TodayisMonday,April24,2017

CustomSearch

RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila

ENBANC

G.R.No.L26341November27,1968

ILOILODOCK&ENGINEERINGCO.,petitioner,
vs.
WORKMEN'SCOMPENSATIONCOMMISSIONandIRENEAM.PABLO,forherselfandinbehalfofherminor
childrenEDWIN,EDGARandEDNA,allsurnamedPABLO,respondents.

LuisitoC.Hofilenaforpetitioner.
VillaviejaandVillanuevaforrespondentWorkmen'sCompensationCommission.
GualbertoC.OpongforrespondentIreneaM.Pabloandherminorchildren.

CASTRO,J.:

This is an appeal by the Iloilo Dock and Engineering Company (hereinafter referred to as the IDECO) from the
decision dated February 28, 1966 of the Workmen's Compensation Commission (hereinafter referred to as the
Commission)affirmingthedecisionoftheRegionalOfficeVIIinIloiloCity,andorderingtheIDECOtopaytothe
widowandchildrenofTeodoroG.Pablo(IreneaM.PabloandtheminorsEdwin,EdgarandEdna,allsurnamed
Pablo)thesumofP4,000,topaytothewidowP89asreimbursementforburialexpensesandP300asattorney's
fees, and to pay to the Commission the amount of P46 as fees pursuant to section 55 of the Workmen's
CompensationAct,asamended.

At about 5:02 o'clock in the afternoon of January 29, 1960, Pablo, who was employed as a mechanic of the
IDECO,whilewalkingonhiswayhome,wasshottodeathinfrontof,andabout20metersawayfrom,themain
IDECOgate,onaprivateroadcommonlycalledtheIDECOroad.Theslayer,MartinCordero,wasnotheardto
sayanythingbeforeorafterthekilling.ThemotiveforthecrimewasandstillisunknownasCorderowashimself
killed before he could be tried for Pablo's death. At the time of the killing, Pablo's companion was Rodolfo
Galopez,anotheremployee,who,likePablo,hadfinishedovertimeworkat5:00p.m.andwasgoinghome.From
themainIDECOgatetothespotwherePablowaskilled,therewerefour"carinderias"ontheleftsideoftheroad
andtwo"carinderias"andaresidentialhouseontherightside.Theentirelengthoftheroadisnowherestatedin
therecord.

According to the IDECO, the Commission erred (1) in holding that Pablo's death occurred in the course of
employmentandinpresumingthatitaroseoutoftheemployment(2)inapplyingthe"proximityrule"and(3)in
holdingthatPablo'sdeathwasanaccidentwithinthepurviewoftheWorkmen'sCompensationAct.

TheprincipalissueiswhetherPablo'sdeathcomeswithinthemeaningandintendmentofthat"deceptivelysimple
andlitigiouslyprolific",1phraseThetwocomponentsofthecoverageformula"arisingoutof"and"inthecourse
of employment."2 The two components of the coverage formula "arising out of" and "in the course of
employment"aresaidtobeseparatetestswhichmustbeindependentlysatisfied3however,itshouldnotbe
forgottenthatthebasicconceptofcompensationcoverageisunitary,notdual,andisbestexpressedintheword,
"workconnection," because an uncompromising insistence on an independent application of each of the two
portionsofthetestcan,incertaincases,excludeclearlyworkconnectedinjuries.4Thewords"arisingoutof"refer
totheoriginorcauseoftheaccident,andaredescriptiveofitscharacter,whilethewords"inthecourseof"refer
tothetime,placeandcircumstancesunderwhichtheaccidenttakesplace.5

As a matter of general proposition, an injury or accident is said to arise "in the course of employment" when it
takesplacewithintheperiodoftheemployment,ataplacewheretheemployeereasonablymaybe,andwhilehe
isfulfillinghisdutiesorisengagedindoingsomethingincidentalthereto.6

Thegeneralruleinworkmen'scompensationlawknownasthe"going&comingrule,"simplystated,isthat"inthe
absenceofspecialcircumstances,anemployeeinjuredin,goingto,orcomingfromhisplaceofworkisexcluded
from the benefits of workmen's compensation acts."7 This rule, however, admits of four wellrecognized
exceptions,towit:(1)wheretheemployeeisproceedingtoorfromhisworkonthepremisesofhisemployer(2)
wheretheemployeeisabouttoenterorabouttoleavethepremisesofhisemployerbywayoftheexclusiveor
customarymeansofingressandegress(3)wheretheemployeeischarged,whileonhiswaytoorfromhisplace
of employment or at his home, or during his employment, with some duty or special errand connected with his
employment and (4) where the employer, as an incident of the employment, provides the means of
transportationtoandfromtheplaceofemployment.8

We address ourselves particularly to an examination and consideration of the second exception, i.e., injuries
sustainedoffthepremisesoftheemployer,butwhileusingacustomarymeansofingressandegress.

This exception, known as the "proximity rule," was applied in Philippine Fiber Processing Co., Inc. vs. Ampil.9
There, the employee, at about 5:15 a.m., while proceeding to his place of work and running to avoid the rain,
slippedandfellintoaditchfrontingthemaingateoftheemployer'sfactory,asaresultofwhichhediedthenext
day.Thesolequestionwaswhetherornottheaccidentwhichcausedtheemployee'sdeatharoseoutofandin
thecourseofhisemployment.ThisCourtruledinfavoroftheclaimantthus:

TheverycaseofAfablevs.SingerSewingMachineCo.invokedbythepetitionerintimatedthat"wedonot
of course mean to imply that an employee can never recover for injuries suffered while on his way to or
from work. That depends on the nature of his employment." Considering the facts found by the
Commission, namely, that the deceased Angel Ariar was not under any shift routine that his assignment
covered the entire working hours of the factory that the first working hour starts at 6:00 o'clock in the
morningthatittakesatleastthirtyminutesbeforethemachineoperatesatfullspeedorloadthatthespot
wherehefell(ditchfrontingpetitioner'sfactoryorsidewalkofitspremises),isimmediatelyproximatetohis
place of work, the accident in question must be deemed to have occurred within the zone of his
employment and therefore arose out of and in the course thereof. In Salilig vs. Insular Lumber Co., G.R.
No. 28951, September 10, 1928, referred to in the Comments on the Workmen's Compensation
Commission Act by Morabe and Inton, 1955 edition, compensation was allowed for injury received by a
laborer from an accident in going to his place of work, along a path or way owned by his employer and
commonlyusedbythelatter'slaborers.

In contrast is Pampanga Sugar Development Co., Inc. vs. Quiroz,10 which concerned injuries sustained by a
centrifugal operator. He had reported for work at 9:30 p.m. (March 7, 1958) and was dismissed at 5:30 the
followingmorning.Soon"afterhesteppedoutofthecompanygate,andwhilestandingabout2metersfromit
between the shoulder of the highway and a railroad that came from inside the compound and intersected the
highway, waiting for a ride home, he was bumped by a jeepney, as a result of which he sustained" injuries. In
holdingthattheseinjurieswere"notproducedbyanaccident"arisingoutofandinthecourseofemployment,""
thisCourtreasonedthus:

Thecompensabilityofaninjurysufferedbyanemployeeproceedingtoorcomingfromhisworkdepends
uponwhetherornotitis"workconnected."AsChiefJusticeKenisonofNewHampshirehasputit,"thefact
thattheemployeeistravellingtoorfromworkonapublichighwaydoesnotnecessarilyexcludecoverage
(Brousseauvs.BlackstoneMills,130A2d543,545).Conversely,itisnotenoughtosaythattheemployee
wouldnothavebeenonthepublichighwayhaditnotbeenforhisjob,sincethesamecanusuallybesaid
ofthegeneralpublic(Payne&Dolanvs.IndustrialCommission,46NE2d925).Thelaw,ineffect,insures
the employee against losses arising from the perils of his work. In other words, the Workmen's
Compensation Act covers occupational injuries, which, as such, must have a causative connection with
something, not merely in common with the public, but peculiar to the employment. In order to warrant
recovery for offthepremises injuries, it must be shown that there has been a very special danger, some
particularriskwhichtheemployercouldhavecausedorallowedtoexist.Hence,

It is significant that practically all successful offthepremises cases have involved normal route of
access to the plant, or an icy sidewalk adjacent to the premises and therefore identified with the
premisesinthesensethattheemployershouldhaveremovedtheice.(Emphasisours.)

It is true that in Philippine Fiber Processing Co. v. Ampil, G.R. No. L8130 (June 30, 1956), we held the
employerliableforaninjurysustainedbyanemployeewho,ashewasrunningtohisplaceofworktoavoid
therain,slippedandfellintoaditchinfrontofthefactory'smaingateandnearthesame.Theditchwas,
however, in itself an obvious hazard which, owing to its proximity to the gate, the employer should have
takenmeasurestoremove.Thus,thruhisinaction,hehadcontributed,inaspecialway,totheoccurrence
oftheaccident.

In the case at bar, no such special circumstance appears to exist. There is no particular causative
connectionbetweentheinjurysustainedbytheemployeeandeitherhisworkorhisemployer.Although,as
statedinthedecisionappealedfrom,therecorddoesnotshowthatthecompany"hadtakenmeasuresto
make the waiting place safe for the employees," neither does the record show either that the accident
occurredattheusualwaitingplaceoftheemployees,orthatsaidplacewasparticularlyunsafe.
OurWorkmen'sCompensationActbeingessentiallyAmericaninoriginandtext,itisnotamisstopaydeference
to pertinent American jurisprudence. In the precise area of law here involved, we can draw guidance from an
affluenceofFederalandStateprecedents.

From Samuel B. Horovitz' Injury and Death under Workmen's Compensation Laws (1944), pp. 159 to 165, we
gleanthefollowingobservations:

Suppose,however,thattheinjuryoccursonthewaytoworkoronthewayhomefromwork.Injuriesgoing
toorfromworkhavecausedmanyjudicialupheavals.

Thequestionhereislimitedtowhethertheinjuriesare"inthecourseof"andnot"outof"theemployment.
Howtheinjuryoccurredisnotinpoint.Streetrisks,whethertheemployeewaswalkingordriving,andall
othersimilarquestionsdealwiththeriskofinjuryor"outof"theemployment."Inthecourseof"dealsmainly
withtheelementoftimeandspace,or"time,placeandcircumstances."

Thus, if the injury occurred fifteen minutes before working hours and within one hundred feet of the
employer's premises, on sidewalks or public roads, the question of "in the course of" the employment is
flatlyraised.

Someofourstatesrefusetoextendthisdefinitionof"inthecourseof"toincludetheseinjuries.Mostofthe
states will protect the employee from the moment his foot or person reaches the employer's premises,
whetherhearrivesearlyorlate.Thesestatesfindsomethingsacredabouttheemploymentpremisesand
define "premises" very broadly, not only to include premises owned by the employer, but also premises
leased, hired, supplied or used by him, even private alleyways merely used by the employer. Adjacent
private premises are protected by many states, and a few protect the employee even on adjacent public
sidewalksandstreets.Whereacityoranyemployerownsorcontrolsanisland,allitsstreetsareprotected
premises.

There is no reason in principle why states should not protect employees for a reasonable period of time
prior to or after working hours and for a reasonable distance before reaching or after leaving the
employer's premises. The Supreme Court of the United States has declared that it will not overturn any
state decision that so enlarges the scope of its act. Hence, a deaf worker, trespassing on railroad tracks
adjacent to his employer's brickmaking premises (but shown by his superintendent the specific short
crossingoverthetrack),andkilledbyatrain,washeldtobeinthecourseofhisemploymentwhenhitby
an oncoming train fifteen minutes before his day would have begun. So long as causal relation to the
employmentisdiscernible,nofederalquestionarises.

The narrow rule that a worker is not in the course of his employment until he crosses the employment
threshold is itself subject to many exceptions. Offpremises injuries to or from work, in both liberal and
narrow states, are compensable (1) if the employee is on the way to or from work in a vehicle owned or
suppliedbytheemployer,whetherinapublic(e.g.,theemployer'sstreetcar)orprivateconveyance(2)if
theemployeeissubjecttocallatallhoursoratthemomentofinjury(3)iftheemployeeistravellingforthe
employer, i.e., travelling workers (4) if the employer pays for the employee's time from the moment he
leaves his home to his return home (5) if the employee is on his way to do further work at home, even
though on a fixed salary (6) where the employee is required to bring his automobile to his place of
businessforusethere.Otherexceptionsundoubtedlyareequallyjustified,dependentontheirownpeculiar
circumstances.

Schneider(supra,atp.117)makesthissignificantstatement:

The proximity rule exception to the general going and coming rule is that an employee is generally
consideredtobeinthecourseofhisemploymentwhilecomingtoorgoingfromhiswork,when,thoughoff
the actual premises of his employer, he is still in close proximity thereto, is proceeding diligently at an
appropriatetime,byreasonablemeans,overthenatural,practical,customary,convenientandrecognized
wayofingress,oregresseitheronlandunderthecontroloftheemployer,oronadjacentpropertywiththe
expressorimpliedconsentoftheemployer.

Onpp.98to99of85ALR,wefindthefollowingdisquisition:

The compensation acts have been very generally held not to authorize an award in case of an injury or
deathfromaperilwhichiscommontoallmankind,ortowhichthepublicatlargeisexposed.28R.C.L.
804.Andtheydonotasageneralrulecoverinjuriesreceivedwhilegoingtoorfromworkonpublicstreets,
wheretheemployeehasnotreached,orhaslefttheemployer'spremises.Thequestionwhetheraninjury
arisesoutofandinthecourseoftheemployment,however,isonedependentuponthefactsofeachcase,
andinsomecases,whereaninjuryoccuredwhiletheemployeewasgoingtoorfromwork,butwasinthe
streetinfrontoftheemployer'spremises,ithasbeenheldcompensable.
 Thus,inthereportedcase(Barnettv.BrtilingCafeteriaCo.,ante,85)theinjurywasheldtohavearisenout
ofandinthecourseoftheemployment,wheretheemployeeslippedoniceonthesidewalkimmediatelyin
frontoftheemployer'splaceofbusiness,whileonherwaytoreportforduty,andjustbeforeenteringby
the only entrance to her place of employment. The court here recognized the general rule that, if an
employeeisinjuredwhilegoingtoorfromhisworktohishouse,ortoorfromsomepointnotvisitedforthe
discharge of a duty arising out of the employment, or while in the use of a public highway, he does not
comewithintheprotectionoftheWorkmen'sCompensationAct,butstatedthatthereisanexceptiontothis
ruleandthattheemploymentisnotlimitedbytheactualtimewhentheworkmanreachesthesceneofhis
laborandbeginsit,orwhenheceases,butincludesareasonabletimeandopportunitybeforeandafter,
while he is at or near his place of employment. The court reasoned that in the case at bar, althoughthe
employee had not entered the employer's place of business, and the sidewalk was a public highway so
much therefore as was in front of the employer's place of business was a necessary adjunct, used in
connection with the business, and that the sidewalk was to a limited degree and purpose a part of the
employer'spremises.

InIndustrialCommissionv.Barber(1927)117OhioSt373,159NE363,theinjurywasheldtohavearisen
inthecourseoftheemploymentwhereanemployee,aboutfiveminutesbeforethehourwhenhewasto
go on duty, was struck by an automobile owned and driven by another employee, within a short distance
fromtheemployer'splant,whichwaslocatedatthedeadendofastreetmaintainedbytheemployerfrom
its plant to the intersection with another street, and, although the street was a public one, it led nowhere
except to the employer's plant, and all of its employees were obliged to use it in going to and from their
work.Thecourtstatedthatwheretheconditionsunderthecontrolofanindustrialplantaresuchthatthe
employeehasnooptionbuttopursueagivencoursewithreferencetosuchconditionsandenvironments,
thepursuanceofsuchcourseisanimpliedobligationoftheemployerinhiscontractwithsuchemployee,
and that when he, for the purpose of entering his employment, has entered into the sphere or zone
controlledbyhisemployerandispursuingacoursewithreferencetowhichhehasnooption,heisthennot
only within the conditions and environments of the plant of his employer, but is then in the course of his
employmentandthat,whenhereceivesaninjuryattributabletosuchconditionsandenvironments,there
isadirectcausalconnectionbetweenhisemploymentandhisinjury,andtheinjuryfallswithintheclassof
industrialinjuriesforwhichcompensationhasbeenprovidedbytheWorkmen'sCompensationLaw.

99C.J.S.,atpp.807814,hasthistosay:

It is laid down as a general rule, known as the "going and coming" rule, that, in the absence of special
circumstances, and except in certain unusual circumstances, and where nothing else appears, harm or
injury sustained by an employee while going to or from his work is not compensable. Such injury, or
accident,isregardedbytheweightofauthorityofmanycourtsasnotarisingoutofhisemployment,andas
notbeing,ornotoccurring,inthecoursethereof.

However, this rule is not inflexible, is not of inevitable application, and is subject to qualifications, and to
exceptions which depend on the nature, circumstances, and conditions of the particular employment, the
circumstancesoftheparticularcase,andthecauseoftheinjury.

Jaynesvs.PotlachForests11expresseswithenlighteningclaritytherationaleforextendingthescopeof"course
ofemployment"tocertain"offpremises"injuries:

Weareurgedheretoagainrecognizeandapplythedistinctionbetweenoffpremisesinjurieswhichoccur
onprivatepropertyandthosewhichoccuronpublicstreetsandhighways.Theextensionofthecourseof
employment to offpremises injuries is not based upon the principle which would justify a distinction upon
thenarrowgroundofprivateandpublicpropertyitisnotsoundtosaythatwhileanemployeeisonpublic
highwayheisalwaysthereasamemberofthepublicandinnowiseintheexerciseofanyrightconferred
by his contract to employment nor is it a complete answer to say that while he is on his employer's
premises his presence there is by contract right, otherwise he would be a trespasser. The question of
whetherornotoneisacoveredemployeeshouldnotberesolvedbytheapplicationofthelawrelatingto
rightstoenteruponlands,orbylawoftrespass,licensee,inviteeorotherwise.

Asubstantialandfairgroundtojustifytheextensionofthecourseofemploymentbeyondthepremisesof
the employer is to extend its scope to the necessary risks and hazards associated with the employment.
Theserisksmayormaynotbeonthepremisesoftheemployerandforthisreasonthereisnojustification
to distinguish between extended risks on public highways and private pathways. In fact it is at most a
distinctionwithoutadifference.Underthebetterreasonedcasesthetechnicalstatusaspublicorprivateis
obviouslyofnomomentorinanyeventinandofitselfisnotconclusive.

Likewiseenlighteningisthefollowingexplanationofthepremisesruleexceptions:

We have, then a workable explanation of the exception to the premises rule: it is not nearness, or
reasonabledistance,oreventheidentifyingorsurroundingareaswiththepremisesitissimplythat,when
 acourthassatisfieditselfthatthereisadistinct"arisingoutof"orcausalconnectionbetweentheconditions
underwhichclaimantmustapproachandleavethepremisesandtheoccurrenceoftheinjury,itmayhold
that the course of employment extends as far as those conditions extend. (Larson's Workmen's
CompensationLaw,1965ed.,vol.1,pp.210211)

Wenowdirectourattentiontothecauseoftheemployee'sdeath:assault.

An"assault,"althoughresultingfromadeliberateactoftheslayer,isconsideredan"accident"withinthemeaning
of sec. 2 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, since the word "accident" is intended to indicate that "the act
causingtheinjuryshallbecasualorunforeseen,anactforwhichtheinjuredpartyisnotlegallyresponsible."12

Inthecaseswheretheassaultwasproventohavebeenworkconnected,compensationwasawarded.InNava,
supra,thehelmsmanofaboatwasengagedinhaulingtheship'scableandincoilingthecablepartlyoccupiedby
afoldingbedofoneofthepassengers.Thispassenger,uponbeingasked,declaredhisownershipofthebed.
Navaexpressedhisintentionofpushingitoutofthewayandproceededtodoso.Angeredbythis,thepassenger
exchangedhotwordswithNava,andthen,withapieceofwood,jabbedNavaatthepitofthestomach.Atthis
point,thepassenger'sbrotherranuptoNavaandstabbedhimtodeath.Thedeathwasadjudgedcompensable.

InBoholLandTransportationCo.vs.Vda.deMandaguit,13thetruckwhichMandaguitwasdrivingcollidedwitha
cyclistgoingintheoppositedirection.Thelatterturnedaroundandimmediatelypursuedthebus.Heovertookita
fewminuteslaterwhenitstoppedtotakeonpassengers.Thedriverthendisembarkedfromthebustowashhis
hands at a drugstore nearby. The cyclist followed him there and knifed him to death. We affirmed the grant of
compensationuponthefindingthatthedeatharoseoutofandinthecourseofemployment.

InGaliciavs.DyPac,14theemployee,PabloCarla,wasaskedtoworkinlieuofanotheremployeewhohadbeen
suspendedfromworkuponrequestofhislaborunionwhileCarlawasworking,thesuspendedemployeeasked
him to intercede for him, but Carla refused an altercation resulted shortly thereafter the suspended employee
stabbed Carla to death. The death was held compensable because "the injury sustained by the deceased was
causedbyanaccidentarisingoutofhisemploymentsincetheevidenceisclearthatthefightwhichresultedinthe
killingofthedeceasedhaditsoriginorcauseinthefactthathewasplacedinthejobpreviouslyoccupiedbythe
assailant."

Inthethreecasesabovecited,therewasevidenceastothemotiveoftheassailant.

InA. P. Santos, Inc. vs. Dabacol,15 the death of an employeedriver who, while driving a cab, was killed by an
unidentifiedpassenger,washeldcompensablebytheCommission.However,thequestionofwhethertheassault
aroseoutoftheemployment,wasnotraisedonappealtothisCourt.

InBatangasTransportationCompanyvs.Vda.deRivera,16thatquestionwasraised.Whiletheemployeedriver
was driving a bus, a passenger boarded it and sat directly behind the driver. After about thirty minutes, during
whichthepassengerandthedriverneversomuchasexchangedaword,thepassengershotthedrivertodeath
andthenfled.Therewasnocompetentproofastothecauseoftheassault,althoughtherewereintimationsthat
theincidentarosefromapersonalgrudge.Themajoritydecision17ruledthedeathcompensable.Thebases:(1)
Onceitisprovedthattheemployeediedinthecourseoftheemployment,thelegalpresumption,intheabsence
of substantial evidence to the contrary, is that the claim "comes within the provisions of the compensation law"
(sec. 43), in other words, that the incident aroseout of the workman's employment. (2) Doubts as to rights to
compensationareresolvedinfavoroftheemployeeandhisdependents.(3)TheCommissioner'sdeclarationon
theworkconnectionmightbebindingontheCourt.(4)Thereareemploymentswhichincreasetheriskofassault
on the person of the employee and it is in that sense that an injury or harm sustained by the assaulted worker
arisesoutoftheemployment,becausetheincreasedrisktoassaultsuppliesthelinkorconnectionbetweenthe
injuryandtheemployment.Amongthejobsenumeratedasincreasingtheriskofassaultare(a)jobshavingtodo
with keeping the peace or guarding property (b) jobs having to do with keeping or carrying of money which
subject to the employee to the risk of assault because of the increased temptation to robbery (c) jobs which
expose the employee to direct contact with lawless and irresponsible members of the community, like that of a
bartenderand(d)workasbusdriver,taxidriverorstreetcarconductor.

Ithasbeensaidthatanemploymentmayeitherincreaseriskofassaultbecauseofitsnatureorbethesubject
matter of a dispute leading to the assault. The first kind of employment, the socalled "increased risk" jobs
comprehend (1) jobs involving dangerous duties, such as that of guarding the employer's property, that of
carrying or keeping money, that where the employee is exposed to lawless or irresponsible members of the
public,orthatwhichsubjectshimtoincreasedorindiscriminatecontactwiththepublic,suchasthejobofastreet
carconductorortaxidriver18(2)jobswheretheemployeeisplacedinadangerousenvironment19and(3)jobs
of employees whose work takes them on the highway. On the other hand, the employment itself may be the
subjectmatterofadisputeleadingtotheassaultaswhereasupervisorisassaultedbyworkmenhehasfired,or
wheretheargumentwasovertheperformanceofworkorpossessionoftoolsorthelike,orwheretheviolence
wasduetolabordisputes.20

InRivera,supra,theunexplainedassaultontheemployeewasconsideredtohavearisenoutoftheemployment
because it occurred in the course of employment. This Court relied on the presumption of law that in any
proceeding for the enforcement of a claim, the claim is presumed to come within the provisions of the Act.21
According to this Court, "this statutory presumption was copied from New York." Concerning the corresponding
NewYorkprovisionoflaw,Larsonhasthistosay:

Inafewjurisdictions,notablyNewYorkandMassachusetts,astatutorypresumptioninfavorofcoverage
hasfiguredinunexplainedaccidentcases.TheMassachusettsstatuteprovides:

In any claim for compensation, where the employee has been killed, or is physically or mentally
unabletotestify,itshallbepresumed,intheabsenceofsubstantialevidencetothecontrary,thatthe
claimcomeswithintheprovisionsofthischapter,thatsufficientnoticeoftheinjuryhasbeengiven,
andthattheinjuryordeathwasnotoccasionedbythewilfulintentionoftheemployeetoinjureorkill
himselforanother.

ThisprovisionwaslargelycopiedfromtheNewYorksectiononpresumptions,exceptthattheNewYorkact
createsthepresumptioninallcases,notmerelythoseinvolvinganemployee'sdeathorinabilitytotestify.

Thesweepinginclusivenessofthislanguagemightseematfirstglancetomeanthatthemeremakingofa
claimisalsothemakingofaprimafaciecase,aslongasdeathorinjuryisshowntohaveoccurred.The
New York and Massachusetts courts have not so interpreted these statutes, however. It seems to be
necessary to establish some kind of preliminary link with the employment before the presumption can
attach. Otherwise, the claimant widow would have merely to say, "My husband, who was one of your
employee,hasdied,andIthereforeclaimdeathbenefits,"whereupontheaffirmativeburdenwoulddevolve
upontheemployertoprovethattherewasnoconnectionbetweenthedeathandtheenvironment.

Itisnotyetentirelyclearwhatinitialdemonstrationofemploymentconnectionwillgivethepresumptiona
foothold. Apparently, the idea is to rule out cases in which claimant can show neither that the injury
occurredinthecourseofemploymentnorthatitaroseoutofit,aswherehecontractedadiseasebuthas
no evidence to show where he got it. If there is evidence that the injury occurred in the course of
employment, the presumption will usually supply the "arisingoutofemployment" factor." Larson's
WorkmenCompensationLaw(1965)vol.1,pp.123124.

WealsoquotefromthedecisionoftheCourtofAppealsofNewYorkinDausvs.Gunderman&Sons:22

Thestatuteisnotintendedtorelievecompletelyanemployeefromtheburdenofshowingthataccidental
injuriessufferedbyhimactuallyweresustainedinthecourseofhisemployment."Itisnotthelawthatmere
proofofanaccident,withoutotherevidence,createsthepresumptionundersection21oftheWorkmen's
Compensation Law (Consol. Law, c. 67) that the accident arose out of and in the course of the
employment.Onthecontrary,ithasbeenfrequentlyheld,directlyandindirectly,thattheremustbesome
evidencefromwhichtheconclusioncanbedrawnthattheinjuriesdidariseoutofandinthecourseofthe
employment."Proofoftheaccidentwillgiverisetothestatutorypresumptiononlywheresomeconnection
appearsbetweentheaccidentandtheemployment.

Likewiseofrelevanceisthefollowingtreatise:

Thediscussionofthecoverageformula,"arisingoutofandinthecourseofemployment,"wasopenedwith
thesuggestionthat,while"course"and"arising"wereputunderseparateheadingsforconvenience,some
interplaybetweenthetwofactorsshouldbeobservedinthevariouscategoriesdiscussed.

Afewexamplesmaynowbereviewedtoshowthatthetwotests,inpractice,havenotbeenkeptinairtight
compartments, but have to some extent merged into a single concept of workconnection. One is almost
tempted to formulate a sort of quantum theory of workconnection: that a certain minimum quantum of
workconnectionmustbeshown,andifthe"course"quantityisverysmall,butthe"arising"quantityislarge,
thequantumwilladduptothenecessaryminimum,asitwillalsowhenthe"arising"quantityisverysmall
butthe"course"quantityisrelativelylarge.

Butifboththe"course"and"arising"quantitiesaresmall,theminimumquantumwillnotbemet.

As an example of the first, a strong "arising" factor but weak "course" factor, one may cite the cases in
which recoveries have been allowed off the employment premises, outside business hours, when an
employeegoingtoorcomingfromworkisinjuredbyahazarddistinctlytraceabletotheemployment,such
asatrafficjamoverflowingfromtheemploymentpremises,orarockflyingthroughtheairfromablaston
the premises. Here, by normal course of employment standards, there would be no award, since the
employee was not on the premises while coming or going. Yet the unmistakable character of the causal
relation of the injury to the employment has been sufficient to make up for the weakness of the "course"
factor.Anotherexampleofthesamekindofbalancingoutisseeninthelineofcasesdealingwithinjuryto
travelling men or loggers while sleeping in hotels or bunkhouses. It was shown in the analysis of these
casesthat,althoughthe"course"factorisontheborderlinewhentheemployeeissoundasleepatthetime
ofinjury,astrongcausalrelationoftheinjurytotheconditionsofemploymentaswhereafellowlogger
runsamok,orastrawfallsintothebunkhouseinmate'sthroatfromthemattressabove,ortheemployeeis
trappedinaburninghotelwillboostthecaseoverthelinetosuccesswhileaweakcausalconnection,
aswherethesalesmanmerelyslipsinahotelbath,coupledwithaweak"course"factorduetotheabsence
of any direct service performed for the employer at the time, will under present decisions add up to a
quantum of workconnection too small to support an award. It was also shown that when the "course"
element is strengthened by the fact that the employee is at all times on call, the range of compensable
sourcesofinjuryisbroaderthanwhentheemployee,althoughlivingonthepremisesisnotoncall.

A somewhat similar balancingout process is seen in the holding that a borderline courseofemployment
activitylikeseekingpersonalcomfortorgoingtoandfromworkfallsshortofcompensabilityifthemethod
adopted is unusual, unreasonable and dangerous, while no such restriction applies to the direct
performanceofthework.

Asanexampleofthereversesituation,astrong"course"elementandaweak"arising"elementonemay
recall the "positional" cases discussed in section 10, as well as the unexplainedfall and other "neutral
cause"cases.Herethecourseofemploymenttestissatisfiedbeyondtheslightestdoubt:theemployeeis
in the midst of performing the active duties of his job. But the causal connection is very weak, since the
source of the injury whether a stray bullet, a wandering lunatic, and unexplained fall or death, or a
mistaken assault by a stranger is not distinctly associated with employment conditions as such, and is
tiedtotheemploymentonlybytheargumentthattheinjurywouldnothaveoccurredtothisemployeebut
for the obligation of the employment which placed him in the position to be hurt. Yet, since the "course"
elementissostrong,awardsarebecomingincreasinglycommononthesefacts.

Incidentally, it may be observed that this "quantum" idea forms a useful yardstick for measuring just how
generousacourthasbecomeinexpandingcompensationcoverageforifacourtmakesanawardwhena
case,bytheabovestandards,isweakbothoncourseofemploymentandoncausalconnection,onecan
conclude that the court is capable of giving the act a broad construction. Thus, an award was made in
Puffin v. General Electric, where the course element was weak (rest period) and the causal element was
weak(settingfiretoownsweaterwhilesmoking).BothfactorswerelikewiseveryweakinO'Learyv.Brown
PacificMaxon Inc., where the course of employment consisted of a recreation period interrupted by a
rescue of a stranger, and the arising factor consisted of drowning in a channel where decedent was
prohibitedfromgoing.And,inMartinv.Plaut,thecourseofemploymentfactorwasweak(acookdressing
inthemorning)andthecausalfactorwasalsoweak(anunexplainedfall)yetanawardwasmadeinNew
York.

ButanotherNewYorkcaseshowsthatthesimultaneousweaknessofcourseandarisingfactorsmayreach
the point where the requisite quantum is not found. In Shultz v. Nation Associates, compensation was
deniedtoanemployeewhowhilecombingherhairpreparatorytogoingtolunchnegligentlystruckhereye
withthecomb.Hereweseethinnessonallfronts:astocourseofemploymenttimefactor,wehavealunch
periodastothecourseofemploymentactivityfactor,wehavecareofpersonalappearanceandastothe
causalfactor,wehavenegligenceoftheemployee.Eachweaknessstandingalonelunchperiod,careof
appearance,negligencewouldnotbefataltherearemanyawardsinwhichoneoranotheroftheseis
present.Butwhenallarepresent,whileanawardisnotimpossibleandcouldbedefendedonapointby
point basis, it cannot be relied upon in most jurisdictions by the prudent lawyer. Larson's Workmen's
CompensationLaw1965ed.Vol.1,pp.452.97to452.100.

Inresume:

1.Workmen'scompensationisgrantediftheinjuriesresultfromanaccidentwhichariseoutofandinthe
courseofemployment.

2.Boththe"arising"factorandthe"course"factormustbepresent.Ifonefactorisweakandtheotheris
strong,theinjuryiscompensable,butnotwherebothfactorsareweak.Ultimately,thequestioniswhether
theaccidentisworkconnected.

3.Inaproceedingfortheenforcementofaclaim,thesameispresumedtocomewithintheprovisionsof
theWorkmen'sCompensationAct.Butapreliminarylinkmustfirstbeshowntoexistbetweentheinjuryand
theemployment.Thusiftheinjuryoccurredinthecourseofemployment,itispresumedtohavearisenout
oftheemployment.
 4. The "course" factor applies to time, place and circumstances. This factor is present if the injury takes
placewithintheperiodofemployment,ataplacewheretheemployeemaybe,andwhileheisfulfillinghis
dutiesorisengagedindoingsomethingincidentalthereto.

5.Theruleisthataninjurysustainedwhiletheemployeegoestoorcomesfromhisplaceofwork,isnotof
theemployment.

6.Theexceptiontotheruleisaninjurysustainedofftheemployee'spremises,butwhileincloseproximity
theretoandwhileusingacustomarymeansofingressandegress.Thereasonforextendingthescopeof
"courseofemployment"tooffpremisesinjuriesisthatthereisacausalconnectionbetweentheworkand
thehazard.

7.An"assault"maybeconsideredan"accident"withinthemeaningoftheWorkmen'sCompensationAct.
The employment may either increase risk of assault because of its nature or be the subjectmatter of a
disputeleadingtotheassault.

From the milestones, we now proceed to take our bearings in the case at bar, having in mind always that no
coverallformulacanbespelledoutwithspecificity,thattheparticularfactsandcircumstancesofeachcasemust
be inquired into, and that in any perceptive inquiry, the question as to where the line should be drawn beyond
whichtheliabilityoftheemployercannotcontinuehasbeenheldtobeusuallyoneoffact.

We shall first dwell on the question of ownership of the private road where Pablo was killed. In granting
compensation,theCommissionsaidthat"theroadwherethedeceasedwasshotwasofprivateownership,was
calledtheIDECOroad,andledstraighttothemainIDECOgate,thusraisingthereasonableassumptionthatit
belonged" to the IDECO. The Commission reasoned out that "even if the ownership of the road were open to
question,therewasnodoubtthatitsprivatecharacterwasobviouslyexploitedbytherespondentforthepurpose
ofitsownbusinesstosuchanextentastomakeittoallintentsandpurposesanextensionofitspremises,"so
thatthe"shootingofthedeceasedmaybeconsideredtohavetakenplaceonthepremises,andthereforewithin
theemployment"andthat"whilerespondentalloweditsnametobeusedinconnectionwiththeprivateroadfor
theingressandegressoftheemployeesitdidnotapparentlytakethenecessaryprecautiontomakeitsafeforits
employeesbyemployingsecurityguards."

ButtheIDECOdeniesownershipoftheroad.InitsmemorandumfiledwiththeRegionalOffice,IDECOaverred
thatPablo'sdeathdidnotoriginatefromhisworkastotime,placeandcircumstances.This,ineffect,isadenial
ofownershipoftheroad.ThedecisionoftheRegionalOfficedoesnotstatethattheroadbelongstotheIDECO.
All that it says is that Pablo was shot "barely two minutes after he was dismissed from work and while walking
alongtheIDECOroadabouttwenty(20)metersfromthegate."Inits"motionforreconsiderationand/orreview,"
theIDECOemphasizedthat"theplacewheretheincidenthappenedwasapublicroad,notlessthantwenty(20)
metersawayfromthemaingateofthecompound,andthereforenotproximatetoorintheimmediatevicinityof
theplaceofwork."Again,theownershipoftheroadwasimplicitlydenied.Andinits"motionforreconsideration
and/or appeal to the Commission enbanc," the IDECO alleged outright that the "road where the incident took
place,althoughofprivateownership,doesnotbelongtoIDECO.Thereisabsolutelynoevidenceonrecordthat
showsIDECOownstheroad."IftheroadwereownedbytheIDECO,therewouldhavebeennoquestionthatthe
assault arose "in the course of employment."23 But if it did indeed own the road, then the IDECO would have
fencedit,andplaceitsmaingateattheotherendoftheroadwhereitmeetsthepublichighway.

ButwhiletheIDECOdoesnotowntheprivateroad,itcannotbedeniedthatitwasusingthesameastheprincipal
means of ingress and egress. The private road leads directly to its main gate.24 Its right to use the road must
thenperforceproceedfromeitheraneasementofrightofwayoralease.Itsright,therefore,iseitheralegalone
oracontractualone.IneithercasetheIDECOshouldlogicallyandproperlybechargedwithsecuritycontrolof
the road. The IDECO owed its employees a safe passage to its premises. In compliance with such duty, the
IDECOshouldhaveseentoitnotonlythatroadwasproperlypavedanddidnothaveholesorditches,butshould
alsohaveinstitutedmeasuresfortheproperpolicingoftheimmediatearea.ThepointwherePablowasshotwas
barelytwentymetersawayfromthemainIDECOgate,certainlynearerthanastone'sthrowtherefrom.Thespot
isimmediatelyproximatetotheIDECO'spremises.Consideringthisfact,andthefurtherfactsthatPablohadjust
finishedovertimeworkatthetime,andwaskilledbarelytwominutesafterdismissalfromwork,theAmpilcaseis
squarelyapplicablehere.Wemaysay,aswedidinAmpil,thattheplacewheretheemployeewasinjuredbeing
"immediatelyproximatetohisplaceofwork,theaccidentinquestionmustbedeemedtohaveoccurredwithinthe
zoneofhisemploymentandthereforearoseoutofandinthecoursethereof."Ourprincipalquestioniswhether
theinjurywassustainedinthecourseofemployment.Wefindthatitwas,andsoconcludethattheassaultarose
outoftheemployment,eventhoughthesaidassaultisunexplained.

Americanjurisprudencesupportsthisview.

InBountifulBrickCompanyvs.Giles,25theU.S.SupremeCourtruled:
 Employment includes both only the actual doing of the work, but a reasonable margin of time and space
necessarytobeusedinpassingtoandfromtheplacewheretheworkistobedone.Iftheemployeetobe
injured while passing, with the express or implied consent of the employer, to or from his work by a way
overtheemployer'spremises,oroverthoseofanotherinsuchproximityandrelationastobeinpractical
effectapartoftheemployer'spremises,theinjuryisonearisingoutofandinthecourseofemploymentas
much as though it had happened while the employee was engaged in his work at the place of its
performance.Inotherwords,theemploymentmaybegininpointoftimebeforetheworkisenteredupon
andinpointofspacebeforetheplacewheretheworkistobedoneisreached.Probably,asageneralrule,
employment may be said to begin when the employee reaches the entrance to the employer's premises
where the work is to be done but it is clear that in some cases the rule extends to include adjacent
premisesusedbytheemployeeasameansofingressandegresswiththeexpressorimpliedconsentof
theemployer.

The above ruling is on all fours with our facts. Two minutes from dismissal and twenty meters from the main
IDECO gate are "a reasonable margin of time and space necessary to be used in passing to and from" the
IDECO's premises. The IDECO employees used the private road with its consent, express or implied. Twenty
metersonthatroadfromthemaingateisincloseproximitytotheIDECO'spremises.ItfollowsthatPablo'sdeath
wasinthecourseofemployment.

InCarter vs. Lanzetta,26 it was held that "such statutes envision extension of coverage to employees from the
time they reach the employer's premises until they depart therefrom and that hours of service include a period
when this might be accomplished within a reasonable interval" and that "under exceptional circumstances, a
continuanceofthecourseofemploymentmaybeextendedbyallowingtheemployeeareasonabletimenotonly
toenterorleavethepremisesbutalsotosurmountcertainhazardsadjacentthereto."

The private road led directly to the main IDECO gate. From this description, it would appear that the road is a
deadendstreet.InSingervs.RichMarineSales,27itwasheldthat,wheretheemployee,whilereturningtowork
at the end of the lunch period, fell at the curb of the sidewalk immediately adjacent to the employer's premises
andoneotherlocatedthereon,andthegeneralpublicusedthestreetonlyinconnectionwiththosepremises,and
theemployeractuallystoredboatsonthesidewalk,thesidewalkwaswithintheprecinctsofemployment.Inthat
case there were even two business establishments on the deadend street. Here, it is exclusively the IDECO
premiseswhichappeartobeattheendoftheprivateroad.

We find in Jean vs. Chrysler Corporation28 a meaningful statement of the obligation of the employer to its
employees:"Thattheemployerowes,sotospeak,adutyof'safepassage'toanemployeetothepointwherehe
canreachtheproperarrivalordeparturefromhisworkseemswithoutquestion."

WenextquoteextensivelyfromKeltyvs.TravellersInsuranceCompany:29

TherulehasbeenrepeatedlyannouncedinTexasthataninjuryreceivedbyanemployeewhileusingthe
publicstreetsandhighwaysingoingtoorreturningfromtheplaceofemploymentisnotcompensable,the
rationaleoftherulebeingthatinmostinstancessuchaninjuryissufferedasaconsequenceofriskand
hazardstowhichallmembersofthetravellingpublicaresubjectratherthanriskandhazardshavingtodo
withandoriginatingintheworkorbusinessoftheemployer....

Anotherexception,however,whichisapplicableisfoundinthesocalled"access"cases.Inthesecasesa
workman who has been injured at a plane intended by the employer for use as a means of ingress or
egress to and from the actual place of the employee's work has been held to be in the course of his
employment. The courts have said that these access areas are so closely related to the employer's
premises as to be fairly treated as a part of the employer's premises. We shall discuss the principal
authoritiesdealingwiththisexceptiontothegeneralrule.

TheleadingcasesinTexasdealingwiththe"access"exception,andonewhichwethinkiscontrollingofthis
appeal,isLumberman'sReciprocalAss'nv.Behnken,112Tex.103,246S.W.72,28A.L.R.1402.Inthat
casetheemployeewasemployedbyHartburgLumberCompany,whichcompanyoperatedandowneda
sawmill in Hartburg, Texas, which was a lumber town, consisting solely of the employer's facilities. A
railroadtrackranthroughthetownandapartofthelumbercompany'sfacilitieswassituatedoneitherside
oftherightofway.Apublicroadranparalleltotherailroadtrackswhichledtothevariousbuildingsonthe
propertyofthelumbercompany.Thiscrossingwasusedbyanymemberofthepublicdesiringtogotoany
partofthelumbercompanyfacilities.Onthedayinquestionthedecedentquitworkatnoon,wenthomefor
lunchandwhilereturningtothelumbercompanyplantforthepurposeofresuminghisemployment,was
struckandkilledbyatrainatthecrossinginquestion.Theinsurancecompanycontended(asitdoeshere)
thatthedecedent'sdeathdidnotoriginateintheworkorbusinessofhisemployerandthatatthetimeof
his fatal injuries he was not in or about the furtherance of the affairs or business of his employer. The
SupremeCourt,inanextensiveopinion,reviewedtheauthoritiesfromotherstatesandespeciallyLatter's
Case 238 Mass. 326, 130 N. E. 637, 638, and arrived at the conclusion that the injury and death under
 suchcircumstanceswerecompensableundertheTexasAct.Thecourtheldthattherailroadcrossingbore
sointimatearelationtothelumbercompany'spremisesthatitcouldhardlybetreatedotherwisethanasa
part of the premises. The Court pointed out that the lumber company had rights in and to the crossing
whichwasusedinconnectionwiththelumbercompany'sbusiness,whetherbyemployeesorbymembers
ofthepublic.Inannouncingthe"access"doctrineJusticeGreenwoodsaid:

WasBehnkenengagedinoraboutthefurtheranceoftheaffairsorbusinessofhisemployerwhenhe
receivedtheinjurycausinghisdeath?Hewasuponthecrossingprovidedasthemeansofaccessto
his work solely because he was an employee. He encountered the dangers incident to use of the
crossing in order that he might perform the duties imposed by his contract of service. Without
subjectinghimselftosuchdangershecouldnotdowhatwasrequiredofhimintheconductofthe
lumbercompany'sbusiness.Hehadreachedaplaceprovidedandusedonlyasanadjuncttothat
business,andwasinjuredfromariskcreatedbytheconditionsunderwhichthebusinesswascarried
on. To hold that he was not acting in furtherance of the affairs or business of the lumber company
would be to give a strict interpretation to this remedial statute, which should be liberally construed
withaviewtoaccomplishitspurposeandtopromotejustice.

xxxxxxxxx

InTexasEmployer'sIns.Ass'nv.Anderson,Tex.Civ.App.,125S.W.2d674,wr.ref.,thiscourtfollowed
the rule announced in Behnken, supra. In that case the employee was killed while crossing the railroad
tracknearhisplaceofemployment.IndiscussingthequestionofthesitusoftheinjuryJusticeLooneysaid:

Its use as a means of ingress to and exit from his place of work not only conduced his safety and
convenience, but contributed to the promptness and efficiency with which he was enabled to
dischargethedutiesowinghisemployerhencethereasonandnecessityforhispresenceuponthe
railroadtrack(thatportionofthepathwayleadingovertherailroadrightofway)wheninjured,inour
opinion,hadtodowith,originatedinandgrewoutoftheworkoftheemployerandthat,theinjury
receivedatthetime,placeandunderthecircumstances,necessarilywasinfurtheranceoftheaffairs
orbusinessoftheemployer.

Again, in Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Boecker, Tex. Civ. App. 53 S. W. 2d 327, err. ref., this court had
occasiontofollowthe"access"doctrine.InthatcaseChiefJusticeJonesquotedfromtheSupremeCourtof
theUnitedStatesinthecaseofBountifulBriskCompany,etal.v.Giles,276U.S.154,48S.Ct.221,72L.
Ed.507,66A.L.R.1402,asfollows:

Anemploymentincludesnotonlytheactualdoingofthework,butareasonablemarginoftimeand
space necessary to be used in passing to and from the place where the work is to be done. If the
employeebeinjuredwhilepassing,withtheexpressorimpliedconsentoftheemployer,toorfrom
his work by a way over the employer's premises, or over those of another in such proximity and
relationastobeinpracticaleffectapartoftheemployer'spremises,theinjuryisonearisingoutof
andinthecourseoftheemploymentasmuchasthoughithadhappenedwhiletheemployeewas
engagedinhisworkattheplaceofitsperformance.Inotherwords,the employment may begin in
pointoftimebeforetheworkisentereduponandinpointofspacebeforetheplacewherethework
istobedoneisreached.

Therulingenunciatedaboveisapplicableinthecaseatbar.ThatpartoftheroadwherePablowaskilledisin
very close proximity to the employer's premises. It is an "access area" "so clearly related to the employer's
premisesastobefairlytreatedasapartoftheemployer'spremises."Thatportionoftheroadbears"sointimate
arelation"tothecompany'spremises.ItisthechiefmeansofenteringtheIDECOpremises,eitherforthepublic
or for its employees. The IDECO uses it extensively in pursuit of its business. It has rights of passage over the
road,eitherlegal,ifbyvirtueofeasement,orcontractual,ifbyreasonoflease.Pablowasusingtheroadasa
means of access to his work solely because he was an employee. For this reason, the IDECO was under
obligation to keep the place safe for its employees. Safe, that is, against dangers that the employees might
encountertherein,oneofthesedangersbeingassaultbythirdpersons.Havingfailedtotakethepropersecurity
measuresoverthesaidareawhichitcontrols,theIDECOisliablefortheinjuriessufferedbyPabloresultinginhis
death.

As therefore stated, the assault on Pablo is unexplained. The murderer was himself killed before he could be
broughttotrial.Itistruethereisauthorityforthestatementthatbeforethe"proximity"rulemaybeapplieditmust
first be shown that there is a causal connection between the employment and the hazard which resulted in the
injury.30ThefollowingmoremodernviewwasexpressedinLewisWoodPreservingCompanyvs.Jones:31

Whilesomeearliercasesseemtoindicatethatthecausativedangermustbepeculiartotheworkandnot
common to the neighborhood for the injuries to arise out of and in the course of the employment (see
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Peek, 36 Ga. App. 557 [137 S.E. 121] Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v.
Cox, 61 Ga. App. 420, 6 S.E. 2d 189), later cases have been somewhat more liberal, saying that, "to be
 compensable,injuriesdonothavetoarisefromsomethingpeculiartotheemployment."Fidelity&Casualty
Co.ofN.Y.v.Bardon,79Ga.App.260,262,54S.E.2d443,444."Wherethedutiesofanemployeeentail
hispresence(ataplaceandatime)theclaimforaninjurythereoccurringisnottobebarredbecauseit
resultsfromariskcommontoallothers...unlessitisalsocommontothegeneralpublicwithoutregardto
such conditions, and independently of place, employment, or pursuit." New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v.
Sumrell,30Ga.App.682,118S.E.786,citedinGlobeIndemnityCo.v.MacKendree,39Ga.App.58,146
S.E.46,47McKineyv.Reynolds&ManleyLumberCo.,79Ga.App.826,829,54S.E.2d471,473.

Butevenwithouttheforegoingpronouncement,theemployershouldstillbeheldliableinviewofourconclusion
that that portion of the road where Pablo was killed, because of its proximity, should be considered part of the
IDECO's premises. Hence, the injury was in the course of employment, and there automatically arises the
presumptioninvokedinRiverathattheinjurybyassaultaroseoutoftheemployment,i.e.,thereisacausal
relationbetweentheassaultandtheemployment.

We do say here that the circumstances of time, two minutes after dismissal from overtime work, and space,
twentymetersfromtheemployer'smaingate,bringPablo'sdeathwithinthescopeofthecoursefactor.Butitmay
logically be asked: Suppose it were three minutes after and thirty meters from, or five minutes after and fifty
meters from, would the "proximity" rule still apply? In answer, we need but quote that portion of the decision in
Jeanvs.ChryslerCorporation,supra,whichansweredaquestionarisingfromaningenioushypotheticalquestion
putforthbythedefendanttherein:

Wecould,ofcourse,say"thisisnotthecasebeforeus"andutilizetheoldsaw,"thatwhichisnotbeforeus
wedonotdecide."Instead,weprefertoutilizetheconsiderablyolderlaw:"Sufficientuntothedayistheevil
thereof"(Matthew1:34),appending,however,thisadmonition:nostatuteisstaticitmustremainconstantly
viabletomeetnewchallengesplacedtoit.Recoveryinapropercaseshouldnotbesuppressedbecause
of a conjectural posture which may never arise and which if it does, will be decided in the light of then
existinglaw.

Since the Workmen's Compensation Act is basically a social legislation designed to afford relief to workmen, it
mustbeliberallyconstruedtoattainthepurposeforwhichitwasenacted.32Liberallyconstrued,sec.2oftheAct
comprehendsPablo'sdeath.TheCommissiondidnoterringrantingcompensation.

ACCORDINGLY,thedecisionappealedfromisaffirmed,atpetitioner'scost.

Concepcion,C.J.,Reyes,J.B.L.,Dizon,Zaldivar,Sanchez,FernandoandCapistrano,JJ.,concur.

Makalintal,J.,reserveshisvote.

Footnotes

1 Description used by Justice Frank Murphy in Cardillo vs. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 330 US 469
(1947),91L.ed.1028.
2Sec.2,Workmen'sCompensationAct.

3ArthurLarson'sWorkmen'sCompensationLaw(1952ed.with1959supplement),vol.1,p.41seealso
1965.ed.,vol.1,p.42.

4Seenote3,atpp.42&43.

5 Afable vs. Singer Sewing Machine Co., 58 Phil. 42, citing Fitzgerald vs. Clarke & Sons, 1 BWCC 1957
DretzenCo.vs.IndustrialBoard,279Ill.11,116NE684.
6 PHHC vs. WCC & Alba Titong, L18246, Oct. 30, 1964, citing Murillo vs. Mendoza, 66 Phil. 689, &
Larson'sWorkmen'sCompensationLaw,1952,ed.,p.153.

7Vol.8,WilliamR.Schneider,Workmen'sCompensationText,PermanentEdition(1951),p.3.

8Seenote7,atpp.7and8.

9L8130,June30,1956,99Phil.1050.

10L22117,April29,1966.
1150ALR2d356,IdahoSupremeCourt,June15,1954.

12TallerVda.deNavavs.YnchaustiSteamshipCo.,57Phil.751.

1370Phil.685.

14 G.R. No. 7402, March 25, 1941, 40 OG No. 1, p. 83 (Court of Appeals case, decision of a special
divisionoffiveJustices,JusticeAlexReyes,ponente).
15L19051,Nov.23,1966.

16L7658,May8,1956.

17FiveJusticesdissented.

18ThejobsoftheemployeesintheNava,Rivera,MadanguitandDabacolcasesarewithinthisclass.

19Theinjuriesresultingfromassaultonthemanagerofabuildingusedasaroominghousebyunsavory
characters,wasadjudgedcompensableinIsraelvs.RambleProperties,Inc.,58NYS2d388.

20TheGalicia case probably comes under this category. For a discussion of assaults as a work hazard,
seeLarson'sWorkmen'sCompensationLaw(1965ed.),vol.1,pp.132144.
21Sec.43(1),Workmen'sCompensationAct.

2228NE2d914.

23Thepresumptionthattheinjuryarisesoutofandinthecourseofemploymentprevailswheretheinjury
occursontheemployer'spremises.Theinjuriesweresustainedbytheemployeewhenshewasstruckby
an automobile while walking from the processing plant where she worked to her automobile which was
parked in the adjoining parking area maintained for employees, Forest v. Birds Eye Division of General
FoodsCorporation,422P2d616,SupremeCourtofIdaho,Jan.17,1967.

Whereastatevehiclebeingdrivenwithconsentofthestateandunderitsdirectionanduponitsbusiness
struckastatehospitalemployeeonthepremisesofthestatehospitalaftershehadcompletedhershift,the
injuries sustained were declared covered by workmen's compensation law in Nichols v. Godfrey, 411 P2d
763,March4,1966.
24 "Main" means principal, chief, first in size, rank, importance. 26 Words & Phrases 60, citing Evers v.
Flanagan,61NYS2d,496,499,186Misc.101.Itmaybereasonablyassumedthenthatthemaingateis
nottheonlygate,althoughthenaturaltendencyofemployeesandcustomersistopassthroughthemain
gate.
2572L.ed.507,Feb.20,1928.

26193So2d259,SupremeCourtofLouisiana,December12,1966.Here,theCourtheldthattheaccident
when the employee fell on the step adjoining the employer's front door, as the employee was leaving,
occurredduringthecourseofemploymentalthoughtheemployeehadbeenengagedforonedayandhad
already been paid, and although the employee had lingered for from 20 to 30 minutes talking to the
employer.

27271NYS2d514,NewYorkSupremeCourt,AppellateDivision,ThirdDepartment,April29,1966.

28140NW2d756,CourtofAppealsofMichigan,March22,1966.

29391SW2d558,CourtofCivilAppealsofTexas,May21,1965.

30Jaynesvs.PotlatchForests,supra.

31140SE2d113,CourtofAppealsofGeorgia,Nov.24,1964.

32Abanavs.Quisumbing,L23489,March27,1968,22SCRA1278,1968APHILD997ManilaRailroad
Co. vs. WCC, L21504, Sept. 15, 1967, 21 SCRA 98, 1967 PHILD 676 ITEMCOP vs. ReyesFlorzo, L
21969,August31,1966,17SCRA1104.
TheLawphilProjectArellanoLawFoundation