16 SCRA 120 Garcia v.

Chief of Staff - Ali

FACTS:
Plaintiff, Mariano E. Garcia filed with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan an action to collect a sum of money against the Chief
of Staff and Adjutant General of the Armed Forces of the Philippines , the Chairman of the Philippine Veterans Board and /or the
Auditor General dated December 1, 1961. Gacia alleged that sometime in July 1948, he suffered injuries while on a military training
camp at Floridablanca, Pampanga . Thereafter he filed his claim fo disability benefits and so submitted papers to support it to the
Office of the Adjutant General.
May 2, 1957, plaintiff received a letter from the said Adjutants Office disqualifying his claim. The Adjutant Office denied his claim of
disability benefits alleging that Commonwealth Act 400 had been repealed by R.A. 610 which took effect on Jan. 1 , 1950. That due
to the injuries plaintiff suffered he lost his sight making him permanently disabled. That by the unjustified refusal by defendants the
latter didnt enjoyed his supposed disability pension from July 1948.
The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine Veterans Administration filed motions to dismiss the
complaint on grounds that the court has no jurisdiction on the said matter of the complaint. The court on March 2, 1962 rendered an
order dismissing the complaint. However, motion for reconsideration of the said order has also been denied.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court has jurisdiction on the said matter and dismissing the complaint on ground, it being the money claim
against the government.

HELD:
The order dismissing the complaint had been affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs. The claim for recovery of money against
the government must be filed with the Auditor General, in line with the principle that the State cannot be charged without its content
as provided by the Commonwealth Act 327 Sec. 1 that in all cases involving the settlement of accounts and claims other than those
of accountable officers, the Auditor General shall act and decide the same within sixty days, exclusive of Sundays and holidays after
their presentation.
Also, if all administrative remedies had been made and if superior administrative officers could grant relief it is not necessary to
entertain actions against the administrative officers as established by the rule.

43 SCRA 360 Amigable v. Cuenca - Ang

FACTS:
Victoria Amigable is the registered owner of Lot No. 639 of the Banilad Estate in Cebu City as shown by her Transfer
Certificate of Title T-18060, which superseded Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-3272 (T-3435) issued to her by the Register of
Deeds of Cebu on February 1, 1924. There was no annotation in favor of the government of any right or interest in the property.
Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a portion of said lot, with an area of 6,167 square meters, for
the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues.

On March 27, 1958 Amigable's counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting payment of the portion of her lot
which had been appropriated by the government. The claim was indorsed to the Auditor General, who disallowed it in his 9th
Indorsement dated December 9, 1958.

On February 6, 1959 Amigable filed in the court a quo a complaint, against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas
Cuenca for the recovery of ownership and possession of the 6,167 square meters of land traversed by the Mango and Gorordo
Avenues. She also sought the payment of compensatory damages in the sum of P50,000.00 for the illegal occupation of her land,
moral damages in the sum of P25,000.00, attorney's fees in the sum of P5,000.00 and the costs of the suit.

On July 29, 1959, the complaint was dismissed and the court rendered its decision holding that it had no jurisdiction over
the plaintiff's cause of action for the recovery of possession and ownership of the portion of her lot in question on the ground that the
government cannot be sued without its consent; that it had neither original nor appellate jurisdiction to hear, try and decide plaintiff's
claim for compensatory damages in the sum of P50,000.00, the same being a money claim against the government; and that the
claim for moral damages had long prescribed, nor did it have jurisdiction over said claim because the government had not given its
consent to be sued.

Unable to secure a reconsideration, the Amigable appealed to the Court of Appeals, which subsequently certified the case to the
SC, there being no question of fact involved.

Issue:

WON the Amigable may properly sue the government under the facts of the case

Held:

Yes, the government is NOT immune to the suit. In the case of Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance of Cebu: where the government
takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated
sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government without thereby violating the DOCTRINE OF
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY FROM SUIT without its consent

Considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of her certificate of title and that she has not
executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of her lot to the government, the appellant remains the owner of the whole lot.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and the case remanded to the court a quo for the determination of
compensation, including attorney's fees, to which the appellant is entitled as above indicated. No pronouncement as to costs.

214 SCRA 286 Veterans Manpower v. CA - Antallan

MOBIL PHILIPPINES EXPLORATION VS. CUSTOMS ARRASTRE SERVICE

18 SCRA 1120
FACTS: Four cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from abroad on S.S. "Leoville", consigned to Mobil Philippines Exploration,
Inc., Manila. The shipment was discharged to the custody of the Customs Arrastre Service, the unit of the Bureau of Customs then
handling arrastre operations therein. The Customs Arrastre Service later delivered to the broker of the consignee three cases only of
the shipment.
Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc., filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the Customs Arrastre Service and the
Bureau of Customs to recover the value of the undelivered case in the amount of P18,493.37 plus other damages.Defendants filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that not being persons under the law, defendants cannot be sued.
Appellant contends that not all government entities are immune from suit; that defendant Bureau of Customs as operator of the
arrastre service at the Port of Manila, is discharging proprietary functions and as such, can be sued by private individuals.

ISSUE: Whether or not the defendants can invoke state immunity.

HELD: Now, the fact that a non-corporate government entity performs a function proprietary in nature does not necessarily result in
its being suable. If said non-governmental function is undertaken as an incident to its governmental function, there is no waiver
thereby of the sovereign immunity from suit extended to such government entity.

The Bureau of Customs, to repeat, is part of the Department of Finance, with no personality of
its own apart from that of the national government. Its primary function is governmental, that
of assessing and collecting lawful revenues from imported articles and all other tariff and
customs duties, fees, charges, fines and penalties (Sec. 602, R.A. 1937). To this function,
arrastre service is a necessary incident.

Clearly, therefore, although said arrastre function may be deemed proprietary, it is a necessary
incident of the primary and governmental function of the Bureau of Customs, so that engaging
in the same does not necessarily render said Bureau liable to suit. For otherwise, it could not
perform its governmental function without necessarily exposing itself to suit. Sovereign
immunity, granted as to the end, should not be denied as to the necessary means to that end.

50 O.G. 1556 Festejo v Fernando - Arevalo

FESTEJO v. FERNANDO
GR No. L-5156; March 11, 1954

FACTS:
*On February 1951, Carmen Festejo filed a suit against Isaias Fernando Director of the Bureau of Public Works, for taking
possession of 3 parcels of land without obtaining first a right of way, without her consent and knowledge , and against her express
objection.
*Festejo demanded the return of the land and its restoration to its former condition.
*Moreover, Festejo demanded that the lands be restored to its former condition and the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of
P19, 343.20 for the unlawful taking.

ISSUE:
Is Fernando immune from suit for being a public officer?

HELD:
*No. The evidence and conceded facts enable the Court to find the defendant guilty of committing acts outside the scope of his
authority when he went outside the boundaries of the right of way upon plaintiff's land and damaged it or destroyed its former
condition and usefulness.
*There can be no claim that he thus invaded plaintiff's land southeasterly of the right of way innocently. Surveys clearly marked the
limits of the land appropriated for the right of way of this trunk highway before construction began.
*Ordinarily the officer or employee committing the tort will be personally held liable and may be sued as any other citizen and held
answerable for whatever injury or damage that resulted from his tortious act.
*An officer, even while acting under color of his office exceeds the power conferred on him by law, he cannot shelter himself under
the plea that he is a public agent.
*It is a general rule that an officer-executive, administrative quasi-judicial, ministerial, or otherwise who acts outside the scope of his
jurisdiction and without authorization of law may thereby render himself amenable to personal liability in a civil suit.
*ART. 32(6) of the Civil Code provides:
Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner
impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages: xxx
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law; xxx
217 SCRA 401 PNR v IAC Ballena
SCRA 42204 Farolan vs. CTA- SARMIENTO-VALEROSO
Facts:
On January 30, 1972, the vessel S/S "Pacific Hawk" with Registry No. 170 arrived at the Port of Manila carrying, among others, 80
bales of screen net consigned to Bagong Buhay Trading (Bagong Buhay). Said importation was declared through a customs broker
under Entry No. 8651-72 as 80 bales of screen net of 500 rolls with a gross weight of 12,777 kilograms valued at $3,750.00 and
classified under Tariff Heading No. 39.06-B of the Tariff and Customs Code at 35% ad valorem. Since the customs examiner found
the subject shipment reflective of the declaration, Bagong Buhay paid the duties and taxes due in the amount of P11,350.00 which
was paid through the Bank of Asia under Official Receipt No. 042787 dated February 1, 1972. Thereafter, the customs appraiser
made a return of duty.
Acting on the strength of an information that the shipment consisted of "mosquito net" made of nylon dutiable under Tariff Heading
No. 62.02 of the Tariff and Customs Code, the Office of the Collector of Customs ordered a
re-examination of the shipment. A report on the re-examination revealed that the shipment consisted of 80 bales of screen net, each
bale containing 20 rolls or a total of 1,600 rolls.Re-appraised, the shipment was valued at $37,560.00 or $10.15 per yard instead of
$.075 per yard as previously declared. Furthermore, the Collector of Customs determined the subject shipment as made of synthetic
(polyethylene) woven fabric classifiable under Tariff Heading No. 51.04-B at 100% ad valorem. Thus, Bagong Buhay Trading was
assessed P272,600.00 as duties and taxes due on the shipment in question. Since the shipment was also misdeclared as to
quantity and value, the Collector of Customs forfeited the subject shipment in favor of the government.
Private respondent then appealed the decision of the Collector of Customs by filing a petition for review with the Commissioner of
Customs. On November 25, 1972 the Commissioner affirmed the Collector of Customs. Private respondent moved for
reconsideration but the same was denied on January 22, 1973.
From the Commissioner of Customs, private respondent elevated his case before the Court of Tax Appeals. Upon review, the Court
of Tax Appeals reversed the decision of the Commissioner of Customs. It ruled that the Commissioner erred in imputing fraud upon
private respondent because fraud is never presumed and thus concluded that the forfeiture of the articles in question was not in
accordance with law. Moreover, the appellate court stated that the imported articles in question should be classified as "polyethylene
plastic" at the rate of 35% ad valorem instead of "synthetic (polyethylene) woven fabric" at the rate of 100% ad valorem based upon
the results conducted by the Bureau of Customs Laboratory. Consequently, the Court of Tax Appeals ordered the release of the
said article upon payment of the corresponding duties and taxes. (C.T.A. Case No. 2490).
Thereafter, the Commissioner of Customs moved for reconsideration. On November 19, 1975, the Court of Tax Appeals denied said
motion for reconsideration.
On August 20, 1976, private respondent filed a petition asking for the release of the questioned goods which this Court denied. After
several motions for the early resolution of this case and for the release of goods and in view of the fact that the goods were being
exposed to the natural elements, we ordered the release of the goods on June 2, 1986. Consequently, on July 26, 1986, private
respondent posted a cash bond of P149,443.36 to secure the release of 64 bales. out of the 80 bales. originally delivered on
January 30, 1972. Sixteen bales remain missing.
Private respondent alleges that of the 143,454 yards (64 bales) released to Bagong Buhay, only 116,950 yards were in good
condition and the 26,504 yards were in bad condition. Consequently, private respondent demands that the Bureau of Customs be
ordered to pay for damages for the 43,050 yards it actually lost.

Issue: whether or not the Collector of Customs may be held liable for the 43,050 yards actually lost by private respondent

Rulling:

Bureau of Customs cannot be held liable for actual damages that the private respondent sustained with regard to its goods. Otherwise, to permit
private respondents claim to prosper would violate the doctrine of doctrine of sovereign immunity.. Since it demands that the Commissioner of Customs
be ordered to pay for actual damages it sustained, for which ultimately liability will fall on the government, it is obvious that this case has been
converted technically into a suit against the state. On this point, the political doctrine that state may not be sued without its consent, categorically
applies. As an unincorporated government agency without any separate judicial personality of its own, the Bureau of Customs enjoys immunity from
suit. Alongwith the Bureau of Internal Revenue, it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty,namely taxation. As an agency, the Bureau of
Customs performs the governmental function of collecting revenues which is defined not a proprietary function. Thus private respondents claim for
damages against the Commissioner of Customs must fails.

1 SCRA 340 Bureau of Printing vs BOPEA - Bansao

BUREAU OF PRINTING vs. BUREAU OF PRINTING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (BOPEA)

G.R. No. L-15751. January 28, 1961
Gutierrez David, J.
Facts:
1. Bureau of Printing Employees Association (BOPEA) filed an action before Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) against
Bureau of Printing (BOP) for unfair labor practices by interfering with or coercing the employees with the right of self-
organization and discriminating in regard to hire and tenure to discourage pursuit of union activities.
2. Bureau of Printing denied the allegation and alleged that:
a. Respondents are suspended for breach of Civil Service rules and regulations
b. BOP has no juridical personality to sue or be sued
c. BOP is not an industrial entity engaged for the purpose of gain but is an agency of the Republic
performing governmental functions.
d. The case shall be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
 3. Court of Industrial Relations denied the petition for dismissal and sustained its jurisdiction over the case as the functions
of BOP are exclusively proprietary in nature.
4. BOP elevated the case to Supreme Court and filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Issues:
1. Whether or not CIR has jurisdiction over BOP.
2. Whether or not BOP has juridical personality to sue or be sued.
Ruling (En Banc):
1. The Court of Industrial Relations has no jurisdiction over BOP for the latter is a government agency and not an industrial
entity. It is an office of the Government created by the Administrative Code of 1916, which operates under the direct
supervision of the Executive Secretary, Office of the President, and is "charged with the execution of all printing and
binding, including work incidental to those processes, required by the National Government and such other work of the
same character as said Bureau may, by law or by order of the Executive Secretary, be authorized to undertake . . .." (Sec.
1644, Rev. Adm. Code.) It has no corporate existence, and its appropriations are provided for in the General
Appropriations Act. Designed to meet the printing needs of the Government, it is primarily a service bureau and is
obviously, not engaged in business or occupation for pecuniary profit. Although it receives outside or private printing jobs,
it is only one half of one percent of all the printing jobs, and cannot be pretended to be an industrial or business concern.
2. The Bureau of Printing, as an office of the Government, without any corporate or juridical personality cannot be sued.
BOP cannot be sued. Any suit, action or proceeding against it, if it were to produce any effect, would actually be a suit,
action or proceeding against the Government itself, and the rule is settled that the Government cannot be sued without its
consent, much less over its objection
233 SCRA 524 Holy See vs Rosario - Bigcas

Facts:
Petitioner, Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City and is represented by the Papal Nuncio in the Philippines. The
petition arose from a controversy regarding a lot, Lot 5-A, of 6,000 square meters located in the Municipality of Paraaque,
registered in the name of the petitioner. Lot 5-A is contiguous to two other lots, 5-B and 5-D. The three lots were sold to Ramon
Licup, who later assigned his rights to the sale to the private respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc., involved in real estate.
Informal settlers were squatting in the property, and dispute arose as to who would evict them. The conflict intensified when the lot
was sold to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation by the petitioner.

The private respondent filed a complaint before the RTC of Makati against the petitioner and three other defendants: Msgr. Domingo
Cirilos, who acted as agent to the sellers, the PRC and Tropicana. It prayed for: 1) annulment of the Deeds of Sale between
petitioner and the PRC on the one hand and Tropicana on the other; 2) the reconveyance of the lots in question; 3) specific
performance of the agreement to sell between it and the owners of the lots and; 4) damages. The petitioners and Cirilos separately
moved to dismiss the complaint: petitioners for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit and Cirilos for being an
improper party. An opposition to the motion was filed by private respondent. The trial court issued an order denying the petitioners
motion to dismiss, reason being that the petitioner can no longer be immune as they entered into a business contract. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration. They then filed a Motion for Hearing for the Sole Purpose of Establishing Factual Allegation for Claim of
Immunity as a Jurisdictional Defense, to facilitate the hearing in its defense of sovereign immunity. Private respondents opposed
the motion as well as the motion for reconsideration.

The trial court ordered the resolution be suspended until after trial on the merits and directing the petitioner to file its answer.
Petitioner elevated the matter to the Supreme Court. The petitioner invoked its privilege of sovereign immunity only on its behalf and
on behalf of its official representatives, the Papal Nuncio. Eventually, the Department of Foreign Affairs filed for a Motion of
Intervention claiming its legal interest on the outcome of the case concerning the diplomatic immunity of the petitioner. It stated its
adoption upon the claim of the petitioner with regard to its claim for sovereign immunity from suit. This was opposed by the private
respondent.

Issue:
Whether or not the Holy See can invoke its right to Sovereign Immunity to suit.

Ruling:

As expressed in Section 2 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution, we have adopted the generally accepted principles of International
Law. Even without this affirmation, such principles of International Law are deemed incorporated as part of the law of the land as a
condition and consequence of our admission in the society of nations. In the present case, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in
the ordinary course of real estate business, surely the said transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis. However,
petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of the lot were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said
property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines.

The Holy See is immune from suit for the act of selling the lot of concern is non-proprietary in nature. The lot was acquired by
petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was made not for commercial purpose, but for the use of
petitioner to construct thereon the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. The decision to transfer the property and the
subsequent disposal thereof are likewise clothed with a governmental character. Petitioner did not sell the lot for profit or gain. It
merely wanted to dispose of the same because the squatters living thereon made it almost impossible for petitioner to use it for the
purpose of the donation.
 GR 142396 Minucher v CA Bohol / cherish
FACTS:
Khosrow Minucher is an Iranian national who came to study in here in PH in UP in 1974 and was appointed Labor Attache for
the Iranian Embassies in Tokyo, JP and Manila, PH. When the Shah of Iran was deposed, he became a refugee and continued
to stay as head of the Iranian Natl Resistance Movement. Scalzo, on the other hand was a special agent of USDEA. He
conducts surveillance operations on suspended drug dealers in the PH believed to be source of prohibited drugs shipped to the
US and make the actual arrest.
During his first meeting with the defendant on May 13, 1996, upon introduction of Jose Ligo, Scalzo expressed his interest in
buying caviar, bought 2 kilos from Minucher and paid 10,000 pesos. Minucher also expressed his desire to obtain US Visa for
his wife Abbas Torabian. Scalzo told him that he could help for a fee of $2,000 per visa. On May 26, 1986, Scalzo visited
Minucher at his house in Kapitolyo, Pasig. Scalzo bought carpets at $24,000. The next day, defendant came back again to
plaintiffs house and directly proceeded to the bedroom where Minucher and Torabian were playing chess. The defendant
requested the plaintiff to come out of the house for a while so that he can introduce him to his cousin. To his complete surprise,
an American jumped out of the cab with a drawn high-powered gun and was in the company of about 30-40 Filipino soldiers with
6 Americans, all armed. Plaintiff was charged with violation of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972). They were acquitted.
Minucher filed a case before the RTC for damages on account of what he claimed to have been trumped-up charges of drug
trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo. In his defense, Scalzo asserted his diplomatic immunity as evidenced by a Diplomatic Note.
He contended that the US govt, pursuant to Vienna Convention, recognized it on Diplomatic Relations. The court ruled in favor
of Scalzo on the ground that he was special agent of USDEA, he was entitled to diplomatic immunity.
RTC: decision in favor of plaintiff
CA: reversed. Scalzo was sufficient clothed with diplomatic immunity pursuant to the terms of Vienna Convention.
ISSUE: Whether or not Scalzo is entitled to diplomatic immunity
HELD:
Yes. As provided in the Vienna Convention. Scalzo was an Assistant Attache of the US diplomatic mission. These officials are
not generally regarded as members of the diplomatic mission, nor are they normally designated as having diplomatic rank. A
foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit but only as long as it can be established that
he is acting within the directives of the sending state. The buy-bust operation and other such acts are indication that the PH
govt has given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the activities within PH territory of agent Scalzo of USDEA. Scalzo hardly can
be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official function or duties.
**
Alternative digest:
Khosrow Minucher vs Hon. Court of Appeals and Arthur Scalzo
G.R. No. 142396 February 11, 2003
Vitug, J.:
Facts:
Khosrow Minucher, an Iranian national, was charged for violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise also known
as Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The criminal charged was followed a buy-bust operation done by the Philippine narcotic
police in the house of the petitioner. Private respondent Scalzo accompanied and assisted the local narcotic agents in the
operation. The trial court ruled acquitting Minucher for the said crime.
Petitioner Minucher filed a civil case against Private respondent Scalzo for damages on the basis of trump-up charges of drug
trafficking made by the latter.
The private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the basis that being as special agent of United States Drug
Enforcement Administration, he was entitled to diplomatic immunity. However, denied by the trial court. Thereby, the court
awarded damages in favor of the petitioner. Private respondent made an appeal to the Court of Appeals and thereby reversed
the decision of the trial court. Hence, the instant petition before the Supreme Court.
Issue: WON private respondent was entitled to diplomatic immunity
Held: Yes. The private respondent is entitled to diplomatic immunity. If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign
government done by its foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity, the
complaint could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a representative of a
state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. While the doctrine (of state immunity) appears to prohibit only suits against
the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by
them in the discharge of their duties.
In the instant case, The job description of private respondent had tasked him to conduct surveillance on suspected drug
suppliers and, after having ascertained the target, to inform local law enforcers who would then be expected to make the arrest.
In conducting surveillance activities on petitioner, later acting as the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust operation, and then
becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher, Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope
of his official function or duties. Therefore, Arthur Scalzo, an agent of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency allowed by
the Philippine government to conduct activities in the country to help contain the problem on the drug traffic, was entitled to the
defense of state immunity from suit. The petition was hereby denied.

244 SCRA 210 Callado v IRRI - Cabaero

FACTS:

Herein, petitioner Ernesto Callado was a driver of the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI). During an official trip to the Ninoy
Aquino International Airport on 11 February 1990, Callado, using an IRRI vehicle, suffered an accident which led to his termination
issued through a Notice by IRRIs Human Resource Development Department Manager on 7 December 1990. Such termination
was based on the following: a) Callado drove the vehicle while on official duty under the influence of liquor; b) gross and habitual
neglect of duties; and c) Callados failure to report to his supervisors the fact that the vehicle had failed to start due to problem with
the car battery.

Aggrieved, Callado filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension and indemnity pay with moral
and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. Respondent IRRI likewise informed the Labor Arbiter, through counsel, that the
Institute enjoys immunity from legal process by virtue of Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620, and that it invokes such
diplomatic immunity and privileges as an international organization in the instant case filed by petitioner.

The Labor arbiter, while admitting IRRI's defense of immunity, nonetheless, cited an Order issued by the Institute to the effect that
"in all cases of termination, respondent IRRI waives its immunity. Thus, there is no immunity placing obstacle to the case.

However, the NLRC found that IRRI did not waive its immunity, thereafter ordered the decision of the Labor Arbiter set aside and the
complaint dismissed.

In this petition, Callado contends that the immunity of the IRRI as an international organization granted by Article 3 of Presidential
Decree No. 1620 may not be invoked in the case at bench inasmuch as it waived the same by virtue of its Memorandum on
"Guidelines on the handling of dismissed employees in relation to P.D. 1620."

ISSUE: Whether or not IRRI waived its immunity from suit in this dispute which arose from an employer-employee relationship.

HELD: No, IRRI's immunity from suit is undisputed. Presidential Decree No. 1620, Article 3 provides:

Immunity from Legal Process. The Institute shall enjoy immunity from any penal, civil and administrative proceedings, except insofar
as that immunity has been expressly waived by the Director-General of the Institute or his authorized representatives.

The only way by which it may relinquish or abandon this immunity is through an express waiver by its Director-General. IRRI had
categorically informed the Labor Arbiter that the Institute will not waive its diplomatic immunity, embedded in P.D. No. 1620, Article 3
which provides:

Art. 3. Immunity from Legal Process. The Institute shall enjoy immunity from any penal, civil and administrative proceedings, except
insofar as that immunity has been expressly waived by the Director-General of the Institute or his authorized representatives.

It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially
a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government, and where
the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then
the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government or
other officer acting under his direction.

227 SCRA 693 DA v NLRC - Cabungcal

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE , petitioner, vs. THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL., respondents

G.R. No. 104269. November 11, 1993.

Facts:
April 1, 1989 Department of Agriculture & Sultan security Agency entered into a contract for security services
September 13, 1990 guards of the said agency filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13th month pay,
uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay and overtime pay, as well for damages against the Department of
Agriculture
May 31, 1991 Executive Labor Arbiter found the petitioner (Department of Agriculture) liable for the payment of the money
claims, aggregating P266,483.91.
The Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution to enforce and execute the judgment against the property of the DA and the security
agency. Thereafter, the City Sheriff levied on execution the motor vehicles of the DA.
Petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for preliminary writ of injunction was filed by the petitioner with
National Labor Relations Commission .
Contention of the petitioner:
o that the writ issued was effected without the Labor Arbiter having duly acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner hence the decision
of the Labor Arbiter is null and void anf should deemed equally invalid and of no legal effect
o faults the NLRC for assuming jurisdiction over a money claim against the Department, which, it claims, falls under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. More importantly, the petitioner asserts
o the NLRC has disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-suability of the State.
Contention of respondent:
o Petitioner has impliedly waived its immunity from suit by concluding a service contract with sultan security agency

Issue: Whether or not the Department of Agriculture can invoke the non-suability of the state as defense
Held: Yes, the DA can invoke the non-suability as a defense.
The general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, where the Philippine government consents
and submits to be sued upon any money claims involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a
basis of civil action between private parties.
the claims of private respondents clearly constitute money claims. Act No. 3083, aforecited, gives the consent of the State
to be "sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, . . ." Pursuant, however, to
Commonwealth Act ("C.A.") No. 327, as amended by Presidential Decree ("P.D.") No. 1445, the money claim should first be
brought to the Commission on Audit
The Labor Code, in relation to Act No. 3083, provides the legal basis for the State liability but the prosecution, enforcement or
satisfaction thereof must still be pursued in accordance with the rules and procedures laid down in C.A. No. 327, as amended by
P.D. 1445
Moreover, When the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it limits the claimants
action only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution. The power of the Courts ends when a judgment
is rendered since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs or execution or garnishment to satisfy such
judgments. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the correspondent appropriation as required by law. The functions
and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their
legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law. Thus, the Supreme Court granted the petition and nullified the writ of
execution directed against the property of the Department of Agriculture.

148 SCRA 424 republic v. Feliciano - castillo

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PABLO FELICIANO and INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G.R. No. 70853 148 SCRA 424 March 12, 1987
Facts:
Pablo Feliciano filed a complaint against the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, for the
recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land, consisting of four (4) lots with an aggregate area of
1,364.4177 hectares in Barrio of Salvacion, Municipality of Tinambac, Camarines Sur.
On November 1, 1954, President Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 90 reserving for settlement purposes a tract of land situated in the
Municipalities of Tinambac and Siruma, Camarines Sur, after which the NARRA and its successor agency, the Land Authority, started sub-
dividing and distributing the land to the settlers
the property in question, while located within the reservation established under Proclamation No. 90, was the private property of plaintiff
and should therefore be excluded therefrom
result of petition: On August 29, 1970, the trial court, through Judge Rafael S. Sison, rendered a decision declaring Lot No. 1 (701.9064
hectares) to be the private property of the plaintiff, and declaring said lot excluded from the NARRA settlement reservation. The court
declared Lots 2, 3 and 4, reverted to the public domain
The appeal was filed by 86 settlers, to dismiss the complaint filed by Feliciano, alleging that they had been in possession of the land for
more than 20 years under claim of ownership.
August 31, 1971- Judge Sison rendered a decision reiterating his decision of August 29, 1970.
November 18, 1971- plaintiff filed a motion for execution, before motion for reconsideration was acted upon
December 10, 1971- the lower court, issued an order denying the motion for execution and setting aside the order denying intervenors'
motion for postponement.
August 31, 1970- intervenors filed a motion to dismiss, principally on the ground that the Republic of the Philippines cannot be sued
without its consent and hence the action cannot prosper. The motion was opposed by the plaintiff.
August 21, 1980- the trial court, issued the questioned order dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction
Respondent moved for reconsideration, while the Solicitor General, on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines filed its opposition thereto,
maintaining that the dismissal was proper on the ground of non-suability of the State.
Upon denial of the motion for reconsideration, plaintiff again went to the Intermediate Appellate Court on petition for certiorari.
April 30, 1985- the respondent appellate court rendered its decision reversing the order of the judge and remanding the case to the court
a quo for further proceedings. Hence this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the state can be sued for recovery and possession of a parcel of land.

Held
No
Jurisprudence is not permitted, except upon a showing that the State has consented to be sued, either expressly or by implication
through the use of statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted. There is no such showing in the instant case. Worse, the
complaint itself fails to allege the existence of such consent. This is a fatal defect and on this basis alone, the complaint
should have been dismissed.
The court did not agree when the respondent contends that the consent of petitioner may be read from the Proclamation itself, when it
established the reservation " subject to private rights, if any there be. "
No such consent can be drawn from the language of the Proclamation. The exclusion of existing private rights from the reservation
established by Proclamation No. 90 cannot be construed as a waiver of the immunity of the State from suit
Waiver of immunity, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be inferred lightly but must be construed in strictissimi juris
Moreover, the Proclamation is not a legislative act. The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority. Waiver of
State immunity can only be made by an act of the legislative body.
Neither is there merit in respondent's submission, that the present action is not a suit against the State within the rule
of State immunity from suit, because plaintiff does not seek to divest the Government of any of its lands or its
funds. It is contended that the complaint involves land not owned by the State, but private land belonging to the
plaintiff, hence the Government is not being divested of any of its properties. There is some sophistry involved in
this argument, since the character of the land sought to be recovered still remains to be established, and the plaintiff's
 action is directed against the State precisely to compel the latter to litigate the ownership and possession of the
property. In other words, the plaintiff is out to establish that he is the owner of the land in question based,
incidentally, on an informacion posesoria of dubious value, and he seeks to establish his claim of ownership by suing
the Republic of the Philippines in an action in personam.

78 SCRA 470 Republic v Purisima - Catolos

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE AMANTE P. PURISIMA, the Presiding Judge of
the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch VII), and YELLOW BALL FREIGHT LINES, INC., respondents.|||
(Republic v. Purisima, G.R. No. L-36084, [August 31, 1977], 168 PHIL 632-637)

Ponente: Fernando, J:

Facts: A motion to dismiss was filed on September 7, 1972 by defendant Rice and Corn Administration in a pending civil suit in the
sala of respondent Judge Amante P. Purisima for the collection of a money claim arising from an alleged breach of contract, the
plaintiff being private respondent Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc. At that time, the leading case of Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc. v.
Customs Arrastre Service, where Justice Bengzon stressed the lack of jurisdiction of a court to pass on the merits of a claim against
any office or entity acting as part of the machinery of the national government unless consent be shown, had been applied in 53
other decisions. Respondent Judge Amante P. Purisima of the Court of First Instance of Manila denied the motion to dismiss dated
October 4, 1972. Hence, the petition for certiorari and prohibition.

Issue: Whether or not respondent Judge Purisimas decision is valid

Held: No. The position of the Republic has been fortified with the explicit affirmation found in this provision of the present
Constitution: "The State may not be sued without its consent."

"The doctrine of non-suability recognized in this jurisdiction even prior to the effectivity of the [1935] Constitution is a logical corollary
of the positivist concept of law which, to para-phrase Holmes, negates the assertion of any legal right as against the state, in itself
the source of the law on which such a right may be predicated. Nor is this all, even if such a principle does give rise to problems,
considering the vastly expanded role of government enabling it to engage in business pursuits to promote the general welfare, it is
not obeisance to the analytical school of thought alone that calls for its continued applicability. Nor is injustice thereby cause private
parties. They could still proceed to seek collection of their money claims by pursuing the statutory remedy of having the Auditor
General pass upon them subject to appeal to judicial tribunals for final adjudication. We could thus correctly conclude as we did in
the cited Providence Washington Insurance decision: "Thus the doctrine of non-suability of the government without its consent, as it
has operated in practice, hardly lends itself to the charge that it could be the fruitful parent of injustice, considering the vast and
ever- widening scope of state activities at present being undertaken. Whatever difficulties for private claimants may still exist, is,
from an objective appraisal of all factors, minimal. In the balancing of interests, so unavoidable in the determination of what
principles must prevail if government is to satisfy the public weal, the verdict must be, as it has been these so many years, for its
continuing recognition as a fundamental postulate of constitutional law." [Switzerland General Insurance Co., Ltd. v. Republic of the
Philippines]

The consent, to be effective, must come from the State acting through a duly enacted statute as pointed out by Justice Bengzon in
Mobil. Thus, whatever counsel for defendant Rice and Corn Administration agreed to had no binding force on the government.

18 SCRA 1120 Merritt v. Govt of PI - david

Facts:
E. Merritt was a constructor who was excellent at his work. One day, while he was riding his motorcycle along Calle Padre Faura,
he was bumped by a government ambulance. The driver of the ambulance was proven to have been negligent. The incident caused
Merritt to be hospitalized and he was severely injured beyond rehabilitation so much so that he could never perform his job the way
he used to and that he cannot even earn at least half of what he used to earn.
In order for Merritt to recover damages, he sought to sue the government which later authorized Merritt to sue the government by
virtue of Act 2457 enacted by the legislature Act 2457 authorized E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the Philippine
Islands and authorized the Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said suit. The lower court then determined the amount of
damages and ordered the government to pay the same.

Issue: W/N the government is liable for the negligent act of the driver of the ambulance

Held:
NO. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or
create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to
enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense. It
follows therefrom that the state, by virtue of such provisions of law, is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals
in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault
nor even negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the organization of branches of public service and in the
appointment of its agents. The State can only be liable if it acts through a special agent (and a special agent, in the sense in which
these words are employed, is one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his
office if he is a special official) so that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes the
trust confided to him.
In the case at bar, the ambulance driver was not a special agent nor was a government officer acting as a special agent hence,
there can be no liability from the government. The Government does not undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the
officers or agents whom it employs, since that would involve it in all its operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties and
losses, which would be subversive of the public interest.

L-6060 30 Sept 1950 Froilan v Pan Oriental Shipping - diloy

Facts: Plaintiff, Fernando Froilan filed a complaint against the defendant-appellant, Pan Oriental Shipping Co., alleging that he
purchased from the Shipping Commission the vessel for P200,000, paying P50,000 down and agreeing to pay the balance in
instalments. To secure the payment of the balance of the purchase price, he executed a chattel mortgage of said vessel in favor of
the Shipping Commission. For various reasons, among them the non-payment of the installments, the Shipping Commission tool
possession of said vessel and considered the contract of sale cancelled. The Shipping Commission chartered and delivered said
vessel to the defendant-appellant Pan Oriental Shipping Co. subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines. Plaintiff
appealed the action of the Shipping Commission to the President of the Philippines and, in its meeting the Cabinet restored him to
all his rights under his original contract with the Shipping Commission. Plaintiff had repeatedly demanded from the Pan Oriental
Shipping Co. the possession of the vessel in question but the latter refused to do so.

Plaintiff, prayed that, upon the approval of the bond accompanying his complaint, a writ of replevin be issued for the seizure of said
vessel with all its equipment and appurtenances, and that after hearing, he be adjudged to have the rightful possession thereof . The
lower court issued the writ of replevin prayed for by Froilan and by virtue thereof the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. was divested of its
possession of said vessel.

Pan Oriental protested to this restoration of Plaintiff s rights under the contract of sale, for the reason that when the vessel was
delivered to it, the Shipping Administration had authority to dispose of said authority to the property, Plaintiff having already
relinquished whatever rights he may have thereon. Plaintiff paid the required cash of P10,000.00 and as Pan Oriental refused to
surrender possession of the vessel, he filed an action to recover possession thereof and have him declared the rightful owner of
said property. The Republic of the Philippines was allowed to intervene in said civil case praying for the possession of the in order
that the chattel mortgage constituted thereon may be foreclosed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RP of the Philippines is immune from suit.

HELD:

NO! because by filing its complaint in intervention the Government in effect waived its right of non suability.

"The immunity of the state from the suits does not deprive it of the right to sue private parties in its own courts. The state as plaintiff may avail itself of
the different forms of actions open to private litigants. In short, by taking the initiative in an action against a private party, the state surrenders its
privileged position and comes down to the level of the defendant. The latter automatically acquires, within certain limits, the right to set up whatever
claims and other defense he might have against the state. The United States Supreme Court thus explains:No direct suit can be maintained against the
United States. But when an action is brought by the United States to recover money in the hands of a party who has a legal claim against them, it
would be a very rigid principle to deny to him the right of setting up such claim in a court of justice, and turn him around to an application to Congress.'".

It is however, contended for the intervener that, if there was at all any waiver, it was in favor of the plaintiff against whom the complainant in
intervention was directed. This contention is untenable. As already stated, the complaint in intervention was in a sense in derogation of the defendant's
claim over the possession of the vessel in question.

When the government enters into a contract, for the State is then deem to have divested itself of the mantle of sovereign immunity
and descended to the level of the ordinary individual. Having done so, it becomes subject to judicial action and processes.

The Supreme Court held that the government impliedly allowed itself to be sued when it filed a complaint in intervention for the
purpose of asserting claim for affirmative relief against the plaintiff to the recovery of the vessel. The immunity of the state from suits
does not deprive it of the right to sue private parties in its own courts. The state as plaintiff may avail itself of the different forms of
actions open to private litigants. In short, by taking the initiative in an action against a private party, the state surrenders its
privileged position and comes down to the level of the defendant. The latter automatically acquires, within certain limits, the right to
set up whatever claims and other defenses he might have against the state.

204 SCRA 212 Republic v Sandiganbayan diloy / paul rivera

Facts:

Private respondents are defendants in Civil Case No. 0008 of the Sandiganbayan. The complaint was filed by the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, against Tantaco, Jr., Santiago, et. al.,
pursuant to Executive Order No. 14 denominated for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages.

Private respondents filed a Motion to Strike Out Some Portions of the Complaint and for Bill of Particulars of Other Portions. The
Sandiganbayan gave the PCGG 45 days to expand its complaint to make more specific allegations.
Private respondents then presented a motion for leave to file interrogatories under Rule 25 of the Rules of Court and
Interrogatories under Rule 25 The PCGG responded through a motion to strike out said motion and interrogatories as the purpose
thereof lacks merit.

Pursuant to the Sandiganbayans order, PCGG filed its expanded complaint, to which Tantoco, Jr. and Santiago reiterated their
motion for bill of particulars, through a Manifestation.

The Sandiganbayan denied the motion to strike out, for bill of particulars, and for leave to file interrogatories, holding them without
legal and factual basis. Also denied was the PCGG's motion to strike out impertinent pleading.

Tantoco, Jr. and Santiago thereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan a pleading denominated "Interrogatories to Plaintiff," and an
"Amended Interrogatories to Plaintiff" as well as a Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents. These were granted by the
Sandiganbayan. PCGG filed a Motion for Reconsideration on the matter alleging, among others, that the interrogatories would make
PCGG Commissioners and officers witnesses, in contravention of Executive Order No. 14 and related issuances. Said motion was
denied by the Sandiganbayan, hence this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not PCGG may object to the interrogatories served on it pursuant to Rule 25 of the Rules of the Court.

Held:

The PCGG may not object to such interrogatories.

The State is immune from suit in the sense that it cannot be sued without its consent which is given either expressly or impliedly.
Express consent may be manifested either through a general law or a special law. Implied consent is given when the State itself
commences litigation or when it enters into a contract.

The immunity of the State from suits does not deprive it of the right to sue private parties in its own courts. The state as plaintiff may
avail itself of the different forms of actions open to private litigants. But it is axiomatic that in filing an action, it divests itself of its
sovereign character and sheds its immunity from suit, descending to the level of an ordinary litigant.

18 SCRA 1120 Mobil Phil c Customs Arrastre Service - gascon

54 SCRA 84 Republic v Villasor - Ilacad

FACTS:
- July 3, 1961: a decision was rendered in favor of respondents P. J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and International
Construction Corporation confirming the arbitration award in the amount of P1,712,396.40
- June 24, 1969: Respondent Honorable Guillermo P. Villasor issued an Order declaring the aforestated decision final and
executory, directing the Sheriffs of Rizal Province, Quezon City and Manila to execute the decision.
- Provincial Sheriff of Rizal served notices of garnishment dated June 28, 1969 with several Banks
- The funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines on deposit with the Banks, particularly, with the Philippine Veterans
Banks and Philippine National Bank are public funds duly appropriated and allocated for the payment of pensions of
retirees, pay and allowances of military and civilian personnel and for maintenance and operations of the AFP
- Petitioner alleged that Respondent Judge, Honorable Guillermo P. Villasor, acted in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting the issuance of an alias writ of execution against the
properties of the AFP, hence the Alias Writ of Execution and notices of garnishment are null and void.

ISSUE: W/N the order of June 24, 1969 (by Respondent Judge declaring executory the decision of July 3, 1961) and the alias writ of
execution issued thereunder are null and void

RULING:
- YES.
- What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of the Constitution.
- It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty that the state as well as
its government is immune from suit unless it gives its consent.
- In the classic formulation of Holmes: A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete
theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law
on which the right depends.
- A corollary, both dictated by logic and sound sense from a basic concept is that public funds cannot be the object of a
garnishment proceeding even if the consent to be sued had been previously granted and the state liability adjudged.
- Justice Teehankee restated the well settled doctrine in the case of Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego:
Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions
and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds
from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.
- WHEREFORE, the writs of certiorari and prohibition are granted, nullifying and setting aside both the order of June 24,
1969 declaring executory the decision of July 3, 1961 as well as the alias writ of execution issued thereunder.

83 SCRA 595 PNB v Pabalan - imperial

Philippine National Bank v. Pabalan
GR No. L-33112
Facts:
PNB was compelled to release the funds from the respondent Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration (PVTA). PNB objected and
invoked the non-suability of the state and that such funds are public in character and both PVTA and PNB are Government-owned
and controlled corporation.
Issue:
Whether or not PNB can or cannot be sued
Held:
Yes, the Philippine National Bank, regardless whether they invoked the non-suability clause of the previous constitution, can be
sued because of the commercial nature of the business which is not included and covered by the doctrine of State immunity from
suit.

2 concept of foreign sovereign immunity

Syquia v. Almeda Lopez 84 Phil 312 - marin
Pedro Syquia et. al. vs. Natividad Almeda Lopez, Et. al. G.R. No. L-1648 August 17, 1949

Facts: Petitioners Pedro, Gonzalo and Leopoldo Syquia are joint owners of properties in Manila, namely, the North Qyauia
Apartments, South Syquia Apartments and Michel Apartments. In 1945, they executed contracts for lease of the apartments to USA,
with the term being until the war has ended and six months after, or unless terminated sooner by USA, as the buildings were used
for billeting and quartering officers of te US armed forces stationed in the Manila Area. George Moore, a Commanding General of
the US Army, and Erland Tillman, Chief of the Real Estate Division to the US Army in Manila who was under the command of
Moore, was said to be in control of the apartment buildings and had authority in the name of USA to assign officers of the army to
the buildings or order them to vacuate the same. When Japan surrendered on September 2, 1945, the lease would be terminated
six months after. The petitioners approached the predecessors of Moore and Tillman and requested the buildings to be returned to
them, as per contract agreement. However, they were advised that the US Army wanted to continue their occupancy of the
buildings, and refused to execute new leases but advised that they will vacate the premises before February 1, 1947, not the original
terms of the contract agreement. Petitioner-plaintiffs sued before the Municipal Court of Manila with the demand to get the
properties as their agreement supposedly expired, and furthermore asked for increased rentals until the premises were vacated.
Respondent-defendants were part of the armed forces of the US moved to dismiss the suit for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
court. The MC of Manila granted the motion to dismiss the suit, sustained by the CFI of Manila, hence the petition for certiorari.

Issue: Whether the Philippine Courts have a lack of jurisdiction, considering, under the doctrine of Sovereign Immunity, that USA
has not given their consent to be a respondent.

Ruling: The case was dismissed, the Supreme Court affirming in majority the decision of the Municipal Court of Manila.

Reason: Considering the circumstances, the real defendant party is the United States of America, as it was the U.S. Army who were
occupying the buildings, with the rent being paid for by their government. USA has not given their consent to be sued in this case,
and any action against them without the consent would constitue a lack o f jurisdiction.

USA v. Ruiz 136 SCRA 487 - medina

FACTS: U.S had a naval base in Subic, Zambales by virtue of the Military Bases Agreement. In May 1952, petitioner invited the
submission of bids for the repair of the offender system, wharves, and damages caused by typhoon. Eligio de Guzman & Co, Inc.
responded to the said invitation and submitted bids. The company received letters from the petitioner requesting them to confirm
their price proposals, which they complied. In June 1952, the company received a letter from Wilham Collins, Director of Contracts
Division of Naval Facilities Engineering Command, which said that they did not qualify to receive awards for the projects because of
a previous unsatisfactory rating on the repair contract for sea walls, and that the project was awarded to third parties. The Company
sued the United States as well as members of the Engineering Command of the US Navy. The filed complaint seeks to allow the
plaintiff to finish the project and if not allowed, seek damages. It also asked for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction to
restrain the defendant from entering into contracts with third parties. The defendants question the subject matter of the complaint,
saying that the United States did not give its consent to be sued. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, but was denied. The writ was
issued.

ISSUE: WON US can be sued.

HELD: No. The respondent judge recognized the restrictive doctrine of State immunity when he said in his Order denying the
defendants (now petitioners) Motion: A distinction should be made between strictly governmental function of sovereign state from
its private, proprietary, non-governmental acts. It is the Courts opinion that entering into a contract for the repair of wharves or
shorelines is a non-governmental function although it may partake of a public nature or character. The correct test for the
application of State immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by the State but the legal nature of the act.
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign
sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. A State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and
thus can be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where
the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case, the projects are an integral part of the naval base, which
is devoted to the defense of both the US and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government; they are not utilized for nor
dedicated to commercial or business purposes.

Clarification: kaya parang nagkapalit yung positions (respondent to plantiff, petitioner to defendant), it's referring to the civ case filed
by De Guzman&Co against US Navy, to which Ruiz was the ponente.
 Sanders v. Veridiano 162 SCRA 88 - misa

Facts:

Petitioner Dale Sanders is a Special Services Director of the US NAVSTA (Naval Station) in Olongapo. Petitioner Moreau was the
commanding officer of the Subic Naval Base. Private respondents Anthony Rossi and Ralph Wyers are American citizens
permanently residing in the Philippines and who were employed as gameroom attendants in the special services department of
NAVSTA. On October 3, 1975, Rossi and Wyer were advised that their employment had been converted from permanent full-time to
permanent part-time. Their reaction was to protest this conversion and to institute grievance proceedings conformably to the
pertinent rules and regulations of the US DoD. The hearing officer recommended for reinstatement of their full-time status. However,
in a letter addressed to petitioner Moreau, Sanders disagreed with the hearing officer's report. The letter contained the statements
that: a ) "Mr. Rossi tends to alienate most co-workers and supervisors;" b) "Messrs. Rossi and Wyers have proven, according to
their immediate supervisors, to be difficult employees to supervise;" and c) "even though the grievants were under oath not to
discuss the case with anyone, (they) placed the records in public places where others not involved in the case could hear." Private
respondent filed for damages alleging that the letters contained libelous imputations and that the prejudgment of the grievance
proceedings was an invasion of their personal and proprietary rights.

However, petitioners argued that the acts complained of were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties and that,
consequently, the court had no jurisdiction over them under the doctrine of state immunity. However, the motion was denied on the
main ground that the petitioners had not presented any evidence that their acts were official in nature.

Issue: Whether the petitioners were performing their official duties when they did the acts for which they have been sued for
damages

Ruling: It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were performed
by them in the discharge of their official duties. Sanders, as director of the special services department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly
had supervision over its personnel and had a hand in their employment, work assignments, discipline, dismissal and other related
matters. The same can be said for Moreau. Given the official character of the above-described letters, it can be concluded that the
petitioners were being sued as officers of the United States government. There should be no question by now that such complaint
cannot prosper unless the government sought to be held ultimately liable has given its consent to be sued.

USA vs Rodrigo GR 79470 - ngo

FACTS: Fabian Genove filed a complaint for damages against petitioners Anthony Lamachia, Wilfredo Belsa, Rose Cartalla
and Peter Orascion for his dismissal as cook in the U.S. Air Force Recreation Center at the John Hay Air Station in
Baguio City. It had been ascertained after investigation, from the testimony of Belsa, Cartalla and Orascion, that Genove
had poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking the vegetables served to the club customers. Lamachia, as club
manager, suspended him and thereafter referred the case to a board of arbitrators conformably to the collective bargaining
agreement between the Center and its employees. The board unanimously found him guilty and recommended his
dismissal. This was effected on March 5, 1986, by Col. David C. Kimball, Commander of the 3rd Combat Support Group,
PACAF Clark Air Force Base. Genove's reaction was to file his complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City
against the individual petitioners. 4 On March 13, 1987, the defendants, joined by the United States of America, moved to
dismiss the complaint, alleging that Lamachia, as an officer of the U.S. Air Force stationed at John Hay Air Station, was
immune from suit for the acts done by him in his official capacity. They argued that the suit was in effect against the
United States, which had not given its consent to be sued. This motion was denied by the respondent judge on June 4,
1987, in an order which read in part:
It is the understanding of the Court, based on the allegations of the complaint which have been hypothetically
admitted by defendants upon the filing of their motion to dismiss that although defendants acted initially in their official
capacities, their going beyond what their functions called for brought them out of the protective mantle of whatever
immunities they may have had in the beginning. Thus, the allegation that the acts complained of were "illegal," done, with
"extreme bad faith" and with "pre-conceived sinister plan to harass and finally dismiss" the plaintiff, gains significance.
The petitioners then came to this Court seeking certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the action was in effect a suit against United States of America.

2. Whether or not the petitioners were immune from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty for acts done by them in the performance of their official
duties.

HELD/RULING:

The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is one of the generally accepted principles of international law that were have adopted as part
of the law of our land. Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of international law under the
doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the majority of the states, such principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every
civilized state as a condition and consequence of its membership in the society of nations. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert
jurisdiction over one another. While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints
filed against officials of the states for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such
officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, the suit must be regarded as against the state although it has not
been formally impleaded. When the government enters into a contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and
divested of its sovereign immunity from suit with its implied consent.
It bears stressing at this point that the aforesaid principle do not confer on the USA a blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in the
Philippines. Neither may the other petitioners claim that they are also insulated from suit in this country merely because they have acted as agents of
the United States in the discharge of their official functions.

There is no question that the USA, like any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its
proprietary or private capacity (commercial acts/jure gestionis). It is only when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity
(governmental acts/jure imperii) that no such waiver may be implied.

In G.R. No. 79470, private respondent Genove was employed as a cook in the Main Club located at the U.S. Air Force Recreation Center,
also known as the Open Mess Complex, at John Hay Air Station. As manager of this complex, petitioner Lamachia is responsible for eleven
diversified activities generating an annual income of $2 million. Under his executive management are three service restaurants, a cafeteria,
a bakery, a Class VI store, a coffee and pantry shop, a main cashier cage, an administrative office, and a decentralized warehouse which
maintains a stock level of $200,000.00 per month in resale items. He supervises 167 employees, one of whom was Genove, with whom the
United States government has concluded a collective bargaining agreement.
From these circumstances, the Court can assume that the restaurant services offered at the John Hay Air Station partake of the nature of
a business enterprise undertaken by the United States government in its proprietary capacity. Such services are not extended to the
American servicemen for free as a perquisite of membership in the Armed Forces of the United States. Neither does it appear that they
are exclusively offered to these servicemen; on the contrary, it is well known that they are available to the general public as well, including
the tourists in Baguio City, many of whom make it a point to visit John Hay for this reason. All persons availing themselves of this facility
pay for the privilege like all other customers as in ordinary restaurants. Although the prices are concededly reasonable and relatively low,
such services are undoubtedly operated for profit, as a commercial and not a governmental activity. The consequence of this finding is that
the petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of state immunity to justify the dismissal of the damage suit against them by Genove. Such
defense will not prosper even if it be established that they were acting as agents of the United States when they investigated and later
dismissed Genove. For that matter, not even the United States government itself can claim such immunity. The reason is that by entering
into the employment contract with Genove in the discharge of its proprietary functions, it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity
from suit. But these considerations notwithstanding, we hold that the complaint against the petitioners in the court below must still be
dismissed. While suable, the petitioners are nevertheless not liable. It is obvious that the claim for damages cannot be allowed on the
strength of the evidence before us, which we have carefully examined. The dismissal of the private respondent was decided upon only
after a thorough investigation where it was established beyond doubt that he had polluted the soup stock with urine. The investigation, in
fact, did not stop there. Despite the definitive finding of Genove's guilt, the case was still referred to the board of arbitrators provided for
in the collective bargaining agreement. This board unanimously affirmed the findings of the investigators and recommended Genove's
dismissal. There was nothing arbitrary about the proceedings. The petitioners acted quite properly in terminating the private respondent's
employment for his unbelievably nauseating act. It is surprising that he should still have the temerity to file his complaint for damages after
committing his utterly disgusting offense.
In G.R. No. 79470, the petition is GRANTED and Civil Case No. 829-R(298) is DISMISSED.

USA vs Guinto 76609 - pajarillaga

These are cases that have been consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of state immunity. The United States of America
was not impleaded in the case at bar but has moved to dismiss on the ground that they are in effect suits against it to which it has
not consented.

FACTS:

1. USA vs GUINTO (GR No. 76607)

The private respondents are suing several officers of the US Air Force in Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding conducted by
them for contracts for barber services in the said base, which was won by Dizon. The respondents wanted to cancel the award
because they claimed that Dizon had included in his bid an area not included in the invitation to bid, and also, to conduct a
rebidding.
2. USA vs RODRIGO (GR No. 79470)
Genove filed a complaint for damages for his dismissal as cook in the US Air Force Recreation Center at Camp John Hay Air Station. It had been ascertained after investigation that Genove had poured urine into
the soup stock used in cooking the vegetables served to the club customers. The club manager suspended him and thereafter referred the case to a board of arbitrators, which unanimously found him guilty and
recommended his dismissal.

3. USA vs CEBALLOS (GR No. 80018)

Bautista, a barracks boy in Camp O Donnell, was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by petitioners, who were USAF officers and special agents of the Air Force Office. An information was filed
against Bautista and at the trial, petitioners testified against him. As a result of the charge, Bautista was dismissed from his employment. He then filed for damages against petitioners claiming that it was because
of the latters acts that he lost his job.

4. USA vs VERGARA (GR No. 80258)

A complaint for damages was filed by private respondents against petitioners (US military officers) for injuries allegedly sustained by the former when defendants beat them up, handcuffed them and unleashed
dogs on them. The petitioners deny this and claim that respondents were arrested for theft but resisted arrest, thus incurring the injuries.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the defendants were immune from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty for acts done by them in the performance of
their official duties.

RULING:

The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is one of the generally accepted principles of international law that were
have adopted as part of the law of our land. Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted
principles of international law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the majority of the states, such
principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition and consequence of its membership in the
society of nations. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. While the doctrine appears to
prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the states for acts
allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the
state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, the suit must be regarded as against the state although it has not been
formally impleaded. When the government enters into a contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level of the other
contracting party and divested of its sovereign immunity from suit with its implied consent.

It bears stressing at this point that the aforesaid principle do not confer on the USA a blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its
agents in the Philippines. Neither may the other petitioners claim that they are also insulated from suit in this country merely
because they have acted as agents of the United States in the discharge of their official functions.

There is no question that the USA, like any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into
a contract in its proprietary or private capacity (commercial acts/jure gestionis). It is only when the contract involves its sovereign or
governmental capacity (governmental acts/jure imperii) that no such waiver may be implied.

In US vs GUINTO, the court finds the barbershops subject to the concessions granted by the US government to be commercial
enterprises operated by private persons. The Court would have directly resolved the claims against the defendants as in USA vs
RODRIGO, except for the paucity of the record as the evidence of the alleged irregularity in the grant of the barbershop concessions
were not available. Accordingly, this case was remanded to the court below for further proceedings.

In US vs RODRIGO, the restaurant services offered at the John Hay Air Station partake of the nature of a business enterprise undertaken by the US government in its
proprietary capacity, as they were operated for profit, as a commercial and not a governmental activity. Not even the US government can claim such immunity because by
entering into the employment contract with Genove in the discharge of its proprietary functions, it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit. But, the court still
dismissed the complaint against petitioners on the ground that there was nothing arbitrary about the proceedings in the dismissal of Genove, as the petitioners acted quite
properly in terminating Genoves employment for his unbelievably nauseating act.

In US vs CEBALLOS, it was clear that the petitioners were acting in the exercise of their official functions when they conducted the buy-bust operation and thereafter testified
against the complainant. For discharging their duties as agents of the United States, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable to their principal, which has not given
its consent to be sued.

In US vs VERGARA, the contradictory factual allegations in this case need a closer study of what actually happened. The record was too meager to indicate if the defendants
were really discharging their official duties or had actually exceeded their authority when the incident occurred. The needed inquiry must first be made by the lower court so it
may assess and resolve the conflicting claims of the parties.

NOTE:
1. A STATE MAY BE SAID TO HAVE DESCENDED TO THE LEVEL OF AN INDIVIDUAL AND CAN THUS BE DEEMED TO HAVE
TACITLY GIVEN ITS CONSENT TO BE SUED ONLY WHEN IT ENTERS INTO BUSINESS CONTRACTS.
2. Jure Gestionis by right of economic or business relations, may be sued. (US vs Guinto)

Jure Imperii by right of sovereign power, in the exercise of sovereign functions. No implied consent.

Distinguish -> Suability & Liability

Merritt v. Government of the Phil. Islands, 18 SCRA 1120 - real
[ March 21, 1916. Justice Grant T. Trent]
FACTS
E. Merrit, riding on a motorcycle, was going toward the western part of Calle Padre Faura, passing along the
west side thereof at a speed of 10 to 12 mph, upon crossing Taft Avenue and when he was 10 feet from the
southwestern intersection of said streets, the General Hospital ambulance, upon reaching said avenue, instead of
turning toward the south, after passing the center thereof, so that it would be on the left side of said avenue, as is
prescribed by the ordinance and the Motor Vehicle Act, turned suddenly and unexpectedly and long before reaching
the center of the street, into the right side of Taft Avenue, without having sounded any whistle or horn, by which
movement it struck the plaintiff, who was already 6 feet from the southwestern point or from the post placed there.
The plaintiff suffered severe physical and even mental injuries. As a consequence of the loss he suffered in
the efficiency of his work as a contractor, he had to dissolve the partnership he had formed with the engineer, Wilson,
because he was incapacitated from making mathematical calculations on account of the condition of his leg and of
his mental faculties, and he had to give up a contract he had for the construction of the Uy Chaco building.
As the negligence which caused the collision is a tort committed by an agent or employee of the
Government, the inquiry at once arises whether the Government is legally liable for the damages resulting therefrom.
Thus, Act No. 2457, An Act Authorizing E. Merritt to Bring Suit Against the Government of the Philippine Islands and
Authorizing the Attorney-General of said Islands to Appear in said Suit, effective February 3, 1915, was enacted by
the State. The case was brought before the court a qou and the trial ensued.
The Court of First Instance of the City of Manila ruled in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of P14,741, together
with the costs of the cause. But the Counsel for the plaintiff insists that the trial court erred (1) in limiting the general
damages which the plaintiff suffered to P5,000, instead of P25,000 as claimed in the complaint, and (2) in limiting
the time when plaintiff was entirely disabled to two months and twenty-one days and fixing the damage accordingly in
the sum of P2,666, instead of P6,000 as claimed by plaintiff in his complaint. On the other hand, the Attorney-
General on behalf of the defendant urges that the trial court erred: (a) in finding that the collision between the
plaintiff's motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital was due to the negligence of the chauffeur; (b) in
holding that the Government of the Philippine Islands is liable for the damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of
the collision, even if it be true that collision was due to the negligence of the chauffeur; and (c) in rendering judgment
against the defendant for the sum of P14,741.
Hence the case for review before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE
 Did the Government of the Philippine Islands, in enacting Act No. 2457, simply waive its immunity from suit
or did it also concede its liability to the plaintiff, Mr. E. Merritt?
HELD
Nope, the Supreme Court avers that the State (the Government of the Philippine Islands) is only liable for
the acts of its agents, officers and employees when they act as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of
Article 1903 of the Civil Code which provides, the responsibility of the state is limited to that which it contracts
through a special agent, duly empowered by a definite order or commission to perform some act or charged with
some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim, and not where the claim is based on acts or omissions imputable
to a public official charged with some administrative or technical office who can be held to the proper responsibility in
the manner laid down by the law of civil responsibility, and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the General
Hospital was not such an agent.
It may be conceded that the State can be made liable for injuries arising from the negligence of its agents or
servants, only by force of some positive statute assuming such liability. But the Supreme Court further states that as
to the scope of legislative enactments permitting individuals to sue the state where the cause of action arises out of
either tort or contract, the rule is stated in 36 Cyc., 915, which provides,By consenting to be sued a state simply
waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his
favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a pre-existing
liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense. Therefore,
arguably indeed, there can be no legal right as against the authority of the sovereign power of the State that makes
the law on which the right depends.xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Torio vs. Fontanilla 85 SCRA 599 - real

[October 23, 1978. Justice Cecilia Munoz Palma.]
FACTS
Pursuant to Section 2282 of the Revised Administrative Code, the Municipal Council of Malasiqui,
Pangasinan, resolved to celebrate the town fiesta and created a Town Fiesta Executive Committee to undertake,
manage and supervise the festivities. The Executive Committee created a sub-committee on Entertainment and
Stage to be Chaired by Jose Macaraeg, which constructed two stages, one for the zarzuela and another for
cancionan. During the program people went up the zarzuela stage and before the play was over the stage
collapsed, pinning underneath one of the performers, Vicente Fontanilla, resulting in his death.
The heirs of the deceased sued the municipality and the councilors for damages due to negligence. The
municipality invoked, inter alia, the principal defense that the holding of a town fiesta was an exercise of its
governmental function from which no liability can arise to answer for the negligence of any of its agents. The
councilors maintained that they merely acted as agents of the municipality in carrying out the municipal ordinance.
The trial court dismissed the complaint, finding that the petitioners exercised due diligence and care of a
good father of a family in selecting a competent man in Jose Macaraeg to construct the stage and if it collapsed it
was due to forces beyond the control of the committee on entertainment and stage.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision stating that petitioners were guilty of negligence when they
failed to take the necessary measures to prevent the mounting of onlookers on the stage resulting in the collapse
thereof. It also held the councilors jointly and solidarily liable with the municipality for damages under Article 27 of the
Civil Code which provides that any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee
refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief
against the latter.
Thus this petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE
Is the celebration of a town fiesta an undertaking in the exercise of a municipality's governmental or public
function or is it of a private or proprietary character?
HELD
This distinction of powers becomes important for purposes of determining the liability of the municipality for
the acts of its agents which result in an injury to third persons. If the injury is caused in the course of the performance
of a governmental function or duty no recovery, as a rule, can be taken from the municipality unless there is an
existing statute on the matter, nor from its officers, so long as they performed their duties honestly and in good faith
or that they did not act wantonly and maliciously. With respect to proprietary functions, the settled rule is that a
municipal corporation can be held liable to third persons ex contractu or ex delicto.
In the case at bar, the SC held that the holding of the town fiesta in 1959 by the municipality of Malasiqui
Pangasinan, was an exercise of a private or proprietary function of the municipality because the essence of which
was for the special benefit of the community and not for the general welfare of the public performed in pursuance of a
policy of the state.
The municipality acted like a corporation and it was interesting to note that the SC used the doctrine of
Respondeat Superior (there was negligence but employees acted within the scope of their employment), not Res
Ipsa Loquitur (there was negligence and a presumed breach of duty on the part of the board of directors or officers),
to assess the liability for damages for the death of Vicente Fontanilla. Meaning to say, even if it found and held that
there was negligence on the part of the municipality, unlike the Court of Appeals which cited Article 27 of the Civil
Code against the municipal councilors so that they be held accountable as well, the SC did not find any breach or
non-performance of official duty on their part. Article 27 of the Civil Code covers a case of non-feasance or non-
performance by a public officer of his official duty; it does not apply to a case of negligence or misfeasance in carrying
out an official duty. Thus, even it affirmed in toto the decision of the Court of Appeals as far as the liability of
Municipality of Malasiqui is concerned, it absolved the Municipal Councilors from assuming same liability. The heirs of
Vicente Fontanilla was awarded with the sum of P1,200.00 in the grant of attorneys
fees.xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Palafox v. Provincial of Ilocos GR L-10659 31 Jan 1958

Facts: Sabas Torralba was a freight truck driver employed by the Provincial Government of Ilocos Norte. On September 30, 1948
Torralba run over Proceto Palafox, father of the Appellees, that resulted on the death of Proceto. Sabas Torralba was prosecuted for
homicide through reckless imprudence. The heirs of Proceto Palafox also filed civil action against Torralbas employer, the Province,
the District Engineer, The Provincial Treasurer. Upon a motion to dismiss, the cases against the defendants was quashed except
Sabas Torralba.

Issue: Whether or Not the Province of Ilocos Norte can be held Liable?

Ruling: NO. The negligent employee engaged in the performance of governmental duties, as distinguished from
corporate or proprietary or business functions the government is not liable. The construction or maintenance of
roads in which the truck and the driver worked at the time of the accident are admittedly governmental activities.
Wherefore, the death of Palafox - tragic and deplorable though as it may be imposed on the province no duty to pay
monetary compensation. The reason for the exemption according to Mr. Justice Story is that the Government does
not undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs, since that would
involve in all its operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties and loses which would be subversive of the public
interest. (U.S. v. Kirkpatrick, 9 Wheat., 720; 6 L. ed., 199; Beers v. Arkansas, 20 How., 527; 15 L. ed., 991.)