Evidence Case Summaries

Mercedita De Jesus
v
Atty. Juvy Mell Sanchez- Malit
A.C. No.6470 July 8, 2014
CJ Sereno
Disbarment complaint
March 1, 2002 Atty. Sanchez-Malit drafted and notarized a Real Estate
Mortgage of a public market stall that falsely named
Mercedita as its absolute and registered owner.
The mortgagee sued the complainant, Mercedita for perjury
and for collection of sum of money.
Mercedita claimed that Atty. Sanchez was a consultant of the
local government unit of Dinalupihan, Bataan and was aware
that the market stall was government-owned.
Before that, Atty. Sanchez also notarized 2 contracts that
caused Mercedita legal and financial problems.
One contract was a lease agreement notarized sometime in

September 1999 without the signature of the lessees.
Mercedita found out that the agreement was not signed by
the lessees when she lost her copy and asked another from
Atty. Sanchez.
The other contact was a sale agreement over a property

covered by a Certificate of Lad Ownership Award which
Mercedita entered into with a Certain Nicomedes Tala
sometime on February 1998. Atty. Sanchez drafted and
notarized said agreement but did not advise Mercedita that
the property was still covered by the period within which it
could not be alienated.
Complainant then submitted 3 special powers of attorney
notarized by Atty. Sanchez-Malit and an Affidavit of Irene
Tolentino, Mercedita's secretary/ treasurer. The SPAs were
not signed by the principals named therein and bore only the
signature of the attorney in fact, Florina Limpioso. Tolentino's
affidavit corroborated complainant's allegations against
respondent.
AQUINOCJU | Page 1 of 76 | Case Summaries of Selected Cases Assigned Under Evidence

August 4, 2004 SC issued a Resolution reequiring respondent to submit her
comment on the Complaint
In her Comment, Atty. Sanchez-Malit explained that the
mortgage contract was prepared in the presence of
Mercedita and that Mercedita read it before she affixed her
signature. However, Mercedita urgently needed the loan
proceeds so the contractwas hastily done. It was only copied
from a similar file in Atty. Sanchez-Malit's computer and the
phrase "absolute and registered owner" was inadvertently
left unedited.
Atty. Sanchez-Malit argued that Mercedita constructed the
subject public market under a Build operate and Transfer
contract with the LGU and technically she could be
considered as its owner.
Further, Atty. Sanchez-Malit said that there had been a prior
mortgage contract over the same property in which
Mercedita respresented herself as its owner but she did not
complain.
The cause of the perhury charge against Merceidta was not

due to the latter's representation as owner of the mortgaged
property but her guarantee that it was free from all liens and
encumbrances.
The perjury charge was even dismissed because the
prosecutor found that Mercedita and her spouse paid the
debt secured with the previous mortgage contract over the
same market stall.
With regard to the lease agreement, Atty. Sanchez-Malit

explained that the document attached to the Affidavit-
Complaint was new. She gave the court's copy of the
agreement to complainant to accommodate Mercedita's
request for an extra copy. Thus, Atty. Sanchez-Malit
prepared and notraized a new one, relying on complainant's
assurance that the lessees would sign it and that it would be
returned inliue of the original copy for the court. But
Mercedita did not keep her promise.
As for the purchase agreement of the property covered by

the CLOA, Atty. Sanchez-Malit claimed that Mercedita was
an experienced realty broker and thus she needed no advice
on the repercussions of that transaction. As a matter of fact,
when the purchase agreement was notraized, Mercedita did
not presen the CLOA so that agreement mentioned nothing
about it. Rather, the agreement expressly stated that the
proprerty was the subject of a case pending before the
DARAB. Hence Mercedita knew of the status of the subject
property.
Finally, Atty. Sanchez-Malit maintained that the SPAs that

were submitted by Mercedita were properly notarized. It can
be gleaned from the documents that the attorney in fact
personally appeared before Atty. Sanchez-Malit. Hence, the
notarization was limited to the attorney in fact's participation
in the execution of the document. Further, the
acknowledgement clearly stated that the document must be
notarized in the principal's place of residence.
An exchange of pleading ensued thereafter.
After her rejoinder, Mercedita filed an Urgent Ex parte Motion
for Submission of Additional Evidence. Attached thereto
were copies of documents notarized by Atty. Sanchez-Malit.
1) an Extra Judicial Deed of Partition which referred to the

SPAs naming Limpioso as attorney-in-fact; (2) five SPAs that
lacked the signatures of either the principal or the attorney-
in-fact; (3) two deeds of sale with incomplete signatures of
the parties thereto; (4) an unsigned Sworn Statement; (5) a
lease contract that lacked the signature of the lessor; (6) five
unsigned Affidavits; (7) an unsigned insurance claim form
(Annual Declaration by the Heirs); (8) an unsigned Invitation
Letter toa potential investor in Japan; (9) an unsigned Bank
Certification; and (10)an unsigned Consent to Adoption.
After the mandatory conference and hearing, the parties
submitted their respective Position Papers.
Atty. Sanchez-Malit's position paper did not tackle the
additional document attached to the complainant's urgent ex
parte motion

Findings of the IBP Investigationg Commisioner recommended the
IBP immediate revocation of the Notarial Commission of Atty
Sanchez-Malit and her disqualification as notary public for 2
years for committing violations such as notarizing documents
without the sgnatures of the parties who had purportedly
apeared before her. He accepted Atty. Sanchez-Malit's
explanation as regards the lease agreement, sale contract
and the 3 SPAs pertaining to Limpioso. But found that the
inacurate crafting of the REM contract was a sufficient basis
to hold Atty. Sanchez-Malit liable for violation of Canon 18
Rule 18.03 of CPR.
He also recommended that she be suspended from the

practice of law for 6 months.
IBP Board of Governors adopeted and approved the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
Atty. Sanchez-Malit filed 2 MRs.
She maintained that the additional documents submitted by

Mercedita were inadmissible as they were obtained without
observing the procedural requisites set forth in Sec 4 Rule IV
of Adm. No 02-08-13 SC (2004 Ruled on Notarial Practice).
Also, the Urgent ex parte motion of Mercedita was actually a

supplemental pleading which was prohibited under the rules
of procedure of the Committee on Bar Discipline. And
besides, Mercedita was not the proper party to question
those document.
Atty. Sanchez-Malit concluded that the the investigating

commisioner should have expunged the documents from the
record instead of giving them due course.
Respondent also prayed that mitigating circumstances be

considered, specifically the following: absence of prior
disciplinary record; absence of dishonest or selfish motive;
personal and emotional problems; timely goodfaith effort to
make restitution or to rectify the consequences of her
misconduct; full and free disclosure to the disciplinary board

or cooperative attitude toward the proceedings; character or
reputation; remorse; and remoteness of prior offenses.
IBP Board of Gov DENIED Atty. Sanchez-Malit's MRs for
lack of substantial reason to justify a reversal.
Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the RoC, the Director for Bar
Discipline transmitted the documents pertaining to the
disbarment complaint against Atty. Sanchez-Malit
RULING Re: Additional Evidence
Atty Sanchez-Malit argues that the additional documents
submitted in evidence by complainant are inadmissible for
having been obtained in violation of the Notarial Rules. The
SC rejected this argument.
Sec. 3 Rule 128 of the Revised Rules on Evidence:

evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue
and is not excluded by the law or these rules.
Compared to Tolentino v Mendoza (Rule 24 AO 1 s.

1993) --only provides for sanctions against persons
violating the rule on confidentiality of birth records but
nowhere does it state that procurement of birth records
in violation of said rule would render said records
inadmissible in evidence.
Revised Ruled of Evidence only provides for the

exclusion of evidence if it is obtained as a result of
illegal searches and seizures. The said rule against
unreasonable searches and seizures is meant only to
protect a person from interference by the govt or the
state.
People v Hipol: The Constitutional proscription enshrined in

the Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation
between a private individual and another individual. It
governs the relationship between the individual and the
State and its agents.
The Bill of Rights only temprs governmental power and

protects the individual against any aggression and

unwarrated interference by any dept of govt and its
agencies.
Since both Rule 24 AO 1 and Revised Rules on Evidence

do not provide for the exclusion from evidence of the
birth cert., said public documents are thus admissible
and should be properly taken into consideration
Case at bar: 2004 Rules on Notarial Law contain no

provision declaring the inadmissibilit of documents obtained
in violation therof. Hence the IBP correctly consider in
evidene the other notarized documents submitted by
complainant as additional evidence.
Misc. The important role a notary public performs cannot be

overemphasized. The Court has repeatedlystressed that
notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act, but
one invested with substantive public interest. Notarization
converts a private document into a public document, making
it admissible in evidence without further proof of its
authenticity. Thus, a notarized document is, by law, entitled
tofull faith and credit upon its face. It is for this reason that a
notary public must observe with utmost care the basic
requirements in the performance of his notarial duties;
otherwise, the public's confidence in the integrity of a
notarized document would be undermined.
Where the notary public admittedly has personal knowledge

of a false statement or information contained in the
instrument to be notarized, yet proceeds to affix the notarial
seal on it, the Court must not hesitate to discipline the notary
public accordingly as the circumstances of the case may
dictate. Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of the
notarization process may be undermined, and public
confidence in notarial documents diminished.21 In this case,
respondent fully knew that complainant was not the owner of
the mortgaged market stall. That complainant comprehended
the provisions of the real estate mortgage contractdoes not
make respondent any less guilty. If at all, it only heightens

the latters liability for tolerating a wrongful act. Clearly,
respondents conduct amounted to a breach of Canon
122 and Rules 1.0123 and 1.0224 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Respondents explanation about the unsigned lease

agreement executed by complainant sometime in September
199925 is incredulous. If, indeed, her file copy of the
agreement bore the lessees signatures, she could have
given complainant a certified photocopy thereof. It even
appears that said lease agreement is not a rarityin
respondents practice as a notary public. Records show that
on various occasions from 2002 to 2004, respondent has
notarized 22 documents that were either unsigned or lacking
signatures of the parties. Technically, each document maybe
a ground for disciplinary action, for it is the duty of a notarial
officer to demand that a document be signed in his or her
presence.26
A notary public should not notarize a document unless the
persons who signed it are the very same ones who executed
it and who personally appeared before the said notary public
to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated
therein.27 Thus, in acknowledging that the parties personally
came and appeared before her, respondent also violated
Rule 10.0128 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
her oath as a lawyer that she shall do no
falsehood.29 Certainly, respondent is unfit to continue
enjoying the solemn office of a notary public. In several
instances, the Court did not hesitate to disbar lawyers who
were found to be utterly oblivious to the solemnity of their
oath as notaries public.30 Even so, the rule is that
disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct
that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer
as an officer of the court and the Court will not disbar a
lawyer where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the
desired end.31 The blatmt disregard by respondent of her
basic duties as a notary public warrants the less severe
punishment of suspension from the practice of law and
perpetual disqualification to be commissioned as a notary
public.

Dispositive WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Juvy Mell Sanchez-Malit is
Portion found guilty of violating Canon 1 and Rules 1.01, 1.02, and
10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility as well as
her oath as notary public. Hence, she is SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for ONE YEAR effective immediately. Her
notarial commission, if still existing, is IMMEDIATELY
REVOKED and she is hereby PERPETUALLY
DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary
public.

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR,
Complainant
v
JUDGE ALBERTO L. LERMA,
Respondent.
ATTY. LOURDES A. ONA,

Complainant,
- versus -
Respondent.
JOSE MARI L. DUARTE,

Complainant,
- versus -
Respondent.
RET. GENERAL MELITON D. GOYENA,

Complainant,
- versus -
Respondent.
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR,

Complainant,
- versus -
Respondent.
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2076

A.M. No. RTJ-07-2077
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2078
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2079
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2080
October 12, 2010

PER CURIAM:

5 administrative cases were filed with the OCA against hudge
Lerma of RTC Branch 256 Muntinlupa City
In a Memo, Court Administrator Lock referred to CJ Puno the 5
administrative cases filed against Judge Lerma.
The cases were redocketed and thereafter referred to an
Investigating Justice of the CA for investigation and
recommendation
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2076
November 27, ccusatory portion of the information which charged him with
1995 unlawful possession of a caliber .30 U.S. carbine with two
magazines and twenty-five (25) rounds of ammunition.
Ruperto Pizarro Bruno was charged with vioaltion of PD 1866

in an information filed with RTC Rosales Pangasinan. Since
the accused was already detained in QC jail due to the
pendency of another criminal case filed against him, the court
ordered that all notices of hearings and proceedings be
forwarded to the Jail Warden of the QC jail.
Warden of QC jail informed Judge bauzon of RTC Rosales that
accused was transferred to Bureau of Corrections in
Muntinlupa in complaince with the commitment order and
decision in another case
SC directed Clerk of RTC Rosales to forward records to EJ
RTC muntinlupa; raffle the case and arraiged the accused and
take his testimony and then the clerk of RTC muntinlupa to
return the records to RTC Rosales
September 29, Accused was arraigned before Judge Lerma
1998
Judge Lerma then received the evidence for the prosecution
February 7, prosecution formally offered its exhibits but the firearm subject
2003 of the information was NOT included in the formal offer
June 27, 2005 the accused filed a motion for leave of court to file demurrer to
prosecution's evidence
Judge lerma granted the motion
Nov 8, 2005 demurrer to prosecutions evidene was filed contending that
without the subject firearm the prosecution failed to prove an

essential element of the offense
february 28, judge lerma granted the demurrer and dismissed the case of
2007 insufficiency of evidence
in a memo, the OCA charged judge lerma with exceeding his
authority. the authority given to judge lrma was limited to the
arraignment of the accused and taking his testimony. it did not
authorize him to decide on the merist of the case. such act
constitued violation of SC directive, a less serious offence
under Sec 9(4) Rule 140 of the RRoC
Judge lerma, in his comment asserted that there was neither a
conscious nor a deliberate intent on his part to disobey any SC
directive when he granted the demurrer to evidence. he
claimed that through inadvertence, he was not able to recall
the lomots of the referral made to him and stressed that he
ruled on the merits of the case in away not tainted with fraud,
etc.
Under Section 9(4), Rule 140, Revised Rules of Court, failure
to obey the Courts resolution is a less serious offense that
carries a penalty of suspension from office without salary and
other benefits for not less than one (1) month or more than
three (3) months, or a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not
exceeding P20,000.00.
RULING Respondent judge was found wanting in the diligence required
of him. We agree with the Investigating Justice in finding
respondent judge guilty of violating a Supreme Court directive,
and impose upon him a fine of P15,000.00.
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2080
Godofredo Galandinez Jr. president of the Alabang Country
Club, wrote a letter in response to another letter from Court
Admin Lock stated that Judge Lerma played golf at the
Alabang Country club in certain dates and time.
Judge Lerma usually played 18 holes of golf on almost all
those times
In another letter, Hirofumi Hotta, operations manager of TAT
Filipinas Golf Club, Judge Lerma likewise played golf on

several dates, all thurdays and all around 1:30PM
According to the OCA, its records show that Judge Lerma did
not declare his absences on days during which he reportedly
played golf at the Alabang Country Club.
Furthermore, an officer certified that Judge Lerma did not file

any application for a leave of absence duting the dates
mentioned by Hirofumi.
OCA asserted that on the days Judge lerma played golf he
was lost to the judiciary for half the working session hours on
those days, positing that htis is not merely truancy but also
dishonesty and falsification of certificates of service
Judge Lerma's Respondent judge, in his comment, countered that contrary to
comment the allegations of the OCA, he only played golf thrice in 2000,
once in 2001, twice in 2002, six (6) times in 2005, and five (5)
times in 2006 a total of eighteen (18) times in six years, or at
the average of three (3) times a year. He argued that his
playing golf 18 times in six years, or thrice a year, could not be
reasonably characterized as habitual to the extent that it
jeopardized the discharge of his functions as a judge. He
alleged that since he shared his courtroom with the other
judges in Muntinlupa, he only played golf on days when no
other place was available for him to carry out his official
functions.Likewise, he explained that, in 1996, his physician
advised him to exercise more vigorously after he was
diagnosed with diabetes and hypertension. Respondent judge
also stressed that he had never missed a day in hearing cases
pending in his sala.[21]
Hearing was conducted and Godofredo, Hirofumi and Shiela
Aquino was presented as witness.
Godofredo dates and time given are based on the logbook entries made
by the starter
start is aperson who records in the logbook the name of the

individuals who play golf

starter may the player himself or a member who brings in
guests to play golf
on cross exam, Godofredo admitted that he is not the

custodian of the logbook; that he is neither the starter not the
pwerson who wrote the entries in the logbook and that he does
not recognize in whose handwrting the entries were made
Hirofumi testified that Aquino, the front desk recipient in the golf club
made the listing of the date and tim when judge lerma played
based on the data soted in their office computer.
aquino had been employed by the company for 15 yrs; workes

as front desk recipient for 6 years; aquino testified she saw
judge lerma registered member for at the golf club before
playing
Investigating justice found as insufficient the evidece presented
to show judge lerma played golf at the Alabang Country Club
but foun substantial evidence that judge played at TAT filipinas.
Aquino's testimony and certifications tha judge lerma did not
file any leave of absences on the dates indicated established
tha judge lerma violated SC memos, and administrative
circulares
Supreme Court Memorandum Order dated November 19, 1973
provides for the observance by judges, among other officials
and employees in the judiciary, of a five-day forty-hour week
schedule which shall be from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. and from
12:30 p.m. to 4:30 p.m. from Mondays to Fridays.
Violation of Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars, and

making untruthful statements in the certificate of service are
considered less serious charges under Section 9, Rule 140 of
the Rules of Court. Under Section 11(B) of Rule 140, these
acts may be punished by suspension from office without salary
and other benefits for not less than one (1) month or more

than three (3) months, or a fine of more than P10,000.00 but
not exceeding P20,000.00
Ruling On the basis of the foregoing findings, we adopt the

recommendation of the Investigating Justice that, in this
administrative case, a fine of P15,000.00 be imposed upon
respondent judge.
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2077
January 24, RTC makati rendered a decition in a civil case entitled twest v
1995 Anacleto and Internationa Corporate bank. the decision
ordered Interbank to release to Twest the entire proceeds of
Interbank Foreign currency trust deposit. however, even before
the decision was rendered, twest had disappeared and was
beleived to have been kidnapped and killed
Atty perez, representing twest filed a motion for execution of
decision. in the motion, atty perez informed the court that RTC
Muntinlupa presided by Judge lerma granted the petition to
appoint atty perez tas administrator of the properties or estate
of twest. rtc makati granted motion for execution
Union Bank Ph filed a Manifestation and urgent Ex Perte
motion praying that the exercise by Atty perez of powers of
administrator of Twest be held in abeyance until the
manifestation and motion is heard. because respondent judge
lerma was on official leave, Judge Aguinaldo acted on the
same and granted the ex parte motion
Union bank then field an urgent manifestation and motion to
recall writ of execution/ garnishment citing the order of Judge
aguinaldo
June 1, 2007 atty perez filed with RTC muntinlupa an omnibus motion to life
or set aside judge aguinaldo's order for having been issued
without jurisdiction, GAD and or violation of DPOL
at the hearing of the omnibus motion, judge lerma ordered atty.
ona, counsel for union bank to file her opposition and comment
to the said motion withtin 10 days. atty perez was given the

sae period from receipt of opposition to file reply if necessary.
on the same day, judge lerma issued another order bearing the
same date, ruling that Union bank had not shown any legal
basis to set aside the court's decision or to suspend the letters
of admin issued to atty perez. the order concluded that atty
perez may exercise all the powers granted to him as admin of
twest.
complainant wrote a letter to the OCA alleging that judge
lerma's second order was irregular since the omnibus motion
filed by atty perez was deemed submitted for resolution only
after the Atyy ona filed her comment/ opposition or until 10 day
period have exprier and the second order was secretly
railroaded to give atty perez a ground to oppose union bank's
urgent manifestation and motion to recall writ of execution/
garnishment filed with RTC, even the staff of judge lerma did
not become aware of the second order until much later since
judge lerma never furnished atty ona with a copy thereof until
she made inquiries regarding the same and the contents of the
second order contradicted the first order and rendered the
pending incident moot and academic.
judge lerma, in his comment, denied the charge.
RULING actions of judge lerma constitute gross negligence and /or
gross ignorance of the law.
We have repeatedly held that to warrant a finding of gross
ignorance of the law, it must be shown that the error is so
gross and patent as to produce an inference of bad faith.
[26] Gross negligence refers to negligence characterized by
want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation
where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and
intentionally, with a conscious indifference to consequences
insofar as other persons may be affected. It is the omission of
that care which even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail
to take on their own property. In cases involving public officials,
there is gross negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant and
palpable.[27]

In the instant case, the issuance by respondent of divergent
orders raises serious questions of impropriety that taint
respondent judges credibility, probity, and integrity. Coupled
with the clandestine issuance of the second order where the
Union Bank counsel and even the judges own staff were left
completely in the dark the action of respondent judge gives
rise to an inference of bad faith. Indeed, we have ample
reason to believe as Atty. Ona posits that the secretly-issued
second order was really intended to give Atty. Perez the
ammunition to oppose Union Banks Urgent Manifestation and
Motion to Recall Writ of Execution/Garnishmentwhich was to
be heard by the RTC of Makati City. Under the circumstances,
the breach committed by respondent can be characterized as
flagrant and palpable.
This action of respondent judge violates Section 8 of Rule 140,

and carries the penalty of dismissal from the service or
suspension from office for more than three (3) months but not
exceeding six (6) months, or a fine of P20,000.00 but not
For this violation, we impose upon respondent judge the
penalty of dismissal from the service, with forfeiture of all
benefits, except earned leave credits, and perpetual
disqualification from reemployment in the government service,
including government-owned and controlled corporations.
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2078

Jose Mari Duarte, the complainant is one of the defendants in
a civil case entitled mateo v board of governors of ayala
alabang village asscociaion. such civil case was filed fro the
declaration of the general membership meeting and election of
ayala alabang village assoc as void ab initio
the case was filed and eventually raffled to rtc muntinlupa
presided by judge lerma
August 15, 2003 defendants arceo and narciso filed their aswer with affirmative
defenses and counterclaims

all other defendants filed a motion to dismiss. on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction and lack of cause of action
September 2, Duarte filed his opposition to motion to dismiss with motion to
2003 declare defendants in default
September 12, judge lerma denied defendants' motion to dismiss and
2003 plaintiff's mtotion to declare defendants in default and set for
hearing plaintiff's application for the issuance of tro.
judge lerma then denied issuance of TRO
November 25, judge lerma rendered decision in favor of plaintiff.
2003
declared meembership meeting void ab initio and ordered
status quo of board's composition before the proceedings.
judge lerma enjoined arceo, narciso, romualdes and duarte

from further exercisiong function of the office they held
judge lerma directed holding of another election
dimissed defendants counterclaim
complainant together with all other defendants appealed to the
ca
Dec 10, 2003 mateo filed with rtc a petition to direct defendants to show
cause hwy they should not be cited and punished for indirect
contempt of court for their alleged defiance of judge lerma's
decision as shown by their continued performance of duties as
governors of ayala alabang despite receipt of a copy of the
said decision
july 1, 2004 judge lerma issued an order declaring duarte, arcer and
romualdes guilty of indirect contempt and ordered each of
them to pay a fine of P30,000 each
duarte and co defendants mored for reconsideration. MR
granted
June 29, 2007 CA decided that lower court should have dismissed complaint

for declaration of general membership meeting and election as
void bec it is the HLURB that has jurisdiction over the dispute
Aug 23, 2007 Mateo filed complaint with SC contending that judge lerma did
not have the judicial authoriy to hear and decide issues for
want or jurisdiction. According to Duarte, this was brought to
the attention of judge lerma but the latter took cognizance of
the case
In his comment, respondent judge argued that the error he
allegedly committed could be corrected by an available judicial
remedy.He maintained that if he erroneously assumed
jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 2003-433, the proper recourse
available to complainant was not an administrative complaint,
but a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
The Investigating Justice recommended that the instant
administrative case against respondent judge be dismissed.
This Court takes the opposite view.
Ruling It is true that to constitute gross ignorance of the law, it is not
enough that the subject decision, order, or actuation of the
judge in the performance of his official duties is contrary to
existing law and jurisprudence but, most importantly, he must
be moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, or corruption.[29]
However, when the law is so elementary and the matter of

jurisdiction is an elementary principle that judges should be
knowledgeable of not to be aware of it constitutes gross
ignorance of the law. Judges are expected to exhibit more than
just cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural
rules. They are expected to keep abreast of our laws and the
changes therein as well as with the latest decisions of the
Supreme Court. They owe it to the public to be legally
knowledgeable, for ignorance of the law is the mainspring of
injustice. Judicial competence requires no less. It is a truism
that the life chosen by a judge as a dispenser of justice is
demanding. By virtue of the delicate position which he
occupies in society, he is duty bound to be the embodiment of
competence and integrity.[

On the matter of the order finding complainant guilty of indirect
contempt, we also find the action of respondent judge sadly
wanting. Section 4, Rule 71 of the same Rules provides
The Rules are unequivocal. Indirect contempt proceedings

may be initiated only in two ways: (1) motu proprio by the
court; or (2) through a verified petition and upon compliance
with the requirements for initiatory pleadings. The procedural
requirements are mandatory considering that contempt
proceedings against a person are treated as criminal in nature.
[32] Conviction cannot be had merely on the basis of written
pleadings.[33]
The records do not indicate that complainant was afforded an

opportunity to rebut the charges against him. Respondent
judge should have conducted a hearing in order to provide
complainant the opportunity to adduce before the court
documentary or testimonial evidence in his behalf. The hearing
also allows the court a more thorough evaluation of the
circumstances surrounding the case, including the chance to
observe the accused present his side in open court and
subject his defense to interrogation from the complainants or
from the court itself.[34]
It must be remembered that the power to punish for contempt

should be used sparingly with caution, restraint, judiciousness,
deliberation, and due regard to the provisions of the law and
the constitutional rights of the individual.[35] In this respect,
respondent judge failed to measure up to the standards
demanded of member of the judiciary.
As already mentioned above, gross ignorance of the law or

procedure is classified as a serious charge under Section 8(9),
Rule 140, Revised Rules of Court, and a respondent found
guilty of serious charge may be punished by: a) dismissal from
the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court
may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office, including government-owned
or controlled corporations, provided, however, that the

forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave
credits; b) suspension from office without salary and other
benefits for more than three (3) months but not exceeding six
(6) months; or c) a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not
In this case, we find respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance

of the law, and impose upon him a fine of P40,000.00.
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2079

January 19, Bennie Cuason was charged before RTC Muntinlupa with
2006 estafa under Art 315 2(a) for defrauding Brigadier General
Meliton Goyena (ret.) by convincing the latter to invest, entrust
and or deliver P20 million peson on the promise that Cuason
would return the investiment with interest plus 2 condominuim
certificates of title
Gen Goyena gave the said amount and he received 2
condominuim certificates of title. after verification, the
condominuim unites were found to be non-existent or had not
yet been constructed
the case was docketed and raffled to RTC Muntinlupa preside
by Judge Guerrero
February 14, Cuason filed an entry of appearance with plea to determine
2006 WON probable cause exist for the purpose of issuance of
WOA. Gen. Goyena filed motion to deny the application and to
cte accused in contept on the ground of forum shopping
April 4, 2006 Cuason filed comment/opposition
With the designation of the branch of court as a special court

for drug cases, the case was reraffled to the sala of judge
lerma.
After hearing, judge lerma issued omnibus order dismissing the
criminal case.
On this first issue, this Court, after a careful scrutiny of the

arguments and evidence of both parties, believes that there
was payment already made as to the principal obligation as

admitted by the complainant in his affidavit dated September
20, 2005 (page 3, par. 17) and what is being left is the
payment of interest which, under the premises, is in [the] form
of condominium certificates. So also, while the complainant
questions the authenticity of those certificates as well as the
existence of [the] condominium units subject thereof, accused,
indubitably, was able to satisfy this Court as to the authenticity
of the questioned certificates and the existence of the units by
showing proofs to that effect.
September 6, Gen Goyena filed with RTC a very urgent manifestation with
2006 motion for the court to conduct ocular inspection
September 22, gen goyena filed omnibus motion for reconsideration, ocular
2006 inspection and inhibition.
1) as correctly found by the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Muntinlupa City, the two (2) condominium units used in partly
settling the liabilities of the accused to the private complainant
do not exist a fact that should have been established by now, if
only the court allowed the ocular inspection prayed for; 2) the
court overlooked the pronouncement in the very case it has
relied on, that Allado and Salonga constitute exceptions to the
general rule and may be invoked only if similar circumstances
are clearly shown to exist; and 3) the order dismissing the case
was improperly or irregularly issued.
September 28, Gen goyena filed a letter complaint addressed to SC CJ

2006 Panganiban charging judge lerma with abuse of judicial
authority and discretion serious irregularity, and gross
ignorance of the law, allegedly shown by the latters act of
willfully and knowingly reversing the well-grounded finding of
probable cause made by the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Muntinlupa City.
October 4, 2006 judge lerma issued order inhibiting himself from sitting in the
case and directied the records of the case be forwarded to the
clerk for rraffling
the case was re reaffled to branch presided by Judge
Manalastas-De Leon

In his memorandum dated September 24, 2007, Court
Administrator Lock found ample basis to charge respondent
judge with delay in rendering an order and for abuse of judicial
discretion and authority
The OCA stated that Criminal Case No. 06-179 was assigned
to respondent judge on May 2, 2006, a fact which the latter did
not dispute. More than a month later, or on June 19, 2006,
respondent judge set accused Cuasons motion to determine
whether or not a probable cause exists for the purpose of the
issuance of a warrant of arrest and complainants motion to
deny application for judicial determination of probable cause
and to cite accused in contempt of this Honorable Court on the
ground of forum shopping for hearing on July 17, 2006. It must
be stressed that accused Cuason and complainant filed their
respective motions on February 14, 2006 and on March 22,
2006, or while the case was still pending in the sala of Judge
Guerrero. After hearing the said motions on July 17, 2006, it
took another forty-eight (48) days for respondent judge to issue
the omnibus order dated September 4, 2006, dismissing the
case for lack of probable cause.
This Court finds that respondent judges delay in the

determination of probable cause clearly runs counter to the
provisions of Section 6, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which provides:
Sec. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. (a) By the Regional

Trial Court. - Within ten (10) days from the filing of the
complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate
the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence.
He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record
clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable
cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment
order if the accused has already been arrested pursuant to a
warrant issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary
investigation or when the complaint or information was filed
pursuant to Section 7 of this Rules. In case of doubt on the
existence of probable cause, the judge may order the

prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days
from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within
thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint or information.
While respondent judge could not have ascertained the

existence of probable cause for the issuance of an arrest
warrant against Cuason within ten (10) days from the filing of
the complaint or information Criminal Case No. 06-179 having
been re-raffled to his sala only on May 2, 2006 prudence
demanded that respondent judge should have determined the
existence of probable cause within ten (10) days from July 17,
2006, the date he heard the respective arguments of the
parties. This interpretation is in keeping with the provisions of
Section 6, Rule 112.
By allowing forty-eight (48) days to lapse before issuing the

two-page omnibus order dated September 4, 2006, respondent
judge should be held liable for undue delay in rendering an
order, which is classified as a less serious charge under
Section 9(1), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, punishable by
suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not
less than one (1) month or more than three (3) months, or a
fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.
Furthermore, the Court agrees with the OCA that the

respondent judge is guilty of abuse of judicial discretion and
authority.
The information in Criminal Case No. 06-179 clearly accuses

Cuason of falsely pretending that he can return the investment
of complainant by paying cash and two (2) condominium units
when in fact these units do not exist or have not yet been
constructed. The issue therefore boils down to whether or not
the condominium units exist, and the incontrovertible proof of
this are the condominium units themselves. The logical thing to
do would have been to order the conduct of an ocular
inspection.Instead of an ocular inspection, respondent relied
on the certificate of registration, the development permit, the

license to sell, the building permit, and the Condominium
Certificate of Title on the basis of which the judge ordered
the dismissal of the case. It may be that an ocular inspection
was premature at the time the respondent dismissed the case
because at that time the case was not yet set for the
presentation of evidence of the parties. Nevertheless, it now
appears that the pieces of evidence relied upon by the
respondent do not fully support his conclusion.
Section 4, Rule 128 of the Rules of Court provides that

evidence must have such a relation to the fact in issue as
to induce belief in its existence or non-
existence. Relevancy is, therefore, determinable by the
rules of logic and human experienceRelevant evidence is
any class of evidence which has rational probative value
to the issue in controversy.[36] Logic and human
experience teach us that the documents relied upon by
respondent do not constitute the best evidence to prove
the existence or non-existence of the condominium
units. To repeat, the best evidence would have been
adduced by an ocular inspection of the units themselves.
Judge Lerma should also have exercised caution in

determining the existence of probable cause. At the very
least, he should have asked the prosecutor to present
additional evidence, in accordance with Section 6, Rule
112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure or, in the
alternative, to show cause why the case should not be
dismissed instead of precipitately ordering the dismissal
of the case. The circumstances required the exercise of
caution considering that the case involved estafa in the
considerable amount of P20 Million for which the
complainant paid P129,970.00 in docket fees before the
Office of the City Prosecutor and later P167,114.60 as
docket fee for the filing of the Information before the RTC.
For this particular violation, we find respondent judge guilty

and impose upon him a fine of P21,000.00.

In A.M. No. RTJ-07-2076, Judge Alberto Lerma is
found GUILTY of violating a Supreme Court directive, and we
impose upon him a FINE in the total amount of FIFTEEN
THOUSAND PESOS (P15,000.00);
2) In A.M. No. RTJ-07-2080, Judge Alberto Lerma

is FINED in the total amount of FIFTEEN THOUSAND
PESOS (P15,000.00) for violation of Supreme Court rules,
directives, and circulars, and for making untruthful statements
in his certificate of service;
3) In A.M. No. RTJ-07-2077, Judge Alberto Lerma is

found GUILTY of gross misconduct and punished with the
penalty of DISMISSAL from the service, with forfeiture of all
benefits, except earned leave credits, with prejudice to
reemployment in any government agency or instrumentality.
4) In A.M. No. RTJ-07-2078, we find Judge Alberto

Lerma GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law, and impose upon
him a FINE of FORTY THOUSAND PESOS (P40,000.00); and
5) In A.M. No. RTJ-07-2079, we find Judge Alberto

Lerma GUILTY of grave abuse of authority and undue delay in
rendering an order, and impose upon him
a FINE of TWENTYONE THOUSAND PESOS (P21,000.00).

G.R. No. 123546 July 2, 1998
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOERAL GALLENO, accused-appellant.
PER CURIAM:
Accused-appellant Joeral Galleno was charged in an
information for the crim of Stautory Rape committed against a
five year old child (Evelyn Obligar)
Accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty. After trial,
Hoeral Galleno was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt and
was sentenced to suffer death.
Evelyn is 5 year old daughter of Rosita who had to leave the
province to find work in Manila after separating from her
husband.
Evelyn with her younger 3 yearl old brother Eleazar was left in
the care and custody of their uncle, Emeterio and aunt
Penicola Obligar
Less than a kilometer away from their place of residence is the
residence of the accused-appellant, Joeral Galleno, who was
then 19 years of age.
Joeral was known well to Evelyn's family due to his frequent
visits at their abode and was courting Emeterio's eldest child,
Gina.
August 16, 1994 Emeterio and Penicola left their residence to work at the
sugarcane plantation. Their 3 children had all earlier left for
school. The only persons left in the house were Evelyn and
Eleazar
Around 4pm, Joeral was on his way to Lola Esing to have his
pants tailored. Since it was drizzling, he passed by the
Obligar's residence and found the 2 children left by
themselves.
Prosecution and defense presented conflicing versions of what
occured next but the result is undisputed. Evelyn sustained a
laceration in her vagina which resulted in profuse and life
threatening bleeding
The prosecution's version of what took place at the Obligar's
residence is based on the testimony of Evelyn, Emeterio and

the doctors who examined and treated her.
Prior to her confinement in the Roxas Memorial General
Hospital Emeterio and Penicola brought Evelyn to the Police
Station where they reported the crime to SPO1 Durana. That
same day, accused-appellant was apprehended.
Denial is presented as the defense.
Accused-appellant testified that when he arrived at the
Obligars, he found the two children Evelyn and Eleazar. While
seated at the balcony, accused-appellant cajoled her by
throwing her up and down. In doing so, his right hand holding
the child and his left hand covering her vagina. Upon lifting up
the child the first time, his left ring finger was accidentally
inserted into the vagina of the child since his fingernail was
long and the child was not wearing any underwear.
Consequently, Evelyn began to cry because her vagina started
to bleed. Upon seeing this, he immediately went down the
house and got some bark or leaves of a madre de cacao tree
and applied the sap on the child's wound. The bleeding ceased
and Evelyn stopped crying. Thereafter, accused-appellant went
home.
Joera testified that on the day he was arrested, Emeterio askid
him to admit the offense so that he could be released the next
day but the accused-appellant did not do so.
Joeral's father, Raul was also called to the witness stand. He
testified that after learning about the arrest of his son, he went
to the Obligars to ask Evelyn what happened to her. The child
allegedly answered that a finger was accidentally inserted into
her genital organ, but that Penicola who was then present,
butted into the conversation and told Raul Galleno that the
penis of accused-appellant was likewise inserted
trial court believed and accepted the testimony of Police
Officer Durana that during the interrogation of Evelyn
conducted at the PNP Station, Emeterio and Penicola did not
interfere with the responses of Evelyn
1. accused-appellant failed to explain how his left ring finger
came in contact with Evelyn's vagina
2. prosecution was able to establish that Evelyn was wearing

shorts
3. Evelyn's statement to Dr. Lanada the physician at Roxa
Memorial that it was accused-appellant's finger which injured
her was a consequence of the victim's confusion
Hence the instant appeal and review
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND
CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE MEDICAL
DOCTORS WHEN THE SAME FAILED TO CONCLUSIVELY
AND SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISH THE CAUSE OF THE
LACERATION IN THE OFFENDED PARTY'S VAGINA
THE TRIAL COURT SHOWED MANIFEST BIAS THEREBY
DEPRIVING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT TO A FAIR AND
IMPARTIAL TRIAL AND DISREGARDED THE RIGHT OF THE
ACCUSED TO BE PRESUMED INNOCENT, WHEN HE
ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED IN THE CROSS EXAMINATION
OF THE ACCUSED
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THE
WARRANTLESS ARREST OF THE ACCUSED AS
UNJUSTIFIED
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INTERPRETING THE
FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE EXTENDED BY THE PARENTS OF
THE ACCUSED TO THE OFFENDED PARTY AS AN IMPLIED
ADMISSION OF GUILT.
1st assignment Testimony of doctors is not impeccable since they found that
of error there was no presence of spermatoza, and they were not sure
what caused the laceration.
As a general rule, witnesses must state facts and not draw
conclusions or give opinions. It is the court's duty to draw
conclusions from the evidence and form opinions upon the
facts proved (
However, conclusions and opinions of witnesses are received

in many cases, and are not confined to expert testimony,
based on the principle that either because of the special skill or
expert knowledge of the witness, or because of the nature of
the subject matter under observation, or for other reasons, the
testimony will aid the court in reaching a judgment
In the case at bar, the trial court arrived at its conclusions not

only with the aid of the expert testimony of doctors who gave
their opinions as to the possible cause of the victim's
laceration, but also the testimony of the other prosecution
witnesses, especially the victim herself. In other words, the trial
court did not rely solely on the testimony of the expert
witnesses. Such expert testimony merely aided the trial court
in the exercise of its judgment on the facts. Hence, the fact that
the experts enumerated various possible causes of the victim's
laceration does not mean that the trial court's inference is
wrong.
The absence of spermatozoa in the victim's vagina does not
negate the conclusion that it was his penis which was inserted
in the victim's vagina
In rape, the important consideration is not the emission of
semen but the penetration of the female genitalia by the male
organ
Verily, it is entirely probable that climax on the part of accused-
appellant was not reached due to the cries of pain of the victim
and the profuse bleeding of her vagina.
As regards the inconsistencies in Evelyn's declarations,
particularly as to what really caused the laceration, we are
convinced that the child, due to her tender age, was just
confused..
Of vital consideration and importance too is the unreliability, if
not the outright incredulity of the version of accused-appellant
which is not in accord with ordinary human experience
Even assuming "ex gratia argumente" that Evelyn was

pantyless, how could it be possible for his finger to penetrate
the vagina for about one-fourth of an inch . . . when she was in
shorts
The Supreme Court, in People vs. Fulgencio Baquiran, 20
SCRA 451, (held that) evidence, to be believed must not only
proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be
credible in itself. Human perception can be warped by the
impact of events and testimony colored by the unconscious
workings of the mind. No better test has yet been found to
measure the value of a witness' testimony than its conformity
to the knowledge and common experience of mankind.

Sec. 4, Rule 128 of the Rules of Court provides that
"(e)vidence must have such a relation to the fact in issue as to
induce belief in its existence or non-existence." This simply
means that relevancy is determinable by the rules of logic and
human experience
There is no precise and universal test of relevancy provided by
law. However, the determination of whether particular evidence
is relevant rests largely at the discretion of the court, which
must be exercised according to the teachings of logic and
everyday experience
There is no explanation how the left ring finger (allegedly with
a long fingernail) of accused-appellant penetrated the victim's
vagina by a depth of one fourth of an inch. Admittedly,
accused-appellant's right hand held the child while his left hand
supposedly held her in the vagina area. Why would he hold the
child's vagina if his only intention was to frolic and kid around
with her?
Accused-appellant likewise failed to explain why after injuring
Evelyn (and after applying to the wound the sap of madre de
cacao), he left her in the company of an even younger child,
the victim's 3-year old brother. He did not even make an effort
to immediately inform Emeterio and Penicola of what had
happened. Instead, he went home and kept mum about the
incident.
Significantly, his act of immediately leaving the place, when
considered in the light of the other evidence, reflects his fear
because of what he had done. The proverb "the wicked fleeth
even when no man pursueth, but the innocent are as bold as a
lion" was correctly adopted by the trial court in drawing its
conclusions.
All of these loopholes are palpable and manifest, and clearly
work against the credibility of accused-appellant's story on
which his defense is based.
Besides, the trial court's conclusions find support in the
testimony of accused-appellant's own witness, Dr. Lourdes
Laada (who was earlier presented during the trial as a
prosecution witness), who testified that a laceration is caused
by a blunt instrument and that a fingernail is not a blunt but a

sharp instrument
As regards accused-appellant's argument that the victim's
testimony is just a concocted story of what really happened,
we apply the rule that the revelation of an innocent child whose
chastity was abused deserves full credence
We likewise consider the fact that her uncle and aunt, virtually
her foster parents, themselves support her story of rape. It is
unnatural for a parent to use her offspring as an engine of
malice, especially if it will subject a daughter to embarrassment
and even stigma
Second Accused-appellant alleges he was deprived of a fair an
assigned error impartial trial since the trial court showed bias by discountung
his testimony and by actually participating in the cross
examination of the accused-appellant
We recently pronounced in People vs. Malabago (265 SCRA
198 [1996]) that a judge may properly intervene in the
presentation of evidence to expedite and prevent unnecessary
waste of time and clarify obscure and incomplete details after
the witness has given direct testimony. And such discretion to
question witnesses in order to clear obscurities in their
testimony cannot be assailed as a specie of bias.
Of course, we are aware of Rule 3.06 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct provides:
While a judge may, to promote justice, prevent
waste of time or clear up some obscurity, properly
intervene in the presentation of evidence during the
trial, it should always be borne in mind that undue
interference may prevent the proper presentation of
the cause or the ascertainment of truth.
And there is undoubtedly undue interference if the judge
extensively propounds questions to the witnesses which will
have the effect of or will tend to build or bolster the case for
one of the parties. We have, however, carefully examined the
record and transcript of stenographic notes of the instant case.
The trial court judge, the Honorable Salvador S. Gubaton, did
propound questions but this was done only for clarification
purposes and not to build the case for one of the parties. For
instance, accused-appellant, in his brief, refers to the

questions propounded by the trial court on his act of cajoling
the child. A perusal of the line of questioning referred to hardly
shows bias on the part of the trial court, but pure clarification.
Third validity of his arrest

assignment of
error
It is settled jurisprudence that any objection involving a warrant
of arrest or procedure in the acquisition by the court of
jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made
before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed
waived
It does not appear in the record that accused-appellants raised
this matter before entering his plea of "not guilty" to the charge
(pp. 63 & 67, Record). Further, this issue was not even
touched during the trial.
Fourth assigned misinterpretation of fianancial assistance

error
trial court misinterpreted the financial assistance extended by
his parents as an attempt to settle the case. Accused-appellant
even banks on the alleged close relationship between
Emeterio Obligar and Raul Galleno as compadres, and the fact
that Emeterio borrowed forty pesos from Raul Galleno, despite
the fact that Emeterio already knew that accused-appellant
caused the laceration in Evelyn's vagina.
First, Emeterio Obligar, whom Raul Galleno said is
his compadre, borrowed P40.00 for fare going to Roxas City
where Evelyn was confined. Second, on August 20, 1994, Raul
Galleno and his wife and one of the brothers of Penicola
Obligar went to Roxas Memorial General Hospital. There he
gave P400.00 financial assistance to Penicola Obligar. Raul
Galleno later admitted that the sum of P440.00 was returned to
him by the spouses. Accused-appellant insists that these offers
of financial assistance were not attempts at an amicable
settlement but were prompted out of a sincere desire on the
part of Raul Galleno to help the offended party
We find no merit in me above-stated argument. It may be

inferred that Raul Galleno wanted to settle the case by offering
an amount to the spouses Obligar
From the above-stated clarificatory questions by the trial court,
it may be gleaned that Raul Galleno no longer had any interest
in aiding the victim when he found that the Obligar spouses
would still pursue the case against his son, accused-appellant,
and hence he found that his offer for settlement was
unavailing. Hence, on this point we likewise agree with the trial
court when it took the financial assistance to mean an act of
settling the case. This act does manifest a father's attempt to
rescue his guilty son from sure incarceration.
WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-appellant
justified by the evidence on record, the assailed decision is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

BSB GROUP, INC., represented by its President, Mr. RICARDO BANGAYAN v
SALLY GO a.k.a. SALLY GO-BANGAYAN,
G.R. No. 168644 February 16, 2010
PERALTA, J.:
BSB Groun Inc is a duly organized domestic corporation
presided by its herein representative Ricardo Bangayan/
Respondent Sally Go is Bangyan's wife who was employed in
the company as a cashier and was engaged amoung others to
receive and account for the payments made by the various
customers of the company
2002 Bangayan filed a complaint for estafa and/or qualified theft
against respondent alleging several checks representing the
aggregate amount of P1.5 million issued by the company's
customers in payment of their obligation were, instead of being
turned over to the company's coffers, indorsed by respondent
who deposited the same to her personal banking account at
Security bank and trust company
an information for qualified was then filed
respondent was charged before RTC manila
respondent entered a negative plea when she was arraigned
trial ensued
on the premise that respondent allegedly encashed the subject
checks and deposited them to her account, the prosecution
moved for the issuance of a subpeona duces tecum/ ad
testificandum against the respective managers or record
custodians of Security bank and Asian Savings Mank (now
Metrobank).
The trial court granted the motion and issued the
corresponding subpoena
respondent files a motion to quash subpoena addressed to
metrobank noting to the court that in the complaint, there was
no mention made of the said bank account to which
respondent, in addition the Security bank account alleedly
deposition the proceeds of the supposed checks
while respondent characterized Metrobank account as
irrelevant to the case, in the same motion, she waiver her

objection to the irrelevancy of Security bank account
mentioned in the complaint inasmuch as she was willing to
address the allegations with respect thereto
petitioner argued for the relevancy of the metrobank account
on the ground that the comlain showed that there were 2
checks which respondent allegedly deposition in an accoun
with the said bank.
respondent filed supplemental motion to quash invoking
absolutely confidential nature of the metrobank account
pursuant to RA 1504
trial court denied the motion to quash for lack of merit
Prosecution was able to present Elenita marasigan, the
representative of Security bank. in her testimony, she sought
to prove that between 1988 and 1989, respondent, while
engaged as cashier at BSB was able to run away with the
checks issued to the company by its customers endorsed the
same and credit the amount to her personal deposit account
with Security bank.
the subject checks were presented to Marasigan for

identification and marking but before the testimony could be
cmpleted, respondent filed a motion to suppress.
she sought to exclude maraisgan's testimony and

accompanying documents on the ground or irrelevancy and
privilege of confidentiality under RA 1405
trial court denid the motion; mr filed' mr denied
respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the CA
CA reversed and set aside the assailed orders of the trial court
hence testimony of Security bank representativ is ordered
stricken from the records
mr filed by petitioner; mr denied
hence the present petition
Petitioner's contention Marasigan's testimony dealin with
respondents deosit acount had a direct relation to the subject
matter of the case for qualified theft hence brings the case

under one of the exceptions to the coverage of confidentiality
under RA 1405.
etitioner believed that what constituted the subject matter in

litigation was to be determined by the allegations in the
information and, in this respect, it alluded to the assailed
November 5, 2004 Order of the trial court, which declared to
be erroneous the limitation of the present inquiry merely to
what was contained in the information.
Respndent claims that the money represented by Security
bank was neither relevant nor material to the case because
nothing in the criminal info suggested that the money therein
deposited was the subject matter of the case.
the checks should be suppressed for violating respondent's
right to due process. and that it would violate the secrecy rule
under RA 1405.
petitioner asserted the sufficiency of the allegation in the infor
for qualified theft as the same has sufficiently alleged the
elements of the offense charged.
Through marasigan's testimony, the court would be able to
establish that the checks involved had been received by
respondent and deposited to her personal account in Security
bank. Petitioner held that the check represented the cash
money stolen by respondent . hence the subj matter of the
case is not ony the cash amount represented by the checks
but also the checks themselves
ISSUE WON the testimony of Marasigan is relevant to the case and
WON they are admissible
HELD INADMISSIBILE
heft is present when a person, with intent to gain but without
violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon
things, takes the personal property of another without the
latters consent. It is qualified when, among others, and as
alleged in the instant case, it is committed with abuse of
confidence. [32]
The prosecution of this offense necessarily
focuses on the existence of the following elements: (a) there
was taking of personal property belonging to another; (b) the

taking was done with intent to gain; (c) the taking was done
without the consent of the owner; (d) the taking was done
without violence against or intimidation of persons or force
upon things; and (e) it was done with abuse of confidence.
In turn, whether these elements concur in a way that
overcomes the presumption of guiltlessness, is a question that
must pass the test of relevancy and competency in
accordance with Section 3 [34] Rule 128 of the Rules of
Court.
addressed by considering whether they have such direct
relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence
or non-existence; or whether they relate collaterally to a fact
from which, by process of logic, an inference may be made as
to the existence or non-existence of the fact in issue.[
Petitioner addresses the incongruence between the allegation
of theft of cash in the Information, on the one hand, and the
evidence that respondent had first stolen the checks and
deposited the same in her banking account, on the other hand,
by impressing upon the Court that there obtains no difference
between cash and check for purposes of prosecuting
respondent for theft of cash. Petitioner is mistaken.
n theft, the act of unlawful taking connotes deprivation of
personal property of one by another with intent to gain, and it
is immaterial that the offender is able or unable to freely
dispose of the property stolen because the deprivation relative
to the offended party has already ensued from such act of
execution. [36]The allegation of theft of money, hence,
necessitates that evidence presented must have a tendency to
prove that the offender has unlawfully taken money belonging
to another. Interestingly, petitioner has taken pains in
attempting to draw a connection between the evidence subject
of the instant review, and the allegation of theft in the
Information by claiming that respondent had fraudulently
deposited the checks in her own name.But this line of
argument works more prejudice than favor, because it in effect,
seeks to establish the commission, not of theft, but rather of
some other crime probably estafa.

Moreover, that there is no difference between cash and check
is true in other instances. In estafa by conversion, for instance,
whether the thing converted is cash or check, is immaterial in
relation to the formal allegation in an information for that
offense; a check, after all, while not regarded as legal tender,
is normally accepted under commercial usage as a substitute
for cash, and the credit it represents in stated monetary value
is properly capable of appropriation. And it is in this respect
that what the offender does with the check subsequent to the
act of unlawfully taking it becomes material inasmuch as this
offense is a continuing one. [37]
In other words, in pursuing a
case for this offense, the prosecution may establish its cause
by the presentation of the checks involved. These checks
would then constitute the best evidence to establish their
contents and to prove the elemental act of conversion in
support of the proposition that the offender has indeed
indorsed the same in his own name. [
Theft, however, is not of such character. Thus, for our
purposes, as the Information in this case accuses
respondent of having stolen cash, proof tending to
establish that respondent has actualized her criminal
intent by indorsing the checks and depositing the
proceeds thereof in her personal account, becomes not
only irrelevant but also immaterial and, on that score,
inadmissible in evidence.
RA 1405 R.A. No. 1405 has two allied purposes. It hopes to discourage
private hoarding and at the same time encourage the people
to deposit their money in banking institutions, so that it may be
utilized by way of authorized loans and thereby assist in
economic development.[41] Owing to this piece of legislation,
the confidentiality of bank deposits remains to be a basic state
policy in the Philippines.[42] Section 2 of the law
institutionalized this policy by characterizing as absolutely
confidential in general all deposits of whatever nature with
banks and other financial institutions in the country. It declares:

In taking exclusion from the coverage of the confidentiality
rule, petitioner in the instant case posits that the account
maintained by respondent with Security Bank contains the
proceeds of the checks that she has fraudulently appropriated
to herself and, thus, falls under one of the exceptions in
Section 2 of R.A. No. 1405 that the money kept in said
account is the subject matter in litigation.
What indeed constitutes the subject matter in litigation in
relation to Section 2 of R.A. No. 1405 has been pointedly and
amply addressed in Union Bank of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals,[50] in which the Court noted that the inquiry into
bank deposits allowable under R.A. No. 1405 must be
premised on the fact that the money deposited in the account
is itself the subject of the action.
Given this perspective, we deduce that the subject matter of
the action in the case at bar is to be determined from the
indictment that charges respondent with the offense, and not
from the evidence sought by the prosecution to be admitted
into the records. In the criminal Information filed with the trial
court, respondent, unqualifiedly and in plain language, is
charged with qualified theft by abusing petitioners trust and
confidence and stealing cash in the amount
of P1,534,135.50. The said Information makes no factual
allegation that in some material way involves the checks
subject of the testimonial and documentary evidence sought to
be suppressed. Neither do the allegations in said Information
make mention of the supposed bank account in which the
funds represented by the checks have allegedly been kept
In other words, it can hardly be inferred from the indictment
itself that the Security Bank account is the ostensible subject
of the prosecutions inquiry. Without needlessly expanding the
scope of what is plainly alleged in the Information, the subject
matter of the action in this case is the money amounting
to P1,534,135.50 alleged to have been stolen by respondent,
and not the money equivalent of the checks which are sought
to be admitted in evidence. Thus, it is that, which the
prosecution is bound to prove with its evidence, and no other

In sum, we hold that the testimony of Marasigan on the
particulars of respondents supposed bank account with
Security Bank and the documentary evidence represented by
the checks adduced in support thereof, are not only
incompetent for being excluded by operation of R.A. No.
1405. They are likewise irrelevant to the case, inasmuch as
they do not appear to have any logical and reasonable
connection to the prosecution of respondent for qualified
theft. We find full merit in and affirm respondents objection to
the evidence of the prosecution. The Court of Appeals was,
therefore, correct in reversing the assailed orders of the trial
court.

Romeo Ilisan y Piabol v People
g.r. 179487 november 15, 2010
Justice nachura
February 3, A baptismal celebration was held at the residence of Ricky
2002 Silva. Among those who attended were petitioner and one Joey
Gaton.
They belonged to different groups of guests.

While Gaton and petitioner were having a drinking spree with
their respective groups, one of petitioner's companions gor
irked by the way Gaton looked at him.
this prompted petitioner and his companions to maul Gaton.
A melee then ensued.
in the course of which, petitioner shot Gaton at the abdomen
with .45 caliber pistol, causing the latter's instantaneous death.
February 7, an information for murder was filed against petitioner
2002
March 18, 2002 petitioner was arraigned and he entered a plea of not guilty
Evidence for the prosecution consisted mainly of the
testimonies of Gabriel Gaton, the victims brother, Marlon
Dellamas, and Edgardo Dag-um, both neighbors of the victim,
who all positively identified petitioner as the gunman.
in his defense, petitioner and his witnesses Ilisan and
Escasinas, petitioner's brother and cousin claimed that another
guest, Chito Partisala, a jail guard was the assailant.
They also present the a forensice chemtist who testified that

petitioner tested negative for gunpowder residue when paraffin
tests were conducted on him a day after the incident
June 14, 2005 rtc accorded more weight to positive testimonies of prosecution
witnesses over declarations of the defense. there being no
proof that treachery and evident premediation qualified the
killing of Gaton, rtc convicted petitioner of homicide
On appeal to the CA, petitioner questioned the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses who allegedly harbored ill motive against
him be they were either related to the victim or to one of the

participants of the commotion.
alsom petitioner argued that the negative results of the paraffin

residue test conducted on him strongly indicate his innocence
CA affirmed RTC's finding of guilt
hence the present petition
The Court generally defers to the trial court's evaluation of
the credibility of witness and their testimonies, for it is in a
better position to decide questions of credibility, having heard
the witnesses themselves and observed their attitude and
deportment during trial.[10] In the absence of any clear
showing that the trial court overlooked or misconstrued cogent
facts and circumstances which would alter a conviction, we are
doctrinally bound by the trial courts assessment of the
credibility of witnesses.[11] The application of this rule becomes
even more stringent when such findings are sustained by the
appellate court,[12] as in the present case.
relationship The fact that Gabriel Gaton is the victims brother does not
impair his credibility as a witness. Relationship by itself does
not give rise to a presumption of bias or ulterior motive, nor
does it ipso factodiminish the credibility or tarnish the testimony
of a witness. On the contrary, a witness relationship to a victim
of a crime would even make his or her testimony more credible
as it would be unnatural for a relative who is interested in
vindicating the crime to accuse somebody other than the
culprit. The natural interest of witnesses, who are relatives of
the victim, in securing the conviction of the guilty would actually
deter them from implicating persons other than the true culprits
There is likewise no indication that Marlon Dellamas and
Edgardo Dag-um were improperly motivated when they
testified against petitioner. As aptly observed by the Office of
the Solicitor General in its Comment,[17] aside from the
prosecution witnesses relationship with the other participants in
the fight, petitioner failed to show any other basis for the ill
motive he imputes against them. As a rule, absent any
evidence showing any reason or motive for prosecution
witnesses to perjure, the logical conclusion is that no such

improper motive exists, and their testimonies are thus worthy of
full faith and credit.[18]
Petitioners reliance on the negative results of the paraffin test
conducted on him the day after the fateful event must fail.
[E]ven if he were subjected to a paraffin test and the

same yields a negative finding, it cannot be
definitely concluded that he had not fired a gun as it
is possible for one to fire a gun and yet be negative
for the presence of nitrates as when the hands are
washed before the test. The Court has even
recognized the great possibility that there will be no
paraffin traces on the hand if, as in the instant case,
the bullet was fired from a .45 Caliber pistol.
Indeed, paraffin tests, in general, have been rendered

inconclusive by this Court. Scientific experts concur in the view
that the paraffin test has proved extremely unreliable. It can
only establish the presence or absence of nitrates or nitrites on
the hand; still, the test alone cannot determine whether the
source of the nitrates or nitrites was the discharge of a firearm.
The presence of nitrates should be taken only as an indication
of a possibility or even of a probability but not of infallibility that
a person has fired a gun.[20]Conversely, the absence of
gunpowder nitrates on petitioners hands, the day after the
incident, does not conclusively establish that he did not fire a
gun; neither are the negative results yielded by the paraffin test
an insurmountable proof of his innocence.
Chito Partisala The courts a quo also correctly rejected the version of the
defense as a mere afterthought intended to exculpate
petitioner, viz.:
If it is true that they saw Chito Partisala sh[o]ot Joey,

why they did not tell the policeman who arrived at
the crime scene immediately that Partisala was the
gunman. Why did Jomarie wait until somebody

pointed to the accused as the gunman before he
told them that it [was] Partisala who shot the victim.[
hus, the positive, clear, and categorical testimonies of the three

eyewitnesses to the crime deserve full merit in both probative
weight and credibility over the negative results of the paraffin
test conducted on petitioner and his witnesses anomalous
claims.

People of the Philippines v Norberto Del Monte G.R. No. 179940 April 23, 2008
Justice Chico-Nazario
December 11, Accused-appellant was charged with violation of Sec 5 Art. II of
2002 RA 9165 otherwise known and Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002
December 10, accused-appellant was caught selling shabu
2002
january 20, accused-appellant was arraigned and there he pleaded not
2003 guilty
february 17, pre trial conference was concluded
2003
trial on the merits ensued
prosecution's lone witness is PO1 Gaudencio Tolentio Jr, the
poseur buyer in the buy bust operation conducted against
appellant
December 10 a confidential informant went to the office of PDEA and
reported that appellant was selling shabu
after receiving said info, a briefing on buy bust operation
against appellant was conducted
the team then proceeded to execute the buy bust operation
When the team arrived at the appellant's place, they saw
appellant standing alone in front of the gate
the informant, PO1 Tolentino approached appellant
informant introduced PO1 tolentino's to appellant as his friend.
po1 tolentino gave appellant the 3 marked 100 peso bills
upon receiving the same, appellant took out a plastic sachet
from his pocket and handed it over to po1 tolentino
as a pre arranged signal, po1 tolention lit a cigarette signifying
that the sale had been consummated.
appellant was arrested and recoverd from him were the
marked money
the plastic sachet with its contents were forwarded to PNP
crime lab

and tested positive for shabu
for the defense, the appellant took the witness stand with his
common law wife and nephew Alejandro Lim
On 10 December 2002, appellant was sleeping in his sisters
house in Poblacion Dike when a commotion woke him up. His
nephew, Alejandro Lim, was shouting because the latter,
together with appellants common-law wife, Amelia Mendoza,
and a niece, was being punched and kicked by several police
officers. When appellant tried to pacify the policemen and ask
them why they were beating up his common-law wife and other
relatives, the policemen arrested him, mauled him, punched
him on the chest, slapped him and hit him with a palo-palo. He
sustained swollen face, lips and tooth. His common-law wife
was likewise hit on the chest with the palo-palo.
The policemen then took appellant and his common-law wife to

a house located in the middle of a field where the former
demanded P15,000.00 for their liberty. The next day, appellant
was brought to the police station.
Amelia Mendoza identified PO1 Tolentino and PO1 Barreras

as the police officers who manhandled them and who
demanded P15,000.00 so that she and appellant could go
home. The following day at 6:00 a.m., she said her child and
cousin arrived with the P15,000.00. She was released but
appellant was detained. She does not know why the police
officers filed this case against appellant. What she knows is
that they were asking money from them.
Alejandro Lim merely corroborated the testimonies of appellant

and Amelia Mendoza.
March 8, 2004 trial court convicted appellant and sentenced him to life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P5million
The trial court found the lone testimony of PO1 Gaudencio M.
Tolentino, Jr. to be credible and straightforward. It established
the fact that appellant was caught selling shabu during an
entrapment operation conducted on 10 December
2002. Appellant was identified as the person from whom PO1

Tolentino bought P300.00 worth of shabu as confirmed by
Chemistry Report No. D-728-2002. On the other hand, the trial
court was not convinced by appellants defense of frame-up
and denial. Appellant failed to substantiate his claims that he
was merely sleeping and was awakened by the screams of his
relatives who were being mauled by the police officers.
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal
CA affirmed the decision but reducd the fine imposed to 500k
Notice of Appeal
Appellant's assignment of error: trial court gravely erred in
finding the accused-appellant guilty of the offense charged
despit the inadmissibility of the evidence against him for failure
of the arresting office to comply with Sec. 21 of RA 9165
He claims that the pictures of him together with the alleged
confiscated shabu were not taken immediately upon his arrest
as shown by the testimony of the prosecution witness.
he adds that po1 tolention and barreras, the police officers who
had initial custody of the drug allegedly seized did not conduct
a physical inventory of the same in his presence as shown by
their joint affidavit of arrest.
their failure to abide by said provision of law casts doubt on

both bus arrest and the admissibility of the evidence adduced
against him
appelant raised the alleged non compliance with sec 21 for the
first time on appeal.
SC/l this he cannot do.

Non compliance People v Pringas
Non compliance with Sec 21 will not render an accused's

arrest illegal or the items seized inadmissibile.

what is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items as the same
would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence
of the accused.
non compliance with Sec 21 particularly the inventory and the
photographing of drugs will not render the drugs inadmissible
in evidence
Sec 3, rule 128 evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is
not excluded by the law or these rules.
for evidence to be inadmissible, there should be a law or rule

which forbids its reception.
if there is no such law or rule, the evidence must be admitted

subject only to the evidentiary weight that will be accorded to
to by the courts.
example One example is that provided in Section 31 of Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court wherein a party producing a document as
genuine which has been altered and appears to be altered
after its execution, in a part material to the question in dispute,
must account for the alteration. His failure to do so shall make
the document inadmissible in evidence.This is clearly provided
for in the rules
There is not provision or statement in said law or in any rule
that will bring about the non admissibility of the confiscated
drugs due to non compliance with Sec 21.
The issue if there is non compliance with the said section is not
of admissibility but of weight evidentiary merit or probative
value to be given the evidence.
the weight to be given by the courts on said evidence depends

on the circumstances obtaining in each case.

he elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of
drugs are (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object,
and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and
the payment therefor.[24] What is material to the prosecution
for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the
transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the
presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti.[2
All these elements have been shown in the instant case.
In the case before us, we find the testimony of the poseur-
buyer, together with the dangerous drug taken from appellant,
more than sufficient to prove the crime charged.Considering
that this Court has access only to the cold and impersonal
records of the proceedings, it generally relies upon the
assessment of the trial court, which had the distinct advantage
of observing the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses
during trial. It is a fundamental rule that findings of the trial
courts which are factual in nature and which involve credibility
are accorded respect when no glaring errors, gross
misapprehension of facts and speculative, arbitrary and
unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such
findings. The reason for this is that the trial court is in a better
position to decide the credibility of witnesses having heard
their testimonies and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying during the trial.
Appellant In the case at bar, the evidence clearly shows that appellant
denies was the subject of a buy-bust operation. Having been caught
selling shabu to in flagrante delicto, his identity as seller of the shabu can no
the poseur- longer be doubted. Against the positive testimonies of the
buyer insisting prosecution witnesses, appellants plain denial of the offenses
that he was charged, unsubstantiated by any credible and convincing
framed, the evidence, must simply fail.
evidence
against him
being planted,
and that the
police officers
were
exacting P15,00

0.00 from him.
rame-up, like alibi, is generally viewed with caution by this
Court, because it is easy to contrive and difficult to
disprove. Moreover, it is a common and standard line of
defense in prosecutions of violations of the Dangerous Drugs
Act. For this claim to prosper, the defense must adduce clear
and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that
government officials have performed their duties in a regular
and proper manner.[ This, appellant failed to do. The
presumption remained unrebutted because the defense failed
to present clear and convincing evidence that the police
officers did not properly perform their duty or that they were
inspired by an improper motive.
The presentation of his common-law wife, Amelia Mendoza,
and his nephew, Alejandro Lim, to support his claims fails to
sway. We find both witnesses not to be credible. Their
testimonies are suspect and cannot be given credence without
clear and convincing evidence.Their claims, as well as that of
appellant, that they were maltreated and suffered injuries
remain unsubstantiated.
Moreover, we agree with the observation of the Office of the
Solicitor General that the witnesses for the defense cannot
even agree on what time the arresting policemen allegedly
arrived in their house.
Having established beyond reasonable doubt all the elements
constituting the illegal sale of drugs, we are constrained to
uphold appellants conviction.

People of the Philippines v Victoriano Garcia and Bernardino Caranguian
g.r. 124514 july 6, 2000
j quisumbing
August 1, 1991 7:30 AM, civilian volunteer organization (CVO) members
Lumboy and Capili informed PO3 Birung that they sighted 2
former Civilian Armed Forces Georgraphical Unit (CAFGU)
agents at nearby Barangay in Cagayam.
Acting on the info, Birun formed a team to track down the 2
former CAFGUs
they then proceeded to the said barangey
in a single file, the crossed an improvised wooden bridge over
the creek
suddenly capili and lumboy came under gunfire
the team immediately returned fire
exchange of fire ensued
about 30 miuntes after, tfiring ceased
birung ordered his men to rescue lumboy and capili
capili was still alive and was rushed to the hospital
lumboy was already dead.
his body was brought to his house
following day, civilian informer Palos inform Birung that the 2
former CAFGUs were Bernardino Caranguian and Victoriano
Garcia.
After preliminary investigation. Both Caranguian and Garcia
were charged with crime f murder for the killing of lumboy. they
were also charged of frustrated murder for wounding capili
appellant was acquitted of frustrated murder but convicted of
murder.
only caranguian was arrested
garcia remains at large to date.
upon arraignment, appellant entered plea of not guilty
trial ensued
prosectution presente ff witnesses:

1. dr. pintucan- treated gunshot wound of capili
2. dra. baculi- conducted autopsy
3. birung- eyewitness to shooting incident
For his defense, appellant invoked denial and alibi.
He testified that he was a CAFGU member. he presented the
memo receipt issued for his gun. he claims that on te day of
the shooting incident, he was at his post in Tabang Sto nino
Cagayan the whole day. he knows Garcia as a fellow CAFGU
but they were not together on the day of incident
Caranguian was found guilty of murder
hence this present appeal
e claims that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. He assails the credibility of prosecution
witness Birung since the latter did not even know the names of
appellant and co-accused at the time of the incident. Further,
the testimony of Birung lacks corroboration. Lastly, appellant
claims an alibi, that it was physically impossible for him to be at
the locus criminissince he was about 15 kilometers away at
the time of the shooting incident.
For the State, the Solicitor General contends that the sole
eyewitness testified in clear and unequivocal terms as to the
identity of the assailants. It is well-settled that between a
positive and categorical testimony and a denial, the former
should prevail. Hence, appellant's bare denials and alibi cannot
prevail over his positive identification, according to the Solicitor
General.
The crucial issue in this appeal pertains to the sufficiency
of evidence to convict appellant. More particularly, we
have to inquire whether there has been sufficient
identification of the appellant as the perpetrator of the
offense.
The quantum of evidence required in criminal cases is proof

beyond reasonable doubt. Section 2 of Rule 133 of the Rules
of Court provides that "[p]roof beyond reasonable doubt does
not mean such degree of proof as, excluding possibility of
error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is

required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in
an unprejudiced mind." The task of the prosecution is two-fold:
first, to prove that a crime was committed, and second, that
accused is the person responsible. Thus, the prosecution must
be able to overcome the constitutional presumption of
innocence beyond reasonable doubt to justify the conviction of
the accused.[12] The reason for requiring proof beyond
reasonable doubt is simply this -
"In a criminal prosecution, the State is arrayed
against the subject; it enters the contest with a prior
inculpatory finding in its hands; with unlimited
command of means; with counsel usually of
authority and capacity, who are regarded as public
officers, and therefore speaking semi-judicially, and
with an attitude of tranquil majesty often in striking
contrast to that of defendant engaged in a perturbed
and distracting struggle for liberty if not for life.
These inequalities of position the law strives to meet
by the rule that there is to be no conviction when
there is a reasonable doubt of guilt." [13]
the case before us, the prosecution presented proof that

Lumboy was killed during the shooting incident on
August 1, 1991. However, we find that the prosecution
failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that it was
appellant who perpetrated the killing.
On direct examination, PO3 Birung testified that Lumboy and
Capili informed him that they sighted two former CAFGUs in
Catarauan.[14] On cross-examination, PO3 Birung testified,
however, that Lumboy did not actually see the two former
CAFGUs but merely heard the news from his place.
[15] Further, Lumboy did not categorically tell PO3 Birung that
the two persons sighted were former CAFGUs, only that said
persons were armed.[16] PO3 Birung testified that he merely
heard from the people of Barangay Catarauan that there were
two dismissed CAFGUs in the vicinity.[17] Further, PO3 Birung
testified that he was not even authorized by the army to catch
the dismissed CAFGUs, and that Catarauan was not part of his

jurisdiction.[18]PO3 Birung testified that the day after the
incident, a civilian informer named Palos told him the names of
appellant and accused.[19] But Palos did not even witness the
shooting incident. He merely executed an affidavit during
preliminary investigation but did not testify in court. Hence, his
affidavit is hearsay and has no probative value.[
hearsay Clearly, the information given by either Lumboy or Palos to
PO3 Birung as to the identity of appellant is hearsay. The
hearsay rule bars the testimony of a witness who merely
recites what someone else has told him, whether orally or in
writing.[21] Section 36 of Rule 130[22] provides that a witness
can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal
knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception,
except as otherwise provided in the rules. In fact, PO3 Birung's
testimony is even double or multiple hearsay, since it is based
upon "third-hand" information related to the witness by
someone who heard it from others. Multiple hearsay is no
more competent than single hearsay.
PO3 Birung insists that he saw the appellant and accused
"walking" during the incident.[24] After the initial shots rang
out, however, the team members immediately sought cover.
Thus, it is highly unlikely that PO3 Birung was able to
sufficiently recognize the gunmen. Further, the other members
of the team, including the injured Capili, did not testify as to the
identity of the appellant. The trial court even observed in its
decision that Capili "deliberately chose not to appear in court
for 18 times when cited to appear during the hearing."
sole eyewitness While it is accepted that the testimony of a sole eyewitness, if
positive and credible, is sufficient to sustain a judgment of
conviction,[25] it bears stressing that such testimony must
be clear, positive, and credible. Hence, an identification of the
appellant as the gunman based on hearsay does not suffice for
conviction.
motive Further, it does not appear appellant has a motive for killing the
victim. While generally, the motive of the accused in a criminal
case is immaterial and does not have to be proven, proof of
the same becomes relevant and essential when, as in this

case, the identity of the assailant is in question.[26] A finding of
guilt must rest on the prosecution's own evidence, not on the
weakness or even absence of evidence for the defense.[27] It
is precisely when the prosecution's case is weak, as in this
instance, that the defense of alibi assumes importance and
becomes crucial in negating criminal liability.[28] Under our
criminal justice system, the overriding consideration is not
whether the court doubts the innocence of the accused but
whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.
[29] Here, doubt as to the identification of appellant as the
guilty person has not been overcome.

People of the Philippines v Roberto Samontaez
g.r. 134530 December 4, 2000
J. De leon Jr.
November 25, Corazon delas Alas saw her daughter, Lolita, then 18 years old
1995 off to school.
this was the last time Corazon had seen her alive beacuse in
the evening of the same day, Lolita's lifeless and naked body
was found in the middle of a sugar cane plantation.
Lolita was apparently raped before the attacker ended her life
nobody witnessed the actual commission of the grisly crime
police investigation reveals the Roberto Samontaez was seen
at around 6:30pm on November 25, 1995 while he was in the
act of coming out of the sugar cane plantation near the place
where the dead body of Lolita was found
at around 5:30pm Roberto passed by the house of melecio
mendoza and he headed to the direction of the sugar cane
plantation
30 minutes late, Lolita was spotted and she was heading
eastward to her house
At around 7pm, roberto returned heading westward and he
passed through the same path along the cane field
Nove 28, 1995 roberto was fetched by the police authorites.
during the investigation, Roberto admitted to the police that the

other personal belongings of Lolita were inside his bag that
was left at his workplace
afterwards, the personal belongings of the victim were
recovered
January 11, Roberto was formally charged with rape with homicide
1996
he strangled her with the ise of her t shirt which caused her
death. then he took Lolita's gold ring and a wrist watch
February 1, roberto was arraigned; entered plea of not guilty
1996

pre trial
before trial on the merits, Roberto manifested his intention of
changing his earlier plea of not guilty to guilty.
the court ordered the accused to be re-arraigned
aftr being satisfied that the accused entered a voluntary and
informed plea by asking some questions, the trial court
required the prosectution to adduce evidence to prove the guilt
of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability
Evidence of the The evidence of the prosecution shows that on November 26,
Prosecution 1995, the victim, Lolita delas Alas alias Betia, left their house in
Sitio Ilaya, Barangay Bunducan, Nasugbu, Batangas at around
6:00 oclock in the morning to attend her classes at Kim Harold
Computer School in Poblacion, Nasugbu, Batangas. She was
expected to return home at 5:00 oclock in the afternoon of the
same day. Having failed to come home on time, the victims
mother, Corazon delas Alas, decided to meet Lolita in
Barangay Pantalan which was her usual route in going home
from school. Upon her arrival in Barangay Pantalan however,
Corazon was informed that Lolita had already passed by, and
that by then she must have reached their home. Corazon
returned to Sitio Ilaya but found that Lolita was not yet
home. Filled with apprehension, Corazon sought the
assistance of her neighbors, Renato Bauyon and Dalmacio
Salao, to locate her daughters whereabouts. At 8:00 oclock in
the evening Corazon fainted upon being informed by Bauyon
and Salao that the dead body of Lolita was found in the sugar
cane plantation of Perino Desacola. The body of her dead
daughter was already inside the house when she regained
consciousness.
It appears that on November 26, 1995, Carlito Samontaez, who
is a first cousin of both the accused-appellant and the victim,
was on his way home after gathering fodder for his animals
when, at a distance of twenty (20) arms length, he chanced
upon Roberto at around 6:30 oclock in the evening while the
latter was coming out of the sugar cane plantation of Perino
Desacola in Sitio Ilaya, Barangay Bunducan, Nasugbu,
Batangas. Carlito and Roberto were coming from opposite
directions.However, when they came close to two (2) arms

length with each other, Carlito observed that Roberto, who was
naked from waist up with his T-shirt placed on his shoulder,
was perspiring, somewhat surprised and looked pale (medyo
po namumutla). Carlito greeted Roberto and asked him where
he just came from, but the latter did not answer and left
hurriedly. Carlito dismissed his cousins reaction, thinking that
he (Roberto) may have been merely drunk.
After reaching his house, Carlito joined in the search for Lolita
upon learning that she was missing.At 8:00 oclock in the
evening, the victim was found dead in the sugar cane
plantation of Perino Desacola in Sitio Ilaya. Lolita was lying on
her stomach, naked and a black T-shirt was tied around her
neck
nother prosecution witness, Melecio Mendoza, who is an uncle
of Roberto Samontaez by affinity, saw Roberto walking
eastward to Sitio Ilaya in Barangay Bunducan at about 5:30
oclock in the afternoon on November 26, 1995. Melecio also
saw Lolita at around 6:00 oclock in the evening of the same
day walking home to Sitio Ilaya. Subsequently, at 7:00 oclock
in the evening, Melecio again saw Roberto passed by his
house, this time heading westward to Sitio Balanggutan in
Barangay Bunducan.Roberto was naked from waist up with his
T-shirt placed on his shoulder.[
Dra. Estela Hizon, M.D., Municipal Health Officer of Nasugbu,
Batangas, conducted a post-mortem examination on the
cadaver of Lolita delas Alas which was already in a state
of rigor mortis. Her findings are contained in her post mortem
certification[12] dated November 26, 1995
Cause of death: Asphyxia by Strangulation.
On December 4, 1995 SPO2 Masikat and his group returned to
Hermogenes Trading in Barangay Galicia III, Mendez, Cavite
and inquired from Mr. Nelson Hermogenes about the bag of
Roberto.Accordingly, Mr. Hermogenes produced a black bag
purportedly belonging to Roberto containing an Omax wrist
watch, a Joop cologne and a pawnshop receipt for a gold ring
that was subsequently redeemed by SPO2 Masikat for
P500.00. The three (3) articles were positively identified during
the trial of the case by Corazon delas Alas as belonging to her

daughter, Lolita delas Alas. The police also found a fan knife
(balisong) and a Barangay Clearance inside the black bag of
Roberto Samontaez.[
Roberto was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape with homicide
The prosecution rested its case on November 30, 1997. During
the scheduled hearings on January 14 and 29, 1998 for the
presentation of evidence of the defense, the accused took the
witness stand and reiterated his previous plea of guilty to the
crime charged in the information.
In his brief, the appellant assails the validity of his plea of huilty
to the charged for having been improvidently made
Rule 116 Sec 3
3 things are enjoined of the trial court after a plea of guilty to a
capital offense is entered by the accused:
. The trial court must conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of
his plea; 2. The trial court must require the prosecution to
present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the
precise degree of his culpability through the requisite quantum
of evidence; and 3. The trial court must ask the accused if he
desires to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to do
so if he desires.
It must be emphasized that the said procedure is mandatory
and any judge who fails to observe it commits grave abuse of
discretion.[
The rationale behind the rule is that the courts must proceed
with more care where the possible punishment is in its severest
form, namely death, for the reason that the execution of such a
sentence is irrevocable and experience has shown that
innocent persons have at times pleaded guilty. The primordial
purpose is to avoid improvident pleas of guilty on the part of an
accused where grave crimes are involved since by admitting
his guilt before the court, he would forfeit his life and liberty
without having fully understood the meaning, significance and
consequence of his plea.
The Court notes the trial courts efforts to ensure the propriety

of appellants plea of guilty to the crime of rape with homicide
as evidenced by its lengthy inquiries to the appellant in
separate hearings, the transcript of which were reproduced in
its assailed Decision
Nevertheless, We are not convinced that such lengthy inquiries
conducted by the trial court during the re-arraignment of the
appellant as well as during the subsequent hearings for the
presentation of evidence of both the prosecution and the
defense sufficiently established voluntariness and full
comprehension of the appellant of his plea of guilty to the crime
charged in the Information. It may be noted that the appellant
earlier entered the plea of Not guilty to the Information in this
case during his arraignment on February 1,
1996. Subsequently, the appellant manifested, through his
counsel de officio, his intention to change his previous plea to
that of a plea of guilty to the crime charged in the
Information. After having entered the plea of guilty on re-
arraignment, the trial court proceeded to propound questions
on the appellant during which affirmative responses were
elicited from the appellant apparently to show that his
subsequent plea of guilty was his own voluntary decision. The
trial court per its Decision under review, however, failed to
dwell on a significant development that transpired during
the scheduled hearing on November 13, 1997 when the
appellant revealed in open court, through counsel, that his
subsequent plea of guilty was prompted by pressure from
a certain policeman so that he (appellant) agreed to admit
the commission of the offense charged. The pertinent
portion of the transcript is quoted hereunder,
The trial court perfunctorily brushed aside the aforesaid
disclosure from the appellant that he was pressured by a
policeman to change his earlier plea of not guilty to that of
guilty to the charge in the information. It did not propound any
clarificatory questions about the matter on the same occasion
such as the identity of the concerned policeman, the nature of
the pressure and the circumstances under which the alleged
pressure was applied on the appellant. Although further
inquiries were undertaken by the trial court in the subsequent
hearings on January 14 and 29, 1998, the questions

addressed to the appellant were primarily aimed at eliciting
affirmative responses or confirmations of his plea of guilty. The
statement of the appellant that he was pressured by a certain
policeman apparently escaped the memory or concern of the
trial court as it did not crop up in its inquiry during those
subsequent hearings. Left unventilated, the appellants
allegation of pressure generates doubt on the voluntariness of
his plea of guilty to a capital offense.
Certain other considerations pose nagging doubts on the clarity
of appellants grasp of the true meaning, full significance and
consequences of his plea of guilty. The trial court failed to
mention and explain clearly to the appellant the elements of the
crime of rape with homicide as charged in the Information.
[32] As a result, appellant was not properly accorded his
fundamental right to be informed of the precise nature of the
accusation against him, which is an integral aspect of the due
process clause under the Constitution.
Notably, the appellant who reached grade IV only stated that
he did not know the consequences of his plea of guilty during
the hearing on February 14, 1996 and again, during the
hearing on January 14, 1998. While the trial court informed the
appellant that his plea of guilty meant that he admitted liability
for the crime of rape with homicide, as charged in the
information, which carries the penalty of death, it failed to
emphasize that his said plea of guilty would not, under any
circumstance, affect or reduce the death penalty, the imposition
of which is mandatory under Section 11 of Republic Act No.
7659.[33] In which event, the appellant must be made to
understand in plain and simple language the precise meaning
of the term mandatory.[34] Additionally, the trial court failed to
apprise the appellant of the civil liability (e.g. indemnity, moral
damages and exemplary damages) arising from the crime of
rape with homicide which shall be imposed on him as
perpetrator of the crime.[35] Despite appellants apparent
willingness to accept the penalty for his crime, it is not
farfetched to say that appellant was actually led to believe that
the penalty for his crime may still be reduced upon his plea of
guilty thereto especially when the trial court informed the
appellant, through counsel, that he should adduce evidence.

s it is, the Decision of the trial court is devoid of any factual
finding relative to the actual commission of the crime of rape
with homicide by the appellant. In the final analysis, it is the
quality rather than the number of questions propounded during
the inquiry that serves the task of ascertaining the
voluntariness and full comprehension by the accused of the
consequences of his plea of guilty to a capital offense.
Lastly, the trial court lamentably considered pieces of
evidence that are inadmissible in evidence for being the
proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. The facts show that
the appellant Roberto Samontaez was actually arrested by
police authorities of Nasugbu, Batangas on November 28,
1995 at his workplace in Barangay Galicia III, Mendez,
Cavite. It does not appear from the record that the
appellant was apprised of his constitutional rights during
the police custodial investigation which are enshrined in
Article III, Section 12(1) of the 1987 Constitution. [37] It also
does not appear that he was assisted by counsel during
the said custodial investigation. In the absence of a valid
waiver, any confession obtained from the appellant during
the police custodial investigation relative to the crime,
including any other evidence secured by virtue of the said
confession is inadmissible in evidence even if the same
was not objected to during the trial by the counsel of the
appellant. Thus, the personal belongings of the victim
namely: Omax wristwatch, gold ring and Joop cologne
were recovered and found inside the bag of the appellant
when the police authorities returned to the appellants
place of work at the Hermogenes Trading in Barangay
Galicia III, Mendez, Cavite after they illegally obtained a
confession from the appellant. In the case of People vs.
Alicando,[38] the Court had opportunity to reiterate the
rule that evidence gathered by virtue of an illegally
obtained confession is inadmissible, thus: We have not
only constitutionalized the Miranda warnings in our
jurisdiction. We have also adopted the libertarian exclusionary
rule known as the fruit of the poisonous tree, a phrase minted
by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in the celebrated case
of Nardone vs. United States. According to this rule, once

the primary source ( the tree) is shown to have been unlawfully
obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the fruit)
derived from it is also inadmissible. Stated otherwise, illegally
seized evidence is obtained as a direct result of the illegal act,
whereas the fruit of the poisonous tree is the indirect result of
the same illegal act. The fruit of the poisonous tree is at least
once removed from the illegally seized evidence, but it is
equally inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle that
evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used to
gain other evidence because the originally illegally obtained
evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained.
The only other evidence of the prosecution are the testimonies

of Carlito Samontaez and Melecio Mendoza, both of which
merely seek to establish the presence of the appellant near the
vicinity of the crime scene on or about the time when the crime
took place. Ultimately, the conviction of the appellant for the
crime charged in the case at bar rested primarily on his plea of
guilty which appeared to have been improvidently made and
hence, contrary to the letter and spirit of Section 3, Rule 116 of
the Revised Rules of Court, su
Decision convicting Roberto is annulled and set aside; the case
is remanded to court a qou for proper arraignment and trial of
the accused

Berberisa Rio v Employees Compensation Commission ans SSS
g.r. 13255 may 9, 2000
Justice panganiban
Virgilio Rio Sr. husband of petitioner was employed by Allied
Port Service Inc as a stevedore since July 1982.
his duties are the ff:

1. handling steel cargoes
2. loading and unloading silica sand
3. handling, loading, unloading lumber products
4. supervising other stevedors
5. other related work
July 19 1992 Virgilio collapsed whil working at South harbor Manila
He was rushed to PGH because of melena, fever, chills and
abdominal pains 8 days before the confinement
He died 3 days lter
the cause of death was uremia secondary to chronic renal
failure
Petitioner Beberisa, his spouse filed a claim for death benefits
before the SSS
SSS denied the claim
the cause of death cannot be considered work connected bec

based on the clinical abstract submitted, Virgilio had already on
and off attack of edema and hypertension which are sugns of
kidney disease even before his employment with the company
ECC affirmed the findings of the SSS. Petitioner failed to
present relevant evidence to establish the causal connection
between the deceased's ailment and his work as stevedore.
Petitioner appealed to the CA
CA affirmed ECC
Since petitioner failed to establish any causal connection of the
disease which led to the death of her husband with the nature
of his working conditions, and, in particular, that said working
condition had increased the risk of contracting the disease,
then the claim for death benefits must fail.

The new law discarded, among others, the concept of
presumption of compensability and aggravation and substituted
one based on social security principles. The purpose was to
restore a sensible equilibrium between the employers
obligation to pay workmens compensation and employees right
to receive reparation for work-connected death or disability.
Hence the present petitione
ISSUE WON petitioner is entitled to death benefits under increased
risk theory
HELD No
The primary and antecedent causes of Virgilio Rios death are
not listed as occupational diseases. Hence, petitioner should
have presented substantial evidence, or such relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to justify a conclusion, showing that the nature of her husbands
employment or working conditions increased the risk of uremia,
chronic renal failure or chronic glomerulonephritis.[18] This the
petitioner failed to do.
Petitioner did not adduce any proof of a reasonable connection
between the work of the deceased and the cause of his death.
There was no showing that the progression of the disease was
brought about largely by the conditions in Virgilios job. Indeed,
petitioner presented no medical history, records or physicians
report in order to substantiate her claim that the working
conditions at the Port Area increased the risk of uremia, renal
failure or glomerulonephritis.
"x x x a claimant must submit such proof as would constitute
a reasonable basis for concluding either that the conditions of
employment of the claimant caused the ailment or that such
working conditions had aggravated the risk of contracting that
ailment. What kind and quantum of evidence would constitute
an adequate basis for a reasonable man (not necessarily a
medical scientist) to reach one or the other conclusion, can
obviously be determined only on a case-to-case basis. That
evidence must, however, be real and substantial, and not
merely apparent; for the duty to prove work-causation or work-
aggravation imposed by existing law is real x x x not merely

apparent."
Such bare allegation does not ipso facto make Virgilios death
compensable. Awards of compensation cannot rest on
speculations or presumptions.[22] The beneficiaries must
present evidence to prove a positive proposition
While this Court has ruled that the sympathy of the law on
social security is toward its beneficiaries,[24]it is likewise
important to note that such sympathy must be balanced by the
equally vital interest of denying undeserving claims for
compensation. "Compassion for the victims of diseases not
covered by the law ignores the need to show a greater concern
for the trust fund to which the tens of millions of workers and
their families to look to for compensation whenever covered
accidents, diseases and deaths occur."[25] In this case, this
Court has no other course but to apply the clear provisions of
the law.[26]
[A.C. No. 5151. October 19, 2004]

PEDRO G. TOLENTINO, ROMEO M. LAYGO, SOLOMON M. LUMALANG, SR.,
MELITON D. EVANGELISTA, SR., and NELSON B. MELGAR, complainants, vs.
ATTY. NORBERTO M. MENDOZA, respondent.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a complaint filed by Pedro G. Tolentino, Romeo M. Laygo, Solomon
M. Lumalang, Sr., Meliton D. Evangelista, Sr., and Nelson B. Melgar against Atty.
Norberto M. Mendoza for Grossly Immoral Conduct and Gross Misconduct.
Complainants allege in their Affidavit-Complaint that respondent, a former
Municipal Trial Court Judge, abandoned his legal wife, Felicitas V. Valderia in
favor of his paramour, Marilyn dela Fuente, who is, in turn, married to one Ramon
G. Marcos; respondent and Marilyn dela Fuente have been cohabiting openly
and publicly as husband and wife in Brgy. Estrella, Naujan, Oriental Mindoro;
respondent had fathered two children by his paramour Marilyn dela Fuente;
respondent and Marilyn dela Fuente declared in the birth certificates of their two
daughters that they were married on May 12, 1986, making it appear that their
two children are legitimate, while in respondents Certificate of Candidacy filed
with the COMELEC during the 1995 elections, respondent declared that his wife
is Felicitas V. Valderia; in respondents certificate of candidacy for the 1998
elections, he declared his civil status as separated; such declarations in the birth
certificates of his children and in his certificate of candidacy are acts constituting
falsification of public documents; and respondents acts betray his lack of good
moral character and constitute grounds for his removal as a member of the bar.
Respondent filed his Comment wherein he states that complainants, who are his
political opponents in Naujan, Oriental Mindoro, are merely filing this case to
exact revenge on him for his filing of criminal charges against them;
complainants illegally procured copies of the birth certificates of Mara Khrisna
Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente
Mendoza, in violation of Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993,
thus, such documents are inadmissible in evidence; respondent did not
participate in the preparation and submission with the local civil registry of
subject birth certificates; respondent never declared that he had two wives, as he
has always declared that he is separated in fact from his wife, Felicitas V.
Valderia; and complainants have used this issue against him during elections and
yet, the people of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro still elected him as Mayor, hence,
respondent has not offended the publics sense of morality.
The administrative case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(hereinafter IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. Thereafter, the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP conducted hearings.
Witnesses for complainants, Nelson B. Melgar and Romeo M. Laygo, submitted

their affidavits as their direct testimony and were subjected to cross-examination
by respondents counsel.
Witness Nelson B. Melgar declares in his affidavit as follows: He knows
respondent for they both reside in Naujan, Oriental Mindoro. Respondent is
known as a practicing lawyer and a former Municipal Trial Court Judge.
Respondent has been cohabiting openly and publicly with Marilyn dela Fuente,
representing themselves to be husband and wife, and from their cohabitation,
they produced two children, namely, Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente
Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza. Sometime in 1995,
he (witness Melgar) received a letter from a concerned citizen, informing him that
respondent was married to Felicitas Valderia of San Rafael, Bulacan, on January
16, 1980, but respondent abandoned his wife to cohabit with Marilyn dela
Fuente. Attached to the letter was a photocopy of a Certification issued by the
Civil Register attesting to the marriage between respondent and Felicitas
Valderia. He also received information from concerned citizens that Marilyn dela
Fuente is also legally married to one Ramon G. Marcos, as evidenced by a
Certification from the Office of the Civil Register. Respondent stated in his
Certificate of Candidacy filed with the COMELEC in 1995 that he is still legally
married to Felicitas Valderia. In respondents Certificate of Candidacy filed with
the COMELEC in 1998, he declared his civil status as separated. Respondent
has represented to all that he is married to Marilyn dela Fuente. In
the Naujanews, a local newspaper where respondent holds the position of
Chairman of the Board of the Editorial Staff, respondent was reported by said
newspaper as husband to Marilyn dela Fuente and the father of Mara Khrisna
Charmina and Myrra Khrisna Normina.
On cross-examination, witness Melgar testified as follows: He was the former
mayor of Naujan and he and respondent belong to warring political parties. It was
not respondent who told him about the alleged immoral conduct subject of the
present case. Although he received the letter of a concerned citizen regarding the
immoral conduct of respondent as far back as 1995, he did not immediately file a
case for disbarment against respondent. It was only after respondent filed a
criminal case for falsification against him that he decided to file an administrative
case against respondent.[1]
On re-direct examination, witness Melgar testified that there were people who
were against the open relationship between respondent and Marilyn dela Fuente
as respondent had been publicly introducing the latter as his wife despite the fact
that they are both still legally married to other persons, and so someone
unknown to him just handed to their maid copies of the birth certificates of Mara
Khrisna Charmina and Myrra Khrisna Normina.[2]
The affidavit of Mr. Romeo M. Laygo, which was adopted as his direct testimony,

is practically identical to that of witness Melgar. On cross-examination, witness
Laygo testified that he was not the one who procured the certified true copies of
the birth certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra
Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza, as somebody just gave said documents
to Nelson Melgar. He was a municipal councilor in 1995 when the letter of a
concerned citizen regarding respondents immorality was sent to Melgar, but he
did not take any action against respondent at that time.[3]
Complainants then formally offered documentary evidence consisting of
photocopies which were admitted by respondents counsel to be faithful
reproductions of the originals or certified true copies thereof, to wit: a letter of one
Luis Bermudez informing Nelson Melgar of respondents immoral acts,[4]the
Certification of the Local Civil Registrar of San Rafael, Bulacan, attesting to the
celebration of the marriage between respondent and one Felicitas Valderia,[5] the
Birth Certificate of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza,[6] the Birth
Certificate of Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza,[7] the Certificate of
Candidacy of respondent dated March 9, 1995,[8] the Certificate of Candidacy of
respondent dated March 25, 1998,[9] Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of
Naujan, Oriental Mindoro dated October 27, 1998, attesting to the marriage
celebrated between Marilyn dela Fuente and Ramon Marcos,[10] and the
editorial page of the Naujanews (February-March 1999 issue),[11] wherein it was
stated that respondent has two daughters with his wife, Marilyn dela Fuente.
Respondent, on the other hand, opted not to present any evidence and merely
submitted a memorandum expounding on his arguments that the testimonies of
complainants witnesses are mere hearsay, thus, said testimonies and their
documentary evidence have no probative weight.
On February 27, 2004, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed Resolution No.
XVI-2004-123, reading as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as
Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering respondents violation
of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Norberto M.
Mendoza is hereby SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY from the practice of law until
he submits satisfactory proof that he is no longer cohabiting with a woman who is
not his wife and has abandoned such immoral course of conduct.
Portions of the report and recommendation of the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline, upon which the above-quoted Resolution was based, read as follows:
FINDINGS:
The evidence of complainants to support their charge of immorality consists in a)

the testimonies of Nelson Melgar and Romeo Laygo given by way of affidavits
executed under oath and affirmed before the Commission and b) their
documentary evidence consisting of their Exhibits A to H.
Respondent filed his comment through counsel and did not formally present or
offer any evidence. Respondent opted not to present his evidence anymore
because according to him there is none to rebut vis--vis the evidence presented
by the private complainants. Respondent instead submitted a memorandum
through counsel to argue his position. As can be seen from the comment and
memorandum submitted, respondents counsel argues that the complaint is
politically motivated since complainants are political rivals of respondent and that
the birth certificates Exhibits D and D-1 which were offered to show that
respondent sired the children namely Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente
Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza out of his
cohabitation with Marilyn dela Fuente are inadmissible because they were
allegedly secured in violation of Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1993. The
rest of the exhibits are either hearsay or self-serving according to respondent.
The witnesses who are also two of the complainants herein, on the other hand,
categorically state in their affidavits [Exhibits A and B] particularly in paragraph 2
that Respondent has been cohabiting openly and publicly with Marilyn de la
Fuente, representing themselves to be husband and wife. In paragraph 10 of
said affidavits the witnesses also categorically state that respondent has even
represented to all and sundry that Marilyn de la Fuente is his wife. These
categorical statements made under oath by complainants are not hearsay and
remain un-rebutted. Respondent chose not to rebut them.
Exhibit E, the Certificate of Candidacy executed by respondent shows that
respondent is married to one, Felicitas V. Valderia. As shown by Exhibit H, a
marriage certificate, Marilyn de la Fuente is married to one, Ramon G. Marcos.
Duly certified true copies of said exhibits have been presented by complainants.
With respect to Exhibits D and D-1, we believe that they are competent and
relevant evidence and admissible in this proceedings. The exclusionary rule
which bars admission of illegally obtained evidence applies more appropriately to
evidence obtained as a result of illegal searches and seizures. The instant case
cannot be analogous to an illegal search or seizure. A person who violates Rule
24 of Administrative Order No. 1 Series of 1993 as cited by respondent risks the
penalty of imprisonment or payment of a fine but it does not make the document
so issued inadmissible as evidence specially in proceedings like the present
case. Exhibits D and D-1 which are duly certified birth certificates are therefore
competent evidence to show paternity of said children by respondent in the
absence of any evidence to the contrary.
By and large the evidence of complainants consisting of the testimonies of

witnesses Nelson Melgar and Romeo Laygo, and corroborated by the
documentary exhibits will show that indeed respondent has been cohabiting
publicly with a certain Marilyn de la Fuente who is not his wife and that out of
said cohabitation respondent sired two children. These facts we repeat have not
been denied by respondent under oath since he chose to just argue on the basis
of the improper motivations and the inadmissibility, hearsay and self-serving
nature of the documents presented. Complainants have presented evidence
sufficient enough to convince us that indeed respondent has been cohabiting
publicly with a person who is not his wife. The evidence taken together will
support the fact that respondent is not of good moral character. That respondent
chose not to deny under oath the grave and serious allegations made against
him is to our mind his undoing and his silence has not helped his position before
the Commission. As between the documents and positive statements of
complainants, made under oath and the arguments and comments of respondent
submitted through his lawyers, which were not verified under oath by respondent
himself, we are inclined and so give weight to the evidence of complainants. The
direct and forthright testimonies and statements of Nelson Melgar and Romeo
Laygo that respondent was openly cohabiting with Marilyn de la Fuente is not
hearsay. The witnesses may have admitted that respondent Mendoza did not tell
them that a certain Marilyn de la Fuente was his paramour (for why would
respondent admit that to complainants) but the witnesses did state clearly in their
affidavits under oath that respondent was cohabiting with Marilyn de la Fuente
who is not respondents wife. Again their categorical statements taken together
with the other documents, are enough to convince us and conclude that
respondent is not of good moral character.
Members of the Bar have been repeatedly reminded that possession of good
moral character is a continuing condition for membership in the Bar in good
standing. The continued possession of good moral character is a requisite
condition for remaining in the practice of law [Mortel vs. Aspiras 100 Phil. 586
(1956); Cordova vs. Cordova 179 SCRA 680 (1989); People vs. Tuanda 181
SCRA 682 (1990)]. The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of
the bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally
accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes
mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage [Mijares vs. Villaluz 274
SCRA 1 (1997)].
In the instant case respondent has disregarded and made a mockery of the
fundamental institution of marriage. Respondent in fact even so stated in Exhibit
F that he is separated from his wife. This fact and statement without any further
explanation from respondent only contributes to the blot in his moral character
which good moral character we repeat is a continuing condition for a member to

remain in good standing. Under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. Respondent has violated this rule against engaging in immoral
conduct.
We agree, as cited by the respondent, with the pronouncement made in Santos
vs. Dischoso, 84 SCRA 622 (1978) that courts should not be used by private
persons particularly disgruntled opponents to vent their rancor on members of
the Bar through unjust and unfounded accusations. However, in the instant case
the charges can hardly be considered as unfounded or unjust based on the
evidence presented. The evidence presented shows that respondent no longer
possess (sic) that good moral character necessary as a condition for him to
remain a member of the Bar in good standing. He is therefore not entitled to
continue to engage in the practice of law.
We find such report and recommendation of the IBP to be fully supported by the
pleadings and evidence on record, and, hence, approve and adopt the same.
The evidence presented by complainants reach that quantum of evidence
required in administrative proceedings which is only substantial evidence, or that
amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conviction.[12]
Witness Melgars testimony that respondent had been publicly introducing Marilyn
dela Fuente as his wife is corroborated by the contents of an article in
the Naujanews, introducing respondent as one of Naujans public servants, and
stating therein that respondent has been blessed with two beautiful children with
his wife, Marilyn dela Fuente.[13] It should be noted that said publication is under
the control of respondent, he being the Chairman of the Board thereof. Thus, it
could be reasonably concluded that if he contested the truth of the contents of
subject article in the Naujanews, or if he did not wish to publicly present Marilyn
dela Fuente as his wife, he could have easily ordered that the damning portions
of said article to be edited out.
With regard to respondents argument that the credibility of witnesses for the
complainants is tainted by the fact that they are motivated by revenge for
respondents filing of criminal cases against them, we opine that even if witnesses
Melgar and Laygo are so motivated, the credibility of their testimonies cannot be
discounted as they are fully supported and corroborated by documentary
evidence which speak for themselves. The birth certificates of Mara Khrisna
Mendoza born on June 16, 1988 and May 22, 1990, respectively, to Norberto M.
Mendoza and Marilyn Dela Fuente; and the Certification from the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar of Bulacan attesting to the existence in its records of an
entry of a marriage between respondent and one Felicitas Valderia celebrated on

January 16, 1980, are public documents and are prima facie evidence of the
facts contained therein, as provided for under Article 410[14] of the Civil Code of
the Philippines.
Respondent mistakenly argues that the birth certificates of Mara Khrisna
Mendoza born on June 16, 1988 and May 22, 1990, respectively, to Norberto M.
Mendoza and Marilyn Dela Fuente, are inadmissible in evidence for having been
obtained in violation of Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993, which
provides as follows:
Rule 24. Non-Disclosure of Birth Records.
(1) The records of a persons birth shall be kept strictly confidential and no
information relating thereto shall be issued except on the request of any of the
following:
a. the concerned person himself, or any person authorized by him;
b. the court or proper public official whenever absolutely necessary in
administrative, judicial or other official proceedings to determine the identity of
the childs parents or other circumstances surrounding his birth; and
c. in case of the persons death, the nearest of kin.
(2) Any person violating the prohibition shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of
at least two months or a fine in an amount not exceeding five hundred pesos, or
both in the discretion of the court. (Article 7, P.D. 603)
Section 3, Rule 128 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides that evidence is
admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these
rules. There could be no dispute that the subject birth certificates are relevant to
the issue. The only question, therefore, is whether the law or the rules provide for
the inadmissibility of said birth certificates allegedly for having been obtained in
violation of Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993.
Note that Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 only provides for
sanctions against persons violating the rule on confidentiality of birth records, but
nowhere does it state that procurement of birth records in violation of said rule
would render said records inadmissible in evidence. On the other hand, the
Revised Rules of Evidence only provides for the exclusion of evidence if it is
obtained as a result of illegal searches and seizures. It should be emphasized,
however, that said rule against unreasonable searches and seizures is meant
only to protect a person from interference by the government or the state.
[15] In People vs. Hipol,[16] we explained that:
The Constitutional proscription enshrined in the Bill of Rights does not concern
itself with the relation between a private individual and another individual. It
governs the relationship between the individual and the State and its agents. The
Bill of Rights only tempers governmental power and protects the individual

against any aggression and unwarranted interference by any department of
government and its agencies. Accordingly, it cannot be extended to the acts
complained of in this case. The alleged warrantless search made by Roque, a
co-employee of appellant at the treasurers office, can hardly fall within the ambit
of the constitutional proscription on unwarranted searches and seizures.
Consequently, in this case where complainants, as private individuals, obtained
the subject birth records as evidence against respondent, the protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures does not apply.
Since both Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 and the Revised
Rules on Evidence do not provide for the exclusion from evidence of the birth
certificates in question, said public documents are, therefore, admissible and
should be properly taken into consideration in the resolution of this administrative
case against respondent.
Verily, the facts stated in the birth certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela
Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza and
respondents Certificate of Candidacy dated March 9, 1995 wherein respondent
himself declared he was married to Felicitas Valderia, were never denied nor
rebutted by respondent. Hence, said public documents sufficiently prove that he
fathered two children by Marilyn dela Fuente despite the fact that he was still
legally married to Felicitas Valderia at that time.
In Bar Matter No. 1154,[17] good moral character was defined thus:
. . . good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good
reputation or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which
he is held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral character is not a
subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality. The standard of
personal and professional integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely
enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal law.
In Zaguirre vs. Castillo,[18] we reiterated the definition of immoral conduct, to wit:
. . . that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference
to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. Furthermore,
such conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be
so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible
to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances
as to shock the common sense of decency.
In the above-quoted case, we pointed out that a member of the Bar and officer of
the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the
keeping of mistresses but must also behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the
public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards and, thus,
ruled that siring a child with a woman other than his wife is a conduct way below
the standards of morality required of every lawyer.[19]

We must rule in the same wise in this case before us. The fact that respondent
continues to publicly and openly cohabit with a woman who is not his legal wife,
thus, siring children by her, shows his lack of good moral character. Respondent
should keep in mind that the requirement of good moral character is not only a
condition precedent to admission to the Philippine Bar but is also a continuing
requirement to maintain ones good standing in the legal profession.
[20] In Aldovino vs. Pujalte, Jr.,[21]we emphasized that:
This Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral
character of members of the Bar. They are expected at all times to uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission
which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity,
honesty, and integrity of the legal profession. Membership in the legal profession
is a privilege. And whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no longer
worthy of the trust and confidence of the public, it becomes not only the right but
also the duty of this Court, which made him one of its officers and gave him the
privilege of ministering within its Bar, to withdraw the privilege.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Norberto M. Mendoza is hereby found GUILTY
of immorality, in violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
He is SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY from the practice of law until he submits
satisfactory proof that he has abandoned his immoral course of conduct.
Let a copy of this resolution be served personally on respondent at his last
known address and entered in his record as attorney. Let the IBP, the Bar
Confidant, and the Court Administrator be furnished also a copy of this resolution
for their information and guidance as well as for circularization to all courts in the
country.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-
Gutierrez, Carpio, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Tinga, Chico-Nazario,
and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Azcuna, J., on leave.
[1] TSN of June 10, 2002, pp. 4-14.

[2] Id. at pp. 15-16.
[3] TSN of August 12, 2002, pp. 16-20.
[4] Exhibits C to C-2, Rollo, pp. 34-36.
[5] Exhibit C-3, Rollo, p. 37.
[6] Exhibit D, Rollo, p. 7.
[7] Exhibit D-1, Rollo, p. 8.
[8] Exhibit E, Rollo, p. 38.

[9] Exhibit F, Rollo, p. 39.
[10] Exhibit H, Rollo, p. 41.
[11] Exhibit G, Rollo, p. 40.
[12] Office of the Court Administrator vs. Morante, A.M. No. P-02-1555, April 16,
2004.
[13] The pertinent portion of the article written in the vernacular is reproduced as
follows:
Sapagkat ang kanyang hangarin na maglingkod sa bayan ng Naujan ay wagas at
dalisay kung kayat siya ay pinalad na manalo bilang punumbayan noong halalan
nang 1998.
Si Mayor Bert Mendoza ay naninirahan sa Barangay Estrella at biniyayaan ng
dalawang magagandang anak na sina Cham-Cham at Chin-Chin sa kaniyang
may-bahay na si Marilyn Dela Fuente.
[14] Art. 410. The books making up the civil register and all documents relating
thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be prima facie evidence
of the facts therein contained.
[15] Villanueva vs. Querubin, 48 SCRA 345, 350 (1972).
[16] 407 SCRA 179, 185 (2003).
[17] In The Matter Of The Disqualification Of Bar Examinee Haron S. Meling In
The 2002 Bar Examinations And For Disciplinary Action As Member Of The
Philippine Sharia Bar, June 8, 2004.
[18] 398 SCRA 658, 662 (2003), citing Narag vs. Narag, 291 SCRA 451, 464
(1998).
[19] Id. at p. 663.
[20] In Re: Suspension From The Practice Of Law In The Territory Of Guam Of
Atty. Leon G. Maquera, Bar Matter No. 793, July 30, 2004.
[21] A.C. No. 5082, February 17, 2004.

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Mercedita De Jesus

One contract was a lease agreement notarized sometime in

The other contact was a sale agreement over a property

AQUINOCJU | Page 1 of 76 | Case Summaries of Selected Cases Assigned Under Evidence

The cause of the perhury charge against Merceidta was not

With regard to the lease agreement, Atty. Sanchez-Malit

As for the purchase agreement of the property covered by

AQUINOCJU | Page 2 of 76 | Case Summaries of Selected Cases Assigned Under Evidence

Finally, Atty. Sanchez-Malit maintained that the SPAs that

1) an Extra Judicial Deed of Partition which referred to the

AQUINOCJU | Page 3 of 76 | Case Summaries of Selected Cases Assigned Under Evidence

He also recommended that she be suspended from the

She maintained that the additional documents submitted by

Also, the Urgent ex parte motion of Mercedita was actually a

Atty. Sanchez-Malit concluded that the the investigating

Respondent also prayed that mitigating circumstances be

AQUINOCJU | Page 4 of 76 | Case Summaries of Selected Cases Assigned Under Evidence

Sec. 3 Rule 128 of the Revised Rules on Evidence:

Compared to Tolentino v Mendoza (Rule 24 AO 1 s.

Revised Ruled of Evidence only provides for the

People v Hipol: The Constitutional proscription enshrined in

The Bill of Rights only temprs governmental power and

AQUINOCJU | Page 5 of 76 | Case Summaries of Selected Cases Assigned Under Evidence

Since both Rule 24 AO 1 and Revised Rules on Evidence

Case at bar: 2004 Rules on Notarial Law contain no

Misc. The important role a notary public performs cannot be

Where the notary public admittedly has personal knowledge

AQUINOCJU | Page 6 of 76 | Case Summaries of Selected Cases Assigned Under Evidence

Respondents explanation about the unsigned lease

AQUINOCJU | Page 7 of 76 | Case Summaries of Selected Cases Assigned Under Evidence

AQUINOCJU | Page 8 of 76 | Case Summaries of Selected Cases Assigned Under Evidence

ATTY. LOURDES A. ONA,

JOSE MARI L. DUARTE,

RET. GENERAL MELITON D. GOYENA,

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR,

A.M. No. RTJ-07-2076

October 12, 2010

AQUINOCJU | Page 9 of 76 | Case Summaries of Selected Cases Assigned Under Evidence

Ruperto Pizarro Bruno was charged with vioaltion of PD 1866

AQUINOCJU | Page 10 of 76 | Case Summaries of Selected Cases Assigned Under Evidence

AQUINOCJU | Page 11 of 76 | Case Summaries of Selected Cases Assigned Under Evidence

Furthermore, an officer certified that Judge Lerma did not file

start is aperson who records in the logbook the name of the

AQUINOCJU | Page 12 of 76 | Case Summaries of Selected Cases Assigned Under Evidence

on cross exam, Godofredo admitted that he is not the

aquino had been employed by the company for 15 yrs; workes

Violation of Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars, and

AQUINOCJU | Page 13 of 76 | Case Summaries of Selected Cases Assigned Under Evidence

Ruling On the basis of the foregoing findings, we adopt the

AQUINOCJU | Page 14 of 76 | Case Summaries of Selected Cases Assigned Under Evidence

AQUINOCJU | Page 15 of 76 | Case Summaries of Selected Cases Assigned Under Evidence

This action of respondent judge violates Section 8 of Rule 140,

A.M. No. RTJ-07-2078

AQUINOCJU | Page 16 of 76 | Case Summaries of Selected Cases Assigned Under Evidence

judge lerma enjoined arceo, narciso, romualdes and duarte

AQUINOCJU | Page 17 of 76 | Case Summaries of Selected Cases Assigned Under Evidence

However, when the law is so elementary and the matter of

AQUINOCJU | Page 18 of 76 | Case Summaries of Selected Cases Assigned Under Evidence

The Rules are unequivocal. Indirect contempt proceedings

The records do not indicate that complainant was afforded an

It must be remembered that the power to punish for contempt

As already mentioned above, gross ignorance of the law or

AQUINOCJU | Page 19 of 76 | Case Summaries of Selected Cases Assigned Under Evidence

In this case, we find respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance