Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 116719 January 18, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
PATRICIO AMIGO alias "BEBOT", accused-appellant.

DECISION

MELO, J.:

Initially, Patricio Amigo was charged with frustrated murder in an Information reading as follows:

The undersigned accuses the above-named accused of the crime of FRUSTRATED

MURDER, under Art. 248, in relation to Art. 5 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as
follows:

That on or about December 29, 1989, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, armed with a knife, with
treachery and evident premeditation and with intent to kill wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attacked, assaulted and stab with said weapon one Benito Ng Suy, thereby inflicting injuries
upon the latter, the following injuries, to wit:

MULTIPLE STAB WOUNDS-LEFT ARM, LEFT CHEST, ABDOMEN AND LEFT

THIGH WITH PENETRATION TO LEFT PLEURAL CAVITY, DIAPHRAGM
STOMACH, DUODENUM, PANCREAS AND MIDTRANVERSE COLON.

thus performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of murder as
a consequence but nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his
will, that is, because of the timely and able medical assistance immediately rendered to the
said Benito Ng Suy.

(p. 1, Rollo.)

to which he pleaded not guilty.

Subsequently, due to the death of the victim, an amended Information was filed charging now the
crime of murder, to wit:

That on or about December 29, 1989, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, armed with a knife, with
treachery and evident premeditation and with intent to kill wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attacked, assaulted and stabbed with said weapon one Benito Ng Suy, thereby inflicting
upon the latter multiple wounds which caused his death and the consequent loss and
damage to the heirs of the victim.
 (p. 3, Rollo.)

After trial on the merits, the court a quo rendered a decision, disposing:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused Patricio Amigo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of MURDER punishable under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, with no modifying
circumstance present, the accused is hereby sentenced to the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, which is the medium period of the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum to
death and to pay the cost; to indemnify the offended party the amount of P93,214.70 as
actual damages and P50,000.00 as compensatory damages and P50,000.00 as moral
damages.

(p. 32, Rollo.)

Reversal thereof is now sought, with accused-appellant arguing that error was committed by the trial
court in imposing or meting out the penalty of reclusion perpetua against him despite the fact that
Sec. 19 (1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution was already in effect when the offense was
committed.

The facts of the case, as briefly summarized in the brief submitted by the Office of the Solicitor
General and as borne out by the evidence, are as follows:

On December 29, 1989, at around 1:00 P.M., after having spent half-day at their store,
located at No. 166-A, Ramon Magsaysay Avenue, Davao City, Benito Ng Suy was driving
their gray Ford Fiera back home, situated at the back of Car Asia, Bajada, Davao City. With
him during that time were his daughters, Jocelyn Ng Suy and a younger one together with
his two year old son, who were all seated at the front seat beside him while a five year old
boy was also seated at the back of the said vehicle. (TSN, April 29, 1991, pp. 3-5; TSN,
March 31, 1992)

On their way home and while traversing the National Highway of Bajada, Davao City, an
orange Toyota Tamaraw driven by one Virgilio Abogada, suddenly made a left turn in front of
the Regional Hospital, Bajada, Davao City, without noticing the Ford Fiera coming from the
opposite direction. This Tamaraw was heading for Sterlyn Kitchenette, which was situated at
the comer of the said hospital. (TSN, April 29, 1991, p. 4; TSN, March 31, 1992, pp. 3 and
13)

With Virgilio was Patricio Amigo alias Bebot, a vulcanizer at Lingling's vulcanizing shop
owned and operated by a certain Galadua. He was also seated at the right front seat beside
Virgilio.

Due to the unexpected veer made by Virgilio, an accidental head on collision occurred
between the Fiera and the Tamaraw, causing a slight damaged to the right bumper of the
latter. (TSN, March 31, 1992, p. 4)

Right after the collision, Benito immediately alighted from the driver's seat and confronted
Virgilio Abogada who also went down from his vehicle. (TSN, April 29, 1991, p. 5)

Benito, who was a big man with a loud voice told Virgilio, "You were not looking," to which
Virgilio retorted, I did not see you". (TSN, April 29, 1991, p. 16)
While the two drivers where having this verbal confrontation, Patricio who was merely a
passenger of Virgilio also alighted from the front seat of the Tamaraw and instantaneously
approached Benito and advised the latter to leave since it was merely a small and minor
accident. (TSN, April 29, 1991, pp. 16-18)

A bit irritated with the actuation exhibit by Patricio, Benito rebuked the former and told him
not to interfere, since he had nothing to do with the accident. (ibid. p. 7)

Irked by the comment made by Benito, Patricio sarcastically asked; "You are Chinese, is it
you?" With a ready answer Benito said; "Yes, I am a Chinese and why?" Patricio in turn
replied; So, you are a Chinese, wait for a while," then left. (ibid. pp. 7 and 19)

Immediately thereafter, Benito ordered Jocelyn to call a policeman, but after a lapsed of
about one minute, Patricio returned and arrogantly approached Benito, asking the latter once
again, "You are a Chinese, is it not?" To this Benito calmly responded in the affirmative. (ibid.
pp. 7, 19-20)

Upon hearing the response, Patricio mumbled "Ah, so you are a Chinese," and suddenly
took a five inch knife from his waist and simultaneously stabbed Benito hitting him twice on
the chest. (Ibid. p. 20)

After being hit, Benito wounded and sensing that his life was in peril, tried to evade his
assailant by pushing Patricio away and run around the Tamaraw but Patricio wielding the
same knife and not content with the injuries he had already inflicted, still chased Benito and
upon overtaking the latter embraced him and thrusted his knife on the victim several times,
the last of which hit Benito on the left side of his body. (ibid. pp. 8, 10, 22)

It was at this juncture that Jocelyn who was still inside the Ford Fiera, pleading for mercy to
spare her father tried to get out of the vehicle but it was very unfortunate that she could not
open its door. (Ibid. p. 10)

Knowing that Patricio was really determined to kill her father by refusing to heed her pleas,
Joselyn shouted for help, since there were already several people around witnessing that
fatal incident, but to her consternation nobody lifted a single finger to help them. (ibid. pp. 6,
10, 18, 21-22) Only after her father lay seated on the floor of their Ford Fiera after being hit
on the left side of his body that she was able to open the door of the said vehicle. (Ibid. p 12)

After this precise moment, her younger sister, upon seeing their father bathing with his own
blood, embraced him, causing Patricio to cease from his ferocious assault and noticing the
presence of several people, he fled. (Ibid. p. 22)

Thereafter, an enraged Jocelyn chased him, but since the assailant ran faster than her, she
was not able to overtake him, thus, she instead decided to go back to where her father was
and carried him inside the Tamaraw who bumped them and consequently brought him to
San Pedro Hospital where he was attended to at the Emergency Room. (ibid. p 13)

While at the Emergency Room, Benito who was on a very critical condition, due to multiple
(13) stabbed wounds, was operated by Dr. Rolando Chiu. After the operation, he was
subsequently brought to the ICU and stayed there for three (3) weeks. (July 12, 1991, pp. 3
and 4)
 In a last ditch effort to save his life, having only 10 to 20 percent survival, Benito was airlifted
to Manila and was directly confined at the Chinese General Hospital. After three (3) weeks of
confinement, Benito expired. CAUSE OF DEATH SEPSIS (an overwhelming infection).
This means that the infection has already circulated in the blood all over the body. (ibid. pp.
6-7)

(pp. 59-65, Rollo.)

Accused-appellant contends that under the 1987 Constitution and prior to the promulgation of
Republic Act No. 7659, the death penalty had been abolished and hence, the penalty that should
have been imposed for the crime of murder committed by accused-appellant without the attendance
of any modifying circumstances, should be reclusion temporal in its medium period or 17 years, 4
months and 1 day, to 20 years of reclusion temporal.

Reasons out accused-appellant:

. . . Since the death penalty (or capital punishment) is not imposable when the stabbing and
killing happened, the computation of the penalty should be regarded from reclusion
perpetua down and not from death penalty. Indeed, the appropriate penalty is deducible
from reclusion perpetua down to reclusion temporal in its medium period. Hence, there being
no modifying circumstances present (p. 5 Decision, ibid.), the correct penalty should be in
the medium period (Art. 64, par. 1, Revised Penal Code) which is 17 years, 4 months and 1
day to 20 years of reclusion temporal.

(p. 10, Appellant's Brief, ff. p. 50, Rollo.)

The question raised by accused-appellant was settled by this Court in People vs. Muoz (170 SCRA
107 [1989]) thusly:

In People vs. Gavarra, Justice Pedro L. Yap declared for the Court that "in view of the
abolition of the death penalty under Section 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the
penalty that may be imposed for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period
to reclusion perpetua," thereby eliminating death as the original maximum period. Later,
without categorically saying so, the Court, through Justice Ameurfina A. Melencio-Herrera
in People vs. Masangkay and through Justice Andres R. Narvasa in People vs. Atencio,
divided the modified penalty into three new periods, the limits of which were specified by
Justice Edgardo L. Paras in People vs. Intino, as follows: the lower half of reclusion
temporal maximum as the minimum; the upper half of reclusion temporal maximum as the
medium; and reclusion perpetua as the maximum.

The Court has reconsidered the above cases and, after extended discussion, come to the
conclusion that the doctrine announced therein does not reflect the intention of the framers
as embodied in Article III, Section 19(1) of the Constitution. This conclusion is not
unanimous, to be sure. Indeed, there is much to be said of the opposite view, which was in
fact shared by many of those now voting for its reversal. The majority of the Court, however,
is of the belief that the original interpretation should be restored as the more acceptable
reading of the constitutional provision in question.

The advocates of the Masangkay ruling argue that the Constitution abolished the death
penalty and thereby limited the penalty for murder to the remaining periods, to wit, the
minimum and the medium. These should now be divided into three new periods in keeping
with the three-grade scheme intended by the legislature. Those who disagree feel that Article
III, Section 19(1) merely prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and has not, by
reducing it to reclusion perpetua, also correspondingly reduced the remaining penalties.
These should be maintained intact.

A reading of Section 19(1) of Article III will readily show that here is really nothing therein
which expressly declares the abolition of the death penalty. The provision merely says that
the death penalty shall not be imposed unless for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes the Congress hereafter provides for it and, if already imposed, shall be reduced
to reclusion perpetua. The language, while rather awkward, is still plain enough. And it is a
settled rule of legal hermeneutics that if the language under consideration is plain, it is
neither necessary nor permissible to resort to extrinsic aids, like the records of the
constitutional convention, for its interpretation.

xxx xxx xxx

The question as we see it is not whether the framers intended to abolish the death penalty or
merely to prevent its imposition. Whatever the intention was, what we should determine is
whether or not they also meant to require a corresponding modification in the other periods
as a result of the prohibition against the death penalty.

It is definite that such a requirement, if there really was one, is not at all expressed in Article
III, Section 19(1) of the Constitution or indicated therein by at least clear and unmistakable
implication. It would have been so easy, assuming such intention, to state it categorically and
plainly, leaving no doubts as to its meaning.

One searches in vain for such a statement, express or even implied. The writer of this
opinion makes the personal observation that this might be still another instance where the
framers meant one thing and said another or strangely, considering their loquacity
elsewhere did not say enough.

The original ruling as applied in the Gavarra, Masangkay, Atencio and Intino cases
represented the unanimous thinking of the Court as it was then constituted. All but two
members at that time still sit on the Court today. If we have seen fit to take a second look at
the doctrine on which we were all agreed before, it is not because of a change in the
composition of this body. It is virtually the same Court that is changing its mind after
reflecting on the question again in the light of new perspectives. And well it might, and can,
for the tenets it lays down are not immutable. The decisions of this Court are not petrified
rules grown rigid once pronounced but vital, growing things subject to change as all life is.
While we are told that the trodden path is best, this should not prevent us from opening a
fresh trial or exploring the other side or testing a new idea in a spirit of continuing inquiry.

Accordingly, with the hope that "as judges, (we) will be equal to (our) tasks," whatever that
means, we hereby reverse the current doctrine providing for three new periods for the
penalty for murder as reduced by the Constitution. Instead, we return to our original
interpretation and hold that Article III, Section 19(1) does not change the periods of the
penalty prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code except only insofar as it
prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and reduces it to reclusion perpetua. The range
of the medium and minimum penalties remains unchanged.

The Court realizes that this interpretation may lead to certain inequities that would not have
arisen under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code before its modification. Thus, a person
originally subject to the death penalty and another who committed the murder without the
 attendance of any modifying circumstance will now be both punishable with the same
medium period although the former is concededly more guilty than the latter. True enough.
But that is the will not of this Court but of the Constitution. That is a question of wisdom, not
construction. Of some relevance perhaps is the parable in the Bible of the workman who was
paid the stipulated daily wage of one penny although he had worked longer than others hired
later in the day also paid the same amount. When he complained because he felt unjustly
treated by the hoe jurisdiction of the court over the person. An appearance may be madt
agree with me for a penny?

The problem in any event is addressed not to this Court but to the Congress. Penalties are
prescribed by statute and are essentially and exclusively legislative. As judges, we can only
interpret and apply them and have no authority to modify them or revise their range as
determined exclusively by the legislature. We should not encroach on this prerogative of the
lawmaking body.

Coming back to the case at bar, we find that there being no generic aggravating or mitigating
circumstance attending the commission of the offenses, the applicable sentence is the
medium period of the penalty prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code which,
conformably to the new doctrine here adopted and announced, is still reclusion perpetua.
This is the penalty we imposed on all the accused-appellants for each of the three murders
they have committed in conspiracy with the others. The award of civil indemnity for the heirs
of each of the victims is affirmed but the amount thereof is hereby increased to P30,000.00 in
line with the present policy.

(at pp. 120-125.)

The above ruling was reiterated in People vs. Parominog (203 SCRA 673 [1991]) and in People
vs. De la Cruz (216 SCRA 476 [1992]).

Finally, accused-appellant claims that the penalty of reclusion perpetua is too cruel and harsh a
penalty and pleads for sympathy. Courts are not the forum to plead for sympathy. The duty of courts
is to apply the law, disregarding their feeling of sympathy or pity for an accused. DURA LEX SED
LEX. The remedy is elsewhere clemency from the executive or an amendment of the law by the
legislative, but surely, at this point, this Court can but apply the law.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995

SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S. GARCIA, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's
office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner
offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good customs and public
policy." 1

In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral
damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in addition
to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial court's discretion. The transcript on which
the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by
petitioner. 2 The transcript reads as follows:

Plaintiff Soccoro D. Ramirez (Chuchi) Good Afternoon M'am.

Defendant Ester S. Garcia (ESG) Ano ba ang nangyari sa 'yo,

nakalimot ka na kung paano ka napunta rito, porke member ka na,
magsumbong ka kung ano ang gagawin ko sa 'yo.

CHUCHI Kasi, naka duty ako noon.

ESG Tapos iniwan no. (Sic)

CHUCHI Hindi m'am, pero ilan beses na nila akong binalikan,

sabing ganoon

ESG Ito and (sic) masasabi ko sa 'yo, ayaw kung (sic) mag explain
ka, kasi hanggang 10:00 p.m., kinabukasan hindi ka na pumasok.
Ngayon ako ang babalik sa 'yo, nag-aaply ka sa States, nag-aaply ka
sa review mo, kung kakailanganin ang certification mo, kalimutan mo
na kasi hindi ka sa akin makakahingi.

CHUCHI Hindi M'am. Kasi ang ano ko talaga noon i-cocontinue ko

up to 10:00 p.m.
ESG Bastos ka, nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka pumasok dito
sa hotel. Magsumbong ka sa Union kung gusto mo. Nakalimutan mo
na kung paano ka nakapasok dito "Do you think that on your own
makakapasok ka kung hindi ako. Panunumbyoyan na kita
(Sinusumbatan na kita).

CHUCHI Itutuloy ko na M'am sana ang duty ko.

ESG Kaso ilang beses na akong binabalikan doon ng mga no (sic)

ko.

ESG Nakalimutan mo na ba kung paano ka pumasok sa hotel,

kung on your own merit alam ko naman kung gaano ka "ka bobo" mo.
Marami ang nag-aaply alam kong hindi ka papasa.

CHUCHI Kumuha kami ng exam noon.

ESG Oo, pero hindi ka papasa.

CHUCHI Eh, bakit ako ang nakuha ni Dr. Tamayo

ESG Kukunin ka kasi ako.

CHUCHI Eh, di sana

ESG Huwag mong ipagmalaki na may utak ka kasi wala kang

utak. Akala mo ba makukuha ka dito kung hindi ako.

CHUCHI Mag-eexplain ako.

ESG Huwag na, hindi ako mag-papa-explain sa 'yo, makaalala ka

kung paano ka puma-rito. "Putang-ina" sasabi-sabihin mo kamag-
anak ng nanay at tatay mo ang mga magulang ko.

ESG Wala na akong pakialam, dahil nandito ka sa loob, nasa

labas ka puwede ka ng hindi pumasok, okey yan nasaloob ka umalis
ka doon.

CHUCHI Kasi M'am, binbalikan ako ng mga taga Union.

ESG Nandiyan na rin ako, pero huwag mong kalimutan na hindi ka

makakapasok kung hindi ako. Kung hindi mo kinikilala yan okey lang
sa akin, dahil tapos ka na.

CHUCHI Ina-ano ko m'am na utang na loob.

ESG Huwag na lang, hindi mo utang na loob, kasi kung baga sa

no, nilapastangan mo ako.

CHUCHI Paano kita nilapastanganan?

 ESG Mabuti pa lumabas ka na. Hindi na ako makikipagusap sa
'yo. Lumabas ka na. Magsumbong ka. 3

As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the
confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping
and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes." An information charging
petitioner of violation of the said Act, dated October 6, 1988 is quoted herewith:

INFORMATION

The Undersigned Assistant City Fiscal Accusses Socorro D. Ramirez of Violation of

Republic Act No. 4200, committed as follows:

That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1988, in Pasay City Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this honorable court,
the above-named accused, Socorro D. Ramirez not being authorized
by Ester S. Garcia to record the latter's conversation with said
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
the use of a tape recorder secretly record the said conversation and
thereafter communicate in writing the contents of the said recording
to other person.

Contrary to law.

Pasay City, Metro Manila, September 16, 1988.

MARIANO M.
CUNETA
Asst. City Fiscal

Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground
that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. In an order
May 3, 1989, the trial court granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner that 1) the facts
charged do not constitute an offense under R.A. 4200; and that 2) the violation punished by R.A.
4200 refers to a the taping of a communication by a person other than a participant to the
communication. 4

From the trial court's Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this
Court, which forthwith referred the case to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution (by the First Division)
of June 19, 1989.

On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision declaring the
trial court's order of May 3, 1989 null and void, and holding that:

[T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under Section 1 of R.A.

4200. In thus quashing the information based on the ground that the facts alleged do
not constitute an offense, the respondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion
correctible by certiorari. 5
Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which respondent
Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution 6 dated June 19, 1990. Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal issue" 7 that the applicable provision of
Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to the
conversation. She contends that the provision merely refers to the unauthorized taping of a private
conversation by a party other than those involved in the communication.8 In relation to this, petitioner
avers that the substance or content of the conversation must be alleged in the Information, otherwise the
facts charged would not constitute a violation of R.A. 4200. 9 Finally, petitioner agues that R.A. 4200
penalizes the taping of a "private communication," not a "private conversation" and that consequently, her
act of secretly taping her conversation with private respondent was not illegal under the said act. 10

We disagree.

First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the language
of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and
interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible 11 or
absurb or would lead to an injustice. 12

Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related
Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes," provides:

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to
any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any
other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone
or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise
described.

The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by
all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a
tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the
statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication.
The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by
the use of the qualifier "any". Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded,
"even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without
the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator" 13 under this provision of R.A. 4200.

A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent court's
conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal,
unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or communications taken either by the parties
themselves or by third persons. Thus:

xxx xxx xxx

Senator Taada: That qualified only "overhear".

Senator Padilla: So that when it is intercepted or recorded, the element of secrecy

would not appear to be material. Now, suppose, Your Honor, the recording is not
made by all the parties but by some parties and involved not criminal cases that
would be mentioned under section 3 but would cover, for example civil cases or
special proceedings whereby a recording is made not necessarily by all the parties
but perhaps by some in an effort to show the intent of the parties because the
actuation of the parties prior, simultaneous even subsequent to the contract or the
act may be indicative of their intention. Suppose there is such a recording, would you
say, Your Honor, that the intention is to cover it within the purview of this bill or
outside?

Senator Taada: That is covered by the purview of this bill, Your Honor.

Senator Padilla: Even if the record should be used not in the prosecution of offense
but as evidence to be used in Civil Cases or special proceedings?

Senator Taada: That is right. This is a complete ban on tape recorded

conversations taken without the authorization of all the parties.

Senator Padilla: Now, would that be reasonable, your Honor?

Senator Taada: I believe it is reasonable because it is not sporting to record the

observation of one without his knowing it and then using it against him. It is not fair, it
is not sportsmanlike. If the purpose; Your honor, is to record the intention of the
parties. I believe that all the parties should know that the observations are being
recorded.

Senator Padilla: This might reduce the utility of recorders.

Senator Taada: Well no. For example, I was to say that in meetings of the board of
directors where a tape recording is taken, there is no objection to this if all the parties
know. It is but fair that the people whose remarks and observations are being made
should know that the observations are being recorded.

Senator Padilla: Now, I can understand.

Senator Taada: That is why when we take statements of persons, we say: "Please
be informed that whatever you say here may be used against you." That is fairness
and that is what we demand. Now, in spite of that warning, he makes damaging
statements against his own interest, well, he cannot complain any more. But if you
are going to take a recording of the observations and remarks of a person without
him knowing that it is being taped or recorded, without him knowing that what is
being recorded may be used against him, I think it is unfair.

xxx xxx xxx

(Congression Record, Vol. III, No. 31, p. 584, March 12, 1964)

Senator Diokno: Do you understand, Mr. Senator, that under Section 1 of the bill as
now worded, if a party secretly records a public speech, he would be penalized under
Section 1? Because the speech is public, but the recording is done secretly.

Senator Taada: Well, that particular aspect is not contemplated by the bill. It is the
communication between one person and another person not between a speaker
and a public.
 xxx xxx xxx

(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, p. 626, March 12, 1964)

xxx xxx xxx

The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted
deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view held by the
respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private
communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.

Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of
the same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts
of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices
enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private
communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1
of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court:
"Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of
the conversation, as well as its communication to a third person should be professed." 14

Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200
does not include "private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word "communication"
to a point of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning "to
share or to impart." In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or
imparting signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in
a conversation, 15 or signifies the "process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between
individuals through a common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)" 16 These definitions
are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of "meanings or
thoughts" which are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between
petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office. Any doubts about the legislative
body's meaning of the phrase "private communication" are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the
terms "conversation" and "communication" were interchangeably used by Senator Taada in his
Explanatory Note to the bill quoted below:

It has been said that innocent people have nothing to fear from
their conversations being overheard. But this statement ignores the usual nature
of conversations as well the undeniable fact that most, if not all, civilized people have
some aspects of their lives they do not wish to expose. Free conversationsare often
characterized by exaggerations, obscenity, agreeable falsehoods, and the
expression of anti-social desires of views not intended to be taken seriously. The
right to the privacy of communication, among others, has expressly been assured by
our Constitution. Needless to state here, the framers of our Constitution must have
recognized the nature of conversations between individuals and the significance of
man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They must have known that
part of the pleasures and satisfactions of life are to be found in the unaudited, and
free exchange of communication between individuals free from every unjustifiable
intrusion by whatever means. 17

In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 18 a case which dealt with the issue of telephone
wiretapping, we held that the use of a telephone extension for the purpose of overhearing a private
conversation without authorization did not violate R.A. 4200 because a telephone extension devise was
neither among those "device(s) or arrangement(s)" enumerated therein, 19 following the principle that
"penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused." 20 The instant case turns on a different
note, because the applicable facts and circumstances pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer from no
ambiguity, and the statute itself explicitly mentions the unauthorized "recording" of private
communications with the use of tape-recorders as among the acts punishable.

WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at bench is clear and unambiguous and
leaves us with no discretion, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Davide, Jr. and Bellosillo JJ., concur.

Hermosisima, Jr., J., is on leave.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 82511 March 3, 1992

GLOBE-MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and IMELDA SALAZAR, respondents.

Castillo, Laman, Tan & Pantaleon for petitioner.

Gerardo S. Alansalon for private respondent.

ROMERO, J.:

For private respondent Imelda L. Salazar, it would seem that her close association with Delfin
Saldivar would mean the loss of her job. In May 1982, private respondent was employed by Globe-
Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation (GMCR) as general systems analyst. Also employed by
petitioner as manager for technical operations' support was Delfin Saldivar with whom private
respondent was allegedly very close.

Sometime in 1984, petitioner GMCR, prompted by reports that company equipment and spare parts
worth thousands of dollars under the custody of Saldivar were missing, caused the investigation of
the latter's activities. The report dated September 25, 1984 prepared by the company's internal
auditor, Mr. Agustin Maramara, indicated that Saldivar had entered into a partnership styled
Concave Commercial and Industrial Company with Richard A. Yambao, owner and manager of
Elecon Engineering Services (Elecon), a supplier of petitioner often recommended by Saldivar. The
report also disclosed that Saldivar had taken petitioner's missing Fedders airconditioning unit for his
own personal use without authorization and also connived with Yambao to defraud petitioner of its
property. The airconditioner was recovered only after petitioner GMCR filed an action for replevin
against Saldivar. 1

It likewise appeared in the course of Maramara's investigation that Imelda Salazar violated company
reglations by involving herself in transactions conflicting with the company's interests. Evidence
showed that she signed as a witness to the articles of partnership between Yambao and Saldivar. It
also appeared that she had full knowledge of the loss and whereabouts of the Fedders airconditioner
but failed to inform her employer.

Consequently, in a letter dated October 8, 1984, petitioner company placed private respondent
Salazar under preventive suspension for one (1) month, effective October 9, 1984, thus giving her
thirty (30) days within which to, explain her side. But instead of submitting an explanations three (3)
days later or on October 12, 1984 private respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for illegal
suspension, which she subsequently amended to include illegal dismissal, vacation and sick leave
benefits, 13th month pay and damages, after petitioner notified her in writing that effective November
8, 1984, she was considered dismissed "in view of (her) inability to refute and disprove these
findings. 2

After due hearing, the Labor Arbiter in a decision dated July 16, 1985, ordered petitioner company to
reinstate private respondent to her former or equivalent position and to pay her full backwages and
other benefits she would have received were it not for the illegal dismissal. Petitioner was also
ordered to pay private respondent moral damages of P50,000.00. 3

On appeal, public respondent National Labor Relations, Commission in the questioned resolution
dated December 29, 1987 affirmed the aforesaid decision with respect to the reinstatement of
private respondent but limited the backwages to a period of two (2) years and deleted the award for
moral damages. 4

Hence, this petition assailing the Labor Tribunal for having committed grave abuse of discretion in
holding that the suspension and subsequent dismissal of private respondent were illegal and in
ordering her reinstatement with two (2) years' backwages.

On the matter of preventive suspension, we find for petitioner GMCR.

The inestigative findings of Mr. Maramara, which pointed to Delfin Saldivar's acts in conflict with his
position as technical operations manager, necessitated immediate and decisive action on any
employee closely, associated with Saldivar. The suspension of Salazar was further impelled by th.e
discovery of the missing Fedders airconditioning unit inside the apartment private respondent shared
with Saldivar. Under such circumstances, preventive suspension was the proper remedial recourse
available to the company pending Salazar's investigation. By itself, preventive suspension does, not
signify that the company has adjudged the employee guilty of the charges she was asked to answer
and explain. Such disciplinary measure is resorted to for the protection of the company's property
pending investigation any alleged malfeasance or misfeasance committed by the employee. 5

Thus, it is not correct to conclude that petitioner GMCR had violated Salazar's right to due process
when she was promptly suspended. If at all, the fault, lay with private respondent when she ignored
petitioner's memorandum of October 8, 1984 "giving her ample opportunity to present (her) side to
the Management." Instead, she went directly to the Labor Department and filed her complaint for
illegal suspension without giving her employer a chance to evaluate her side of the controversy.

But while we agree with the propriety of Salazar's preventive suspension, we hold that her eventual
separation from employment was not for cause.

What is the remedy in law to rectify an unlawful dismissal so as to "make whole" the victim who has
not merely lost her job which, under settled Jurisprudence, is a property right of which a person is
not to be deprived without due process, but also the compensation that should have accrued to her
during the period when she was unemployed?

Art. 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides:

Security of Tenure. In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not

terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by
this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full
backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary
equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to
the time of his actual reinstatement. 6 (Emphasis supplied)
Corollary thereto are the following provisions of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the
Labor Code:

Sec. 2. Security of Tenure. In cases of regular employments, the employer shall

not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause as provided in the
Labor Code or when authorized by existing laws.

Sec. 3. Reinstatement. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall by

entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to
backwages." 7 (Emphasis supplied)

Before proceeding any furthers, it needs must be recalled that the present Constitution has gone
further than the 1973 Charter in guaranteeing vital social and economic rights to marginalized
groups of society, including labor. Given the pro-poor orientation of several articulate Commissioners
of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, it was not surprising that a whole new Article emerged on
Social Justice and Human Rights designed, among other things, to "protect and enhance the right of
all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic and political inequalities, and remove
cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good." 8 Proof of the
priority accorded to labor is that it leads the other areas of concern in the Article on Social Justice, viz., Labor ranks ahead of such topics as
Agrarian and Natural Resources Reform, Urban Land Roform and Housing, Health, Women, Role and Rights of Poople's Organizations and
Human Rights. 9

The opening paragraphs on Labor states

The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities
for all.

It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining

and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in
accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions
of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making
processes affecting their rights and benefits is may be provided by law.10 (Emphasis
supplied)

Compare this with the sole.provision on Labor in the 1973 Constitution under the Article an
Declaration of Principles and State Policies that provides:

Sec. 9. The state shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment and
equality in employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or
creed, and regulate the relations between workers and employers. The State shall
ensure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective baegaining, security of
tenure, and just and humane conditions of work. The State may provide for
compulsory arbitration. 11

To be sure, both Charters recognize "security of tenure" as one of the rights of labor which the State
is mandated to protect. But there is no gainsaying the fact that the intent of the framers of the
present Constitution was to give primacy to the rights of labor and afford the sector "full protection,"
at least greater protection than heretofore accorded them, regardless of the geographical location of
the workers and whether they are organized or not.
It was then CONCOM Commissioner, now Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., who substantially
contributed to the present formulation of the protection to labor provision and proposed that the
same be incorporated in the Article on Social Justice and not just in the Article on Declaration of
Principles and State Policies "in the light of the special importance that we are giving now to social
justice and the necessity of emphasizing the scope and role of social justice in national
development." 12

If we have taken pains to delve into the background of the labor provisions in our Constitution and
the Labor Code, it is but to stress that the right of an employee not to be dismissed from his job
except for a just or authorized cause provided by law has assumed greater importance under the
1987 Constitution with the singular prominence labor enjoys under the article on Social Justice. And
this transcendent policy has been translated into law in the Labor Code. Under its terms, where a
case of unlawful or unauthorized dismissal has been proved by the aggrieved employee, or on the
other hand, the employer whose duty it is to prove the lawfulness or justness of his act of dismissal
has failed to do so, then the remedies provided in Article 279 should find, application. Consonant
with this liberalized stance vis-a-vis labor, the legislature even went further by enacting Republic Act
No. 6715 which took effect on March 2, 1989 that amended said Article to remove any possible
ambiguity that jurisprudence may have generated which watered down the constitutional intent to
grant to labor "full protection." 13

To go back to the instant case, there being no evidence to show an authorized, much less a legal,
cause for the dismissal of private respondent, she had every right, not only to be entitled to
reinstatement, but ay well, to full backwages." 14

The intendment of the law in prescribing the twin remedies of reinstatement and payment of
backwages is, in the former, to restore the dismissed employee to her status before she lost her job,
for the dictionary meaning of the word "reinstate" is "to restore to a state, conditione positions etc.
from which one had been removed" 15 and in the latter, to give her back the income lost during the
period of unemployment. Both remedies, looking to the past, would perforce make her "whole."

Sadly, the avowed intent of the law has at times been thwarted when reinstatement has not been
forthcoming and the hapless dismissed employee finds himself on the outside looking in.

Over time, the following reasons have been advanced by the Court for denying reinstatement under
the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto; that reinstatement can no longer be effected in
view of the long passage of time (22 years of litigation) or because of the realities of the
situation; 16 or that it would be "inimical to the employer's interest; " 17 or that reinstatement may no longer
be feasible; 18 or, that it will not serve the best interests of the parties involved; 19 or that the company
would be prejudiced by the workers' continued employment; 20 or that it will not serve any prudent
purpose as when supervening facts have transpired which make execution on that score unjust or
inequitable 21 or, to an increasing extent, due to the resultant atmosphere of "antipathy and antagonism"
or "strained relations" or "irretrievable estrangement" between the employer and the employee. 22

In lieu of reinstatement, the Court has variously ordered the payment of backwages and separation
pay 23 or solely separation pay. 24

In the case at bar, the law is on the side of private respondent. In the first place the wording of the
Labor Code is clear and unambiguous: "An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be
entitled to reinstatement. . . . and to his full backwages. . . ." 25 Under the principlesof statutory
construction, if a statute is clears plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation. This plain-meaning rule or verba legis derived from the
maxim index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention) rests on the valid presumption that the
words employed by, the legislature in a statute correctly express its intent or will and preclude the court
from construing it differently. 26 The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to:have
used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the
statute. 27 Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure.
Neither does the provision admit of any qualification. If in the wisdom of the Court, there may be a ground
or grounds for non-application of the above-cited provision, this should be by way of exception, such as
when the reinstatement may be inadmissible due to ensuing strained relations between the employer and
the employee.

In such cases, it should be proved that the employee concerned occupies a position where he
enjoys the trust and confidence of his employer; and that it is likely that if reinstated, an atmosphere
of antipathy and antagonism may be generated as to adversely affect the efficiency and productivity
of the employee concerned.

A few examples, will suffice to illustrate the Court's application of the above principles: where the
employee is a Vice-President for Marketing and as such, enjoys the full trust and confidence of top
management; 28 or is the Officer-In-Charge of the extension office of the bank where he works; 29 or is an
organizer of a union who was in a position to sabotage the union's efforts to organize the workers in
commercial and industrial establishments; 30 or is a warehouseman of a non-profit organization whose
primary purpose is to facilitate and maximize voluntary gifts. by foreign individuals and organizations to
the Philippines; 31 or is a manager of its Energy Equipment Sales. 32

Obviously, the principle of "strained relations" cannot be applied indiscriminately. Otherwisey

reinstatement can never be possible simply because some hostility is invariably engendered
between the parties as a result of litigation. That is human nature. 33

Besides, no strained relations should arise from a valid and legal act of asserting one's right;
otherwise an employee who shall assert his right could be easily separated from the service, by
merely paying his separation pay on the pretext that his relationship with his employer had already
become strained. 34

Here, it has not been proved that the position of private respondent as systems analyst is one that
may be characterized as a position of trust and confidence such that if reinstated, it may well lead to
strained relations between employer and employee. Hence, this does not constitute an exception to
the general rule mandating reinstatement for an employee who has been unlawfully dismissed.

On the other hand, has she betrayed any confidence reposed in her by engaging in transactions that
may have created conflict of interest situations? Petitioner GMCR points out that as a matter of
company policy, it prohibits its employees from involving themselves with any company that has
business dealings with GMCR. Consequently, when private respondent Salazar signed as a witness
to the partnership papers of Concave (a supplier of Ultra which in turn is also a supplier of GMCR),
she was deemed to have placed. herself in an untenable position as far as petitioner was concerned.

However, on close scrutiny, we agree with public respondent that such a circumstance did not create
a conflict of interests situation. As a systems analyst, Salazar was very far removed from operations
involving the procurement of supplies. Salazar's duties revolved around the development of systems
and analysis of designs on a continuing basis. In other words, Salazar did not occupy a position of
trust relative to the approval and purchase of supplies and company assets.

In the instant case, petitioner has predicated its dismissal of Salazar on loss of confidence. As we
have held countless times, while loss of confidence or breach of trust is a valid ground for
terminations it must rest an some basis which must be convincingly established. 35 An employee who
not be dismissed on mere presumptions and suppositions. Petitioner's allegation that since Salazar and
Saldivar lived together in the same apartment, it "presumed reasonably that complainant's sympathy
would be with Saldivar" and its averment that Saldivar's investigation although unverified, was probably
true, do not pass this Court's test. 36 While we should not condone the acts of disloyalty of an employee,
neither should we dismiss him on the basis of suspicion derived from speculative inferences.

To rely on the Maramara report as a basis for Salazar's dismissal would be most inequitous because
the bulk of the findings centered principally oh her friend's alleged thievery and anomalous
transactions as technical operations' support manager. Said report merely insinuated that in view of
Salazar's special relationship with Saldivar, Salazar might have had direct knowledge of Saldivar's
questionable activities. Direct evidence implicating private respondent is wanting from the records.

It is also worth emphasizing that the Maramara report came out after Saldivar had already resigned
from GMCR on May 31, 1984. Since Saldivar did not have the opportunity to refute management's
findings, the report remained obviously one-sided. Since the main evidence obtained by petitioner
dealt principally on the alleged culpability of Saldivar, without his having had a chance to voice his
side in view of his prior resignation, stringent examination should have been carried out to ascertain
whether or not there existed independent legal grounds to hold Salatar answerable as well and,
thereby, justify her dismissal. Finding none, from the records, we find her to have been unlawfully
dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission
dated December 29, 1987 is hereby AFFIRMED. Petitioner GMCR is ordered to REINSTATE private
respondent Imelda Salazar and to pay her backwages equivalent to her salary for a period of two (2)
years only.

This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Paras, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr. and Nocon, JJ., concur.

Cruz, J., concurs in the result.

Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Padilla, JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

I believe there is just cause for dismissal per investigative findings. (See Decision, p. 2.)

Narvasa C.J., concurs

Separate Opinions

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

I believe there is just cause for dismissal per investigative findings. (See Decision, p. 2.)

Narvasa C.J., concurs

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 109445 November 7, 1994

FELICITO BASBACIO, petitioner,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FRANKLIN DRILON in his
capacity as Secretary of Justice, respondent.

Amparita S. Sta. Maria for petitioner.

MENDOZA, J.:

This case presents for determination the scope of the State's liability under Rep. Act No. 7309, which
among other things provides compensation for persons who are unjustly accused, convicted and
imprisoned but on appeal are acquitted and ordered released.

Petitioner Felicito Basbacio and his son-in-law, Wilfredo Balderrama, were convicted of frustrated
murder and of two counts of frustrated murder for the killing of Federico Boyon and the wounding of
the latter's wife Florida and his son Tirso, at Palo, Calanuga, Rapu-Rapu, Albay, on the night of June
26, 1988. The motive for the killing was apparently a land dispute between the Boyons and
petitioner. Petitioner and his son-in-law were sentenced to imprisonment and ordered immediately
detained after their bonds had been cancelled.

Petitioner and his son-in-law appealed. Only petitioner's appeal proceeded to judgment, however, as
the appeal of the other accused was dismissed for failure to file his brief.

On June 22, 1992 the Court of Appeals rendered a decision acquitting petitioner on the ground that
the prosecution failed to prove conspiracy between him and his son-in-law. He had been pointed to
by a daughter of Federico Boyon as the companion of Balderrama when the latter barged into their
hut and without warning started shooting, but the appellate court ruled that because petitioner did
nothing more, petitioner's presence at the scene of the crime was insufficient to show conspiracy.

Based on his acquittal, petitioner filed a claim under Rep. Act No. 7309, sec. 3(a), which provides for
the payment of compensation to "any person who was unjustly accused, convicted, imprisoned but
subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal." 1 The claim was filed with the Board of
Claims of the Department of Justice, but the claim was denied on the ground that while petitioner's
presence at the scene of the killing was not sufficient to find him guilty beyond reasonable doubt, yet,
considering that there was bad blood between him and the deceased as a result of a land dispute and the
fact that the convicted murderer is his son-in-law, there was basis for finding that he was "probably guilty."

On appeal, respondent Secretary of Justice affirmed the Board's ruling. Said the Secretary of Justice
in his resolution dated March 11, 1993:
 It is believed therefore that the phrase "any person . . . unjustly accused, convicted
and imprisoned" in Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7309 refers to an individual who was
wrongly accused and imprisoned for a crime he did not commit, thereby making him
"a victim of unjust imprisonment." In the instant case, however, Claimant/Appellant
cannot be deemed such a victim since a reading of the decision of his acquittal
shows that his exculpation is not based on his innocence, but upon, in effect, a
finding of reasonable doubt.

Petitioner brought this petition for review on certiorari. Neither Rule 45 nor Rep. Act No. 7309,
however, provides for review by certiorari of the decisions of the Secretary of Justice. Nonetheless,
in view of the importance of the question tendered, the Court resolved to treat the petition as a
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.

Petitioner questions the basis of the respondent's ruling that to be able to recover under sec. 3(a) of
the law the claimant must on appeal be found to be innocent of the crimes of which he was
convicted in the trial court. Through counsel he contends that the language of sec. 3(a) is clear and
does not call for interpretation. The "mere fact that the claimant was imprisoned for a crime which he
was subsequently acquitted of is already unjust in itself," he contends. To deny his claim because he
was not declared innocent would be to say that his imprisonment for two years while his appeal was
pending was justified. Petitioner argues that there is only one requirement for conviction in criminal
cases and that is proof beyond reasonable doubt. If the prosecution fails to present such proof, the
presumption that the accused is innocent stands and, therefore, there is no reason for requiring that
he be declared innocent of the crime before he can recover compensation for his imprisonment.

Petitioner's contention has no merit. It would require that every time an accused is acquitted on
appeal he must be given compensation on the theory that he was "unjustly convicted" by the trial
court. Such a reading of sec. 3(a) is contrary to petitioner's professed canon of construction that
when the language of the statute is clear it should be given its natural meaning. It leaves out of the
provision in question the qualifying word "unjustly" so that the provision would simply read: "The
following may file claims for compensation before the Board: (a) any person who was accused,
convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal."

But sec. 3(a) requires that the claimant be "unjustly accused, convicted [and] imprisoned." The fact
that his conviction is reversed and the accused is acquitted is not itself proof that the previous
conviction was "unjust." An accused may be acquitted for a number of reasons and his conviction by
the trial court may, for any of these reasons, be set aside. For example, he may be acquitted not
because he is innocent of the crime charged but because of reasonable doubt, in which case he
may be found civilly liable to the complainant, because while the evidence against him does not
satisfy the quantum of proof required for conviction, it may nonetheless be sufficient to sustain a civil
action for damages. 2 In one case the accused, an alien, was acquitted of statutory rape with homicide
because of doubt as to the ages of the offended parties who consented to have sex with him.
Nonetheless the accused was ordered to pay moral and exemplary damages and ordered deported. 3 In
such a case to pay the accused compensation for having been "unjustly convicted" by the trial court
would be utterly inconsistent with his liability to the complainant. Yet to follow petitioner's theory such an
accused would be entitled to compensation under sec. 3(a).

The truth is that the presumption of innocence has never been intended as evidence of innocence of
the accused but only to shift the burden of proof that he is guilty to the prosecution. If "accusation is
not synonymous with guilt," 4so is the presumption of innocence not a proof thereof. It is one thing to say
that the accused is presumed to be innocent in order to place on the prosecution the burden of proving
beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty. It is quite another thing to say that he is innocent and
if he is convicted that he has been "unjustly convicted." As this Court held in a case:
 Though we are acquitting the appellant for the crime of rape with homicide, we
emphasize that we are not ruling that he is innocent or blameless. It is only the
constitutional presumption of innocence and the failure of the prosecution to build an
airtight case for conviction which saved him, not that the facts of unlawful conduct do
not exist. 5

To say then that an accused has been "unjustly convicted" has to do with the manner of his
conviction rather than with his innocence. An accused may on appeal be acquitted because he did
not commit the crime, but that does
not necessarily mean that he is entitled to compensation for having been the victim of an "unjust
conviction." If his conviction was due to an error in the appreciation of the evidence the conviction
while erroneous is not unjust. That is why it is not, on the other hand, correct to say as does
respondent, that under the law liability for compensation depends entirely on the innocence of the
accused.

The phrase "unjustly convicted" has the same meaning as "knowingly rendering an unjust judgment"
in art. 204 of the Revised Penal Code. What this Court held in In re Rafael C. Climaco 6 applies:

In order that a judge may be held liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, it
must be shown beyond doubt that the judgment is unjust as it is contrary to law or is
not supported by the evidence, and the same was made with conscious and
deliberate intent to do an injustice . . . .

To hold a judge liable for the rendition of manifestly unjust judgment by reason of
inexcusable negligence or ignorance, it must be shown, according to Groizard, that
although he has acted without malice, he failed to observe in the performance of his
duty, that diligence, prudence and care which the law is entitled to exact in the
rendering of any public service. Negligence and ignorance are inexcusable if they
imply a manifest injustice which cannot be explained by a reasonable interpretation.
Inexcusable mistake only exists in the legal concept when it implies a manifest
injustice, that is to say, such injustice which cannot be explained by a reasonable
interpretation, even though there is a misunderstanding or error of the law applied,
yet in the contrary it results, logically and reasonably, and in a very clear and
indisputable manner, in the notorious violation of the legal precept.

Indeed, sec. 3(a) does not refer solely to an unjust conviction as a result of which the accused is
unjustly imprisoned, but, in addition, to an unjust accusation. The accused must have been "unjustly
accused, in consequence of which he is unjustly convicted and then imprisoned. It is important to
note this because if from its inception the prosecution of the accused has been wrongful, his
conviction by the court is, in all probability, also wrongful. Conversely, if the prosecution is not
malicious any conviction even though based on less than the required quantum of proof in criminal
cases may be erroneous but not necessarily unjust.

The reason is that under Rule 112, sec. 4, the question for the prosecutor in filing a case in court is
not whether the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt but only whether "there is reasonable
ground to believe that a crime has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof."
Hence, an accusation which is based on "probable guilt" is not an unjust accusation and a conviction
based on such degree of proof is not necessarily an unjust judgment but only an erroneous one. The
remedy for such error is appeal.

In the case at bar there is absolutely no evidence to show that petitioner's conviction by the trial
court was wrongful or that it was the product of malice or gross ignorance or gross negligence. To
the contrary, the court had reason to believe that petitioner and his co-accused were in league,
because petitioner is the father-in-law of Wilfredo Balderrama and it was petitioner who bore the
victim a grudge because of a land dispute. Not only that. Petitioner and his coaccused arrived
together in the hut of the victims and forced their way into it.

The Court of Appeals ruled there was no conspiracy only because there was no proof that he did or
say anything on the occasion. Said the appellate court.

Both eyewitness testimonies fail to show the appellant Felicito Basbacio to have
committed any act at all. Both fail to show Felicito Basbacio as having said anything
at all. Both fail to show Felicito Basbacio as having committed anything in
furtherance of a conspiracy to commit the crimes charged against the defendants. It
seems to be a frail and flimsy basis on which to conclude that conspiracy existed
between actual killer Wilfredo Balderrama and Felicito Basbacio to commit murder
and two frustrated murders on that night of June 26, 1988. It may be asked: where
was the coming together of the two defendants to an agreement to commit the
crimes of murder and frustrated murder on two counts? Where was Basbacio's
contribution to the commission of the said crimes? Basbacio was as the record
shows nothing but part of the dark shadows of that night. . . .

One may take issue with this ruling because precisely conspiracy may be shown by concert of action
and other circumstances. Why was petitioner with his son-in-law? Why did they apparently flee
together? And what about the fact that there was bad blood between petitioner and the victim
Federico Boyon? These questions may no longer be passed upon in view of the acquittal of
petitioner but they are relevant in evaluating his claim that he had been unjustly accused, convicted
and imprisoned before he was released because of his acquittal on appeal. We hold that in view of
these circumstances respondent Secretary of Justice and the Board of Claims did not commit a
grave abuse of its discretion in disallowing petitioner's claim for compensation under Rep. Act No.
7309.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug
and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

# Footnotes

1 The statute in pertinent parts provide:

Sec. 3. Who may File Claims. The following may file claims for compensation
before the Board:

a) any person who was unjustly accused, convicted, imprisoned but subsequently
released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal;
b) any person who was unjustly detained and released without being charged;

c) any victim of arbitrary or illegal detention by the authorities as defined in the

Revised Penal Code under a final judgment of the court; and

d) any person who is a victim of violent crimes. For purposes of this Act, violent
crimes shall include rape and shall likewise refer to offenses committed with malice
which resulted in death or serious physical and/or psychological injuries, permanent
incapacity or disability, insanity, abortion, serious trauma, or committed with torture,
cruelty or barbarity.

Sec. 4. Award Ceiling. For victims of unjust imprisonment or detention, the

compensation shall be based on the number of months of imprisonment or detention
and every fraction thereof shall be considered one month: Provided, however, That in
no case shall such compensation exceed One thousand pesos (P1,000.00) per
month.

In all other cases, the maximum amount for which the Board may approve a claim
shall not exceed Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) or the amount necessary to
reimburse the claimant the expenses incurred for hospitalization, medical treatment,
loss of wage, loss of support or other expenses directly related to the injury,
whichever is lower. This is without prejudice to the right of the claimant to seek other
remedies under existing laws.

2 The Civil Code provides in Art. 29: "When the accused in a criminal prosecution is
acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt,
a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such
action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the
court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the
complaint should be found to be malicious.

"If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the
court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be
inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that
ground."

3 People v. Ritter, 194 SCRA 690 (1991).

4 People v. Dramayo, 42 SCRA 59, 64 (1971).

5 Supra note 3 at 722.

6 55 SCRA 107, 119 (1974).

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 109835 November 22, 1993

JMM PROMOTIONS & MANAGEMENT, INC., petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ULPIANO L. DE LOS SANTOS, respondent.

Don P. Porciuncula for petitioner.

Eulogio Nones, Jr. for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:

The sole issue submitted in this case is the validity of the order of respondent National Labor
Relations Commission dated October 30, 1992, dismissing the petitioner's appeal from a decision of
the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration on the ground of failure to post the required
appeal bond. 1

The respondent cited the second paragraph of Article 223 of the Labor Code as amended, providing
that:

In the case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer

may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a
reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in an amount
equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from.

and Rule VI, Section 6 of the new Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, as amended, reading as follows:

Sec. 6. Bond In case the decision of a Labor Arbiter involves a monetary award,
an appeal by the employer shall be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or
surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the
Commission or the Supreme Court in an amount equivalent to the monetary award.

The petitioner contends that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in applying these rules
to decisions rendered by the POEA. It insists that the appeal bond is not necessary in the case of
licensed recruiters for overseas employment because they are already required under Section 4,
Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules not only to pay a license fee of P30,000 but also to post a cash
bond of P100,000 and a surety bond of P50,000, thus:

Upon approval of the application, the applicant shall pay a license fee of P30,000. It
shall also post a cash bond of P100,000 and surety bond of P50,000 from a bonding
company acceptable to the Administration and duly accredited by the Insurance
 Commission. The bonds shall answer for all valid and legal claims arising from
violations of the conditions for the grant and use of the license, and/or accreditation
and contracts of employment. The bonds shall likewise guarantee compliance with
the provisions of the Code and its implementing rules and regulations relating to
recruitment and placement, the Rules of the Administration and relevant issuances of
the Department and all liabilities which the Administration may impose. The surety
bonds shall include the condition that the notice to the principal is notice to the surety
and that any judgment against the principal in connection with matters falling under
POEA's jurisdiction shall be binding and conclusive on the surety. The surety bonds
shall be co-terminus with the validity period of license. (Emphasis supplied)

In addition, the petitioner claims it has placed in escrow the sum of P200,000 with the Philippine
National Bank in compliance with Section 17, Rule II, Book II of the same Rule, "to primarily answer
for valid and legal claims of recruited workers as a result of recruitment violations or money claims."

Required to comment, the Solicitor General sustains the appeal bond requirement but suggest that
the rules cited by the NLRC are applicable only to decisions of the Labor Arbiters and not of the
POEA. Appeals from decisions of the POEA, he says, are governed by the following provisions of
Rule V, Book VII of the POEA Rules:

Sec. 5. Requisites for Perfection of Appeal. The appeal shall be filed within the
reglementary period as provided in Section 1 of this Rule; shall be under oath with
proof of payment of the required appeal fee and the posting of a cash or surety bond
as provided in Section 6 of this Rule; shall be accompanied by a memorandum of
appeal which shall state the grounds relied upon and the arguments in support
thereof; the relief prayed for; and a statement of the date when the appellant
received the appealed decision and/or award and proof of service on the other party
of such appeal.

A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other requisites aforestated shall
not stop the running of the period for perfecting an appeal.

Sec. 6. Bond. In case the decision of the Administration involves a monetary award,
an appeal by the employer shall be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or
surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the
Commission in an amount equivalent to the monetary award. (Emphasis supplied)

The question is, having posted the total bond of P150,000 and placed in escrow the amount of
P200,000 as required by the POEA Rules, was the petitioner still required to post an appeal bond to
perfect its appeal from a decision of the POEA to the NLRC?

It was.

The POEA Rules are clear. A reading thereof readily shows that in addition to the cash and surety
bonds and the escrow money, an appeal bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary award is
required to perfect an appeal from a decision of the POEA. Obviously, the appeal bond is intended
to further insure the payment of the monetary award in favor of the employee if it is eventually
affirmed on appeal to the NLRC.

It is true that the cash and surety bonds and the money placed in escrow are supposed to guarantee
the payment of all valid and legal claims against the employer, but these claims are not limited to
monetary awards to employees whose contracts of employment have been violated. The POEA can
go against these bonds also for violations by the recruiter of the conditions of its license, the
provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing rules, E.O. 247 (reorganizing POEA) and the
POEA Rules, as well as the settlement of other liabilities the recruiter may incur.

As for the escrow agreement, it was presumably intended to provide for a standing fund, as it were,
to be used only as a last resort and not to be reduced with the enforcement against it of every claim
of recruited workers that may be adjudged against the employer. This amount may not even be
enough to cover such claims and, even if it could initially, may eventually be exhausted after
satisfying other subsequent claims.

As it happens, the decision sought to be appealed grants a monetary award of about P170,000 to
the dismissed employee, the herein private respondent. The standby guarantees required by the
POEA Rules would be depleted if this award were to be enforced not against the appeal bond but
against the bonds and the escrow money, making them inadequate for the satisfaction of the other
obligations the recruiter may incur.

Indeed, it is possible for the monetary award in favor of the employee to exceed the amount of
P350,000, which is the sum of the bonds and escrow money required of the recruiter.

It is true that these standby guarantees are not imposed on local employers, as the petitioner
observes, but there is a simple explanation for this distinction. Overseas recruiters are subject to
more stringent requirement because of the special risks to which our workers abroad are subjected
by their foreign employers, against whom there is usually no direct or effective recourse. The
overseas recruiter is solidarily liable with a foreign employer. The bonds and the escrow money are
intended to insure more care on the part of the local agent in its choice of the foreign principal to
whom our overseas workers are to be sent.

It is a principle of legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute (or a set of rules as in this case),
care should be taken that every part thereof be given effect, on the theory that it was enacted as an
integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions. Ut res magis valeat quam
pereat. 2 Under the petitioner's interpretation, the appeal bond required by Section 6 of the
aforementioned POEA Rule should be disregarded because of the earlier bonds and escrow money it has
posted. The petitioner would in effect nullify Section 6 as a superfluity but we do not see any such
redundancy; on the contrary, we find that Section 6 complements Section 4 and Section 17. The rule is
that a construction that would render a provision inoperative should be avoided; instead, apparently
inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and
harmonious whole.

Accordingly, we hold that in addition to the monetary obligations of the overseas recruiter prescribed
in Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules and the escrow agreement under Section 17 of the
same Rule, it is necessary to post the appeal bond required under Section 6, Rule V, Book VII of the
POEA Rules, as a condition for perfecting an appeal from a decision of the POEA.

Every intendment of the law must be interpreted in favor of the working class, conformably to the
mandate of the Constitution. By sustaining rather than annulling the appeal bond as a further
protection to the claimant employee, this Court affirms once again its commitment to the interest of
labor.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.

Davide and Quiason, JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, J, is on leave.

# Footnotes

1 Order issued by NLRC Commissioner Domingo H. Zapanta, Second Division,

dated October 30, 1992.

2 "That the thing may rather have effect than be destroyed." Simonds v. Walker, 100
Mass. 113; National Pemberton Bank v. Lougee, 108 Mass. 373, 11 Am. Rep. 367.
Charitable bequests are also governed by this maxim. Kieg v. Richardson, C.C.A.
N.C., B6 F. 2d 849, 858.