UNIVERSITY OF PETROLEUM & ENERGY STUDIES

COLLEGE OF LEGAL STUDIES

BBA., LL.B (HONS.), CORPORATE LAWS

SEMESTER - II

ACADEMIC YEAR: 2016-17 SESSION: January-May

PROJECT
FOR
Law of Torts
(LLBL 241)

Under the Supervision of: Mr. Krishna Deo Singh Chauhan

NAME: DEVANSH BHARGAVA

SAP NO: 500055208
ROLL NO R760216036
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Writing a project is one of the most significant academic challenges I have ever faced. Though
this project has been presented by me but there are many people and websites who remained in
veil and the history of my browser, who gave their support and helped me to complete this
project.

First of all I am very grateful to my subject teacher Mr. Krishna Deo Singh Chauhan without the
kind support and help and the threat of deduction of marks, the completion of the project was a
Herculean task for me. He gave his valuable time from his busy schedule to help me to
complete this project and suggested me from where and how to collect data.

.I acknowledge my friends who gave their valuable but utterly ridiculous advice which did not
prove to be useful at all and had to be completely ignored in writing this project. I want to
convey a most sincere thanks to my seniors for helping throughout the project.
 INTRODUCTION

Generally a man is held liable for his wrongful acts when committed either intentionally or out of
culpable negligence, but, there is an exception to this general rule which is known as wrongs of
Strict Liability or Absolute Liability. These are the acts for which a man is responsible
irrespective of the existence of either wrongful intent or negligence. They are the exception to
the general requirement of fault. Both in strict and absolute liability principle deal with the
situation where something unusual brought on the land of the defendant, which if escapes and
causes damage to the plaintiff, would make the defendant liable. The new rule of strict liability
has been laid down by the Supreme Court of India in the case of M.C Mehta v. Union of India.
This new rule is harsher than the rule as laid down in Ryland v. Fletcher. This is known as the
rule of absolute liability. The court has held that the rule of Ryland v. Fletcher which was laid
down in the 19th century did not fully meet the need of modern industrial society with highly
developed scientific knowledge and technology where hazardous or inherently dangerous
industries were it was necessary to lay down a new rule not yet recognized by law to adequately
deal with the problem arising in a highly industrialized economy. The pre-requirements essential
for establishing a liability under the principle of strict liability viz., the non-natural use of land,
use of a dangerous thing, and the element of escape provided substantial loopholes to the
enterprises to escape liability under the Rylands v. Fletcher1 rule. Moreover, the exceptions
provided within the rule (and restated by the Supreme Court of India in MC Mehta v. Union of
India2) afford ample opportunity to the commercial enterprises to escape liability

Strict Liability
1
Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 LR HL 330(1868).
2
MC Mehta v. Union of India AIR SC 1086(1986).
Strict Liability doctrine can be defined as the acts or omissions which are held liable without the
mens rea (mental intent). It is a standard for liability which may exist in either a criminal or civil
context. A rule specifying strict liability makes a person legally responsible for the damage and
loss caused by his or her acts and omissions regardless of culpability including the fault in
criminal law. In tort law, strict liability is the imposition of liability on a party without a finding
of fault (such as negligence or tortious intent). The claimant need only prove that the tort
occurred and that the defendant was responsible.

In criminal law, a person is guilty and convicted on both actus reus (the prohibited act) and mens
rea (the intention to commit the prohibited act). Mens rea along with actus reus forms the
bedding stone for the criminal offence. However, such is not in the cases of strict liability, The
mens rea (intention) is irrelevant in both cases. The person is guilty on the act alone (actus reus)
even if he had no intention. Intention, here, doesn't form part of the requirements to prove the
offence. There is no need to prove negligence either. The liability is said to be strict because
defendants will be convicted even though they were genuinely ignorant of one or more factors
that made their acts or omissions criminal. The defendants may therefore not be culpable in any
real way, i.e. there is not even criminal negligence, the least blameworthy level of mens rea.
These laws are applied either in regulatory offences enforcing social behavior where minimal
attaches to a person upon conviction, or where society is concerned with the prevention of harm,
and wishes to maximize the deterrent value of the offence.

In the 19th century doctrine of strict liability was laid down in Rylands vs. Fletcher it was laid
down in England.

Facts: The defendant owned a mill, where he constructed a reservoir to supply water to the mill.
This reservoir was constructed over old coal mines, and the mill owner had no reason to suspect
that these old diggings led to an operating colliery. The water in the reservoir ran down the old
shafts and flooded the colliery.

Judgment: Blackburn J. held the mill owner to be liable, on the principle that The person who
for his own purposes brings on his land and collects and keeps there anything likely to do
mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and if he does not do so, is prima facie
answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape. On appeal this
principle of liability without fault was affirmed by the House of Lords but restricted to non-
natural users vide. Thus, corporations that handle water, electricity, oil, noxious fumes, colliery
spoil and poisonous vegetation are covered by this doctrine.
For the application of the rule therefore the following three essentials should be
there:

(1) Some dangerous thing must have been brought by a person on his land.
(2) The thing thus brought or kept by a person on his land must escape.
(3) It must be non-natural use of land.

DANGEROUS THING BOUGHT INTO THE LAND

According to this essential, the person will only be liable if a person brings a dangerous thing on
his land and that thing escapes and it causes mischief .In Rylands v Fletcher, the thing so
collected was a large body of water. The water collected in the reservoir was of a huge quantity
and was thus regarded to be of potential danger.

ESCAPE

The rule in Rylands v Fletcher shall apply, if the essential that the thing causing the damage must
escape to the area outside the occupation and control of the defendant is fulfilled. The
requirement of escape was firmly set in the law by the House of Lords decision in Read v J.
Lyons & Co Ltd3. The claimant was employed by the Ministry of Supply as an inspector of
munitions in the defendants munitions factory and, in the course of her employment there, was
injured by the explosion of a shell that was being manufactured. It was admitted that high
explosive shells were dangerous but the defendants were held not liable because escape of the
thing should be from a place where the defendant had control and occupation of land to a place
which is outside his occupation and control.

NON-NATURAL USE

Water collected in the reservoir in such a huge quantity in Rylands v Fletcher was held to be
non-natural use of land. Keeping water for ordinary domestic purposes is natural-use. For the
use to be non-natural it must be some special use bringing with it increased danger to others, and
must not by the ordinary use of land or such a use as is proper for the general benefit of

3
Read v J. Lyons & Co Ltd, 2 All E.R. 471(1946).
community. In Noble v Harrison, it has been held that trees on ones land are not non-natural use
of land. There the branch of a non-poisonous tree growing on the defendants land, which
overhung on the highway, suddenly broke and fell on the plaintiffs vehicle passing along the
highway. The branch had broken off due to some latent defect. It was held that the defendant
could not be held liable under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher. Generally an employer is not liable
for the wrongful act done by an independent contractor. However, it is no defence to the
application of this rule that the act causing damages had been done by an independent contractor.
In Rylands v Fletcher itself, the defendants were held liable even though they had got the job
done from the independent contractors.
Similarly, in T.C. Balakrishnan Menon v T.R. Subramaniam4, an explosive made out of a
coconut shell filled with explosive substance, instead of rising in the sky and exploding there, ran
at a tangent, fell amidst the crowd and exploded, causing serious injuries to the respondent. One
of the questions for consideration before the Kerala High Court was whether the appellants, who
had engaged an independent contractor to attend to the exhibition of fireworks, would be liable.
It was held that the rule in Rylands v Fletcher would be applicable because the explosive is an
extra hazardous object. The persons using such an object are liable even for the negligence of
their independent contractor. Hence after looking at all these examples we can easily understand
that the thing which is brought on the land there there must be a natural use of land.

EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE of Strict

Liability

The following exceptions to the rule have been recognized by Rylands v Fletcher and some later
cases:-

(i) Default of the claimant

(ii) Act of God
(iii) Statutory Authority
(iv) Consent of the claimant

4
T.C. Balakrishnan Menon v T.R. Subramaniam, A.I.R.Kerala, 151(1968).
(v) Act of third party.

DEFAULT OF THE CLAIMANT

If the damage is caused solely by the act or default of the claimant himself, he has no remedy.
Suppose if a person enters in someones property where he know there is a ferocious dog that
can bite him. Then also he enters there and is being bitten by the dog then he cannot claim for
compensation. In Rylands v Fletcher itself, this was noticed as a defence. If a person knows that
there is a danger of his mine being flooded by his neighbors operations on adjacent land , and
courts the danger by doing some act which renders the flooding probable he cannot complain. So
too in Ponting v Noakes5, the claimants horse reached over the defendants boundary, nibbled
some poisonous tree there and died accordingly and it was held that the claimant could recover
nothing, for the damage was due to the horses own intrusion and alternatively there had been no
escape of vegetation. As we can see in this as the thing doesnt escapes from the property of
defendant and the plaintiff was itself in fault not keeping proper care of his horse dues which he
is bared from getting damage.

ACT OF GOD

Where the escape is caused directly by natural causes without human intervention in
circumstances in which no human foresight can provide and of which human prudence is not
bound to recognize the possibility, the defence of Act of God applies. In this defence the most
important thing is that the thing escape without the knowledge of the defendant and secondly the
escape was such that no one can thought of possibility of happening it. This was recognized by
Blackburn J. in Rylands v Fletcher itself and was applied in Nichols v Marsland. In this case the
defendant for many years had been in possession of some artificial ornamental lakes formed up
by damming up a natural stream. An extraordinary rainfall, greater and more violent than any
within the memory of the witnesses broke down the artificial embankments and the rush of
escaping water carried away four bridges in respect of which damage the claimant sued.

5
Ponting v Noakes, 2 Q.B. 281(1894).
Judgment was given for the defendant; the jury had found that she was not negligent and the
court held that she ought not to be liable for an extraordinary act of nature which she could not
foresee or reasonably anticipate.

STATUTORY AUTHORITY

The rule in Rylands v Fletcher may be excluded by statute. Whether it is so or not is a question
of construction of the particular statute concerned. In Green v Chelsea Waterworks Co6, for
instance a main belonging to a water-works company, which was authorized by Parliament to lay
the main, burst without any negligence on the part of the company and the claimants premises
were flooded; the company was held not liable. On the other hand, in Cross Electricity Co v
Hydraulic Power Co 7where the facts were similar, the defendants were held to be liable and had
no exemption to the interpretation of their statute. The distinction between the cases is that the
Hydraulic Power were empowered by statute to supply water for industrial purposes, that is they
had permissive power but not a mandatory authority, and they were under no obligation to keep
their mains charged with water at high pressure, or at all. The Chelsea Waterworks Co. was
authorized by statute to lay mains and were under a statutory duty to maintain a continuous
supply of water; it was an inevitable consequence that damage would be caused by occasional
bursts and so by necessary implication the statute exempted them from liability where there was
no negligence.

CONSENT OF THE CLAIMANT

Where the claimant has expressly or impliedly consented to the presence of the source of danger
and there has been no negligence on the part of the defendant, the defendant is not liable. Thus if
the plaintiff is aware of all the harm which can be caused and thus done it voluntarily then he
may not get the damages. The exception merely illustrates the general defence, volenti non fit
injuria. The main application of the principle of implied consent is occupied by different persons
and the tenant of a lower suffers damage as a result of water escaping from an upper floor,

6
Green v Chelsea Waterworks Co, 70 L.T. 547(1894).
7
Cross Electricity Co v Hydraulic Power Co 3 K.B. 772(1914).
though it has to be said that the cases which have discussed this defence have tended to involve
perfectly ordinary domestic fittings which would to modern eyes be a natural use of land.

ACT OF THIRD PARTY

If the harm has been caused due to the act of a stranger, who is neither the defendants servant
nor the defendant has any control over him, the defendant will not be liable under this rule. In
Richards v Lothian some strangers blocked the waste pipes of a wash basin, which was
otherwise in the control of the defendants, and opened the tap. The overflowing water damaged
the plaintiffs goods. The defendants were held not liable.

Rule of Strict Liability in India

The doctrine of Strict Liability evolved in India the case of MC Mehta vs. Union of Indias
when Justice Bhagwati revolutionized the law of strict liability. He did not follow the principles
laid down in Ryland V Fetcher on the ground that those principles are not in keeping with the
present day jurisprudential thinking.

Facts: Shriram Food and Fertilizer Industry, a subsidiary of Delhi Cloth Mills Limited, was
engaged in the manufacture of dangerous chemical. In December 1985, large amounts of oleum
gas leaked form one of the units in the heart of Delhi which resulted in the death of several
persons. The leakage, resulted from the bursting of a tank containing oleum gas, was caused by
mechanical and human errors. It created a scare among the people residing nearby and within
two days, another leakage, a minor one, broke out as a result of oleum gas escaping from the
joints of a pipe. On 6th December 1985, the District Magistrate, Delhi ordered Shriram to stop the
manufacturing and processing of hazardous chemicals and fertilizers at their establishment in
Delhi and to remove such chemicals and gases from Delhi. At this particular point, M.C. Mehta
moved to Supreme Court to file PIL and claim for compensation for the losses caused and also
demanded that the closed establishment should not restart.

Judgment:
M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, popularly known as the Oleum Gas Leak case, was decided by a
5-judge bench of the Supreme Court in 1986. It ruled that if the enterprise is permitted to carry
on any hazardous or inherently dangerous activity for its profit, the law must presume that such
permission is conditional on the enterprise absorbing the cost of any accident arising on account
of such hazardous or inherently dangerous activity as an appropriate item of its overhead. The
court also emphasised that there are no exceptions to the rule of strict liability. Moreover, the
amount of compensation would depend upon the capacity of the enterprise and not the earning
capacity of the individual victims. The court held that any enterprise that is engaged in an
inherently dangerous activity is `absolutely liable to compensate all those affected by an
accident. They key feature of the judgment was the principle of `absolute liability, in which no
exceptions (such as an `act of God) are brooked.
In the Union of India vs. Prabhakaran, where the Supreme Court had extended its cover to
public utilities like the railways, electricity distribution companies, public corporations and local
bodies which may be social utility undertakings not working for private profit. In this case a
woman fell on a railway track and was fatally run over. Her husband demanded compensation.
The railways argued that she was negligent as she tried to board a moving train. The Supreme
Court rejected this contention and said that her contributory negligence should not be
considered in such untoward incidents the railway has strict liability.

Absolute Liability

The rule of strict liability famously laid down by Blackburn J., in Rylands v. Fletcher8, proved to
be rather ineffective with the passage of time to counter the dangerous use of ones property or
an industry that produced substances or wastes detrimental to public health. The pre-
requirements essential for establishing a liability under the principle of strict liability viz., the
non-natural use of land, use of a dangerous thing, and the element of escape provided substantial

8
Ibid p.2
loopholes to the enterprises to escape liability under the Rylands v. Fletcher9 rule. Moreover, the
exceptions provided within the rule (and restated by the Supreme Court of India in MC Mehta v.
Union of India10) afford ample opportunity to the commercial enterprises to escape liability.

The Supreme Court of India in MC Mehta v. Union of India11 evolved a more stringent rule of
strict liability than the Rylands v. Fletcher12 rule. In this case, which involved the leakage of and
the harm caused by Oleum gas from one of the units of Shriram industries in Delhi. The court
held that keeping in mind the needs and demands of a modern society with highly advanced
scientific knowledge and technology where for the sake of development program, it was
necessary to carry out inherently dangerous or hazardous industry, a new rule had to be laid
down to adequately deal with the problems arising in a highly industrialized economy. This new
rule had to be based on the English rule of strict liability, but had to be even more austere such
that no firm carrying out an inherently dangerous or hazardous activity might not escape from
liability, irrespective of the fact that whether there was any negligence involved or not.

The court also pointed out that the duty owed by such an enterprise to the society is absolute
and non-delegable and that the enterprise cannot escape liability by showing that it had taken all
reasonable care and there was no negligence on its part. The basis of the new rule as indicated by
the Supreme Court are two:

If an enterprise is permitted to carry on an hazardous or inherently dangerous activity for

its profit, the law must presume that such permission is conditional on the enterprise
absorbing the cost of any accident (including indemnification of all those who suffer
harm in the accident) arising on account of such hazardous or inherently dangerous
activity as an appropriate item of its over-heads; and

The enterprise alone has the resource to discover and guard against hazards or danger and
to provide warning against potential hazards.

9
Ibid p.2
10
Ibid p.2
11
Ibid p.2
12
Ibid p.2
The rule in Rylands v. Fletcher requires non-natural use of land by the defendant and escape
from his land of the thing, which causes damage. But the rule in MC Mehta v. Union of India is
not dependent upon any such conditions. The necessary requirements for applicability of the new
rule are that the defendant is engaged in hazardous or inherently dangerous activity and that
harm results to anyone on account of an accident in the operation of such hazardous or inherently
dangerous activity.

The rule in Rylands v. Fletcher will not cover cases of harm to persons within the premises for
the rule requires escape of the thing, which causes harm from the premises. The new rule makes
no distinction between the persons within the premises where the enterprise is carried on and
persons outside the premises for escape of the thing causing harm from the premises is not a
necessary condition for the applicability of the rule. Further, the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher,
though strict in the sense that it is not dependent on any negligence on the part of the defendant
and in this respect similar to the new rule, is not absolute as it is subject to many exceptions but
the new rule in Mehtas case is not only strict but absolute and is subject to no exception.

Another important point of distinction between the two rules is in the matter of award of
damages. Damages awardable where the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher applies will be ordinary or
compensatory; but in cases where the rule applicable is that laid down in MC Mehtas case the
court can allow exemplary damages and the larger and more prosperous the enterprise, the
greater must be the amount of compensation payable by it. A small bump in the road was
encountered in Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India13 and doubts were expressed as to the
quantum of damages payable. But the Supreme Court set all doubts aside in another landmark
decision, Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India14 and it was held that the rule
laid down in Mehta case was not obiter and was appropriate and suited to the conditions
prevailing in our country.

13
Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India, AIR SC 1480(1990).
14
Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India AIR SC 1446(1996).
 THE BHOPAL GAS TRAGEDY CASE

The Union Carbide factory is located in Bhopal, a town in Madhya Pradesh. The fateful incident
happened due to the leakage of lethal gas called methyl isocyanate (MIC) gas from three storage
tanks of Union Carbide factory, a Multinational Corporation. MIC is an intermediate used in the
manufacture of pesticides. Methyl isocyanate (MIC) is produced by combination of phosgene, a
deadly poisonous gas used in the First World War with methyl amine. In the accident nearly 36
tones of poisonous MIC gas released into the air of Bhopal. MIC gas causes burning sensation in
the eyes, removes oxygen from the lungs resulting in breathing trouble and chest tightness, and
also cyanide generation in the body, which ultimately turn fatal and leads to death. Bhopal gas
tragedy caused the single biggest air pollution tragedy which, according to official sources,
claimed 2500 lives, whereas non-governmental sources put the figure much higher. According to
the figure released by the government around 17,000 people have been rendered permanent
disabled and another 30,000 partially handicapped. Those who have suffered mini disability
number about 1,50,000.The Bhopal gas tragedy polluted drinking water, soils, tank and pond
water and adversely affected fetus, newly born babies, pregnant woman, young and old people
alike. It killed thousands of animals and innumerable micro-organisms.

The tragedy is a burning example of one of the deadliest disaster caused by human negligence in
the maintenance of deadly gas such as MIC gas. Several circumstantial evidence points to the
total breakdown of the essential safety provisions within the plant due to the negligence of the
authorities.

Bhopal gas tragedy caused the single biggest air pollution tragedy which, according to official
sources, claimed 2500 lives, whereas non-governmental sources put the figure much higher.
According to the figure released by the government around 17,000 people have been rendered
permanent disabled and another 30,000 partially handicapped. Those who have suffered mini
disability number about 1,50,000.
The Bhopal gas tragedy polluted drinking water, soils, tank and pond water and adversely
affected fetus, newly born babies, pregnant woman, young and old people alike. It killed
thousands of animals and innumerable micro-organisms.

The tragedy is a burning example of one of the deadliest disaster caused by human negligence in
the maintenance of deadly gas such as MIC gas. Several circumstantial evidence points to the
total breakdown of the essential safety provisions within the plant negligence of the authorities15.

the Supreme said that the purpose of the 1985 Act and principles of natural justice lead to the
interpretation of Section 4 of the Act, that in case of a proposed or contemplated settlement,
notice should be given to the victims or their legal dependents whose rights are to be affected to
ascertain their views. This, however, does not mean that the consent of all the victims is required
for the settlement. The Government of India, acting as the representative of the victims can place
the views of the victims before the Court; in such a manner as it consider necessary before a
settlement is entered into. Further, it was stated by the Court that the victims had the right to
approach the court at any stage if, it was felt by the victims that their rights were being deprived
of in the action against Union Carbide Corporation.
This judgment is landmark not only for the fact that it underlined the diversion from the rule set
by the Supreme Court in the Mehta case, but also for the fact that it brought into focus the rights
of the victims with regard to the action filed by the Government of India. It brought into focus
the lethargy surrounding both the Indian administration as well as the Indian legal system. The
amount of damages payable to the victims again brought back the same old question: what is the
value of an Indian life? Is the Indian life so insignificant that a paltry sum of Rs. 3 lakhs is all the
compensation that it deserves? These questions, which many thought, had been settled finally by
MC Mehta v. Union of India16 were again brought up by the victims of the Bhopal Gas Tragedy
through this case. And it would not be unfair to say that both the Indian administration and the
Indian legal system failed them, miserably17.

15
http://www.importantindia.com/7657/summary-of-bhopal-gas-tragedy-facts /(last visited- 11/11/2016)
16
MC Mehta v. Union of India, AIR SC 1086(1987).
17
https://indiankanoon.org/docfragment/87257/?formInput=bhopal%20gas%20tragedy(last visited-11/111/2016)
 CONCLUSION

Both in strict and absolute liability principle deal with the situation where something unusual
brought on the land of the defendant, which if escapes and causes damage to the plaintiff, would
make the defendant liable. The new rule of strict liability has been laid down by the Supreme
Court of India in the case of M.C Mehta v. Union of India. This new rule is harsher than the rule
as laid down in Ryland v. Fletcher. This is known as the rule of absolute liability. The court has
held that the rule of Ryland v. Fletcher which was laid down in the 19th century did not fully
meet the need of modern industrial society with highly developed scientific knowledge and
technology where hazardous or inherently dangerous industries were it was necessary to lay
down a new rule not yet recognized by law to adequately deal with the problem arising in a
highly industrialized economy.

The Supreme Court of India in MC Mehta v. Union of India evolved a more stringent rule of
strict liability than the Rylands v. Fletcher rule. In this case, which involved the leakage of and
the harm caused by Oleum gas from one of the units of Shriram industries in Delhi. The court
held that keeping in mind the needs and demands of a modern society with highly advanced
scientific knowledge and technology where for the sake of development program, it was
necessary to carry out inherently dangerous or hazardous industry, a new rule had to be laid
down to adequately deal with the problems arising in a highly industrialized economy. This new
rule had to be based on the English rule of strict liability, but had to be even more austere such
that no firm carrying out an inherently dangerous or hazardous activity might not escape from
liability, irrespective of the fact that whether there was any negligence involved or not.
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. http://www.importantindia.com/7657/summary-of-bhopal-gas-tragedy-facts /(last
visited- 11/11/2016)
2. https://indiankanoon.org/docfragment/87257/?formInput=bhopal%20gas%20tragedy(las
t visited-11/111/2016)
3. Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India, AIR SC 1480(1990).
4. MC Mehta v. Union of India, AIR SC 1086(1987).
5. Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India AIR SC 1446(1996).
6. Green v Chelsea Waterworks Co, 70 L.T. 547(1894).
7. Cross Electricity Co v Hydraulic Power Co 3 K.B. 772(1914).