9/1/2016 G.R.No.

L39699

TodayisThursday,September01,2016

RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila

SECONDDIVISION

G.R.No.L39699March14,1979

SANMIGUELCORPORATION,petitioner,
vs.
HON.CELSOAVELINO,PresidingJudgeoftheCourtofFirstIn.stanceofCebu,BranchXIII,andtheCity
ofMandaue,respondents.

Gadioma&Colonforpetitioner.

LorenzoA.Parandiang,Jr.andAmadeoD.SenoforrespondentCityofMandaue.

FERNANDO,J.:

ItisunderstandableforpetitionerSanMiguelCorporationtoexpectthespeedydeterminationofitsclaimthatthe
challengedordinanceofrespondentCityofMandaue 1imposingaspecifictaxshouldbenullified.Henceitsconcern
atthefailureofrespondentJudgeCelsoAvelinooftheCourtofFirstInstanceofCebu,BranchXIII,tograntitsmotionto
dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction a complaint for the collection of such tax filed by respondent City. The
challengedorderreadsasfollows:"Actingonthe[motiontodismiss]filedbythedefendantthroughcounselonOctober11,
1974 and the [opposition] thereto filed by the plaintiff through counsel on October 17, 1974, the Court finds no justifiable
reasonindismissingtheComplaintatthisstageoftheproceedingsandherebydeniessaidmotion." 2Offhand,itwouldnot
beeasytoassailitscorrectness,manifestingasitdoescautionandcareinascertainingtheprincipalquestioninvolvedin
the suit for the collection of the specific tax, which is its validity. It is undoubted that under the Constitution, even the
legislative body cannot deprive this Court of its appellate jurisdiction over all cases coming from inferior courts where the
constitutionalityorvalidityofanordinanceorthelegalityofanytax,impost,assessment,ortollisinquestion.3Sinceitis
likewiseexpresslyprovidedinSection43oftheJudiciaryActthattheoriginaljurisdictionoverallcivilactionsinvolvingthe
legalityofanytax,impostorassessmentappertainstotheCourtofFirstInstance,4ittakesacertaindegreeofingenuityto
allegethatthelowercourtwasbereftofsuchauthority.Counselforpetitioner,AttorneyDemosthenesB.Gadioma,bothin
the petition and in his scholarly and exhaustive memorandum, did seek to impart plausibility to a suit of this character by
relying not so much on the alleges ultra vires or constitutional infirmity of the ordinance but rather on the failure of
respondent City to follow the procedure set fort in the Local Tax Code. 5 It was contended that there was a finding of
invalidity by the then Acting Justice Secretary, at present Acting Minister of Justice, Catalino Macaraig, Jr. There is
inaccuracy in such a characterization as the actual phrase used by such dignitary is that it "is of doubtful validity. 6 The
argumentpressedisthatasuitforcollectionisnottheappealprovidedforinthelastsentenceofSection47:"Thedecision
oftheSecretaryofJusticeshallbefinalandexecutoryunless,withinthirtydaysuponreceiptthereof,theaggrievedparty
contentsthesameinacourtofcompetentjurisdiction." 7RespondentCitydisagrees.Itisitssubmissionthatthesuitfor
collectioncannotbeviewedotherthanasanappeal.Theaggrievedparty,hererespondentCity,inthesuitforcollection,did
definitely contest the correctness of the decision of the Secretary of Justice in a court of competent jurisdiction this,
even on the assumption that there was a finding a invalidity. The statutory purpose is thus satisfied. Such an action is in
accordancewiththetraditionalandappropriateproceduretotestthelegalityofastatute,decree,orordinance.

This Court finds such an approach persuasive. It conforms to the authoritative principle that the question of
validityisforthejudiciarytodecide.AsfarbackastheleadingcaseofMarburyv.Madison, 8 where the American
SupremeCourtenunciatedtheprincipleofjudicialreview,ChiefJusticeMarshallstressed:"Itisemphaticallytheprovince
anddutyofthejudicialdepartmenttosaywhatthelawis." 9ThatwaspreciselywhatwasdonebyrespondentCity.Ithas
likewiseinitsfavorthefactthateventheverydecisionoftheActingSecretaryofJusticereliedupondidnotsquarelyrule
on the validity of the ordinance but only on its "doubtful character." The writs prayed for, certiorari and prohibition, cannot
issue.

Thefactsareundisputed.RespondentCity,inaccordancewithPresidentialDecreeNo.231,enactedin1973,to
takeeffectonJanuary1,1974,thechallengedordinance,otherwiseknownastheMandaueCityTaxCode.The
CityTreasurer,onApril1,1974,demandedfrompetitionerpaymentofthemadespecifictaxonthetotalvolume
ofbeeritproducedintheCityofMandaue.Petitioner,onApril8,1974,contestedthecorrectionofsaidspecific
tax"onthegroundthatSection12(e)(7)inrelationtoSection12(e)(1)and(2),MandaueCityOrdinanceNo.97,
is illegal and void because it imposed a specific tax beyond its territorial jurisdiction. " The matter was then
referredbyrespondentCitytoitsCityFiscalpursuanttosuchPresidentialDecree.Itsvaliditywassustained.Then
came the appeal to the Secretary of Justice, with the then Acting Secretary of Justice Macaraig, as noted,
rendering the opinion that it is "of doubtful validity." A suit for collection was thereafter filed by the City where it
squarelyputinissuethevalidityofsuchordinance,thuscontestingtheopinionoftheActingSecretaryofJustice.

The crucial issue from the petitioner's standpoint is whether the filing of such action after such opinion was
rendered may be considered "an appeal" under the Presidential Decree. Hence the motion to dismiss by
petitioner,whichwasdenied,respondentJudgefinding"nojustifiablereasonat[that]stageoftheproceedings10
ratinginthispetitionforcertiorariandprohibition.

Torepeat,thepetitionmustfaitThewritsprayedforcannotbegranted.

1.Terselyandbluntlyput,petitionerwoulddenythejurisdictionofrespondentJudgetopassuponthevalidityofa
challengedordinanceinanappropriateaction.Tosaytheleast,thereisunorthodoxyinsuchanapproachWhat
immediatelycallsattentionisitsnovelty.Itisopposedtoandisnotinconformitywiththeacceptedjuridicalnorm
that the validity of a statute, an executive order or ordinance is a matter for the judiciary to decide and that

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wheneverinthedispositionofapendingcasesuchaquestionbecomesunavoidable,thenitisnotonlythepower
but the duty of the Court to resolve such a question. In the pending suit by respondent City, sought to be
dismissed by petitioner corporation, it specifically prayed "that Ordinance No. 97, Series of 1973, of the herein
plaintiff is valid, legal, and enforceable in accordance with law ... 11 Since both under the Constitution and the
Judiciary Act, respondent Judge is vested with jurisdiction to make such a declaration, it would be, at the very least,
premature for the corrective power of this Tribunal to be interposed , just because he did not, "at [that] stage of the
proceedings," grant the motion to dismiss on the allegation that there was lack of jurisdiction. The authorities support
squarely the procedure followed by respondent City to remove doubts as to the validity of the ordinance in question. 12
Even more in point are these two decisions with reference to the municipal power to impose specific taxes on beverages
manufacturedwithinitsterritorialboundaries,CityofBacolodv.Gruet13andCityofNagav.CourtofAppeals.14Itisworth
mentioningthatinthefirstcasecited,theentityinvolvedispetitionercorporation,thenknownasSanMiguelBrewery,Inc.,
defendantandappellantGruetbeingsuedinhiscapacityasmanagerofitsCocaColaPlantinBacolodCity.

2.Thereisthisreinforcementtotheconclusionreached.TosoconstrueSection47wouldbetoraiseaserious
constitutional question For it would in effect bar what otherwise would be a proper case cognizable by a court
preciselyintheexerciseoftheconcededpowerofjudicialreviewjustbecausetheprocedurecontendedforwhich
isthatofan"appeal"underthecircumstancesatermvagueandambiguous,wasnotfollowed.Petitionermaynot
besufficientlyawareoftheimplicationsofsuchaproposition.Itwouldruncountertothewellsettleddoctrinethat
betweentwopossiblemodesofconstructions,theonewhichwouldnotbeinconflictwithwhatisordainedbythe
Constitutionistobepreferred.Everyintendmentofthelawshouldleantowardsitsvalidity,notitsinvalidity.15 The
judiciary,asnotedbyJusticeDouglas,should6favorthattinterpretrationoflegislationwhichgivesitthegreaterchanceof
givingthetestofconstitutionality.16

3.Theinherentweaknessofthissuitforcertiorariandprohibitionislikewisediscerniblefromthefactthatthethen
Acting Secretary of Justice Macaraig limited himself to a finding that the ordinance in question was "of doubtful
validity.17ThatisfarfromacategoricaldeclarationofitsbeingrepugnanttotheConstitutionoritsbeingultra vires. That
betraysarealizationthatunlessanduntilthejudiciaryspeaksinnouncertainterms,thepresumptionofvaliditycontinues
misgivings as to the likelihood of an alleged infringement of any binding norm do not suffice. There is this aphorism from
JusticeMalcolm"Todoubtistosustain. 18Thatismerelytoaccordrecognitiontothewellsettledandbindingdoctrinethat
onlyinaveryclearcaseisthejudiciaryjudgedinnullifyingastatute,orordinance.

4.Onelastword.ThedecisionydoesnotextendtoanydedeterminationbythisCourtastothevalidity,orlackof
it,oftheassailedordinance.Todosowouldbe,attheveryleast,premature.Thatisafunctionforthelowercourt
toperform.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. The of the case before respondent Judge should be conducted as
speedilyascircumstancespermit.Costsagainstpetitioner.

Barredo,Antonio,Aquino,Concepcion,Jr.,Santos,andAbadSantos,JJ.,concur.

#Footnotes

1OrdinanceNo.97,Section12(1973).

2Petition,AnnexH.

3AccordingtoArticleX,Section5,par.(2)oftheConstitution:"TheSupremeCourtshallhavethe
followingpowers:...(2)Reviewandrevise,reverse,modify,oraffirmonappealorcertiorari,asthe
lawortheRulesoftheCourtmayprovide,finaljudgmentsanddecreesininferiorcourtsin(a)all
casesinwhichtheconstitutionalityorvalidityofanytreaty,executiveagreement,law,ordinance,or
executiveorderorregulationisinquestion,(b)Allcasesinvolvingthelegalityofanytax,impost
assessment,ortoll,oranypenaltyimposedinrelationthereto."Underthe1935Constitution,the
equivalentprovisionisfoundinArticleVIII,Section,Section2,par.(1)and(2).

4RepublicActNo.296,Section43(1948).

5PresidentialDecreeNo.231,Section47(1973).

6Petition,par.7andAnnexE.

7LastsentenceofPD231,Section47.

81Cranch137(1803).

9Ibid,175.

10Petition,AnnexH.

11Petition,AnnexF.

12Tospeakofrecentcasesalone,thefollowingmaybeCited.YUKingv.CityofZamboangaL
20406,Dec.29,1966,18SCRA1241OrmocSugarCo.,Inc.v.MunicipalBoardofOrmocCity,L
24322,July21,1967,20SCRA739Villanuevav.CityofIloilo1,26521,Dec.28,1968,26SCRA
578Seraficav.TreasurerorCity,L24813,April28,1969,27SCRA1108ProcterandGamble
TradingCo.v.MunicipalityofMedina,L29125,Jan.31,1972,43SCRA130CityofBacolodv.
Enriquez,L27408,July25,1975,65SCRA381.

13117Phil.181(1963).

14L24954,August14,1968,24SCRA594.

15Cf.inreGuaria24Phil.37(1913)Radiowealthv.Agregardodo,86Phil.429(1950)Sanchezv.
LyonConstruction,87Phil.309(1950)Uyv.Genato,L37399,May29,1974,57SCRA123.

16ExparteEndo323US283,300(1944).

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17Petition,par7AnnexE.

18YuCongEngv.Trinidad,47Phil.385,414(1925).

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