Constitutional Law 1 Review Notes

The 1987 Philippine Constitution

Definition

Constitution defined. That body of rules and maxims in accordance with which the powers of sovereignty are
habitually. With particular reference to the Constitution of the Philippines: That written instrument enacted by direct
action of the people by which the fundamental powers of the government are established, limited and defined, and
by which those powers are distributed among the several departments for their safe and useful exercise for the
benefit of the body politic.

Classification

a. Written or unwritten

A written constitution is one whose precepts are embodied in one document or set of documents; while
an unwritten constitution consists of rules which have not been integrated into a single, concrete form
but are scattered in various sources, such as statutes of a fundamental character, judicial decisions,
commentaries of publicists, customs and traditions, and certain common law principles.

b. Enacted (Conventional) or Evolved (Cumulative)

A conventional constitution is enacted, formally struck off at a definite time and place following a
conscious or deliberate effort taken by a constituent body or ruler; while a cumulative constitution is
the result of political evolution, not inaugurated at any specific time but changing by accretion rather
than by any systematic method.

c. Rigid or Flexible

A rigid Constitution is one that can be amended onlyby a formal and usually difficult process; while a
flexible Constitution is one that can be changed by ordinary legislation.

Essential parts of the Philippine Constitution

a. Constitution of Liberty

The series of prescriptions setting forth the fundamental civil and political rights of the citizens and
imposing limitations on the powers of government as a means of securing the enjoyment of those rights.

b. Constitution of Government

The series of provisions outlining the organization of the government, enumerating its powers, laying
down certain rules relative to its administration, and defining the electorate.

c. Constitution of Sovereignty

The provisions pointing out the mode or procedure in accordance with which formal changes in the
fundamental law may be brought about.
Interpretation/Construction of the Philippine Constitution

a) In Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003, the Supreme Court
made reference to the use of well- settled principles of constitutional construction, namely: First,
verbaleais, i. e., whenever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyers
document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the peoples
consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood in the sense they have a
common use. Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio leqis et anima. The words of the Constitution
should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of the framers. Thus, in Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317, it was held that the Court in construing a Constitution should
bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished and the evils sought to be prevented or remedied. A
doubtful provision shall be examined in light of the history of the times and the conditions and
circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. Third, utmaaisvaleatauampereat. i.e., the
Constitution has to be interpreted as a whole. In Civil Liberties Union, it was declared that sections
bearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole
purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable
construction, the two can be made to stand together.

b) If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids is available.
Again in Civil Liberties Union, supra., it was held that while it is permissible to consult the debates
and proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the
resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are
powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. We think it safer to construe
the Constitution from what appears upon its face. The proper interpretation, therefore, depends more
on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers understanding thereof.

c) In case of doubt, the provisions should be considered self-executing; mandatory rather than directory;
and prospective rather than retroactive.

d) Self-executing provisions. A provision which lays down a general principle is usually not self-
executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of
supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies a sufficient rule by means of which the
right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.

Francisco v. House of Representatives

G. R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003
Carpio Morales, J.

Facts: On June 2, 2003 former President Joseph Estrada filed the first impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
Hilario Davide, Jr. and seven Associate Justices for culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust
and other high crimes. But the impeachment complaint was dismissed on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in
substance. Thereafter, on October 23, 2003 the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General
of the House by Representatives Gilberto Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against Chief Justice Hilario
David, Jr. which arose eighteen petitions against the House of Representatives, most of which contend that the filing
of the second impeachment complaint violates the provision of Section 3 (5) Article XI of the Constitution.

Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De Venecia, argues that Sections 16 & 17 Rule V of the
House of Impeachment Rules do not violate Section 3 (5) Article XI of our present constitution contending that the
term "initiate" does not mean to "file." Because filing can be only accomplished in 3 ways as stated in Section 3 (2)
Article XI of the constition that is (1) by a verified complaint for impeachment by any member of the House of
Representatives; or (2) by any citizen upon a resolution or endorsement by any member; or (3) by at least 1/3 of the
members of the house.

Respondent House of Representatives concludes that the one year bar prohibiting the initiation of impractical
proceedings against the same officials could not have been violated as the impeachment proceedings against Chief
Justice Hilario David, Jr. and seven Associate Justices had not been initatiated as the House of Representatives has
yet to act on it.

Issue: Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3 (5) Article XI of the
Constitution.
Ruling: The court ruled that the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario Jr. which was filed by
Representatives Gilbert Teodoro, Jr. And Felix William Fuentebella with the office of the Secretary General of the
House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5 Section 3 of Article XI of the
Constitution

Applying the principles of constitution, verbalegis, the words used in the Constitution should be given their ordinary
meaning except when technical terms are employedin which case the significance thus attached to them prevails.

It is concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint, once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated in a foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official
within one year period following Article XI Section 3 (5) of the Constitution.

Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary

G. R. No. 83896, February 22, 1991
Fernan, C.J.

Facts: Ignacio P. Lacsina, Luis R. Mauricio, Antonio R. Quintos and Juan T. David for petitioners in 83896.Antonio
P. Coronel for petitioners in 83815.

Two petitions were consolidated and are being resolved jointly as both seek a declaration of the unconstitutionality
of Executive Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987.Petitioners contend that this
Executive Order which, in effect, allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to
hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions is opposed to Section 13, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution, that is:

Sec. 13.The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not,
during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially
interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.

Issue: Whether or not the Executive Order 284 is constitutional.

Ruling: The court ruled that Executive Order 284 is unconstitutional.

In the principles of construction of the constitution, ratio legisest anima, that the words of the constitution should be
interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers. The legislative intent of the Constitutional provision is to
prevent government officials from holding multiple positions in the government for self-enrichment which is a
betrayal of public trust.

It has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished
by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. The object is to ascertain the reason which
induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished
thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to affect that
purpose.
In the light of the construction given to Section 13, Article VII in relation to Section 7, paragraph 2 Artivle IX-B of
the 1987 Constitution, E.O. 284 dated July 23, 1987 is unconstitutional. The petitions are GRANTED. Executive
Order No. 284 is declared null and void and is accordingly set aside.

As a result, DENR Secretary FulgenioFactoran, Jr., DILF Secretary Luis Santos, DOH Secretary Alfredo Bengzon
and DBM Secretary Guillermo Carague are ordered to immediately relinquish their offices and employment.

Brief History

The Malolos Constitution

Formally known as political constitution of 1899. It is the basic law of the first Philippine Republic. Written
by Felipe Calderon y Roca and Felipe Buencamino to a pair of proposals to the malolos congress by
ApolinarioMabini and Pedro Paterno. Proclamation of Philippine independence, at Kawit, Cavite, on June 12, 1898.
Revolutionary Congress convened at Barasoain Church, Malolos, Bulacan, on September 15, 1898. Three drafts
were submitted, namely, the drafts of Pedro Paterno, ApolinarioMabini and Felipe Calderon. This was the first
republican constitution in Asia, framed by a revolutionary convention which included 40 lawyers, 16 physicians, 5
pharmacists, 2 engineers and 1 priest. The Constitution recognized that sovereign power was vested in the people,
provided for a parliamentary government, acknowledged separation of powers, and contained a bill of rights.

1900 Mckinleys Instructions

US President McKinleys Instructions of April 7, 1900, to transform the military into a civil government as
rapidly as conditions would permit. On September 1, 1900, the authority to exercise that part of the military power
of the US President which is legislative in character was transferred from the military government to the Philippine
Commission [first, the Schurman Commission, then, the Taft Commission].

Spooner Amendment

The Spooner Amendment to the Army Appropriation Bill of March 2, 1901 provided that all military, civil
and judicial powers necessary to govern the Philippine Islands shall be exercised in such manner x xx for the
establishment of a civil government and for maintaining and protecting the inhabitants in the free enjoyment of their
liberty, property and religion. On July 1, 1901, the Office of the Civil Governor was created, and the executive
authority previously exercised by the military governor was transferred to the Civil Governor.

1902 Philippine Bill

The Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 continued the existing civil government, with the co mmitmentfrom the
US Congress to convene and organize in the Philippines a legislative body of their own representatives. On October
16,1907, the Philippine Assembly was convened to sit as the Lower House in a bicameral legislature, with the
Philippine Commission as the Upper House.

1916 Jones Law (Philippine Autonomy Act)

The Jones Law (Philippine Autonomy Act) of August 29, 1916. It superseded the Spooner Amendment and
the Philippine Bill of 1902. It was the principal organic act of the Philippines until November 15,1935, when the
Philippine Commonwealth was inaugurated (under the 1935 Constitution). It contained a preamble, a bill of rights,
provisions defining the organization and powers of the departments of government, provisions defining the
electorate, and miscellaneous provisions on finance, franchises and salaries of important officials. Executive power
was vested in the Governor General, legislative power in a bicameral legislature composed of the Senate and House
of Representatives, and judicial power in the Supreme Court, the Courts of First Instance and inferior courts.

Tydings-McDuffie Act (Philippine Independence Act)

The Tydings-McDuffie Act (Philippine Independence Act) of March 24, 1934 authorized the drafting of a
Constitution for the Philippines, the establishment of a Commonwealth Government and, after ten years,
independence.
1935 Constitution

a) Pursuant to the authority granted under the Tydings-McDuffie Law, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No.
4125 (May 26,1934) calling for the election of delegates to the Constitutional Convention.

b) Election of delegates: July 10, 1934; Constitutional Convention inaugural: July 30, 1934.

c) Draft Constitution approved by the Constitutional Convention on February 8, 1935; brought to Washington on
March 18, 1935, and on March 23, 1935, US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt certified that the draft
constitution conformed substantially to the Tydings-McDuffie Law.

d) The Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite held on May 14,

e) The Philippine Commonwealth established under the Constitution was inaugurated on November 15, 1935; full
independence was attained with the inauguration of the (Third) Philippine Republic on July 4, 1946. -

f) The Constitution was amended in 1939: Ordinance appended to the Constitution, in accordance with the Tydings-
Kocialkowski Act of August 7, 1939 [Resolution of Congress: September 15, 1939; Plebiscite: October 24, 1939]
g) It was amended again in 1940: Changed Presidents and Vice Presidents term from six to four years, but no
person shall serve as President for more than 8 years; changed the unicameral to a bicameral legislature; established
an independent Commission on Elections [Resolution: April 11, 1940; Plebiscite: June 18, 1940]

i) Another amendment was adopted in 1947: Parity Amendment, effective July 4, 1949, granting to Americans, for a
period of twenty-five years, the same privileges as Filipinos in the utilization and exploitation of natural resources in
the Philippines [Resolution: September 18, 1946; Plebiscite: March 11, 1947], See: Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil.
The Japanese Occupation Order No. 1

With the occupation of Manila, the Commander in Chief of the Japanese Forces proclaimed, on January 2,
1942, the military administration over the territory occupied by the army, and ordered that all the laws now in force
in the Commonwealth, as well as executive and judicial institutions shall continue to be effective for the time being
as in the past, and all public officials shall remain in their present posts and carry on faithfully their duties as
before.

1973 Constitution
On January 17, 1973, President Marcos issued Presidential Proclamation No. 1102, declaring that the new
Constitution had been ratified by the citizens assemblies and has thereby come into force and effect. The President
serves as a symbolic head of state, executive power is exercise by the Prime minister with the assistance of the
Cabinet and Legislative power is vested in a unicameral national assembly.

Freedom Constitution

Proclamation No. 1, February 25, 1986, announcing that she (Corazon Aquino) and Vice President Laurel
were assuming power. Proclamation No. 3, March 25, 1986, announced the promulgation of the Provisional
[Freedom] Constitution, pending the drafting and ratification of a new Constitution. It adopted certain provisions of
the 1973 Constitution, contained additional articles on the executive department, on government reorganization, and
on existing laws. It also provided for the calling of a Constitutional Commission to be composed of 30-50 members,
to draft a new Constitution. Under this constitution, executive and legislative powers are exercise by the president,
and shall continue to exercise legislative powers until a legislature is elected and convened under a new constitution
1987 Philippine Constitution

Approval of draft Constitution by the constitutional commission on October 12, 1986, and signed on
October 15, 1986, at the Plenary Hall, National Government Center, Quezon City, and was ratified by a nationwide
plebiscite on February 2, 1987.

Important Principles
Principle in the Separation of Powers

The separation of powers is a constitutional principle introduced to ensure that the three major institutions
of the state namely; the legislative, the executive and the judiciary are not concentrated in any single body whether
in functions, personnel or powers. Legislative is a law-making body, Executive puts law into operation and Judiciary
interprets law and settle disputes. Montesquieu, a French writer/philosopher believes that if all three powers were
held by the same person, then there would be a dictatorship and arbitrary rule would prevail. Another writer, John
Locke mentioned that the three organs of the state must not get into one hand as it may be too great a temptation to
human frailty. Aristotle is of the opinion that if the three organs of a state are well arranged, then the constitution is
bound to be well arranged.

The Executive Branch

The executive branch is headed by the President, who is elected by a direct vote of the people. The term of office of
the President, as well as the Vice-President, is six (6) years. As head of the Executive Department, the President is
the Chief Executive. He represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the
officials and employees of his department.

The Legislative Branch

The legislative branch, which has the authority to make, alter or repeal laws (see also the definition of legislative
power), is the Congress. Congress is vested with the tremendous power of the purse, traditionally recognized in
the constitutional provision that no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law.

The Judiciary
Judicial power is vested in the Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. The judiciary
has the moderating power to determine the proper allocation of powers between the branches of government.

Principle of Checks and Balances

This allows one department to resist encroachments upon its prerogatives or to rectify mistakes or excesses
committed by the other departments, e.g., veto power of the President as check on improvident legislation, etc.

Principle of Comity

Principles of comity and convenience require that the courts stay their hand until the administrative
processes are completed.

Hierarchy of Laws

1. National laws and international treaties/agreements

2. Administrative issuance to implement laws
3. Ordinances by LGU

Power of Judicial Review

It is emphatically the province and duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is. If two laws
conflict with each other, the Courts must decide on the operation of each. So, if a law be in opposition to the
Constitution, the Court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence
of judicial duty.

Doctrine of Operative Fact

The general rule is that a void law or administrative act cannot be the source of legal rights or duties.
Article 7 of the Civil Code enunciates this general rule, as well as its exception: "Laws are repealed only by
subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the
contrary. When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the
latter shall govern. Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not
contrary to the laws or the Constitution."

The doctrine of operative fact is an exception to the general rule, such that a judicial declaration of
invalidity may not necessarily obliterate all the effects and consequences of a void act prior to such declaration.

The decision now on appeal reflects the orthodox view that an unconstitutional act, for that matter an
executive order or a municipal ordinance likewise suffering from that infirmity, cannot be the source of any legal
rights or duties. Nor can it justify any official act taken under it. Its repugnancy to the fundamental law once
judicially declared results in its being to all intents and purposes a mere scrap of paper. As the new Civil Code puts
it: "When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter
shall govern. Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary
to the laws of the Constitution." It is understandable why it should be so, the Constitution being supreme and
paramount.

Political Questions Doctrine

Political questions are those questions which under the constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of the government but the difficult question which the court is frequently called upon to answer is
weather a question is one in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative oer
executive branch government.

Inherent Powers of Government

The inherent powers of the State are:

(a) Police Power;
(b) Power of Eminent Domain
(c) Power of Taxation

Immunity from Suit

There can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends, however,
it may be sued if it gives consent, whether express or implied. The doctrine is also known as the Royal Prerogative
of Dishonesty. Immunity is enjoyed by other States, consonant with the public international law principle of par in
parem non habet imperium. The Head of State, who is deemed the personification of the State, is inviolable, and
thus, enjoys immunity from suit.

Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency

Doctrine of qualified political agency or alter ego principle means that the acts of the secretaries of the
Executive departments performed and promulgated in the regular course of business are presumptively the acts of
the Chief Executive.
EXCEPTIONS:
1. In cases wherein the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or by the law to act in person or
2. The exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative
functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments.

Non- Delegation of Power

The Congress cannot further delegate the power delegated to it by the people. This is in keeping with the
principle of non-delegation of powers which is applicable to all the three branches of the government. The rule states
that what has been delegated cannot further be delegated potestasdelegata non delegaripotest. A delegated power
must be discharged directly by the delegate and not through the delegates agent. It is basically an ethical principle
which requires direct performance by the delegate of an entrusted power. Further delegation therefore constitutes
violation of the trust reposed by the delegator on the delegate. The people, through the Constitution, delegated law-
making powers to the Congress, and as such, it cannot as a rule delegate further the same to another.

Exemptions: in order to address the numerous and complex demands of legislative functions, the
Constitution provides exception to the rule. Further delegation is permitted in the following circumstances: (1)
Delegation to the people at large. The Congress delegates its legislative power by allowing direct legislation by the
people in cases of initiative and referendum; (2) delegation of emergency power to the president in times of war or
crisis pursuant to Section 23, Article VI; (3) Delegation of tariff power to the President pursuant to Section 28,
Article VIof the Constitution; (4) Delegation to administrative bodies power of subordinate legislation which
allows administrative bodies to promulgate supplementary rules, so they can deal with technical problems with more
expertise to dispatch than Congress or by the courts; and (5) Delegation to Local Governments Units for an effective
and efficient legislation within their respective jurisdiction, because they are in better position than the National
Government to act purely with local concerns.

Power of Supervision and Control

Distinction:
The Power of Supervision refers to the capacity of the superior officers to see to it the lower officers performs their
functions in accordance with the law, if the subordinates fail or neglect to fulfill them, then the officer may take
such actions or steps as prescribed by law to make them performs these duties. while on the other hand, the Power to
Control is the capability of an officer to alter, modify, nullify, or set aside what a subordinate officers had done in
the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgement of the latter. It includes the authority to order the doing
of an act by subordinate or to undo such act or to assume a power directly vested in him by law. (Cruz, 2002).

Preamble

We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane
society, and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good,
conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity, the blessings of independence and
democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and
promulgate this Constitution.

Function of the Preamble

The preamble is not a source of right or obligations. Because, however, it sets down the origin, scope, and
purpose of the constitution, it is useful as an aid in ascertaining the meaning of ambiguous provisions in the body of
the constitution. It is thus a source of light.

Origin, Scope and Purpose of the Constitution

Its origin, or authorship is the will of the sovereign Filipino people. Its scope and purpose is to build a
just and humane society and to establish a government that shall emody our ideals and aspirations, promote the
common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity the blessings of
independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality and
peace.

Article I

The national territory of the Philippines comprises:

1. The Philippine archipelago

 2. With all the islands and waters embraced therein
3. And all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction
4. Consisting of its
a. Terrestrial
b. Fluvial; and
c. Aerial domains
5. Including its
a. Territorial sea
b. The seabed
c. The subsoil
d. The insular shelves; and
e. The other submarine areas
6. The waters
a. Around
b. Between and
c. Connecting
d. The islands of the archipelago
Regardless of their breadth and dimensions
Form part of the INTERNAL WATERS of the Philippines

Definition of Archipelago
An archipelago is a body of water studded with islands. The Philippine archipelago is that body of water
studded with islands which is delineated in the Treaty of Paris (1898), as amended by the Treaty of Washington
(1900) and the Treaty of Great Britain (1930).

Definition of all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction
It includes any territory that presently belongs or might in the future belong to the Philippines through any of
the internationally accepted modes of acquiring territory.

Archipelagic principle
Two elements:
The definition of internal waters (as provided above);
The straight baseline method of delineating the territorial sea consists of drawing straight lines connecting
appropriate points on the coast without departing to any appreciable extent from the general direction of the coast.

Important distances with respect to the waters around the Philippines

1. Territorial sea - 12 nautical miles (n.m.)

2. Contiguous zone - 12 n.m. from the edge of the territorial sea
3. Exclusive economic zone - 200 n.m. from the baseline [includes (1) and (2)]

RA 9255 or the New Baseline Law of 2009

Baselines serve as basis for a countrys maritime jurisdiction and a means to establish maritime boundaries
with neighboring coastal States.

Section 1. The baselines of the Philippines archipelago are hereby defined and described specifically.

Section 2. The baseline in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise exercises sovereignty and
jurisdiction shall be determined as "Regime of Islands" under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article
121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS):a) The Kalayaan Island Group as
constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596; andb) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal.

Section 3. This Act affirms that the Republic of the Philippines has dominion, sovereignty and jurisdiction over all
portions of the national territory as defined in the Constitution and by provisions of applicable laws including,
without limitation, Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, as amended.
Section 4. This Act, together with the geographic coordinates and the chart and maps indicating the aforesaid
baselines, shall be deposited and registered with the Secretary General of the United Nations.

Section 5. The National Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA) shall forthwith produce and
publish charts and maps of the appropriate scale clearly representing the delineation of basepoints and baselines as
set forth in this Act.

Section 6. The amount necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act shall be provided in a supplemental budyet
or included in the General Appropriations Act of the year of its enactment into law.

Section 7. If any portion or provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional or invalid the other portions or
provisions hereof which are not affected thereby shall continue to be in full force and effect.

Section 8. The provisions of Republic Act No. 3046, as amended by Republic Act No. 5446, and all other laws,
decrees, executive orders, rules and issuances inconsistent with this Act are hereby amended or modified
accordingly.
Section 9. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or in any two
(2) newspaper of general circulation.

1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea lays down a comprehensive regime of law and order
in the world's oceans and seas establishing rules governing all uses of the oceans and their resources. It enshrines the
notion that all problems of ocean space are closely interrelated and need to be addressed as a whole.

The Convention was opened for signature on 10 December 1982 in Montego Bay, Jamaica. This marked the
culmination of more than 14 years of work involving participation by more than 150 countries representing all
regions of the world, all legal and political systems and the spectrum of socio/economic development. At the time of
its adoption, the Convention embodied in one instrument traditional rules for the uses of the oceans and at the same
time introduced new legal concepts and regimes and addressed new concerns. The Convention also provided the
framework for further development of specific areas of the law of the sea.

The Convention entered into force in accordance with its article 308 on 16 November 1994, 12 months after the
date of deposit of the sixtieth instrument of ratification or accession. Today, it is the globally recognized regime
dealing with all matters relating to the law of the sea.

The Convention (full text) comprises 320 articles and nine annexes, governing all aspects of ocean space, such as
delimitation, environmental control, marine scientific research, economic and commercial activities, transfer of
technology and the settlement of disputes relating to ocean matters.

Some of the key features of the Convention are the following:

* Coastal States exercise sovereignty over their territorial sea which they have the right to establish its breadth up to
a limit not to exceed 12 nautical miles; foreign vessels are allowed "innocent passage" through those waters;
* Ships and aircraft of all countries are allowed "transit passage" through straits used for international navigation;
States bordering the straits can regulate navigational and other aspects of passage;
* Archipelagic States, made up of a group or groups of closely related islands and interconnecting waters, have
sovereignty over a sea area enclosed by straight lines drawn between the outermost points of the islands; the waters
between the islands are declared archipelagic waters where States may establish sea lanes and air routes in which all
other States enjoy the right of archipelagic passage through such designated sea lanes;
* Coastal States have sovereign rights in a 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) with respect to natural
resources and certain economic activities, and exercise jurisdiction over marine science research and environmental
protection;
* All other States have freedom of navigation and overflight in the EEZ, as well as freedom to lay submarine cables
and pipelines;
* Land-locked and geographically disadvantaged States have the right to participate on an equitable basis in
exploitation of an appropriate part of the surplus of the living resources of the EEZ's of coastal States of the same
region or sub-region; highly migratory species of fish and marine mammals are accorded special protection;
* Coastal States have sovereign rights over the continental shelf (the national area of the seabed) for exploring and
exploiting it; the shelf can extend at least 200 nautical miles from the shore, and more under specified
circumstances;
* Coastal States share with the international community part of the revenue derived from exploiting resources from
any part of their shelf beyond 200 miles;
* The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf shall make recommendations to States on the shelf's outer
boundaries when it extends beyond 200 miles;
* All States enjoy the traditional freedoms of navigation, overflight, scientific research and fishing on the high seas;
they are obliged to adopt, or cooperate with other States in adopting, measures to manage and conserve living
resources;
* The limits of the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of islands are determined in
accordance with rules applicable to land territory, but rocks which could not sustain human habitation or economic
life of their own would have no economic zone or continental shelf;
* States bordering enclosed or semi-enclosed seas are expected to cooperate in managing living resources,
environmental and research policies and activities;
* Land-locked States have the right of access to and from the sea and enjoy freedom of transit through the territory
of transit States;
* States are bound to prevent and control marine pollution and are liable for damage caused by violation of their
international obligations to combat such pollution;
* All marine scientific research in the EEZ and on the continental shelf is subject to the consent of the coastal State,
but in most cases they are obliged to grant consent to other States when the research is to be conducted for peaceful
purposes and fulfils specified criteria;
* States are bound to promote the development and transfer of marine technology "on fair and reasonable terms and
conditions", with proper regard for all legitimate interests;
* States Parties are obliged to settle by peaceful means their disputes concerning the interpretation or application of
the Convention;
* Disputes can be submitted to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea established under the Convention,
to the International Court of Justice, or to arbitration. Conciliation is also available and, in certain circumstances,
submission to it would be compulsory. The Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction over deep seabed mining disputes.

Raegan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

30 SCRA 968 (1969)

Facts: The petitioner William Raegan a citizen and an employee of United States assigned in the Philippines was
charged by respondent commissioner of internal revenue for income tax on an amount realized by him on sale of his
automobile to William Johnsons as shown with the bill in Pampanga, on the same date William Johnsons sold the
car to friend Meneses evidence by a deed of sale executed in manila. Petitioner dispute that the power to tax cannot
be imposed as the sale as made outside the Philippine territory and the state has no jurisdiction over the place.
Issue: Whether or not the said income tax was legally collected by respondent.

Ruling: The court held that the Philippines being an independent and sovereign can exercise its power over its
territorial domain. The court of tax appeal found nothing objectionable in the assessment and payment of income
tax. Thus, the action of the state to collect taxes is an act of sovereignty over its territory and the commission shall
not affirm the requested refund of the petitioner.
People v. Gozo
30 SCRA 476 (1973)

Facts: Loreta Gozo questioning the validity and applicability of the Municipal Ordinance No. 14, Series of 1964 of
Olongapo, Zambales, convicting her of a violation of a requiring a permit from the municipal mayor for the
construction or erection of a building, as well as any modification, alteration, repair or demolition thereof. She
contended that her house was constructed within the naval base leased to the American armed forces located inside
the United States Naval Reservation within the territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City and therefore shall be
exempted from the Municipal Ordinance No. 14. Series of 1964.

Issue: Whether or not the Municipal Ordinance No. 14 series of 1964 shall be enforceable within the US Naval
base.
Ruling: Yes. The administrative jurisdiction of a municipal law, within the limits of its territory, whatever statutory
powers are vested upon it may be valid exercised. Any residual authority and therein conferred, whether expressly or
implied, belongs to the national government, not the alien country. Thus, the Municipal Ordinance valid and
applicable to exercise within the naval base.

Magallona v. Ermita
655 SCRA 476 (2011)

Facts: In March 2009, R.A. 9522 was enacted by the Congress to comply with the terms of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which the Philippines ratified on February 27, 1984. Professor
Merlin Magallona et al questioned the validity of RA 9522 as they contend, among others, that the law decreased the
national territory of the Philippines. Some of their particular arguments are as follows:
1. RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine states sovereign
power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution, embodying the terms of the Treaty of Paris and
ancillary treaties.
2. RA 9522 opens the countrys waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and
aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the countrys nuclear-free
policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions.
3. RA 9522s treatmentof the KIG as regime of islands not only results in the loss of a large maritime area
but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.
Hence, petitioners files action for the writs of certiorari and prohibition assails the constitutionality of Republic Act
No. 95221 (RA 9522) adjusting the countrys archipelagic baselines and classifying the baseline regime of nearby
territories.

Issues: Whether or not RA 9522, the amendatory Philippine Baseline Law is unconstitutional.

Ruling: No. Because according to the Supreme Court state that RA 9522, or UNCLOS, itself is not intended to gain,
or lose, territory. The treaty and the baseline law has nothing to do with the acquisition, enlargement, or diminution
of the Philippine territory and therefore declared that RA 9522 is not unconstitutional. The law did not decrease the
demarcation of our territory. In fact it increased it. Under the old law amended by RA 9522 (RA 3046), we adhered
with the rectangular lines enclosing the Philippines. The area that it covered was 440,994 square nautical miles (sq.
na. mi.). But under 9522, and with the inclusion of the exclusive economic zone, the extent of our maritime was
increased to 586,210 sq. na. mi. If any, the baselines law is a notice to the international community of the scope of
the maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights.

WEEK 2

ARTICLE II
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

Legal Value of Article II

The Declaration of Principles and States Policies is a statement of the basic ideological principles and policies that
underlie the Constitution. As such, the provisions shed light on the meaning of the other provisions of the
Constitution and they are a guide for all departments of the government in the implementation of the Constitution.

TONDO MEDICAL v. CA
527 SCRA 746 2007)
Facts: On November 26, 2004, the Court of Appeals was denying a petition for nullification of the Health Sector
Reform Agenda (HSRA) Philippines 1999-2004 of the Department of Health (DOH); and Executive Order No.
1102, Redirectiong the Functions and Operations of the Department of Health which was issued by then President
Joseph Ejercito Estrada on May 24, 1999. Executive Order No. 102 was enacted pursuant to Section 17 of the Local
Government Code (republic Act no. 7160), which provided for the devolution to the local government units of basic
services and facilities as well as specific health-related functions and responsibilities.
Issue: Whether or not the HSRA and EO NO.102 was unconstitutional.

Held: No. The HSRA cannot be nullified based solely on petitioners bare allegations that it violates the general
principles expressed in the non self-executing provisions they cite herein. There are two reasons for denying a cause
of action to an alleged infringement of broad constitutional principles: basic considerations of due process and the
limitations of judicial power. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals decreed that the President was empowered to issue
Executive Order No. 102, in accordance with Section 17 Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. It also declared that
the DOH did not implement EO No. 102 in bad faith or with grave abuse of discretion. In view of the foregoing, the
instant Petition is DENIED. The Court AFFIRMED the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on
26 November 2004, declaring both HSRA and Executive Order No. 102 as valid and constitutional.

PRINCIPLES

Section 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them.

Functions of the Government

a. Constituent. These are compulsory functions which constitute the very bonds of society. For example, the
keeping of order and providing for the protection of persons and property from violence and robbery, or the
fixing of the legal relations between man and wife and between parents and children are obligatory or
constituent functions of government.
b. Ministrant. These are optional functions of government. The principles for determining whether or not a
government shall exercise certain of these optional actions are: (1) that a government should do for the
public welfare those things which private capital would not naturally undertake and (2) that a government
should do those things which by its very nature is better equipped to administer for the public welfare than
is any private individual or group of individuals.

BACANI v. NACOCO
G.R. No. L-6957, November 29, 1956

Facts: Herein petitioners are stenographers in Branch VI of the CIF Manila.In a pending civil case where the public
respondents are involved, they requested for the services of the stenographers and thereby paid them for the said
transcript at the rate of P1 per page, amounting to P714 in total.However, upon inspecting the books of the
corporation, the Auditor General disallowed the payment of such fees and sought for the recovery of the amounts
paid. Consequently, the AG required the petitioners to reimburse the amounts invoking that the National Coconut
Corporation is a government entity within the purview of section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917
which states that: The Government of the Philippine Islands is a term which refers to the corporate governmental
entity through which the functions of government are exercised throughout the Philippine Islands, including, save as
the contrary appears from the context, the various arms through which political authority is made effective in said
Islands, whether pertaining to the central Government or to the provincial or municipal branches or other form of
local government., hence, exempted from the payment of the fees in question.
Issue: Whether the NCC is a government entity and is exempted from the payments in question?

Ruling: The Court held No. Discussing, there are two-fold functions of the government namely: constituent and
ministrant. The constituent function refers to the bonds of society and are compulsory in nature, while ministrant is
more on public welfare like public works, education, charity, health and safety. From such, we may infer that there
are functions which our government is required to exercise to promote its objectives as expressed in our Constitution
and which are exercised by it as an attribute of sovereignty, and those which it may exercise to promote merely the
welfare, progress and prosperity of the people.

The NCC has that function because the corporation promotes certain aspects of the economic life of the people. In
short, NCC belongs to what we call the government-owned and controlled corporation which is governed by
Corporation Law.

Albeit the NCC performs governmental functions for the peoples welfare, however, it was given a corporate power
separate and distinct from our government, for it was made subject to the provisions of our Corporation Law in so
far as its corporate existence and the powers that it may exercise are concerned.

To recapitulate, we may mention that the term Government of the Republic of the Philippines used in section 2 of
the Revised Administrative Code refers only to that government entity through which the functions of the
government are exercised as an attribute of sovereignty, and in this are included those arms through which political
authority is made effective whether they be provincial, municipal or other form of local government.

ACCFA v. CUGCO
30 SCRA 649 (1969)

FACTS: ACCFA was a government agency created under RA No. 821, as amended. Its administrative machinery
was reorganized and its named changed to Agricultural Credit Administration under the Land Reform Code or RA
3844. ACCFA Supervisors' Association and the ACCFA Workers' Association were referred to as Union in the
ACCFA.
The Unions and ACCFA entered into a collective bargaining agreement effective for a period of one year. Few
months have passed, however,The Unions, together with the CUGCO, filed a complaint against the ACCFA for
having allegedly committed acts of unfair labor practices and non implementation of said agreement. Court of
Industrial Relations ordered ACCFA to cease from committing further acts tending to discourage the Union
members in the exercise of their right to self-organizatoin, to comply with and implement the provisions of the
CBA, and to bargain with good faith with the complainants. ACCFA moved to reconsider but it was turned down in
a resolution. ACCFA appealed by certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not ACCFA exercised governmental functions.

HELD:Yes. The implementation of the land reform program of the government according to Republic Act No. 3844
is most certainly a governmental, not a proprietary, function; and for that purpose Executive Order No. 75 has placed
the ACA under the Land Reform Project Administration.
The law itself declares that the ACA is a government office, with the formulation of policies, plans and programs
vested no longer in a Board of Governors, as in the case of the ACCFA, but in the National Land Reform Council,
itself a government instrumentality; and that its personnel are subject to Civil Service laws and to rules of
standardization with respect to positions and salaries, any vestige of doubt as to the governmental character of its
functions disappears.

PVTA v. CIR
65 SCRA 416 (1975)

Facts: Private respondents alleged their employment relationship, the overtime services in excess ofthe regular eight
hours a day rendered by them, and the failure to pay them overtime compensation inaccordance with
Commonwealth Act No. 444. Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration denied theallegations and raising the
special defenses of lack of a cause of action and lack of jurisdiction. Therespondent Court issued an order sustaining
the claims of private respondents for overtime services anddirecting petitioner to pay the same, minus what it had
already paid. There was a motion forreconsideration but it was denied by the respondent Court. Petitioner Philippine
Virginia TobaccoAdministration contends that it is beyond the jurisdiction of respondent Court as it is
exercisinggovernmental functions and that it is exempt from the operation of Commonwealth Act No. 444.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner discharges governmental and not proprietary functions.
Held: Yes, the Petitioner discharges governmental and not proprietary functions.The Supreme Court ruled that a
reference to the enactments creating Petitioner Corporationsuffices to demonstrate the merit of petitioners plea that
it performs governmental and not proprietaryfunctions. Under Republic Act No. 2265, its purposes and objectives
are: "(a) To promote the effectivemerchandising of Virginia tobacco in the domestic and foreign markets so that
those engaged in theindustry will be placed on a basis of economic security; (b) To establish and maintain
balancedproduction and consumption of Virginia tobacco and its manufactured products, and such
marketingconditions as will insure and stabilize the price of a level sufficient to cover the cost of production
plusreasonable profit both in the local as well as in the foreign market; (c) To create, establish, maintain, andoperate
processing, warehousing and marketing facilities in suitable centers and supervise the sellingand buying of Virginia
tobacco so that the farmers will enjoy reasonable prices that secure a fair returnof their investments; (d) To prescribe
rules and regulations governing the grading, classifying, andinspecting of Virginia tobacco; and (e) To improve the
living and economic conditions of the peopleengaged in the tobacco industry.
PHHC v. Court of Industrial Relations
150 SCRA 296

Facts:The PHHC seeks a reversal of the Resolution of the CIR en banc in ordering them to pay private respondents
wage differential for work. The Philippine government and World Food Program (WFP) entered into an agreement
in a plan for the SapangPalay resettlement area in the PHHC proposing a self-help project to be undertaken by the
squatter families for the construction of two dams. The undertaking is for the purpose of water irrigation to be used
for additional food production. In recruiting participants to the program, the WFP issued an application form
mentioning the voluntary nature of the work to be rendered. The participants were assigned to work on canals and
roads; however, the projects agreed between the PHHC and WFP were never fully implemented. They were ordered
to accomplish a time sheet which is the basis for the payment of 50 centavos/day and a weekly food ration. They
were also provided with work tools and assigned a work supervisor to manage and administer the SapangPalay
project in which the latter also conducted ocular inspection in the area. However, the participants went to the
Department of Labor complaining about their work and compensation which Secretary Ople suggest that the
workers in the said project must be paid in minimum wage law. After that, petitioner suspended work and the
workers assert their minimum wage and the 50 centavos be paid to them. The petitioner answered before the CIR
that they were exercising governmental functions and that they did not hire private respondents and CIR had no
jurisdiction over them. The Court dismissed the action of the petitioner since there was no evidence that private
respondents rendered overtime work. The petitioner moved to reconsider before the CIR but denied the claims.
Thus, they elevated the case to the Supreme Court.

Issue:WON the CIR has jurisdiction over PHHC, a government owned and/or controlled corporation performing
governmental function.

Held: The Court ruled that the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction over labor disputes involving GOCC but not
the performing governmental functions. Since the National Housing Association was created, the Philippine
government has carried mass housing and resettlement program to meet the needs of Filipinos. The PHHC is
governmental institution performing governmental functions. Thus, the Court grant the petition and set aside the
assailed resolution of the Court of CIR.

Spouses Fontanilla v. Hon. Maliaman

GR Nos. 55963 February 27, 1991
(Constitutional Law Government Agency, Proprietary Functions)

FACTS: Regular Employee of National Irrigation Administration (NIA), a government agency involved in an
accident that resulted to the death of the son of Spouses Fontanilla. NIA was held liable for damages caused by the
fault and/or negligence of the driver of the its agency. NIA maintains that it is not liable for the act of its driver
because the former does not perform primarily proprietorship functions but governmental functions.
ISSUE: Whether or not NIA may be held liable for damages caused by its driver.
HELD: Yes. NIA being a corporate entity and having distinct and separate corporate personality is liable for acts of
its employee even if it proved the diligence and supervision but in this case, the latter has not been established herein
and because its community services are only incidental functions to the principal aim which is irrigation of lands,
thus, making it an agency with proprietary functions governed by Corporation Law and is liable for actions of their
employees.

VFP v. Reyes
483 SCRA 526 (2006)

Facts: Petitioner Veterans Federation of the Philippines (VFP) is a corporate bodyorganized under Republic Act No.
2640. Sometime in August 2002, petitioner received a letter from Undersecretary of the Department of National Def
ense(DND) to conduct Management Audit of VFP pursuant to RA 2640, where it statedthat VFP is under the supervi
sion and control of the Secretary of National Defense.Petitioner complained about the broadness of audit and request
ed suspension untilissues are threshed out, which was subsequently denied by DND. As a result, petitioner sought rel
ief under Rule 65 assailing that it is a private non-governmentcorporation

.Issue: Whether or not veterans federation created by law is a public office,considering that it does not possess a por
tion of the sovereign functions of thegovernment and considering fur3ther that, it has no budgetary appropriation fro
mDBM and that its funds come from membership dues.

Ruling: Yes, petitioner is a public corporation. In Laurel v. Desierto, public officeis defined as the right, authority an
d duty, created and conferred by law, by which,for a given period, is invested with some portion of the sovereign fun
ctions of thegovernment, to be exercised for the benefit of the public.In the instant case, the functions of VFP
the protection of the interests of war veterans which promotes social justice and reward patriotism
certainly fallwithin the category of sovereign functions. The fact that VFP has no budgetaryappropriation is only a p
roduct of erroneous application of the law by publicofficers in the DBM which will not bar subsequent correct appli
cation.Hence, placing it under the control and supervision of DND is proper.

Ramiscal v. Sandiganbayan
499 SCRA 375 (2006)

Facts:Jose S. Ramiscal Jr., Julian Alzaga, Manuel Satuito, Elizabeth Liang and Jesus Garcia were charged with
Malversation through Falsification of Public Documents before the Sandiganbayan. The Information alleged that
Ramiscal, et. al. misappropriated and converted the amount of P250,318,200.00 for their personal use from the funds
of AFP-RSBS. Ramiscal filed with the Sandiganbayan an Urgent Motion to Declare Nullity of Information and to
Defer Issuance of Warrant of Arrest. He argued, that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the case because
the AFP-RSBS is a private entity. The said Urgent Motion was later adopted by Alzaga and Satuito. The Urgent
Motion was denied by the Sandiganbayan. Ramiscal, et. al. filed a Motion for Reconsideration. In a Resolution
issued, the Sandiganbayan sustained Ramiscal, et. al.s contention that the AFP-RSBS is a private entity. Hence, it
reconsidered its earlier Resolution and ordered the dismissal of their criminal case. Upon denial of its Motion for
Reconsideration, the prosecution filed the present special civil action for certiorari with the Supreme Court.

Issue:Whether or not the AFP-RSBS is not a government entity.

Held:No, the AFP-RSBS is a government entity. It was created by Presidential Decree 361. Its purpose and
functions are akin to those of the GSIS and the SSS, as in fact it is the system that manages the retirement and
pension funds of those in the military service. Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine
National Police are expressly excluded from the coverage of The GSIS Act of 1997. Therefore, soldiers and military
personnel, who are incidentally employees of the Government, rely on the administration of the AFP-RSBS for their
retirement, pension and separation benefits. Its enabling law further mandates that the System shall be administered
by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines through an agency, group, committee or board, which
may be created and organized by him and subject to such rules and regulations governing the same as he may,
subject to the approval of the Secretary of National Defense, promulgate from time to time. Moreover, the
investment of funds of the System shall be decided by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines with
the approval of the Secretary of National Defense. The funds of the AFP-RSBS, except for the initial seed money,
come entirely from contributions and that no part thereof come from appropriations. While it may be true that there
have been no appropriations for the contribution of funds to the AFP-RSBS, the Government is not precluded from
later on adding to the funds in order to provide additional benefits to them. The above considerations indicate that
the character and operations of the AFP-RSBS are imbued with public interest. As such, we hold that the same is a
government entity and its funds are in the nature of public funds.

Alzaga v. Sandiganbayan (2nd division)

October 27, 2006 (505 SCRA 848)

FACTS:October 7, 1999, there was a case filed against the petitioners regarding alleged irregularities which
attended the purchase of four lots in Tanauan, Batangas by the AFP-RSBS. Being vice presidents and assistant vice
president of the AFP-RSBS, the petitioners claim that they are not under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan since
AFP-RSB is a private entity.

ISSUE:(1) WON AFP-RSBS is a government entity.

(2) WON the petitioners are under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

HELD:(1) Yes. Considering that the character and operations of the AFP-RSBS are imbued with public interest and
its fund are in the nature of public fund, it is indeed a government entity.
(2) Yes. The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over presidents, directors, trustees, or managers of GOCCs,
state universities, or educational institutions or foundations. The positions of the petitioners being vice president
and assistant vice president are not specifically enumerated in RA 8249 but it is clearly higher than managers. Thus,
considering them under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Javier v. Sandiganbayan
G. R. Nos. 147026-27, September 11, 2009
Del Castillo, J.

Facts: Petitioner Carolina R. Javier petitioned for certiorari before the Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court in
Criminal Case Nos. 25867 and 25898, entitled "People of the Philippines, Plaintiff versus Carolina R. Javier,
Accused," seeking to nullify respondent Sandiganbayan's: (1) Order which denied her Motion to Quash Information;
(2) Resolution which denied her Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Quash Information; and (3) Order
declaring that a motion for reconsideration would be superflous as the issues are fairly simple and straightforward.
On June 7, 1995, RA No. 8047, or otherwise known as the "Book Publishing Industry Development Act," was
enacted into law. On September 29, 1997, petitioner was issued by the Office of the President a travel authority to
attend the Madrid International Book Fair in Spain on October 8-12, 1997. Based on her itinerary of travel, she was
paid P139,199.00 as her travelling expenses. Unfortunately, the petitioner was not able to attend the scheduled
internatonal book fair.
Resident Auditor Rosario T. Martin advised petitioner to immediately return/refund her cash advance considering
that her trip was canceled. Petitioner, however, failed to do so. Commission on Audit charged petitioner with
Malversation of Public Funds, as defined and penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, for not
liquidating the cash advance granted to her in connection with her supposed trip to Spain. On January 17, 2001, the
Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution27 denying petitioners motion with the following disquisition:
The accused is under the jurisdiction of this Court because Sec. 4 (g) of P.D. 1606 as amended so provides,
thus:
Sec. 4.Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:
x xxx
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations,
state universities or educational institutions or foundations;
x xxx
 The offense is office-related because the money for her travel abroad was given to her because of her
Directorship in the National Book Development Board. Furthermore, there are also allegations to hold the accused
liable under Article 222 of the Revised Penal Code which reads:
Art. 222. Officers included in the preceding provisions. The provisions of this chapter shall apply to
private individuals who, in any capacity whatever, have charge of any insular, provincial or municipal funds,
revenues, or property and to any administrator or depository of funds or property attached , seized or deposited by
public authority, even if such property belongs to a private individual.
Where, as in this case, petitioner performs public functions in pursuance of the objectives of R.A. No.
8047, verily, she is a public officer who takes part in the performance of public functions in the government whether
as an employee, agent, subordinate official, of any rank or classes. In fact, during her tenure, petitioner took part in
the drafting and promulgation of several rules and regulations implementing R.A. No. 8047. She was supposed to
represent the country in the canceled book fair in Spain. In fine, the Court hold that petitioner is a public officer. The
next question for the Court to resolve is whether, as a public officer, petitioner is within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
Presently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or
more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent,
acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as
Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 989 (Republic Act No. 6758),
specifically including:
x xxx
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "Grade '27'" and up under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "Grade '27'" and higher under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989.
x xxx

Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess
of jurisdiction.

Ruling: In view of the foregoing, the court hold that the present petition does not fall under the exceptions wherein
the remedy of certiorari may be resorted to after the denial of one's motion to quash the information. And even
assuming that petitioner may avail of such remedy, the Court still hold that the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED. The questioned Resolutions and Order of the Sandiganbayan
are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

PHILIPPINE SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS vs. COA

G.R. No. 169752 September 25, 2007

FACTS:The petitioner was incorporated as a juridical entity over one hundred years ago by virtue of Act No. 1285,
enacted on January 19, 1905, by the Philippine Commission. The petitioner, at the time it was created, was
composed of animal aficionados and animal propagandists. The objects of the petitioner, as stated in Section 2 of its
charter, shall be to enforce laws relating to cruelty inflicted upon animals or the protection of animals in the
Philippine Islands, and generally, to do and perform all things which may tend in any way to alleviate the suffering
of animals and promote their welfare.
At the time of the enactment of Act No. 1285, the original Corporation Law, Act No. 1459, was not yet in existence.
Act No. 1285 antedated both the Corporation Law and the constitution of the SEC.
For the purpose of enhancing its powers in promoting animal welfare and enforcing laws for the protection of
animals, the petitioner was initially imbued under its charter with the power to apprehend violators of animal
welfare laws. In addition, the petitioner was to share 1/2 of the fines imposed and collected through its efforts for
violations of the laws related thereto.
Subsequently, however, the power to make arrests as well as the privilege to retain a portion of the fines collected
for violation of animal-related laws were recalled by virtue of C.A. No. 148. Whereas, the cruel treatment of animals
is now an offense against the State, penalized under our statutes, which the Government is duty bound to enforce;
When the COA was to perform an audit on them they refuse to do so, by the reason that they are a private entity and
not under the said commission. It argued that COA covers only government entities. On the other hand the COA
decided that it is a government entity.

ISSUE: WON the said petitioner is a private entity.

RULING:YES. First, the Court agrees with the petitioner that the charter test cannot be applied. Essentially, the
charter test provides that the test to determine whether a corporation is government owned or controlled, or private
in nature is simple. Is it created by its own charter for the exercise of a public function, or by incorporation under the
general corporation law? Those with special charters are government corporations subject to its provisions, and its
employees are under the jurisdiction of the CSC, and are compulsory members of the GSIS.
And since the charter test had been introduced by the 1935 Constitution and not earlier, it follows that the test
cannot apply to the petitioner, which was incorporated by virtue of Act No. 1285, enacted on January 19, 1905.
Settled is the rule that laws in general have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. All statutes are to
be construed as having only a prospective operation, unless the purpose and intention of the legislature to give them
a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used. In case of doubt, the
doubt must be resolved against the retrospective effect.
Second, a reading of petitioners charter shows that it is not subject to control or supervision by any agency of
the State, unlike GOCCs. No government representative sits on the board of trustees of the petitioner. Like all
private corporations, the successors of its members are determined voluntarily and solely by the petitioner in
accordance with its by-laws, and may exercise those powers generally accorded to private corporations, such as the
powers to hold property, to sue and be sued, to use a common seal, and so forth. It may adopt by-laws for its
internal operations: the petitioner shall be managed or operated by its officers in accordance with its by-laws in
force.
Third. The employees of the petitioner are registered and covered by the SSS at the latters initiative, and not
through the GSIS, which should be the case if the employees are considered government employees. This is another
indication of petitioners nature as a private entity.
Fourth. The respondents contend that the petitioner is a body politic because its primary purpose is to secure
the protection and welfare of animals which, in turn, redounds to the public good. This argument, is not tenable. The
fact that a certain juridical entity is impressed with public interest does not, by that circumstance alone, make the
entity a public corporation, inasmuch as a corporation may be private although its charter contains provisions of a
public character, incorporated solely for the public good. This class of corporations may be considered quasi-public
corporations, which are private corporations that render public service, supply public wants, or pursue other
eleemosynary objectives. While purposely organized for the gain or benefit of its members, they are required by law
to discharge functions for the public benefit. Examples of these corporations are utility, railroad, warehouse,
telegraph, telephone, water supply corporations and transportation companies. It must be stressed that a quasi-
public corporation is a species of private corporations, but the qualifying factor is the type of service the former
renders to the public: if it performs a public service, then it becomes a quasi-public corporation.
Authorities are of the view that the purpose alone of the corporation cannot be taken as a safe guide, for the fact is
that almost all corporations are nowadays created to promote the interest, good, or convenience of the public. A
bank, for example, is a private corporation; yet, it is created for a public benefit. Private schools and universities are
likewise private corporations; and yet, they are rendering public service. Private hospitals and wards are charged
with heavy social responsibilities. More so with all common carriers. On the other hand, there may exist a public
corporation even if it is endowed with gifts or donations from private individuals.
The true criterion, therefore, to determine whether a corporation is public or private is found in the totality of the
relation of the corporation to the State. If the corporation is created by the State as the latters own agency or
instrumentality to help it in carrying out its governmental functions, then that corporation is considered public;
otherwise, it is private. Applying the above test, provinces, chartered cities, and barangays can best exemplify
public corporations. They are created by the State as its own device and agency for the accomplishment of parts of
its own public works.
Fifth. The respondents argue that since the charter of the petitioner requires the latter to render periodic reports
to the Civil Governor, whose functions have been inherited by the President, the petitioner is, therefore, a
government instrumentality.
This contention is inconclusive. By virtue of the fiction that all corporations owe their very existence and
powers to the State, the reportorial requirement is applicable to all corporations of whatever nature, whether they are
public, quasi-public, or private corporationsas creatures of the State, there is a reserved right in the legislature to
investigate the activities of a corporation to determine whether it acted within its powers. In other words, the
reportorial requirement is the principal means by which the State may see to it that its creature acted according to the
powers and functions conferred upon it.

Serana vs Sandiganbayan
GR 162059, January 22, 2008

Facts: Accused movant charged for the crime of estafa is a government scholar and a student regent of the
University of the Phillipines, Diliman, Quezon City. While in the performance of her official functions, she
represented to former President Estrada that the renovation of the Vinzons Hall of the UP will be renovated and
renamed as Pres. Joseph Ejercito Estrada Student Hall and for which purpose accused requested the amount of
P15,000,000.00.Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over her person because as a UP
student regent, she was not a public officer due to the following: 1.) that being merely a member in representation of
the student body since she merely represented her peers; 2.) that she was a simple student and did not receive any
salary as a UP student regent; and 3.) she does not fall under Salary Grade 27.
The Ombudsman contends that petitioner, as a member of the BOR is a public officer, since she had the general
powers of administration and exercise the corporate powers of UP. Compensation is not an essential part of public
office.Moreover, the Charter of the University of the Philippines reveals that the Board of Regents, to which
accused-movant belongs, exclusively exercises the general powers of administration and corporate powers in the
university. It is well-established in corporation law that the corporation can act only through its board of directors, or
board of trustees in the case of non-stock corporations.

Issue: WON a government scholar and UP student regent is a public officer.

Held: Yes. First, Public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which for a given
period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some
portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercise by him for the benefit of the public. The
individual so invested is a public officer. (Laurel vs Desierto) Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the
public office. An investment in an individual of some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be
exercised by him for the benefit of the public makes one a public officer. Second, Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No.
1606 explicitly vest the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. Hence, it
is not only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out,
the BOR performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a non-stock corporation. By express mandate
of law, petitioner is a public officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606 the statute defining the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
Third, it is well established that compensation is not an essential element of public office. At most, it is merely
incidental to the public office. Hence, Petitioner is a public officer by express mandate of P.D.No. 1606 and
jurisprudence.

De Jure and De Facto Government

a. De Jure. A government established by authority of the legitimate sovereign.

b. De Facto. A government established in defiance of the legitimate sovereign.

Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh

75 Phil 113 (1945)

Facts:Petitioner Co Kim Cham had a pending Civil Case with the Court of First Instance of Manila initiated during
the time of the Japanese occupation.
The respondent judge, Judge Arsenio Dizon, refused to continue hearings on the case which were initiated during the
Japanese military occupation on the ground that the proclamation issued by General MacArthur that all laws,
regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null
and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control had the effect of
invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgments of the court of the Philippines during the Japanese
military occupation, and that the lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial
proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines in the absence of an enabling law
granting such authority.
Respondent, additionally contends that the government established during the Japanese occupation were no de facto
government.
Issues:Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation issued by General MacArthur declaring that all laws,
regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null
and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control has invalidated
all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts.
Rulings: The phrase processes of any other government is broad and may refer not only to the judicial processes,
but also to administrative or legislative, as well as constitutional, processes of the Republic of the Philippines or
other governmental agencies established in the Islands during the Japanese occupation. Taking into consideration the
fact that, as above indicated, according to the well-known principles of international law all judgements and judicial
proceedings, which are not of a political complexion, of the de facto governments during the Japanese military
occupation were good and valid before and remained so after the occupied territory had come again into the power
of the titular sovereign, it should be presumed that it was not, and could not have been, the intention of General
Douglas MacArthur, in using the phrase processes of any other government in said proclamation, to refer to
judicial processes, in violation of said principles of international law.

In Re Letter of Associate Puno

210 SCRA 588

Facts:The petitioner, Reynato S. Puno, was first appointed as Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals on 1980.On
1983, the Court of Appeals was reorganized and became the Intermediate Appellate Court pursuant to BP Blg.
129.On 1984, petitioner was appointed to be Deputy Minister of Justice in the Ministry of Justice. Thus, he ceased to
be a member of the Judiciary.After February 1986 EDSA Revolution, there was a reorganization of the entire
government, including the Judiciary.A Screening Committee for the reorganization of the Intermediate Appelate
Court and lower courts recommended the return of petitioner as Associate Justice of the new court of Appeals and
assigned him the rank of number 11 in the roster of appellate court justices.When the appointments were signed by
Pres. Aquino, petitioner's seniority ranking changes from number 11 to 26. Then, petitioner alleged that the change
in seniority ranking was due to "inadvertence" of the President, otherwise, it would run counter to the provisions of
Section 2 of E.O. No. 33.Petitioner Justice Reynato S. Puno wrote a letter to the Court seeking the correction of his
seniority ranking in the Court of Appeals.The Court en banc granted Justice Puno's request.A motion for
reconsideration was later filed by Associate Justices Campos Jr. and Javellana who are affected by the ordered
correction.They alleged that petitioner could not claim reappointment because the courts where he had previously
been appointed ceased to exist at the date of his last appointment.

Issue: Whether or not the present Court of Appeals is merely a continuation of the old Court of Appeals and
Intermediate Appellate Court existing before the promulgation of E.O. No. 33.

Held: The Court held that the Court of Appeals and Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to E.O. No. 33
phased out as part of the legal system abolished by the 1987 Revolution. The Court of Appeals that was established
under E.O. No. 33 is considered as an entirely new court.

The present Court of Appeals is a new entity, different and distinct from the courts existing before E.O. No. 33. It
was created in the wake of the massive reorganization launched by the revolutionary government of Corazon Aquino
in the aftermath of the people power in 1986.

Revolution is defined as "the complete overthrow of the established government in any country or state by those
who were previously subject to it." or "as sudden. radical and fundamental change in the government or political
system, usually effected with violence or at least some acts of violence."

Republic v. Sandiganbayan
 GR No. 104768, July 21, 2003

Facts:Two sets of board and officers of Eastern Telecommunications, Philippines, Inc. (ETPI) were elected, one by
the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) and the other by the registered ETPI
stockholders.Victor Africa, a stockholder of ETPI filed a petition for Certiorari before the Sandiganbayan alleging
that the PCGG had been illegally exercising the rights of stockholders of ETPI, in the election of the members of
the board of directors. The Sandiganbayan ruled that only the registered owners, their duly authorizedrepresentatives
or their proxies may vote their corresponding shares. The PCGG filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and
prohibition before the Court which was granted. The Court referred the PCGGs petition to hold the special
stockholders meeting to the Sandiganbayan for reception of evidence and resolution. The Sandiganbayan granted
the PCGG authority to cause the holding of a special stockholders meeting of ETPI and held that there was an
urgent necessity to increase ETPIs authorized capital stock; there existed a prima facie factual foundation for the
issuance of the writ of sequestration covering the Class A shares of stock; and the PCGG was entitled to vote the
sequestered shares of stock. The PCGG-controlled ETPI board of directors held a meeting and the increase in
ETPIs authorized capital stock from P250 Million to P2.6 Billion was unanimously approved. Africa filed a
motion to nullify the stockholders meeting, contending that only the Court, and not the Sandiganbayan, has the
power to authorize the PCGG to call a stockholders meeting and vote the sequestered shares. The Sandiganbayan
denied the motions for reconsideration of prompting Africa to file before the Court a second petition, challenging the
Sandiganbayan Resolutions authorizing the holding of a stockholders meeting and the one denying the motion for
reconsideration.

ISSUES:Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in ordering the holding of a stockholders
meeting to elect the ETPI board of directors without first setting in place, through the amendment of the articles of
incorporation and the by-laws of ETPI

HELD:On the PCGGs imputation of grave abuse of discretion upon the Sandiganbayan for ordering the holding of
a stockholders meeting to elect the ETPI board of directors without first setting in place, through the amendment of
the articles of incorporation and the by-laws of ETPI, the safeguards prescribed in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Roxas. The
Court laid down those safeguards because of the obvious need to reconcile the rights of the stockholder whose
shares have been sequestered and the duty of the conservator to preserve what could be ill-gotten wealth. There is
nothing in the Cojuangco case that would suggest that the above measures should be incorporated in the articles and
by-laws before a stockholders meeting for the election of the board of directors is held. The PCGG nonetheless
insists that those measures should be written in the articles and by-laws before such meeting, otherwise, the
{Marcos] cronies will elect themselves or their representatives, control the corporation, and for an appreciable
period of time, have every opportunity to disburse funds, destroy or alter corporate records, and dissipate assets.
That could be a possibility, but the peculiar circumstances of the case require that the election of the board of
directors first be held before the articles of incorporation are amended. Section 16 of the Corporation Code requires
the majority vote of the board of directorsto amend the articles of incorporation. At the time Africa filed his motion
for the holding of the annual stockholders meeting, there were two sets of ETPI directors, one controlled by the
PCGG and the other by the registered stockholders. Which of them is the legitimate board of directors? Which of
them may rightfully vote to amend the articles of incorporation and integrate the safeguards laid down in
Cojuangco? It is essential, therefore, to cure the aberration of two boards of directors sitting in a single corporation
before the articles of incorporation are amended to set in place the Cojuangco safeguards. The danger of the so-
called Marcos cronies taking control of the corporation and dissipating its assets is, of course, a legitimate concern
of the PCGG, charged as it is with the duties of a conservator. Nevertheless, such danger may be averted by the
substantially contemporaneous amendment of the articles after the election of the board.

Sovereignty
a. Legal Sovereignty. The supreme power to affect legal interests either by legislative, executive or judicial
action. This is lodged in the people but is normally exercised by state agencies. Stated in terms of auto-
limitations, sovereignty is the property of a state-force due to which it has the exclusive capacity of
legal-determination and self-restriction.
b. Political Sovereignty. The sum of total of all the influences in a state, legal and non-legal, which
determine the course of law.

PEOPLE v. GOZO
G.R. No. L-36409, OCTOBER 26, 1973
 FERNANDO, J.:

FACTS: Appellant, Loreta Gozo bought a house and lot located inside the US Naval Reservation which is within
the territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City. She demolished the said house and erected a new one without necessary
permits as a result of the advices she got from an assistant in the Mayors Office and some neighbors. She was then
charged by the City Engineers Office for violating a municipal ordinance requiring her to secure permits for any
demolition and/or construction within the City. In violation thereof, the lower courts convicted her. Thus, she
appealed and countered that the City of Olongapo cannot exercise their administrative jurisdiction over the said lot
because it is not within Philippine Territory but of the U.S. Naval Base.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Municipal Ordinance is enforceable on a U.S. Naval Base and if is within the Philippine
Territory?
RULING: Yes. The Municipal Ordinance is enforceable on a U.S. Naval Base since the Philippine Government did
not abdicate its sovereignty over the bases and that those bases are still a part of the Philippine territory thus giving
the Philippines jurisdiction over offenses committed therein. Olangapo City therefore, could administer its
administrative jurisdiction for the reason that the Philippines did not abdicate its sovereignty over the bases. In
which, the Court AFFIRMED the appealed decision of November 11, 1969 that the accused, Loreta Gozo is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the Violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 14, series of 1964 sentencing her to pay a fine
of P200.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Moreover, it was modified that she is required to
demolish the house that is the subject matter of the case, given a period of thirty days from the finality of this
decision within which to obtain the required permit. Only upon her failure to do so will that portion of the appealed
decision require demolition to be enforced.

Tanada vs. Angara

272 SCRA 18 (1997)

Facts: Petitioners Tanada et al questioned the constitutionality of the concurrence of the Philippine Senate of the
Presidents ratification of the international agreement establishing The World Trade Organization. They argued
that the WTO agreement violates the mandate of 1987 Constitution to develop a self-reliant and independent
national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos to give preference to qualified Filipinos and to promote
preferential use of Filipino labor domestic materials and locally produced goods.
Issue: Does the 1987 Constitution prohibit our country from participating in World Wide Trade liberalization and
economic globalization?
Ruling: No. The 1987 Constitution does not prohibit our country from participating in World Wide Trade
liberalization and economic liberalization. The court dismissed the petition.

Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice,
freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.

LEOVILLO C. AGUSTIN v. HON. ROMEO F. EDU, et al.

G.R. No. L-49112 (1979)

Facts: This case is a petition assailing the validity or the constitutionality of a Letter of Instruction No. 229, issued
by President Ferdinand E. Marcos, requiring all vehicle owners, users or drivers to procure early warning devices to
be installed a distance away from such vehicle when it stalls or is disabled. In compliance with such letter of
instruction, the Commissioner of the Land Transportation Office issued Administrative Order No. 1 directing the
compliance thereof. The petition alleges that such letter of instruction and subsequent administrative order are
unlawful and unconstitutional as it violates the provisions of commitment to the international law.
Issue:Whether or not the Letter of Instruction No. 229 in part of the treaties is constitutional?
Held: Yes. The hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized by international bodies
concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the United Nations
Organization (U.N.). It cannot be disputed then that this Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses
relevance. "The Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the
land." It is not for this country to repudiate a commitment to which it had pledged its word. The concept of
Pactasuntservanda stands in the way of such an attitude, which is, moreover, at war with the principle of
international morality.
 Jose B.L. Reyes vs Ramon Bagatsing
125 SCRA 553
Political Law Freedom of Speech Primacy of the Constitution over International Law

Facts:Retired Justice JBL Reyes in behalf of the members of the Anti-Bases Coalition sought a permit to rally from
Luneta Park until the front gate of the US embassy which is less than two blocks apart. The permit has been denied
by then Manila mayor Ramon Bagatsing. The mayor claimed that there have been intelligence reports that indicated
that the rally would be infiltrated by lawless elements. He also issued City Ordinance No. 7295 to prohibit the
staging of rallies within the 500 feet radius of the US embassy. Bagatsing pointed out that it was his intention to
provide protection to the US embassy from such lawless elements in pursuant to Art. 22 of the Vienna Convention
on Diplomatic Relations. And that under our constitution we adhere to generally accepted principles of
international law.

ISSUE:Whether or not a treaty may supersede provisions of the Constitution.

HELD: No. Indeed, the receiving state is tasked for the protection of foreign diplomats from any lawless element.
And indeed the Vienna Convention is a restatement of the generally accepted principles of international law. But the
same cannot be invoked as defense to the primacy of the Philippine Constitution which upholds and guarantees the
rights to free speech and peacable assembly. At the same time, the City Ordinance issued by respondent mayor
cannot be invoked if the application thereof would collide with a constitutionally guaranteed rights.

Tanada v. Angara
272 SCRA 18 (1997)

Facts:This is a case petition by Sen. WigbertoTanada, together with other lawmakers, taxpayers, and various NGOs
to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement.
Petitioners believe that this will be detrimental to the growth of our National Economy and against to the Filipino
First policy. The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction
of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new opportunities for the
service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and more investment in the country. These are the
predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators, a free market espoused
by WTO.
Petitioners also contends that it is in conflict with the provisions of our constitution, since the said Agreement is an
assault on the sovereign powers of the Philippines because it meant that Congress could not pass legislation that
would be good for national interest and general welfare if such legislation would not conform to the WTO
Agreement.
ISSUE:Whether or not the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and the
Agreements and Associated Legal Instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that agreement
cited by petitioners directly contravene or undermine the letter, spirit and intent of Section 19, Article II and Sections
10 and 12, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
Rulings:In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the
petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to
have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the
dispute. As explained by former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question
of whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not
only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.

Bayan v. Zamora
Gr 138570, October 10, 2000

Facts: The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America entered into an agreement called the
Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The agreement was treated as a treaty by the Philippine government and was
ratified by then-President Joseph Estrada with the concurrence of 2/3 of the total membership of the Philippine
Senate.
 The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides for the
guidelines to govern such visits, and further defines the rights of the U.S. and the Philippine governments in the
matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials
and supplies.
Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates 25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides that foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty
duly concurred in by the Senate . . . and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.

Issue:Whether or not the VFA unconstitutional?

Ruling: No, the VFA is not unconstitutional. Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities in the country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently met, viz. it must be under a treaty, the treaty
must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast
by the people in a national referendum and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.

There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The concurrence handed by
the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution . . . the provision in
requiring ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum being unnecessary since Congress has
not required it.

This Court is of the firm view that the phrase recognized as a treaty means that the other contracting party accepts
or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require the other contracting state, the United States of America in
this case, to submit the VFA to the United States Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord
strict meaning to the phrase.

Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning
except where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. Its
language should be understood in the sense they have in common use.

Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because,
under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. To be sure, as long as the VFA possesses
the elements of an agreement under international law, the said agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty.

The records reveal that the United States Government, through Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard, has stated that the
United States government has fully committed to living up to the terms of the VFA. For as long as the United States
of America accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself further to comply with its obligations under
the treaty, there is indeed marked compliance with the mandate of the Constitution.

Bayan v. Romulo
GR 159618 February 1, 2011

Facts:Having a key determinative bearing on this case is the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal
Court (ICC) with the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international
concern and shall be complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions. The serious crimes adverted to cover
those considered grave under international law, such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes
of aggression.On December 28, 2000, the RP, through Charge dAffaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome
Statute which, by its terms, is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by the signatory states. As of the
filing of the instant petition, only 92 out of the 139 signatory countries appear to have completed the ratification,
approval and concurrence process. The Philippines is not among the 92.
RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement
On May 9, 2003, then Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone sent US Embassy Note No. 0470 to the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) proposing the terms of the non-surrender bilateral agreement (Agreement,
hereinafter) between the USA and the RP. Via Exchange of Notes No. BFO-028-037 dated May 13, 2003 (E/N
BFO-028-03, hereinafter), the RP, represented by then DFA Secretary Ople, agreed with and accepted the US
proposals embodied under the US Embassy Note adverted to and put in effect the Agreement with the US
government. In esse, the Agreement aims to protect what it refers to and defines as persons of the RP and US from
frivolous and harassment suits that might be brought against them in international tribunals.8 It is reflective of the
increasing pace of the strategic security and defense partnership between the two countries. As of May 2, 2003,
similar bilateral agreements have been effected by and between the US and 33 other countries.
Issue:Whether or not the RP-US NON SURRENDER AGREEMENT is void ab initio for contracting obligations
that are either immoral or otherwise at variance with universally recognized principles of international law.
Ruling: The petition is bereft of merit.
Validity of the RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement
Petitioners initial challenge against the Agreement relates to form, its threshold posture being that E/N BFO-028-03
cannot be a valid medium for concluding the Agreement.
Petitioners contentionperhaps taken unaware of certain well-recognized international doctrines, practices, and
jargonsis untenable. One of these is the doctrine of incorporation, as expressed in Section 2, Article II of the
Constitution, wherein the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law and international
jurisprudence as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, cooperation, and amity with all
nations. An exchange of notes falls into the category of inter-governmental agreements, which is an internationally
accepted form of international agreement.

Equal Standing of International Law and Municipal Law

Lim v. Executive Secretary

GR 151445 April 11, 2002

FACTS: Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) signed in 1999, personnel from the armed forces of the
United States of America started arriving in Mindanao to take partin "Balikatan 02-1 on January 2002. The
Balikatan 02-1 exercises involves the simulation of joint military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty,
a bilateral defense agreement entered into by the Philippines and the United States in 1951. The exercise is rooted
from the international anti-terrorism campaign declared by President George W. Bush in reaction to the 3
commercial aircrafts hijacking that smashed into twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City and the
Pentagon building in Washington, D.C. allegedly by the al-Qaeda headed by the Osama bin Laden that occurred on
September 11, 2001. Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition attacking the constitutionality of the joint exercise. PartylistsSanlakas and Partido Ng
Manggagawaas residents of Zamboanga and Sulu directly affected by the operations filed a petition-in-intervention.

The Solicitor General commented the prematurity of the action as it is based only on a fear of future violation of
the Terms of Reference and impropriety of availing of certiorari to ascertain a question of fact specifically
interpretation of the VFA whether it is covers "Balikatan 02-1 and no question of constitutionality is involved.
Moreover, there is lack of locus standi since it does not involve tax spending and there is no proof of direct personal
injury.

ISSUE: W/N the petition and the petition-in-intervention should prosper.

HELD: NO. Petition and the petition-in-intervention are hereby DISMISSED without prejudice to the filing of a
new petition sufficient in form and substance in the proper Regional Trial Court - Supreme Court is not a trier of
facts

Shangri-La v. Developers
GR 159938 March 31, 2006

Facts:Respondent DGCI applied for and was granted registration of the Shangri-La mark and S logo in its
restaurant business. Petitioner Shangri-La, chain of hotels and establishments owned by the Kuok family worldwide,
moved to cancel the registration of the mark on the ground that it was illegally and fraudulently obtained and
appropriated by respondents. Petitioner also moved to register the mark and logo in its own name. Later, respondent
DGCI filed before the trial court a complaint for infringement against petitioner alleging that DGCI had been the
prior exclusive user and the registered owner in the Philippines of said mark and logo. Petitioner Shangri-La argued
that respondent had no right to apply for the registration because it did not have prior actual commercial use thereof.
The trial court found for respondent. CA affirmed.
Issue:Whether or not respondents prior use of the mark is a requirement for its registration.
Ruling: YES.While the present law on trademarks has dispensed with the requirement of prior actual use at the time
of registration, the law in force at the time of registration must be applied. Under the provisions of the former
trademark law, R.A. No. 166, as amended, hence, the law in force at the time of respondents application for
registration of trademark, the root of ownership of a trademark is actual use in commerce. Section 2 of said law
requires that before a trademark can be registered, it must have been actually used in commerce and service for not
less than two months in the Philippines prior to the filing of an application for its registration.

Philip Morris, Inc. v. Fortune Tobacco Corporation

GR 158589 June 27, 2006

FACTS:Respondent contends that petitioner was not in danger of sustaining irreparable damage by the usage of the
former of the product name MARK, same as that of petitioners product, since petitioner was not doing business
in the Philippines.

ISSUE:Whether or not there has been an invasion of plaintiffs right of property to such trademark or trade name.

RULING:Court ruled that petitioner, although not doing business in the Philippines, has the legal right to sue for
infringement anyone who uses their duly registered mark. Sec 2 of RA 166 provides that foreign corporations and
corporations domiciled in a foreign country are not disabled from bringing suit in Philippine courts to protect their
rights as holders of trademarks registered in the Philippines. It was further reinforced by the Paris convention which
affords foreign signatories to the said treaty the advantages and protections which Philippine law grants to
Philippine nationals. There is no legal requirement that the foreign registrant itself manufacture and sell its products
here. All the statute requires is the use in trade and commerce in the Philippines.

The trademark infringement by a local company may, for one thing, affect the volume of importation into the
Philippines of cigarettes bearing petitioners' trademarks by independent or third party traders. The Court was led to
believe there was a prima facie basis for holding, as the Patent Office had held and as the Court of Appeals did
originally hold, that private respondent's "MARK" infringes upon petitioners' registered trademarks in view of the
fact that out of all the words in the English language, respondents chose the word "mark" to refer to its cigarettes.

While the petitioners may not have qualified under Section 2 of R.A. No. 166 as a registrant, neither did respondent
DGCI, since the latter also failed to fulfill the 2-month actual use requirement. What is worse, DGCI was not even
the owner of the mark. For it to have been the owner, the mark must not have been already appropriated (i.e., used)
by someone else. At the time of respondent DGCIs registration of the mark, the same was already being used by the
petitioners, albeit abroad, of which DGCIs president was fully aware.

Recognition of Foreign Judgements

Mijares v. Ranada
GR 139325 April 12, 2005

FACTS: Mijares, et al.*, alleged having suffered human rights abuses such as arbitrary detention, torture and rape in
the hands of police or military forces during the Marcos era, obtained a Final Judgment in their favor against the
Estate of the late Ferdinand Marcos amounting to roughly 1.9 Billion U.S. Dollars in compensatory and exemplary
damages for tortuous violations of international law in the US District Court of Hawaii. This Final Judgment was
affirmed by the US Court of Appeals.

As a consequence, Petitioners filed a Complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Makati for the enforcement of the
Final Judgment, paying Php 410.00 as docket and filing fees based on Rule 141, Section 7(b) where the value of the
subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The Estate of Marcos however, filed a MTD alleging the non-
payment of the correct filing fees. The Regional Trial Court of Makati dismissed the Complaint stating that the
subject matter was capable of pecuniary estimation as it involved a judgment rendered by a foreign court ordering
the payment of a definite sum of money allowing for the easy determination of the value of the foreign judgment. As
such, the proper filing fee was 472 Million Philippine pesos, which Petitioners had not paid.

ISSUE: Whether or not the amount paid by the Petitioners is the proper filing fee?
RULING: Yes, but on a different basis, amount merely corresponds to the same amount required for other actions
not involving property. The Regional Trial Court of Makati erred in concluding that the filing fee should be
computed on the basis of the total sum claimed or the stated value of the property in litigation. The Petitioners
Complaint was lodged against the Estate of Marcos but it is clearly based on a judgment, the Final Judgment of the
US District Court. However, the Petitioners erred in stating that the Final Judgment is incapable of pecuniary
estimation because it is so capable. On this point, Petitioners state that this might lead to an instance wherein a first
level court (MTC, MeTC, etc.) would have jurisdiction to enforce a foreign judgment. Under Batasang Pambansa
129, such courts are not vested with such jurisdiction. Section 33 of Batasang Pambansa 129 refers to instances
wherein the cause of action or subject matter pertains to an assertion of rights over property or a sum of money. But
here, the subject matter is the foreign judgment itself. Section 16 of Batasang Pambansa 129 reveals that the
complaint for enforcement of judgment even if capable of pecuniary estimation would fall under the jurisdiction of
the Regional Trial Courts. Thus, the Complaint to enforce the US District Court judgment is one capable of
pecuniary estimations but at the same time, it is also an action based on judgment against an estate, thus placing it
beyond the ambit of Section 7(a) of Rule 141. What governs the proper computation of the filing fees over
Complaints for the enforcement of foreign judgments is Section7(b)(3), involving other actions not involving
property.
Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines vs. DOH
GR 173034 October 9, 2007

Facts: Named as respondents are the Health Secretary, Undersecretaries, and Assistant Secretaries of the
Department of Health (DOH). For purposes of herein petition, the DOH is deemed impleaded as a co-respondent
since respondents issued the questioned RIRR in their capacity as officials of said executive agency.1Executive
Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino on October 28, 1986 by virtue of the legislative
powers granted to the president under the Freedom Constitution. One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code
states that the law seeks to give effect to Article 112 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk
Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHA
adopted several Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it
should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes.In 1990, the
Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 24 of said instrument provides
that State Parties should take appropriate measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that all
segments of society, specially parents and children, are informed of the advantages of breastfeeding. On May 15,
2006, the DOH issued herein assailed RIRR which was to take effect on July 7, 2006.

Issue: Whether Administrative Order or the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR) issued by the
Department of Health (DOH) is not constitutional;

Held: YES. Under Article 23, recommendations of the WHA do not come into force for members,in the same way
that conventions or agreements under Article 19 and regulations under Article 21 come into force. Article 23 of the
WHO Constitution reads:
Article 23. The Health Assembly shall have authority to make recommendations to Members with respect to
any matter within the competence of the Organization for an international rule to be considered as customary law, it
must be established that such rule is being followed by states because they consider it obligatory to comply with
such rules.

Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either

By transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed
into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation method applies
when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law.

Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the WHA Resolutions into domestic law. The
provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law of the land that can be implemented by
executive agencies without the need of a law enacted by the legislature

Section 3. Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. The Armed Forces of the Philippines is
the protector of the people and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the
national territory.
 IBP vs Zamora
G.R. No. 141284 August 15 2000 [Judicial Review; Civilian supremacy clause]

FACTS:Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, President Estrada,
in verbal directive, directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper
deployment and campaign for a temporary period only. The IBP questioned the validity of the deployment and
utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement.

ISSUE: Weather or not the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violate the constitutional
provisions on civilian supremacy over the military.

RULING:The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling
of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The
participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. It is their
responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary
equipment to the Marines and render logistical support to these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be
properly argued that military authority is supreme over civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of the Marines
to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. Neither does it amount to an insidious
incursion of the military in the task of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the
Constitution.

Kulayan v. Tan
675 SCRA 482 (2012)
Facts: Three members from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were kidnapped in the vicinity of
the Provincial Capitol in Patikul, Sulu. Andres Notter, a Swiss national, Eugenio Vagni, an Italian national, and
Marie Jean Lacaba, a Filipino engineer, were purportedly inspecting a water and sanitation project for the Sulu
Provincial Jail when inspecting a water and sanitation project for the Sulu Provincial Jail when they were seized by
three armed men who were later confirmed to be members of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). The leader of the
alleged kidnappers was identified as Raden Abu, a former guard at the Sulu Provincial Jail. News reports linked Abu
to Albader Parad, one of the known leaders of the Abu Sayyaf. The local group, later renamed Sulu Crisis
Management Committee, convened under the leadership of respondent Abdusakur Mahail Tan, the Provincial
Governor of Sulu, organized the Civilian Emergency Force (CEF), a group of armed male civilians coming from
different municipalities.The organization of the CEF was embodied in a "Memorandum of Understanding" entered
into between three parties: the provincial government of Sulu, represented by Governor Tan; the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, represented by Gen. Saban; and the Philippine National Police, represented by P/SUPT. Latag.
Governor Tan issued Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009 (Proclamation 1-09), declaring a state of emergency in the
province of Sulu.13 It cited the kidnapping incident as a ground for the said declaration, describing it as a terrorist
act pursuant to the Human Security. On 1 April 2009, SPO1 Sattal Jadjuli was instructed by his superior to report to
respondent P/SUPT. Julasirim Kasim.15 Upon arriving at the police station, he was booked, and interviewed about
his relationship to Musin, Jaiton, and Julamin, who were all his deceased relatives. Upon admitting that he was
indeed related to the three, he was detained. After a few hours, former Punong Barangay Juljahan Awadi,
companions were arrested. The affidavit of the apprehending officer alleged that they were suspected ASG
supporters and were being arrested under Proclamation 1-09. Petitioners contend that Proclamation No. 1 and its
Implementing Guidelines were issued ultra vires, and thus null and void, for violating Sections 1 and 18, Article VII
of the Constitution, which grants the President sole authority to exercise emergency powers and calling-out powers
as the chief executive of the Republic and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The Provincial Governor is not
authorized by any law to create civilian armed forces under his command, nor regulate and limit the issuances of
PTCFORs to his own private army. On 16 April 2009, Jamar M. Kulayan, Temogen S. Tulawie, Hadji Mohammad
Yusop Ismi, Ahajan Awadi, and SPO1 Sattal H. Jadjuli, residents of Patikul, Sulu, filed the present Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition
Issue: W or N Proclamation 1-09 was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, as it threatened fundamental freedoms guaranteed under Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
Held: Yes. I. Transcendental public Importance warrants a relaxation of the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts
Doctrine provides that where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the CA or the
RTC, it is in either of these courts and not in the Supreme Court, that the specific action for the issuance of such writ
must be sought unless special and important laws are clearly and specifically set forth in the petition. The moot and
academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts
will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the
exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when [the] constitutional
issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the
case is capable of repetition yet evading review. Every bad, unusual incident where police officers figure in
generates public interest and people watch what will be done or not done to them. Lack of disciplinary steps taken
against them erode public confidence in the police institution. As petitioners themselves assert, the restrictive
custody of policemen under investigation is an existing practice, hence, the issue is bound to crop up every now and
then. The matter is capable of repetition or susceptible of recurrence. It better be resolved now for the education and
guidance of all concerned. Hence, the instant petition is given due course, impressed as it is with transcendental
public importance. II. Only the President is vested with calling-out powers, as the commander-in-chief of the
Republic It has already been established that there is one repository of executive powers, and that is the President of
the Republic. This means that when Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution speaks of executive power, it is
granted to the President and no one else. ii. The exceptional character of Commander-in-Chief powers dictate that
they are exercised by one president One of these acts or prerogatives is the bundle of Commander-in-Chief powers
to which the "calling-out" powers constitutes a portion. The Presidents Emergency Powers, on the other hand, is
balanced only by the legislative act of Congress, as embodied in the second paragraph of Section 23, Article 6 of the
Constitution: The Local Government Code does not involve the diminution of central powers inherently vested in
the National Government, especially not the prerogatives solely granted by the Constitution to the President in
matters of security and defense. The intent behind the powers granted to local government units is fiscal, economic,
and administrative in nature. The Code is concerned only with powers that would make the delivery of basic
services more effective to the constituents,61 and should not be unduly stretched to confer calling-out powers on
local executives. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is granted said proclamation and guidelines are hereby declared
NULL and VOID.

Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may call
upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under
conditions provided by law, to render personal, military or civil service.

Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and promotion of
the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.

Kilosbayan v. Morato
G. R. No. 118910, November 16, 1995
Mendoza, J.

Facts: Petitioners seek reconsideration the court's decision in this case. They insist that the decision in the first case
has already settled (1) whether petitioner Kilosbayan, Inc. has a standing to sue and (2) whether under its charter
(R.A. No. 1169, as amended) the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office can enter into any form of association or
collaboration with any party in operating an on-line lottery. Consequently, petitioners contend, these questions can
no longer be reopened.
It is argued that, in any case, a reexamination of the two questions is barred because the PCSO and the
Philippine Gaming Management Corporation made a "formal commitment not to ask for a reconsideration of the
Decision in the first lotto case and instead submit a new agreement that would be in conformity with the PCSO
Charter (R.A. No. 1169, as amended) and with the Decision of the Supreme Court in the first Kilosbayan case
against on-line, hi-tech lotto."
They believed that the ruling in the first case was erroneous. Since in their view reexamination was not
barred by the doctrine of stare decisis, res judicata or conclusiveness of judgment or law of the case, they voted the
way they did with the remaining five (5) dissenters in the first case to form a new majority of eight.
Petitioners quote extensively from the speech of Commissioner Garcia before the Constitutional
Commission, explaining the provisions on independent people's organizations. There is nothing in the speech,
however, which supports their claim of standing.
 Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens and legislators have indeed been allowed to sue but then only (1) in
cases involving constitutional issues and (2) under certain conditions. Petitioners do not meet these requirements on
standing.Taxpayers are allowed to sue, for example, where there is a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or
where a tax measure is assailed as unconstitutional.Voters are allowed to question the validity of election laws
because of their obvious interest in the validity of such laws.Legislators are allowed to sue to question the validity of
any official action which they claim infringes their prerogatives qua legislators.Petitioners do not have the same
kind of interest that these various litigants have. Petitioners assert an interest as taxpayers, but they do not meet the
standing requirement for bringing taxpayer's suits as set forth in Dumlao v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392, 403
(1980)Petitioners' suit does not fall under any of these categories of taxpayers' suits.Neither do the other cases cited
by petitioners support their contention that taxpayers have standing to question government contracts regardless of
whether public funds are involved or not. Thus, petitioners' right to sue as taxpayers cannot be sustained. Nor as
concerned citizens can they bring this suit because no specific injury suffered by them is alleged. As for the
petitioners, who are members of Congress, their right to sue as legislators cannot be invoked because they do not
complain of any infringement of their rights as legislators.
Indeed, as already stated, petitioners' opposition is not really to the validity of the ELA but to lotteries
which they regard to be immoral. Thus, what the PCSO is prohibited from doing is from investing in a business
engaged in sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities. Thus, what the PCSO is prohibited from doing is
from investing in a business engaged in sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner Kilosbayan Incorporated has a legal standing to sue.

Ruling: The Court has concluded that petitioners do not have standing. The previous ruling sustaining the standing
of the petitioners is a departure from the settled rulings on "real parties in interest" because no constitutional issues
were actually involved.

The "law of the case" doctrine is also inapplicable, because this case is not a continuation of the first one. Since the
present case is not the same one litigated by theparties before in Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be
in any sense regarded as the law of this case. The parties are the same but the cases are not.

Since ELA is a different contract, the previous decision does not preclude determination of the petitioner's standing.
STANDING is a concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional question is actually involved. The more
appropriate issue is whether the petitioners are REAL PARTIES in INTEREST. Since ELA is a different contract,
the previous decision does not preclude determination of the petitioner's standing.

FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the motion for reconsideration of petitioners is DENIED with finality.

Kulayan v. Tan
675 SCRA 482 (2012)

FACTS: Three members from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were kidnapped in the vicinity
of the Provincial Capitol in Patikul, Sulu as they were inspecting a water sanitation project for the Sulu Provincial
Jail. It was later confirmed that they were seized by the Abu Sayaf Group (ASG). A committee was then formed to
investigate the kidnapping incident. It was under the leadership of Respondent Abdusakur Mahail Tan, Provincial
Governor of Sulu. Governor Tan issued a proclamation stating that the province of Sulu was under the state of
emergency, citing the kidnapping as a terrorist act. Thus, Tan called upon the PNP and Civilian Emergency Force to
setup checkpoints and chokepoints, conduct general search and seizures including arrests, and other actions
necessary to ensure public safety. Petitioners Kulayan et al, however claims that the proclamation was issued ultra
vires, and thus null and void.
ISSUES: Whether or not a governor can exercise the calling-out powers of a President.
RULING: No. A governor could not exercise these powers. Given the foregoing, Tan cannot call upon the armed
forces at his own bidding. In issuing assailed proclamation, Tan exceeded his authority when he declared a state of
emergency and called upon the Armed Forces, the police, and his own Civilian Emergency Force. The calling-out
powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President. An exercise by another official, even if he
is the local chief executive, is ultra vires.

Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.

 United Church of Christ in the Philippines, Inc. v. Bradford United Church of Christ, Inc.
674 SCRA 92 (2012)

Facts: In 1989, Bradford United Church of Christ, Inc. (BUCCI) built a fence that invaded the right way of
allocated by United Church of Christ in the Philippines (UCCP) to Cebu Conference Inc. (CCI). UCCP favoured
CCI and the series of events then followed led to the breakup of BUCCI from UCCP. BUCCI then separate itself
from UCCP and filed its Amended Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws which provided for and effected its
disaffiliation from UCCP. SEC approved it on 2 July 1993. UCCP filed a complaint for rejection of decision alleging
that separate incorporation and registration of BUCCI is not allowed under the UCCP Constitution and By-Laws.
SEC dismissed UCCPs petition and defended the right of BUCCI to disassociate itself from UCCP in recognition of
its constitutional freedom to associate and disassociate. On appeal, CA affirmed previous decision of SEC. Before
this court, UCCP maintains that it has the sole power to decide whether BUCCI could disaffiliate from it as this
involves a purely ecclesiastical affair.
Issue: Whether or not the determination of the validity of disaffiliation of respondents is purely an ecclesiastical
affair.
Ruling: No. The issue is not purely a ecclesiastical affair. An ecclesiastical affair is one that concerns doctrine, creed
or form of worship of the church or the adoption and enforcement within a religious association of needful laws and
regulations for the government of the membership, and the power of excluding from such associations those deemed
unworthy of membership.
UCCP and BUCCI are under the jurisdiction of SEC, Section 3 PD No. 902 which is being corporate entities and
grantees of primary franchise. SEC shall provide absolute jurisdiction, supervision and control over all corporations.
Even with their religious nature, SEC may exercise jurisdiction over them in matters that are legal and corporate.
BUCCI as juridical entity separate and distinct from UCCP, possesses the freedom to determine its steps.

STATE POLICIES
Section 7.The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its relations with other states, the paramount
consideration shall be national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest, and the right to self-
determination.

Lim v. Executive Secretary

GR 151445 April 11, 2002

FACTS: Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) signed in 1999, personnel from the armed forces of the
United States of America started arriving in Mindanao to take partin "Balikatan 02-1 on January 2002. The
Balikatan 02-1 exercises involves the simulation of joint military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty,
a bilateral defense agreement entered into by the Philippines and the United States in 1951. The exercise is rooted
from the international anti-terrorism campaign declared by President George W. Bush in reaction to the 3
commercial aircrafts hijacking that smashed into twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City and the
Pentagon building in Washington, D.C. allegedly by the al-Qaeda headed by the Osama bin Laden that occurred on
September 11, 2001. Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition attacking the constitutionality of the joint exercise. PartylistsSanlakas and Partido Ng
Manggagawaas residents of Zamboanga and Sulu directly affected by the operations filed a petition-in-intervention.

The Solicitor General commented the prematurity of the action as it is based only on a fear of future violation of
the Terms of Reference and impropriety of availing of certiorari to ascertain a question of fact specifically
interpretation of the VFA whether it is covers "Balikatan 02-1 and no question of constitutionality is involved.
Moreover, there is lack of locus standi since it does not involve tax spending and there is no proof of direct personal
injury.

ISSUE: W/N the petition and the petition-in-intervention should prosper.

HELD: NO. Petition and the petition-in-intervention are hereby DISMISSED without prejudice to the filing of a
new petition sufficient in form and substance in the proper Regional Trial Court - Supreme Court is not a trier of
facts

Section 8. The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from
nuclear weapons in its territory.

Bayan v. Zamora
Gr 138570 October 10, 2000

FACTS: On October 05, 1998, the former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, ratified the Visiting Force Agreement
(VFA) between the United States of America and the Philippines. Through the Executive Secretary Ronaldo
Zamora, the instrument for ratification, the letter of the President and a copy of the VFA were transmitted to the
Senate for a concurrence pursuant to the Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. The concerned committees
proposed Senate Resolution No. 443 that recommends the concurrence of the Senate to the VFA and creation of a
Legislative Oversight Committee to oversee its implementation. Later on, the proposed Senate Resolution was
approved with a two-thirds (2/3) votes of the members of the Upper House, and was renumbered as Senate
Resolution No. 18. On June 01, 1999, the VFA officially entered into force after an exchange of notes between
respondent secretary Siazon and United States ambassador Hubbard. Via consolidated petitions for Certiorari and
Prohibitions, the petitioners assailed the Constitutionality of the Visiting Force Agreement between the two
countries.
ISSUE: (1) is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Article VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the
1987 Constitution?, (2) whether or not the VFA violates the prohibition against nuclear weapons under Section 8,
Article II of the Constitution?
RULING: (1) the Supreme Court ruled that, the fact that the President referred the VFA to the Senate under Section
21, Article VII, and that the Senate extended its concurrence under the same provisions, the issue is immaterial.
Moreover, it is false to argue that Section 25, Article XVIII of is inapplicable to mere transient agreements for the
reason that there is no permanent placing structure for the establishment of military bases pursuant to the same
provisions. (2) Furthermore, installation and establishment of military bases within a territory is no longer
practicable because of the alternatives offered by new means and weapons of warfare such as Nuclear Weapons,
guided missiles as well as huge sea vessels that can stay afloat in the sea ever for years without returning to their
home country. These military warships are actually used as substitute for a land-home base not only of military
aircraft but also of military and facilities. Besides, vessels are mobile as compared to land-based military
headquarters. Also, the movement of US vessels and aircraft are subjected upon the approval of the Philippine
Government and shall be in accordance with international customs and practice governing such vessels or aircraft
under Paragraph (2) of Article VIII of the Visiting Force Agreement. Hence, it doesnt violates the prohibition
against nuclear weapons under Section 8, Article II of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing disquisitions, the consolidated petitions are hereby DISMISSED.

Section 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and
independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate social
services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living, and an improved quality of life for all.

Section 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development.