SEPARATE OPINION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

By his Petition for Prohibition filed on June 17, 2004, petitioner Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. prays for a
judgment annulling the existence and proceedings of the Joint Committee of Congress (Joint Committee) to
canvass the votes for Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates in the May 10, 2004 elections following the
adjournment of Congress sine die on June 11, 2004 and for the issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the
Joint Committee to cease and desist from conducting any further proceedings pursuant to the Rules of the Joint
Public Session of Congress on Canvassing the Votes Cast for Presidential and Vice-Presidential Candidates in the
May 10, 2004 Elections (Rules on Canvassing).

In support thereof, he argues that "the [e]xistence and [p]roceedings [o]f the Joint Committee of Congress [a]re
[i]nvalid, [i]llegal and [u]nconstitutional [f]ollowing the [a]djournment [s]ine [d]ie [o]f [b]oth Houses of
Congress [o]f [t]heir [r]egular [s]essions on June 11, 2004."1

This is the second petition filed before this Court in as many weeks questioning the conduct of the national
canvass for President and Vice-President. Earlier, on June 2, 2004, Representative Ruy Elias C. Lopez of the
3rd Legislative District of Davao City filed a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus questioning the
constitutionality of the Rules on Canvassing promulgated by Congress which was dismissed by Resolution of this
Court dated June 8, 2004.2

Coming as it does at the proverbial eleventh hour with the Joint Committee having, in the meantime, completed
its preliminary canvass and in the process of preparing and transmitting its report to the joint session of
Congress for approval, cynical minds may be tempted to dismiss the instant petition as simply being a delaying
tactic, an exercise in political brinksmanship to further narrow partisan ambitions. However, given petitioner's
record of public service and the novelty of his petition, I am more inclined to view the same as a legitimate
resort to available legal remedies in a sincere attempt to ascertain the finer boundaries of the duty to canvass
imposed on Congress by the Constitution itself.

And even if this were not the case, there is every reason to believe that the framework of the law and the
Constitution, like the towers of a suspension bridge deeply planted in the bedrock of democracy, are sufficiently
resilient to withstand the momentary stresses laid on them by the ebb and flow of the political currents holding
aloft the very life of our nation without fear of buckling or breaking. It is with this supreme confidence that I now
proceed to consider the arguments raised by petitioner as well as those presented in the Comments filed by the
Solicitor General and the Senate and House panels of respondent Joint Committee.

At bottom, petitioner's arguments rest on the premise that "[w]ith the adjournment sine die on June 11, 2004 by
the Twelfth Congress of its last regular session, the term of the Twelfth Congress terminated and expired on the
said day and the said Twelfth Congress serving the term 2001 to 2004 passed out of legal existence." Thus, he
claims, all pending matters and proceedings were automatically terminated in accordance with "legislative
procedure, precedent or practice" as "borne by the rules of both Houses of Congress."3 From this, he concludes
that "[u]pon the adjournment sine die of the Twelfth Congress, its function as a national board of canvassers for
presidential and vice-presidential elections has become functus officio [i.e. legally defunct]"; and as a result
"[n]ecessarily, the Joint Committee of Congress has likewise become functus officio because obviously the spring
cannot rise higher than its source."4

In sum, the petition presents two issues for resolution: (1) whether the term of Congress ended upon the
adjournment of the regular sessions of both its Houses sine die; and (2) whether Congress, in its capacity as the
National Board of Canvassers, and consequently its creation - the respondent Joint Committee - has
become functus officio.

After a considered review of the applicable Constitutional provisions and the relevant laws and jurisprudence, I
find that both these issues must be resolved in the negative for the reasons discussed hereunder.
First, petitioner's underlying premise that the term of the Twelfth Congress ended with its adjournment sine
die on June 11, 2004 is without constitutional foundation.

Petitioner cites as basis for his assertion, Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution which reads:

Sec. 15. The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth Monday of July for its regular session,
unless a different date is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in session for such number of days as it may
determine until thirty days before the opening of its next regular session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and
legal holidays. The President may call a special session at any time.

The foregoing provision clearly does not pertain to the term of Congress, but to its regular annual legislative
sessions and the mandatory 30-day recess before the opening of its next regular session, which itself is subject
to the power of the President to call a special (legislative) session at any time.

On the contrary, Section 4 of Article VIII also of the Constitution clearly provides that "[t]he term of office of the
Senators shall be six years and shall commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day
of June next following their election." Similarly, Section 7 of the same Article provides that "[t]he Members of
the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of threeyears which shall begin, unless otherwise
provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election."

That the term of the present Congress ends on the same day when the term of the next Congress begins, and
not earlier, is highlighted by the following exchange between then Commissioners Regalado Maambong (now a
Justice of the Court of Appeals) and Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (now Chief Justice of this Court) during the
proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission:

MR. MAAMBONG. Thank you.

More or less, that is a specific answer but I may be just engaging in wishful thinking if I request the Committee
to formulate probably a definitive statement that whatever changes in the executive department, there should
be no dissolution of a legislative body which is composed of representatives of the people. But that is not for
today, probably some other time when the Committee will think about it.

In line with this question that I have posed is the matter of continuity of the legislative body, be it unicameral or
bicameral. There is a statement to the effect that if we have an Upper House, considering the staggered terms of
its members, at any time there will always be a group of available and experienced men who can be depended
upon to continue the policies of the government, which is not true in the unicameral system because when it
adjourns or when there is a new election, no member is left around. Will the Commissioner comment on the
continuity?

MR. DAVIDE. I thank the Commissioner for asking that question because that exactly is one of the evils in a
bicameral system. It might happen that in a given election, after the expiration of one-half term of the Senate
members, a new mandate from the people will actually be the outcome in the given election. For a very
hypothetical situation, let us assume that one-half of the Members of the Senate belong to one particular party.
This one-half will be the one to remain because the term of the others may have expired at a given period. But
at the commencement of the term of the Members of the Lower House whose term now may be coextensive with
the term of the remaining Members of the Senate, we may have a Lower House elected from another political
party.

So we will have a National Assembly with an Upper House composed of people belonging to one party and a
Lower House composed of Members belonging to another party. So how can we have unity in that legislature? It
would be a chaotic legislature. That situation alone is the best argument against maintaining a bicameral system
of government.

MR. MAAMBONG. Actually, the question is more on the continuity of a legislative body as an
argument for those who are in favor of the bicameral system where at any given moment there is
still a continuing legislative body.
MR. DAVIDE. Under our proposal there will always be a continuing legislative body. because the
election will be on the second Monday of May and they will assume on the 30-day of June, which
would also be the end of the term of the previous National Assembly. So there is a continuing body -
the National Assembly.

MR. MAAMBONG. That answers my question.5 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Consequently, there being no law to the contrary, until June 30. 2004, the present Twelfth Congress to which
the present legislators belong cannot be said to have "passed out of legal existence."

Second, in contending that Congress, as the National Board of Canvassers, and by necessary implication
respondent Joint Committee, has become functus officio upon the sine die adjournment of Congress, petitioner
has apparently confused the legislative and non-legislative functions of Congress, in contravention of the letter
and intent of the Constitution.

Although it is incontrovertible that the primary function of Congress is to legislate,6 it is equally indisputable that
the Constitution has conferred upon it non-legislative powers7 as a part of the system of checks and balances
which underpins our republican form of government. As observed in the leading case of Angara v. Electoral
Commission: 8

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express
provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from
the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended
them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for
an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various
departments of the government. For example, the Chief Executive under our Constitution is so far made a
check on the legislative power that this assent is required in the enactment of laws. This, however, is subject to
the further check that a bill may become a law notwithstanding the refusal of the President to approve it, by a
vote of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National Assembly. The President has also the
right to convene the Assembly in special session whenever he chooses. On the other hand, the National
Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that its consent through its Commission on
Appointments is necessary in the appointment of certain officers; and the concurrence of a majority of all its
members is essential to the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power to determine what courts other than
the Supreme Court shall be established, to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support,
the National Assembly controls the judicial department to a certain extent. The Assembly also exercises the
judicial power of trying impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter,
effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare
executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.9 (Emphasis supplied)

Indeed, while the regular legislative functions of Congress may have come to a close upon the final
adjournment of its regular sessions (subject to the power of the President to call a special session at any
time),10 this adjournment does not necessarily affect its non-legislative functions. For while in some cases
these non-legislative functions are, by constitutional fiat, made dependent on the regular session of
Congress, 11 in other instances it is the Constitution itself which commands that Congress convene to perform
its duties.12 In the latter cases, the members of Congress shall assemble automatically, without need of
intervention by the President.

This is clear from the following discussion during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission on Section
18, Article VII on the power of Congress to revoke or extend the declaration of Martial Law or the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus by the President:

MR. RAMA. Madam President, this is an amendment to line 4. After the words "The Congress," I propose to
insert the clause WHICH SHALL BE AUTOMATICALLY CONVENED IF NOT IN SESSION, and then
continue with the phrase "by a vote of at least a majority... " The reason for this, Madam President,
is that there is a period in a year during which the Congress is not in session. We talk about Congress
revoking a proclamation; we talk about some kind of checks on the President, but during this 30-day
period of the year, there is no Congress to make such revocation. A scheming President could very
well time his declaration of martial law during the period when Congress is not in session. This is a
30-day period and if his declaration of martial law is based upon fabricated facts or rigged events, or
is not in accordance with the provisions in the Constitution, such President could get away with
murder for 30 days without the process of revocation. So, it is necessary that Congress shall be able
to convene automatically if not in session.

Another reason is that it is only the President who can call a special session. So, a President who is
hellbent on declaring martial law in order to militarize the people could very well not call for the
session and that is going to be a legal issue. So, to avoid this confusion, it is necessary for clarity that we
place this amendment, to wit: "Congress, WHICH SHALL BE AUTOMATICALLY CONVENED IF NOT IN SESSION,
by a vote of at least of all its Members. . ."

xxx

MR. SUAREZ. As I recall, in the Article on the Legislative, the Congress is supposed to be in session the whole
year except during that period of 30 days before the next regular session.

MR. RAMA. That is correct.

MR. SUAREZ. So that would preclude the matter of automatic convening in the case of a regular session. Let us
take the case of a special session, because I share the proponent's sentiment about this. Therefore, the special
session could be called within that interregnum period of 30 days.

MR. RAMA. That is correct.

MR. SUAREZ. That is prior to the next regular session. So the proponent is speaking about that situation, Madam
President.

MR. RAMA. This particular 30-day period when the Congress is not in session.

MR. SUAREZ. That is what the Gentleman has in mind.

MR. RAMA. That is what I have in mind.

MR. SUAREZ. That is not in connection with the regular session.

MR. RAMA. Not in connection with the regular session.

MR. SUAREZ. Will the proponent accept the suggestion to put the clause after the words "special session"?

THE PRESIDENT. Will Commissioner Suarez read the provision?

MR. SUAREZ. ". . . in regular or special session WHICH SHALL BE AUTOMATICALLY CONVENED."

THE PRESIDENT. Is the amendment acceptable to Commissioner Rama?

MR. RAMA. It might be a little awkward.

MR. SUAREZ. But that is the sense of what we had in mind.

MR. RAMA. That would be the sense, but for clarity and elegance, we should place this after the word
"Congress."

xxx
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President. THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.

MR. DAVIDE. May I just comment on the discussion about the special session. It is not that the special session
can be called only within the 30 days preceding the commencement of a regular session. Under the proposal on
the legislative power, the law itself may also determine the length of the session, in between the commencement
on the fourth Monday of July and the beginning of the 30 days preceding the next regular session. So special
sessions can be convened at any time between these two periods, not just the remaining 30 days.

I would propose that there should be a separate sentence to be inserted probably between lines 8 and 9 to read
as follows: THE CONGRESS, IF NOT IN SESSION, SHALL WITHIN TWENTY-FOUR HOURS FOLLOWING SUCH
PROCLAMATION OR SUSPENSION, CONVENE IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS RULES WITHOUT NEED OF A CALL. This
would be consistent with what had earlier been approved in the matter of a vacancy in the office of the President
and the Vice-President, instead of "automatic" it should be WITHOUT NEED OF A CALL.

THE PRESIDENT. Is that accepted?

MR. RAMA. We accept the amendment, Madam President.13 (Emphasis supplied)

Among the functions vested by the Constitution in Congress is its duty, as the National Board of Canvassers, to
canvass the votes for and to proclaim the newly elected President and Vice-President under Section 4, Article VII
of the Constitution:

Section 4. The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by direct vote of the people for a term of six
years which shall begin at noon on the thirtieth day of June following the day of the election and shall end at
noon of the same date six years thereafter. The President shall not be eligible for any reelection. No person who
has succeeded as President and has served as such for more than four years shall be qualified for election to the
same office at any time.

No Vice-President shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of the service for the full term for
which he was elected.

Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President and Vice-President shall be held on the
second Monday of May.

The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by the board of
canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the President of
the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not later
than thirty days after the day of the election, open all certificates in the presence of the Senate and
the House of Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon determination of the
authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes.

The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in case two or more
shall have an equal and highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote
of a majority of all the Members of the Congress, voting separately.

The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates.

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose. (Emphasis
supplied)

This duty has been characterized as being ministerial and executive14 and therefore non-legislative in character.
Furthermore, since it is the Constitution itself which requires that the canvassing of votes be done by Congress
in joint public session, a call for a special session by the President is not necessary.15 Thus, in a hypothetical
situation where an administration candidate appears to have lost the election and canvassing was not completed
before the compulsory recess of Congress, the incumbent President cannot subvert the will of the people by the
simple expedient of refusing to call a special session.

Significantly, these very points were stressed during the proceedings of respondent Joint Committee (of which
petitioner is also a member) as pointed out in the Comment submitted by its Co-Chairman, Representative Raul
M. Gonzalez,

<viz< span=""></viz<><:

24. Noted constitutionalist Rep. Antonio Nachura, a member of the House of Representatives of the
12th Congress and also a member of the Joint Committee of Congress to Canvass the Votes Cast for President
and Vice President in the May 10, 2004 Elections, articulated the position of the Joint Committee in respon[se] to
the petitioner's submission as advanced by the minority in the [J]oint [C]ommittee during its session on June 14,
2004, thus:

REP. NACHURA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If I may be allowed to submit my opinion to the query...

THE CHAIRMAN (Deputy Speaker Gonzalez). Please proceed, Cong. Nachura.

REP. NACHURA. ... raised by the Honorable Senator Pimentel. First, Mr. Chairman, it is my submission that the
adjournment by Congress was an adjournment of its regular session. Accordingly, what was adjourned was not
Congress nor was there a suspension of any of the other powers of [C]ongress, except that of its legislative
power in relation to the regular session of Congress. This is shown by Section 15 of Article VI of the Philippine
Constitution.

So what was adjourned was the regular session of [C]ongress.

This adjournment does not in any way affect the possibility that Congress may be called to a special
session at any time before June 30 because June 30 is the expiration of the term of office of the
Members of the House of Representatives and half of the Members of the Senate.

Mr. [C]hairman, the adjournment of the regular session does not affect at all Congress sitting as a
national canvassing board, since after all, it is the Constitution itself that has called [C]ongress to sit
as a national canvassing board. If after we adjourned our regular session it is possible for the President of
the Philippine[s] to call Congress to a special session, then I submit, Mr. Chairman, that the Constitution, by its
express mandate to Congress, calls Congress to this special duty to canvass the [Presidential and [V]ice-
[P]residential election results. (TSN, Resumption of Committee Meeting, Monday June 14, 2004, Regodon-1,
pages 2-3, Santos-1, page 1)

XXX

REP. NACHURA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairmen, to underscore the fact that Congress continues to exist
as a Body, Congress may be called to a special session by the President of the Philippines. If it is called to a
special session, that is recognition that [C]ongress is still existing all the way up to June 30. Now, is it necessary
for the President to call Congress to a special session in order that it may sit as a national canvassing board? I
submit, no, because the Constitution itself in Section 4 of Article VII already calls Congress to sit at a special
session. It would be superfluous for us to ask the President of the Philippines to call Congress to a special
session since, after all, when the President calls Congress to a special session, it is in order that the Congress
may take up legislative matters. In this particular instance, we have the Constitution itself calling Congress to sit
as a national canvassing board independently of any call for a special session by the President. (TSN,
Resumption of Committee Meeting, Monday, June 14, 2004, Solomon-1, page 4, Vivero-1, page 1)

Moreover, the joint public session convened by express directive of the Constitution to canvass the votes for and
to proclaim the newly elected President and Vice-President cannot adjourn sine die until it has accomplished its
constitutionally mandated tasks. For only when a board of canvassers has completed its functions is it
rendered functus officio. Its membership may change, but it retains its authority as a board until it has
accomplished its purposes. Directly in point is this Court's definitive ruling in Pelayo, Jr. v. Commission on
Elections,16 viz:

But argument is here advanced that the proclamation made by the old board of canvassers on January 13, 1968
is null and void. It is said that the term of office of the elected city officials who by law are members thereof had
expired, and, consequently, also their substitutes.

This argument dwindles in strength on the face of the fact that the board of canvassers is a body entirely
different and distinct from the city council of DavaoCity. The board of canvassers is created for a specific
purpose: canvass and proclamation, and no more. Its term of office does not coincide with the term of
office of the officials concerned. It terminates as soon as its functions are finished. Only then does it
adjourn sine die and thus become functus officio. As a corollary thereto, it normally retains its
authority as a board until it shall have completed its functions and accomplished its purposes. They
may be public officers in another capacity. Yet they are never functus officio as election officers until they
have totally discharged their duties. They cannot be disrobed until then. Public policy and interest
prop up this position. For, they are agents of the State. They are purely and distinctly election officers. Thus,
in Aquino vs. Commission on Elections, L-28392, January 29, 1968, this Court clarified the role of a city board of
canvassers in the following language:

"The city board of canvassers is an entity that is entirely different and distinct from the city board or city council
of a chartered city. Similarly, a provincial board of canvassers, or a municipal board of canvassers, is an entity
entirely different and distinct from the provincial board of a province, or the municipal council of a municipality,
as the case may be. While members of a city board (or city council), or a provincial board or of a municipal
council, are members also of a city board of canvassers, or provincial board of canvassers, or of a municipal
board of canvassers, as the case may be, they do not act in the board of canvassers in the capacity of city
councilmen, or in the capacity of a member of the provincial board, or in the capacity of a member of a
municipal council, but as election officials to perform functions specifically provided by law. The board of
canvassers exist for a specific function - that is, to canvass the results of the election as shown in the election
returns and to proclaim the winning candidates. Once this specific function had been performed the existence of
the board of canvassers is ended and terminated."17 (Emphasis supplied)

Lastly, contrary to petitioner's claim, there is no factual or legal precedent to support his assertion that the duty
and authority of Congress to act as the National Board of Canvassers for the positions of President and Vice-
President was automatically terminated upon the sine die adjournment of both its Houses.

As noted by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in its Comment, "[h]istory is not on the side of the
petitioner." Such a view is shared by former

Senate President Jovito Salonga who notes that in both the 1992 and 1998 Presidential elections, "the joint
canvassing committee of Congress proceeded with the canvass even though the sessions then had ...
adjourned."18 Salonga adds that "Congress ... eventually convened in joint session to receive the report of the
canvassing committee, and proclaimed Fidel Ramos and Joseph Estrada as the winners of the 1992 and 1998
elections, respectively.19

Even under the pendency of the 1935 Constitution wherein the regular session of Congress was limited to only
100 session days, exclusive of Sundays, beginning on the fourth Monday of January,20the authority of Congress
to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President21 was never questioned although Section 6 of Republic Act
No. 180, enacted on June 21, 1947, provided that:

Sec. 6. Regular elections for national offices. - (a) On the second Tuesday in November, nineteen hundred and
forty-nine, and upon the same day every four years thereafter, the President and the Vice-President of the
Philippines shall be elected. The canvass by both Houses of the Congress of the Philippines shall begin
on the second Tuesday in the following December, for which purpose said body shall meet in a
special joint session. The President-elect and the Vice-President-elect shall assume office at twelve o'clock
noon on the thirtieth day of December.

xxx (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

While petitioner may have forgotten his history, as an incumbent member of the present Senate, he should be
aware that, as observed by both respondent Joint Committee's Senate panel and the OSG, the Rules adopted by
that body expressly provide for the convening of a joint session of both Houses of Congress to canvass the votes
for President and Vice-President even during a voluntary or compulsory legislative recess. Section 42, Rule XIV
of the Rules of the Senate states:

SEC. 42. The Senate shall convene once every year for its regular session. It shall continue to be in session for
such number of days as it may determine in its legislative calendar, subject only to such limitations as may be
provided by the Constitution: Provided, That the President of the Senate, in consultation with the Majority
and Minority Leaders and upon agreement with the Speaker of the House of Representatives, may
reconvene the Senate in session without need of a call by the President of the Philippines, at any time during a
recess as provided in the legislative calendar, to consider urgent legislative matters; or in case of a vacancy in
the Office of the Vice-President, to confirm the nominee of the President for the position in accordance with
Section 9, Article VII of the Constitution, or to determine the inability of the President of the Philippines to
discharge the powers and duties of his office upon the written declaration of a majority of all the Members of the
Cabinet in accordance with Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, or convene in joint session during any
voluntary or compulsory recess to:

(a) Canvass the votes for President and Vice-President not later than thirty days after the day of the
elections in accordance with Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution; and

(b) Determine the validity of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus by the President of the Philippines, or to revoke such proclamation or suspension, or extend the
same if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

While a legislative or congressional "recess" is defined in Section 100, Rule XXV of the same rules provides as
follows:

SEC. 100. The Senate adjourns for a congressional recess:

(a) In compliance with its legislative calendar.

(b) At the end of the regular session, thirty (30) days before the next regular session,
exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays and Holidays.
(c) At the end of a special session of Congress.
(d) Upon the termination of the term of a Congress.

Recess includes:

(a) The period of time between the adjournment of the regular session and the convening of
the next regular session of the same Congress.
(b) The intervening period of time between the adjournment of a regular session, and the
convening of the special session of the same Congress.
(c) The intervening period of time between the adjournment of a special session, and the
convening of the next regular session of the same Congress.
(d) The intervening period of time between the end of a session and its resumption on a fixed
date as provided in the legislative calendar other than the adjournment of the annual
regular session.

Indeed, taken to its logical conclusion, petitioner's construction would require Congress to complete the canvass
for President and Vice-President within the period from 30 days after the date of the election to the start of the
compulsory legislative recess 30 days prior to the next regular session of Congress. As the following tables
show:

Crucial Dates

1992 1998 2004 2010

 Date of Elections
(2ndMonday of May 11, May 11, May 10, May 10,
May) 1992 1998 2004 2010
Deadline Set by
the Constitution
to Open
Certificates in
Joint Public
Session (30 days
June 10, June 10, June 9, June 9,
after date of
1992 1998 2004 2010
election)
Date Congress
Con-venes for its
First Regular
Session
July 27, July 27, July 26, July 26,
(4thMonday of
1992 1998 2004 2010
July)
Date of
Adjournment (30
days prior to the
first regular
session -
excluding
Saturdays/
June 15, June 15, June 14, June 14,
Sundays/ Legal
1992 1998 2004 2010
holidays)
Date of Opening
June 10, June 10, June 9, June 9,
of Certificates
1992 1998 2004 2010
Date of
June 15, June 15, June 14, June 14,
Adjournment
1992 1998 2004 2010
Number of Days
to Finish
Canvassing from
Date of Opening
until Date of
5 days 5 days 5 days 5 days
Adjournment

such a construction could limit the canvassing period to only 5 days. Even going by the principles of legal
hermeneutics alone, such a construction must be rejected as it flies in the face of the rule that a construction
that would lead to absurd, impossible or mischievous consequences should not be followed.22
In light of all the foregoing, it is clear that petitioner's arguments are bereft of legal and constitutional bases.
The petition must thus necessarily fail.

WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the Petition.

Endnotes:

1 Rollo at 6.

2 Lopez v. Senate of the Philippines, et al., G.R. No. 163556, June 8, 2004.

3 Rollo at 8.

4 En passant, it may be noted that "session" simply means the sitting of a court, legislature, council,
commission, etc. for the transaction of its proper business. It is the period of time during which such body is
assembled in form, and engaged in the transaction of business, or, in a more extended sense, the whole space
of time from its first assembling to its prorogation or adjournment sine die [BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6thed., 1991)
1371]. On the other hand, "adjournment" refers to the act of a court, legislative body, public meeting, or officer,
by which the session or assembly is dissolved, either temporarily or finally, and the business in hand dismissed
from consideration, either definitely or for an interval. If the dissolution is final, the adjournment is said to
be sine die - literally, "without a day" [ BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY(6th ed., 1991) 42].

5 II Record of the Constitutional Commission: Proceedings and Debates 66 (1986).

6 CONST, art. VI, sec. 1.

7 These include the power to revoke or extend the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or
declaration of martial law (Article VII, Section 18), the power to approve presidential amnesties (Article VII,
Section 19), the power to confirm or reject certain appointments (Article VII, Sections 9 and 16), the sole power
to declare the existence of a state of war (Article VI, Section 23, paragraph 1), the power to judge the
President's ability to discharge the powers and duties of his office (Article VII, Section 11, paragraph 4), the
power of impeachment over the President, Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of
the Constitutional Commissions and the Ombudsman (Article XI, Section 3), and the power to propose
amendments to the constitution (Article XVII, Section 1, paragraph 1).

8 63 Phil. 139 (1936).

9 Id. at 156-157.

10 However, under Article VII, Section 10, the Congress shall convene without need of a call on the third day
after vacancies in the offices of the President and Vice-President occur to enact a law calling for a special election
to elect a President and a Vice-President.

11 Under Article VI, Section 18, the Commission on Appointments may exercise its functions only when Congress
is in session since it is required to "act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days." In the
same manner, the impeachment power under Article XI, Section 3, may only be exercised while Congress is in
session.

12 These include the situation when the President transmits to the Senate President and House Speaker his
written declaration that no inability to discharge the powers and duties of his office exists but majority of the
members of his cabinet submits a declaration to the contrary and Congress will decide the issue under Article
VII, Section 11; and the situation when the President proclaims martial law or suspends the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus and Congress will vote whether it will revoke or extend the period of proclamation or
suspension under Article VII, Section 18.

13 II Records of the Constitutional Commission 502-503.

14 Lopez v. Roxas, 17 SCRA 756, 769 (1966).

15 I.A. CRUZ, PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW 132-133 (2002 ed.).

16 23 SCRA 1374 (1968).

17 Id. at 1385-1386.

18 http://www.inq7.net/nat/2004/jun/20/text/nat_4-1-p.htm.

19 Ibid.

20 CONST. (1935), art. VI, sec. 9.

21 Id., art. VII, sec. 2.

22 Marcelino v. Cruz, Jr., 121 SCRA 51, 58 (1983) citing H.C. BLACK, CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE
LAWS, Sec. 13 p. 28; vide: Soriano v. Offshore Shipping and Manning Corporation, 177 SCRA 513, 519 (1989)
citing Bello v. Court of Appeals, 56 SCRA 518 (1974); Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Esso Standard
Eastern, Inc., 172 SCRA 364, 370 (1989) citing People v. Rivera, 59 Phil 242 (1933); Verceles v. Araneta Diaz,
47 Phil 843, 847 (1925); Lamb v. Phipps, 22 Phil 456, 493 (1912).