Caso Banacolombia. Ma Alejandra González PDF

case 1-429-402
October 16, 2014
Going Bananas for Change: An Industry Ripe for

Corporate Social Responsibility
Introduction
Carlos Diaz-Granados graduated from a top-ranked university in Colombia. Due to his exceptional
performance while obtaining his undergraduate degree, he was awarded a scholarship to study for an MBA
at a renowned university in the United States. After graduation, Diaz-Granados worked as a volunteer in
Ecuador for a nongovernmental organization (NGO)i committed to environmental issues in agribusiness.ii
A major banana company then recruited him to be its coordinator for Rainforest and ISO 14001a set of
environment-related normscertifications in Costa Rica.
Diaz-Granados worked in this role for two years before being promoted to corporate social responsibility
(CSR) manager for the company in Cte dIvoire. Diaz-Granados decided to relocate near his family in Santa
Marta, Colombia, in 2002. It was there that he invested his life savings to establish Banacolombia, a joint
venture company with a multinational corporation (MNC).iii Diaz-Granados was responsible for coordinating
the complete value chain of the banana operations for Banacolombia in Colombia (see Exhibit 1).
Exhibit 1
Banana Value Chain before the Exporting Process
Field management Cleaning Transport by Vessel loading

Harvest Labeling truck to the port at the port
Production Packing (Transportation (Transportation
(Fieldwork) (Packing station) and Logistics) and Logistics)
Exhibit created by the authors using the source Banana Supply Chain Traceability: EAN.UCC Standards Application Guide. GS1, 2004. Web. 2014.
i
A nongovernmental organization (NGO) is a not-for-profit group of people organized to pursue an objective for the benefit of
humanity and society.
ii
Agribusiness refers to the production and commercialization of agricultural products.
iii
The term multinational corporation (MNC) refers to a company that established its own operations in multiple countries.
Published by GlobaLens, a division of the William Davidson Institute (WDI) at the University of Michigan.
2014 Maria Alejandra Gonzalez-Perez and Cristina Robledo-Ardila. This case was prepared by Professor Maria
Alejandra Gonzalez-Perez at the Universidad EAFIT and Cristina Robledo-Ardila (Assistant Professor at the Universidad
EAFIT). This case was designed for academic purposes to simulate a scenario that could occur in the business world.
It does not portray an actual company, protagonist, or event.
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Going Bananas for Change: An Industry Ripe for Corporate Social Responsibility 1-429-402
The Banana Industry
The banana industry has been at the forefront of documented claims of poor working conditions, which
included issues such as low wages, wages that depended on daily banana demands, informal contracts
defined on a daily or weekly basis, long working hours, risks of accidents from fatigue, and a lack of
protective equipment which resulted in the perpetuation of social inequalities. The industry faced problems
such as controlled prices and wages that depended on commodity prices and market volatility, and therefore,
a lack of job and wage stability. In addition, there were very limited added-value activities done in the
industry, and health problems were known to arise from the use of chemicals and pesticides on the bananas.
Worldwide, the industry faced opposition from consumer groups, local community organizations, and
international NGOs regarding the degradation of environmental conditions due to the use of pesticides
and chemical fertilizers. As both, an owner and general manager of Banacolombia, Diaz-Granados had
multiple responsibilities, some of which were contradictory. Most important, he felt a mission to reshape
Banacolombias corporate agenda in a way that would improve the living conditions of the workers in the
Colombian banana industry.
On one hand, Diaz-Granados had to make sure that Banacolombia was cost-effective and profitable,
while on the other hand he was committed to accomplishing the principles of the United Nations Global
Compactiv (see Appendix A). Diaz-Granados informed his decisions by establishing a managerial approach
that was guided by the premise of exceeding the demands that were committed to improving working
practices and environmental conditions of the banana industry suggested by NGOs. Such NGOs included
Banana Link, Euroban, Rainforest Alliance, Ethical Trade Initiative, and Social Accountability International.
Corporate Social Responsibility
The golden era of CSR began in the 1950s and intensified in the 1970s, when literature on CSR started
to be published. The concerns for corporate image and reputation rose considerably, leading corporations
to assume new roles within the spheres of politics, society, and the economy. The augmented presences
of information and telecommunication technology, coupled with advancements in global connectivity,
contributed to the appearance of new business trends relating to business ethics, the role of stakeholders,
and the importance of corporate citizenship. Thus, CSR appeared as a global response and a way to face
social inequalities and environmental degradation.1, 2, 3, 4
Since the 1970s, diverse models of CSR had been proposed and CSR went through various stages. The
first stage was the profit-maximizing stage, where CSR focused on seeking profit maximization under the
premise that whats good for the business [was] good for the country.5 The second stage was based on
trusteeship administration, in which corporations had to balance and be accountable to both internal and
external groups. The third stage combined profit seeking with working toward societal betterment.
It was during the 1990s that CSR became a priority, not only because of its social impact but also
because of its direct ability to influence a companys financial results. As proposed by Archie B. Carroll, the
CSR concept distinguished four spheres of responsibility, namely: economic, legal, ethical, and philanthropic
responsibility.v, 6, 7, 8
iv
The United Nations Global Compact has proposed 10 principles for responsible management in the areas of human rights, labor, the
environment, and anti-corruption.
v
As the four spheres were defined, three different levels of analysis were considered, namely the individual, organization, and
institution. This determined that social responsiveness included environmental assessment, stakeholder management, and emerging-
issues management.
2
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Additionally to these frameworks, there were authors who suggested that CSR might affect the financial
performance of companies, while some academics suggested that environmentally and socially responsible
initiatives increased the cost to business operations.9 Therefore, to be socially responsible would have been
a financial disadvantage compared with less responsible companies. Others asserted that CSR costs were
long-term investments, and that these actions affected employee motivation and productivity, consumers
goodwill, societal license to operate, improvement of relationships with local and national governments,
and financial institutions.10 Furthermore, several other authors suggested that CSR needed to be linked to
strategic planning; therefore, companies realized that the current competitive context called for the creation
of a specialized CSR agenda and management for each company.11
World Exports of Bananas
In 2010, world exports of bananas reached almost 14 million tons (30,864 million pounds).12 The largest
banana producers were India, China, Philippines, Ecuador, and Brazil; however, in most of these countries
production was domestically consumed.13 The worlds main exporting countries were Ecuador, Colombia,
Costa Rica, and the Philippines.14 See Exhibit 2. Together, these countries accounted for 73% of world
banana exports.15 Banana exports were a very important source of income and employment, making the
industry a strong determinant for household food security in developing countries.16
The main consumer markets for imported bananas were European Union (EU) countries, the United
States, Japan, and the former USSR countries.17 The EU imported around 60% of its banana consumption
from Latin American countries and 20% from African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries. An additional
20% of the bananas consumed in the EU were produced within the region, i.e., the Canary Islands (Spain),
Martinique and Guadeloupe (France), Madeira and the Azores (Portugal), and Crete (Greece).18 After the EUs
enlargement in May 2004, banana imports from Latin America increased by 70%.19
Exhibit 2
Banana Exports by Region 20082012, million tons
18.0
16.0 0.6
0.6
0.6 0.6 2.8
14.0 0.6 2.2
2.3 1.9
1.8
12.0 Africa
10.0
Asia
8.0
6.0 12.3 12.5 13.0 Latin America

12.0 11.8
and Caribbean
4.0
2.0
0.0
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Source: Banana Market Review and Banana Statistics 20122013. FAO. 2014. Web. 2013.
Key Players
According to the British NGO Banana Link, market share in the banana industry continued to be dominated
by the big four corporations: Dole Food Company Inc. (11%), Chiquita Brands International (13%), Fresh
Del Monte Produce (12%), and Fyffes (6%).20 These four corporations, along with the Ecuadorian family
enterprise Noboa (2%), controlled distribution and retail sales in 76% of the global market (Exhibit 3).21
Even though there were many small and medium-sized independent producers, most farms were owned by
either the big companies or supplied fruit to them.22, 23, 24
The banana trade has historically simultaneously divided and connected, for example, Latin America and
the Caribbean as sites of production and North America and Europe as sites of consumption. Historic patterns
of trade regulation defined two community systems for bananas: the United States, which was regulated by the
free market and dominated by Chiquita, Dole, and Del Monte, and the ACP countries, which traded with Europe.
Exhibit 3
Market Share in Global Banana Exports by Volume
2002 2013
Chiquita
Chiquita 13%
22%
Others
30% Fresh del
Monte
12%
Dole
Noboa Others 11%
Fresh del 56%
8%
Monte
20% Fy es
Fy es 6%
4% Dole Noboa
16% 2%
Source: The Changing Role of Multinational Companies in the Global Banana Trade. FAO. 2014. Web. 2014.
Competition Rules in the Banana Industry
The European Common Organization of the Market in Bananas (COMB) regulations were a set of policies
based on preferential treatment and market share based on the country of origin. The tensions between the
interventionist EU market and the US free market approaches led to the World Trade Organizations (WTO)
banana dispute, also known as the banana trade war.vi This required a global market arbiter to explain the
intervention of the WTO. In November 2012, after nearly two decades of negotiations, the dispute was finally
settled.25, 26
The WTO considered import tariffs imposed by the EU on bananas to be illegal. This was because the
tariffs gave preferential treatment to its former colonies in ACP countries. This implied that for communities
such as the banana regions in Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Honduras, or for managers such as Diaz-
Granados, there were macro-political conditions and preferential-treatment trade that directly affected short
and long-term demand of bananas.
vi
The dispute arose as a response to the EUs policies to favor imports of former colonies that produced bananas.
4
Competition for entry into the European market and the consequent drive to lower production costs were
worsening labor conditions. In Latin America, there were variations in labor costs among banana-producing
countries due to wage differences, national labor markets, welfare regimes, and labor efficiencies related
to different types of landholding. Additionally, in order to compete, small, independent producers were
obligated to meet the same quality and environmental standards, food security regulations, and efficiency
levels as the large producers. These standards raised production costs, which in turn put downward pressure
on wages and living conditions.
The Transformation of Governance Relations in the Banana Industry
The end of the 19th century saw the start of the first and most important banana-producing region in
Colombia. The banana industry in Santa Marta generated over 7,000 direct jobs, which provided a means of
employment and subsistence for more than 24,000 families.27, 28 Each year in the first decade of the 21st
century, Santa Marta exported around 22 million banana boxes, and it annually contributed to the Colombian
economy income of approximately USD $170 million. Urab, the other banana-producing region in Colombia,
bordered Panama and produced over 80% of all bananas exported from Colombia. Ninety percent of Urabs
economy was dependent on the banana industry.29, 30
The banana industry used to be a producer-driven value chain, characterized by multinational corporations
(MNCs). MNCs owned and coordinated production networks in a vertically integrated manner in which process
upgrades took place within a particular firm. The industry today has remained indisputably a buyer-driven
value chain characterized by decentralized production networks in which banana MNCs rely on local producers
to a greater extent. Direct pressure was exercised over production through quality stipulations.
MNCs sought to form joint ventures in order to dissipate social and labor tensions away from their
companies, as many MNCs had an unhealthy reputation in some banana-producing regions. From 1965 to
1990, legal action was taken by former workers against Del Monte, Dole, Chiquita, and other firms based on
the use of chemicals for agriculture (pesticides, insecticides, herbicides, and fungicides) that harmed human
health; this was the case of workers exposed to Nemagon, a nematicide used to kill a particular type of
parasite.vii, 31 As a result, campaigns were launched with regard to these cases by various NGOs committed
to human rights, the environment, and development.32 Then, in 1992, the Second International Tribunal on
Water in Amsterdam condemned Dole for seriously polluting the Atlantic region of Costa Rica through its
banana operations in the Valle de la Estrella.
This transformation affected the role of producers and workers participating in the value chains. It also
caused forms of cultural and political resistance. Social networks definitively affected communications and
the organization of the local community. Local farmers now had the chance to be part of a global community
that empowered their demands for better living conditions. Local farmers also possessed the capability to
have their words read instantly by consumers in foreign markets with the development of the Internet. This
sense of having been accounted for, listened to, and being part of a larger community also coincided with the
emergence and consolidation of the fair trade movement, which strengthened alternative forms of commerce.
More recently, the industry was indisputably a buyer-driven chain, as there was strong evidence of the
growing power of buyers (mainly retailers and supermarket chains) in developed countries. This growing
power allowed buyers to gain a high degree of influence over networks of suppliers in developing countries.
This led to calls for buyers to take responsibility for issues beyond delivery dates and quality to areas such
as environmental impact and the working conditions of banana farmers.33
vii
Nematicides are highly toxic compounds. Side effects may include poisoning and mortality of workers involved in their application.
Therefore, it is important for workers to have the required skills and technical knowledge for use (Gowen, S. R., 1997).
5
The emergence of services promoting ethical practices was a response to market incentives that rewarded
well-behaved brands whose goods and products were guilt-free, and whose labor and environmental practices
across the value chain were accountable and traceable through certifications.34, 35
The Banana Industry in Colombia
Colombia belonged to the group of so-called dollar countries. Traditionally, Colombia occupied
third place in world banana exports after Ecuador and Costa Rica, but in recent years, the Philippines and
Guatemala displaced Colombia into fifth.36 Nevertheless, in 2013, there were 150,000 workers across the
banana industry in Colombia, and 18,000 were represented by the trade union Sintrainagro.viii, 37
The production of exporting bananas took place in two different regions of Colombia: Urab and Santa
Marta, both on the Caribbean coast. The main difference between the two regions was the scale of production.
Urab was dominated by large-scale plantations, while in Santa Marta associations of small producers (e.g.,
cooperatives) were the predominant form of production.
Traditionally in Colombia, bananas were ranked third in economic importance, after coffee and flowers.
Production for exports took place in a variety of forms, ranging from large to small plantations that were
either locally or foreign owned. Throughout the 1970s, the banana industry grew steadily, but by the 1980s
it reduced competitiveness in terms of prices, which caused a decline in international sales. It was only after
the mid-1980s that domestic banana prices moved toward international prices to regain competitiveness.38
The banana industry in Colombia became an organized growing activity at the end of the 20th century,
when multinational companies such as Chiquita Brands and Dole Brands showed strong interest in the
commercialization of bananas grown in the Urab and Santa Marta regions.39
In recent years, the public and private sectors in Colombia have engaged in collaborative efforts to
increase competitiveness while improving working conditions within the banana industry. The public sector
has worked on improving infrastructure for production and exports (roads, ports, and airports), while the
private sector has worked on implementing environmentally friendly production techniques.40
A Race to the Bottom within the Banana Industry
At the local level, the presence of MNCs, the spread of foreign capital, and other forms of market
economy brought both advantages and disadvantages for workers and communities. On the negative side,
the presence of MNCs brought a variety of hardships for workers coupled with abuse in terms of working
hours, wages, and working conditions. On the positive side, the presence of foreign capital over a prolonged
period led to working opportunities for those who could access the labor market. This in turn led to an
increase in life expectancy due to health care facilities, public health programs, the construction of towns,
and improvements in the public infrastructure such as access to clean water and sewage treatment. There
was also a sense of technological progress and integration into the world with the development of roads and
rail, ports, electrification, and telecommunication.
In Latin American countries, banana cultivation coincided with a wide succession of diplomatic, military,
and economic changes. In the process of transforming the tropical rain forest into monoculture plantations,
profound ecological, demographic, political, and cultural changes took place. Banana companies developed
towns, railroads, roads, harbors, ports, and electrification in the formerly impenetrable tropical rain forest.
The integration of this frontier zone into the world marketplace transformed the political and cultural
identities of its inhabitants as new forms of conflict, processes, and actors emerged.
viii
Sintrainagro is the main trade union of workers in the agricultural industry in Colombia (Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la
Industria Agropecuaria).
6
The introduction of commercial banana cultivation presented new challenges for engineers, workers,
and entrepreneurs. The cultivation of bananas became connected to the process of capital formation, nation
building, and labor migration both domestically and abroad. Through the 20th century, the banana generated
demand for land, capital, and labor. Banana companies needed to recruit a large number of workers to establish
the required infrastructure for large-scale banana production. Thousands of those recruited lost their lives in
the malaria and yellow fever-infested rain forest while trying to make the banana trade possible.41
Fierce competition in the banana industry led to oversupply in international markets, and this rapidly
resulted in downward pressure on banana pricing. This situation was exacerbated by demands from an
increasingly centralized global retail industry for more competitive pricing. Labor unions, communist political
parties, and individual workers have resisted the attempts of foreign banana companies to impose poor
working conditions and low wages. Often during these struggles, banana workers were divided by language,
religion, color, and national origin.
International NGOs such as Oxfam, Banana Link, and civil society organizations have raised concerns
in regards to working conditions and environmental degradation. As a result of monocrop cultivation and
continuous pressure to increase productivity, banana plantations were associated with deforestation, water
pollution, and loss of soil fertility and biodiversity, which remained the case in the banana regions in Colombia.
Typically, technological progress in the banana industry was not associated with good labor relations
or democratic forms of governance. The vulnerability of banana production to environmental damage played
a substantial role in technological upgrading. For instance, irrigation systems evolved from the manual
distribution of water through hoses to sophisticated sensor-activated electronic irrigation systems. These
changes impacted the nature of the work.
Irrigation changed from being a basic manual labor to a function requiring highly developed skills such as
knowledge of electronics, plant biology, global positioning systems (GPS), and meteorology. Biotechnological
improvements caused greater resistance to pests and diseases and, thus, increased productivity. Engineering
innovations permitted adaptation to environmental constraints. This also allowed companies to increase
their logistics capacity in responding to market requirements.
Although the banana industry was highly dependent on human labor, the introduction of machinery
caused a decrease on the number of paid workers. People in banana regions feared a race to the bottom.
This has been experienced in the past decade as lower and lower prices were paid by some customers,
especially large retailers, adding to the actions taken by some MNCs to relocate production to locations with
weaker legislation and cheaper labor. Diaz-Granados was forced by the market to reduce production costs by
subcontracting Banacolombias labor.
The Role of the International Civil Society in the Banana Industry
Civil society has undertaken social responsibility initiatives within the banana industry to foster and
regulate social, economic, and political activity through non-state and non-corporate interdependent
governance. In other words, NGOs and other civil society organizations acted through monitoring agencies to
encourage desirable behavior by corporations and governments. This regulated the interdependent relations
via networks in the absence of an overarching political power.
Civil society, composed of local and international NGOs, regarded itself as the main alternative form of
regulation operating outside the framework of the nation-states. Although there was not a globally defined
framework enforceable by legislation, international civil society organizations generally operated based on
7
Western principles of human rights. Within the banana industry, international NGOs operating in markets in
developed countries such as the EU, the United States, and Japan used mechanisms such as rallies, protests,
marches, demonstrations, boycotts, and other public actions as a catalyst for change. This typically occurred
when dialogue with decision-makers in a corporation or government failed to produce results. These public
displays were strategically designed to gain the immediate attention and short-term responses of decision-
makers. The main mechanism was to attract press coverage by exposing, and sometimes exaggerating,
socially unacceptable behavior of governments or corporations.
Since the 1990s, several NGOs dealing with the banana industry were created in banana-consumer
countries to challenge the practices found in the producing countries. Some of the most active NGOs within
the international banana industry were BananaLink, BanaFair, Euroban, Rainforest Alliance, Ethical Trade
Initiative (ETI), and Social Accountability International. Worldwide, the banana industry experienced a
dramatic upgrade in both occupational health and safety, along with accident prevention and risk
management. These improvements took place in response to increasingly demanding norms imposed by fresh
fruit outlets in Europe, the United States, New Zealand, Japan, Australia, and other countries. The industry,
in turn, responded to demands by creating worker-friendly groups in consumer markets, such as consumer
organizations and other NGOs.
Several consumer and action groups were created in both the agricultural trade area and with marketing
strategies that encouraged the exercise of politics by consumers. Consumer actions in importing markets
had a potential impact in readdressing trade relationships at the policy level that would at least allow the
survival of developing countries within the competitive international market.
Banacolombia
Diaz-Granados had extensive experience as an NGO activist and also as a CSR manager in Cte dIvoire.
In these roles, he developed special empathy for powerless communities. He believed the banana industry
played a key role in terms of job creation and generation of income for the area.
Diaz-Granados was deeply concerned that fears of a race to the bottom were being exacerbated by
international competition based on the pressure to produce at a low cost. This was creating a permanent
crisis for both workers and local companies. The industry was going through a change so that quality and
social responsibility mattered. Diaz-Granados decided he needed to design a strategy for Banacolombia to
avoid competing only on a price basis. He also considered it important to implement certifications such as
SA 8000, which was a set of technical norms referring to working conditions and rights at the workplace.
However, a major issue for banana growers in developing countries remained. This issue dealt with the
fact that financial costs associated with the proliferating industry of certifications were generally passed on
to producers.42 The efforts for improving working conditions resulted in Colombian bananas not being the
cheapest alternative available to buyers. As Guillermo Rivera of Sintrainagro stated, When customers from
the consumer markets go in search of the cheapest fruit, and that is their only criteria for choosing suppliers,
they are increasingly likely to avoid Colombia.43
From his experiences in Costa Rica and Cte dIvoire, Diaz-Granados understood the social, labor,
and environmental standards surrounding the banana industry. He was determined to ensure that CSR
was institutionalized within Banacolombia as a core part of day-to-day operations, including training,
environmentally friendly agricultural practices, health and safety policies, and a rewards system to
motivate employees who brought new ideas to positively impact the local community, working conditions,
environmental efficiency, and transparency. See Exhibit 4.
8
Exhibit 4
Social Relationships across the Value Chain
Transnational
Trade Unions
NGOs
Consumers
Big Retail Chains Ripeners Distribution Shops
Investors
Importers
International Policies
(Multinational Corporations) Consumer Markets
(EU/USA)
Producing National Policies Exporters

Countries
National
Companies
Independent Growers
Own Plantations Producers / Exporters
and Packers
Community Based
Trade Unions
Organizations
Workers Families
Source: Gonzalez-Perez, Maria Alejandra (2010). Beyond CSR: Evidences of Social Responsibility Networks in the Banana Industry. Corporate Social Responsibility in Latin
America: A Collection of Research Papers from the UNCTAD Virtual Institute. UNCTAD: Geneva, pp. 5975.
Can CSR Readdress the Race to the Bottom?
In 2012, the United Kingdom imported more bananas from Colombia than any other country.44 In
fact, one out of every three bananas imported carried the fair trade label.45 This helped account for an
increasing recognition from banana importers on the importance of improved working conditions for banana
growers.46 However, competition at the international level was still based on price, and implementing socially
responsible initiatives carried a direct increase in the price of bananas. How could Diaz-Granados find a way
to sustain Banacolombia while successfully addressing the race to the bottom in the banana industry?
Appendices
Appendix A
The 10 Principles of the UN Global Compact
The UN Global Compacts ten principles in the areas of human rights, labor, the environment and anti-
corruption enjoy universal consensus and are derived from:
t The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
t The International Labor Organizations Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at
Work
t The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development
t The United Nations Convention Against Corruption
The UN Global Compact asks companies to embrace, support and enact, within their sphere of
influence, a set of core values in the areas of human rights, labor standards, the environment and anti-
corruption:
Human Rights
t Principle 1: Businesses should support and respect the protection of internationally proclaimed
human rights; and
t Principle 2: make sure that they are not complicit in human rights abuses.
Labor
t Principle 3: Businesses should uphold the freedom of association and the effective recognition
of the right to collective bargaining;
t Principle 4: the elimination of all forms of forced and compulsory labor;
t Principle 5: the effective abolition of child labor; and
t Principle 6: the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.
Environment
t Principle 7: Businesses should support a precautionary approach to environmental challenges;
t Principle 8: undertake initiatives to promote greater environmental responsibility; and
t Principle 9: encourage the development and diffusion of environmentally friendly technologies.
Anti-Corruption
t Principle 10: Businesses should work against corruption in all its forms, including extortion
and bribery.
Source: The Ten Principles. The Ten Principles. United Nations Global Compact. 2014.Web. <https://www.unglobalcompact.org/abouttheGc/TheTenprinciples/index.html>.
10
Acknowledgments
Although facts related in this case are real and collected from secondary data, information regarding
the cases protagonist and his company (Banacolombia) is fictitious. Feedback from Dr. Christina Stringer in
Auckland University in New Zealand was valuable for writing this case.
11
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12
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12
Banana Statistics 2011. FAO. 2013. Web. 2014. <http://www.fao.org/docrep/meeting/022/AM480T.pdf>.
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid.
15
Ibid.
16
InfoComm. UNCTAD. 2006. Web. 2013. <http://www.unctad.info/en/Infocomm/Agricultural_Products/Banana/Market/>.
17
Banana Statistics 2011.
18
Ibid.
19
Ibid.
20
Ibid.
21
The Changing Role of Multinational Companies in the Global Banana Trade. FAO. 2014. Web. 2014. <http://www.fao.org/
docrep/019/i3746e/i3746e.pdf>.
22
Chambron, A. C. Can Voluntary Standards Provide Solutions? International Banana Conference II: Reversing the Race to the
Bottom (2005): 94107. Print.
23
Kasteele, Adelien van de. The Banana Chain: The Macro Economics of the Banana Trade. International Banana Conference,
Brussels. 1 Jan. 1998. Conference.
24
Kasteele, Adelien van de. Update on the Banana Chain. International Banana Conference II, Brussels. 1 Jan. 2005. Lecture.
25
Historic Signing Ends 20 Years of EU-Latin American Banana Disputes. World Trade Organization. 2012. Web. 2013. <http://
www.wto.org/english/news_e/news12_e/disp_08nov12_e.htm>.
26
Dispute Settlement. European CommunitiesRegime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas. World Trade
Organization. 2013. Web. 2013. <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds27_e.htm>.
27
Coyuntura Bananera. Augura. 2013. Web. 2013. <http://www.augura.com.co/images/files/COYUNTURA%20BANANERA%20
2012(1).pdf>.
28
Zonas Productoras en Colombia. Augura. 2013. Web. 2013. <http://www.augura.com.co/index.php?option=com_content&view=
article&id=11&Itemid=21>.
29
Ibid.
30
Coyuntura Bananera.
31
Gowen, S. R. Chemical Control of Nematodes: Efficiency and Side-effects. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations, 1997. Print.
32
Chambron, A. C.
33
Jenkins, Rhys, Ruth Pearson, and Gill Seyfang. Corporate Responsibility & Labour Rights: Codes of Conduct in the Global Economy.
London: Earthscan, 2002. Print.
34
Gonzalez-Perez, M. A., and T. McDonough. More than Bananas: Social Responsibility Networks and Labour Relations in the
Banana Industry in the Uraba Region of Colombia. Trade Union Responses towards Globalization. Vol. 1. Geneva: Global Union
Research Network (2007): 139152. Print.
35
Gonzalez-Perez, M. A. Social Responsibility Networks (SRN): The Role of the International Civil Society in Redressing the
Negative Effects of Globalization and the Local Level. AD-Minister, 13 (2009): 5871. Print.
36
Banana Exports. FAO. 2014. Web. 2014. <http://www.fao.org/economic/est/est-commodities/banano/banana-exports/es/ >.
37
Colombian Banana Workers, Growers Reach Accord to Avoid Strike. Reuters, 1 Jan. 2013. Web. 1 Jan. 2013. <http://www.
reuters.com/article/2013/06/19/colombia-bananas-idUSL2N0EO16Y20130619>.
38
CropsColombia Country Studies. US Library of Congress. 2013. Web. 2013. <http://countrystudies.us/colombia/68.htm>.
39
Bucheli, Marcelo. Bananas and Business. The United Fruit Company in Colombia, 18992000. New York: New York University Press,
2005. Print.
40
The World Banana Economy: 19852002. FAO. 2013. Web. 2013. <http://www.fao.org/docrep/007/y5102e/y5102e05.htm>.
13
41
Bucheli, Marcelo. Bananas and Business: The United Fruit Company in Colombia, 18992000. New York: New York University Press,
2005. Print.
Fonnegra, Gabriel. Bananeras Testimonio Vivo de Una Epopeya. Bogota: Ediciones Tercer Mundo, 1980. Print.
Litvin, Daniel. Empires of Profit: Commerce, Conquest and Corporate Responsibility. New York: Texere, 2003. Print.
Striffler, Steve, and Mark Moberg. Banana Wars: Power, Production, and History in the Americas. Edited by G. M. Joseph and E. S.
Rosenberg. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2003. Print.
42
Gereffi, Gary, Ronie Garcia-Johnson, and Erika Sasser. The NGO-Industrial Complex. Foreign Policy, 125 (2001): 5665. Print.
43
Quines somos. Sintrainagro. 2013. Web. 2013. <http://www.sintrainagro.co/quienes_somos.php>.
44
Banana Link.
45
Ibid.
46
Colombian Banana Crisis: A Ticking Time Bomb. Bananalink. 1 Jan. 2013. Web. 1 Jan. 2014. <http://www.bananalink.org.uk/
colombian-banana-crisis-ticking-time-bomb>.
14
Notes
15
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