Tan v.

Philbanking
FACTS: Helen Aguinaldo (respondent) and her husband Daniel took out a 200,000 loan from Philippine
Banking Corporation (PBC). The loan was secured by a real estate mortgage in favor of PBC. Additional loans
were obtained from PBC with a total amount of 500,000. Daniel Aguinaldo died without paying all loans.
Thus, loans with PBC remained unpaid despite demand of PBC. The bank extrajudicially foreclosed the
mortgage. Respondent filed a complaint to nullify the foreclosure proceedings.

RTC granted the petition and ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel the titles of the bank and issue new
titles in the name of the respondent. She then sold one of the lots to Roberto Tan (petitioner). The title was
clean when it was sold.

PBC appealed the case to CA. CA initially denied the reinstatement of the titles of PBC. PBC moved for a recon.
CA granted the MR and ordered the reinstatement of the cancelled titles of PBC. The CA decision also affected
the land petitioner bought from the respondent. The petitioner was sued as a nominal party being the new
owner of the land. Hence, appealed the decision to the SC.

ISSUE + RULING: W/N the titles of PBC could be reinstated NO

The CA, in its decision, correctly denied respondent banks prayer to reinstate its canceled TCTs because to do
so would effectively cancel petitioners title on the same lot. It must be noted that petitioners title was
regularly issued after the lot covered by the same was sold to him by respondent Aguinaldo. Petitioner relied
on the sellers title, which was then free from any claims, liens or encumbrances appearing thereon.

As such, petitioners title can only be challenged in a direct action. It is well settled that a certificate of title
cannot be subject to collateral attack and can be altered, modified or cancelled only in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law.

Having obtained a valid title over the subject lot, petitioner is entitled to protection against indirect attacks
against his title. The CAs original ruling on the matter, as stated in its decision, denying respondent banks
prayer for reinstatement of its canceled titles "without prejudice to the filing of proper action" should thus
stand. It is more in keeping with the purpose of the adoption of the Torrens system in our country:

The Torrens system was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the most effective measure to
guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is
established and recognized. If a person purchases a piece of land on the assurance that the sellers title
thereto is valid, he should not run the risk of being told later that his acquisition was ineffectual after all. This
would not only be unfair to him. What is worse is that if this were permitted, public confidence in the system
would be eroded and land transactions would have to be attended by complicated and not necessarily
conclusive investigations and proof of ownership. The further consequence would be that land conflicts could
be even more numerous and complex than they are now and possibly also more abrasive, if not even violent.
The Government, recognizing the worthy purposes of the Torrens system, should be the first to accept the
validity of the titles issued thereunder once the conditions laid down by the law are satisfied.

Leong v. Sese
FACTS: For over two decades, Elena (Petitioner), sister of Carmelita lived at a lot in Quiapo, Manila owned by
the spouses Carmelita, and Florentino Leong (Petitioner). When the building was razed by fire in 1995, she
and her relatives constructed makeshift houses in the property. When Spouses Leong to the United States,
they eventually agreed to dissolve their marriage in Illinois, USA. In their marriage settlement agreement,
Florentino agreed to convey and quitclaim all his right, title and interest in the Quiapo property.

In lieu of Florentinos signature to the deed of sale, Carmelita attached a notarized waiver of interest signed by
Florentino, reiterating his waiver over the Quiapo property. Thereafter, title to the property was transferred to
Edna (respondent). When Elena and relatives refused to vacate the property, respondent filed a complaint for
recovery of possession against Elena. In defense, Elena pointed out that there was no conformity on the part
of Florentino in the deed of sale, and Carmelitas failure to comply with the proviso that neither party may
evict any relatives without Florentino first obtaining clear title over the Malabon property. Florentino, on the
other hand, filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of deed of sale and title against the respondent, alleging
that the sale was without his consent.

Elena and Florentino elevated the case to the Supreme Court for review. They argue that the respondent was
a buyer in bad faith. She should have made inquiries since Elena was residing on the property. Florentinos
lack of consent to the sale also nullified the sale, and Florentinos waiver of interest was void since donations
between spouses are void. Being a buyer a bad faith, respondent should bear the loss. On the other hand,
respondent counters that the Civil law provisions cited by the petitioners are not applicable anymore since
Florentino, at the time he signed the waiver, was an American citizen, and the waiver was not a donation but
a consequence of the separation of their property as a result of the divorce proceedings.

ISSUE + RULING: WON respondent Edna is a buyer in good faith and for value YES

The Torrens system was adopted to "obviate possible conflicts of title by giving the public the right to rely
upon the face of the Torrens certificate and to dispense, as a rule, with the necessity of inquiring further." One
need not inquire beyond the four corners of the certificate of title when dealing with registered property.
Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 known as the Property Registration Decree recognizes innocent
purchasers in good faith for value and their right to rely on a clean title:

Section 44. Statutory liens affecting title. Every registered owner receiving a certificate of title in
pursuance of a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land taking a
certificate of title for value and in good faith, shall hold the same free from all encumbrances except those
noted in said certificate and any of the following encumbrances which may be subsisting, namely:

1. Liens, claims or rights arising or existing under the laws and Constitution of the Philippines which
are not by law required to appear of record in the Registry of Deeds in order to be valid against
subsequent purchasers or encumbrances of record.
2. Unpaid real estate taxes levied and assessed within two years immediately preceding the
acquisition of any right over the land by an innocent purchaser for value, without prejudice to the
right of the government to collect taxes payable before that period from the delinquent taxpayer
alone.
3. Any public highway or private way established or recognized by law, or any government irrigation
canal or lateral thereof, if the certificate of title does not state that the boundaries of such highway
or irrigation canal or lateral thereof have been determined.
4. Any disposition of the property or limitation on the use thereof by virtue of, or pursuant to,
Presidential Decree No. 27 or any other law or regulations on agrarian reform.

An innocent purchaser for value refers to someone who "buys the property of another without notice that
some other person has a right to or interest in it, and who pays a full and fair price at the time of the purchase
or before receiving any notice of another persons claim." One claiming to be an innocent purchaser for value
has the burden of proving such status. The protection of innocent purchasers in good faith for value grounds
on the social interest embedded in the legal concept granting indefeasibility of titles.
Both lower courts found respondent to be an innocent purchaser in good faith for value. The RTC discussed:

By her overt acts, Edna See with her father verified the authenticity of Carmelitas land title at the Registry of
Deeds of Manila. There was no annotation on the same thus deemed a clean title. Also, she relied on the duly
executed and notarized Certificate of Authority issued by the State of Illinois and Certificate of Authentication
issued by the Consul of the Republic of the Philippines for Illinois in support to the Waiver of Interest
incorporated in the Deed of Absolute Sale presented to her by Carmelita. Examination of the assailed
Certificate of Authority shows that it is valid and regular on its face. It contains a notarial seal. The assailed
Certificate of Authority is a notarized document and therefore, presumed to be valid and duly executed. Thus,
respondent Ednas reliance on the notarial acknowledgment found in the duly notarized Certificate of Authority
presented by Carmelita is sufficient evidence of good faith.

As discussed by the CA, respondent did conduct further inquiry by relying not only on the certificate of title,
but also on Florentinos waiver.

The question of whether Florentino and Carmelita were already American citizens at the time of the propertys
sale to Edna thus no longer covered by our laws relating to family rights and duties involves a factual
question outside the ambit of a petition for review on certiorari. In any event, respondent exerted due
diligence when she ascertained the authenticity of the documents attached to the deed of sale such as the
marital settlement agreement with Florentinos waiver of interest over the property. She did not rely solely on
the title. She even went to the Registry of Deeds to verify the authenticity of the title. These further inquiries
were considered by the lower courts in finding respondent to be an innocent purchaser in good faith and for
value.

In petitioners memorandum before this court, they mentioned the rule of fraud as an exception to the
indefeasibility of title principle, but failed to substantiate their allegation. Even assuming the procurement of
title was tainted with fraud and misrepresentation, "such defective title may still be the source of a completely
legal and valid title in the hands of an innocent purchaser for value."

Respondent, an innocent purchaser in good faith and for value with title in her name, has a better right to the
property than Elena. Elenas possession was neither adverse to nor in the concept of owner.
Article 428 of the Civil Code provides that the owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without
other limitations than those established by law. The owner has also a right of action against the holder and
possessor of the thing inorder to recover it. Thus, respondent had every right to pursue her claims as she did.

Mactan v. Heirs of Ijordan

FACTS: In 1957, Julian executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale in favor of the Civil Aeronautics
Administration, the predecessorininterest of petitioner Manila Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA).
Since then until the present, MCIAA rejmained in material, continuous, uninterrupted and adverse possession
of the subject lot.

In 1980, the respondents caused the judicial reconstitution of the original certificate of title covering the
subject lot. Consequently, Original Certificate of Title of the Register of Deeds of Cebu was reconstituted in the
names of the respondents' predecessorsininterest. The respondents' ownership of the subject lot was
evidenced by OCT. They asserted that they had not sold their shares in the subject lot, and had not authorized
Julian to sell their shares to MCIAA's predecessorininterest.

The failure of the respondents to surrender the owner's copy of prompted the petitioner to sue them for the
cancellation of title in the RTC alleging in its complaint that the certificate of title conferred no right in favor of
the respondents because the lot had already been sold to the Government in 1957. RTC dismissed MCIAA's
complaint insofar as it pertained to the shares of the respondents but recognized the sale as to the 1/22 share
of Julian.

MCIAA moved for reconsideration but the RTC denied its motion. MCIAA appealed to the CA. CA affirmed the
orders of the RTC issued. CA subsequently denied MCIAA's MR. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE + RULING:

1. WON the subject lot validly conveyed in its entirety to the petitioner NO

CA and the RTC concluded that the Deed was void as far as the respondents' shares in the subject lot were
concerned, but valid as to Julian's share. Their conclusion was based on the absence of the authority from his
coheirs in favor of Julian to convey their shares in the subject lot. We have no reason to overturn the
affirmance of the CA on the issue of the respondents' coownership with Julian. Hence, the conveyance by
Julian of the entire property pursuant to the Deed did not bind the respondents for lack of their consent and
authority in his favor. As such, the Deed had no legal effect as to their shares in the property.

Article 1317 of the Civil Code provides that no person could contract in the name of another without being
authorized by the latter, or unless he had by law a right to represent him; the contract entered into in the
name of another by one who has no authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his powers, is
unenforceable, unless it is ratified, expressly or impliedly, by the person on whose behalf it has been executed,
before it is revoked by the other contracting party.

But the conveyance by Julian through the Deed had full force and effect with respect to his share of 1/22 of
the entire property.

2. WON the respondents inaction for more than 30 years to recover possession of the lots amounts to an
implied ratification of sale NO

MCIAA's contention on acquisitive prescription in its must fail. Aside from the absence of the satisfactory
showing of MCIAA's supposed possession of the subject lot, no acquisitive prescription could arise in view of
the indefeasibility of the respondents' Torrens title. Under the Torrens System, no adverse possession could
deprive the registered owners of their title by prescription. The real purpose of the Torrens System is to quiet
title to land and to stop any question as to its legality forever. Thus, once title is registered, the owner may
rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting on the mirador su casa to
avoid the possibility of losing his land.

Republic v. Guzman
FACTS: David Guzman (petitioner) is a natural a naturalborn American citizen, is the son of the spouses
Simeon Guzman, a naturalized American citizen, and Helen Meyers Guzman, an American citizen. In Simeon
died leaving to his sole heirs Helen and David an estate consisting of several parcels of land located in
Bulacan.
Helen and David executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Simeon Guzman dividing and
adjudicating to themselves all the property belonging to the estate of Simeon. The document of extrajudicial
settlement was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds. The taxes due thereon were paid through
their attorneysinfact, and the parcels of land were accordingly registered in the name of Helen and David in
undivided equal shares.

Helen executed a Quitclaim Deed assigning, transferring and conveying to her son David her undivided (1/2)
interest on all the parcels of land subject matter of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of
Simeon Guzman. Since the document appeared not to have been registered, upon advice of Atty. Abela, Helen
executed another document, a Deed of Quitclaim, confirming the earlier deed of quitclaim as well as modifying
the document to encompass all her other property in the Philippines.

David executed a Special Power of Attorney where he acknowledged that he became the owner of the parcels
of land subject of the Deed of Quitclaim executed by Helen and empowering Atty. Abela to sell or otherwise
dispose of the lots.

A certain Atty. Batongbacal wrote the OSG and furnished it with documents showing that David's ownership of
the (1/2) of the estate of Simeon Guzman was defective. On the basis thereof, the Government (petitioner)
filed before the RTC a Petition for Escheat praying that (1/2) of David's interest in each of the subject parcels
of land be forfeited in its favor. RTC dismissed the petition. Petitioner appealed to the CA, it affirmed the RTC
decision. Hence, this petition.

As a rule, only a Filipino citizen can acquire private lands in the Philippines. The only instances when a
foreigner can acquire private lands in the Philippines are by hereditary succession and if he was formerly a
natural born Filipino citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship. Petitioner therefore contends that the
acquisition of the parcels of land by David does not fall under any of the exceptions. It asserts that David
being an American citizen could not validly acquire onehalf (1/2) interest in each of the subject parcels of land
by way of the two (2) deeds of quitclaim as they are in reality donations inter vivos. . It also reasons out that
the elements of donation are present in the conveyance made by Helen in favor of David.

David maintains, on the other hand, that he acquired the property by right of accretion and not by way of
donation, with the deeds of quitclaim merely declaring Helen's intention to renounce her share in the property
and not an intention to donate. He further argues that, assuming there was indeed a donation, it never took
effect since the Special Power of Attorney he executed does not indicate acceptance of the alleged donation.

ISSUE + RULING: WON respondent David acquired the property by way of donation NO

There are three (3) essential elements of a donation: (a) the reduction of the patrimony of the donor; (b) the
increase in the patrimony of the donee; and, (c) the intent to do an act of liberality or animus donandi. When
applied to a donation of an immovable property, the law further requires that the donation be made in a public
document and that

there should be an acceptance thereof made in the same deed of donation or in a separate public document.
In cases where the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, it is mandated that the donor should be
notified thereof in an authentic form, to be noted in both instruments.

Not all the elements of a donation of an immovable property are present in the instant case. The transfer of
the property by virtue of the Deed of Quitclaim executed by Helen resulted in the reduction of her patrimony
as donor and the consequent increase in the patrimony of David as donee. However, Helen's intention to
perform an act of liberality in favor of David was not sufficiently established. A perusal of the two (2) deeds of
quitclaim reveals that Helen intended to convey to her son David certain parcels of land located in the
Philippines, and to reaffirm the quitclaim she executed in 1981 which likewise declared a waiver and
renunciation of her rights over the parcels of land. The language of the deed of quitclaim is clear that Helen
merely contemplated a waiver of her rights, title and interest over the lands in favor of David, and not a
donation. That a donation was far from Helen's mind is further supported by her deposition which indicated
that she was aware that a donation of the parcels of land was not possible since Philippine law does not allow
such an arrangement. She reasoned that if she really intended to donate something to David it would have
been more convenient if she sold the property and gave him the proceeds therefrom It appears that foremost
in Helen's mind was the preservation of the Bulacan realty within the bloodline of Simeon from where they
originated, over and above the benefit that would accrue to David by reason of her renunciation. The element
of animus donandi therefore was missing.

Likewise, the two (2) deeds of quitclaim executed by Helen may have been in the nature of a public document
but they lack the essential element of acceptance in the proper form required by law to make the donation
valid. Also, the Special Power of Attorney merely acknowledges that David owns the property referred to and
that he authorizes Atty. Abela to sell the same in his name.

Moreover, it is mandated that if an acceptance is made in a separate public writing the notice of the
acceptance must be noted not only in the document containing the acceptance but also in the deed of
donation.

Thus, in Santos v. Robledo we emphasized that when the deed of donation is recorded in the registry of
property the document that evidences the acceptance if this has not been made in the deed of gift
should also be recorded. And in one or both documents, as the case may be, the notification of the acceptance
as formally made to the donor or donors should be duly set forth. Where the deed of donation fails to show
the acceptance, or where the formal notice of the acceptance made in a separate instrument is either not
given to the donor or else noted in the deed of donation, and in the separate acceptance, the donation is null
and void.

These requisites, definitely prescribed by law, have not been complied with, and no proof of compliance
appears in the record. The two (2) quitclaim deeds set out the conveyance of the parcels of land by Helen in
favor of David but its acceptance by David does not appear in the deeds, nor in the Special Power of Attorney.
Further, the records reveal no other instrument that evidences such acceptance and notice thereof to the
donor in an authentic manner. It is wellsettled that if the notification and notation are not complied with, the
donation is void. Therefore, the provisions of the law not having been complied with, there was no effective
conveyance of the parcels of land by way of donation inter vivos.

Sherwill v. Sitio Sto. Nino

FACTS: Petitioner Sherwill Corp. is the registered owner of two parcels of land in Muntinlupa, Rizal. Both lots
form part of the Muntinlupa Estate, while the titles thereon were issued by the Registry of Deeds in 1913.

On October 16, 2002, the petitioner filed a Complaint for quieting of title against respondents Sitio Sto. Nio
Residents Association, Inc. (SSNRAI), Nilda Devilleres, and the Lands Management Bureau (LMB). The
petitioners complaint alleges that:

a.) In the late 1960s and the 1970s, and up to the 1980s, unauthorized persons, without the prior
knowledge and consent of petitioner, unlawfully entered and occupied the lots.
b.) Respondents are disturbing and casting clouds over said titles. LMB is set to recommend to the OSG,
the nullification of TCTs of the two parcels in question and/or the reversion thereof to the Phil.
Government, (LMB case)
c.) Petitioner is the third or fourth transferee and buyer in good faith of the lots in question. Certainly, its
titles have long become indefeasible and conclusive one year after the issuance thereof. Since
petitioner acquired subject two (2) lots in 1984, it has dutifully paid realty taxes thereon.

Petitioner prays for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against LMB, ordering it to cease and desist
from hearing or continuing its hearing the LMB case; and the quieting of title of, and the complete removal of
any and all clouds thereon, and the accompanying declaration that said titles are indefeasible and conclusive
against the whole world, as in fact they are. RTC dismissed the petition on the grounds of litis pendencia and
forum shopping. MR was likewise denied hence, this petition.

One of petitioners contention is that LMB does not have jurisdiction to try the case as such falls under the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC. The OSG, however, contends that the determination of whether there
was a violation of the Friar Lands Act is well within the authority of the LMB to investigate, it being the agency
of the government charged with administrative control over Friar Land Estates under Commonwealth Act No.
2550. As such, according to the OSG, the LMB has primary jurisdiction over the subject matter.

ISSUE + RULING: W/N the Lands Management Bureau (LMB) has jurisdiction to try the LMB case YES

it is the courts which should defer the exercise of jurisdiction on the matter. Jurisdiction having been correctly
assumed by the Director of Lands over the parties conflicting claims, the case should, in accordance with law,
remain there for final adjudication. After all, the Director of Lands, who is the officer charged with carrying out
the provisions of the Public Land Act, has control over the survey, classification, lease, sale or any other form
of concession or disposition and management of the public lands, and his finding and decision as to questions
of fact, when approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (now Secretary of Environment
and Natural Resources), is conclusive.

The power and authority of the Director of Lands were discussed in the recent case of Republic of the
Philippines v. De Guzman. According to the Court, the Director of Lands does not lose authority over the land
even upon the issuance of an original certificate of title over the same. Thus, the authority of the Director of
Lands to investigate conflicts over public lands is derived from Section 91 of the Public Land Act. In fact, it is
not merely his right but his specific duty to conduct investigations of alleged fraud in securing patents and the
corresponding titles thereto. While title issued on the basis of a patent is as indefeasible as one judicially
secured, such indefeasibility is not a bar to an investigation by the Director of Lands as to how such title had
been acquired, if the purpose of such investigation is to determine whether or not fraud had been committed
in securing such title, in order that the appropriate action for reversion may be filed by the Government. As a
rule then, courts have no jurisdiction to intrude upon matters properly falling within the powers of the LMB.

On the petitioners claim that its titles to the subject lots have been rendered indefeasible, the pronouncement
of the Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals said that the indefeasibility of a title over land previously public is
not a bar to an investigation by the Director of Lands as to how such title has been acquired, if the purpose of
such investigation is to determine whether or not fraud had been committed in securing such title in order that
the appropriate action for reversion may be filed by the Government.

The OSG correctly invoked the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in this case. Indeed, the courts cannot and will
not resolve a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal,
especially where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special
knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters
of fact. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and
comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory
scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in such case, the judicial
process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view. And in such cases,
the court cannot arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is
initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence, in this case, the LMB.

Agro v. Parungao
FACTS: Petitioner Rivulet Corp. was the registered owner of Hacienda Bacan, an agricultural land in Negros
Occidental covered. Despite the sale in favor of Atty. Jose Miguel Arroyo in a tax delinquency sale, title to
Hacienda Bacan remained in Rivulets name.
Dept. of Agrarian Reform (DAR) commenced the administrative process to acquire the subject property under
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL). DAR sent notices to Atty. Arroyo.

Subsequently, Rivulet voluntarily offered sale to the government the subject property. DAR Municipal Office
(DARMO) screened potential agrarian reform beneficiaries and poster the list of qualified beneficiaries. During
the pendency of the administrative process, the Sangguniang Bayan of Isabela enacted an ordinance
reclassifying Hacienda Bacan from agricultural to agro-industrial.

Undersecretary Acosta found that coverage can proceed despite the reclassification of Hacienda Bacan since
the Notices of Coverage were issued to Atty. Arroyo. However, the landowner is not precluded from filing an
application for conversion or for retention within the bounds of law.

For its part, Rivulet demanded the Register or Deed not to cancel the TCT in its name and not to issue any
certificates of land ownership award. No action or reply having been received, Rivulet filed before the RTC a
petition for injunction or TRO. Rivulets TCT was cancelled and TCT was issued in the name of the Republic.

Respondent Undersecretary Parungao sought advice on the possibility of installing farmer beneficiaries in the
subject property despite the TRO. OSG advised the respondent that there appears no legal obstacle to the
installation of farmerbeneficiaries in Hacienda Bacan. It opined that the TRO was directed only against the
Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental and the LRA Administrator and that the installation of farmer -
beneficiaries was not among the acts enjoined. Moreover, the CARP Law directs the DAR to proceed with the
distribution of the acquired land to the farmerbeneficiaries upon the issuance of CLOAs in their favor.
Accordingly, the farmer beneficiaries were installed in the subject landholding with the assistance of the
members of the PNP.

ISSUE + RULING: W/N in the acts of respondents in installing farmer-beneficiaries in the subject of
landholding constitutes an open defiance and disobedience of the Court. - NO

To be contemptuous, an act must be clearly contrary to or prohibited by the Court. Thus, a person cannot be
punished for contempt for disobedience of an order of the Court, unless the act which is forbidden or or
required to be done is clearly and exactly defined.

The DAR and its officials were not among those enjoined. Neither can they be considered agents of the LRA
Administrator and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental. Moreover, the installation of farmer beneficiaries
was not among the acts specifically restrained, negating the claim that the performance thereof was a
contumacious act.

The Court had already ruled that the issuance of title in the name of the Republic was a necessary part of the
implementation of the governments CARP. As such, it is the ministerial duty of the Register of Deeds to
register the land in the name of the Republic after full payment has been made and no injunctive relief can be
issued except by the Court. While the Court issued a TRO, records reveal that the acts sought to be enjoined
had already been accomplished prior to its issuance, rendering the same of no practical purpose.

Time and again, the Court has stressed that the power to punish for contempt should be exercised on the
preservative, not on the vindictive principle, and only when necessary in the interest of justice. Under the
foregoing circumstances, the Court finds no contumacious disobedience on the part of respondents.

Balbin v. Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur

FACTS: Petitioners Aurelio and Francis Balbin presented to the Ilocos Sur register of deeds a duplicate copy of
the registered owners certificate of title and a deed of donation inter-vivos, requesting that the latter be
annotated on the title. The registered owner Cornelio Balbin appears to have donated inter-vivos 2/3 portion
of the land in favor of the petitioners. The Register of Deeds denied the requested annotation for being
legally defective or otherwise not sufficient in law. It appears that previously annotated in the memorandum
of encumbrances on the OCT are three separate sales earlier executed by Cornelio Balbin in favor of Florentino
Gabayan, Roberto Bravo and Juana Gabayan, who each received their co-owners duplicate CTs. Mainly
because these 3 co-owners copies of CTs had not been presented by petitioners, the Register of Deeds
refused to make the requested annotation. Petitioners referred the matter to the Commissioner of Land
Registration, who upheld the action of the Register of Deeds in a resolution.

ISSUE + RULING: W/N the refusal of the Register of Deeds to make the annotation is proper YES

In the case at bar, the three other copies of the title were in existence, presumably issued under section 43 of
Act 496.

Section 43. Certificates where land registered in names of two or more persons. Where two or more
persons are registered owners as tenants in common, or otherwise, one owner's duplicate certificate
may be issued for the whole land, or a separate duplicate may be issued to each for his undivided
share.

As correctly observed by the Land Registration Commissioner, petitioners' claim that the issuance of those
copies was unauthorized or illegal is beside the point, its legality being presumed until otherwise declared by a
court of competent jurisdiction. There being several copies of the same title in existence, it is easy to see how
their integrity may be adversely affected if an encumbrance, or an outright conveyance, is annotated on one
copy and not on the others. The law itself refers to every copy authorized to be issued as a duplicate of the
original, which means that both must contain identical entries of the transactions, particularly voluntary ones,
affecting the land covered by the title. If this were not so, if different copies were permitted to carry differing
annotations, the whole system of Torrens registration would cease to be reliable.

Since the property subject of donation is also presumed conjugal, that is, property of donor Cornelio and his
deceased wife Nemesia Mina, there should first be a liquidation of the partnership before the surviving spouse
may make such a conveyance. Assuming the conjugal nature of the property, the donation bears on its face
an infirmity which justified the denial of registration, namely, the fact that 2/3 portion of the property which
Cornelio donated was more than his share, not to say more than what remained of such share after he had
sold portions of the same land to 3 other parties.

Pending the resolution of a separate case, wherein Cornelios civil status, character of land and validity of
conveyances are in issue, the registration may await the outcome of said case and parties may protect their
rights by filing the proper notices of lis pendens.