III, Section 2, of the Constitution. Judge Anghad, however, focused on the
substantive part of said section, i.e., the existence of probable cause. In failing to find
probable cause, Judge Anghad ruled that the confession of SPO2 Maderal is incredible for
the following reasons: (1) it was given after almost two years in the custody of the National
Bureau of Investigation; (2) it was given by someone who rendered himself untrustworthy
for being a fugitive for five years; (3) it was given in exchange for an obvious reward of
discharge from the information; and (4) it was given during the election period amidst a
"politically charged scenario where "Santiago City voters were pitted against each other
along the lines of the Miranda camp on one side and former City Mayor Amelita S. Navarro,
and allegedly that of DENR Secretary Heherson Alvarez on the other."32

We painstakingly went through the records of the case and found no reason to disturb the
findings of probable cause of Judge Tumaliuan.

It is important to note that an exhaustive debate on the credibility of a witness is not within
the province of the determination of probable cause. As we held in Webb33:

A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than
not a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need
not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing
guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty
of guilt. As well put in Brinegar v. United States, while probable cause demands more than
"bare suspicion," it requires "less than evidence which would justify x x x conviction." A
finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a
pronouncement of guilt.

x x x Probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a

summary manner. Preliminary investigation is not a part of trial x x x.

Dismissing a criminal case on the basis of a decision of this Court in another case with
different accused constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

Judge Anghad had quashed the warrant of arrest on the ground, among other things, that
there was a petition for review of the assistant prosecutors resolution before the Secretary
of Justice. However, after the Secretary of Justice affirmed the prosecutors resolution,
Judge Anghad summarily dismissed the two criminal cases against the petitioners on the
basis of the following explanation:

Rodel Maderal was one of the accused in People vs. Wilfredo Leano, et al., RTC, Branch 41,
Manila, and based from his sworn statements, he pinpointed to Mr. Miranda the
mastermind and with him and the other police officers as the direct perpetrators, the
October 9, 2001 Decision of the Supreme Court absolving the five cops of murder, certainly
makes his sworn Statements a "narration of falsehood and lies" and that because of the
decision acquitting said officers "who were likewise falsely linked by said Rodel Maderal in
his April 27, 2001 statements, it is now beyond doubt that Rodel Maderal made untruthful,
fabricated and perjured statements and therefore the same is without probable value." This
Court agrees with the defenses views. Indeed, of what use is Maderals statements when
the Supreme Court rejected the prosecutions evidence presented and adduced in Criminal
Case No. 97-160355. Rodel Maderal is supposed to turn state witness in these two (2) cases
but with the Supreme Court decision adverted to, the probative value of his statements is
practically nil.

xxxx

This Court finds merit to the manifestation of the accused Miranda dated October 18, 2001,
praying for the summary dismissal of the two (2) murder charges in view of the latest
decision of the Supreme Court in PEOPLEvs. Wilfredo Leao, et al., G.R. No. 13886,
acquitting the accused therein and in effect disregarding all the evidence presented by the
prosecution in that case. Accordingly, the two (2) informations [for] murder filed against
Jose Miranda are ordered dismissed.34

This is a clear case of abuse of discretion. Judge Anghad had no right to twist our decision
and interpret it to the discredit of SPO2 Maderal, who was still at large when the evidence of
the prosecution in the Leao case was presented. A decision, even of this Court, acquitting
the accused therein of a crime cannot be the basis of the dismissal of criminal case against
different accused for the same crime. The blunder of Judge Anghad is even more
pronounced by the fact that our decision in Leao was based on reasonable doubt. We
never ruled in Leao that the crime did not happen; we just found that there was
reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused therein, since the prosecution in that case
relied on circumstantial evidence, which interestingly is not even the situation in the criminal
cases of the petitioners in the case at bar as there is here an eyewitness: Rodel Maderal.
The accused in Leao furthermore had no motive to kill respondent Tuliaos son, whereas
petitioners herein had been implicated in the testimony of respondent Tuliao before the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee.
It is preposterous to conclude that because of our finding of reasonable doubt in Leao, "it
is now beyond doubt that Rodel Maderal made untruthful, fabricated and perjured
statements and therefore the same is without probable value."35 On the contrary, if we are
to permit the use of our decision in Leao, an acquittal on the ground of reasonable doubt
actually points to the probability of the prosecutions version of the facts therein. Such
probability of guilt certainly meets the criteria of probable cause.

We cannot let unnoticed, too, Judge Anghads dismissal of the informations two days after
we resolved to issue, upon the filing of a bond, a temporary restraining order prohibiting
him from further proceeding with the case. The bond was filed the day after the
informations were dismissed. While the dismissal of the case was able to beat the effectivity
date of the temporary restraining order, such abrupt dismissal of the informations (days
after this Courts resolve to issue a TRO against Judge Anghad) creates wild suspicions
about the motives of Judge Anghad.

Nullification of a proceeding necessarily carries with it the reinstatement of the orders set
aside by the nullified proceeding.

In their second assignment of error, petitioners claim that the CAdid not recall or reinstate
the warrants of arrest issued by Judge Tumaliuan, but instead directed Judge Anghad to
issue apparently new warrants of arrest.36 According to the petitioners, it was an error for
the CAto have done so, without a personal determination of probable cause.

We disagree. Whether the CAordered the issuance of new warrants of arrest or merely
ordered the reinstatement of the warrants of arrest issued by Judge Tumaliuan is merely a
matter of scrupulous semantics, the slight inaccuracy whereof should not be allowed to
affect the dispositions on the merits, especially in this case where the other dispositions of
the CApoint to the other direction. Firstly, the CAhad reinstated the 25 June 2001 Order of
Judge Tumaliuan,37 which issued the warrants of arrest. Secondly, the CAlikewise declared
the proceedings conducted by Judge Anghad void. Certainly, the declaration of nullity of
proceedings should be deemed to carry with it the reinstatement of the orders set aside by
the nullified proceedings. Judge Anghads order quashing the warrants of arrest had been
nullified; therefore those warrants of arrest are henceforth deemed unquashed.

Even if, however, the CAhad directed the issuance of new warrants of arrest based on a
determination of probable cause, it would have been legally permissible for them to do so.
The records of the preliminary investigation had been available to the CA , and are also
available to this Court, allowing both the CAand this Court to personally examine the records
of the case and not merely rely on the certification of the prosecutor. As we have ruled in
Allado v. Diokno and Roberts v. CA , the determination of probable cause does not rest on a
subjective criteria. As we had resolved in those cases to overrule the finding of probable
cause of the judges therein on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, in the same vein, we
can also overrule the decision of a judge reversing a finding of probable cause, also on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion.

There is no double jeopardy in the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before

arraignment

In their third assignment of error, petitioners claim that the CAcommitted a reversible error
in ordering the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524, alleging that
the order of dismissal issued therein had become final and executory. According to
petitioners:
It is also worthy to point out at this juncture that the Joint Order of Judge Anghad dated
November 14, 2001 is NOT ONE of those Orders which were assailed in the private
respondent Tuliaos Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition filed by the private
respondent before the CA . As carefully enumerated in the first page of the assailed
Decision, only the following Orders issued by Judge Anghad were questioned by private
respondent, to wit:

1.) Joint Order dated August 17, 2001;

2.) Order dated September 21, 2001;

3.) Joint Order dated October 16, 2001; and

4.) Joint Order dated October 22, 2001.

Obviously, the Joint Order dated November 14, 2001 of Judge Anghad, which ultimately
dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 AND 36-3524 is NOT included in the list of the
assailed Order/Joint Orders. Hence, the CAshould not have passed upon the validity or
nullity of the Joint Order of November 14, 2001.38

Petitioners must have forgotten that respondent Tuliaos Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition
and Mandamus was filed not with the CA , but with this Court. The CAdecided the case
because we referred the same to them in our 19 November 2001 Resolution. Such petition
was filed on 25 October 2001, around three weeks before the 14 November 2001 Order.
Upon receipt of the 14 November 2001 Order, however, respondent Tuliao lost no time in
filing with this Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in Contempt, alleging that Judge
Anghad "deliberately and willfully committed contempt of court when he issued on 15
November 2001 the Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the informations for
murder." On 21 November 2001, we referred said motion to the CA , in view of the previous
referral of respondent Tuliaos petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.

Our referral to the CAof the Motion to Cite Public Repondent in Contempt places the 14
November 2001 Order within the issues of the case decided by the CA . In claiming that
Judge Anghad committed contempt of this Court in issuing the 14 November 2001 Order,
respondent Tuliao had ascribed to Judge Anghad an act much more serious than grave
abuse of discretion.

Respondent Tuliao claims that Judge Anghad issued the 14 November 2001 Order on 15
November 2001, antedating it so as to avoid the effects of our 12 November 2001
Resolution. In said 12 November 2001 Resolution, we resolved to issue a temporary
restraining order enjoining Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the criminal cases
upon the respondent Tuliaos filing of a bond in the amount of P20,000.00. Respondent
Tuliao had filed the bond on 15 November 2005.

While we cannot immediately pronounce Judge Anghad in contempt, seeing as disobedience

to lawful orders of a court and abuse of court processes are cases of indirect contempt
which require the granting of opportunity to be heard on the part of respondent,39 the
prayer to cite public respondent in contempt and for other reliefs just and equitable under
the premises should be construed to include a prayer for the nullification of said 14
November 2001 Order.
In any case, the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before arraignment does not
constitute double jeopardy. Double jeopardy cannot be invoked where the accused has not
been arraigned and it was upon his express motion that the case was dismissed.40

As to respondent Tuliaos prayer (in both the original petition for certiorari as well as in his
motion to cite for contempt) to disqualify Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the
case, we hold that the number of instances of abuse of discretion in this case are enough to
convince us of an apparent bias on the part of Judge Anghad. We further resolve to follow
the case of People v. SPO1 Leao,41 by transferring the venue of Criminal Cases No. 36-
3523 and No. 36-3524 to the City of Manila, pursuant to Art VIII, Section 4, of the
Constitution.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 18 December 2002 and the
Resolution dated 12 June 2003 of the CAare hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that
Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 be transferred to and raffled in the RTC of the
City of Manila. In this connection,

1) Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Executive Judge of the RTC of the City
of Santiago, Isabela, who is directed to effect the transfer of the cases within ten
(10) days after receipt hereof;

2) The Executive Judge of the RTC of the City of Santiago, Isabela, is likewise
directed to report to this Court compliance hereto within ten (10) days from transfer
of these cases;

3) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila shall proceed to raffle the criminal cases
within ten (10) days from the transfer;

4) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila is likewise directed to report to this
Court compliance with the order to raffle within ten (10) days from said compliance;
and

5) The RTC Judge to whom the criminal cases are raffled is directed to act on said
cases with reasonable dispatch.

6) Finally, Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is directed to issue forthwith warrants of

arrest for the apprehension of petitioners Jose C. Miranda, Alberto P. Dalmacio,
Romeo B. Ocon, and accused Rodel T. Maderal, conformably with the decision of the
CAdated 18 December 2002.

The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court dated 4 August 2003 is hereby
LIFTED. Costs against Petitioners.

G.R. No. 164170 April 16, 2009

MACA-ANGCOS ALAWIYA y ABDUL, ISAGANI ABDUL y SIACOR, and SARAH

LANGCO y ANGLI, Petitioners,
vs.
CA , SECRETARY OF JUSTICE SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, P/C INSP. MICHAEL
ANGELO BERNARDO MARTIN, P/INSP. ALLANJING ESTRADA MEDINA, PO3
ARNOLD RAMOS ASIS, PO2 PEDRO SANTOS GUTIERREZ, PO2 IGNACIO DE PAZ,
and PO2 ANTONIO SEBASTIAN BERIDA, JR., Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 4 February 2004 Decision2 and 25
June 2004 Resolution3 of the CAin CA-G.R. SP No. 76345. The CAdismissed the petition for
certiorari filed by petitioners Maca-Angcos Alawiya y Abdul, Isagani Abdul y Siacor, and
Sarah Langco y Angli.

The Facts

On 18 September 2001, petitioners executed sworn statements4 before the General

Assignment Section of the Western Police District in United Nations Avenue, Manila,
charging accused P/C Insp. Michael Angelo Bernardo Martin, P/Insp. Allanjing Estrada
Medina, PO3 Arnold Ramos Asis, PO2 Pedro Santos Gutierrez, PO2 Ignacio De Paz and PO2
Antonio Sebastian Berida, Jr., who were all policemen assigned at that time at the Northern
Police District, with kidnapping for ransom.

The sworn-statements of petitioners commonly alleged that at about 10:00 in the morning
of 11 September 2001, while petitioners were cruising on board a vehicle along United
Nations Avenue, a blue Toyota Sedan bumped their vehicle from behind; that when they
went out of their vehicle to assess the damage, several armed men alighted from the Toyota
Sedan, poked guns at, blindfolded, and forced them to ride in the Toyota Sedan; that they
were brought to an office where P10,000,000 and two vehicles were demanded from them
in exchange for their freedom; that, after haggling, the amount was reduced to P700,000
plus the two vehicles; that the money and vehicles were delivered in the late evening of 11
September 2001; that they were released in the early morning of 12 September 2001 in
Quiapo after they handed the Deed of Sale and registration papers of the two vehicles.

After the initial investigation by the Western Police District, the case was reported to the
Philippine National Police Intelligence Group in Camp Crame, where a lateral coordination
was made with the Philippine National Police-National Capital Regional Police Office Regional
Intelligence and Investigation Division (PNP-NCR-RID) for the identification, arrest and filing
of appropriate charges against the accused. After its own investigation, the PNP-NCR-RID
recommended that accused be charged with violation of Art 267 of the RPC,5 as amended by
RANo. 7659.

State Prosecutor Emmanuel Y. Velasco (State Prosecutor Velasco), who conducted the
preliminary investigation, issued a Resolution6 dated 14 January 2002, recommending that
the accused be indicted for the crime of kidnapping for ransom. The Resolution was
endorsed for approval by Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Nilo C. Mariano and approved by
Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo.

On 24 January 2002, State Prosecutor Velasco filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 41,7 an
Information for Kidnapping for Ransom against the accused with no bail recommended. The
Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 02198832, reads as follows:
That on September 11, 2001 at about 10:00 AM along United Nations Avenue, Manila and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named Accused, who are all police
officers, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another and grouping
themselves together, did then and there by force and intimidation, and by the use of high-
powered firearms, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, carry away and deprive MACA-
ANGCOS ALAWIYA, ISAGANI ABDUL and ZARAH LANGCO of their liberty against their will for
the purpose of extorting ransom as in fact a demand for ransom was made as a condition
for their release amounting to TEN MILLION PESOS (PHP10,000,000.00) which amount was
later reduced to SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND (PHP700,000.00) plus two vehicles consisting
of TOYOTA FX and MITSUBISHI ADVENTURE to the damage and prejudice of MACA-
ANGCOS ALAWIYA, ISAGANI ABDUL and SARAH LANGCO in said amount and such other
amounts as may be awarded to them under the provisions of the Civil Code.

CONTRARY TO LAW.8

On 28 January 2002, the TC, upon motion by the prosecution, issued a Hold Departure
Order against the accused.9 On even date, the TC issued a Warrant of Arrest against all the
accused.10

Meanwhile, on 8 February 2002, the accused filed a petition for review of the Resolution of
State Prosecutor Velasco with the Office of the Secretary of Justice.

On 18 February 2002, the accused moved for the quashal of the Information on the ground
that "the officer who filed the Information has no authority do so."11

In an Order12 dated 27 February 2002, the TC denied the motion to quash on the ground
that under the ruling in People v. Mapalao,13 an accused who is at large is not entitled to bail
or other relief. The TC also held that the jurisdiction and power of the Ombudsman under
Section 15(1) of RANo. 6770 (RA 6770),14as well as Administrative Order No. 8 of the Office
of the Ombudsman, are not exclusive but shared or concurrent with the regular prosecutors.
Thus, the authority of the Department of Justice to investigate, file the information and
prosecute the case could no longer be questioned.

In a Resolution15 promulgated on 24 September 2002, then Secretary of Justice Hernando B.

Perez reversed the ruling of State Prosecutor Velasco and ordered the latter to cause the
withdrawal or dismissal of the Information for kidnapping for ransom. The Secretary of
Justice ruled that there was no prior approval by the Office of the Ombudsman before the
Information for kidnapping was filed with the TC. He also found that the incident complained
of was a bungled buy-bust operation, not kidnapping for ransom.

On 11 October 2002, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by
then Secretary of Justice Simeon A. Datumanong in a Resolution promulgated on 17
February 2003.16

Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the CA , seeking the nullification of the
Secretary of Justices ruling for having been rendered in grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The CArendered a Decision of 4 February 2004 dismissing the petition for certiorari. The
CAdenied the petitioners motion for reconsideration in a Resolution of 25 June 2004.

Hence, this petition.

 The Ruling of the CA

The CAsustained the finding of the Secretary of Justice that the incident complained of was
a bungled buy-bust operation, contrary to the finding of State Prosecutor Velasco, that it
was a kidnapping for ransom.

The CAgave credence to the accuseds documentary evidence which supported their claim
that the incident was a botched buy-bust operation. The CAspecifically noted
the Sinumpaang Salaysay of Cesar Landayan (Landayan), who was driving a taxi at the time
of the incident and was apprehended together with petitioners. The Sinumpaang
Salaysay categorically stated that he and petitioners were released from accuseds custody
at about 12:50 in the afternoon of the same day, 11 September 2001. Thus, Cesars
statement refuted the complaint of petitioners that they were freed only in the morning of
12 September 2001 after a pay-off of P700,000 in casino chips and two vehicles. The
CAstressed that Landayans Sinumpaang Salaysay was given on 14 September 2001, prior to
petitioners complaint for kidnapping for ransom which was filed on 18 September 2001
before the Western Police District. Having been executed prior to the filing of the complaint
for kidnapping for ransom by petitioners, Cesars Sinumpaaang Salaysay could not be
discredited as a cover-up evidence.

The CAupheld the Secretary of Justices ruling that prior approval by the Office of the
Ombudsman for the Military was needed for the filing of the Information before the RTC,
pursuant to OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001.17 The CAfurther sustained the finding that
there were sufficient evidence that the offense charged against accused was committed in
relation to their office and that the accused were all acting in the discharge of their functions
as policemen.

The Issues

The issues in this case are:

1. Whether the prior approval by the Office of the Ombudsman for the Military is
required for the investigation and prosecution of the instant case against the
accused;

2. Whether the reversal by the Secretary of Justice of the resolution of State

Prosecutor Velasco amounted to an "executive acquittal;"

3. Whether the accused policemen can seek any relief (via a motion to quash the
information) from the TC when they had not been arrested yet; and

4. Whether there was probable cause against the accused for the crime of
kidnapping for ransom.

The Ruling of this Court

On the prior approval by the Ombudsman for the investigation and prosecution of the case
against the accused policemen

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), which is representing the Secretary of Justice,
agrees with petitioners that prior approval by the Ombudsman is not required for the
investigation and prosecution of the criminal case against the accused policemen. The OSG
correctly cites the case of Honasan II v. The Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the
Department of Justice,18 where the Court held that the power of the Ombudsman to
investigate offenses involving public officers or employees is not exclusive but is concurrent
with other similarly authorized agencies of the government such as the provincial, city and
state prosecutors. In view of the foregoing, both the CAand the Secretary of Justice clearly
erred in ruling that prior approval by the Ombudsman is required for the investigation and
prosecution of the criminal case against the accused policemen.

On the reversal by the Secretary of Justice

of the resolution of State Prosecutor Velasco

Settled is the rule that the Secretary of Justice retains the power to review resolutions of his
subordinates even after the information has already been filed in court.19 In Marcelo v. CA
,20 reiterated in Roberts, Jr. v. CA ,21 this Court clarified that nothing in Crespo v.
Mogul22 forecloses the power or authority of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of
his subordinates in criminal cases despite an information already having been filed in
court.23 The nature of the power of control of the Secretary of Justice over prosecutors was
explained in Ledesma v. CA 24 in this wise:

Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the Secretary of justice who,
under the Revised Administrative Code, exercises the power of direct control and supervision
over said prosecutors; and who may thus affirm, nullify, reverse or modify their
rulings. (Emphasis supplied)

Contrary to petitioners contention, the Secretary of Justices reversal of the Resolution of

State Prosecutor Velasco did not amount to "executive acquittal" because the Secretary of
Justice was simply exercising his power to review, which included the power to reverse the
ruling of the State Prosecutor. However, once a complaint or information is filed in court,
any disposition of the case such as its dismissal or its continuation rests on the sound
discretion of the court.25 Trial judges are not bound by the Secretary of Justices reversal of
the prosecutors resolution finding probable cause. Trial judges are required to make their
own assessment of the existence of probable cause, separately and independently of the
evaluation by the Secretary of Justice.26

On the motion to quash the information

when the accused had not been arrested yet

People v. Mapalao,27 as correctly argued by the OSG, does not squarely apply to the present
case. In that case, one of the accused, Rex Magumnang, after arraignment and during the
trial, escaped from detention and had not been apprehended since then. Accordingly, as to
him the trial in absentia proceeded and thereafter the judgment of conviction was
promulgated. The Court held that since the accused remained at large,

he should not be afforded the right to appeal from the judgment of conviction unless he
voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the court or is otherwise arrested. While at large,
the accused cannot seek relief from the court as he is deemed to have waived the same and
he has no standing in court.28 In Mapalao, the accused escaped while the trial of the case
was on-going, whereas here, the accused have not been served the warrant of arrest and
have not been arraigned. Therefore, Mapalao is definitely not on all fours with the present
case.lavvphil.net
Furthermore, there is nothing in the Rules governing a motion to quash29 which requires
that the accused should be under the custody of the law prior to the filing of a motion to
quash on the ground that the officer filing the information had no authority to do so.
Custody of the law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs other than an application for
bail.30 However, while the accused are not yet under the custody of the law, any question on
the jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he
files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when the accused invokes
the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person.31

At any rate, the accuseds motion to quash, on the ground of lack of authority of the filing
officer, would have never prospered because as discussed earlier, the Ombudsmans power
to investigate offenses involving public officers or employees is not exclusive but is
concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of the government.

On the existence or non-existence of probable cause

Ordinarily, the determination of probable cause is not lodged with this Court. Its duty in an
appropriate case is confined to the issue of whether the executive or judicial determination,
as the case may be, of probable cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction.32However, in the following
exceptional cases, this Court may ultimately resolve the existence or non-existence of
probable cause by examining the records of the preliminary investigation.33

a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;

b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or

multiplicity of actions;

c. When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice;

d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;

e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;

f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;

g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;

h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;

i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance;

j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to
quash on that ground has been denied; [and]

k. Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent the
threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners.

There is no clear showing that the present case falls under any of the recognized
exceptions. Moreover, as stated earlier, once the information is filed with the TC, any
disposition of the information rests on the sound discretion of the court. The TC is mandated
to independently evaluate or assess the existence of probable cause and it may either agree
or disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice. The TC is not bound to
adopt the resolution of the Secretary of Justice.34 Reliance alone on the resolution of the
Secretary of Justice amounts to an abdication of the TCs duty and jurisdiction to determine
the existence of probable cause.35

Considering that the Information has already been filed with the TC, then the TC, upon filing
of the appropriate motion by the prosecutor, should be given the opportunity to perform its
duty of evaluating, independently of the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice
recommending the withdrawal of the Information against the accused, the merits of the
case and assess whether probable cause exists to hold the accused for trial for kidnapping
for ransom.36

WHEREFORE, we REMAND this case to the RTC, Branch 41, Manila, to independently
evaluate or assess the merits of the case to determine whether probable cause exists to
hold the accused for trial.

G.R. Nos. L-32282-83 November 26, 1970

PEOPLE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MARIO J. GUTIERREZ, Judge of the CFI of Ilocos Sur, et.al , respondents.

Petition for writs of certiorari and mandamus, with preliminary injunction, filed by the
Solicitor General and State Prosecutors, to annul and set aside the order of Judge Mario J.
Gutierrez of the CFI of Ilocos Sur (respondent herein), dated 20 July 1970, denying the
prosecution's urgent motion to transfer Criminal Case Nos. 47-V and 48-V of said CFI,
entitled "People vs. Pilotin, et al.," to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial
District; to direct the respondent Judge to effectuate such transfer; and to restrain the trial
of the cases aforesaid in the CFI of Ilocos Sur, sitting in Vigan, capital of the province.

In the morning of 22 May 1970, a group of armed persons descended on barrio Ora Centro,
municipality of Bantay, Province of Ilocos Sur, and set fire to various inhabited houses
therein. On the afternoon of the same day, in barrio Ora Este of the same municipality and
province, several residential houses were likewise burned by the group, resulting in the
destruction of various houses and in the death of an old woman named Vicenta Balboa.
After investigation by the authorities, the provincial fiscal, with several state prosecutors
assigned by the Department of Justice to collaborate with him, on 10 June 1970 filed in the
CFI of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, two informations (Criminal Cases 47-V for arson with homicide and
48-V for arson) charging that the seventeen private respondents herein, together with 82
other unidentified persons, "confederating, conspiring, confabulating and helping one
another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously burn or cause to be burned
several residential houses, knowing the said houses to be occupied" and belonging to
certain persons named in the filed informations in barrios Ora Este and Ora Centro, Bantay,
Ilocos Sur (Petition, Annexes B and B-1). Accused Camilo Pilotin and Vincent Crisologo
furnished bail, and on 15 June 1970 voluntarily appeared before respondent Judge
Gutierrez, were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Trial was then set for 27, 28 and 29 July
1970.

It appears that on the same day, 15 June, the Secretary of Justice issued Administrative
Order No. 221, authorizing Judge Lino Anover, of the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second
Judicial District, with official station at San Fernando, La Union, to hold a special term in
Ilocos Sur, from and after 1 July 1970. Three days thereafter, on 18 June 1970, the
Secretary further issued Administrative Order No. 226, authorizing Judge Mario Gutierrez to
transfer Criminal Cases Nos. 47-V and 48-V to the Circuit Criminal Court, "in the interest of
justice and pursuant to RANo. 5179, as implemented by Administrative Order Nos. 258 and
274" of the Department of Justice.

On 22 June 1970, the prosecution moved the respondent judge for a transfer of cases 47-V
and 48-V to the Circuit Criminal Court, invoking the Administrative Orders just mentioned
and calling attention to the circumstance that they were issued at the instance of the
witnesses seeking transfer of the hearing from Vigan to either San Fernando, La Union, or
Baguio City, for reasons of security and personal safety, as shown in their affidavits. The
accused vigorously opposed such transfer, and on 20 July 1970, the respondent judge
declined the transfer sought, on the ground that Administrative Order No. 258 only provided
for transfer of cases to the Circuit Criminal Court where the interest of justice required it for
the more expeditious disposal of the cases, and in the cases involved the accused had
already pleaded; that if the objective of the proposed transfer was to subsequently obtain a
change of venue from the Supreme Court under Section 4 of RANo. 5179 the same should
have been done right at the very inception of these cases.

In view of the lower court's denial of the motion to transfer the cases to the Circuit Criminal
Court, the prosecution resorted to Us for writs of certiorari and mandamus, charging abuse
of discretion and praying this Court to set aside the order of denial of the transfer and to
compel the respondent CFI to remand the cases to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second
Judicial District, as well as to authorize the latter to try the cases (47-V and 48-V) at either
San Fernando, La Union, or Baguio City.

Respondents in their answer denied any abuse of discretion in view of the fact that the
Administrative Order No. 226 merely authorized the court below, but did not require or
command it, to transfer the cases in question to the Circuit Criminal Court, and likewise
denied that the circumstances justified any such transfer.

At petitioners' request this Court enjoined the respondent Judge Gutierrez from proceeding
with the trial of the cases until further orders.

We agree with respondents that the present laws do not confer upon the Secretary of
Justice power to determine what court should hear specific cases. Any such power, even in
the guise of administrative regulation of executive affairs, trenches upon the time-honored
separation of the Executive and the Judiciary; and while not directly depriving the courts of
their independence, it would endanger the rights and immunities of the accused or civil
party. It could be much too easily transformed into a means of predetermining the outcome
of individual cases, so as to produce a result in harmony with the Administration's
preferences. The creation by RANo. 5179 of the Circuit Criminal Courts for the purpose of
alleviating the burden of the regular Courts of First Instance, and to accelerate the
disposition of criminal cases pending or to be filed therein, nowhere indicates an intent to
permit the transfer of preselected individual cases to the circuit courts. Neither do
Administrative Orders Nos. 258 and 274 evidence any such intention; particularly since
Administrative Order No. 258, Series of 1968, in Section 2 of its Part V, as confirmed by
Administrative Order No. 274 of the same year, in Section 3 of Part III thereof, provides that
the transfer to Circuit Criminal Courts of cases pending in the regular Courts of First
Instance should be effected by raffle, chance here operating to nullify any executive
arbitration of what particular cases should be apportioned to either tribunal. The very terms
of Administrative Order No. 226, issued on 18 June 1970 by Secretary of Justice Makasiar,
relied upon by the petitioners, in merely authorizing, and not directing, Judges Arciaga and
Gutierrez of the CFI of Ilocos Sur to transfer Criminal Cases Nos. 44-V and 47-V (People vs.
Pilotin, et al.) to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District, reveals that the
Secretary himself was aware of the impropriety of imperatively directing transfer of specified
cases. Respondent Judge Gutierrez, therefore in construing Administrative Order No. 226 as
permissive and not mandatory, acted within the limits of his discretion and violated neither
the law nor the Executive Orders heretofore mentioned.

It is unfortunate, however, that in refusing to consider Department Administrative Order No.

226 of the Secretary of Justice as mandatory respondent Judge Gutierrez failed to act upon
the contention of the prosecuting officers that the cases against private respondents herein
should be transferred to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District because a
miscarriage of justice was impending, in view of the refusal of the prosecution witnesses to
testify in the court sitting in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, where they felt their lives would be
endangered. This claim was buttressed by the affidavits of the injured parties and
prosecution witnesses, reaffirming their fear to appear in Vigan to testify in cases 47-V and
48-V and expressing their willingness to testify if the cases are heard outside of Ilocos Sur,
where they can be free from tension and terrorism (Petition, Annex J). The fear thus
expressed can not be considered fanciful and unfounded when account is taken of the
circumstances that the informations filed in the CFI of Ilocos Sur show that of the one
hundred armed participants in the burning of the houses at barrios Ora Este and Ora Centro,
Municipality of Bantay, some eighty-two (82) are still unidentified and at large; that one of
the accused, private respondent Vincent Crisologo, belongs to an influential family in the
province, being concededly the son of the Congressman for the first district of Ilocos Sur
and of the lady Governor that the reluctant witnesses are themselves the complainants in
the criminal cases, and, therefore, have reasons to fear that attempts will be made to
silence them; that it is not shown that the Executive branch is able or willing to give these
witnesses full security during the trial and for a reasonable time thereafter, that even if
armed security escorts were to be provided, the same would be no guarantee against the
possibility of murderous assault against the affiant witnesses, as recent events have proved;
that Constabulary reports (Annex H) show that between 1 January and 31 May 1970 no less
than 78 murders have been reported committed in said province, of which number only 21
were solved; and, finally, that the promotion and confirmation of respondent Judge Mario
Gutierrez from Clerk of Court to Judge of the CFI of the Second Judicial District, Branch III,
was actively supported by Congressman and Governor Crisologo, parents of accused Vincent
Crisologo (Annexes H, H-1, and K to N-2 to petitioner's supplemental memorandum).

This just refusal to testify in Ilocos Sur manifested by the complaining witnesses, who had
on a previous occasion freely given evidence before the investigators in Manila, renders
manifest the imperious necessity of transferring the place of trial to a site outside of Ilocos
Sur, if the cases are to be judicially inquired into conformably to the interest of truth and
justice and the State is to be given a fair chance to present its side of the case.

The respondents vigorously contend that a transfer of the trial site can not be made,
because it is a long standing rule of criminal procedure in these Islands that one who
commits a crime is amenable therefor only in the jurisdiction where the crime is committed,
for the reason pointed out in U.S. vs. Cunanan, 26 Phil. 376, and People vs. Mercado, 65
Phil. 665, that the jurisdiction of a CFI in the Philippines is limited to certain well-defined
territory and they can not take jurisdiction of persons charged with one offense committed
outside of that limited territory, and they invoke Rule 110, Section 14 (a), of the Revised
Rules of Court providing that "in all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and
tried in the court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any
one of the essential ingredient thereof took place."

It is well to note that this Court has explained in Beltran vs. Ramos, 96 Phil. 149, 150, that
the purpose of the rule invoked by accused respondents herein was "not to compel the
defendant to move to and appear in a different court from that of the province where the
crime was committed, as it would cause him great inconvenience in looking for his witnesses
and other evidence in another place." Where the convenience of the accused is opposed by
that of the prosecution, as in the case at bar, it is but logical that the court should have
power to decide where the balance of convenience or inconvenience lies, and to determine
the most suitable place of the trial according to the exigencies of truth and impartial justice.

In the particular case before Us, to compel the prosecution to proceed to trial in a locality
where its witnesses will not be at liberty to reveal what they know is to make a mockery of
the judicial process, and to betray the very purpose for which courts have been established.
Since the rigorous application of the general principle of Rule 110, Section 14 (a), would
result here in preventing a fair and impartial inquiry into the actual facts of the case, it must
be admitted that the exigencies of justice demand that the general rule relied upon by
accused respondents should yield to occasional exceptions wherever there are weighty
reasons therefor. Otherwise, the rigor of the law would become the highest injustice
"summum jus, summa in juria."

The respondents accused can not complain that to transfer the trial to a site where the
prosecution's witnesses can feel free to reveal what they know would be equivalent to
railroading them into a conviction. Because regardless of the place where its evidence is to
be heard, the prosecution will be always obligated to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. The scales of justice clearly lean in favor of the prosecution being given
full opportunity to lay its case before a proper arbiter: for a dismissal of the charges for lack
of evidence is a verdict that the prosecution can neither challenge nor appeal.

We must thus reject the idea that our courts, faced by an impasse of the kind now before
Us, are to confess themselves impotent to further the cause of justice. The Constitution has
vested the Judicial Power in the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be
established by law (Art VIII, Section 13), and such judicial power connotes certain incidental
and inherent attributes reasonably necessary for an effective administration of justice. The
courts "can by appropriate means do all things necessary to preserve and maintain every
quality needful to make the judiciary an effective institution of government" (Borromeo vs.
Mariano, 41 Phil. 322).

One of these incidental and inherent powers of courts is that of transferring the trial of
cases from one court to another of equal rank in a neighboring site, whenever the
imperative of securing a fair and impartial trial, or of preventing a miscarriage of justice, so
demands. This authority was early recognized in England as inhering in the courts of justice
even prior to the eighteenth century. The opinion in Crocker vs. Justices of the Superior
Court, 208 Mass. 162, 21 Ann. Cases 1067, has shown how the eminent Lord Chief Justice
Mansfield, in Rex vs. Cowle (Eng.) 2 Burr 834, decided in 1759, said that, in this respect,
"the law is clear and uniform as far back as it can be traced."

And in Reg. vs. Conway, 7 Jr. C. J. 507, the question was fully discussed, and all the judges
appear to have agreed as to the power of the court, Cramption, Jr., saying at page 525:
 There is another common-law right, equally open to defendants and
prosecutors, ... that where it appears that either party cannot obtain a fair
and impartial trial in the proper county, then this court ... has jurisdiction to
take the case out of the proper county, as it is called, and to bring it into an
indifferent county ... This jurisdiction to change the venue ... has been
exercised by this court from a very early period. We have reported cases,
where the doctrine is laid down in emphatic language; we have the practice
of the Court of Queen's Bench in England independently of any practice of
our own court ... The general jurisdiction of the court, in a proper case, to
change the venue from one county to any other, cannot be the subject of
doubt.

This power to transfer trial of criminal cases in furtherance of justice, exercised through
writs of certiorari, has, according to the weight of authority, passed to the State Supreme
Courts of the American Union. 1 In Cochecho R. Co. vs. Farrington, 26 N.H. 428, at page
436, it was held that the power to transfer the place of holding trials

became thoroughly engrafted upon the common law, long before the
independence of this country; and from that time forth, not only has the
practice prevailed in the courts of England, but the power is now exercised by
the Courts of very many if not all of our states, either by force of express
statute or the adoption of the common law in the jurisprudence of the same.

That such inherent powers are likewise possessed by the Philippine courts admits of no
doubt, because they were organized on the American pattern with the enactment of the first
judicial organic law, Act 136, on 11 June 1901, by the Philippine Commission, then
composed by a majority of able American lawyers, fully familiar with the institutions and
traditions of the common law.

In Alzua and Arnalot vs. Johnson, 21 Phil. 300, 333, this Court stated:

And it is safe to say that in every volume of the Philippine Reports, numbers
of cases might be cited wherein recourse has been had to the rules,
principles and doctrines of the common law in ascertaining the true meaning
and scope of the legislation enacted in and for the Philippine Islands since
they passed under American sovereignty.

Among the earliest measures of the Philippine Commission, after the

establishment of Civil Government under American sovereignty, was the
enactment on June 11, 1901, of Act No. 136, "An Act providing for the
organization of courts in the Philippine Islands." This Act in express terms
abolished the then existing Audiencia or Supreme Court and Courts of First
Instance, and substituted in their place the courts provided therein. It sets
out in general terms the jurisdiction, duties, privileges, and powers of the
new courts and their judges. The majority of the members of the body which
enacted it were able American lawyers. The spirit with which it is informed,
and indeed its very language and terminology would be unintelligible without
some knowledge of the judicial systems of England and the United States. Its
manifest purpose and object was to replace the old judicial system, with its
incidents and traditions drawn from Spanish sources, with a new system
modeled in all its essential characteristics upon the judicial systems of the
United States. It cannot be doubted, therefore, that any incident of the
 former system which conflicts with the essential principles and settled
doctrines on which the new system rests, must be held to be abrogated by
the law organizing the new system.

While not expressly conferred by Act 136, We find it difficult to believe that the framers'
intent was to deny, by silence, to the Philippine Courts, and particularly upon this Supreme
Court, the inherent jurisdiction possessed by the English and American courts under their
common law heritage to transfer the place of trial of cases in order to secure and promote
the ends of justice, by providing fair and impartial inquiry and adjudication.

Like the exemption of judges of courts of superior or general authority from liability in a civil
action for acts done by them in the exercise of their judicial functions, upheld in the Alzua
case as essentially inherent in the courts established by Act 136, even if not expressly
provided for, the power to transfer the place of trials when so demanded by the interest of
justice is equally essential and possesses no inferior rank. To it apply, mutatis mutandis, the
words of this Court in the Alzua case just cited:

The grounds of public policy and the reasoning upon which the doctrine is
based are not less forceful and imperative in these Islands than in the
countries from which the new judicial system was borrowed; and an
examination of the reasons assigned ... leaves no room for doubt that a
failure to recognize it as an incident to the new judicial system would
materially impair its usefulness and tend very strongly to defeat the ends for
which it was established. (21 Phil. 333-334)

Not only has there been since then no proof of any specific pronouncement, by Constitution
or Congress, against the exercise by our Courts of the power discussed heretofore: on the
contrary, the law establishing the Circuit Criminal Courts, RANo. 5179, in its Section 4,
provides express legislative recognition of its existence:

SEC. 4. The Circuit Criminal Courts may hold sessions anywhere within their
respective districts: Provided, however, that cases shall be heard within the
province where the crime subject of the offense was committed. And
provided further, that when the interest of justice so demands, with prior
approval of the Supreme Court, cases may be heard in a neighboring
province within the district ... (Emphasis supplied)

Since the requirements for proper jurisdiction have been satisfied by the filing of the criminal
case in question with the CFI of Ilocos Sur, in which province the offenses charged were
committed, according to the informations; since the holding of the trial in a particular place
is more a matter of venue, rather than jurisdiction; since the interests of truth and justice
can not be subserved by compelling the prosecution to proceed to trial in the respondent
court in Ilocos Sur, because its witnesses, for just and weighty reasons, are unwilling to
testify therein, and the respondent court, ignoring their safety, has abusively denied the
motion to have the case transferred to another court, this Supreme Court, in the exercise of
judicial power possessed by it under the Constitution and the statutes, should decree that
the trial of cases 47-V and 48-V should be heard and decided by the Circuit Criminal Court of
the Second Judicial District, either in San Fernando, La Union, or in Baguio City, at the
earlier available date. This arrangement would have the advantage that the same trial judge
could later be authorized to hear the defense witnesses in Vigan, if circumstances so
demanded. Furthermore, the adjudication of the case by a judge other than respondent
Gutierrez, if resulting in acquittal, would remove any doubt or suspicion that the same was
in any way influenced by the trial Judge's being beholden to the Crisologo family.

The solution thus adopted is in harmony with the ideals set by this Court in Manila Railroad
Co. vs. Attorney General, 20 Phil. 523, where We said:

... The most perfect procedure that can be devised is that which gives
opportunity for the most complete and perfect exercise of the powers of the
court within the limitations set by natural justice. It is that one which, in
other words, gives the most perfect opportunity for the powers of the court
to transmute themselves into concrete acts of justice between the parties
before it. The purpose of such a procedure is not to restrict the jurisdiction of
the court over the subject matter but to give it effective facility in righteous
action.

It may be said in passing that the most salient objection which can be urged
against procedure today is that it so restricts the exercise of the court's
power by technicalities that part of its authority effective for justice between
the parties is many times in inconsiderable portion of the whole. The purpose
of procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the
application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. It was created
not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of
justice. It does not constitute the thing itself which courts are always striving
to secure to litigants. It is designed as the means best adapted to obtain that
thing. In other words, it is a means to an end. It is the means by which the
powers of the court are made effective in just judgments. When it loses the
character of the one and takes on that of the other the administration of
justice becomes incomplete and unsatisfactory and lays itself open to grave
criticism. (Manila Railroad Co. v. Attorney-General, 20 Phil. 523, 529 [1911].
Emphasis and paragraphing supplied.)

In resume, this Court holds, and so rules:

(1) That RANo. 5179 creating the Circuit Criminal Courts did not, and does not, authorize
the Secretary of Justice to transfer thereto specified and individual cases;

(2) That this Supreme Court, in the exercise of the Judicial Power vested by the Constitution
upon it and other statutory Courts, possesses inherent power and jurisdiction to decree that
the trial and disposition of a case pending in a CFI be transferred to another CFI within the
same district whenever the interest of justice and truth so demand, and there are serious
and weighty reasons to believe that a trial by the court that originally had jurisdiction over
the case would not result in a fair and impartial trial and lead to a miscarriage of justice.

(3) That in the present case there are sufficient and adequate reasons for the transfer of the
hearing of Criminal Cases Nos. 47-V and 48-V of the CFI of Ilocos Sur to the Circuit Criminal
Court of the Second Judicial District, in the interest of truth and justice.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the writs of certiorari and mandamus prayed

for are granted; the order of the respondent CFI of Ilocos Sur, dated 20 July
1970, is sustained in so far as it holds that the Administrative Order No. 221
of the Department of Justice is not mandatory, but only directory;
nevertheless, said order is declared in grave abuse of discretion and set aside
 in so far as it declines to transfer the trial of its cases Nos. 47-V and 48-V to
another court within the district; and said respondent Court is accordingly
directed and ordered to remand the two criminal cases aforesaid to the
Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District for hearing of the
evidence for the prosecution either in Baguio or San Fernando, La Union, at
the earliest available date, and such other proceedings as the Circuit Criminal
Court may determine in the interest of justice.

The accused are required to file bail bonds to answer for their appearance at the trial and
sentence by the Circuit Criminal Court for the Second Judicial District, in the same amount,
and under the same terms and conditions as their present bail bonds, which will be replaced
by those herein ordered, all within fifteen (15) days from finality of this decision.

No special pronouncement as to costs.

Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro and Teehankee, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, C.J., took no part.

Villamor, J., reserves his vote.

Dizon and Makasiar, JJ., are on leave.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, J., concurring:

The learned and scholarly opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes renders crystal-clear why the
decision reached by this Court should be what it is. It is a manifestation of the jurist's art at
its most exemplary. It belies the belief not infrequently given utterance that hard cases
make bad law. The problem before us is unique and unprecedented as far as our previous
decisions go. It calls for a resolution far-reaching in its consequences and far-flung in its
implications. Fortunately for the administration of justice according to law, there is the
recognition of power vested in this Court, in the past perhaps only imperfectly discerned but
nonetheless in existence, to be utilized whenever there is need to do so. This is one such
occasion. Even without resort then to precedents coming from jurisdictions after which our
judicial system was patterned, the same result would have been reached. For only thus, to
paraphrase Cardozo, would the flexibility and the creativeness of the judicial process assert
themselves.

The opinion of Justice J.B.L., Reyes therefore calls for assent, which I readily yield. Nor does
it seem inappropriate if it be stressed that the conclusion reached by the Court is solidly
buttressed not only in law as history but likewise in law as logic and as social control. Hence
this brief concurring opinion, which likewise will afford me the opportunity to give expression
to the view that the Constitution and the proceedings in the Constitutional Convention of
1934-1935 point unerringly to the conclusion that this Court as the sole body vested with
judicial power by the fundamental law itself is not devoid of supervisory authority over
inferior courts. Necessarily the prerogative to transfer the venue of criminal prosecutions
whenever there is a persuasive showing that there would be a failure of justice is therein
included. On such an assumption, I do not feel called upon to inquire into any asserted
authority, even if denominated administrative, of an alter ego of the Executive, the
Secretary of Justice, over the lower courts. For my belief gets stronger with the years that it
would be difficult to assert that such a competence, even as thus limited, is warranted under
a Constitution based on the doctrine of separation of powers and necessarily committed to
the principle of judicial independence.

1. We start with the grant by the Constitution of Judicial power to this Court and to such
inferior courts as may be established by law. 1 Thus is conferred the authority to decide
cases through the ascertainment of facts and the application of the law, involving many a
time its interpretation. 2It connotes, in the language of the decision, "the imperative of
securing a fair and impartial trial, or of preventing a miscarriage of justice. ...." 3Where, as
this did develop in this case, there is more than a probability of an impasse with the
witnesses for the prosecution displaying the utmost reluctance to testify if the trial would be
held in Vigan, entailing the risk that there be, again in the language of the opinion, "a
mockery of the judicial process." 4it would appear undeniable, and we have so held today,
that this Court is not to be denied the necessary competence to set matters right. It is not
to fold its hands as if in helpless submission to a binding decree of Providence but must
meet the problem squarely, possessed of power adequate to cope with such an exigency. In
the same way that the two other coordinate departments, the Executive and Congress,
being constitutional organs, can rely on the fundamental law to justify the exercise of
certain prerogatives, 5 so may this Court, the only constitutional court, exercise supervision
over all other judicial agencies thereafter legislatively created, appropriately termed by the
Constitution as inferior courts.

There would be a void in the framework of government thus established if there is no official
body of a higher rank that can take the necessary steps to avoid a frustration of the exercise
of judicial power. It is my firm conviction that neither the Presidency nor Congress can
rightfully be entrusted with such a task. If it were thus, then the doctrine of separation of
powers becomes a myth. Such an approach necessarily and logically compel the conclusion
that the so called administrative supervision exercised by the Secretary of Justice is, to put it
at its mildest, infected with the gravest doubts as to its constitutionality.

There is no need to go that far to reach a decision in this case as is so aptly demonstrated in
the opinion of the Court. What appears to me undisputed is that where the question
partakes of a judicial character, only this Court can perform that function and trace its
source to the Constitution itself. That is to free the Constitution from the reproach that a
situation is left unprovided for. What is more, it assures the utmost respect for the principle
that like the other two coordinate and co-equal branches, Court is likewise the recipient of
power conferred by the Constitution itself. 6

2. So much for law from the standpoint of analytical jurisprudence of law as logic. If the
matter be viewed from the approach found congenial by sociological jurists, law as one of
the most effective forms of social control, the same conclusion appears to be inescapable.
This is to examine legal institutions in terms of how they function. It certainly would be a
blot on the administration of justice if by the reluctance of witnesses to testify, based on
what they consider to be a feeling that cannot be stigmatized under the circumstances as
having no basis in reason, no trial could be had of a criminal case. It is a matter of great
public interest that crime should not go unpunished. Of course, it is equally important that
the rights of whoever is accused are duly safeguarded. Where as in this case an impasse is
likely to occur, in itself an alarming symptom of a breakdown in the orderly legal processes,
the loss of public confidence in the rule of law itself is incalculable. That is an eventuality
which at all pains must be avoided. The only question is how. If the legal doctrine and
principles, which under the system of legal norms followed must be grounded in the
Constitution itself do not recognize such a competence in this Court, then for some all may
well be lost.

It would be unthinkable, again given the assumption, not entirely without basis, that the two
other branches of the government cannot escape political considerations, to assume that
either Congress or the Executive can be trusted to take care of such a situation. Nor would it
do to leave such matters in the hands of the lower courts, unless whatever is decided by
them is subject to correction and review by the only constitutional court, certainly vested
with the needed supervisory authority. It would thus appear, if a breakdown in the legal
system is to be averted, that the power of this Court is undeniable. There would seem to be
no other way to avoid a serious disruption in the legal order.

The above considerations necessarily lead me to yield a full concurrence with what has been
so persuasively and ably put forth in the masterly opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes.

December 5, 1970

BARREDO, J., concurring:

The accuracy of the technical bases as well as the unerring logic of the resolution of the
various facets of this case evidence in the main opinion written by our erudite colleague Mr.
Justice J.B.L. Reyes could not but impel the unanimous assent given thereto by the
members of this Court. Indeed, I could give the best evidence of my full concurrence therein
by merely signing the same without this separate opinion. I feel, however, that the impact
of this decision is of such transcendental importance to the administration of justice in this
country, particularly now when some sectors of our people make no secret of lingering
doubts as to the fairness and impartiality by judicial actuations and decisions, that my duty
as a member of this highest tribunal of the land calls for more than just the giving of my
vote in favor thereof. I consider it incumbent upon me, since none of my brethren seems to
be minded to do it, to project more emphatically certain relevant matters, the significance of
which should go hand in hand with the resolution of the case itself.

I can neither control nor conceal the feeling of full satisfaction that overwhelms me now,
because I consider this decision as probably the first one of national importance, in a long
time, that will receive universal and unqualified approval throughout the length and breath
of this Republic. I am sure it will yield for our constitutional government as a whole and for
the judiciary in particular a rich harvest of regained trust and confidence in the
administration of justice. This decision is a great leap forward. We are shaking away from a
long standing jurisprudential rule; We are casting aside technical procedural roadblocks; We
are here and now proclaiming to all and sundry the plenitude, under the Constitution, of Our
power and authority to "insure to (our people) and their posterity, the blessings of
independence under a regime of justice" (Preamble of the Constitution) by holding that the
"judicial power ... vested in ... (the) Supreme Court" necessarily carries with it the power to
lay down procedures that will effectively and fully guarantee, as far as it is humanly possible
to do so, that substantial justice shall not be defeated thru technicalities of procedure; and
what is most important today, as I view it, is that this is one decision the essence of which
spells simple justice that will be plainly understood by the common man. In the clearest
terms, this Court holds in effect in this decision that inspite of the traditional rule that a
person charged with an offense may not be tried in a province outside of the one ill which
the alleged offense or any essential ingredient thereof has been committed, it is the duty of
the corresponding TC, with the approval of the Supreme Court, to see to it that when the
demands of justice require it, the venue is moved to another province wherein the
circumstantial environment will insure a full disclosure of all material facts essential in the
pursuit of truth and justice. Surely, the common man would not understand why the
Supreme Court in whom the totality of judicial power is vested by the Constitution would not
have the authority and the right, nay the duty, to prevent a trial from being held in a place
where it would be nothing more than a farce and an empty show, the final chapter of which
may have already been prewritten, even independently of the honesty and integrity of the
presiding judge, because of external factors and forces that impede the witnesses from
making a free and fearless exposition of what they know. I am exceedingly happy that by
this decision, the common man will understand that neither the Constitution nor this Court
will ever be found wanting in what is needed top render justice in its truest sense.

Now, for some views of my own on the specific legal issues raised by the parties in their
pleadings. The problem revolves around the power of the Secretary of the Department of
Justice vis-a-vis the operation of the Circuit Criminal Courts created by RA5179. The People
contends that by Administrative Order 258 and 271, Series of 1968 and Administrative Order
No. 226, Series of 1970, of the Secretary of Justice, issued pursuant allegedly to RA5179,
(presumably Section 8 thereof) the transfer of the criminal cases herein involved, Criminal
Cases Nos. 47-V and 48-V of the CFI of Ilocos Sur to the Circuit Criminal Court of the
Second Judicial District is legally justifiable. On the other hand, the defense submits that
under the uniformly announced doctrine of this Court regarding the jurisdictional nature of
the venue of criminal cases and principally because to give effect to the administrative
orders aforementioned would be impairing the independence of the judiciary, the accused in
aforesaid cases must be tried in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, by the CFI in which, it is a fact, the case
was filed on June 15, 1970, the very day Administrative Order No. 221 of the Secretary of
Justice authorizing Judge Lino Anover of the Circuit Criminal Court to hold sessions in Vigan
beginning July 1, 1970 was issued.

It is my considered view that the less said about the intervention of the Department of
Justice with the Circuit Criminal Courts by the issuance of Administrative Orders 258 and
274, Series of 1968 and worse Administrative Order No. 226, Series of 1970 the better, for I
find absolutely no legal authority for the issuance of said Orders. The first two purportedly
direct and instruct the judges of the various judicial districts of the Philippines as to how to
apportion among themselves, together with the corresponding circuit criminal court judges,
the cases falling within their concurrent jurisdiction. I feel very strongly that the distribution
of the powers of government by the Constitution places, even in its broadest sense,
everything that judges have to do that might in one way or another affect or be related to
the ultimate disposition of the controversies and cases to be tried by them, including the
distribution of the cases to be tried by them, entirely and exclusively with the judges
themselves by common agreement among them, and so I hold that whatever be the import
of Section 8 of RA5179 providing that "for administrative purposes, the Circuit Criminal
Courts shall be under the supervision of the Department of Justice," the same cannot be
considered as contemplating any intervention of the Secretary of Justice in the distribution
of cases among judges. That the common impression and long standing practice on the
matter are otherwise, cannot alter what, in my humble view, the Constitution ordains.
I take it that under RA5179, Circuit Criminal Courts are nothing but additional branches of
the regular Courts of First Instance in their respective districts with the limited concurrent
jurisdiction to take cognizance of, try and decide only those cases enumerated in Section 1
of the Act. This is readily implied from Section 3 of the Act which says:

SEC. 3. The provisions of all laws and the Rules of Court relative to the
judges of the Courts of First Instance and the trial, disposition and appeal of
criminal cases therein shall be applicable to the circuit judge and the cases
cognizable by them insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of
this Act.

It is also my conviction that when Congress enacted RA5179, it was conscious of the
existing doctrinal rule laid down by this Court, in Cunanan 1 that in criminal cases, venue is
equivalent to territorial jurisdiction and precisely because of this consciousness and the
knowledge that the nature of the crimes placed within the jurisdiction of the Circuit Criminal
Courts is such that their successful prosecution might be impaired or obstructed by the
doctrinal rule aforementioned that in Section 4 of the Act, Congress expressly provided that
as a rule, "cases shall be heard within the province where the crime subject of the offense
(sic) was committed" but "when the interest of justice so demands, with the prior approval
of the Supreme Court, cases may be heard in a neighboring province of the district."

It is contended that these quoted provisions of Section 4 contemplate only those cases
already in the Circuit Criminal Court. That may be so, but my view is that by the said
provisions, Congress has precisely opened the door for the regular courts trying cases of the
nature enumerated in the Act to shift those cases to the circuit criminal court in instances
like the present wherein it appears quite evident that to maintain Vigan as the venue of the
trials in question will defeat the ends of justice, for, after all, the circuit court is just another
branch of the CFI, and once it is in the former court, then Section 4 may be easily applied.
Moving of cases from one branch of a CFI to another branch thereof is neither new nor
unusual when the judges concerned are agreed that such a step would best promote the
interests of justice. In the light of this practice, commendable in its motivation, why cannot
the transfer be made from the CFI to circuit criminal court? Indeed, this should not be
treated as merely a matter of discretion; judges should feel bound to act accordingly, as a
matter of duty, hence a negative action in the appropriate cases is ground
for certiorari or mandamus. In this connection, however, I must hasten to advert, that the
interested parties should be duly heard on the matter and, in accordance with the spirit, if
not the letter of the law, approval of the Supreme Court be secured.

Apropos of all this discussion, I would like to make it clear that the rule invoked by the
defense to the effect that venue in criminal cases is jurisdictional in character has no
foundation in any act of the legislature. There can be no question that jurisdiction is
conferred only by law and that it is only venue that may be fixed by the Rules of Court
because jurisdiction is substantive and venue is merely procedural. The rule the defense
invokes is found only in a decision of this Court rendered way back in 1913. In
Cunanan, supra, this Court held: "The jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance of the
Philippine Islands, in criminal cases, is limited to certain well-defined territory. They cannot
take jurisdiction of persons charged with an offense alleged to have been committed outside
of that limited territory."

As can be noted, no provision of law is cited in support of the ruling. The reason is simple.
There is no such law. In other words, whatever force such invoked ruling may have is no
more than that of a construction given by this Court. I dare say that when a previous
construction by this Court runs counter to fundamental principles now separating the rule
making power of the courts from the legislative faculty to define and apportion jurisdiction,
it is best to lean in favor of recognizing the constitutional boundaries of our prerogatives
when they are plain and the contrary cannot be implied. And since it was this Court that
made the construction, there is nothing to stop Us from modifying the same, and inasmuch
as Section 14, par. (a) of Rule 110 is purely a rule of venue, not legislated upon by Congress
as a jurisdictional matter, Our power to change the same is unquestionable. I, therefore,
reiterate my concurrence in the resolution of this point in the main opinion.

Accordingly, I agree that the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in not yielding
to the suggested transfer of the cases in question to the circuit criminal court. Court trials
and proceedings mean nothing unless the pronouncement and decisions of the courts merit
the faith and trust of the parties in particular and the people in general. To the common
man specially, the imperatives of justice administered by our courts are: (1) judge who can
be trusted and (2) procedures that insulate the proceedings from all factors that may taint
the ultimate outcome of litigations with doubt and skepticism. To my mind, it is not enough
that a judge trusts himself or can be trusted as capable of acting in good faith, it is equally
important that no circumstance attendant to the proceedings should mar that quality of
trustworthiness. It is thus clear that by Our decision in this case, We are not expressing any
distrust as to the impartiality of respondent judge; it should be clearly understood, however,
that it is possible for his decision to be unfair not because he has made it so, but because
under the circumstances, the adulterated evidence before him leaves him no other
alternative.

May I say as I close that what is most striking in this decision is that it is a unanimous one,
in spite of the fact that at first blush it appeared that there were formidable adverse
precedents on our way. After long and careful deliberation and after viewing all its angles,
factual and legal, when the time for voting came, there was no hesitation in the assent that
all of us gave to the rationalizations and conclusions contained in the scholarly main opinion
of Mr. Justice Reyes and the dispositive part of the decision, but by no means and in
absolutely no degree did the public discussion generated by the peculiary circumstances and
personages involved in this case ever influence any of Us, as such things, indeed, never will.

# Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, J., concurring:

The learned and scholarly opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes renders crystal-clear why the
decision reached by this Court should be what it is. It is a manifestation of the jurist's art at
its most exemplary. It belies the belief not infrequently given utterance that hard cases
make bad law. The problem before us is unique and unprecedented as far as our previous
decisions go. It calls for a resolution far-reaching in its consequences and far-flung in its
implications. Fortunately for the administration of justice according to law, there is the
recognition of power vested in this Court, in the past perhaps only imperfectly discerned but
nonetheless in existence, to be utilized whenever there is need to do so. This is one such
occasion. Even without resort then to precedents coming from jurisdictions after which our
judicial system was patterned, the same result would have been reached. For only thus, to
paraphrase Cardozo, would the flexibility and the creativeness of the judicial process assert
themselves.

The opinion of Justice J.B.L., Reyes therefore calls for assent, which I readily yield. Nor does
it seem inappropriate if it be stressed that the conclusion reached by the Court is solidly
buttressed not only in law as history but likewise in law as logic and as social control. Hence
this brief concurring opinion, which likewise will afford me the opportunity to give expression
to the view that the Constitution and the proceedings in the Constitutional Convention of
1934-1935 point unerringly to the conclusion that this Court as the sole body vested with
judicial power by the fundamental law itself is not devoid of supervisory authority over
inferior courts. Necessarily the prerogative to transfer the venue of criminal prosecutions
whenever there is a persuasive showing that there would be a failure of justice is therein
included. On such an assumption, I do not feel called upon to inquire into any asserted
authority, even if denominated administrative, of an alter ego of the Executive, the
Secretary of Justice, over the lower courts. For my belief gets stronger with the years that it
would be difficult to assert that such a competence, even as thus limited, is warranted under
a Constitution based on the doctrine of separation of powers and necessarily committed to
the principle of judicial independence.

1. We start with the grant by the Constitution of Judicial power to this Court and to such
inferior courts as may be established by law. 1 Thus is conferred the authority to decide
cases through the ascertainment of facts and the application of the law, involving many a
time its interpretation. 2It connotes, in the language of the decision, "the imperative of
securing a fair and impartial trial, or of preventing a miscarriage of justice. ...." 3Where, as
this did develop in this case, there is more than a probability of an impasse with the
witnesses for the prosecution displaying the utmost reluctance to testify if the trial would be
held in Vigan, entailing the risk that there be, again in the language of the opinion, "a
mockery of the judicial process." 4it would appear undeniable, and we have so held today,
that this Court is not to be denied the necessary competence to set matters right. It is not
to fold its hands as if in helpless submission to a binding decree of Providence but must
meet the problem squarely, possessed of power adequate to cope with such an exigency. In
the same way that the two other coordinate departments, the Executive and Congress,
being constitutional organs, can rely on the fundamental law to justify the exercise of
certain prerogatives, 5 so may this Court, the only constitutional court, exercise supervision
over all other judicial agencies thereafter legislatively created, appropriately termed by the
Constitution as inferior courts.

There would be a void in the framework of government thus established if there is no official
body of a higher rank that can take the necessary steps to avoid a frustration of the exercise
of judicial power. It is my firm conviction that neither the Presidency nor Congress can
rightfully be entrusted with such a task. If it were thus, then the doctrine of separation of
powers becomes a myth. Such an approach necessarily and logically compel the conclusion
that the so called administrative supervision exercised by the Secretary of Justice is, to put it
at its mildest, infected with the gravest doubts as to its constitutionality.

There is no need to go that far to reach a decision in this case as is so aptly demonstrated in
the opinion of the Court. What appears to me undisputed is that where the question
partakes of a judicial character, only this Court can perform that function and trace its
source to the Constitution itself. That is to free the Constitution from the reproach that a
situation is left unprovided for. What is more, it assures the utmost respect for the principle
that like the other two coordinate and co-equal branches, Court is likewise the recipient of
power conferred by the Constitution itself. 6

2. So much for law from the standpoint of analytical jurisprudence of law as logic. If the
matter be viewed from the approach found congenial by sociological jurists, law as one of
the most effective forms of social control, the same conclusion appears to be inescapable.
This is to examine legal institutions in terms of how they function. It certainly would be a
blot on the administration of justice if by the reluctance of witnesses to testify, based on
what they consider to be a feeling that cannot be stigmatized under the circumstances as
having no basis in reason, no trial could be had of a criminal case. It is a matter of great
public interest that crime should not go unpunished. Of course, it is equally important that
the rights of whoever is accused are duly safeguarded. Where as in this case an impasse is
likely to occur, in itself an alarming symptom of a breakdown in the orderly legal processes,
the loss of public confidence in the rule of law itself is incalculable. That is an eventuality
which at all pains must be avoided. The only question is how. If the legal doctrine and
principles, which under the system of legal norms followed must be grounded in the
Constitution itself do not recognize such a competence in this Court, then for some all may
well be lost.

It would be unthinkable, again given the assumption, not entirely without basis, that the two
other branches of the government cannot escape political considerations, to assume that
either Congress or the Executive can be trusted to take care of such a situation. Nor would it
do to leave such matters in the hands of the lower courts, unless whatever is decided by
them is subject to correction and review by the only constitutional court, certainly vested
with the needed supervisory authority. It would thus appear, if a breakdown in the legal
system is to be averted, that the power of this Court is undeniable. There would seem to be
no other way to avoid a serious disruption in the legal order.

The above considerations necessarily lead me to yield a full concurrence with what has been
so persuasively and ably put forth in the masterly opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes.

December 5, 1970

BARREDO, J., concurring:

The accuracy of the technical bases as well as the unerring logic of the resolution of the
various facets of this case evidence in the main opinion written by our erudite colleague Mr.
Justice J.B.L. Reyes could not but impel the unanimous assent given thereto by the
members of this Court. Indeed, I could give the best evidence of my full concurrence therein
by merely signing the same without this separate opinion. I feel, however, that the impact
of this decision is of such transcendental importance to the administration of justice in this
country, particularly now when some sectors of our people make no secret of lingering
doubts as to the fairness and impartiality by judicial actuations and decisions, that my duty
as a member of this highest tribunal of the land calls for more than just the giving of my
vote in favor thereof. I consider it incumbent upon me, since none of my brethren seems to
be minded to do it, to project more emphatically certain relevant matters, the significance of
which should go hand in hand with the resolution of the case itself.

I can neither control nor conceal the feeling of full satisfaction that overwhelms me now,
because I consider this decision as probably the first one of national importance, in a long
time, that will receive universal and unqualified approval throughout the length and breath
of this Republic. I am sure it will yield for our constitutional government as a whole and for
the judiciary in particular a rich harvest of regained trust and confidence in the
administration of justice. This decision is a great leap forward. We are shaking away from a
long standing jurisprudential rule; We are casting aside technical procedural roadblocks; We
are here and now proclaiming to all and sundry the plenitude, under the Constitution, of Our
power and authority to "insure to (our people) and their posterity, the blessings of
independence under a regime of justice" (Preamble of the Constitution) by holding that the
"judicial power ... vested in ... (the) Supreme Court" necessarily carries with it the power to
lay down procedures that will effectively and fully guarantee, as far as it is humanly possible
to do so, that substantial justice shall not be defeated thru technicalities of procedure; and
what is most important today, as I view it, is that this is one decision the essence of which
spells simple justice that will be plainly understood by the common man. In the clearest
terms, this Court holds in effect in this decision that inspite of the traditional rule that a
person charged with an offense may not be tried in a province outside of the one ill which
the alleged offense or any essential ingredient thereof has been committed, it is the duty of
the corresponding TC, with the approval of the Supreme Court, to see to it that when the
demands of justice require it, the venue is moved to another province wherein the
circumstantial environment will insure a full disclosure of all material facts essential in the
pursuit of truth and justice. Surely, the common man would not understand why the
Supreme Court in whom the totality of judicial power is vested by the Constitution would not
have the authority and the right, nay the duty, to prevent a trial from being held in a place
where it would be nothing more than a farce and an empty show, the final chapter of which
may have already been prewritten, even independently of the honesty and integrity of the
presiding judge, because of external factors and forces that impede the witnesses from
making a free and fearless exposition of what they know. I am exceedingly happy that by
this decision, the common man will understand that neither the Constitution nor this Court
will ever be found wanting in what is needed top render justice in its truest sense.

Now, for some views of my own on the specific legal issues raised by the parties in their
pleadings. The problem revolves around the power of the Secretary of the Department of
Justice vis-a-vis the operation of the Circuit Criminal Courts created by RA5179. The People
contends that by Administrative Order 258 and 271, Series of 1968 and Administrative Order
No. 226, Series of 1970, of the Secretary of Justice, issued pursuant allegedly to RA5179,
(presumably Section 8 thereof) the transfer of the criminal cases herein involved, Criminal
Cases Nos. 47-V and 48-V of the CFI of Ilocos Sur to the Circuit Criminal Court of the
Second Judicial District is legally justifiable. On the other hand, the defense submits that
under the uniformly announced doctrine of this Court regarding the jurisdictional nature of
the venue of criminal cases and principally because to give effect to the administrative
orders aforementioned would be impairing the independence of the judiciary, the accused in
aforesaid cases must be tried in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, by the CFI in which, it is a fact, the case
was filed on June 15, 1970, the very day Administrative Order No. 221 of the Secretary of
Justice authorizing Judge Lino Anover of the Circuit Criminal Court to hold sessions in Vigan
beginning July 1, 1970 was issued.

It is my considered view that the less said about the intervention of the Department of
Justice with the Circuit Criminal Courts by the issuance of Administrative Orders 258 and
274, Series of 1968 and worse Administrative Order No. 226, Series of 1970 the better, for I
find absolutely no legal authority for the issuance of said Orders. The first two purportedly
direct and instruct the judges of the various judicial districts of the Philippines as to how to
apportion among themselves, together with the corresponding circuit criminal court judges,
the cases falling within their concurrent jurisdiction. I feel very strongly that the distribution
of the powers of government by the Constitution places, even in its broadest sense,
everything that judges have to do that might in one way or another affect or be related to
the ultimate disposition of the controversies and cases to be tried by them, including the
distribution of the cases to be tried by them, entirely and exclusively with the judges
themselves by common agreement among them, and so I hold that whatever be the import
of Section 8 of RA5179 providing that "for administrative purposes, the Circuit Criminal
Courts shall be under the supervision of the Department of Justice," the same cannot be
considered as contemplating any intervention of the Secretary of Justice in the distribution
of cases among judges. That the common impression and long standing practice on the
matter are otherwise, cannot alter what, in my humble view, the Constitution ordains.

I take it that under RA5179, Circuit Criminal Courts are nothing but additional branches of
the regular Courts of First Instance in their respective districts with the limited concurrent
jurisdiction to take cognizance of, try and decide only those cases enumerated in Section 1
of the Act. This is readily implied from Section 3 of the Act which says:

SEC. 3. The provisions of all laws and the Rules of Court relative to the
judges of the Courts of First Instance and the trial, disposition and appeal of
criminal cases therein shall be applicable to the circuit judge and the cases
cognizable by them insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of
this Act.

It is also my conviction that when Congress enacted RA5179, it was conscious of the
existing doctrinal rule laid down by this Court, in Cunanan 1 that in criminal cases, venue is
equivalent to territorial jurisdiction and precisely because of this consciousness and the
knowledge that the nature of the crimes placed within the jurisdiction of the Circuit Criminal
Courts is such that their successful prosecution might be impaired or obstructed by the
doctrinal rule aforementioned that in Section 4 of the Act, Congress expressly provided that
as a rule, "cases shall be heard within the province where the crime subject of the offense
(sic) was committed" but "when the interest of justice so demands, with the prior approval
of the Supreme Court, cases may be heard in a neighboring province of the district."

It is contended that these quoted provisions of Section 4 contemplate only those cases
already in the Circuit Criminal Court. That may be so, but my view is that by the said
provisions, Congress has precisely opened the door for the regular courts trying cases of the
nature enumerated in the Act to shift those cases to the circuit criminal court in instances
like the present wherein it appears quite evident that to maintain Vigan as the venue of the
trials in question will defeat the ends of justice, for, after all, the circuit court is just another
branch of the CFI, and once it is in the former court, then Section 4 may be easily applied.
Moving of cases from one branch of a CFI to another branch thereof is neither new nor
unusual when the judges concerned are agreed that such a step would best promote the
interests of justice. In the light of this practice, commendable in its motivation, why cannot
the transfer be made from the CFI to circuit criminal court? Indeed, this should not be
treated as merely a matter of discretion; judges should feel bound to act accordingly, as a
matter of duty, hence a negative action in the appropriate cases is ground
for certiorari or mandamus. In this connection, however, I must hasten to advert, that the
interested parties should be duly heard on the matter and, in accordance with the spirit, if
not the letter of the law, approval of the Supreme Court be secured.

Apropos of all this discussion, I would like to make it clear that the rule invoked by the
defense to the effect that venue in criminal cases is jurisdictional in character has no
foundation in any act of the legislature. There can be no question that jurisdiction is
conferred only by law and that it is only venue that may be fixed by the Rules of Court
because jurisdiction is substantive and venue is merely procedural. The rule the defense
invokes is found only in a decision of this Court rendered way back in 1913. In
Cunanan, supra, this Court held: "The jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance of the
Philippine Islands, in criminal cases, is limited to certain well-defined territory. They cannot
take jurisdiction of persons charged with an offense alleged to have been committed outside
of that limited territory."
As can be noted, no provision of law is cited in support of the ruling. The reason is simple.
There is no such law. In other words, whatever force such invoked ruling may have is no
more than that of a construction given by this Court. I dare say that when a previous
construction by this Court runs counter to fundamental principles now separating the rule
making power of the courts from the legislative faculty to define and apportion jurisdiction,
it is best to lean in favor of recognizing the constitutional boundaries of our prerogatives
when they are plain and the contrary cannot be implied. And since it was this Court that
made the construction, there is nothing to stop Us from modifying the same, and inasmuch
as Section 14, par. (a) of Rule 110 is purely a rule of venue, not legislated upon by Congress
as a jurisdictional matter, Our power to change the same is unquestionable. I, therefore,
reiterate my concurrence in the resolution of this point in the main opinion.

Accordingly, I agree that the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in not yielding
to the suggested transfer of the cases in question to the circuit criminal court. Court trials
and proceedings mean nothing unless the pronouncement and decisions of the courts merit
the faith and trust of the parties in particular and the people in general. To the common
man specially, the imperatives of justice administered by our courts are: (1) judge who can
be trusted and (2) procedures that insulate the proceedings from all factors that may taint
the ultimate outcome of litigations with doubt and skepticism. To my mind, it is not enough
that a judge trusts himself or can be trusted as capable of acting in good faith, it is equally
important that no circumstance attendant to the proceedings should mar that quality of
trustworthiness. It is thus clear that by Our decision in this case, We are not expressing any
distrust as to the impartiality of respondent judge; it should be clearly understood, however,
that it is possible for his decision to be unfair not because he has made it so, but because
under the circumstances, the adulterated evidence before him leaves him no other
alternative.

May I say as I close that what is most striking in this decision is that it is a unanimous one,
in spite of the fact that at first blush it appeared that there were formidable adverse
precedents on our way. After long and careful deliberation and after viewing all its angles,
factual and legal, when the time for voting came, there was no hesitation in the assent that
all of us gave to the rationalizations and conclusions contained in the scholarly main opinion
of Mr. Justice Reyes and the dispositive part of the decision, but by no means and in
absolutely no degree did the public discussion generated by the peculiary circumstances and
personages involved in this case ever influence any of Us, as such things, indeed, never will.