Personality and Individual Differences 86 (2015) 5056

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Personality and Individual Differences

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/paid

Experiencing the temporally extended self: Initial support for the role of
affective states, vivid mental imagery, and future self-continuity in the
prediction of academic procrastination
Eve-Marie C. Blouin-Hudon , Timothy A. Pychyl
Department of Psychology, Carleton University, 1125 Colonel By Drive, Ottawa, ON K1S 5B6, Canada

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: Procrastination is a self-defeating behavior that occurs when present self chooses to delay a task action in favor of
Received 18 March 2015 future self taking on this task later. Given this dynamic between present and future self with procrastination, we
Received in revised form 29 May 2015 hypothesized that higher levels of perceived self-continuity would be related to lower levels of self-reported pro-
Accepted 1 June 2015
crastination, because higher self-continuity would help individuals experience future self as a direct extension of
Available online xxxx
present self. Data collected from 583 undergraduate participants in three studies revealed that individual differ-
Keywords:
ences in perceived similarity to one's future self predicts procrastination such that participants who experienced
Academic procrastination higher future self-continuity in ten years (studies 1 and 2) and in two months (study 3) reported fewer procras-
Future self-continuity tination behaviors. Furthermore, we found that high scores on Vividness of Mental Imagery and Positive Affective
Positive and Negative Affect state scales were related to future self-continuity in ten years (study 2) and in two months (study 3). We discuss
Mental imagery these results in relation to the theoretical importance of future self-continuity in an understanding of procrasti-
nation as well as our directions for future research.
2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction Unfortunately, procrastination does not seem to be isolated to the

When a person is faced with challenging, unfullling, or simply bor-
ing tasks, it can be easy to feel stuck and unable to move forward with
a project, a relationship, or with life in general (Blunt & Pychyl, 2000;
Van Eerde, 2003). This feeling is problematic because it can distract
one's attention away from long-term objectives, inuence the specious
pursuit of short-term gains, and ultimately decrease well-being.
For example, students pursuing post-secondary education are often
faced with responsibilities and deadlines that dictate when a task should
be completed, no matter how dull or aversive the task may be. Of course,
the long-term benets of completing these tasks likely involve the
successful completion of one's degree, the pursuit of graduate education
or even the start of a fullling career. Paradoxically, a majority of stu-
dents nevertheless report procrastinating on academic tasks (e.g., Ellis
& Knaus, 1977; O'Brien, 2002), and half of undergraduates regularly en-
gage in procrastination (e.g., Day, Mensink, & O'Sullivant, 2000).
This research was funded by a research grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council of Canada (Joseph Armand Bombardier Canada Graduate Scholarship-
Master's) awarded to Eve-Marie Blouin-Hudon.
Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 613 520 2600x1813.
E-mail addresses: evemarieblouinhudon@cmail.carleton.ca (E.-M.C. Blouin-Hudon),
tim.pychyl@carleton.ca (T.A. Pychyl).
academic domain such that 20% of men and women refer to themselves
as being chronic procrastinators across various domains (Harriott &
Ferrari, 1996). What is especially problematic about these numbers is
that the tasks that are being put off involve important long-term goal
pursuits such as saving for retirement (Helman, Copeland, &
Vanderhei, 2011) and adopting preventative health behaviors such as
exercising, eating more healthily and going for annual physical check-
ups (Sirois, 2004, 2007; Stead, Shanahan, & Neufeld, 2010).
This paradoxical self-defeating delay of long-term outcomes in favor
of smaller, sooner rewards has been explained as present self
undermining future self by giving in to feel good now (Sirois & Pychyl,
2013; Tice & Bratslavsky, 2000; Tice, Bratslavsky, & Baumeister, 2001).
As such, present self uses the needless delay of procrastination as a
short-term emotion-focused coping strategy. Avoidance pays now for
present self, but can lead to deleterious effects in terms of stress and com-
promised performance for future self. Ironically, of course, the self suffers,
sooner or later.
Accordingly, this present-self/future-self discrepancy is the focus of
our research. We seek to understand how temporal aspects of self play
a role in procrastination, particularly the perceived self-continuity
between present and future self. We might expect that individuals who
understand that the self in the future may really suffer more because of
the avoidance strategy adopted by present self would be less likely to pro-
crastinate. In the studies that follow, we have addressed the question of

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0191-8869/ 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
 E.-M.C. Blouin-Hudon, T.A. Pychyl / Personality and Individual Differences 86 (2015) 5056
whether higher levels of future self-continuity would be related to lower
procrastination.
2. Conceptualizing procrastination
Procrastination represents the voluntary delay of an intended action
and can be conceptualized as an avoidant coping strategy, which falls
under the broader family of self-regulatory failures (e.g., Sirois &
Pychyl, 2013; Tice & Bratslavsky, 2000). As opposed to conscientious in-
dividuals dispositioned to overcome short-term pursuits by adaptively
regulating present behavior (i.e., delaying gratication, following
norms and rules, and prioritizing tasks; John & Srivastava, 1999; Lay &
Brokenshire, 1997; Lay et al., 1998; Watson, 2001), procrastinators
cope with challenging, unfullling, or boring tasks by giving in to feel
good now (Blunt & Pychyl, 2000; Sirois & Pychyl, 2013; Tice &
Bratslavsky, 2000; Tice et al., 2001; Van Eerde, 2003). Ultimately, this
delay can impair long-term well-being and health by increasing anxiety,
depression (Ferrari, 1991; Lay, Edwards, Parker, & Endler, 1989), and
stress (Flett, Blankstein, & Martin, 1995; Sirois, Melia-Gordon, & Pychyl,
2003; Tice & Baumeister, 1997).
Sirois and Pychyl (2013) have proposed that a disconnection be-
tween present and future self might explain why procrastinators pre-
dominantly focus on present gains while failing to anticipate their
own affective reaction to future aversive tasks. In fact, research by
Ersner-Hersheld, Garton, Ballard, Larking, and Knutson (2009) and
Hersheld, Goldstein, Sharpe, Jesse Fox, Yeykelis, Carstensen, et al.
(2011) provides some support for this focus on the discrepancy be-
tween present and future self, as Hersheld et al. found evidence that
individuals who report low future self-continuity are more likely to en-
gage in self-regulation failures such as saving less money for retirement.
3. Conceptualizing future self-continuity
Future self-continuity represents the extent to which a person feels
connected and similar to his or her future self and is central to creating
a uid sense of identity through subjective time (Chandler, 1994).
Experiencing a sense of self that is connected and continuous over time
guides present behavior through a broader cognitive-affective scope
and is benecial for goal pursuit, decision-making, well being (Bird &
Reese, 2008; Damasio, 2010; Greenwald, 1980; Sani, 2008), emotion
regulation (Chandler, 1994), and coping (Sadeh & Karniol, 2012).
Although future self-continuity has many functional benets,
achieving a continuous sense of self may not come naturally to some,
as multiple selves can be experienced throughout a lifetime. In fact,
present self's afnity to past or future selves is contingent on the time
that has passed between each self (Part, 1971, 1987) and can greatly
inuence how connected and similar one feels to a future self that is
perceived as distant in time.
Neuroscience research also supports the central role of the concep-
tion of self temporally by illustrating that certain areas of the brain acti-
vate differently for future self than for present self. For example, in a
study by Ersner-Hersheld et al. (2009), participants low on future
self-continuity showed similar neural activations when they imagined
their future self as when they imagined a stranger, and these were dif-
ferent neural activations than for present self. Consequently, feeling dis-
connected and different from future self has been linked to purely
present-focused decision-making such that individuals who lack per-
sonal sameness across time (James, 1985, originally published in
1892) are likely to make more unethical decisions (Hersheld, Cohen,
& Thompson, 2011) and discount larger benets for future self by
accepting immediate rewards of less value (Bartels & Urminsky, 2011).
4. Procrastination and the temporally extended self
There is limited research exploring the role of future self-continuity
with regards to procrastination, but what ndings demonstrate so far is
51
that procrastinators almost exclusively adopt a present-focused per-
spective and rarely project themselves into the future (Ferrari &
Diaz-Morales, 2007; Specter & Ferrari, 2000). Since future self-
continuity is important for guiding appropriate emotional responses
and daily goal-oriented behaviors (Chandler, 1994; Damasio, 2010;
Greenwald, 1980), it follows that procrastination might be explained
in part by a fragmented relationship between a person's present and fu-
ture self like it is for other self-regulation failures, such as saving for re-
tirement. If future self-continuity can be used for adaptive temporal
decision-making, the question then remains: how can the self achieve
continuity?
Since future self can only be accessed through one's imagination,
then a reduced or heightened ability to mentally create and manipulate
vivid mental images may help explain why certain individuals feel more
or less connected with that self (e.g., Ellis, 1995; Neisser, 1988; Part,
1971). Furthermore, individuals who experience greater positive affec-
tive states may be more likely to include the patterning of future self's
goals, affect, and thoughts into present awareness, as these positive
states have been found to favor mental exibility and cognitive broad-
ening (Fredrickson, 2001; Fredrickson & Joiner, 2002). Taken together,
vivid mental images and positive affective states can represent an adap-
tive psychological tool for long-term decision making by allowing a per-
son to regulate behavior within a broader cognitive-affective scope.
An important body of research has investigated how mentally trav-
eling into the past or the future can inuence impulsive decision-
making, mostly in terms of temporal discounting (e.g., Ainslie, 2001;
Green & Myerson, 2004; Loewenstein, Read, & Baumeister, 2003) and
episodic memory (e.g., Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007). However, this re-
search has mostly focused on a person's goal-oriented and cognitive re-
lationship to situations and events. As such, the present research adds a
novel contribution to the literature by furthering the understanding of
how self-regulation failures such as procrastination operate in relation
to the temporally extended self. As an exploratory goal, the present re-
search also investigates how affect and certain imaginative processes,
more specically vivid mental imagery, may sustain and enhance the
connection between present and future self.
To investigate the role of self-continuity in relation to procrastina-
tion, we conducted three studies with a similar design. In each case, par-
ticipants were asked to imagine their future self in ten years (studies 1
and 2) and in two months (study 3). Participants were also asked to an-
swer self-report items related to their procrastination behavior. Corre-
spondingly, we extended the hypothesis that participants who
reported higher future self-continuity in ten years and at the end of
the semester would procrastinate less. As an exploratory goal founded
on the idea that future self-discontinuities may be due to a failure of
the imagination (Part, 1971), studies 2 and 3 included self-report
questions about affective states and vividness of mental imagery. In
these studies, we expected participants who reported highly vivid men-
tal images and more positive affective states to also report higher future
self-continuity in ten years (study 2) and at the end of the semester
(study 3).
5. Study 1
In the rst study, we examined the relation of future-self-continuity
and procrastination. We hypothesized that future self-continuity would
negatively predict procrastination such that individuals with high future
self-continuity would report less procrastination than individuals with
low future self-continuity (Hypothesis 1).
5.1. Method
5.1.1. Participants
The sample included 86 students (67.4% females, 32.6% males) who
were aged between 18 and 42 years old (M = 22.46, SD = 4.98). Partic-
ipants were mainly enrolled full-time (77.9%) in their rst (17.4%),
52 E.-M.C. Blouin-Hudon, T.A. Pychyl / Personality and Individual Differences 86 (2015) 5056
second (39.5%), third (26.7%), and fourth year of study (15.1%) at a
large, research-intensive Canadian university.
5.1.2. Procedure
Participants were recruited through an online system where they re-
ceived grade-raising credit in an introductory psychology undergradu-
ate course for their voluntary participation. Participants were provided
a website link and instructed to complete a 30-minute online survey
on academic procrastination and future self-continuity hosted by a se-
cured website and approved by the university ethics committee.
5.1.3. Procrastination
Procrastination was assessed using Haghbin and Pychyl's (2014)
Multidimensional Measure of Procrastination (MMoP). The MMoP was
developed to measure various aspects of academic procrastination and
its associated emotions and cognitions. In this study, only a selection
of items related to the behavior section of the MMoP were used. The be-
havior section consists of two subscales: irrational delay (e.g., Despite
my intention to start and nish academic tasks on time, I engage in
other unnecessary activities instead) and hedonistic delay (e.g., I am
not interested in starting academic tasks ahead of time because I
would rather do more enjoyable things instead). All items are mea-
sured on a 1 (never) to 6 (always) Likert-type scale. A total procrastina-
tion score is obtained by summing the item ratings. Both scales have
demonstrated excellent levels of internal consistency (Irrational delay
study 1: = 0.95, study 2: = 0.97, study 3: = 0.97; Hedonistic
delay study 1: = 0.94, study 2: = 0.95, study 3: = 0.95).
5.1.4. Future self-continuity
Ersner-Hersheld et al.'s (2009) future self-continuity scale was used
to measure how connected and similar participants felt to their future
self as imagined in ten years. This scale was based on the Inclusion of
the Other in the Self scale (Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992). As such, future
self-continuity is measured by two items on a 7-point scale marked at
each point by two circles that range from depicting no overlap to
depicting almost complete overlap. The rst item asks participants to
select the circle pair that best describes how similar they feel to a future
self in ten years on the scale ranging from 1 (not similarity at all) to 7
(completely similar). Higher scores are judged to indicate more continu-
ity with one's future self. The testretest reliability for the present scale
was good over a two-week period ( = .66).
5.2. Results
We regressed the MMoP scores on the future self-continuity scores
to determine if feeling connected to future self in ten years was predic-
tive of decreases in procrastination behavior. Consistent with our hy-
pothesis, future self-continuity in ten years (M = 4.27, SD = 1.27)
signicantly negatively predicted academic procrastination (M = 3.22,
SD = .780; see Table 1).
Table 1
Standardized regression coefcients (standard error), statistical signicance probability
(P), and effect size for future self-continuity predicting academic procrastination (studies
1, 2, and 3).
(SE) P R2
Study 1
FSC .334 (.523) .002 .111
Study 2
FSC .175 (.048) .020 .031
Study 3
FSC sem .173 (.041) .003 .030
Note. FSC = Future self-continuity in ten years, FSC sem = Future self-continuity in two
months.
p b .05.
p b .01.
5.3. Discussion of study 1
These results indicate that people who feel more connected to their
future self in ten years time tend to self-report lower levels of academic
procrastination. Given previous research (e.g., Ersner-Hersheld et al.,
2009; Hersheld, Goldstein et al., 2011), we speculate that procrastina-
tion is lower for those with higher future self-continuity because these
people take into account the self-defeating nature of needless delay,
and choose to act more often in the present rather than delay action
for future self.
Based on these initial ndings, it is also important to better under-
stand the psychological processes that may help sustain and enhance
a person's sense of self through subjective time. Based on past research
that recognize affect as playing an important role in mobilizing and mo-
tivating cognitive energy (e.g., Fredrickson, 2001; Fredrickson & Joiner,
2002; Izard, 1971, 1977; Tomkins, 1962), it follows that affective expe-
rience might mobilize energy in ways that broaden or narrow one's cog-
nitive scope and inuence how connected and similar or disconnected
and fragmented one feels to their future self.
Accordingly, our second study aimed to understand how affect
might broaden and energize cognition to include future self. Since
cognitive-affective orientations can be quite complex (see Izard, 1977;
Tomkins, 1962), our second study was also designed to explore how
certain higher-order cognitive processes, specically vivid mental imag-
ery, may both inuence affective experience and increase future self-
continuity.
6. Study 2
It will be recalled that our investigation was guided by the proposi-
tion that future self-discontinuities may be due to a failure of the
imagination (Part, 1971), as it is our unique capacity for imagination
that allows us to create a continuous sense of self across time (Ellis,
1995; Neisser, 1988).
Of particular relevance, research by Ersner-Hersheld et al. (2009)
and Hersheld, Goldstein et al. (2011) shows that assisting participants'
imagination to include more vivid representations of future self can
favor long-term decision-making. In these studies, participants were
instructed to enter a virtual reality environment where they were
faced with a digitally aged picture of themselves (avatar) or of another
research participant. Results demonstrated that participants felt more
similar to their future self following digital aging and were more willing
to discount present rewards (i.e., more money today) in order to in-
crease long-term gains (i.e., more money for retirement). This research
offers a strong theoretical foundation for exploring how individual dif-
ferences in vividness of mental imagery, an important cognitive process
of the imagination, may also relate to future self-continuity.
Specically, mental imagery is characterized by the ability to control
and manipulate cognitive images through all sensory modalities
(i.e., touch, smell, taste, hearing, sight; Serruya & Grant, 2009; Katz,
1983). Similar to direct perception, vivid mental images are particularly
effective at evoking emotions as they enhance the experience of sensory
details of an imaged future situation or subject (Damasio, 1999;
D'Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2006; Kosslyn, Ganis, & Thompson,
2001). Furthermore, Positive Affect has been found to increase mental
exibility (Fredrickson, 2001; Fredrickson & Joiner, 2002). As such,
these are likely to increase one's ability to consider different aspects or
perspectives of an object, idea, or image (e.g., Caas, Quesada, Antol,
& Fajardo, 2003; Eslinger & Grattan, 1993; Kim, Johnson, & Gold, 2012).
Although one cannot physically meet his or her future self, positive
affective states and the ability to mentally create vivid images should
allow a person to feel more connected to future self by regulating
present and future states within a broader cognitive-affective scope. In
order to explore these relationships, we hypothesized that Vividness of
Mental Imagery would increase Positive Affect (Hypothesis 2a), Vividness
of Mental Imagery would increase Negative Affect (Hypothesis 2b), and
 E.-M.C. Blouin-Hudon, T.A. Pychyl / Personality and Individual Differences 86 (2015) 5056
that Vividness of Mental Imagery and Positive Affective states would predict
increases in future self-continuity, while Negative Affect will predict
decreases in future self-continuity (Hypothesis 3).
6.1. Method
6.1.1. Participants
The sample included 196 students (77.2% females, 21.6% males)
aged between 18 and 39 years old (M = 22.05, SD = 4.14). Participants
were mainly enrolled full-time (81.9%) in their rst (10.4%), second
(35.2%), third (26.9%), and fourth (25.4%) year of study at a large,
research-intensive Canadian University.
6.1.2. Procedure
Participants were recruited through an online system where they re-
ceived grade-raising credit in an introductory psychology undergradu-
ate course for their voluntary participation. Participants were provided
a link and instructed to complete a 60-minute online survey on academ-
ic procrastination in relation to emotions and imagination hosted by a
secure website and approved by the university ethics committee. In ad-
dition to the measures used to assess procrastination (Haghbin &
Pychyl, 2014) and future self-continuity (Ersner-Hersheld et al.,
2009) in study 1, we also assessed affective experience and vividness
of imagery.
6.1.3. Positive and Negative Affect
The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (Watson, Clark, &
Tellegen, 1988) was adopted to measure the positive and negative affec-
tive states of participants regarding their experience over the past few
days. Participants were asked to rate adjectives describing affect on a
scale from 1 (Not at all agree) to 7 (Totally agree). Ten adjectives mea-
sured Negative Affect (e.g., depressed, unhappy, frustrated, worried/
anxious, and angry/hostile), and ten adjectives measured Positive Affect
(e.g., happy, joyful, enjoyment/fun, and pleased). This questionnaire
revealed excellent internal consistency for Positive Affect (study 2:
= 0.89; study 3: = 0.87) and Negative Affect (study 2: = 0.91;
study 3: = 0.89).
6.1.4. Vividness of mental imagery
The Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (Marks, 1973) was
used to assess individual differences in the ability to form vivid mental
images. Participants were asked to imagine 4 situations (e.g., close
friend, rising sun, store, landscape), with 4 items assessing the details
of the mental image for each situation (e.g., The sun is rising above
the horizon in a hazy sky). Items were rated on a scale ranging from
1 (no image at all, you only know that you are thinking of the object)
to 5 (perfectly clear and as vivid as normal vision). The numerical values
on the 5-point rating scale initially proposed by Marks were reversed so
that higher ratings represent greater vividness (McKelvie, 1995).
Overall, the internal consistency of the present questionnaire was
excellent (study 2: = .90; study 3 = .88).
6.2. Results
To replicate ndings from study 1, this time with a larger sample, we
regressed MMop scores on future self-continuity scores. Consistent with
our hypothesis and with ndings in study 1, results demonstrated that
future self-continuity in ten years (M = 4.33, SD = 1.44) signicantly
negatively predicted academic procrastination (M = 2.97, SD = .940;
see Table 1).
Consistent with hypothesis 2a, results of a linear regression demon-
strated that higher abilities in forming Vivid Mental Images (M = 3.70,
SD = .642) signicantly predicted increases in Positive Affect
(M = 3.23, SD = .778; see Table 3). Surprisingly and contrary to hypoth-
esis 2b, Vividness of mental imagery marginally predicted decreases in
Negative Affect (M = 2.24, SD = .914; see Table 3).
53
Concerning hypothesis 3, results indicated that Vividness of Mental
Imagery, when included in the rst step of a hierarchical linear regres-
sion, signicantly positively predicted future self-continuity. However,
when Positive and Negative Affect were included in the model at step
2, Vividness of Mental Imagery was no longer a signicant predictor of
future self-continuity. At step 2, Positive Affect signicantly positively
predicted future self-continuity, while Negative Affect signicantly neg-
atively predicted future self-continuity (see Table 4 and refer to Table 2
for the Pearson correlation matrix among study 2 variables).
6.3. Discussion of study 2
Our results demonstrate that positive affective states are related to
both the ability to construct vivid mental images and to higher levels
of future self-continuity. While vividness of mental imagery was a sig-
nicant predictor of future self-continuity, our results suggest that pos-
itive affective states explain more variance in one's connection to future
self in ten years than mental-image vividness.
In light of our ndings, positive affective states may be particularly
relevant for projecting oneself to the future as they have been found
to broaden and enhance cognitive exibility, creativity, and reectivity
(Fredrickson, 2001; Fredrickson & Joiner, 2002). Of particular interest,
research by Pyone and Isen (2011) has shown that employees who
experienced increases in Positive Affect also reported a more future-
oriented time perspective. Extending these ndings, our results demon-
strate that positive affective states relate to the broadening of one's
cognitive scope to include future self specically.
It is possible that individuals who can construct vivid mental images
do not necessarily construct images of the future or of future self per
se. In fact, research by D'Argembeau and Van der Linden (2006) has
demonstrated that people who are able to create vivid mental images
are more likely to experience more details (both contextual and emo-
tional) when remembering the past as well as when imagining the fu-
ture. In our sample, procrastinators who have been found to adopt a
predominantly past and present-focused perspective (Ferrari &
Diaz-Morales, 2007; Specter & Ferrari, 2000) with high mental imag-
ery abilities may have projected themselves more into the past as op-
posed to the future. Although speculative, this could explain in part
why vividness of mental imagery is not a very strong unique predictor
of future self-continuity.
7. Study 3
While many long-term goals can benet from projecting and
connecting oneself to a future self ve, ten, or even twenty years
down the road (i.e., saving for retirement, preventing health problems,
graduating from college), it is often necessary for people to overcome
Table 2
Pearson correlation matrix for studies 2 and 3 variables.
Variables 1 2 3 4
Study 2
1. Proc
2. FSC .175
3. PA .275 .180
4. NA .240 .227 .05
5. VMI .214 .181 .277 .146
Study 3
1. Proc
2. FSC sem .173
3. PA .130 .171
4. NA .288 .197 .108
5. VMI .130 .142 .291 .128
Note. ProcProcrastination, FSC = Future self-continuity ten years, PA = Positive Affect,
NA = Negative Affect, VMI = Vividness of Mental Imagery.
p b .01.
p b .05.
54 E.-M.C. Blouin-Hudon, T.A. Pychyl / Personality and Individual Differences 86 (2015) 5056

present temptations in order to reach shorter-term goals that are just a Table 4
few months down the road, such as completing assignments and read- Standardized regression coefcients (standard error), statistical signicance probability
(P), and Effect Sizes for Vividness of Mental Imagery and Affect predicting future self-con-
ings in order to pass a course, or ossing one's teeth daily to prevent tinuity (studies 2 and 3).
gum disease. Although a person may be more likely to feel connected
to a future self that is closer in time (e.g., Part, 1971, 1987), people (SE) P R2 R2

who procrastinate often disregard consequences for tomorrow's, next Study 2

week's, or next month's future self when needlessly delaying these
short-term goals. In order to appropriately understand procrastinators'
disconnect from a future self that is much closer in time, we aimed to
replicate the ndings in studies 1 and 2, but in study 3, we measured
participants' connection to their future self at the end of the semester
(approximately two months' time) as opposed to the distant future as
depicted in studies 1 and 2.
7.1. Method
7.1.1. Participants
The total sample included 301 students (78.1% females, 20.6% males)
who were aged between 17 and 57 years old (M = 19.60, SD = 4.426).
Participants were mainly enrolled full-time (96.3%) in their rst
(56.8%), second (31.2%), third (9.0%), and fourth year of study (2.7%)
at a large, research-intensive Canadian university.
7.1.2. Procedure
The same procedure and measures from study 2 were used. The only
change was in the future self-continuity measure, where participants
were asked how similar they felt to their future self at the end of the
semester using the same seven overlapping circles of the future
self-continuity scale as in studies 1 and 2.
7.2. Results
We regressed MMoP scores on future self-continuity scores to
determine if feeling more connected to future self in two months was
predictive of decreases in academic procrastination behavior. Results
demonstrated that future self-continuity at the end of the semester
(M = 4.74, SD = 1.37) signicantly negatively predicted academic pro-
crastination (see Table 1).
In line with ndings in study 2, analyses of a linear regression
demonstrated that higher abilities in forming Vivid Mental Images
(M = 3.71, SD = .628) signicantly predicted increases in Positive
Affect (M = 3.17, SD = .754; see Table 3). Once again contrary to our
hypothesis in study 2, results of a linear regression demonstrated that
Vividness of Mental Imagery signicantly predicted decreases in
Negative Affect (M = 2.41, SD = .834; see Table 3).
Results also indicated that Vividness of Mental Imagery was a signif-
icant positive predictor of future self-continuity at the end of the semes-
ter when entered in a rst step of a hierarchical linear regression. As in
study 2, when affect was entered in a second step, Vividness of Mental
Imagery was no longer a signicant predictor. At step 2, Negative Affect
signicantly negatively predicted how similar participants felt to their
Table 3
Standardized regression coefcients (standard error), statistical signicance probability
(P), and Effect Sizes for Vividness of Mental Imagery predicting Positive and Negative Af-
fect (studies 2 and 3).
(SE) P R2
Study 2
VMI .277 (.090) .000 .077 PA
VMI .146 (.107) .052 .021 NA
Study 3
VMI .291 (.068) .000 .085 PA
VMI .130 (.080) .030 .016 NA
Note. PA = Positive Affect, NA = Negative Affect, VMI = Vividness of Mental Imagery.
p b .05.
p b .01.
p b .10.
Step 1 .025
VMI 157 (.173) .039
Step 2 .090 .066
VMI .085 (.176) .274
PA .157 (.142) .042
NA .221 (.117) .003
Study 3
Step 1 .020
VMI .142 (.127) .017
Step 2 .077 .057
VMI .077 (.130) .207
PA .134 (.108) .026
NA .195 (.094) .001
Note. VMI = Vividness of mental Imagery, PA = Positive Affect, NA = Negative Affect.
p b .016.
p b .01.
future self at the end of the semester, while Positive Affect was a signif-
icant positive predictor (see Table 4 and refer to Table 2 for the Pearson
correlation matrix among study 3 variables).
8. General discussion
The rst study of the present research examined how future self-
continuity or feeling connected and similar to one's future self can
inuence self-reported academic procrastination behavior. Our results
demonstrate that students who experience a greater connection to
their future self in ten years' time also report less procrastination.
While study 2 replicated these results, study 3 demonstrated that feel-
ing connected to a future self that is much closer in time (i.e., two
months) is also related to lower self-reported procrastination.
Our results offer initial empirical evidence for the relationship be-
tween future self-continuity and a self-report measure of procrastina-
tion. Specically, individuals who report lower future self-continuity
are more likely to needlessly delay tasks for future self to deal with.
We argue that these individuals are more likely to engage in this need-
less delay because they perceive future self as a stranger (Sirois &
Pychyl, 2013) as opposed to an extension of who they are today.
Our results from studies 1 and 2 also extend the ndings of
Ersner-Hersheld et al. (2009); Hersheld, Goldstein et al. (2011) by
demonstrating that academic procrastination, like the more long-term
task of saving for retirement, represents an instance of self-regulatory
failure that is partly characterized by a disconnection from future self.
Unlike retirement savings however, academic procrastination can rep-
resent the breakdown of action for goals that are much closer in time.
Specically, our results from study 3 demonstrate that feeling connect-
ed to a future self two months down the road, as opposed to ten years
later, is also negatively related to procrastination.
As past studies have shown, delaying important tasks to future self
can ultimately end up undermining long-term mental and physical
health (Sirois, 2007). As such, future self-continuity may be benecial
Outcome for adaptive temporal decision-making by allowing people to relate
and regulate present and future states into a broader cognitive-
affective scope.
In order to gain a better understanding of the cognitive and affective
processes underlying future self-continuity, the second and third stud-
ies of the present research were designed to explore how affect and in-
dividual differences in vividness of mental imagery can inuence a
person's perceived connection and similarity to future self in ten years
(study 2) and in two months (study 3). In line with ndings that sup-
port vivid mental imagery as a particularly efcient cognitive tool for
 E.-M.C. Blouin-Hudon, T.A. Pychyl / Personality and Individual Differences 86 (2015) 5056
stimulating affect (Damasio, 1999; Kosslyn et al., 2001), our results
demonstrated that participants who were able to construct vivid mental
images experienced more positive affective states than participants for
whom this ability was not as developed. Since mental imagery has
been found to enhance the experience of both positive and negative af-
fective states (Damasio, 1999; Kosslyn et al., 2001), it is surprising that
vivid mental imagery predicted decreases in Negative Affect both in
studies 2 and 3.
On the one hand, these ndings might be due to an artefact in our
mental imagery measure, since imaging a close friend and a nature
landscape are likely to inspire Positive Affect. However, the mental im-
agery measure was included after the affect measure in study 3, which
indicates that there may be something more to these results. In both
studies 2 and 3, participants were asked to think about how similar
and connected they felt to their future self before they were presented
with the other measures, which may have inuenced self-referential
task-independent thoughts and images (i.e., mind wandering/
daydreaming). In support of this speculation, research has found that
self-referential thoughts while mind wandering are predominantly
future-oriented (Smallwood, Schooler, Turk, Cunningham, & Macrae,
2010), and that these are more likely to be related to positive images
(D'Argembeau, Renaud, & Van der Linden, 2011). In light of our ndings,
it would be interesting for future research to investigate how spontane-
ous mental images about future self while mind wandering relate to Pos-
itive versus Negative Affect.
Lastly, our results from studies 2 and 3 demonstrate that vividness of
mental imagery is predictive of increases in future self-continuity, but
only when entered as a single predictor. When affect was entered in
the model, the unique variance in future self-continuity both in ten
years (study 2) and at the end of the semester (study 3) explained by
vividness of mental imagery was no longer signicant. In line with our
hypotheses, Positive Affect increased future self-continuity both in ten
years and at the end of the semester, while Negative Affect predicted de-
creases in one's sense of connection to future self.
These results indicate that vivid mental images may be most ef-
cient at stimulating Positive Affect, but not at directly enhancing the con-
nection between present and future self. As proposed by Ellis (2005),
the self can achieve continuity when the different items in the stream
of consciousness (i.e., thoughts, images, language, emotions) are orga-
nized in a pattern that is unique to the person and sustained in time.
Since Positive Affect has been found to energize, broaden, and motivate
behavior and cognition (Fredrickson, 2001; Fredrickson & Joiner, 2002;
Izard, 1971, 1977; Tomkins, 1962), it follows that these positive affec-
tive states can serve to unite, direct and organize conscious states into
this unique pattern to shape the temporally-extended self. As such, for
our participants, Positive Affect likely served to broaden and guide
their cognitive scope to include the patterning of future states, and en-
hanced the experiencing of future self as an extension of present self,
as opposed to a stranger.
Ultimately, it seems that ones connection to future self can benet
from the ability to form detailed and vivid mental images, but more im-
portantly, requires a broadened cognitive scope. Accordingly, positive
affective states, while stimulated by vivid mental images, seem general-
ly more predictive of projecting oneself into the future and connecting
to future self.
9. Limitations and future directions
Our ndings offer a preliminary understanding of the temporally ex-
tended self in relation to procrastination and of the cognitive-affective
processes that serve to foster one's connection to future self. Our studies
nonetheless have clear limitations. For all three studies, the data were
cross-sectional. To solidify and further elaborate our conclusions, ex-
ploring how these constructs unfold through time in a longitudinal
study is a necessary next step.
55
Our studies also used undergraduate students as our population of
interest. As such, the relationships we have observed can only truly as-
sist our understanding of procrastination and the temporally extended
self within the academic domain. It would be important for future stud-
ies to explore the relations between vividness of mental imagery, affec-
tive states and future self-continuity in diverse community samples
varying in age and background.
Lastly, it is important to mention that vividness of mental imagery is
not the only facet of the imagination that could foster future self-
continuity. Imagery related to our other senses, such as touch or scent,
might also account for variance in how connected we feel to our future
self (e.g., Cautela & McCullough, 1978). As such, the exploration of how
our imagination allows us to connect to future self by actually
experiencing that self affectively and kinesthetically could greatly
benet the development of interventions aimed at preventing self-
regulatory failures such as procrastination, and ultimately, at increasing
long-term health and well-being.
10. Conclusion
Procrastination is a self-defeating behavior characterized by a failure
in self-regulation. As such, individuals who procrastinate predominant-
ly disengage from aversive tasks in order to decrease or avoid Negative
Affect. Ultimately, prioritizing short-term gains (sooner, smaller re-
wards) over the pursuit of long-term intentions (later, larger rewards)
can impede health and well-being because future self is increasingly
burdened by these tasks. In light of our ndings, we conclude that indi-
viduals who procrastinate are more likely to perceive their future self as
a stranger as opposed to a direct extension of who they are today.
This disconnection between present and future self may in part be
due to a failure of the imagination. In fact, our imaginative ability to cre-
ate vivid mental images is particularly important for enhancing the ex-
perience of affect. In turn, positive affective states are useful for
energizing cognition in ways that broaden and expand the cognitive
scope. Overall, we conclude that vivid mental imagery and positive af-
fective states contribute to a broadened cognitive-affective scope,
which can be important for future self-continuity.
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