DC TRACTION POWER SYSTEM GROUNDING
Dev Paul
Senior Member, IEEE
Earth Tech, 2101 Webster Street, Suite 1000, Oakland, CA 94612
Phone: (510) 419 6448; Fax: (510) 419 5355; Dev_Paul@earthtech.com
Abstract The paper provides a review of the present
practice of DC Traction Power System grounding methods
employed in North America. An analysis of equipment
grounding, system grounding and their relationships to
achieve optimized equipment and personal safety is derived.
Generic protective relay schemes commonly used in the dc
equipment enclosure grounding are shown. Rail leakage stray
current and personnel safety affected by the dc system
grounding method are discussed. To enhance
personnel/equipment safety, specific recommendations for
the design of the dc traction power system grounding are
included.
Index Terms - Equipment grounding; rail to ground potential;
rapid transit system, stray current, system grounding, touch
potential.
I. INTRODUCTION
Rapid transit systems are expanding at great speed
throughout the world including North America. However,
there is very little effort towards development of standards
for dc power system design and protection as compared to ac
power systems used for general industry. Each new transit
project begins with its own set of design directive documents
and applies equipment and system grounding methods that
may not be fully evaluated due to lack of clear understanding
of their relationship to stray current and personnel safety. It is
the authors view that there are times when the low resistance
and high resistance equipment grounding methods used for dc
power systems may be misunderstood to be the power system
grounding in accordance with the definition of ac power
systems grounding. At present there are no recommended
guidelines or industry standards that cover dc traction power
system grounding; unlike the color book series [5] that covers
ac power system grounding.
This paper attempts to provide the ABCs of dc equipment
enclosure and dc traction power system grounding methods
and their relationship. Only the protective relay schemes
associated with dc equipment enclosure grounding and
system grounding are described. The overall dc rapid transit
system protective relay scheme is beyond the scope of this
paper. Interested readers are encouraged to read dc breakers
protection duty requirements indicated in [9].
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Typical dc electrification one line diagram of a rapid
transit system with grounding protective relay schemes
covering the equipment and dc power system grounding
methods is included Fig.1. To accommodate two different
contradictory requirements of minimizing dc stray current
and maximizing personnel safety through the design of dc
power system grounding protection schemes is discussed.
II. DC TRACTION POWER SYSTEM
In a dc traction power system, current from the traction
power substations is delivered to the moving trains by either
the third rail or the overhead contact system (OCS) and is
returned to the substations by the track running rails. The
installation configuration of the traction power substation
stations (TPSSs), positive and negative feeder cable runs, and
the track running rails is such that the third rail or the OCS
acts as a long positive conductor and the cross-bonded
running rails as the negative conductor, while each TPSS is in
parallel between these two positive and negative conductors.
Sectionalizing of the positive conductor is provided by the dc
feeder breakers at each traction power substation. Sometimes
gap stations are employed in the middle of the two traction
power substations to increase the sectionalization, especially
for a 1500V dc system when the distance between the traction
power substations is relatively large. Under normal system
operation, to minimize dc stray current and its associated
corrosion effects on underground utilities, the running rails
and the dc traction power system negative are kept
ungrounded.
Present practice when designing the dc traction power
system is to keep rated voltage in the range of 600 - 1500V
dc with 750V dc the normal choice of many projects [3]. The
dc switchgear [4] consists of single polarity (positive) dc
circuit breakers of either the high speed or the semi-high
speed type [11] to supply dc power to train propulsion system
via third rail or OCS system. The negative polarity bus box is
physically kept separated from the dc switchgear.
Fig. 1 represents various components of the dc
electrification system including the vehicle. It should be
noted that the vehicle touch potential is practically the same
as the rail-to-ground potential, especially if there is no other
provision for grounding the vehicle [7].
1

1: Rectifier Unit 2: DC Switchgear 3: Negative Bus Box
4: Equipment Grounding Protection 5: System Grounding Protection
Fig. 1. DC Electrification One Line Diagram
To properly address the subject of grounding, there should
be a clear understanding of the differences between
"equipment" grounding and "system" grounding. Equipment
grounding refers to grounding of the enclosures of the
rectifier unit and dc switchgear. System grounding refers to
grounding of the current carrying conductor of the dc
negative system. This negative system is the negative of the
rectifier unit at each TPSS and the track running rails
carrying negative return current. The three basic
configurations: a) ungrounded, b) impedance grounded and c)
effectively grounded that apply to ac power systems [5] could
very well apply to dc traction power systems. Under normal
system operation, there is no direct intentional electrical
connection between the dc negative and the ground.
However, this ungrounded system establishes reference to
ground through leakage resistance of the running rails. This
leakage resistance depends upon the track insulation material
and is generally in the order of 200 /1000'/rail under normal
dry weather conditions [5]. This value is subject to change
depending upon type of track construction, weather
conditions and age of the tracks due to accumulation of
metallic dust. Thus, the ungrounded dc traction power system
in reality is grounded through an equivalent rail-to-ground
leakage resistance (Rng) value derived by expression (1),
assuming all four running rails of double track system are
crossbonded.
Rng = 50/(5.28D)
Where:
D: Represents the sum of half the distances in miles between
adjacent traction power substations
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These inherent characteristics of the dc traction power
system being grounded through its rail leakage resistance will
establish the return path for the positive-to-ground fault
current.
III. EQUIPMENT GROUNDING
Design of the dc equipment enclosure grounding shall
assure maximum safety of personnel and equipment under
fault conditions.
Early published literature [1][2] indicates that danger to
personnel results from high dc short circuit currents due to
associated fire, molten metal and brilliant flash rather than
electric shock risk due to dc voltage present at the equipment
enclosure under fault conditions. At that time, grounding of
one polarity of the dc system was standard practice for the
railway and mining industries. As a result of these
experiences, the development of high-resistance equipment
grounding protective relay schemes became the norm of the
transit industry in the USA. These practices lead to the
inclusion of the following in ANSI C37.20.1 [4]:
Exception: LV switchgear having single polarity dc
circuits, rated above 250V, shall be ungrounded. It is
recommended that they be connected to ground only by
protecting or indicating devices of relatively high resistance.
NEC [6] article 250110 (1) states that the exposed non-
current carrying metal parts of fixed equipment likely to
become energized shall be grounded if within 8 feet vertically
or 5 feet horizontally from grounded surface and subject to
contact by persons.
It has been recognized by the transit industry that dc
equipment enclosure rectifiers and metal enclosed dc
switchgear should be grounded by using an appropriate
protective relay scheme for safety of personnel and
equipment. This protection relay scheme, which employs
either high resistance or low resistance equipment grounding
methods, has been a subject of many debates and discussions
among equipment suppliers, design engineers and transit
authority representatives. Each transit property employs one
or the other grounding method depending upon their own
understanding of the safety and design issues [3]. It should be
mentioned that the tolerable touch potential for a dc system is
relatively higher, in the order of 3.5 times, than an ac system
[14].
A. High Resistance Grounding Method (HRGM)
(1)
The equipment is completely insulated/isolated from all
surrounding grounded structures by using insulated floor,
insulated conduit bushings, and insulated substation walls
facing the equipment. A constant voltage in the order of 25V
dc is applied between the enclosure and ground, Fig.2. This
2
voltage produces current high enough to energize relay 64M
but not relay 64T. Upon loss of this voltage or in case of
enclosure-to-ground fault, relay 64M will de-energize to
provide enclosure ground fault alarm indication. In case of dc
bus short to enclosure, the current will be high enough to
energize relay 64T to trip the substation ac and dc breakers to
clear the enclosure live fault condition. Shorting switch
device 57 and overvoltage relay device 59 are components of
one of the system grounding schemes that follow. It is worth
mentioning that the resistance value of HRGM scheme will
assure that during equipment fault (arcing or bolted), the
reasonable setting of device 59 will allow its activation to
clear the enclosure live fault.
B. Low Resistance Grounding Method (LRGM)
The equipment enclosure is kept insulated/isolated from all
surrounding grounded structures. The enclosure is grounded
at a single point by a low resistance protection relay scheme
Fig. 3. A low voltage in the order of 1V dc is applied between
the enclosure and ground to monitor integrity of the low
resistance grounding protection. Alarm relay device 74 will
provide alarm when this voltage is interrupted or there is
enclosure ground condition. During enclosure live fault
condition, relay device 64 will energize to trip the substation
ac and dc breakers due to relatively higher magnitude of fault
current when switch 57 closes upon energization of relay
device 59. Transfer tripping of the dc feeder breakers at
adjacent substations is a must to clear the fault on the load
side of local dc feeder breakers. Without this transfer
tripping, major equipment damage has resulted with a low
resistance equipment grounding scheme.
64M: Ground fault monitoring relay, 64T: Enclosure live fault trip relay
Fig. 2. High Resistance Grounding Method
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74: Alarm relay, 64: Enclosure live fault detection trip relay
Fig. 3. Low Resistance Grounding Method
IV. DC POWER SYSTEM GROUNDING
Design of the dc power system grounding needs to
compromise two contradictory requirements: a) minimum dc
stray current, and b) maximum personnel/equipment safety.
To achieve this objective, system grounding should be
designed to satisfy the following basic requirements:
1. Under normal system operation, the grounding system
should minimize dc stray current. This can be achieved
by keeping the system ungrounded, i.e. floating. No
intentional connection is made between system negative
and ground.
2. Under abnormal system operation with unsafe rail-to-
ground potential, the system should be grounded by
shorting the negative polarity to ground to suppress the
unsafe voltage. The method of shorting the rail or the
substation negative bus box to ground shall be achieved
automatically through protection relays and shorting
devices in the shortest possible time. Upon clearing this
abnormal situation, the system will automatically return
to original stage of ungrounded power system.
Various methods employed to achieve the system
grounding schemes and their limitations are discussed.
A. Solidly Grounded System
The negative of each substation is grounded to the local
ground grid without any intentional impedance in the
grounding circuit Fig.4. It should be recognized that the
running rails negative return circuit effectively becomes in
parallel with the ground and thus a considerable part of the
negative return current may seek the path of ground,
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increasing the threat of corrosion to underground utilities in
vicinity of the tracks. Drainage bonds between underground
utilities near the traction power substation and electrical
bonding of underground utilities in vicinity of the tracks is
mandatory to mitigate the corrosion effect of dc currents.
This method may exist only in older transit systems. The
modern systems do not employ such a grounding system.
B. Diode Grounded System
Paralleled array of diodes with a shorting dc contactor and
protection relays are employed at each traction power
substation Fig. 5. Upon detecting a set voltage level, relay
device 59 energizes a dc contactor to automatically ground
the negative system. Directional overcurrent relay device 32
opens the shorting contactor for low level "forward" currents
and trips the traction power system if high level ground fault
current continues to flow. It should be noted that under
normal system operation, for small magnitudes of voltage
difference between rail and ground, the diodes are always
conductive, thus setting a stage for relatively higher stray
currents.
C. Automatic Grounding Switch
Shorting switch device 57, overvoltage relay device 59,
and overcurrent relay device 50 are employed at each traction
power substation Fig.6. Upon detecting set voltage level,
Fig. 4. Solidly Grounded System
Fig. 5. Diode Grounded System
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device 59 activates and closes the shorting switch to
automatically ground the negative system. Upon sensing
short circuit current, device 50 activates to de-energize the
traction power substation. In addition device 50 provides
local indication and remote alarm to manually reset the
shorting switch. It should be mentioned that a shorting switch
is a mechanical device and takes definite time to activate;
dangerous voltage could occur during this time.
D. Ungrounded (floating) System
The system is kept ungrounded under normal and
abnormal conditions Fig. 7. This system provides least stray
current; however, it may prove to be dangerous to the general
public and maintenance persons as the vehicle or running
rails may be at an elevated dc voltage with respect to ground,
especially during positive-to-ground fault. This method is not
used in present transit systems for safety reasons, especially
under abnormal fault conditions.
E. Thyristor Grounding Method
The various protective relay devices of the thyristor-
grounding scheme are shown in Fig. 8. Overvoltage relay
device 59 continuously checks the negative-to-ground
voltage. When this voltage exceeds a preset value, the relay
triggers the thyristor gate (GTO) by auxiliary relay device
59X to ground the negative system. This limits the potentially
Fig. 6. Automatic Grounding Switch
Fig. 7. Ungrounded System
4
dangerous rail-to-ground voltage by allowing current to
return to the source. The contacts of instantaneous current
relay device 50 energize time delay auxiliary relays 50X1 and
50X2. After a short delay upon sensing decrease in the
current, device 50X1 provides an alarm as well as provides
gate turn off signal to the thyristor to resume its normal
position of an ungrounded system. However, if the current
continues to flow in case of positive-to-ground fault, then
after a preset time delay device 50X2 will trip all dc feeder
breakers. The setting of relay device 59 may be set in the
order of 60 volts, which is considered safe touch potential.
This will allow system to operate ungrounded for normal
conditions until ground-to-negative rail potential rises to the
set limit of 60 volts under abnormal positive feeder-to-
ground fault condition.
The dc feeder breakers will automatically close through the
load measuring protective relay scheme except for the faulted
feeder circuit breaker, and thus provides a positive indication
of the faulted circuit.
It should be mentioned that a bi-directional GTO unit may
be required, depending upon the system configuration and
excessive train starting currents resulting in dangerous rail
voltage rise above ground. Such a design if implemented
should have GTO activation counters, and voltage and
current monitoring device scheme to optimize the settings of
device 59 to assure maximum safety and minimum stray
current injection.
The advantage of the bi-directional thyristor scheme over
the grounding diode scheme is that the thyristor unit will
ground the system only when the set dangerous voltage
occurs due to either train bunching load currents or due to
positive-to-ground faults that develop. Under normal system
operation below the set negative-to-ground overvoltage, the
system is kept ungrounded.
Fig. 8. Thyristor Grounding System
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V. DC EQUIPMENT ENCLOSURE FAULT
Bridging of the dc bus to enclosure may lead to bolted fault
or arcing fault inside the dc enclosure. Depending upon the
condition of the power system being ungrounded or
grounded, fault current will be controlled by the various
resistance parameters defined below.
Rng : Running rails leakage resistance. This can be computed
by using expression (1).
Rsg : Substation ground grid resistance. This value can be in
the order of 5 or less by proper design of TPSS ground grid.
Rrc : Equipment grounding protection scheme resistance.
A.Ungrounded Power System
Steady state dc bolted fault current (Ibfc) and arcing fault
current (Iarc) inside the dc equipment enclosure may be
computed by using the following expressions when the power
system is ungrounded:
Ibfc = V/ (Rng + Rrc + Rsg) (2)
Iarc = (V - 200) /(Rng + Rrc + Rsg) (3)
B. Grounded Power System
When any of the system grounding protection schemes
grounds the negative rail, then the value of rail-to-ground
resistance as well as the local ground grid resistance in
expressions (2) and (3) will become zeros thus increasing the
fault current values. The fault current expressions for the
grounded system (grounding points of equipment ground
circuit and the grounding point of the negative rail or bus
connected to same ground grid) will be as follows:
Ibfc = V/ (Rrc) (4)
Iarc = (V - 200) /(Rrc) (5)
Expressions (2) through (4) are for comparing grounding
configurations only and not for computing accurate dc short
circuit current. It should be noted that the enclosure touch
voltage in case of arcing or bolted fault between the positive
dc bus and the enclosure is practically the voltage drop across
the equipment grounding protection scheme resistance value.
Thus the touch potential in case of low resistance equipment
grounding method will be lower than the touch potential in
case of high resistance grounding method. However, the
corresponding short circuit current in case of low resistance
method will be considerably higher than the corresponding
value in case of high resistance method.
It is important that the settings of relay device 59 associated
with the system grounding protection relays be such that
device 59 activates to make the ungrounded system as a
grounded system to clear enclosure live fault condition as
required.
5
 TABLE 1 elevated with respect to the rail with the possibility of
High Resistance and Low Resistance Equipment Grounding Methods
activating relay device 59 as shown in system grounding
Description of High Resistance Low Resistance
Technical Method Method methods. This in turn will trip the substation feeder breakers
Features to clear the fault condition. Unless the negative is shorted to
Constant 25 V dc I V dc ground by appropriate protection relay scheme, fault current
monitoring voltage is controlled by the rail-to-ground leakage resistance and the
Relaying circuit 200 - 700 ohms Less than 1 ohm
fault impedance. In many situations this fault current will be
resistance (Rrc) Use 500 ohms Use 0.5 ohms
Hot switchgear 1.48A* 1.50A 101.35A* 1500A
so low that the dc feeder breaker protective relays may not be
enclosure to 1.48A** *** 116.28A *** able to detect and clear the fault condition in appropriate
ground bolted 1.50A ** 1500A time.
fault current (Ibfc) *** ***
Hot switchgear to 1.08A* 1.1A*** 74.32A* 1100A VII. DC STRAY CURRENT
ground arcing 1.08A** 1.1A*** 85.27A** ***
fault current (Iarc ) 1100A
*** The fraction of the dc load current returning to the traction
Safety clearance 5 feet horizontal Insulated floor for power substation via negative rails leaks to ground due to
between dc 8 feet vertical added safety leakage resistance of the insulation pads between running
switchgear insulated floor rails and ground. To minimize dc stray current, voltage drop
enclosure and
adjacent grounded across the negative return rails is kept as low as practical and
surface the traction power system negative is kept ungrounded under
*Indicates values associated with double track lengths of 5 miles with normal system operation. The relative magnitude of the stray
leakage resistance of 200 ohms/1000/rail, ungrounded system current and the vehicle touch potential for various system
**Indicates corresponding values for track length of 10 miles, ungrounded
system
grounding configurations is shown in Table 2. Both the stray
***Values for the grounded system via any of the system grounding current and the human safety seem to be balanced by the
methods making negative rail connected to ground by voltage sensing relay thyristor grounding method as compared to other system
device 59. grounding methods.
The calculated values of bolted and arcing fault currents The protective relays shown in Fig.8 provide complete
shown in Table 1 are based upon system voltage of 750V and tripping and isolation of the traction power system in case of
ground grid resistance of 5 ohms both for the grounded heavy short circuit current due to positive-to-ground fault,
system and ungrounded system. Voltage drop across the arc and automatically return to normal configuration once the
is assumed to be 200V as shown in expressions (3) and (5). fault is cleared. Reverse GTO may be used at the stations to
suppress dangerous vehicle touch potential; however, it may
Table 1 indicates that short circuit current values in the case unnecessarily increase stray current magnitude.
of high resistance grounding method as compared to the
corresponding short circuit values in the case of low TABLE 2
resistance method have very little effect by the change from System Grounding vs Touch Potential and Stray Current
System Grounding Rail to Ground Stray current level
an ungrounded to a grounded system. Table 1 also indicates Method Potential
that the potential rise of local substation ground in the case of (Vehicle Touch
high resistance grounding method is small compared to the Potential)
low resistance method and may not be detected by system Solidly Grounded Low High
grounding relay device 59. Diode Grounded Moderate/Low Moderate/High
Thyristor Grounded Moderate/High Moderate/Low
Ungrounded System High Low
VI. FAULTS OUTSIDE THE DC ENCLOSURE
VIII. SAFETY ANALYSIS
There is a possibility of two types of faults outside the dc
enclosure on the electrified tracks. These faults are arcing The arc associated with dc current has proven to be very
fault (positive-to-ground) and bolted short circuit fault dangerous to personnel and equipment. Thus the equipment
(positive-to-negative). The arcing fault will generally involve grounding and system grounding protection schemes should
high impedance at the fault location, whereas the bolted fault be optimized to minimize dc fault current if possible. The
will have no intentional fault impedance at the fault location. design should also assure that a person in contact with the
Both types of fault currents will be controlled by the system faulted dc equipment enclosure or the transit vehicle is not
grounding resistance parameters and/or rail-to-ground exposed to the danger of electric shock. DC voltage in the
leakage resistance, irrespective of the type of equipment range of 60V to 90V is considered safe [7][14] according to
grounding method. the present transit industry practice. Based upon the present
If positive touches ground away from the traction power trends of more litigation from such causes as electric shocks
substation, it will lead to a high impedance fault with low and from the nature of some humans with pace makers or
current magnitude. However, the ground potential will be metallic components embedded in human bones by advances

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in the medical field, it appears that the safe dc voltage may
very well be lower than 60V.
To reduce the effect of electric shock to passengers, the
station platform edges should employ high-resistance rubber
mats. Similarly, inside the traction power substation,
insulated floors with very high volume resistivity compound
tend to increase the operator safety from electric shock.
From the safety point of view running rails should be
grounded, however, from the stray current point of view they
should be kept isolated from ground. To compromise this
requirement, the system grounding protective relay scheme
should ground the rail upon sensing the dangerous voltage
difference between the rail and ground, and automatically
return to the normal state of an ungrounded rail when
dangerous voltage is suppressed.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
1. Generic protection schemes of high-resistance and low-
resistance equipment grounding methods are presented.
With the application of modern microprocessor and
digital relays, individual vendors offer their own brand
names for these grounding protection schemes. There is
no industry standard for the resistance values used in the
low or high resistance protective relay schemes. Some
suppliers may promote their low resistance protective
relay scheme without establishing its short circuit current
withstand capability. This could prove to be destructive
and dangerous in case of heavy short circuit current
established by system grounding protection scheme.
Both the protective relay scheme as well as the shorting
device should be capable of withstanding the worst case
maximum expected dc short circuit currents.
2. Both the high resistance and the low resistance
equipment grounding protective relay schemes in
combination with the preferred GTO system grounding
protection scheme should be evaluated. The evaluation
should be based upon the short circuit and rail-to-ground
potential rise calculations. The results should be
reviewed with the equipment supplier.
3. The substation spacing should be established by
performing rail to ground potential rise and stray current
analysis under normal and abnormal system operation.
For system grounding purposes a bi-directional GTO unit
may be needed, depending upon the system parameters
and configuration.
4. When the passenger stations are physically separated
from the traction power substations, system grounding
protection scheme with reverse GTO similar to one used
at the traction power substation may be employed at the
passenger station. This may increase the personnel safety
from the high vehicle touch potential under rare cases of
simultaneous train starting or train bunching conditions.
5. Application engineer should carefully evaluate supplier's
equipment and system grounding protective relay
schemes. Evaluation should include the overall reliability
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and factory tests of microprocessor solid-state products
to assure that their performance is guaranteed.
X. RECOMMENDATION
1. For safe design practices of a dc traction power system,
there is a need for the industry standard for clarification
of high and low resistance grounding protection methods
with recommended resistance values. The standard
should review and establish the safe touch dc potential
for the general public and the substation maintenance
person, especially now when pace makers and metallic
bones has become an integral part of the human body.
2. It is recommended that the low voltage switchgear
committee responsible for upgrading ANSI C37.20.1 [4]
should review the outdated exception, LV switchgear
having single polarity dc circuits, rated above 250V,
should be ungrounded. It is recommended that they be
connected to the ground only by protecting or indicating
devices of relatively high resistance. This seems to be
invalid as the majority of the modern transit systems are
operated ungrounded under normal system operation
compared to the grounded systems of the past.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
Author would like to thank Mr. Rey Belardo of Earth Tech
for his technical reviews during the preparation of this paper.
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[3] Paul Forquer, Equipment Grounding in Traction Power Substations,
APTA June 1993
[4] IEEE Standard for Metal-Enclosed Low oltage Power Circuit Breaker
Switchgear, ANSI/IEEE Std. C37.20.1
[5] IEEE Recommended Practices for Grounding of Industrial and
Commercial Power Systems, IEEE Std. 142-1991
[6] National Electrical Code, NFPA 70 1999, National Fire Protection
Association.
[7] Dev Paul, Operational Safety and Maintenance Considerations for
People Movers DC Grounding Systems, APTA 1988
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Ungrounded, and Diode Grounded DC Transit Systems,
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[11] ANSI/IEEE Standard C37.14 - 1999, IEEE Standard for Low - Voltage
DC Power Circuit Breakers Used in Enclosures
[12] US Department of Transportation, A Corrosion Control Manual for Rail
Rapid Transit. UMTA-DC-06-0152-83-1.
[13] C.F. Dalziel and W.R.Lee, "Reevaluation of Lethal Electric
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[14] IEEE Guide for Safety in AC Substation Grounding ANSI/IEEE Std.80
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