8/31/2016 G.R.No.

L10405

TodayisWednesday,August31,2016

RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila

ENBANC

G.R.No.L10405December29,1960

WENCESLAOPASCUAL,inhisofficialcapacityasProvincialGovernorofRizal,petitionerappellant,
vs.
THESECRETARYOFPUBLICWORKSANDCOMMUNICATIONS,ETAL.,respondentsappellees.

Asst.FiscalNoliM.CortesandJoseP.Santosforappellant.
OfficeoftheAsst.SolicitorGeneralJoseG.BautistaandSolicitorA.A.Torresforappellee.

CONCEPCION,J.:

Appeal, by petitioner Wenceslao Pascual, from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, dismissing the
aboveentitledcaseanddissolvingthewritofpreliminaryinjunctionthereinissued,withoutcosts.

On August 31, 1954, petitioner Wenceslao Pascual, as Provincial Governor of Rizal, instituted this action for
declaratoryrelief,withinjunction,uponthegroundthatRepublicActNo.920,entitled"AnActAppropriatingFunds
for Public Works", approved on June 20, 1953, contained, in section 1C (a) thereof, an item (43[h]) of
P85,000.00 "for the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement" of Pasig feeder road
terminals(Gen.RoxasGen.AranetaGen.LucbanGen.CapinpinGen.SegundoGen.Delgado
Gen.MalvarGen.Lim)"that,atthetimeofthepassageandapprovalofsaidAct,theaforementionedfeeder
roads were "nothing but projected and planned subdivision roads, not yet constructed, . . . within the Antonio
Subdivision...situatedat...Pasig,Rizal"(accordingtothetracingsattachedtothepetitionasAnnexesAand
B,nearShawBoulevard,notfarawayfromtheintersectionbetweenthelatterandHighway54),whichprojected
feederroads"donotconnectanygovernmentpropertyoranyimportantpremisestothemainhighway"thatthe
aforementionedAntonioSubdivision(aswellasthelandsonwhichsaidfeederroadsweretobeconstrued)were
privatepropertiesofrespondentJoseC.Zulueta,who,atthetimeofthepassageandapprovalofsaidAct,wasa
member of the Senate of the Philippines that on May, 1953, respondent Zulueta, addressed a letter to the
MunicipalCouncilofPasig,Rizal,offeringtodonatesaidprojectedfeederroadstothemunicipalityofPasig,Rizal
that, on June 13, 1953, the offer was accepted by the council, subject to the condition "that the donor would
submitaplanofthesaidroadsandagreetochangethenamesoftwoofthem"thatnodeedofdonationinfavor
of the municipality of Pasig was, however, executed that on July 10, 1953, respondent Zulueta wrote another
letter to said council, calling attention to the approval of Republic Act. No. 920, and the sum of P85,000.00
appropriatedthereinfortheconstructionoftheprojectedfeederroadsinquestionthatthemunicipalcouncilof
PasigendorsedsaidletterofrespondentZuluetatotheDistrictEngineerofRizal,who,uptothepresent"hasnot
madeanyendorsementthereon"thatinasmuchastheprojectedfeederroadsinquestionwereprivateproperty
atthetimeofthepassageandapprovalofRepublicActNo.920,theappropriationofP85,000.00thereinmade,
fortheconstruction,reconstruction,repair,extensionandimprovementofsaidprojectedfeederroads,wasillegal
and,therefore,voidabinitio"thatsaidappropriationofP85,000.00wasmadebyCongressbecauseitsmembers
weremadetobelievethattheprojectedfeederroadsinquestionwere"publicroadsandnotprivatestreetsofa
private subdivision"' that, "in order to give a semblance of legality, when there is absolutely none, to the
aforementionedappropriation",respondentsZuluetaexecutedonDecember12,1953,whilehewasamemberof
theSenateofthePhilippines,anallegeddeedofdonationcopyofwhichisannexedtothepetitionofthe
four(4)parcelsoflandconstitutingsaidprojectedfeederroads,infavoroftheGovernmentoftheRepublicofthe
Philippinesthatsaidallegeddeedofdonationwas,onthesamedate,acceptedbythethenExecutiveSecretary
that being subject to an onerous condition, said donation partook of the nature of a contract that, such, said
donation violated the provision of our fundamental law prohibiting members of Congress from being directly or
indirectlyfinanciallyinterestedinanycontractwiththeGovernment,and,hence,isunconstitutional,aswellasnull
andvoidabinitio, for the construction of the projected feeder roads in question with public funds would greatly
enhanceorincreasethevalueoftheaforementionedsubdivisionofrespondentZulueta,"asidefromrelievinghim
fromtheburdenofconstructinghissubdivisionstreetsorroadsathisownexpense"thattheconstructionofsaid
projectedfeederroadswasthenbeingundertakenbytheBureauofPublicHighwaysandthat,unlessrestrained
bythecourt,therespondentswouldcontinuetoexecute,complywith,followandimplementtheaforementioned
illegal provision of law, "to the irreparable damage, detriment and prejudice not only to the petitioner but to the
Filipinonation."

Petitionerprayed,therefore,thatthecontesteditemofRepublicActNo.920bedeclarednullandvoidthatthe
allegeddeedofdonationofthefeederroadsinquestionbe"declaredunconstitutionaland,therefor,illegal"that
a writ of injunction be issued enjoining the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, the Director of the
Bureau of Public Works and Highways and Jose C. Zulueta from ordering or allowing the continuance of the
abovementioned feeder roads project, and from making and securing any new and further releases on the
aforementioneditemofRepublicActNo.920,andthedisbursingofficersoftheDepartmentofPublicWorksand
Highways from making any further payments out of said funds provided for in Republic Act No. 920 and that
pendingfinalhearingonthemerits,awritofpreliminaryinjunctionbeissuedenjoiningtheaforementionedparties
respondent from making and securing any new and further releases on the aforesaid item of Republic Act No.
920andfrommakinganyfurtherpaymentsoutofsaidillegallyappropriatedfunds.

Respondents moved to dismiss the petition upon the ground that petitioner had "no legal capacity to sue", and
thatthepetitiondid"notstateacauseofaction".Insupporttothismotion,respondentZuluetaallegedthatthe
ProvincialFiscalofRizal,notitsprovincialgovernor,shouldrepresenttheProvinceofRizal,pursuanttosection
1683oftheRevisedAdministrativeCodethatsaidrespondentis"notawareofanylawwhichmakesillegalthe

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appropriationofpublicfundsfortheimprovementsof...privateproperty"andthat,theconstitutionalprovision
invoked by petitioner is inapplicable to the donation in question, the same being a pure act of liberality, not a
contract.Theotherrespondents,inturn,maintainedthatpetitionercouldnotassailtheappropriationinquestion
because "there is no actual bona fide case . . . in which the validity of Republic Act No. 920 is necessarily
involved"andpetitioner"hasnotshownthathehasapersonalandsubstantialinterest"insaidAct"andthatits
enforcementhascausedorwillcausehimadirectinjury."

Acting upon said motions to dismiss, the lower court rendered the aforementioned decision, dated October 29,
1953,holdingthat,sincepublicinterestisinvolvedinthiscase,theProvincialGovernorofRizalandtheprovincial
fiscalthereofwhorepresentshimtherein,"havetherequisitepersonalities"toquestiontheconstitutionalityofthe
disputed item of Republic Act No. 920 that "the legislature is without power appropriate public revenues for
anything but a public purpose", that the instructions and improvement of the feeder roads in question, if such
roadswhereprivateproperty,wouldnotbeapublicpurposethat,beingsubjecttothefollowingcondition:

The within donation is hereby made upon the condition that the Government of the Republic of the
Philippineswillusetheparcelsoflandherebydonatedforstreetpurposesonlyandfornootherpurposes
whatsoever it being expressly understood that should the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
violatetheconditionherebyimposeduponit,thetitletothelandherebydonatedshall,uponsuchviolation,
ipsofactoreverttotheDONOR,JOSEC.ZULUETA.(Emphasissupplied.)

whichisonerous,thedonationinquestionisacontractthatsaiddonationorcontractis"absolutelyforbiddenby
the Constitution" and consequently "illegal", for Article 1409 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, declares in
existenceandvoidfromtheverybeginningcontracts"whosecause,objectorpurposeiscontrarytolaw,morals..
.orpublicpolicy"thatthelegalityofsaiddonationmaynotbecontested,however,bypetitionerherein,because
his "interest are not directly affected" thereby and that, accordingly, the appropriation in question "should be
upheld"andthecasedismissed.

Attheoutset,itshouldbenotedthatweareconcernedwithadecisiongrantingtheaforementionedmotionsto
dismiss,whichasmuch,aredeemedtohaveadmittedhypotheticallytheallegationsoffactmadeinthepetitionof
appellantherein.Accordingtosaidpetition,respondentZuluetaistheownerofseveralparcelsofresidentialland
situated in Pasig, Rizal, and known as the Antonio Subdivision, certain portions of which had been reserved for
the projected feeder roads aforementioned, which, admittedly, were private property of said respondent when
Republic Act No. 920, appropriating P85,000.00 for the "construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and
improvement"ofsaidroads,waspassedbyCongress,aswellaswhenitwasapprovedbythePresidentonJune
20, 1953. The petition further alleges that the construction of said roads, to be undertaken with the
aforementionedappropriationofP85,000.00,wouldhavetheeffectofrelievingrespondentZuluetaoftheburden
ofconstructinghissubdivisionstreetsorroadsathisownexpenses,1andwould"greatlyenhanceorincreasethe
value of the subdivision" of said respondent. The lower court held that under these circumstances, the
appropriationinquestionwas"clearlyforaprivate,notapublicpurpose."

Respondents do not deny the accuracy of this conclusion, which is selfevident. 2However, respondent Zulueta
contended,inhismotiontodismissthat:

A law passed by Congress and approved by the President can never be illegal because Congress is the
source of all laws . . . Aside from the fact that movant is not aware of any law which makes illegal the
appropriation of public funds for the improvement of what we, in the meantime, may assume as private
property...(RecordonAppeal,p.33.)

Thefirstpropositionmustberejectedmostemphatically,itbeinginconsistentwiththenatureoftheGovernment
established under the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and the system of checks and balances
underlying our political structure. Moreover, it is refuted by the decisions of this Court invalidating legislative
enactmentsdeemedviolativeoftheConstitutionororganiclaws.3

Asregardsthelegalfeasibilityofappropriatingpublicfundsforapublicpurpose,theprincipleaccordingtoRuling
CaseLaw,isthis:

It is a general rule that the legislature is without power to appropriate public revenue for anything but a
publicpurpose....Itistheessentialcharacterofthedirectobjectoftheexpenditurewhichmustdetermine
itsvalidityasjustifyingatax,andnotthemagnitudeoftheinteresttobeaffectednorthedegreetowhich
thegeneraladvantageofthecommunity,andthusthepublicwelfare,maybeultimatelybenefitedbytheir
promotion.Incidentaltothepublicortothestate,whichresultsfromthepromotionofprivateinterestand
the prosperity of private enterprises or business, does not justify their aid by the use public money. (25
R.L.C.pp.398400Emphasissupplied.)

TheruleissetforthinCorpusJurisSecunduminthefollowinglanguage:

In accordance with the rule that the taxing power must be exercised for public purposes only, discussed
supra sec. 14, money raised by taxation can be expended only for public purposes and not for the
advantageofprivateindividuals.(85C.J.S.pp.645646emphasissupplied.)

Explainingthereasonunderlyingsaidrule,CorpusJurisSecundumstates:

Generally, under the express or implied provisions of the constitution, public funds may be used only for
publicpurpose.Therightofthelegislaturetoappropriatefundsiscorrelativewithitsrighttotax,and,under
constitutionalprovisionsagainsttaxationexceptforpublicpurposesandprohibitingthecollectionofatax
foronepurposeandthedevotionthereoftoanotherpurpose,noappropriationofstatefundscanbemade
forotherthanforapublicpurpose.

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The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public funds is whether the statute is
designed to promote the public interest, as opposed to the furtherance of the advantage of individuals,
althougheachadvantagetoindividualsmightincidentallyservethepublic.(81C.J.S.pp.1147emphasis
supplied.)

Needlesstosay,thisCourtisfullyinaccordwiththeforegoingviewswhich,apartfrombeingpatentlysound,are
anecessarycorollarytoourdemocraticsystemofgovernment,which,assuch,existsprimarilyforthepromotion
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of the general welfare. Besides, reflecting as they do, the established jurisprudence in the United States, after
whoseconstitutionalsystemourshasbeenpatterned,saidviewsandjurisprudenceare,likewise,partandparcel
ofourownconstitutionallaw. la w p h il.n e t

This notwithstanding, the lower court felt constrained to uphold the appropriation in question, upon the ground
that petitioner may not contest the legality of the donation above referred to because the same does not affect
him directly. This conclusion is, presumably, based upon the following premises, namely: (1) that, if valid, said
donation cured the constitutional infirmity of the aforementioned appropriation (2) that the latter may not be
annulledwithoutapreviousdeclarationofunconstitutionalityofthesaiddonationand(3)thattherulesetforthin
Article1421oftheCivilCodeisabsolute,andadmitsofnoexception.Wedonotagreewiththesepremises.

ThevalidityofastatutedependsuponthepowersofCongressatthetimeofitspassageorapproval,notupon
events occurring, or acts performed, subsequently thereto, unless the latter consists of an amendment of the
organiclaw,removing,withretrospectiveoperation,theconstitutionallimitationinfringedbysaidstatute.Referring
to the P85,000.00 appropriation for the projected feeder roads in question, the legality thereof depended upon
whethersaidroadswerepublicorprivatepropertywhenthebill,which,latteron,becameRepublicAct920,was
passedbyCongress,or,whensaidbillwasapprovedbythePresidentandthedisbursementofsaidsumbecame
effective,oronJune20,1953(seesection13ofsaidAct).Inasmuchasthelandonwhichtheprojectedfeeder
roadsweretobeconstructedbelongedthentorespondentZulueta,theresultisthatsaidappropriationsoughta
privatepurpose,andhence,wasnullandvoid.4ThedonationtotheGovernment,overfive(5)monthsafterthe
approval and effectivity of said Act, made, according to the petition, for the purpose of giving a "semblance of
legality",orlegalizing,theappropriationinquestion,didnotcureitsaforementionedbasicdefect.Consequently,a
judicialnullificationofsaiddonationneednotprecedethedeclarationofunconstitutionalityofsaidappropriation.

Again,Article1421ofourCivilCode,likemanyotherstatutoryenactments,issubjecttoexceptions.Forinstance,
the creditors of a party to an illegal contract may, under the conditions set forth in Article 1177 of said Code,
exercise the rights and actions of the latter, except only those which are inherent in his person, including
therefore,hisrighttotheannulmentofsaidcontract,eventhoughsuchcreditorsarenotaffectedbythesame,
exceptindirectly,inthemannerindicatedinsaidlegalprovision.

Again,itiswellstatedthatthevalidityofastatutemaybecontestedonlybyonewhowillsustainadirectinjuryin
consequence of its enforcement. Yet, there are many decisions nullifying, at the instance of taxpayers, laws
providingforthedisbursementofpublicfunds,5uponthetheorythat"theexpenditureofpublicfundsbyanofficer
oftheStateforthepurposeofadministeringanunconstitutionalactconstitutesa misapplication of such funds,"
which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer.6Although there are some decisions to the contrary, 7the
prevailingviewintheUnitedStatesisstatedintheAmericanJurisprudenceasfollows:

In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite standing to attack the
constitutionality of a statute, the general rule is that not only persons individually affected, but also
taxpayers, have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of moneys raised by taxation and
maythereforequestiontheconstitutionalityofstatutesrequiringexpenditureofpublicmoneys.(11Am.Jur.
761emphasissupplied.)

However,thisviewwasnotfavoredbytheSupremeCourtoftheU.S.inFrothinghamvs.Mellon(262U.S.447),
insofar as federal laws are concerned, upon the ground that the relationship of a taxpayer of the U.S. to its
Federal Government is different from that of a taxpayer of a municipal corporation to its government. Indeed,
underthecomposite system of government existing in the U.S., the states of the Union are integral part of the
Federationfromaninternationalviewpoint,but,eachstateenjoysinternallyasubstantialmeasureofsovereignty,
subjecttothelimitationsimposedbytheFederalConstitution.Infact,thesamewasmadebyrepresentativesof
eachstateoftheUnion,notofthepeopleoftheU.S.,exceptinsofarastheformerrepresentedthepeopleofthe
respectiveStates,andthepeopleofeachStatehas,independentlyofthatoftheothers,ratifiedsaidConstitution.
In other words, the Federal Constitution and the Federal statutes have become binding upon the people of the
U.S.inconsequenceofanactof,and,inthissense,throughtherespectivestatesoftheUnionofwhichtheyare
citizens. The peculiar nature of the relation between said people and the Federal Government of the U.S. is
reflected in the election of its President, who is chosen directly, not by the people of the U.S., but by electors
chosenbyeachState, in such manner as the legislature thereof may direct (Article II, section 2, of the Federal
Constitution). la w p h i1 .n e t

TherelationbetweenthepeopleofthePhilippinesanditstaxpayers,ontheotherhand,andtheRepublicofthe
Philippines,ontheother,isnotidenticaltothatobtainingbetweenthepeopleandtaxpayersoftheU.S.andits
FederalGovernment.Itiscloser,fromadomesticviewpoint,tothatexistingbetweenthepeopleandtaxpayersof
each state and the government thereof, except that the authority of the Republic of the Philippines over the
peopleofthePhilippinesismorefullydirectthanthatofthestatesoftheUnion,insofarasthesimpleandunitary
type of our national government is not subject to limitations analogous to those imposed by the Federal
ConstitutionuponthestatesoftheUnion,andthoseimposedupontheFederalGovernmentintheinterestofthe
Union. For this reason, the rule recognizing the right of taxpayers to assail the constitutionality of a legislation
appropriatinglocalorstatepublicfundswhichhasbeenupheldbytheFederalSupremeCourt(Cramptonvs.
Zabriskie, 101 U.S. 601) has greater application in the Philippines than that adopted with respect to acts of
CongressoftheUnitedStatesappropriatingfederalfunds.

Indeed,intheProvinceofTayabasvs.Perez(56Phil.,257),involvingtheexpropriationofalandbytheProvince
ofTayabas,two(2)taxpayersthereofwereallowedtointerveneforthepurposeofcontestingthepricebeingpaid
to the owner thereof, as unduly exorbitant. It is true that in Custodio vs. President of the Senate (42 Off. Gaz.,
1243), a taxpayer and employee of the Government was not permitted to question the constitutionality of an
appropriationforbackpayofmembersofCongress.However,inRodriguezvs.TreasurerofthePhilippinesand
Barredovs.CommissiononElections(84Phil.,36845Off.Gaz.,4411),weentertainedtheactionoftaxpayers
impugningthevalidityofcertainappropriationsofpublicfunds,andinvalidatedthesame.Moreover,thereason
thatimpelledthisCourttotakesuchpositioninsaidtwo(2)casestheimportanceoftheissuesthereinraised
ispresentinthecaseatbar.Again,likethepetitionersintheRodriguezandBarredocases,petitionerhereinis
notmerelyataxpayer.TheProvinceofRizal,whichherepresentsofficiallyasitsProvincialGovernor,isourmost
populatedpoliticalsubdivision, 8and,thetaxpayersthereinbearasubstantialportionoftheburdenoftaxation,in
thePhilippines.

Hence, it is our considered opinion that the circumstances surrounding this case sufficiently justify petitioners
actionincontestingtheappropriationanddonationinquestionthatthisactionshouldnothavebeendismissed
bythelowercourtandthatthewritofpreliminaryinjunctionshouldhavebeenmaintained.
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Wherefore,thedecisionappealedfromisherebyreversed,andtherecordsareremandedtothelowercourtfor
furtherproceedingsnotinconsistentwiththisdecision,withthecostsofthisinstanceagainstrespondentJoseC.
Zulueta.Itissoordered.

Paras,C.J.,Bengzon,Padilla,BautistaAngelo,Labrador,Reyes,J.B.L.,Barrera,GutierrezDavid,Paredes,and
Dizon,JJ.,concur.

Footnotes

1For,pursuanttosection19(h)oftheexistingrulesandregulationoftheUrbanPlanningCommission,the
ownerofasubdivisionisunderobligation"toimprove,repairandmaintainallstreets,highwaysandother
waysinhissubdivisionuntiltheirdedicationtopublicuseisacceptedbythegovernment."

2ExparteBagwell,79P.2d.395RoadDistrictNo.4ShelbyCountyvs.Allred.68S.W2d164Stateex
rel.Thomsonvs.Giessel,53N.W.2d.726,AttorneyGeneralvs.CityofEauClaire,37Wis.400Stateex
rel.Smithvs.AnnuityPensionBoard,241Wis.625,6N.W.2d.676Statevs.Smith,293N.W.161State
vs. Dammann 280 N.W. 698 Sjostrum vs. State Highway Commission 228 P. 2d. 238 Hutton vs.Webb,
126N.C.897,36S.E.341MichiganSugarCo.vs.AuditorGeneral,124Mich.674,83N.W.625Oxnard
BeetSugarCo.vs.State,105N.W.716.

3Casanovasvs.Hord.8Phil.,McGirrvs.Hamilton,30Phil.,563CompaniaGeneraldeTabacosvs.Board
ofPublicUtility,34Phil.,136CentralCapizvs. Ramirez, 40 Phil., 883 Concepcion vs. Paredes, 42 Phil.,
599 U.S. vs. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil., 6 McDaniel vs. Apacible, 44 Phil., 248 People vs. Pomar, 46 Phil.,
440Agcaoilivs.Suguitan,48Phil.,676GovernmentofP.I.vs.Springer,50Phil.,259ManilaElectricCo.
vs. Pasay Transp. Co., 57 Phil., 600 People vs. Linsangan, 62 Phil., 464 People and Hongkong &
ShanghaiBankingCorp.vs.JoseO.Vera,65Phil.,56Peoplevs.Carlos,78Phil.,53544Off.Gaz.428In
reCunanan,94Phil.,53450Off.Gaz.,1602CityofBaguiovs.Nawasa,106Phil.,144CityofCebuvs.
Nawasa,107Phil.,1112Ruttervs.Esteban,93Phil.,68Off.Gaz.,[5]1807.

4InthelanguageoftheSupremeCourtofNebraska,"Anunconstitutionalstatuteisalegalstillbirth,which
neithermoves,norbreathes,norholdsoutanysignoflife.Itisaformwithoutonevitalspark.Itiswholly
deadfromthetimeofconception,and,noright,eitherlegalorequitable,arisesfromsuchinanimatething."
(OxnardBeetSugarCo.vs.State,102N.W.80.).

5See,amongothers,Livermore,vs.Waite,102Cal.113,25L.R.A.312,36P.424Crawfordvs.Gilchrist,
64Fla.41,59So.963Lucasvs.AmericanHawaiianEngineeringandConstr.Co.,16Haw.80Castlevs.
Capena,5Haw.27Littlervs.Jayne,124Ill.123,16N.E.374Burkevs.Snively,208I11.328,70N.E.372
Ellinghamvs.Dye,178Ind.336,99N.E.1Christmasvs. Warfield, 105 Md. 536 Sears vs. Steel, 55 Or.
544,107Pac.3Stateexrel.Taylorvs.Pennover,26Or.205,37Pac.906Carmanvs. Woodruf, 10 Or.
123MacKinleyvs.Watson,145Pac.266Searsvs.James,47Or.50,82Pac.14Mottvs.Pennsylvania
R.Co.,30Pa.9,72Am.Dec.664Bradlyvs.PowerCounty,37Am.Dec.563Frostvs.Thomas,26Colo.
227,77Am.St.Rep.259,56Pac.899Martinvs.Ingham,38Kan.641,17Pac.162Martinvs.Lacy,39
Kan.703,18Pac.951Smithvs.Maguerich,44Ga.163Giddingsvs.Blacker,93Mich.1,16L.R.A.402,
52N.W.944Rippevs.Becker,56Minn.100,57N.W.331Auditorvs.Treasurer,4S.C.311McCullough
vs.Brown,31S.C.220,19S.E.458Stateexrel.Lambvs.Cummingham,83Wis.90,53N.W.35Stateex
rel.Rosenhianvs.Frear,138Wis.173,119N.W.894.

6Rubsvs.Thompson,56N.E.2d.761Reidvs.Smith,375Ill.147,30N.E.2d.908Fergusvs. Russel,
270 Ill. 304, 110 N.E. 130 Burke vs. Snively, 208 Ill. 328 Jones vs. Connell, 266 Ill. 443, 107 N.E. 731
Dudickvs.Baumann,349[PEPSI]Ill.46,181N.E.690.

7Thompsonvs.CanalFundComps.,2Abb.Pr.248Shieffelinvs.Komfort,212N.Y.520,106N.E.675
Hutchisonvs.Skinmer,21Misc.729,49N.Y.Supp.360Longvs.Johnson,70Misc.308127N.Y.Supp.
756Whitebackvs.Hooker,73Misc.573,133N.Y.Supp.534Stateexrel.Cranmervs. Thorson, 9 S.D.
149,68N.W.202Davenportvs.Elrod,20S.D.567,107N.W.833IndianaJonesvs.Reed,3Wash.57,
27Pac.1067Birminghamvs.Cheetham,19Wash.657,54Pac.37Tacomavs.Bridges,25Wash.221,
65Pac.186Hilgervs.State,63Wash.457,116Pac.19.

8Ithas1,463,530inhabitants.

TheLawphilProjectArellanoLawFoundation

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