AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
Volume 33, Number 3, July 1996
PERFECfiON, HAPPINESS,
AND DUTIES TO SELF
Diane Jeske
W bat duties do we have to ourselves?
How does the content of our duties to our-
selves differ from the content of our duties
to others? These two questions have re-
ceived little attention in contemporary
moral philosophy, and tbe very notion of a
duty to self has suffered from general ne-
glect. This latter fact is rather surprising,
given the significant interest in recent
years in Kantian moral theory. Kant, after
all, regarded the division of duties into two
categories, duties to others and duties to
ourselves, as both natural and important.
Both types of duties are, for Kant, derived
from tbe categorical imperative, which sets
restrictions on bow we may treat rational
beings, either other rational beings or our-
selves. Although Kant regarded duties to
self as having the same source as duties to
others. he claimed that the content of our
duties to self is different from the content
of our duties to others: whereas we have
duties to promote the happiness of others,
we have no duties to promote our own
happiness. Similarly, we have duties to
promote our own perfection as rational
and moral agents but no such duties to
promote the perfection of others.
Kant's substantive thesis about the dif-
ference in content between our duties to
ourselves and our duties to others has been
less often discussed by moral philosophers
than have most other aspects of his moral
theory, probably because of the general
lack of interest in the notion of a duty to
self that I noted abovel I want to rectify
this neglect of what is, for several reasons,
263
one of the most interesting aspects of
Kant's normative view. First, Kant pro-
vides a conceptual framework in wb.icb we
can make sense of the notion of a duty to
self without recourse to any theological
presuppositions 2 Second, his sharp dis-
tinction between happiness and perfection
raises interesting questions about the most
fruitful way to understand those concepts
and their relationship to a notion familiar
to contemporary moral philosophers, that
of well-being more generally. While I want
to defend what is in essence a reversal of
Kant's thesis, i.e. I want to defend the claim
that we have duties to promote our own
happiness and the perfection of others, but
no duties to promote the happiness of
(most) others (I will agree with Kant that
we have duties to promote our own perfec-
tion), my goal is not, ultimately, to show
where Kant went wrong. I am primarily
concerned to show how certain Kantian
themes and elements of a Kantian concep-
tual grid can be combined with certain no-
tions familiar from contemporary ethics.
and theories of the self to provide the too
long neglected notion of a duty to self a
new foothold in moral philosophy.
I. KANT ON DUTIES TO SELF
AND D UTIES TO OTHERS
In what follows I am not concerned to
defend any particular interpretation of
Kant's moral philosophy, but, rather, to
present and to stress what seems to be a
fairly straightforward aspect of his view on
the content of duties to self and duties to
264 I AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
others. I will begin by preseming a brief
synopsis of the relevant portion of Kant's
ethical view. Of necessity, this presentation
will be brief and will ignore many impor-
tant features of Kant's extremely complex
theory. I hope to bring out enough to make
clear both the basis for and nature of his
claim about the content of our duties to self
and our duties to others, and the elements
of his conceptual framework of which I will
make use.
For Kant the commands of morality are
categorical imperatives; in fact, there is
only one such command (which can be
given at least three different formulations),
and so he calls it the categorical imperative
(G 416).3 Categorical imperatives are con-
trasted with hypothetical imperatives,
where the distinction between the two
types of imperatives has to do with whether
the imperative is "universally valid'' ( G
416) 4 A hypothetical imperative is not
universally valid; rather, it "is valid only un-
der a subjectively contingent condition" (G
416). In other words, a hypothetical im-
perative is a statement of a reason for ac-
tion only for those agents who happen to
have the relevant end(s). So, for example,
imperatives of skill, such as "if you want to
bake a good souffle, then you ought to beat
the egg whites until they are stiff," recom-
mend a particular course of action (beating
the egg whites until they are stiff) to an
agent, only if that agent has the relevant
end (baking a good souffle). Hypothetical
imperatives are valid only for those agents
with the requisite inclinations, and they
command courses of action as means to
satisfying those inclinations. 5
Imperatives of prudence are those that
instruct us how to achieve our own happi-
ness. Such imperatives do apply to all
agents, because, in fact, all rational beings
do seek their own happiness, "by a natural
necessity" ( G 415). Nonetheless, Kant says,
" the precept of prudence, still remains hy-
pothetical; the action is commanded not
absolutely but only as a means to a further
purpose" ( G 416). Even though it is in my
nature to want to be happy. the application
of the requirement expressed by an im
perative of prudence is still dependent on
au end that I have-if I did not want to
seek my own happiness, I would have no
reason to do what the hypothetical impera-
tive of prudence instructed that I olilght to
do. So the imperative of prudence is valid
only for those agents with an inclination or
desire for their own happiness, even if that
includes all of us. 6 (Of course, we might
think it odd for Kant to insist that we are
all, by a "natural necessity," inclined to
seek our own happiness. After all. given
his subjective conception ofhappiness (see
section JI below), achievement of happi-
ness is simply satisfaction of whatever de-
sires an individual happens to have or
achievement of a pleasurable state of con-
tentment with one's lot. Why shouldi we be
deter mined , in any sense, to seek that?
Kant's entire moral theory is an attempt to
escape human determination by desires
and inclinations, so it is odd that be would
privilege one such desire in this way.)
The categorical imperative, on the other
hand, "immediately commands a certain
conduct without having as its condition any
other purpose to be attained by it" (G 416).
This imperative is the imperative of moral-
ity, of which Kant offers three formula-
tions: universal law, humanity as an end in
itself, and the kingdom of ends. This im-
perative applies to all rational agents, re-
gardless of what ends they have: no matter
what you want, you ought to do as the im-
perative commands you to do. So the
oughts of morality are, to borrow W.O.
Falk's nice phrases, oughts " twice over"
which commit one "through and
through.'' 7 There's no evading the cate-
gorical imperative by ceasing to have a cer-
tain end; it applies to you no mauer what
you want or what ends you have, because
it "commands a certain conduct without
having as its condition any other purpose
to be attained by it" ( G 416). Or, again, the
categorical imperative represents "an ac-
tion as objectively necessary in itself, with-
out reference to another end" (G 414). So
the categorical imperative is universally
valid, and the necessity involved here is not
merely a " natural necessity," as in tbe case
 PERFECTION, HAPPINESS. AND DUTIES TO SELF I
of imperatives of prudence: categorical im-
peratives are universaUy valid for aU ra-
tional agents independently of any of their
ends. even of their necessary ends.
In The Metaphysical Principles of Virtue
(the second part of The Metaphysics of
Morals). Kant states that one has no duty
to promote one's own happiness:S
For one's own happiness is an end which, to
be sure, all men do have. . . What everyone
of himseiJ already inevitably wants does not
belong under the concept of duty. because
duty is a constraint to an end that is not
gladly adopted. It is, therefore. a contradic-
tion to say that one is obligated to promote
his own happiness with all his powers (386).
Our moral duties correspond to the rea-
sons formulated in categorical imperatives,
those that apply to us independently of
whatever incljnations we have. Further,
not only does "ought" imply "can," but
"ought" also implies " might not ," in the
sense that "ought" implies that there is the
possibility of the agent's refraining from
the action c<>mmanded. 9 And because we
are all by virtue of our nature inclined to
pursue our own happiness, we can have no
duty to do so. to But we do not all have as
an end the perfection of our natures, and.
thus, we can be and are obligated to pursue
such perfection. The perfection of one's
self involves " the cultivation of one's ca-
pacities" (M 387). both one's under-
standing and one's will. The cultivation of
one 's understanding involves developing
all of those abilities that are distinctive of
one's human as contrasted with one's ani-
mal nature. The cultivation of one's will
involves becoming disposed to act out of
respect for the moral law, i.e., involves a
disposition to act in the right manner as a
result of having cenain types of motives: "it
is one's duty to push the cultivation of his
will up to the purest vinuous disposition,
in which the law is at the same time the
incentive of one's actions which are in ac-
cordance with duty, and is obeyed from
duty" (M 387).
Thus, it seems clear that, for Kant, I can-
not be obligated to promote the perfection
of other perS<>ns, because no one but the
265
agent herself can be responsible for her
pursuing certain ends for cenain types of
reasons (M 386). We can, however. be ob-
ligated to promote the happiness of other
persons. in so far as we do not always take
the happiness of others as our end. The
promotion of otl1ers' happiness is an im-
perfect duty. i.e., a duty with respect to
which I can choose when and how I will
fulfill it, 11 so "what they count as belonging
to their happiness is left up to them to de-
cide; but I may decline many of these
things which I do not regard as so belong-
ing, if they otherwise have no right to de-
mand them of me" (M 388). So I am not
obligated to take all of another's ends as
my own. I can ignore those ends that " I do
not regard as ... belonging [to their happi-
ness)". I also have perfect duties to refrain
from doing anything that might impede an-
other's own pursuit of her moral and natu-
ral perfection. But such duties arc, by
necessity. negative in character; I must re-
frain, for example, from putting tempta-
tions in the way of another (M 394). I have
no positive duties to promote the perfec-
tion of others' natures.
According to Kant, then, the imperative
to promote the happiness of others is cate-
gorical, it provides us with an "ought" that
we cannot avoid by altering our ends o r by
failing to have the happiness of others as
our end: we ought to have their happiness
as an end of ours. 12 The imperative to pro-
mote our own perfection is also categori-
cal: we ought, no matter what we do
actually want, to pursue our own natural
and moral perfection. But the imperative
to pursue our own happiness is merely hy-
pothetical, the ought with which it supplies
us is contingent for its application upon
our wanting to be happy, something all hu-
man beings are in fact inclined to pursue.
In the following sections, l will argue that
there are categorical imperatives instruct-
ing us to pursue our own and others' per-
fection, and to pursue our own happiness
(and the happiness of a limited class of oth
crs). Imperatives to promote the happi-
ness of any other persons, however, are
merely hypothetical.
266 I AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUART ERLY
ll. IMPERATIVES. VALUE,
AND WELL-BEING
For Kant categorical imperatives are not
consequentialist in nature; in Olher words,
it is not the case that the categorical im-
perative instructs us to promote some end
because of the value of that end. Ra1her,
the categorical imperative is a deontologi-
cal re.striction on our conduct, a restriction
on how we may act, no matter what the
value of the consequences of our so acting.
As Kant says, the categorical imperative
represents "an ac1ion as objectively neces-
sary in itsel without reference to another
end" (G 414; emphasis mine).
We might agree with Kant that categori-
cal imperatives are those that command
some action regardless of the contingent
subjective states of the agent, and yet hold,
contra Kant, that at least some such im-
peratives command actions as means to
valuable consequences that we ought to
have as ends even if we do noL ln other
words, categorical imperatives can also be
tied to the promotion of objective value. If
a state of affairs is objectively valuable,
then any agent in a position to do so bas
reason to promote that state of affairs; i.e.,
there is agent-neutral reason to promote
itn So, an agent's having an agent-neutral
reason to promote a state of affairs is inde-
pendent of her wanting to bring about that
state of affairs. She ought to have that state
of affairs as one of her ends. The require-
ment to bring about an objectively valuable
state of affairs is an ought "twice over:"
you ought to want to promote such value,
and you ought to promote it. t4 Categorical
imperatives that express reasons deriving
from the promotion of objective value do
not represent actions as "objectively neces-
sary" in themselves, but necessary as means
to ends that one ought to have, no matter
whal one's inclinations. 15
Hypothetical imperatives, on the other
hand, can be lied to the promotion of sub-
jective value. A state of affairs has subjec-
tive value for some agent if and only if that
agent subjectively values (wants, desires,
has as an end) that state of affairs. (Of
course, we would need to modify this state-
ment, and say that a state of affairs h.as sub-
jective value for an agent if she values it
under the appropriate conditions, e ..g. con-
ditions of adequate information, correct
reasoning, etc.) lf a state of affairs is sub-
jectively valued by an agent, then she has
agenr-relarive reason to promote that state
of affairs, i.e., she has reason to promote
that state of affairs and that reason is not
necessarily shared by any other agent. lf
another agent shares her end, then and
only then will that agent also have an
agent-relative reason to promote it. So
suppose that I want to bake a good souffle;
I then have agent-relative reason to beat
my egg whites until they are stiff. Y-ou will
have an agent-relative reason to do so if
and only if you also want me to bake a
good souffle. Our reasons are dependent
on our happening to subjectively value the
state of affairs in which I bake a good souf-
fle. If we assume that my baking a good
souffle is not an objectively valuable state
of affairs, then there is no categorical im-
perative stating a reason to have as an end
my baking a good souffle.16
It is important to notice that certain sub-
jective states of agents, such as pleasure, or
certain states determined by subj ective
states of agenls, can have objective value.
Non-egoistic hedonists, for example, hold
that we all have reason to promote pleas-
ure, ours or anyone else's; i.e., they regard
certain subjective states of agents as having
objective value. Similarly, on a desire-satis-
faction conception of objective value, my
subjectively valuing my having a dog as a
pet makes it the case that everyone bas
reason to promote the satisfaction of my
desire. If a subjective state of mine has ob-
jective value, then it is valuable not only
fo r me, but valuable simpliciter. If a state
of affairs has merely subjective value, how-
ever, it is valuable only for the agent who
subjectively values it. Thus, we need to
keep apart the metaethical distinclion be-
tween the concepts of objective and sub-
jective value, and normative claims about
what has objective or subjective value. It
is particularly important, in what follows,
 PERFECTION. HAPPINESS, AND DUTIES TO SELF 1267
to keep in mind that one could give a
purely subjective normative account of ob-
jective value. 17
Any plausible account of objective value
will be a welfarist conception of objective
value. In other words, all and only the well-
being or welfare of sentient or rational be-
ings has objective value. 18 The welfarist
conce ption of objective value is what dis-
tinguishes utilitarianism from other ver-
sions of (maximizing) consequentialism,
thereby rendering it the most plausible of
such consequentialist theories. But utili -
tarians differ among themselves as to what
constitutes the well-being or, to use a more
Aristotelian term, ''flourishing" of rational
creatures. (From now on, I will not be con-
cerned with merely sentient creatures.) I
think that there is reason to refrain from
identifying the notion of such well-being
straightforwardly with that of pleasure (a
Ia Bentham) or with that of the satisfaction
of all and any actual desires. 19 We can un-
derstand an agent's failing to be well-off
even if she experiences nothing but pleas-
ure or gets everything that she happens to
want; we think that the source of one's
pleasures or the content of one's desires
matters.20 So the notion of well-being is
not a purely subjective notion. Nonethe-
less, to be well-off a person must have cer-
tain subjective attitudes towards her life;
she must be satisfied and regard her life as
worth living. 21 So a well-off person must
get some of what she actually wants, but
what such a person actually wants will be
the same as or at least will not conflict with
what she ought to want.
What ought one to want (with regards to
oneself)? Here we can agree with Kant,
Mill, and Aristotle, that we ought to want
to develop our capacities that distinguish
us as human beings from other creatures.
Part of what it is for beings like us to be
well-off must involve the development of
our intellectual, mora1 creative, rational,
and emotive capacities.22 And part of the
development of those capacities rna y nec-
essarily involve the development and pur-
suit of one's own individual subjective
preferences.23 Of course, many pleasures
are also components of our well-being.
There is no denying that of two individuals
who both develop their capacities the one
whose life has, on balance, more pleasure
than pain is better-off than the one whose
life is full of pain and misery. Also, the ful-
fillment of basic needs for food, shelter,
medical care, etc., are basic preconditions
of well-being, and so also have objective
value, even if only instrumental rather than
intrinsic objective value. The notion of hu-
man well-being, then, is complex, involving
the "perfection" of our natures, the getting
of pleasure (which will naturally follow
from our getting at least some of what we
want) or, at the least, the avoidance of pain
and suffering, and the fulfillment of basic
needs as a precondition. 24 This notion of
well-being is objective in T. M. Scanlon's
sense, because it " provides a basis for ap-
praisal of a person's well-being which is in-
dependent of that person's tastes and
interests,"25 or, at least, independent to a
large extent of such preferences.
Kant has no such notion of weU-being
(although he speaks sometimes of P'hysical
or moral well-being, such well-being is not
the complex notion of overall well-being
discussed above; see, e .g., M 393-394).
Rather, he straightforwardly contrasts the
perfection of our natures with happiness.
It is not entirely clear bow Kant under-
stands the notion of happiness. but it is
clear that he understands it as a purely sub-
jective notion. He uses happiness to mean
" uninterrupted prosperity" ( G 393 ), and "a
maximum of well-being in my present and
in every future condition" (G 418). In The
Metaphysical Principles of Virtue, he de-
fines "happiness" as " satisfaction with
one's condition as far as he is certain of its
continuance" (387). The reason why Kant
does not state any imperatives of prudence
is that he thinks it is indeterminate as to
what the contents of such imperatives are.
We do not know what will make us happy,
because what we want may not be what we
would want under conditions of greater
knowledge of the future, or what we want
may not bring us the pleasure we expect
(G 418). So, for Kant, happiness is to be
268 I AMERICAN PH1LOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
identified either with pleasure or some sort
of informed desire-satisfaction.
I think that Kant is right to understand
happiness as a purely subjective notion.
However, it is wrong to identify it with the
notion of pleasure; we need only imagine
cases where individuals experience pleas-
ure as a result of the false belief that they
are getting what they want. It is right to
say, though, that an agent is happy when
she promotes what has subjective value for
her. An agent can be happy, then, without
the perfection of her nature. Of course, as
I said above, to be well-off one must get at
least some of what one wants, so there is
overlap between the notion of well-being
and that of happiness. Nonetheless, they
are most profitably viewed as distinct no-
tions; cert:ain satisfactions will not be objec-
tively valuable, and perfection of our
natures is a component of well-being but
not necessarily of happiness. Such perfec-
tion is part of an agent's happiness only if
she happens to subjectively value her own
perfection. So my notion of happiness
does not provide a standard independent
of a person's tastes and interests; it pro-
vides a subjective criterion of evaluation.26
Whereas happiness is purely a subjective
notion, well-being is only partially subjec-
tive; and it is arguable that the objective
component of well-being is the central and
most important component, that the truly
well-off agent is the one who derives her
central pleasures from achieving her objec-
tive ends. Of course, the best state is one
in which an agent can be both well-off and
happy, because most of what she subjec-
tively values does not come into conflict
with or is identical with what is objectively
valuable.
Now that we have the lay of the land with
respect to the interrelations between well-
being, perfection, and happiness, we can
consider Kant's thesis about the content of
our duties to ourselves and to others. I will
begin by considering our duty to promote
well-being, where I have suggested that we
should understand well-being as having
perfection as a constitutive element.
III.
THE PROMOTION OF WELL-B EING
AS A DUTY TO S.ELF AND TO OTHERS
lf we accept that human well-being or
flourishing is objectively valuable, then we
are claiming that we all have an agent-neu-
tral reason to promote such well-being.
Thus, there is a categorical imperative re-
quiring us to promote the well-being both
of ourselves and of others. In other words,
we have duties to promote the well-being
of ourselves and of others, where well-be-
ing is partially constituted by the perfec-
tion of our rational and moral natures. But
we need to ask two questions at this point.
First, are categorical imperatives instructing
us to promote our own well-being impera-
tives of morality, or are they imperatives of
rationality? Do we really have a moral
duty to promote our own welfare? Second,
given that "perfection" is a component of
well-being, is it possible for us to have posi-
tive duties to promote others' well-being,
or do we just have, as Kant claimed, nega-
tive duties not to interfere with their pro-
motion of their own well-being?
I will begin with the first question. If we
accept that human welfare is objectively
valuable, then we will accept the claim that
there are categorical imperatives instruct-
ing us to promote welfare, including our
own welfare. Thus, the requirement to
promote our own well-being is valid for us
no matter what our subjective, contingent
ends happen to be. But is such a require-
ment a moral requirement? Jf we were to
regard moral requirements as re-quire-
ments with a certain content, e.g. require-
ments to promote the good of others, then
clearly it would simply be contradictory to
claim that we have moral duties to pro-
mote our own well-being. Such a charac-
terization of moral duties is wrong:. The
categorical imperative instructing me to
pursue my well-being instructs me to do so
not because it is my well-being, but be-
cause it is well-being, which is objectively
valuable. The requirement arises as a re-
sult of the intrinsic character of the state
of affairs that is to be promoted. I could
know that I ought to promote that s~ate of
 PERFECTION, HAPPINESS, AND DUTIES TO SELf' I
affairs without knowing how or even
whether I figure in to that state of affairs.27
Rational principles; in the sense of princi-
ples that instruct me how to promote my
own interests require, for their application,
knowledge of which among many individu-
als is me. Thus, we can understand moral
duties to self (as opposed to requireme nts
of prudence or rationality) as those re-
quirements on action expressed by "ought"
statements that I can know arc valid for me
prior to my knowing which particular indi-
vidual I am.28
But some might argue that duties to pro-
mote objective value are not duties owed
to any particular persons, that they are im-
perfect duties. But if duties to promote
welfare are duties to no one in particular,
are they really duties that each of us owes
to his or her self? An unwillingness to see
duties to promote value as duties to par-
ticular persons arises from a failure. to rec-
ognize that a concern for total value is a
concern for total well-being, and the latter
is just a concern for the well-being of all
individual persons. We are obligated to
produce as much well-being as possible,29
because each person has a claim on us to
promote her well-being, given that her
well-being has objective value. But all such
claims are merely prima facie and can be
outweighed by an appeal to other such
claims or by appeal to the presence of
deontological restrictions on conduct. So
when it turns out that the best way for me
to promote welfare is by promoting my
own welfare, then I have a duty to myself
to promote my own well-being. My claim
to my own efforts outweighs all other such
claims. The duty is like an imperfect duty
because the means of fulfilling it are still
Left to me to decide, but it is not imperfect
in so far as, if I fail in my duty, the person
whose claim on my beneficent efforts was
strongest has the right to complain.JO So I
think that there is no reason not to hold
that our duties to promote well- being are
duties that we owe to one another and to
ourselves.31
Therefore, because the development of
our rational and other distinctively human
169
capacitie-s, or our "perfection" as human
beings, is an important constituent of our
welfare or flourishing, we have duties to
ourselves and to others to promote the
perfection of our and their natures. The
former claim Kant accepted, wh.i.le he de-
nied the latter. But now we see that we
have reason, within a limited consequen-
tialist (or limited deontological) frame--
work, of accepting both claims.
But can we positively promote the per-
fection of others' natures, or can we, at the
most, refrain from interfering with their
perfection of their own natures? Kant is
certainly right.that we cannot do for others
what we can do for ourselves; we have con-
trol over our own actions and motives in
ways that we do not have control over
those of others. We cannot insure that oth-
ers have the correct ends for the right rea-
sons. But we can attempt to guar antee
them the necessary preconditions for their
promotion of their own perfection. So we
can insure that others have their basic
needs fulfilled, and also their perhaps not
so basic needs such as education. Kant
himself recognized the importance of edu-
cation, and claimed that we have duties to
see that children and young adults have the
training that they need. 32 As many liberal
political philosophers since Mill have real-
ized, we do others little good by just re-
specting their rights to liberty if we do not
make attempts to guarantee to them that
they can exercise those rights; as Rawls
says, we must distinguish liberty from the
worth of liberty.33 Positive provision of re-
sources may be necessary to insure that
others can take advantage of their rights.
Kant is right that for certain states. of af-
fairs involving x's doing A , that state of af-
fairs may only be valuable if x does A
voluntarily and for the right reasons, after
a certain course of delibera.tion. But that
does not preclude others' being able to
provide resources necessary to put x in a
position to engage in the appropriate de-
liberation that will lead to his doing A for
the right reasons. And, as I have said just.
above, Kant himself sometimes seemed to
recognize precisely this point.
270 I AMERJCAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
And so we can agree with Kant that we
have duties to ourselves to promote our
own perfection. But we have not seen a
reason to deny that we also have duties to
others to promote their perfection. And
claiming that we have a duty to promote
the well-being and thereby the perfection
of others need not commit us to any anti-
liberal views about using coercion to force
others to live in the ways that we think that
they ought to live. Of course, such conclu-
sions may fall out of certain conceptions of
well-being or "perfection," for example,
conceptions under which it is better for one
to be compelled not to engage in homosex-
ual sex even if one desires such sexual in-
tercourse, conceptions under which people
ought not to be exposed to the art of cer-
tain races, or conceptions under which a
woman 's perfection necessarily involves
rearing children. The facl that human per-
fection has been construed in ways that
lead people to think that they are required
to do morally repugnant things is no argu-
ment against the claim that we do have a
duty to promote the perfection (well-be-
ing) not only of ourselves but also of oth-
ers. by providing others with resources
necessary to the development of their ca-
pacities, where such development is plausibly
construed to require space to autonomously
deve lop one's own subjective prefer-
ences.3
IV. T HE PROMOTION OF HAPPINESS AS A
DUTY TO SELF ANDTO INTIMATES
We can now consider our duty to pro-
mote happiness. I have identified happi-
ness with subjective value, or (informed)
desire-satisfaction. Thus, an agent is happy
when she is realizing all or many of her sub-
jective ends. Of course, the happy agent
will lead a pleasurable life, in so far as
pleasure is the usual by-product of desire-
satisfaction (although not always) and peo-
ple do usua lly desire pleasure for
themselves. But happiness is not to be iden-
tified with pleasure.
Do I have a duty to promote the happi-
ness of others? Let us return to Kant's
claim that "what they [others) count as be-
longing to their happiness is left up to them
to decide; but I may decline many of these
things which l do not regard as so belong-
ing, if they otherwise have no right to de
mand them of me" (M 388). How could I
possibly not regard as belonging to your
happiness what you do regard as so be-
longing? If we were to take a hedonistic
view of happiness, it might be tTue that you
think that going bungee jumping will bring
you pleasure, and so you desire to go
bungee jumping, but I, having gone bungee
jumping and knowing you well, know that
it would not bring you pleasure. Or, you
might want to go bungee jumping only be-
cause you have failed to appreciate the fact
that that activity involves a certain risk of
the cord fraying and breaking and of your
plunging to an ugly death . Howev er, in
what follows, I am going to set aside such
worries, by assuming that you have delib-
erated with adequate information about
your desires, so that what you actually
want has subjective value for you. I n such
a case, there will be no question of my cor-
rectly believing that, although you want x,
x is not a component of your happiness.
Now, do I have a duty to promote your
happiness? It is plausible to say that I do
not have any such duty. Suppose that you
do want to go bungee jumping. Does your
wanting to do so provide me with any rca-
son to help you to go bungee jumping? My
wanting to do something provides me with
at least prima facie reason to do so, but
your wanting to do something does not, in
itself, provide me with any even prima facie
reason to help you to do it. Perhaps I have
a negative duty not to stop others from
pursuing their own happiness, when such
does not involve any immoral ends or ends
that conflict with my own happiness, but I
do not have a positive duty to promote oth-
ers' happiness.
Of course, as I have said, there is overlap
between the concepts of well-being and of
happiness, if we assume that to be well-off
a person must get at least some of the
things she subjectively values. Also, we all
do want to be free from suffering and to
experience pleasure, and, if a certain bal-
ance of pleasure over pain is necessary for
well-being, tben, again, there will be com-
mon components of our well-being and of
 PERFECTION, HAPPINESS, AND DUTIES TO SELF I 271
our happiness. But then I have a duty to
see that you get a certain amount of what
you want because I have a duty to promote
your well-being, not because I have a duty
to promote your happiness. Happiness is
best understood as a purely subjective con-
cept. You are responsible for the subjec-
tive ends that you develop, whereas, simply
in virtue of the sort of bein~ you are, you
have certain objective ends. 3 I am respon-
sible to you with regard to the latter, but
not with regard to the former. I do not fail
to treat you as an end in yourself just be-
cause I do not take your subjective ends as
being ends for me. I would fail to treat you
as an end only if I failed to take your ob-
jective ends as my ends. Of course, doing
the latter may involve allowing you space
to develop your subjective ends, but, once
I have fulfilled that negative duty, I have
no positive duty to help you to promote
your subjective ends regarded simply as
constituents of your happiness, i.e. regarded
as things that you simply happen to want.
This point can be illustrated by consider-
ing a nice example offered by Scanlon36 to
argue for a similar point. Suppose that
there is a man whose overriding end in life
is to build a temple to his god. He is willing
to forgo adequate food, medical care, and
shelter, in order to build the temple. When
we distribute resources, should we take
into account that he subjectively values the
building of the temple more than he sub-
jectively values the fulfillment of his basic
needs? I agree with Scanlon that we would
be justified in refusing to help him to build
his temple, while offering him the resources
necessary for meeting his needs. The ful-
fillment of those needs are basic precondi-
tions of his meeting his objective ends and
of avoiding a certain amount of pain and
suffering, whether he realizes it or not. If
be refuses our help in meeting his objective
ends, we have no duty to insure that he can
build his temple just because that is what
be wants. However, we may be required to
minimize his suffering by offering some as-
sistance, and we are certainly required not to
prevent his being able to build his temple. 37
But now suppose that it is my best frie.nd
Tracy who wants to go bungee jumping.
Am I justified in refusing to help her to go
bungee jumping? (Let us put aside any
worries that I might have about the safety
of Tracy's desired activity.) I regard
bungee jumping as frivolous and, there-
fore, as a waste of time and money. But
Tracy wants very strongly to go bungee
jumping. Given that she is my friend, it
seems that I should take Tracy's desires as
providing me with at least prima facie rea-
son for action. I should ignore my own
views and help her fulfill her g()als. I
should encourage her efforts and assist her
when she asks. Friendship requires taking
the friend 's subjective valuings as reasons
for one to act, even in cases where one
does not share the subjective valuing. If a
stranger wants to go bungce jumping, that
is no business of mine, and I have no re-
sponsibility to see that she can do so simply
because she wants to. Such, however, is
not tbe case, when it is my friend wbo
wants to go bungee jumping. So I have du-
ties to promote the happiness of certain
other persons, namely my intimates: my
friends and family members, at the least.
Of course, I must also promote their well-
being, and there is no guarantee that their
happiness and well-being will not co nflict.
So, we might say that I am obligated to pro-
mote the happiness of my friends and fam-
ily members to whatever extent my doing
so does not conflict with my promotion of
their well-being.38
Do I have duties to promote my own
happiness? Kant thought not, because we
all necessarily have our own happiness as
an end. (I noticed in section I that it is odd
that Kant makes this claim.) However, we
can notice that even if we are all inclined
to promote our own present happiness, it is
sure Iy not the case that we are all inclined
to promote our own fwure happiness. The
happiness of myself at sixty is something
that I may completely neglect or even hin-
der by smoking, drinking, or laziness. And
this may not be a case of weakness Of will;
rather, I might just say that I do not really
care if I ruin the health of my sixty year old
self, and there is no reason to suppose that
I may not be completely sincere in my as-
sertion. Kant claimed that happiness is "a
maximum of well-being in my present and
in every future condition" ( G 418).. If we
272 I AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
include future satisfactions as part of our
happiness, then it is just false to claim that
we all take our own happiness as an end,
given that people can fail to care about their
distant futures.
Ought we to take our own future happi-
ness as an end? If it is plausible to accept,
as I have suggested, that we ought to take
our friends' happiness as our end (isn't
that, after all, part of what it is to be some-
one's friend?), then it must be at least as
plausible that we ought to take our own
future happiness as our end. After all, my
future self is just me in the future; she
stands in an even more intimate relation-
ship to me than do my friends. Of course,
to make this distinction between future
and present selves may require a meta-
physical commitment to a Humean or neo-
Humean conception of the self. Only on
such views do we get a real distinction be-
tween present and future selves. If we ac-
cept that the person is a Cartesian ego,
strictly or perfectly identical over time,
then we may not be able to speak of duty
to self in other than a metaphorical sense;
some well-known objections to the notion
of a duty to self depend upon a notion of
the ~erson as perfectly identical over
time. 9 However, if those objections are
misplaced or if one accepts a Humean or
neo-Humean conception of the self, the no-
tion of a duty to promote one's own future
happiness should seem plausible.40
We can now see what we ought to do in
certain case.s of an agent's changing her
values over time. Nagel offers us the case
of a radical young man who, for some rea-
son, knows that, at forty, he will have highly
conservative values.41 Should he now, at
twenty, plan for the satisfaction of his fu-
ture selfs desires, given his own radical val-
ues? ln cases where an agent foresees a
change in her mere desires, such as a shift
in preference from gardening to cooking,
then it seems that the agent ought (in both
the moral and prudential sense) to plan for
the satisfaction of her future self's desires
to cook instead of garden. But an agent
University of Iowa
may believe that a change in her desires
will lead to a decline in her well-being, and,
in that case, she ought to frustrate he r own
future selfs happiness in order to attempt
to provide for her welfare. If the young
radical believes that his forty year old con-
servative self will pursue ends that pre-
clude his pursuing his actual objective
ends, then he ought to attempt to frustrate
his future self, insure that his future self
will not have those conservative values, or
do as much as he can now to promote his
objective ends before he loses his clear-
sightedness about such ends. (Of course,
the young radical may be wrong about the
nature of his objective ends, and tben be
will be wrong about what be will think that
be ought to do.)
We have duties then, to promote the
happiness of both our own future selves
and of our friends and family members.
We do not, however, have duties to pro-
mote the happiness of all and any other
persons. This conclusion differs not only
from that of Kant but also from that of
many utilitarians who offer a purely sub-
jective conception of welfare, or who iden-
tify welfare with happiness.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Many of my claims have drawn on less
than obvious views about, for example,
how to understand moral duty42 and about
the significance for action of our intimate
relationships both with others and with our
own future selves. But, as I said above. my
project is primarily to revive the notion of
a duty to self, both by showing the interest
of Kant's views on the topic, and by show-
ing how we can build on and modify Kant's
suggestions. Discussion of duties to self can
play an important role in discussions of
value, the nature of duty, our relationships
with others and ourselves, and of the na-
ture of human welfare. Thus, duties to self
(and Kant's views on that topic) deserve
the attention of contemporary moral phi-
losophers43
Received February I, 1996
 PERFECTION, HAPPINESS, AND DUTIES TO SELF I 273

NOTES
I. Another reason for this neglect is perhaps that most co01emporary moral philosophers take the
Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals as their primary source for Kant's moral theory. But The
Metaphysics of Morals contains more detail regarding Kant's substantive normative ethical vie ws,
including details about the content of our duties to ourselves and to others and about the way that
Kant understands happiness and perfection. (The Grounding and the second part of The Meta-
physics ofMorals (The Metaphysical PrinciplesofVirrue) are reprinted together as Ethical Philoso-
phy, James W. Ellington, tr. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., lnc.. l983). I will cite the former
as Gin the text, and the latter as M, followed by marginal numbers indicating the page reference
following the Prussian Academy Edition of Kant's works.)
2. Such is certainly not true of many earlier moral philosophers. A glance through, for e><ample,
British Moralists 16501800, D. D. Raphael, ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., Inc., 1991),
reveals bow often duties to self were viewed as being, ultimately, duties to the Creator.
3. There is only one (what we migbt call) basic categorical imperative. However, specific i.mpcra-
tives of duty, such as the imperative that commands us not to murder, are categorical imperatives
that can be derived from the basic categorical imperative. So wbcn I speak of the categorical
imperative, I am referring to the basic one, while when I speak of categorical imperatives I am
referring to a type of imperative (contrasted with hypothetical imperatives) of which there are also
specific derivative ones.
4.1! is important to note that,for Kant, to say of an imperative that it is universally valid impUics that
it is necessarily valid. If an imperative is universally valid, we can know a priori that it is valid for all
rational beings.
5. And because it is always a matter of empirical fact what specific ends some particular agent has,
we cannot know a priori whether a given hypothetical imperative is valid for that particular agent.
6. So the hypothetical imperatives of prudence are universally valid, because all rationaU agents
necessarily have their own happiness as an end. Thus, as I indicate in what follows, categorical
imperatives must be understood as those imperatives that are universally valid independently of
tbe ends. even the necessary ends, of any or all rational agents.
However, a caveat is in order here. Kant speaks of "the precept of prudence" (emphasis mine). If
there were only one such precept then it would be universally valid. But if happiness is different for
eacb agent, and, given Kant's purely subjective conception of happiness (see section 11 below), it
will be, then there will not be merely one imperative of prudence: the content of such imperatives
will vary from agent to agent. Nonetheless, we might say, whatever the content of the imperatives
of prudence for each agent, such are necessarily valid/or that agent. [n contrast, imperatives of skill
regarding the baking of soufnes. for example, may be relativizcd to agents with respect to the
altitudes at which they live, but, nonetheless, the imperative of skill relativized to the class of agents
at your altitude is still not necessarily valid for you.
7. In his "Morality, Self, and Others," in Morality and the Language of Conduct (Detroit: Wayne
State University Press, 1965), p. 43.
8. At G 399, Kant does claim that "to secure one's own happiness is a duty (at least indireclly)" . If
an individual is unhappy, be will be unable to attend to his duties appropriately. So promoting
one's happiness is a duty only in-so-far as it is a necessary condition of fulfilling one's duties. But,
given what Kant says about duty (sec following text), it is difficult to sec how he can support the
claim that promoting one's own happiness inven indirectly a duty.
9.So imperatives are never valid for a divine will: "the ought is here out of place, because the would
is already of itself necessarily in agreement with the law'' (G 414). So the notion of a.cting in
accordance with law (Kant 's fundamental moral concept) can be applicable even in cases where
one necessarily waots to do what is in accord with the law.lltus, tbc divine will can act in accord with
moral law and thereby be considered moral; however, it cannot be regarded as acting in accord with
duty, because the notion of duty or of "ought" does require for its application that one not
necessarily want to do what one ought to do. (I am grateful to an anonymous referee for this
journal for helpful clarification on tbis point.)
274 1 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

10. We need to specify that we cannot have as a duty an action the performance of which we are
necessarily inclined to pursue. If we were all inclined, as a matter of fact, to give food to the poor,
we would still be obligated to be charitable. Duty can overlap with our comingem ends; after all,
the sympathetic person has as many duties as Kant 's cold-hearted philanthropist.. See, e .g. , G
413-414.
11. Or. we can say that my imperfect duty to do.r is one which no person has a right or claim .a gainst
me that I fulfill by doing some specific action. See section ID for a further discussion of imperfect
duties.
12. This imperative instructs us to seek a certain end. However, one might say that the imperative
remains non-consequentialist, because we are instructed to pursue the end not because of the
value of happiness, but because of the nature of rational beings: respect for s uch beings involves
taking their ends (or at least some of their ends) as our own.
13. For discussions of agent-neutral vs. agent-relative reasons, see Derek Parfit, Reason. and
Persons (Oxford University Press, 1984), 143, and Thomas Nagel, Tire View From Nowhere (Oxford
University Press,l986), 152ft.
14. At the end of the L ectures on Etlric:s, tr. Louis Infield, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishi-ng Co.,
loc., 1963), Kant makes the following claim: "The end, therefore, for which man is destined is to
achieve his fullest perfection through his own freedom ....The universal end of mankind is the
highest moral perfection. If we all so ordered our conduct that it should be in harmony with the
universal end of ma.o kind,the highest perfection would be attained. We must e ach of us, therefore,
endeavour to guide our conduct to this end; each of us must make such a contribution of bis own
that if all contributed similarly the result would be perfection" (252}. These remarks suggest that
Kant could agree with me that certain actions are commanded by categorical imperatives in so far
as those actions are means to our universal, final, or highest end. If so, then, contrary to his own
remarks about the nature of categorical imperatives, not all such command ao action '' without
reference to another end". (I am grateful to an anonymous referee for this journal for emphasizing
this point.)
15. Of course, if certain actions are objectively valuable, then categorical imperatives will com-
mand us to perform those actions for their own sakes.
16. We must view all statements of reasons as s tatements of prima facie reasons. So my having
reason to beat my egg whites until they arc stiff can be outweighed by my reason to abandon my
apartment, given the fact that a fire is roaring through it.
17. Another way to distinguish the concepts of objective value and of subjective value is te> notice
that a state of affairs could have objective value without being related in any way to the subjective
states of agents. Such is not the case with respect to subjective value, however: to be subjectively
valuable just is to be appropriately related to certain subjective states of agents.
18. Of course, here I am talking about intrinsic value. Anything that is a means to the well-being of
sentient or rational creatures will have objective value, but it will have only instrumental objective
value.
19. In fact, however, most utilitarians have offered either a hedonistic or some version of a
desire-satisfaction conception of human well-being. Many philosophers will, therefore, identify
utilitarians as those consequentialists who have such a purely subjective conception of well-being,
i.e., a conception under which what bas value are certain subjective states of the agent or is
determined by certain subjective states of the agent. Nonetheless, utilitarians have tended to
identify well-being with pleasure or happiness, i.e., with some purely subjective notion. So those
consequentialists who reject such a purely subjective conception of welfare are still appropriately
regarded as utilitarians. See David Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press,1989), for a defense of a version of "objective utilitarianism."
20. Following Aristotle, we can say that the life. of pleasure fails to satisfy the condition of
self-sufficiency: it does not seem that in and of itself, pleasure makes a life worth living. Similarly,
the life of pleasure is not the most cboiceworthy life: even i we have pleasure, we still have reason
to pursue or to choose other ends. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Terence Irwin,tr. (Indian
apolis: Hackett Publishing Co., Inc., 1985), pp. 7,13-15.
 PERFECTION, HAPPII\'ESS, AND DUTIES TO SELF I 275

21. See Richard Kraut, "Two Conceptions of Happiness," The Philosophical Review, vol. 88 (1979),
pp. 181-82. Kraut makes a distinction between a subjective conception of happiness and an
objective conception of happiness which corresponds (at least in broad outline) to my distinction
between happiness and well-being.
22. The standards by which we measure the development of an individual's capacities may be
relativizcd to the individual 's inherent limitations, rather than being the same for all individuals, as
they are for Aristotle. Mill, given much of what he says on freedom of lifestyle in On Liberty
(Indianapolis: Hackel! Publishing Co., Inc., 1978), would agree with the former claim rather than
with Aristotle's. See Kraut,192ff.
23. See Mill, On Liberty, Chapter Ill, and Scanlon, p. 658.
24. Of course, in every individual life, there will arise questions about wben .it is appropriate t.o trade
away a certain amount of perfection for a great deal of pleasure, or even for a moderate amount of
pleasure. I am not going to auempt to address such questions here.
25. See his "Preference and Urgency,'' The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 72 (1975), p. 658.
26. See Scanlon, p. 656.
27. See Thomas Nagel, The Possibility ofAltruism (Princeton University Press, 1978), Part 111.
28. As I pointed out in footnote 9 above, for Kant, the notion of law is more fundamental for
morality than is that of duty, where the Iauer alone is tied to the notion of the moral "ought". I
reject this aspect of Kant's view, but will not pursue that issue here because it docs not figure
centrally in my argument. and would take us too far afield.
29. Some consequentialists claim tbat we ought to "satisfice" rather than to maximize with respect
to value, i.e. that we are morally bound to bring about "enough" value or a certain amount of value
but not bound to bring about the most that we possibly can. I cannot settle this disagreement here.
For a discussion of satisficing consequentialism, sec Michael Slote, Common-sense Morality and
Consequentialism (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1.985), Chapter Ill.
30. This way of viewing consequentialist duties should be attractive to those with various types of
egalitarian moral and/or political theories who want to claim that the worst-off have claims to a
certain share of resources.
31. !think that failing to see the point that I am making in the text has led to some infl.ueotial
criticisms of utilitarianism. For example, Michael Stocker, in "The Schizophrenia of Modern
Ethical Theories," reprinted in Twentieth Century Ethical Theory, Cahn and Haber, cds. {Engle
wood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1995),claims that "what is lacking in these theories (consequentialist
theories sucb as Moore's) is simply.. .the person" (535). Stocker accuses such consequentialists of
being concerned with the value of a person and not with the person, where I am claiming tbat tbe
former cannot be understood as anything other than the Iauer, unless one is seriously confused
about the nature of value. If Stocker's criticism does succeed against Moore (I do oottbink that it
does), that would be an argument against non-naturalism, not against moral theories concerned
with the promotion of value as such.
32. See, for example, tbe discus.~ion headed ''Duties Arising From Differences of Age,. in the
Lectures on Ethics.
33. A Theory ofJustice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 204.
34. Again, see Mill, On Liberty. Of course, we must also make a distinction between what we are
obligated to do and what we are permitted to do through the means of governmental coercion. I
may not be permitted to use legal means to fulfill my duties to promote the perfection of others, or
to fulfill all such duties.
35. There is a very complicated and difficult issue here that I am ignoring. To what extent are we
"responsible" for the subjective ends that we develop? ) am relying on a distinction between the
way we acquire our preferences and the way that we are assailed by diseases and natural disasters.
See Ronald Dworkin, "liberalism," in A Matter of Principle (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1985), pp. 192ft.
36. "Preference and Urgency," pp. 659-60.
276 I AM ERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

37. 1t has bee n suggested to me (by an anonymous referee for this journal) that Kant might say that
I have a duty to promote what people want only inSOfar as they deserve to get what they w.ant, i.e.,
in so far as their being virtuous makes them worthy of happiness. U that were Kanl's claim, then
Kant and I might be more in accord with respect to when we are obligated to secure for others the
satisfaction of their desires; at least, we would be in agreement that we have no general duty to do
so. (However, Kant would be claiming that we have a duty to promote such desire satisfaction as
rewards, and I am arguing that we have a duty to promote such when they are contributo:ry to or
components ofwellbeing.) However, many of Kant's claims seem to contradict sucb an interpreta
Lion. Most interestingly, in the Lectures on Ethics, he discusses our duties with respect to the
"rogue" (197). See alsop. 200 of that text.
38. This sort of attention to friends simply in virtue of their being friends is, of course, foreign to
much moral theory, including Kant's. For a discussion and defense of such attention, see my
"Friendship, Virtue, and Impartiality," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (forthcoming) .
39. Sec, for example, Marcus G. Singer, "On Duties to Oneself," Ethics, vol. 69 (1959), pp. 202-5.
Singer's worries apply only to the notion of duty. He claims that the notion requires for its
application the distinctness of the subjec t of the duty and of the obligee. However, the notion of
concern does not require for its application such distinctness, as Butler made clear. See his "Of
Personal Identity," reprinted in Persona/Identity, ed. John Perry (Berkeley: University of Califor
nia Press, 1975), pp. 99-106. Butler, in fact, argues that the notion of conce rn for one's future self
requires the strict or perfect identity of the subject over time.
40. For a discussion of duties to future selves as an implication of psychological reductionism, see
Parfit, Reasons and Per.rons, 318ff. For another attempt to connect concern for friends and concern
for future selves, see Jennifer Whiting, "Friends and Future Selves." The Philosophical Review, vol.
95 (1986), pp. 547-80.
41. The Possibility of Altruism, p. 74. There are, without doubt, difficulties in understanding such a
case.lt makes it seem as though our future selves are lurking around the corner,just waiting for us
to go away so that they can take our places, rather than being simply ourselves at some future t:ime.
Nonetheless, we do seem to be able to make some sense of the case.
42. See Philippa Foot, "Morality as a System of Hypothetical lmperativeoS," in Virtues and v:;ces and
Other Essays in Moral Philosophy (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1978), pp.. 157 73,
for a well-known auempt to refute Kant's e-quation of moral duties with the reasons expressed in
categorical imperatives.
43. 1 would like to thank Richard Fumerton, Guenter Zoeller, and an anonymous referee for this
journal for helpful comments on and discussion of previous drafts of this paper.