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DELEUZEI a

EDITED BY At-rnnr\r HAKr(

Th i s is t he f ir s t d i c ti o n a ry d e d i c a te d to the ' w ork of Gi l l es D el euze.

It provides an in-depth and lucid introduction to one of the most influential
figuresin coniinentalphilosophy.

The dictionary defines and contextualisesmore than 150 ter-rnsthat relate to

Deleuzel philosophy including concepts such as 'becoming','body without
organs','decerritorializatiqn','differenre','repetition','rhizome'
and 'schizoanalysis'.
The clear explanationsalso-addressthe main intellectualinfluenceson Deleuze
as well as tl're influence Deleuze has had on suDiects such as feminism,
cinema, postcolonial theory, geographyand cultural studies.Those unfamiliar
with Deleuze will find the dictionary a user-friendlytool equippingthem with
definitions and interpretations both as a study and/or a teaching aid.

The entries are written by some of the rnost prominent Deleuze scholars
inciudingRosi Braidotti,Claire Colebrook,Tom Conley,EugeneHollarrdand Paul
Patton.Thesecontributors bring their expert knowledgeand critical opinion to
bear on the entries and provide an enrichingtheoretical context for anyone
interestedin Deleuze.

Adrian Parr is Professor of contemporary art and designat the SavannahCollege

of Art and Design. She is the editor, with lan Buchanan,of Deleuze ond the
Contemporory World, f orthcom i ng from Edinburgh U n iversity Press.

SBN 0-7 186-1899-6

IS

9 8tr
Th e D e l eu ze Dicti onarv

Editedby Adrian Parr

EdinburghUniversity Press

..-.-__----.-
 C ontents

Acknowledgements vl
@ in this edition, Edinburgh University Press,2005
@ in the individual contributions is retained by the authors

Edinburgh University PressLtd Introduction Claire Colebrooh

22 George Squarg Edinburgh

Typeset in Ehrhardt Entries A-Z

by Servis Filmsetting Ltd, Longsight, Manchester,and
printed and bound in Great Britain by
Bibliography 308
Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham, Wilts

A CIP record for this book is availablefrom the British Library

Notes on Contributors 315
ISBN 0 7486 18988 (hardback)
ISBN 0 7486 18996 (paperback)

The right of the contributors

to be identified as authors of this work
has been asserted in accordance with
the Copyright, Designs and PatentsAct 1988.
 A ckn o w l e d g e ments
First I would like to thank all rhe authorswho contributedto this proiect.
Without you this dictionary would never have come into existence.
Everyonewho hasentriesincludedhereand my editor,JackieJones,have
beentremendouslycooperativeand helpful in more waysthan one.I would
like also to thank Keith Ansell-Pearson,Ronald Bogue, Paul Patton and
JamesWilliamsfor their commentsand suggesgions, all of which havecer-
tainly strengthenedthe theoreticalrigour of this dictionary; any short-
comingsareentirelymy own. I am very gratefulto MonashUniversityand
SavannahCollegeof Art and Design for their continuingsupport.Lastly,
the strongintellectand generosityof Ian Buchananand Claire Colebrook
havebeena wonderfulsourceof inspirationfor me and I would iust like to
extend my warmestthanksto you both; this project would neverhaveseen
the light of day without your continuingencouragement and support.
Adrian Parr
Intr oduc ti on
Claire Colebrook
Why a Deleuzedictionary?It might seema particularly craven,disre-
spectful,literal-mindedand reactiveprojectto form a Deleuzedictionary.
Not only did Deleuze strategicallychangehis lexicon to avoid the notion
that his texts consistedof terms that might simply name extra-textual
truths, he alsorejectedthe idea that art, scienceor philosophycould be
understoodwithout a senseof their quite specificcreativeproblem. A
philosopher's concepts produce connections and styles of thinking.
Conceptsareintensive:they do not gathertogetheran alreadyexistingset
of things (extension);they allow for movementsand connection.(The
conceptof 'structure' in the twentieth century, for example,could not be
isolatedfrom the problem of explaining the categoriesof thinking and the
imageof an impersonalsocialsubjectwho is the effect of a conceptual
system;similarly, the concept of the 'cogito' relatesthe mind to a move-
ment of doubt, to a world of mathematicallymeasurablematter,and to a
distinctionbetweenthought and the body.)To translatea term or to define
any point in a philosopher'scorpus involvesan understandingof a more
generalorientation, problem or milieu. This does not mean that one
reducesa philosophyto its context- say,explainingDeleuze's'nomadism'
asa reactionagainsta rigid structuralismor linguistics.On the contrary,to
understanda philosophy as the creation of a plane,or as a way of creating
someorientation by establishingpoints and relations,meansthat any phi-
losophyis more than its manifestterms, more than its context. In addition
to the producedtexts and terms, and in addition to the explicit historical
presuppositions, thereis an unthoughtor outside- the problem,desireor
life of a philosophy.For Deleuze,then, reading a philosopherrequires
going beyond his or her produced lexicon to the deeper logic of produc-
tion from which the relationsor senseof the text emerge.This senseitself
canneverbe said;in repeatingor recreatingthe milieu of a philosopherall
we can do is produce another sense,another said. Even so, it is this striv-
ing for sensethat is the creativedrive of readinga philosopher.Sq when
l)eleuzereadsBergsonhe allowseachterm and moveof Bergson'sphilos-
ophy to revolvearound a problem: the problem of intuition, of how the
humanobservercan think from beyondits own constituted,habituated
rrndall ttxl humanworld,
 I NTRO DUCTI O N
It would seem,then, that offering definitions of terms in the form of a
dictionary- as though a word could be detachedfrom its philosophicallife
andproblem- would not only be at oddswith the creativerole of philosophy;
it would alsosustainan illusion that the philosophicaltext is nothing more
thanits 'said'andthat becoming-Deleuzian wouldbe nothingmorethanthe
adoptionof a certainvocabulary. Do we,in systematising Deleuze'sthought,
reducean eventand untimelyprovocationto onemore doxa?
If Deleuze'swritings aredifficult and resistantthis cannotbe dismissed
asstylistically unfortunate, asthough he really oughtto havejust sat down
and told us in so many words what 'difference in itself' or 'immanence'
really meant.Why the difficulty of style and vocabularyif there is more to
Deleuzethan a way of speaking?A preliminary answerlies in the nexusof
conceptsof 'life', 'immanence'and 'desire'. The one distinction that
Deleuzeinsistsupon, both when he speaksin his own voicein Dffirence
and,Repetitiozand when he createshis senseof the history of philosophy,
is the 'imageof thought'. Philosophybeginsfrom an imageof what it is to
think, whetherthat be the graspof ideal forms, the orderly receptionof
senseimpressions,or the social construction of the world through lan-
guage.The concepts of a philosophy both build, and build upon, that
image. But if the history of philosophy is a gallery of such images of
thought - from the conversing Socratesand mathematicalPlatq to the
doubting Descartesand logical Russell- some philosophershave done ,
more than stroll through this galleryto add their own image.Somehave,
in 'schizo' fashion, refused to add one more proper relation between
thinker and truth, and havepulled thinking apart. One no longer makes
one more step within thought - tidying up a definition, or correctinga
seemingcontradiction.Only when this happensdoesphilosophyrealiseits
power or potential.
Philosophyis neither correct nor incorrect in relation to what currently
countsas thinking; it createsnew modesor stylesof thinking. But if all
philosophyis creation,rather than endorsement,of an imageof thought,
somephilosophershavetried to givea senseor conceptto this creationof
thinking: not one more imageof thought but 'thought without an image'.
Deleuze's celebratedphilosophersof univocity confront the genesis,
rupture or violenceof thinking: not man who thinks, but a life or unthought
within which thinking might happen.When Spinozaimaginesone expres-
sive substance,when Nietzsche imagines one will or desire, and when
Bergsoncreatesthe conceptof life, they go someway to towardsreally
askingaboutthe emergence of thinking.This is no longerthe emergence of
thc thinker,or one who thinks, but the emergenceof somethinglike a
minintrrlrclation,cvcntor pcrocptionof thinking,fronrwhich'thinkcrs'arc
thcn cll'cctctl.'l'hisnlcrulsthrrtthc rcrrlhistoryof'plrikrsophy rcquircs
IN TR OD U C TION
understanding the way philosophersproducesingularpoints,or the orien-
tations within which subjects,objects,perceiversand imagesare ordered.
Any assemblage such as a philosophicalvocabulary(or an artistic style,
or a set of scientific functions) facesin two directions. It both givessome
sort of order or consistencyto a life which bearsa much greatercomplex-
ity and dynamism,but it alsoenables- from that order - the creationof
further and more elaborateorderings.A philosophicalvocabularysuch as
Deleuze'sgivessenseor orientationto our world, but it alsoallowsus to
producefurther differencesand further worlds. On the one hand, then,
a Deleuzianconcept such as the 'plane of immanence'or 'life' or 'desire'
cstablishesa possiblerelation betweenthinker and what is to be thought,
giving us somesort of logic or order. On the other hand, by coupling this
conceptwith other concepts,such as taffectt'concept'and tfunctiont,or
'planeof transcendence' and 'imageof thought',we canthink not just about
life or the planeof immanencebut alsoof how the brain imagines,relates
to, styles,pictures,representsand ordersthat plane.This is the problemof
how life differsfrom itself,in itself.The role of a dictionaryis only one side
of a philosophy.It looks at the way a philosophy stratifiesor distinguishes
its world, but once we haveseenhow 'a' philosophythinks and movesthis
should then allow us to look to other philosophiesand other worlds.
There is then a necessary fidelity and infidelity,not only in any diction-
irry or any reading,but also in any experienceor any life. Life is both
cffectedthrough relations,suchthat thereis no individual or text in itself;
rrtthe sametime, life is not reducibleto effectedor actualrelations.There
rre singularitiesor'powersto relate'thatexceedwhat is alreadygiven.This
is the senseor the singularityof a text. Senseis not what is manifestlysaid
rrr denoted;it is what is openedthroughdenotation.Sq we might saythat
we needto understandthe meaningof Deleuze'sterminology- how 'ter-
ritorialisation' is defined alongside 'deterritorialisation','assemblage',
'llody without Organs' and so on - and then how thesedenotedterms
cxpresswhat Deleuzewantsto say,the intention of the Deleuziancorpus.
llut this shouldultimately then leadus to the sense of Deleuze,which can
only be giventhrough the productionof anothertext. 1 can say,here,that
the senseof Deleuze'sworksis the problemof how thinking emergesfrom
life, and how life is not a being that is given but a power to give various
scnsesof itself (what Deleuzerefersto as'?being').But in sayingthis I have
producedanothersense.Each definition of eachterm is a different path
from a text, a different productionof sensethat itself opensfurther paths
lirr definition.So, far from definitionsor dictionariesreducingthe forceof
itn iruthoror a philosophy,they createfurther distinctions.
'l'his clocsr.rotmcfln, as ccrtirin popular vcrsionsof Frcnch post-
structuralismmight irrclicrrtc, thilt tcxtshuvclro nrcanings rnd thrt onc ctn
 I NTRO DUCTI O N
make anything mean what one wants it to mean.On the contrary, the life
or problem of Deleuze's philosophy lay in the event: both the event of
philosophicaltextsand the eventof worksof art. The eventis a disruption,
violenceor dislocationof thinking.To readis not to recreateoneself,using
the text asa mirror or medium through which one repeatsalreadyhabit-
ual orientations.Just as life can only be lived by risking connectionswith
other powers or potentials,so thinking can only occur if there is an
encounterwith relations,potentialsand powersnot our own. If we take
Deleuze'sdefinition of life seriously- that it is not a given whole with
potentials that necessarilyunfold through time, but is t airtual power to
createpotentialsthrough contingentand productiveencounters- then this
will relatedirectlyto an ethicsof reading.We cannotreada thinker in order
to find what he is saying'tous', asthoughtextswerevehiclesfor exchang-
ing information from one being to another.A text is immanent to life; it
createsnew connections,new stylesfor thinking and new imagesand ways
of seeing.To read a text is to understandthe problem that motivated its
assemblage. The more faithful we are to a text - not the text's ultimate
messagebut its construction,or the way in which it producesrelations
among concepts,images,affects,neologismsand alreadyexisting vocabu-
laries - the more we will havean experienceof a style of thought not our
own, an experienceof the powerto think in creativestylesassuch.
One of the most consistentand productivecontributionsof Deleuze's
thought is his theory and practiceof reading,both of which are grounded
in a specificqonceptionof life. If there is one understandingof philosophy
andgoodreadingasgroundedin consistency anddoxa,which wouldreturn
a text to an assimilable logicandallowthoughtto remainthe same,Deleuze
placeshimself in a counter-traditionof distinctionand paradox.Neither
philosophynor thinking flowsinevitablyand continuouslyfrom life; reason
is not the actualisationof what life in its potentialwasalwaysstriving to be,
More than any other thinker of his time Deleuzeworksagainstvitalismor
the idea that reason,thinking and conceptssomehowservea function or
purposeof life, a life that is nothing more than changeor alteration for the
sakeof efficiencyor self-furthering. If there is a conceptof life in Deleuze
it is a life at oddswith itself, a potential or power to createdivergentpoten-
tials.Admittedly,it is possibleto imaginethinking, with its concepts,dic-
tionariesand organon,as shoring 'man' againstthe forcesof chaosand
dissolution,but we can also- when we extendthis potential- seethinking
asa confrontationwith chaos,asallowingmore of what is nrt ourselvesto
transformwhat we takeourselvesto be.In this sensethought has'majori-
tarian' and 'minoritarian'tendencies, both a movementtowardsreducing
chnoticdiffcrcnccto uniformity and samencss and a tendcncytowards
opcninglhoscsrmcuniticsto n'stttttcring'orinconrprchcnsion, I)clcuzc'
IN TR OD U C TION
far from believingthat one might return thought to life and overcomethe
submissionto system,recognisesthat the creation of a systemis the only
way one canreally live non-systemically.One createsa minimal or dynamic
order,both to avoidabsolutedeterritorialisation on the one hand and reac-
tive repetitionof the already-ordered on the other.In this sense,Deleuzeis
a child of the Enlightenment. Not only does he inhabit the performative
self-contradiction, 'Live in such a way that one's life diverges from any
givenprinciple,'healsodeducesthis 'principlethat is not one' from life. If
one is to lioe, theremust both be a minimal connectionor exposureto the
outsidealongsidea creationor perceptionof that outside,with perception
being a difference.
Deleuze'sontology- that relationsareexternalto terms- is a commit-
ment to perceivinglife; life is connectionand relation,but the outcomeor
eventof thoserelationsis not determinedin advanceby intrinsic proper-
ties. Life is not, therefore,the ground or foundation differentiatedby a set
of ternls, such that a dictionary might provide us with one schemaof order
amongothers.The productionor creationof a systemis both an exposure
to thosepowersof differencenot alreadyconstitutedasproper categories
of recognising'man' and a radical enlightenment.Enlightenment is,
defined dutifully, freedom from imposed tutelage - the destruction of
masters.Deleuze'sdestructionof masteryis an eternal,rather than per-
petual, paradox. Rather than defining thought and liberation against
anothersystem,with a continualcreationand subsequentdestruction,the
challengeof Deleuze's thought is to createa systemthat containsits own
aleatoryor paradoxicalelements,elementsthat are both inside and outside,
orderingand disordering.This is just what Deleuze'sgreatconceptsserve
to dol life is both that which requires some form of order and system
(giving itself through differencesrhar are perceivedand synthesised)and,
that which also opens the system,for life is just rhat power to d.ifferfrom
which conceptsemergebut that can neverbe includedin the extensionof
any concept.
We canonly begin to think and live when we losefaith in the world, when
weno longerexpecta world to answerto and mirror ourselvesandour already
constituteddesires.Thinking is paradox,nor becauseit is simple disobedi-
enceor negationof orthodoxy,but because if thinking hasany forceor dis-
tinction it hasto work againstinertia.If a body wereonly to connectwith
whatallowedit to remainrelativelystableand self contained- in imageof the
autopoieticsystemthat takesonly what it can masterand assimilate- then
the very powerof life for changeand creationwould be stalledor exhausted
by self-involved life formsthat livedin orderto remainthe same.Despitefirst
appearances a dictionarycanbe the openingof a self-enclosed system.If we
nrc faithfulto thc lifc of Dclcuzc'sthought- rccognising it as n crcation
 I NTRO DUCTI O N
rather than destinedeffectof life - then we canrelive the production of this
systemand this responseasan imageof production in general.
(I
must createa systemor be enslavedby anotherman's'- so declares
Blake'sidealpoet in the highly contestedand chaoticagonisticsof his great
poemJerusalem.Blake's aphorismswereindebtedto an enlightenmentlib-
erationism that found itself in a seeminglyparadoxicalstructure. If we are
condemnedto live in someform of systemthenwe caneitherinhabitit pas-
sivelyand reactively,or we canembraceour seemingsubmissionto a system
of relationsnot our own and respondcreatively. Blake'searlyresponsepro-
vided an alternative to the inescapability of the categoricalimperative
which still hauntsus today:if I am to speakand act asa moral beingthen
I can neither saynor do what is particular or contingent for me; living with
othersdemandsthat I decidewhat to do from the point of view of 'human-
ity in general'.To speakor to live is alreadyto be other than oneself,and so
morality demandsa necessary recognitionof an initial submission.Such
a final consensusor intersubjectivity may neverarrive, but it hauntsall life
nevertheless. By contrast,Deleuze'sparadoxical and eternalaffirmationof
creation begins from the inescapabilityof a minimal system- to perceive
or live is alreadyto be connected,to be other - but far from this requiring
a striving for a systemof consensusor ideal closure,this producesan infin-
ite opening.It might seemthat the Enlightenmentimperative- abandon
all externalauthority - comesto function asyet one more authority, and it
might alsoseemthat a fidelity to Deleuzeis a crime againstthe thinker of
difference.But the problemof Deleuze'sthought is iust this passage from
contradiction to paradox. To not be oneselfis contradictory if one must be
eitherthis or that, if life must decideor stabiliseitself (form a harrative or
imageof itself). 'Becoming-imperceptible',by contrast,is an enablingand
productive paradox.One connectsor perceivesin order to live, in order to
be,but this very tendencyis alsoat the sametime a becoming-other:not
a nonbeingbut a?being.A Deleuziandictionarycomesinto beingonly in
its use,only when the thoughts that it enablesopen the systemof thought
to the very outsideand life that madeit possible.
ACTIVE/REACTIVE
Lee Spinks
The distinction between active and reactive forces was developed by
Friedrich Nietzsche in his Oz the Genealogyof Morality and rhe notes
posthumouslycollectedas The Will to Power.In his seminalreadingof
Nietzsche,Deleuzeseizedupon this distinction (and what it madepossible)
and placedit at the very heartof the Nietzscheanrevaluationof values.For
Nietzsche,the distinction betweenactiveand reactiveforce enabledhim to
present'being' asa processrather than 'substance'. The world of substan-
tial being,he argued,is producedby the recombinationof multiple effectsof
forceinto discreteideas,imagesand identities.There is no essential'truth'
of being;nor is there an independent'reality' beforeand beyondthe flux of
appearances; everyaspectof the realis alreadyconstitutedby quantitiesand
combinationsof force. Within this economy of becoming,every force is
relatedto otherforcesand is definedin its characterby whetherit obeysor
commands.What we call a body (whether understoodas political, social,
chemicalor biological)is determinedby this relationbetweendominating
and dominated forces.Meanwhile Deleuze maintains that any two forces
constitutea bodyassoonastheyenterinro relationship.Within this bodythe
superior or dominant forcesare describedas 'active'; the inferior or domi-
natedforcesaredescribedas'reactive'.Thesequalitiesofactiveandreactive
forceare theoriginal qualitiesthat definethe relationshipof forcewith force.
If forcesare defined by the relative differencein their quality or power,
the notion of quality is itself determinedby the differencein quantity
betweenthe two forces that come into relationship. The characterof any
relation,that is, is producedthrough forces.There are no intrinsic prop-
erties that dctcrmine how forccs will relate:a masterbecomesa master
throughthe act <lfovcr.powcring,In thc-cncountcr bctwccnforccs,each
 ACTI VE, / REACTI V E
force receivesthe quality that correspondsto its quantity. Forces are
dominant,or dominated,dependingupon their relativedifferencein quan-
tity; but they manifest themselvesas active or reactiveaccordingto their
differencein quality.Once the relationhasbeenestablished the quality of
forces- dominant or dominated- producesan activepower (that com-
mandsthe relation) and a reactiyepower (definedby the relation).The
differencebetweenforcesdefined accordingto their quantity as active or
reactiveis describedin terms of a hierarchy.An activeforce is the stronger
term and goesto the limit of what it can do. Its characteristics are domi-
nating,possessing, subjugatingand commanding.The expressionof activ-
ity is the expressionof what is necessarilyunconscious;all consciousness
doesis expressthe relation ofcertain reactiveforcesto the activeforcesthat
dominatethem. Active force affirmsits differencefrom everythingthat is
weakerthan and inferior to itself; meanwhilereactiveforce seeksto limit
activeforce,imposerestrictionsupon it, and to recastit in the spirit of the
negative.Crucially reactiveforcecannottransformitself into a fully active
force; nor can a collection of reactiveforces amalgamatethemselvesinto
somethinggreaterthanactiveforce.A slavewho gainspower,or who bonds
with other slaves,will remain a slaveand can only be freed from slaveryby
abandoningconsciousness. Consciousnessremains what it is, and is unlike
the active force of difference. Consciousnessrepresents and recognises
activeforces,therebyseparatingactivity from what it cando. Suchsepara-
tion constitutesa subtractionor division of activeforce by making it work
against the power of its own affirmation. The remarkablefeature of the
becoming-reactive of activeforceis that historicallyit hasmanagedto form
the basisof an entire vision of life. This vision embodiesthe principle of
'ressentiment':a movementin which a reactiveand resentfuldenial of
higher life begins to createits own moral systemand account of human
experience.The reactivetriumph expressedin movementsof conscious-
nesslike ressentiment,bad consciousness and the asceticideal depends
upon a mystification and reversalof activeforce: at the core of thesenew
interpretations of life reactive force simulatesactive force and turns it
againstitself.It is at preciselythe historicalmomentwhen the slavebegins
to triumph over the master who has stoppedbeing the spectreof law,
virtue, morality and religion.
An active force becomesreactive when a reactive force managesto
separateit from what it can do. The historicaldevelopmentof reactive
forcesis itself predicatedupon the affinity betweenreactionand negation,
an affinity which is itself a weakform of the Will to Powerin so far asit is
an cxprcssion of nihilismor thc will to nothingncss. Thc will to asceticism
rlr wrlrld-rcnunciittionis, lftcr rrll, still itn cxprcssionof rpil/. 'fhus,
whilc rcnctivclirrccsrtrc wcnkcrthnn rctivc firrccs,thcy rlso posscssil
AC TU AL ITY
potentiallysublimeelementin as much as they are ableto advancea new
interpretation of life (the world of moral ideas, for example) and they
supplyus with an original,althoughnihilistic,versionof the Will to Power.
By inventinga transcendentideaof life in orderto judgelife, reactiveforces
separateus from our power to createvalues;but they alsoteachus new feel-
ings and new waysof being affected.What needsro be understoodis that
there is a variation or internal difference in the disposition of reactive
forces;theseforceschangetheir characterand their meaningaccordingto
the extentto which they developtheir affinity for the will to nothingness.
Consequentlyoneof the greatproblemsposedto interpretationis to deter-
mine the degreeof developmentreactiveforceshavereachedin relationto
negationand the will to nothingness;similarlywe needalwaysto attendro
the nuanceor relativedispositionof activeforce in terms of its develop-
ment of the relationbetweenactionand affirmation.
Connectives
Bergson
Genealogy
Nietzsche
Will to Power
ACTUALITY
Claire Colebrook
It might seemthat Deleuze'sphilosophyis dominatedby an affirmarionof
the virtual and is highly critical of a wesrerntradition that hasprivileged
arctuality.To a certainextent this is true, and this privilegecan be seenin
the way philosophyhastraditionallydealtwith difference.First, rhereare
deemedto be actualterms,termswhich areextendedin time- havingcon-
tinuity - and possiblyalsoextendedin space.Theseterms arethen related
to eachother, so differenceis somethingpossible for an alreadyactualised
entity. Difference is betweenactual terms, such as the differencebetween
consciousness and its world, or is a differencegroundedupon actuality,
such as somethingactualbearingthe capacityfor possiblechanges.This
understandingof actualityis thereforeried to the conceptof possibility.
Possibilityis somethingthat can be predicatedof, or attributedto, a being
which rcmains the same.Now againstthis understandingof actuality,
l)clcuzcsctsr diffcrentcouplc:actuality/potenriality. If thereis something
rctualit is not bccirr.rsc
it trrkcsup timc,nor bccausc timc is that whichlinks
l0 ACTUALI TY
or containsthe changesof actualbeings;rather,actualityis unfold'ed' from
potentiality. We should see the actual not as that from which change and
differencetake place,but asthat which hasbeeneffectedfrom potentiality.
Time is not the synthesisor continuity of actualterms, as in phenomen-
ology where consciousness constitutestime by linking the past with the
presentand future. Rather,time is the potential for variouslines of actual-
ity. From any actual or unfolded term it should be possible (and, for -
Deleuze,desirable)to intuit the richer potentiality from which it has
emerged.
As an avowedempiricistDeleuzeseemsto be committedto the primacy
of the actual:one should remain attentiveto what appears,to what is,
without invoking or imagining some condition outside experience.
However,while it is true that Deleuze'sempiricismaffirmslife and experi-
ence,he refusesto restrict life to the actual.In this respecthe overturnsa
history of western metaphysicsthat defines the potential and virtual
accordingto alreadypresentactualities.We should not, Deleuzeinsists,
define what somethingis accordingto alreadyactualisedforms. So we
shouldnot, for example,establishwhat it is to think on the basisof what is
usually,generallyor actuallythought.Nor shouldwe think that the virtual
is merely the possible:those things that, from the point of view of the
actualworld, may or may not happen.On the contrary,Deleuze'sempiri-
cism is that of the Idea,and it is the essence of the Idea to actualiseitself.
There is, therefore,an Idea of thinking, the potentialor power to think,
which is then actualisedin any singlethought. We can only fully under-
standand appreciatethe actualif we intuit its virtual condition, which is
alsoa real condition.That is, real conditionsarenot thosewhich must be
presupposedby the actual- such as assumingthat for any thought there
must be a subjectwho thinks- rather,realconditionsare,for Deleuze,the
potentialsof life from which conditionssuchas the brain, subiectivityor
mind emerge.
For example,if we want to understanda text historicallywe needto go
beyondits actualelements- not iust what it saysbut alsobeyondits man-
ifestcontext- to the virtual problemfrom which anytext is actualised. For
instance,we should not readJohn Milton's ParadiseLost (1667)as a his-
torical documentrespondingto the English revolution,a revolutionthat
we might understandby readingmore textsfrom the seventeenth century.
Rather,we needto think of the potentialor Ideaof revolutionassuch:how
Milton's text is a specificactualisation,fully different,of the problemof
how we might bc free,of how powermightrealiscitscl[,of how individuals
rrrightrclclscthcmsclvcs tirlm imposccl scrvituclc. Any lctu:rltcxt or cvcnt
is p<lssiblcorrlybccirusc rcrrlityhrrsl virtuitldintcttsion,il powcrto cxprcss
thc l',nglislrrcvolttlion,tltc l"r'cnch
rrctuirlitics:
tlill'crcrrt
itscll'irrirlwirys
AFFEC T il
rcvolution,the Russianrevolution,are specificand differentonly because
rrctualityis the expressionof an Ideaof revolutionwhich can repeatitself
infinitely.
Connective
Virtual/Virtuality
AFFECT
Felicity J. Colman
Watchme: affectionis the intensityof colour in a sunseton a dry and cold
autumnevening.Kiss me: affectis that audible,visualand tactiletransfor-
mation producedin reactionto a certain situation, event or thing. Run
irwayfrom me: affectedare the bodiesof spectreswhen their spaceis dis-
turbed. In all thesesituations,affectis an independentthing; somerimes
describedin terms of the expressionof an emotionor physiologicaleffect,
but all the while trans-historical, trans-temporal, trans-spatial and
autonomous.
Affect is the change,or variation,that occurs when bodiescollide, or
come into contact. As a body, affect is the knowable product of an
cncounter,specificin its ethicaland lived dimensionsand yet it is alsoas
indefiniteas the experienceof a sunset,transformation,or ghost. In its
largestsense,affect is part of the Deleuzianproject of trying-to-under-
stand,andcomprehend,andexpressall of the incredible,wondrous,tragic,
painful and destructiveconfigurationsof things and bodiesastemporally
mediated,continuouseyents.Deleuzeusesthe term'affection'to refer to
the additiveprocesss, forces,powersand expressions of change.
Affectcanproducea sensoryor abstractresultand is physicallyand tem-
porally produced.It is determinedby chanceand organisationand it con-
sistsof a variety of factorsthat include geography,biology,meteorology,
:rstronomy,ecologyand culture. Reactionis a vital part of the Deleuzian
concept of affectivechange.For instance,describingBaruch Spinoza's
study of the transformationof a body,a thing, or a group of things over a
period of spaceand time, Deleuze and Guattari write in A Thousand
Plu,teaus: iA.ffectsare becomings'(D&G 1987:256).Affect expresses the
modificationof experiences asindependentthings of existence,when one
produccsor rccognisesthe consequences of movementand time for (cor-
porcirl,spiritual,:rnimirl,ntincral,vcgctlblcand or c<lnceptual) bodies.
Afl'cctis not only itttcxpcricntiallirrcc,it crrnbcconrcrrnrirtcriirlthing,irncl
t2 AFFECT
assuch,asDeleuzedescribes, it cancompelsystemsof knowledge,history,
memoryand circuitsof power.
Deleuze'sconceptionof affectdevelopsthrough his entire oeuvre.In his
study of David Hume in Ernpiricismand,SubjectiaityDeleuzediscussesthe
linkagesbetweenideas,habitsofthought, ethics,patterns,and repetitions
of systems;all the while describingthe relationshipbetweenaffect and
differencein terms of temporally specificsubjectivesituations.Empiricism
and,SubjectioityalsosignalsDeleuze'sinterest in Henri Bergson,a key
thinker in the Deleuziandevelopmentof a theoryof affect.Bergson'sbook
Matter and,Memory addressesthe corporeal condition of what he terms
'affection'inrelationto perception(D 1988a:l7). Deleuzealsoengages the
work of Spinozaand the latter'saddressof affectionsand affectin termsof
a modality of 'taking on' somethingin the Ethics(1677).In his essay'On
the Superiorityof Anglo-AmericanLiterature', Deleuzedescribesaffect
as verbs becoming events- naming affectsas perceivableforces,actions,
and activities. In relation to art in What is Philosophy?he and Guattari
describeaffectsasmore than sensateexperienceor cognition. Through art,
we can recognisethat affectscanbe detachedfrom their temporal and geo-
graphicoriginsand becomeindependententities.
In accounting for experiencein a non-interpretive manner, Deleuze's
conceptionof affectexposedthe limits of semioticsthat tendsto structure
emotional responsesto aestheticand physicalexperiences.Undeniably
a romantic conceptwithin his discussionof the regulation and production
of desire and energy within a socialfield, Deleuze'swritings of affect
nevertheless enablea material,and thereforepolitical, critique of capital
and its operations. Within a Deleuzian framework, affect operates as
a dynamicof desirewithin an assemblage to manipulatemeaningand rela-
tions, inform and fabricate desire, and generateintensity - yielding
different affectsin any given situation or event.Perceptionis a non-passive
continual moulding, driven and given by affect.
Closelylinkedto Deleuzeand Guattari'sconceptsof 'multiplicity','expe-
rience'and 'rhizomatics',the conceptof 'affect'shouldalsobe considered in
relationto theconceptsof'arborescence'and'lines offlight'. Situatedaspart
of the Deleuzian'and'of becoming,the molecularthresholdsof bodiesand
thingsaseventsaredescribedby Deleuzein terms of affectivehappenings;
occasionswherethings and bodiesare altered.To this end, affectdescribes
the forcesbehindall formsof socialproductionin the contemporaryworld,
and theseaffectiveforces'ethical,ontological,cognitive,and physiological
powers.In Deleuze'ssingularandcollaborative work with Guattari,affective
firrccsarcclcpictedasreactiveor activc(followingFriedrichNietzsche),tacit
or pcrfrlrmccl.As l)clcuzc portrtys it, nffcctivcpowcr cirnbe utilisedto
limbrrrccrrtc,
cotttroltnd crcntivity,
rrbility,'rruthrlrity,
cnrrhlc
A R B OR E S C E N T S C H E MA 13
Connectives
Active/Reactive
Arborescentschema
Becoming
Experience
Hume
Lines of flight
Multiplicity
Rhizome
ARBORESCENT SCHEMA
CIiffStagoll
The arboreal schemais one of Deleuze's many potent and prominent
biologicaland organicimages.His criticism,and his useof the schema,is
scatteredacrosshis corpus,at varioustimestargetingapproaches to philos-
ophy psychiatry literature, science,theoretical criticism and even every-
day living. The notion of an arborescentor tree-likeschemais Deleuze's
counterpointto his model of the rhizome,which he usesto challengeten-
denciesin thinking and to suggestwaysof rehabilitating 'thought' asa cre-
ativeand dynamicenterprise.
Deleuze'smodel of the tree-likestructure appearsto be quite simple.
Typically, at its top, is some immutable concept given prominence either
by transcendentaltheorising or unthinking presumption. In Deleuze's
works on epistemologyand ontology, he identifies Plato's Forms, the
modelsof the subjectespousedby Ren6Descartesand ImmanuelKant, as
well as the 'Absolute Spirit' of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel as
cxamples.All other conceptsor particularsare organisedverticallyunder
this conceptin a tree/trtnk/root arrangement.The ordering is strictly
hierarchical, from superior to subordinate,or transcendentto particular,
suchthat the individual or particularelementis conceivedaslessimport-
rrnt,powerful,productive,creativeor interestingthan the transcendent.
The subordinate elements, once so arranged, are unable to 'move'
lrorizontallyin such a way as to establishcreativeand productiveinter-
lclationshipswith other concepts,particularsor models. Rather, their
position is final, accordingto an organisingprinciple implied or deter-
rnincd by the superiorconcept.
lfurthermorc, thc trcc is a self-containedtotality or closedsystemthat
is cqual just to tlrc sum of its parts.Rclationsbctwccnclcmcntsof the
t4 ARBO RESCENT SCHEMA
systemare interior to and inherent within the model. They are stableor
even essentialin so far as, first, the superior concept is the all-powerful
definingforcethat dictatesthe positionor meaningof all elsein the system
and, second,the tendency is to think of the systemeither as complete in
itself or elseunconnectedto othersystemsin anymeaningfulway.The tree
is 'fixed to the spot' and static. Any remaining movementis minimal and
internal to the systemrather than exploratory or connective.Becausethe
creativepotential of disorder and inter-connectivityis precluded, the
potentialinherentin conceptualisingand thinking in this manneris very
limited.
Deleuze'smodelcallsto mind the porphyriantree,a deviceusedby the
philosopher Porphyry to show how reality and our conceptsare ordered
and how logicalcategorisationproceeds.The conceptof'Substance'can
be placedat the top of the tree,and dichotomousbranchingat eachlevel
obtainedby addinga specificdifferencesuchthat, at the lowestlevel,some
individual canbe identifiedasa sub-setof 'Substance'.
This versionof the arborealmodel alsohighlights somethingof its com-
plexity and ontologicalimportancefor Deleuze.The differenceevident
betweenparticularsis subsumedby the similarity that definesthem in
terms of superior concepts in general and the transcendent concept
(Substance)in particular.Rather than deriving conceptsfrom individual
particulars(or interactionsbetweenthem), an abstractconceptis usedto
organiseindividuals and determine their meaning relative just to the
organisationalhierarchy.Differencehasto be addedbackto eachelement
in order to define it asa particular,rather than having individual elements
serveasthe startingpoint for conceptualisation. In contrast,Deleuzeholds
that lived experiencecomprisesparticularity and uniquenessin each
moment, experienceand individual, the inherent differencesof which
ought always to be acknowledged.By positing the concept over the
particular, thinking of the arborealkind abstractsfrom lived experiencein
its very structure.
For Deleuze,thinking in such a way stiflescreativity,leavessuperior
conceptsrelatively immune to criticism and tends to closeone's mind to
the dynamism,particularityand changethat is evidentin lived experience.
Not only is suchthinking necessarily abstract,it alsoservesto protectthe
status quo and relieve dominant conceptsand positions from productive
critique.
Conncctives
Rhizomc
Sullsllncc
ART l5
ART
Felicity J. Colman
Deleuze'sdescriptionsof art remind us that it is one of the primary
mediums with which humans learn to communicateand respond to the
world. Art excitedDeleuzefor its ability to createthe domainsthat he
saw,felt, tasted,touched,heard,thought, imaginedand desired.Besides
publishing bookson singular writers and artists,including making specific
manifestostylestatementsconcerningart asa categoryof criticalanalysis,
Deleuze'sspecificactivitiesin respectto art extendedto writing short
cxhibition catalogueessaysfor artists (for exampleon the French painter
G6rardFromanger),andmakingexperimental music(with RichardPinhas).
Deleuze'spreferredart works for his discussionsencompassed a range
of mediums, including music and sounds (birdsong), cinema, photo-
graphy,the plastic arts (sculpture,painting and drawing), literature and
lrchitecture. Deleuze's philosophical interests also led him to discussa
numberof performativeand theatricalworks,usingexamplesfrom anthro-
pologyto makecultural and philosophicaldistinctions.Deleuzeaddresses
the visual,aestheticand perceptualterms of art through distinctive polem-
ical methodologiesdrawn from the sciences,such as biologicalevolution,
geologicalformationsand concepts,and mathematics.
Deleuzeleansupon a critical assortmentof art history critics, film critics,
literarycritics,architecturalcriticsandmusicalcriticsthroughouthis philo-
sophicalpractice: Wilhelm Worringer, Alois Riegl, Paul Claudel, Clement
Greenberg,LawrenceGowing,GeorgesDuthuit, GregoryBateson,Andr6
llazin,ChistianMetz, and Umberto Eco.As a writer,Deleuze'sliterarypre-
clccessors figure prominently (seework in EssaysCritical and'Clinical). His
cognitiveapproachtowardart comesfrom his adoptedphilosophicalfathers
including Immanuel Kant, Baruch Spinozaand Friedrich Nietzsche.In
Nietzsche and.Philosophy,Deleuzeemploys'art' asa categoryof 'Critique',
trrkingon Nietzsche'sobservationthat the world is emotiveandsensory, but
rrny analysisof this world is bound by epistemologicalstructures. For
l)cleuze,the descriptivenature of art lies with art's ability not merely to
rcdescribe;rather art has a material capacityto evokeand to question
throughnon-mimeticmeans,by producingdifferentaffects.
l)eleuze treatsplastic art movementsincluding Byzantine,the Gothic,
t hc Baroque,Romanticism,Classicism,Primitive,Japanese, and Art Brut,
rrstrans-historicalconceptsthat contributeto the field of art through their
virri<luspropositionsand developmentof forms, aestheticsand associated
Singulrrrilrtists,writcrs irnd composersincludingWilliam Blake,
rrll'ccts.
.Klcc, 'Ihom:rs
Vinccnt Virn (iogh, lhul (l6zrrnrrc,Prtul Hardy, Maric
l6 ART
Henri-Beyle Stendhal, Samuel Beckett, Antonin Artaud, William S.
Burroughs,Lewis Carroll,Leopoldvon Sacher-Masoch, FranzKafka,and
Alain Robbe-Grillet are critically absorbedby Deleuze in terms of their
respectiveenquiriesinto the creationof art forms that translate,illustrate
and perform the forces of the world (such as desire), by making them
visible. Deleuze mentions in passingan enormous range of artists of
variousmediumsto makea point or an observation- from Igor Stravinsky
to Patti Smith, from Diego Vel6squezto Carl Andre. The means and
methodsby which art is ableto transformmaterialinto sensoryexperience
is of course part of the modernist contribution to art in the twentieth
century.In his discussions concerningart, Deleuzeis thus a contributorto
the twentieth-centurymodernistcanon.
The methodologyof art forms the core of Deleuze'sstudy of Marcel
Proust's work A lo recherche du tempsperdu (1913-27), a book that exam-
inesaspectsof temporality desireand memory.As in his bookco-authored
with Guattari on KaJba,in Proust,Deleuzeunderstandsart asbeing much
more than a medium of expression.
Deleuze'sbook FrancisBacon: TheLogicoJ'Sensation works through the
complicatedconnectionsof Deleuzeand Guattari'sBody without Organs
(BwO) and English painter FrancisBacon'streatmenrof the power and
rhythms of the human body, to a discussionof the differencesfrom and
similaritiesto the work of French painter Clzanneof Bacon'sown work.
In this book,Deleuzeprivilegespaintingasan art form that affordsa con-
creteapprehensionofthe forcesthat rendera body.
In Deleuze'sfinal work co-authoredwith Guattari, What is Philosophy?
'art' is accordeda privilegedpositionin their triad of philosophy,art and
science.Art is an integral componentof their three level operationsof the
cerebralqualityof things(thebrain-becoming-subject). In this book,'art' as
a categoryhasdevelopedinto the meansby which Deleuzeand Guattari can
operateaffect, temporality,emotion, mortality, perception and becoming.
The active, compounding creativity of artists' work are described as
'percepts'- independentaggregates of sensation
that live beyondtheir cre-
ators.DeleuzeandGuattarisignificantlycommentthat theinspirationfor art
is givenby sensations;the affectof methods,materials,memoriesandobjects:
'We paint,sculpt,compose, and write with sensations'(D&G1994:166).
Connectives
Affcct
llacon
l')xpcricncc
Knlkrr
AXIOM ATIC T7
ARTAUD, ANTONIN (1895-1948)- refer to the entries on 'art',
'becoming* performanceart', 'Bergson','Body without Organs','ethics',
'feminism'r'Foucault* fold','hysteria','Lacan'and'linesof flight f art *
politics'.
AXIOMATIC
Alberto Toscano
Proposedby Deleuzeand Guattari in A Thousand, Plateaus'axiomatic'is
usedto definethe operationof contemporarycapitalismwithin universal
history and generalsemiology.Originatingin the discourseof scienceand
mathematicalset theory in particular, 'axiomatic' denotesa method that
neednot providedefinitionsof the terms it workswith, but rather orders
a givendomainwith the adjunctionor subtractionof particularnorms or
commands(axioms).Axioms thus operateon elementsand relationswhose
natureneednot be specified.They areindifferentto the propertiesor qual-
ities of their domain of application and treat their obiectsas purely func-
tional, rather than as qualitatively differentiated by some intrinsic
character.Axiomsarein turn accompanied by theorems,or modelsof real-
isation,which apply them to certainempiricalor materialsituations.
An axiomaticsystemdiffers from systemsof codingand overcodingby its
capacityto operatedirectlyon decodedflows.In thisrespect,whilstit implies
a form of capture,its degreeof immanenceand ubiquity is far greaterthan
thatof codingsystems, all of whichrequireaninstanceof externalityor tran-
scendence.That is why Deleuze and Guattari defend the thesis of a
differencein kind betweencapitalistand pre-capitalist formations:the latter
code flows, while the former operateswithout coding. Within universal
history the immanentaxiomaticof capitalismis activatedwith the passingof
l thresholdof decodingand deterritorialisation, at the momentwhen, fol-
klwing Karl Marx, we areconfrontedby barelabourand independentcapital.
The axiomaticmethod,asinstantiatedby contemporarycapitalismand
royal science,can be juxtaposedto schizoidpractice,which is capableof
combiningdecodedflowswithout the insertionof axioms,aswell asto the
problematicmethod in the sciences,which is concernedwith eventsand
singularpoints rather than systemicconsistency. One of the bolderclaims
mlde by Deleuzeand Guattari is that we shouldnot think of the axiomatic
irsir notion analogicallyexportedfrom scienceto illustratepolitics.On the
contrary,within scienceitself the axiomaticis deemedto collaboratewith
thc Statc in thc fixation of unruly flows, diagrams and variations.
rgcncythat subordinatcs
lisscntinllyit is rrstrrrtifyingor scmioticising the
t8 AXIOM AT IC
transversalcommunicationsand conjunctionsof flowsto a systemof fixed
pointsand constantrelations.
As Deleuze and Guattari indicate,the unity of an axiomatic system
and of capitalismin particular,is itself very difficult to pin down, since
the opportunisticcharacterof the adjunction and subtractionof axioms
opensup the question of the saturationof the systemand of the inde-
pendenceof the axioms from one another. Moreover, though their
dependenceon the axiomsmakesmodelsof realisationisomorphic (for
exampleall statesin one way or anothersatisfythe axiom of production
for the market),thesemodelscan demonstrateconsiderableamountsof
heterogeneityand variation (suchassocialist,imperialist,authoritarian,
social-democratic,or 'failed' states).The axiomaticsystemis therefore
not a closed dialectical totality, since it also generates'undecidable
propositions' that demand either new axioms or the overhaul of the
system,and it is interrupted by entities(for examplenon-denumerable
infinite sets)whosepower is greaterthan that of the system,and which
thus open breachesto an outside. It is the capacityto conjugate and
control flows without the introduction of a transcendent agency
(a totaliser) that makes the capitalist axiomatic the most formidable
apparatusof domination.
Deleuzeand Guattariinsistthe capitalistaxiomaticestablishes relations
and connectionsbetweendecodedflows,that are otherwiseincommensu-
rableand unrelated,and subordinatestheseflowsto a generalisomorphy,
such as the subjectwho must producefor the market.In this sensetoo,
Deleuzeand Guattaridiscernthat the capitalistaxiomaticpointsto a resur-
genceof machinicenslavement, onethat is all the morecruel becauseof its
impersonality(its beyondforms of citizenship,sovereigntyand legitima-
tion). In as much as its mode of operationcan entirely bypasssubjective
belief or the codingof humanbehaviour,suchan axiomaticmovesus from
a societyof disciplineto a societyof control,wherepoweractsdirectly on
a decodeddividualmatter.Nevertheless, Deleuzeand Guattariarecareful
to note,it is not simplythe casethat flowscontinueto evadeand evenover-
powerthe axiomatic,but that the globaland non-qualifiedsubjectivityof
capitalneverattainsabsolutedeterritorialisation, and is alwaysaccompa-
nied by forms of socialsubjection,in the guise of nation-states,and a
panoplyof territorialisations at the levelof its modesof realisation.
Conncctives
( lrrpitrrlisrl
Mirrx
,Sr'lt
izortrtrrlv
sis
BAcoN, FRANcr s ( t gog- gz) t9
BACON, FRANCTS (t909-92)
John Marks
Deleuze'saim in FrancisBacon:TheLogicofSensation,as with all his other
work on art, is to producephilosophicalconceptsthat correspondto the
'sensibleaggregates'that the artist hasproduced.The 'logic of sensation'
that Deleuzeconstructsshowshow FrancisBaconuses'Figures' to paint
sensations that aim to act directlyon the nervoussystem.'Sensation',here,
refers to a pre-individual, impersonal plane of intensities.It is also,
Deleuzeclaims,the oppositeof the facileor the clich6sof representation.
It is at one and the sametime the human subjectand alsothe impersonal
event.It is directedtowardsthe sensiblerather than the intelligible.
In developingthe use of the 'Figure', Bacon pursuesa middle path
betweenthe abstractand the figural, betweenthe purely optical spacesof
abstractart and the purely 'manual'spacesof abstractexpressionism. The
'Figure' retainselementsthat arerecognisably human;it is not a represent-
ationalform, but rather an attempt to paint forces.For Deleuze,the voca-
tion of all non-representational art is to make visible forcesthat would
otherwiseremaininvisible.It is for this reasonthat Bacon'sfiguresappear
to be deformedor contorted,sometimespassingthrough objectssuch as
washbasins or umbrellas:the body seeksto escapefrom itself. There are
cven somepaintingsin which the 'Figure' is little more than a shadow
within a 'scrambledwhole', as if it has been replacedentirely by forces.
ln short, Bacon'spaintingscan be consideredas an artistic expressionof
l)eleuzeand Guattari'sconceptof the Body without Organs.
Generallyin his work, Deleuzeseeksto contradictthe receivedwisdom
that artistssuchasBaconor FranzKafka arein somewayexpressinga deep
tcrror of life in their art. For this reason,he is at pains to point out that
llacon hasa greatlove of life, and that his paintingevincesan extraordin-
rrryvitality.Baconis optimistic to the extentthat he'believes'in the world,
but it is a very particularsort of optimism. Baconhimself saysthat he is
ccrebrallypessimistic- in that he paintsthe horrors of the world - but ar
thc sametime nervouslyoptimistic. Bacon'swork may be imbued with
irll sorts of violence,but he managesto paint the 'scream'and not the
'lrrlrror'- thc violcnceof the sensation ratherthantheviolenceof thespec-
litclc- rnd hc rcpro:rchcs himsclf whcn hc feelsthat he haspaintedtoo
tttttclrhorrot'.'l'hc filrccstlut cirusctlrcscrcirnr
shouldnot bc confirscdwith
20 BA C o N , F R AN c Is (tgog-gz)
the visiblespectacle beforewhich one screams.The screamcapturesinvis-
ible forces,which cannotbe represented, becausethey lie beyondpain and
feeling. So, cerebrally,this may lead to pessimism,since these invisible
forcesare even more overwhelming than the worst spectaclethat can be
represented.However,Deleuzeclaimsthat, in making the decisionto paint
the scream,Bacon is like a wrestler confronting the 'powers of the invis-
ible', establishinga combat that wasnot previouslypossible.He makesthe
activedecisionto amrm the possibilityof triumphing overtheseforces.He
allows life to screamat death, by confronting terror, and entering into
combatwith it, ratherthan representingit. The 'spectacle'of violence,on
the other hand,allowstheseforcesto remaininvisible,and divertsus, ren-
deringus passivebeforethis horror.
It is for these reasonsthat Deleuze talks at some length about the
importanceof 'meat' in Bacon'spaintings.For Deleuze,Baconis a great
painterof 'heads'rather than 'faces'.Baconseeksto dismantlethe struc-
tured spatialorganisationof the facein order to make the head emerge.
Similarly, Baconsometimesmakesa shadowemergefrom the body asif it
werean animal that the body wassheltering.In this way,Baconconstructs
not formal correspondences betweenman and animal, but rather azoneof
indiscernibility. The bonesare the spatialorganisationof the body,but the
flesh in Bacon's paintings ceasesto be supported by the bones.Deleuze
remarksupon Bacon'spreferencefor prone'Figures'with raisedlimbs,
from which the drowsyfleshseemsto descend.This flesh,or meat,con-
stitutesthe zone of indiscernibilitybetweenman and animal.The head,
then, constituteswhat Deleuzecallsthe 'animalspirit' of man.Bacondoes
not askus to pity the fate of animals(althoughthis could well be one effect
of his paintings),but rather to recognisethat every human being who
suffersis a pieceof meat.In short, the man that suffersis an animal,and
the animal that suffersis a man. Deleuzetalks of this in terms of a 'reli-
gious'aspectin Bacon'spaintings,but a religiousdimensionthat relatesto
the brutal realityof the butcher'sshop.The understandingthat we areall
meat is not a moment of recognition or of revelation, but rather, for
Deleuze,a moment of true becoming.The separationbetweenthe specta-
tor and the spectacleis broken down in favour of the 'deep identity' of
becoming.
Connectives
Art
Becoming
Intcnsity
Scnsitlion
BEC OM IN G 2l
BECKETI SAMUEL (190G89)- refer to the entries on 'art',
tspace'.
'minoritarian * cinema' and
BECOMING
CliffStagoll
'logether with 'difference', 'becoming' is the key theme of Deleuze's
corpus.In so far as Deleuzechampionsa particular ontology,thesetwo
conceptsareits cornerstones,servingasantidotesto what he considersto
be the western tradition's predominant and unjustifiable focus upon
beingand identity.This focusis replicated,Deleuzeargues,in our every-
day thinking, such that the extent of the variety and changeof the expe-
rienced world has been diluted by a limited conception of difference:
difference-from-the-same.Deleuze works at two levels to rectify such
habitual thinking. Philosophically,he developstheories of difference,
rcpetition and becoming. For the world of practice, he provides chal-
lcnging writings designedto upset our thinking, together with a range of
'tools' for conceivingthe world anew.At both levels,becoming is critical,
fbr if the primacy of identity is what defines a world of re-presentation
(presenting the same world once again), then becoming (by which
l)eleuze means 'becoming different') defines a world of presentation
rlnew.
Taking his lead from Friedrich Nietzsche'searly notes,Deleuzeuses
thc term 'becoming' (deoenir)to describethe continual production (or
'rcturn') of difference immanent within the constitution of events,
whetherphysicalor otherwise.Becomingis the pure movementevidentin
changesbetween particularevents.This is not to saythat becomingrepre-
scntsa phasebetweentwo states,or a range of terms or statesthrough
which somethingmight passon its journey to anotherstate.Ratherthan a
product, final or interim, becomingis the very dynamism of change,situ-
rtlcd betweenheterogeneousterms and tending towardsno particular goal
rlr cnd-state.
llecoming is most often conceivedby comparing a start-point and an
crrd-pointand deducingthe setof differencesbetweenthem. On Deleuze's
irccount,this approachmeansfirst subtractingmovementfrom the field of
rrctionor thinking in which the statesare conceived,and then somehow
rcintroducingit as the meansby which anotherstaticstatehas 'become'.
l'irr l)cleuze,this approachis an abstractexercisethat detractsfrom the
liclrncssof our cxperiences. For him, bccomingis neither merely an
rttlrillutcofl nor tn intcrmcditrybctwccncvcnts,but ir charirctcristic
of thc
22 BECO M I NG
very productionof events.It is not that the time of changeexistsbetween
one eventand another,but that every eventis but a unique instant of pro-
duction in a continualflow of changesevident in the cosmos.The only
thing 'shared'by eventsis their havingbecomedifferent in the courseof
their production.
The continualproductionof uniqueeventsentailsa specialkind of con-
tinuity: they are unified in their very becoming.It is not that becoming
'envelops'them (since their production is wholly immanent) but that
becoming'movesthrough' everyevent,such that eachis simultaneously
start-point,end-point and mid-point of an ongoingcycleof production.
Deleuze theorisesthis productive cycle using Nietzsche'sconcept of
'eternalreturn'. If eachmomentrepresentsa uniqueconfluenceof forces,
and if the nature of the cosmosis to move continually through states
without headingtowardsany particularoutcome,then becomingmight be
conceivedasthe eternal,productivereturn of difference.
Deleuzebelievesthat eachchangeor becominghasits own duration,
a measureof the relativestability of the construct,and the relationship
between forces at work in defining it. Becoming must be conceived
neither in terms of a 'deeper' or transcendentaltime, nor as a kind of
'temporalbackdrop'againstwhich changeoccurs.Becoming-differentls
itsown time, the real time in which changesoccur.This time which does
not changebut in which all changesunfold is not a Kantian a priori form
dependingupon attributesof a particularkind of consciousness. Rather
it is the time of production,foundedin differenceand becomingand con-
sequent to relations between internal'and external differences.For
Deleuze,the presentis merely the productivemoment of becoming,the
moment correlatingto the productivethresholdof forces.As such,it rep-
resentsthe disiunction betweena past in which forces have had some
effect and a future in which new arrangementsof forceswill constitute
new events.In other words,becomingper seis Deleuze'sversionof pure
and empty time.
Such a view of the world hasimportant implicationsfor conceptstrad-
itionally consideredcentralto philosophy.It undercutsanyPlatonictheory
that privilegesbeing, originality and essence.For Deleuze,there is no
world 'behind appearances', asit were.Insteadof beingabouttransitions
that somethinginitiates or goes throggh, Deleuze'stheory holds that
things and states are prod'uctsof becoming.The human subiect, for
example,ought not to be conceivedasa stable,rationalindividual' experi-
encing changesbut remaining,principally,the sameperson.Rather,for
l)eleuzc,one'sself mustbe conceivedasa constantlychangingassemblage
of' lilrccs, rn cpiphcnomcnonarising from chanceconfluencesof lan-
Hurl11c$, rlrgrtnisms,
socictics, litwsitnclstl tln.
cxpcctrttitlns,
BEC OM IN G + M U SIC 23
Connectives
l)uration
Nietzsche
B E CO MI NG + M U S I C
Marcel Swibod,a
'Becoming' and 'music' are two terms that can be brought together such
that a becoming is capable of proceeding through music, for example
through the musical operation known as 'counterpoint', or the interweav-
ing of several different melodic lines horizontally where the harmony is
produced through linear combinations rather than using a vertical chordal
structure or setting. Counterpoint might most usually constitute a specif-
ically 'musical' case in that when one speaksof musical counterpoint the
ilssertions made regarding the term usually refer back to a given musical
cxample: in short, counterpoint is something that we normally hear.
However, when counterpoint describes the interweaving of different lines
rs something other than what we can hear, then it opens up to a different
function, a function that frees the term from a direct relation to properly
musical content. Consider the work of the ethologistJakob von Uexkiill on
the relationship between animal behaviour among certain speciesand the
cnvironments inhabited by these speciesthat led him to propound a theory
of this relationship based on a conception of counterpoint. To this extent,
nature - in the very ways in which it can be figured through the inter-
rction of different lines of movement, between animals and their environ-
ments, or between and across different species of animals - can be
tunderstoodas constituting a counterpoint in a sensethat extends beyond
rrstrictly metaphorical deployment of the term. From the perspective out-
lined here, music enters into a relation of proximity to nature where music
hccomes nature.
If the term 'nature' is somewhat problematic as a rule in cultural theory,
it is to the extent that it cannot be unquestioningly presupposed as having
rrny objective existence beyond the terms which define it, terms which are
often loaded. In the present case,the term aims at neither an objective con-
ccption nor a discursive one. Rather, this description attempts to restore to
'nilture' a material dimension that extends beyond the confines of dis-
coLfrse,to the extent that discourse implies material processesthat cannot
lrc rcduccd to intcrpretation or the status of fixed objects.To im-ply, in this
irrstirncc,is to cn-{irld, whcrcby langurgc can in somc instrnccsbc dcploycd
24 BECO M I NG + PERFO R M A N C E ART
in waysthat foregroundits enfoldingof materialprocesses. Implicationin
this senseis illustratedby the useof the term 'counterpoint',a term which
haslargely beenretainedby Deleuzeand Guattari in A Thousand, Plateaus
becauseit is highly amenableto a thinking orientedtowardsprocess. As was
mentionedearlier,the term is mostoftenusedin a musicalcontextto figure
the (harmonic)interactionsof melodiclines.As such it doesnot describe
a fixed object and the term's linguistic or semanticsenseis insufficient to
accountfor whatactuallyhappens when counterpoint takesplaceasit draws
its contingentconnectionsbetweendifferentmelodiclines.
This characteristicof the term makesit amenableto the task of con-
structing a different conception of nature, in that it is detachablefrom its
strictly musicalcontext in such a way that it still retains its capacityboth
to describeand at thesametimeto imply, or enfold process.This capacity
is what allowsus to usethe term to describenon-musicalaswell asmusical
interactions,wherethe ideaof the melodic line, strictly speaking,givesway
to an expandedconceptionoflinear interactions,suchasthosetakingplace
betweenthe bodies of different animals,animal species,their environ-
ments)and oneanother.This expandedsenseof the term permitsthe con-
struction of a renewedconceptionof nature that puts it in proximity
to music, where na,turebecomes music.hn example of this proximity is
embodiedin the work of the French composerOlivier Messiaenwho
famouslytranscribedthe songsof differentbird speciesbeforeincorporat-
ing them into his musicalcompositions.The territorial codingsbetween
and acrosscertain bird speciesand their environments(transcodings)are
carriedover into the music in the useof birdsong,such that therecan no
longerbe a binary or hierarchicaldistinctiondrawn betweenthe produc-
tions of tculturetand thoseof 'naturet.
Music becomes na,tureand naturebecomes musicand their resulting indis-
cernibility is the product of a philosophicallabour: to selecttermsbestsuited
to the tash of thinhing and,d,escribingprlcess.Counterpoint is such a term
becauseit is capableof putting music and nature into proximity and
describingthe material implications that orient thought towardsprocess.
BECOMING + PERFORMANCE ART
Ad,rian Parr
The early era of performanceart from the mid-1960sand through the
1970s includcd such figures as Allan Kaprow, Vito Acconci, Bruce
Nirunrirn,(lhris llurdcn, Adrian Pipcr, Lauric Anderson,Lacy lnd
| ,lhowitz,I lannrrltWilkc,( llrolcc Schnccnrirnn,
anclAnirMcndictrrin thc
BEC OM IN G + PER FOR M AN C E AR T 25
United States;JosephBeuys,Marina and Ulay, Valie Export, Hermann
Nitsch and the Vienna Actionismusin West Europe;Jan Mlcoch, Petr
Stembera,Milan Knizak, Gabor Attalai, TamasSzentjobyin EastEurope;
Stuart Brisley,and Gilbert and Georgein England;and Jill Orr, Stelarc
and Mike Parr in Australia.More recentlyperformancehasbecomea sig-
nificant, if not primary, ingredient of many artistic practices.Examples
include but are not restricted to: Coco Fuscq Guillermo G6mez-Pefra,
Ricardo Dominguez, Santiago Sierra, Franco B., VanessaBeecroft,
Matthew Barney,TehchingHsieh, and AndreaFraser.
Stronglyinfluencedby Antonin Artaud, Dada,the Situationists,Fluxus
and Conceptual Art, performance art in its early days tended to define
itself as the antithesisof theatre,in so far as the event wasnever repeated
the sameway twice and did not havea linear structurewith a clearbegin-
ning,middleandend.More importantly though,all performanceart inter-
rogatesthe clarity of subjectivity,disarrangingthe clear and distinct
positions that the artist, artwork, vieweq art institution and art market
occupy.
Trying to articulatethe changedrelationshipbetweenartist, artwork
rnd viewer that performanceart inauguratedcan at times be difficult but
the Deleuzian concept of 'becoming' is especiallyuseful here in that it
allowsus to considerart in terms of a transformativeexperienceaswell as
conceptualisethe processof subjectificationperformanceart sustains.
'Becoming'points to a non-linear dynamic processof changeand when
usedto assistus with problems of an aestheticnature we are encouraged
not just to reconfigurethe apparentstability of the art object as 'object'
definedin contradistinctionto a fully coherent'subject' or an extension
of that 'subject' but rather the conceptof art's becomingis a fourfold
bccoming-minor of the artist, viewer, artwork and milieu. It is in this
rcgardthat performancepromptsus to considerthe productionandappre-
ciation of art away from the classicalsubject/object distinction that
prcvailedby and largeup until the 1960s.
A good example of this would have to be Acconci's Following Piece
(1969)that beganwith a propositionrandomly to follow peoplein New
Yrrrk.The ideawasthat the performancewould independentlyarriveat a
krgicalendpoint,regardlessof the artist'sintention and despitethe 'goal'
ot'the work beingachieved.Instead,it wasthe personbeingfollowedwho
lrrought the work to its final conclusion,such as when she enteredher
irl)ilrtmentor got into her car and droveoff. In this instancethe work was
grrovisionally structuredby a proposition,'to follow anotherperson',but
tlrc cvcntualform the work took wasstructuredby the movementsof the
l)crsonbcing firllowcd.In fact, hcre the art can be consideredasa process
scnsitivcto its own trrnsfilrmation;asthc artistwaslcd lround thc city at
26 BE R Gs o N , H E N R I ( r 859- rg4r)
the whim of someoneelse.There is a propositionto do 'X' then the activ-
ity of doing 'X' activatesnew previously unforeseenorganisationsto take
place;the art is in the 'becomingof art' that is in itself social.Art of this
kind may be bestarticulatedas 'art without guarantees'; this is becauseit
existsentirelyin durationand amidstthe playof divergentforcesthat typi-
fiesDeleuze'sunderstandingof 'becoming'.
What is more,with performanceart artisticvalueis producedsocially;it
is not an abstractvalue that is imposedoutside the creativeprocessitself.
Hence,what we find is that this kind of artisticpracticeconcomitantlypro-
videsa radicalchallengeagainstthe wholeconceptof labourin a capitalist
context.Valueis not decidedaccordingto profit marginsand the market,
rather it is a particular kind of socialorganisation.For example,when
Beuysarrivedat the Ren6Block Galleryin New York (May 1974)wherehe
lived with a wild coyotefor sevendaysin the gallery,the art wasin how the
two slowly developeda senseof trust in the other to the point wherethey
eventuallysleptcurled up together.The meaningthat emergedout of the
piecewas not universal,nor was it absolutelyrelative;as an a-signifying
processthis wasan art practiceoccurringat the limits of signification.
In the examplesgiven,the art wasboth sociallyproducedand conceived
in terms of 'social formation', one that convergeddifferencesin their
mutual becoming.Hence,what this demonstrates is that performanceart
turns its backon the opticalemphasisthat oncegovernedart. Instead,such
practicesaim at producing an encounteror event, not in the simplistic
sensethat it'happened' at a particularmomentin time, but in so far asit
aspiresto bring a variety of elementsand forces into relation with one
another.Ultimately, performanceart involvesa multiplicity of durations,
eachof which is implied in the art work asa whole.
The crucialpoint is that performanceart cannotbedescribedwithin trad-
itional aestheticparametersthat reinforcethe validity of subject/object
distinctions,consequentlythe conceptualapparatus'becoming'offersus
is descriptive. It helps us describe the processof change indicative of
performanceart; an event that in its singularity concomitantlyexpressesa
multiplicity of relations,forces,affectsand percepts.
BERGSON, HENRI ( 1859-1941)
Felicity J. Colman
I )clcuzchm bccncrcditedwith restoringFrenchphilosopherHenri Bergson
Io lhc crrnonof'kcy thinkcrsof'his gcncration,
and Bergson's
work contin-
irllon disciplincsconccrncdwith timc, movcmcnt,nlcnlory
rucsl0 irnprirct
BERG SoN, HnNnr ( r 859- r g4r ) 27
andperception.Along with the thoughtsof GottfriedWilhelm von Leibniz,
Baruch Spinoza,Friedrich Nietzsche,David Hume, Antonin Artaud,
Guattari and Lucretius, DeleuzeengagesBergson'sempiricism as a chal-
lengeto the rigidity of philosophy,especially in its useof transcendental ele-
ments,phenomenological assumptions, and the questfor 'knowledge'and
'truth'. Deleuze'sphilosophicalinterestin Bergsonis manifoldand central
to his entire oeuvre.Although neglectedin philosophicalcanonsof the
secondhalf of the twentieth century,in the early decadesof that century,
Bergson'swork was well known and widely discussedin many artistic and
literaryarenas,from the FrenchCubiststo the Englishwriter T E. Hulme.
In BergsonDeleuzefinds an intellectualpartner for someof his core
philosophicalpursuits: conceptsand ideasof temporality,the affective
nature of movementand duration, the political implicationsof multipli-
city and difference,the morphologicalmovementof genetics,and the tem-
poral causalityof eventsashabitualand associated series.Deleuzesignals
his interest in Bergsonin his essayon Hume, Empiricismand Subjectiaity.
Then, in 1966,Deleuzepublishedhis book Bergsonism, in which he called
for 'a return to Bergson',through an extendedconsiderationof what he
sawasBergson'sthree key concepts:intuition asmethod,the demandfor
an inventionand utilisationof a metaphysicalorientationof science,and a
logicalmethodand theoryof multiplicities.Bergsonnot only questionsthe
logisticsof existencein terms of movement,but his writing indicateshis
genuinefascinationwith the subjectsand objectsof life - appealingto
Deleuze'sown propositionsconcerningvitalism.
Bergson'sconceptsare influentialfor Deleuze'swork in Dffirence and
Repetition,where Deleuze developsideas of differenceand repetition,
memoryand repetition,the intensiveand extensiveforms of time, and the
physicalmovementsof time; all of which are indebtedto Bergson'sdis-
cussionof the paradoxicalmodalitiesof time in his book, Matter and
MemorylMatiire et Mimoirel (1896).Bergsonproposesa movingmodelof
duration - a conceptof duration that is not spatiallypredeterminedbut
continually alters its past through cognitive movement.Then, later in
CreatioeEoolutionBergson incorporatesthe cinematic model into his
philosophical expression,noting the cinematographicalcharacter of
irncientphilosophyin its apprehensionof the thought of ordinary know-
lcdge(B 19l 1: 331-33).From this model(andthe Kantiannotionof time,
rrndHegelianconceptionof thought and movement)Deleuzedevelopshis
cxplicationof how the perceptualrecognitionof moving imagesof the
cincmaticscreenoperatesnot through the apprehension of that movement,
br.rtthrough specificmoments of sound and optical registration.This
f )clcuzcdiscusscs at lcngthin his two bookson the cinema,CinemaI : The
trtt tttcrnutl-imageitncl()inL'ma2:'l'hc'l'irnc-I inuga.
28 BLACK HO L E BL AC K H OL E 29

Memory is conceivedof by Bergsonasa temporalblendingof perceptual contribute to; philosophical or otherwise. These engagementsare at times
imageryandthis ideabecomes centralto Deleuze'shypothesis
in his discus- fleeting and at times more sustained,and contribute to their strategy of pre-
sion of the philosophicalimportanceof cinema.In his secondbook on venting their position from stabilising inro an ideology, merhod, or single
cinema, The Time-lmage,Deleuze draws from Bergson'sinterest in the metaphor. In other words, they encouragephilosophy to occupy the spaceof
different types of possiblememory states- dreams,amnesia,d6ji-vu, and slippage that exists between disciplinary boundaries, and to question how
death.To theseDeleuzeaddsa breadthof memoryfunctions:fantasy,hallu- things are made, rather than simply analysing or interpreting the taken-
cinations,Nietzsche'sconceptof 'promise-behaviour' where we make a for-granted final result or image. This provides the foundation for the work
memoryof thepresentfor the futureuseof thepresent(nowaspast),theatre, presentedin I nti-oed'ipusandA TkousandPlateaus,andthe seriesof renewed
Alain Robbe-Grillet'sconceptof the 'recognition'processwherethe por- terms proposed by these texts (including schizoanalysis,rhizomatics, prag-
trayalof memoryis throughinventionandelimination,andnumerousothers. matics, diagrammatism, cartography,and micropolitics).
FollowingBergson,Deleuzedescribeshow the perceptualandcognitive Appearing predominantly in A Thousand, Plateaus,the term .black hole,
abilitiesof the dreamor wakefulreceptorof memoryeventsor imageryare has been sourced from contemporary physics. Referring to spaces that
dependentupon a complexnetwork of factors.As Bergsondiscussesin cannot be escapedfrom once drawn into, Deleuze and Guattari describe the
Matter andMemory,systemsof perceptualattentionare contingentupon black hole as a star that has collapsed into itself. while although this term
the 'automatic'or 'habitual'recognitionof things.Thesedifferentmodes exists literally rather than as a metaphor (becauseit maintains an effect that
of rememberingare further temperedthrough the degreeof attention is fully actualised, affective and real), it has been relocated away from its
givenin the perceptionof things,affectingnot only the descriptionof the original source in scientific discourse.As with many of the terms appropri-
object, but the featuresof the object itself. From Bergson,Deleuze's ated by A ThousandPlareaus,it is presented as being engaged in its own
mature conceptionof duration and the movementsand multiplicitiesof processof deterritorialisation that is independent from the text that it has
time aredeveloped. been woven into; these concepts do not exist for the newly bricolaged-
together text, but happen to come into contact with it or move through it as
l condition or processof their own moving trajectory or line of flight.
Connectives
In the context of A Thousand.Pleteeus, the black hole is presented as
Cinema being one - unwanted but necessary- outcome for a failed line of flight.
Difference l)eterritorialising movement strays away from the concept and state of
Duration molar identity and aims to force splinters to crack open into giant ruptures
Hume rrnd cause the subsequent obliteration of the subject as he becomes
Memory cnsconcedwithin a processof becoming-multiple. Engaged in this process,
Multiplicity the subject is deconstituted, and becomes a new kind of assemblagethat
occupies what Deleuze and Guattari call the 'plane of consistency', which
is a spaceof creativity and desire. However, becausethis plane is also that
of death and destruction, traps are scattered throughout this process.
BLACK HOLE
l')xisting as micro-fascisms across this plane, black holes threaten self-
conscious acts of transcendence and self-destruction alike, which is why
Kylie Message
l)cleuze and Guattari advise nomads to exercise caution as they dis-
DeleuzeandGuattaribelievethatthe roleof philosophyis to inventnewcon- organise themselvesaway from the molar organisations of the State. So, in
ceptsthat challenge the waythat philosophyitselfis written andformulated. sirlple terms, the black hole is one possible outcome of an ill-conceived
Because of this, they draw both from new ideasand from thoseof a multi- (which oftcn equates to overly self-conscious) attempt at deterritorialisa-
plicity ofalreadyexistingdisciplines,includingbiologicalandearthsciences, tion thirt is cirused by a threshold crossed too quickly or an intensity
andphysics. This interdisciplinary coverage is designed to maketheirphilo- lrcconrcdangcrousbcciruscit is no longer bcarable.
sophicll projcct h:rvcconcurrcnt signiticancc rlr (n<l
cffcct mattcrhowsmall) Arrotlrcrway of'thirrking lbout thc blrrckholc is in tcrms of how Deleuze
witlrirrthc lickl ol'r:ont:cpl thittthcylloth lpprollriltc li'otttitttd
rritlttritlriccs i ttttl (i ttl tl ti tt' i r cwr it c lhc r clit t iot t shipphilosophyir nclpsychoir r r alysis
hir s
30 BO DY BOD Y 3l
llI
with desire and subjectivity. If the black hole is one possibleoutcome faced such a body; the animal body is another, but a body can also be a body of 1
by the overly convulsive, self-consumed desiring subject, then it works to work, a social body or collectivity, a linguistic corpus, a political party, or
illustrate their contention that every strong emotion - such as conscious- even an idea. A body is not defined by either simple materiality, by its occu-
l
ness or love - pursues its own end. As a potential outcome for both paths pying space('extension'), or by organic structure. It is defined by the rela-
of transcendenceand destruction, the lure of the black hole indicates the tions of its parts (relations of relative motion and rest, speedand slowness),
subject's attraction toward an absolute (lack) of signification. This and by its actions and reactions with respect both to its environment or
expressesthe absolute impossibility of representation at the same time as milieu and to its internal milieu. The parts of a body vary depending on
it actively works to show how grand narrative statementscontinually inter- the kind of body: for a simple material object, such as a rock, its parts are
twine subjectivity and signification. In appealing to a deterritorialising minute particles of matter; for a social body, its parts are human individuals
activity, Deleuze and Guattari problematise the processof subjectification who stand in a certain relation to each other. The relations and interactions
which, they claim, results either in self-annihilation (a black hole), or of the parts compound to form a dominant relation, expressing the
re-engagement with different planes of becoming. 'essence'or a power of existing of that body, a degree of physical intensity
In addition to presenting the black hole as a possibleend-point to certain that is identical to its power of being affected. A body exists when, for
acts of deterritorialisation, Deleuze and Guattari use it as a way of further whatever reason, a number of parts enter into the characteristic relation
conceptualising their notion of faciality. In this context, black holes exist that defines it, and which corresponds to its essenceor power of existing.
as the binary co-requisite of the flat white surface, wall or landscapethat Since nature as a whole contains all elements and relations, nature as
nominally symbolises the generic white face of Christ. In order to break a whole is a body, a system of relations among its parts, expressing the
through the dominating white face,or wall of the signifier, and avoid being whole order of causal relations in all its combinations.
swallowed by the black hole, one must renounce the face by becoming Deleuze is fond of quoting Baruch Spinoza'sdictum that'no one knows
imperceptible. However, Deleuze and Guattari advise caution when what a body can do'. The more power a thing has, or the greater its power
embarking on such a line of flight. Indeed, they claim madnessto be a def- of existence,the greater number of ways in which it can be affected. Bodies
inite danger associatedwith attempts to break out of the signifying system are affected by different things, and in different ways, each type of body
represented by the face.We must not, they warn, entirely reject our organ- being characterised by minimum and maximum thresholds for being
ising boundaries becauseto do so can result in the complete rejection of affected by other bodies: what can and what cannot affect it, and to what
subjectivity. Recalling the slogan of schizoanalysis,they tell us not to turn degree. Certain external bodies may prove insufficient to produce a reac-
our backs on our boundaries, but to keep them in sight so that we can dis- tion in a body, or fail to pass the minimum threshold, whereas in other
mantle them with systematiccaution. cases,the body being affected may reach a maximum threshold, such that
it is incapableof being affected any further, as in a tick that dies of engorge-
ment. A body being affected by another, such that the relations of its parts
Connectives
are the effect of other bodies acting on it, is a passivedetermination of the
Molar body, or passion. If an external body is combined or 'composed' with a
Schizoanalysis body in a way that increasesthe affected body's power of being affected,
Space this transition to a higher state of activity is experienced as joy; if the com-
bination decreasesthe affected body's power of being affected, this is the
irffect of sadness.It is impossible to know in advance which bodies will
compose with others in a way that is consonant with a body's characteris-
BODY
t ic relation or ratio of its parts, or which bodies will decompose a body by
c:rr.rsingits parts to enter into experimental relations.
Bruce Baugh
Whcther the effect is to increaseor decreasea body's power of acting and
i
'liocly'tirr l)clcuzcis clcfinccl
itsirnywholccomposed of parts,wherethese bcing 1ll'cctccl,onc body affecting;anothcr, or producing effectsin it, is in
llrrllssl:rrrtl
irrsorrrc to onc rlnothcr,
rclirtiorr
tlc(irritc lilr
rtnclhrs r citpacitv rcrrlityrrcrlnrbinirrgirnclrr mixing of thc tw<lb<lclics, irnclm<lstoficn 'bit by
Irt'ing :rlli't'tt'rl lr v ot lr c l lr or lic s . ' l' lr t ' lt t t r t t r t r t l l r x l v i s j t t s l o t t c c x i t t t t g l l t 'o l ' bi l ' , or pru' t by l) iu't . Sonr ct int cst his nr ixing lr llu's onc ol'lhc bodics

32 BO DY W I THO UT ORGANS
(as when food is alteredin being assimilated,or when a poison destroys
a body's vital parts); sometimesit altersboth and producesa composite
relationof partsthat dominatesthe relationsof both components(aswhen
chyleand lymph mix to form blood,which is of a differentnaturefrom its
components);andsometimesit preservesthe relationof partsamongthem
both, in which casethe two bodiesform parts of a whole. The characteris-
tic relationthat resultsfrom harmoniouslycombiningthe relationsof the
two componentbodiesinto a'higher individual'or'collectiveperson',such
as a community or an association,correspondsto a collectivepower of
beingaffected,and resultsin collectiveor communalaffects.
Since a body is a relation of parts correspondingto an essence,or
a degreeof physical intensity, a body need not have the hierarchical and
dominatingorganisationof organswe call an 'organism'.It is rather an
intensivereality,differentiatedby the maximumand minimum thresholds
of its powerof beingaffected.
Connectives
Body without Organs
Power
Space
Spinoza
BODY WITHOUT ORGANS
Kylie Message
A phraseinitially takenfrom Antonin Artaud, the Body without Organs
(BwO) refersto a substratethat is alsoidentifiedasthe planeof consistency
(as a non-formed, non-organised,non-stratifiedor destratifiedbody or
term). The term first emergedin Deleuze'sTheLogic of Sense,and was
further refined with Guattari in Anti-Oedipusand A ThousandPlateaus.
The BwO is proposedasa meansof escapingwhat Deleuzeand Guattari
perceiveas the shortcomingsof traditional(Freudian,Lacanian)psycho-
analysis.Rather than arguing that desireis basedon Oedipal lack, they
claim desireis a productive-machine that is multiple and in a stateof con-
stant flux. And whereaspsychoanalysis proclaimsclosureand interpret-
trtion, their critique of the three terms (organism, significanceand
sr.rbjcctiticrrtion)
that organiseand bind us most effectivelysuggeststhe
possibilityof'opcnings nndsp:rccs
ftrrthc crcationof ncw modesof cxpcri-
crtcc'.l{itlhcr tltiin llrrrcccdingdircctly to invcrt rlr dcc<lnstructlcnlls
aa
BOD Y WITH OU T OR GAN S JJ
dominant in the production of identity and consciousness, they suggest
that implicit within, between,and all around theseare other - possibly
more affective- fieldsof immanenceand statesof being.
Attention is refocusedawayfrom the subjectivity(a term which they feel
is too often mistakenfor the term 'consciousness') traditionallyprivileged
by psychoanalysisas Deleuze and Guattari challenge the world of the
articulating,self-definingand enclosedsubject.The BwO is the proposed
antidote(aswell asprecedent,antecedentandevencorrelate)to this articu-
late and organisedorganism;indeed,they claim that the BwO hasno need
for interpretation.The BwO doesnot exist in oppositionto the organism
or notionsof subjectivity,and it is nevercompletelyfree of the stratified
exigenciesof proper language,the State, family, or other institutions.
However, it is, despite this, both everywhereand nowhere,disparateand
homogeneous. In terms of this, there are two main points to note: firstly,
that the BwO existswithin stratifiedfieldsof organisationat the sametime
as it offers an alternative mode of being or experience(becoming);
secondlgthe BwO doesnot equateliterally to an organ-lessbody.
In referenceto the first point, Deleuze and Guattari explain that
althoughthe BwO is a processthat is directedtoward a courseof contin-
ual becoming,it cannotbreak awayentirely from the systemthat it desires
escapefrom. While it seeksa mode of articulation that is free from the
binding tropesof subjectificationand signification,it must play a delicate
gameof maintainingsomereferenceto thesesystemsof stratification,or
elserisk obliterationor reterritorialisationbackinto thesesystems.In other
words,suchsubversionis a never-completed process.Instead,it is continu-
ous and oriented only towardsits processor moyementrather than toward
any teleologicalpoint of completion.Consistentwith this, and in order to
be affective(or to have affect)it must exist - more or less- within the
systemthat it aimsto subvert.
Deleuzeand Guattari take Miss X as their role model. A hypochon-
driac, sheclaimsto be without stomach,brain, or internal organs,and is
left with only skin and bonesto give structureto her otherwisedisorgan-
isedbody.Through this example,they explainthat the BwO doesnot refer
literally to an organ-lessbody. It is not produced as the enemy of the
organs,but is opposedto the organisationof the organs.In other words,
the BwO is opposedto the organisingprinciplesthat structure,defineand
speakon behalf of the collectiveassemblage of organs,experiencesor
statesof being. Whereaspsychoanalysis privileges'lack' as the singular
lnd productiveforce that maintainsdesire,Deleuzeand Guattari claim
that by binding and judging desirein this way,our understandingand
rclati<lnship with the real or Imaginarybecomesfurthcr removedand
cornpromiscd.
 34 BO DY W I THO UT ORGANS
Elaboratingfurther on the natureof the BwO, Deleuzealsoinvokesthe
German biologist,August Weismann,and his 'theory of the germplasm'
(1885,published1893)to contendthat - like the germplasm- the BwO is
alwayscontemporarywith and yet independentof its host organism.
Weismannbelievedthat at eachgeneration,the embryo that developsfrom
the zygotenot only setsasidesomegermplasmfor the next generation(the
inheritanceof acquiredfeatures)but it also producesthe cells that will
developinto the soma- or body - of the organism.In Weismann'sview,
the somaplasmsimply providesthe housingfor the germplasm,to ensure
that it is protected,nourishedand conveyedto the germplasmof the oppo-
site sex in order to createthe next generation.What comesfirst, the
chickenor the egg?Weismannwould insistthe chickenis simply oneegg's
device for laying another egg. Similarly, Deleuzepresentsthe BwO as
equivalentto the egg;like the egg,the BwO doesnot exist beforeor prior'
to the organism,but is adjacentto it and continuouslyin the processof
constructingitself.
Insteadof slotting everythinginto polarisedfields of the norm and its
antithesis,Deleuze and Guattari encourageus to remove the poles of
organisationbut maintain a mode of articulation.They advisethat in
seekingto makeourselvesa BwO, we needto maintaina mode of expres-
sion, but rid languageof the central role it has in arbitrating truth and
reality againstmadnessand the pre*symbolicreal.Relocatingdesireaway
from a dichotomouslinguistictrajectory,Deleuzeand Guattari presentit
as being contextualisedby the field of immanenceoffered by the BwO
rather than by the conclusivefield of language.As such, desireis always
alreadyengagedin a continuousprocessof becoming.However,despite
occupying(and in somecasesembodying)a field of immanenceor a plane
ofconsistencywhich areoften describedasbeingdestratified,decodedand
deterritorialised,the BwO hasits own modeof organisation(whoseprin-
ciples are primarily derived from Baruch Spinoza).Rather than being
a specificform, the body is morecorrectlydescribedasuncontainedmatter
or a collectionof heterogeneous parts.
Connectives
Becoming
Body
Desirc
Lacirn
l)sychorrnrrlysis
Spinozit
lL-
C A P ITA LIS M 35
BREUER, JOSEPH (I8+2-I925) - refer to the entrieson 'hysteria'and
tfeminismt.
BURROUGHS,WILLIAM (1914-97) - refer'to the entries on tart'
* politics'.
and'post-structuralism
CANGUILHEM, GEORGES (1904-95)-referto theentryon'schizo-
phrenia'.
CAPITALISM
Jonathan Roffe
In the periodbeforehis death,Deleuzeannouncedin an interviewthat he
would like to composea work which would be called TheGrand.eur of Marx.
This fact clearlyindicatesDeleuze?s positiveattitudetowardsthe philoso-
phy of Karl Marx, which he neverabandoneddespitealteringmanyof its
fundamentalelements.Certainlythe most important of theseelementsis
capitalism.The Marxism of-Deleuzecomesfrom his insistencethat all
politicalthought must take its bearingsfrom the capitalistcontextwe live
in. While mentioningcapitalismin passingin a number of places,it is the
two volumesof Caphalismand Schizophreniawhich contain the most sus-
tainedand radicaltreatmentof this theme.
Deleuze and Guattari insist any given social formation restricts or
structuresmovementsor flows. They claim that theseflows are not just
the flows of money and commoditiesfamiliar to economists,but can be
seenat a variety of levels:the movementof peopleand traffic in a city,
the flows of words that are bound up in a language,the flows of genetic
code betweengenerationsof plants, and even the flow of matter itself
(the movementof the ocean,electronsmoving in metals,and so forth).
Thus, Deleuze and Guattari's political ,thought begins with the
prcmissthat nature itself, the Whole of existence,is at once a matter of
fkrws,and that tny s<lcictymust structrlretheseflows in ordcr to subsist.
All Stltc rncl prc-Strtc socictics- rrllthoscwhich irccordingto Murx lrc
36 CAPIT AL ISM
pre-capitalist- on DeleuzeandGuattari'saccount,havesucha restriction
of flows astheir basicprinciple.
Deleuzeand Guattari call this processof restriction, or structuring,
'coding'. They conceivecoding as at once restrictive and necessary.
Societies,as regimesof coding,aim to bring about certainfixed waysof
existing(living, talking,working,relating)while denyingother more mal-
leable ways. However, without some structure - our own coherent
individuality and agencyfor example,which Deleuzeand Guattari con-
siderspecificto eachsocialformationand alwaysoppressive - therewould
be no basisupon which to challengeand attemptto alter the givencoding
regime.Both Anti-Oed,ipusandA Thousand, Plateausinclude lengthy analy-
sesof differentkinds of societiesand the waysin which they codeflows.
Capitalismis the radicalexceptionto this basiccentralunderstandingof
the nature of society.There are four featuresto this exceptionalstatusof
capitalismfor Deleuzeand Guattari. First, insteadof working by coding
flows,capitalismis a regimeof decoding.Second,and in tandemwith this,
the recodingthat would takeplacein non-capitalistsocietiesto recapture
decodedflows is replacedby the processof axiomatisation.For example,
the coding of sexualrelationsthrough marriage,the church, moralsand
popularculture - which in different societieslocatethe practiceof sexin
certaincontexts,whetherthat is marriage,prostitutionor youth culture-
hasbeendecodedin capitalistsocieties. This is first of all, for Deleuzeand
Guattari, a good thing, making possiblenew kinds of relations that were
excludedby the codingregimesin question.In capitalism,however,a cor-
relativeaxiomatisationhas takenplacemaking possiblethe saleof sex as
a product (what Karl Marx called a 'commodity'). Axioms operate,in
short, by emptyingflows of their specificmeaningin their codedcontext
(sexasthe act of marriage,the mealasthe centreof family life, and so on)
and imposing a law of generalequivalencein the form of monetary value.
Theseflowsremaindecodedin sofar asthey arefluid partsof the economy.
They cannot,ascommodities,be bound to a certainstateof affairsto have
value - for food to be a product it must be possibleto eat it in a context
other than the family home,or tribe.
The third important aspectof capitalismfor Deleuzeand Guattari -
drawingon Marx - is that this processof decoding,/axiomatisation hasno
real limit. Given that all such limits would be codes,this movement
effectivelyand voraciouslyerodesall such limits. This accountsfor the
sensein capitalistsocietiesof perpetual novelty and innovation, since
codcd flows are continuallybeing turned into commoditiesthrough this
proccss,furthcr cxtcnclingthe realmof monetaryequivalence.
I krwcvcr,suclrir proccsscoulclncvcr bc total.Thus, fourthly,thc fact
thrrtcrrllitirlisl
srrcicty;rrocccds
in this waycklcsnot mcanfor I)clctrzcrrnd
C A P ITA LIS M * U N IV E R S A L H IS TOR Y JI
Guattari that codedelementsof socialformation are entirely absent.It is
rather the casethat certain fragmentsof Statesociety(in particular) are
put to work in the serviceof capitalism.Obviously,structureslike the
governmentand the family still exist in capitalism.As they note, there
could be no total decodedsociety- an oxymoronicphrase.Governments
and monarchiesremain,while having their real juridical power substan-
tially reduced,asregulativemechanismsstabilisingthe growth of decod-
ing/ axiomatisation.The nuclear family in particular, the kind of coded
entity that one might imagine would be dissolved by the decoding/
axiomatisingmovementof capitalism,is for Deleuzeand Guattari the site
of a surprisingminiaturisationof Statesociety,where the father takesthe
position (structurally speaking)of the despoticand all-seeingruler.
None of thesepoints, howeveqmakesfor a celebrationof the libera-
tory effectsof capitalism.Deleuze and Guattari remain Marxists in so
far as.they consider real freedom to be unavailablein the world of
monetaryequivalenceenactedby capitalism.While imitating the decod-
ing that makespossiblethe freeing up of flows and new ways of existing,
capitalist society only produces a different, more insidious, kind of
unfreedom.
Connectives
Freedom
Marx
Oedipalisation
CAPITALISM + UNIVERSAL HISTORY
EugeneHolland
DeleuzeandGuattariarealoneamongpost-structuralists to resuscitate the
notion of universalhistory. But by drawing on Karl Marx rather than
GeorgWilhelm FriedrichHegel,they insistthat this is an'ironic'universal
history,for three reasons:it is retrospective, singularand critical. [t is ret-
rospectivein that the perspectiveof schizophreniaonly becomesavailable
toward the end of history,under capitalism;yet at the sametime, capital-
ism doesnot representthetelosofhistory, but rather a contingentproduct
of fortuitous circumstance.This confirms the singularity of capitalist
socicty:it is not somehiddensimilaritybetweencapitalismand previous
s<rcillfirrmsthrt makcsclpitrrlismunivcrsirl, but rathcrwhat M:rrx (in thc
Orunilrisse\ cirllsthc 'csscntirtldifl'crcncc'bctwccrrit arrd thc othcrs: it
il
 38 CAPIT AL ISM + UNIVERSA L H IS TOR Y
exposesthe sourceofvalue that previoussocietieskept hidden.And hence
capitalismoffers the key to universalhistory becausewith capitalism,
societycan finally becomeself-critical.
Capitalistmodernity representsthe key turning point in this view of
universalhistory,for a crucial discoveryis madein a number of different
fields:by Martin Luther; by Adam Smith and David Ricardo;somewhat
laterby SigmundFreud,who will thereforebe considered'theLuther and
the Adam Smith of psychiatry'.The key discoveryis that valuedoesnot
inhere in objects but rather gets invested in them by human activity,
whether that activity is religious devotion, physicallabour or libidinal
desire.In this fundamentalreversalof perspective,objectsturn out to be
merely the support for subjectivevalue-givingactivity.Yet in eachof the
threefields,the discoveryofthe internal,subjectivenatureofvalue-giving
activity is accompaniedby a resubordination of that activity to another
externaldetermination:in the caseof Luther, subjectivefaith freed from
subordinationto the CatholicChurch is nevertheless resubordinated to the
authority of Scripture; in Smith and Ricardo,wage-labourfreed from
feudal obligationsis resubordinatedto private capital accumulation;in
Freud, the free-form desireof polymorphouslibido is resubordinatedto
heterosexualreproduction in the privatised nuclear family and the
Oedipuscomplex.To free human activity from theselast externaldeter-
minationsis the task of world-historicalcritique: Marx providesthe cri-
tique of political economy to free wage-labourfrom private capital;
Friedrich Nietzscheprovidesthe critique of religionand moralismto free
Will to Power from nihilism; Deleuzeand Guattari provide the critique of
psychoanalysisto free libido from the private nuclear family and the
Oedipuscomplex.
If capitalismmakeshistory universal,this is ultimately becauseit pro-
motes multiple differences,becausethe capitalistmarket operatesas a
'difference-engine'. For Marx, the key human universalwas production:
the species-beingof humanity was defined in terms of its ever-growing
ability to produceits own meansof life rather than simply consumewhat
nature offered.For Deleuzeand Guattari, the key universalis not just
production(not evenin the very broadsensethey grant that term inAnti-
Oedipus), but specificallythe production of differencefree from codifica-
tion and representation. The marketfostersan increasinglydifferentiated
network of socialrelationsby expandingthe socialisationof production
alongwith the divisionof labour,eventhough capitalextractsits surplus
from thc differentialflowsenabledby this network,by meansof exploita-
ti<lnirnclthc ncvcr-cnclingrepaymcntof an infinite debt. Even though the
rlifl'crcrtcc-cnginc of' crrpitrrlfails firlly tu rcllisc universalhistory, it
noncthclcss tttitkcstrrrivcrsrrlity
possiblc; putsit on lhc lristoricirl
irgcndrr.
L
C APTU R E 39
So while the capitalist market inauguratesthe potential for universal
history in its productionof difference,it is the eliminationof capitalfrom
the market that will multiply differenceand realisethe freedom inherent
in universalhistory.
CAPTURE
Alberto Toscano
The conceptof 'capture'is usedby Deleuzeand Guattari to dealwith two
problemsof relationality:first, how to conceiveof the connectionbetween
the State,the war machineand capitalismwithin a universalhistory of
politicallife; and second,how to formulatea non-representational account
of the interaction of different beings and their territories, such as to
ground a thinking of becoming.In the first instance,capturedefinesthe
operation whereby the State (or Urstaat) binds or encaststhe war
machinb,therebyturning it into an objectthat canbe madeto work for the
State, to bolster and expand its sovereignty.Apparatusesof capture
constitutethe machinicprocesses specificto Statesocieties.They can be
conceivedas being primarily a matter of signs;whencethe figure of the
One-EyedEmperor who binds and fixes signs,complementedby a One-
Armed Priest or jurist who codifiesthesesignsin treaties,contractsand
laws.Capturecanbe understoodasconstitutinga control of signs,accom-
panying the other paradigmatic dimension of the State, the control of
tools.The principalontologicaland methologicalissuerelatedto this con-
ceptionof capturehasto do with the type of relationbetweencaptureand
the captured (namely in the caseof the war machine as the privileged
correlateof the apparatus).
Deleuzeand Guattari'snotion of universalhistory evadesany explan-
ation by strict causality or chronological sequence.Rather, it turns to
notionsdrawn from catastrophetheory and the sciencesof complexityto
revivethe Hegelianintuition that the Statehasalwaysbeenthere- not as
an idea or a concept,but as a thresholdendowedwith a kind of virtual
efficacy,evenwhen the Stateas a complexof institutionsand as a system
of control is not yet actual.The logic of captureis such that what is cap-
tured is simultaneouslypresupposedand generatedby the act of capture,
appropriatedand produced.Deleuzeand Guattari return to many of the
key notions in Karl Marx's critique of political economyto bolster the
thcsis of a constructivecharacterof capture,arguing, for instance,that
surpluslabourcanbc unclcrst<xrd to cngcndcrlabourpropcr(th<lughit can
irlsobc urrdclslood irstlrc irttcrrrplto llkrckrlr nranipulatc:r
constitutivc
40 CAPTURE
flight from labour). Capture is thus both an introjection and determination
of an outside and the engendering of the outside as outside of the appar-
atus. It is in this regard that capture is made to correspond to the Marxian
concept of primitive accumulation, interpreted as a kind of originary vio-
lence imposed by the State to prepare for the functioning of capital. Here
Deleuze and Guattari are sensitive to the juridical aspectsof the question,
such that State capture defines a domain of legitimate violence, in as much
as it always accompaniescapture with the affirmation of a right to capture.
In its intimate link to the notion of machinic enslavement,the apparatus of
capture is proper to both the initial imperial figure of the State and to full-
blown global or axiomatic capitalism, rather than to the intermediary stage
represented by the bourgeois nation-state and its forms of disciplinary
subjectivation.
The notion of capture can also be accorded a different inflection, this
time linked to the privileging of ethological models of intelligibility within
a philosophy of immanence. Here the emphasis is no longer on the expro-
priation and appropriation of an outside by an instance of control, but on
the process of convergence and assemblagebetween heterogeneous series,
on the emergence of blocs of becoming, such as the one of the wasp and
the orchid. What we have here is properly speaking a double capture or
inter-capture, an encounter that transforms the disparate entities that
enter into a joint becoming. In Deleuze and Guattari's KaJha, such a
process is linked to a renewal of the theory of relation, and specifically to
a reconsideration of the status of mimesis, now reframed as a type of sym-
biosis. Under the heading of capture we thus encounter two opposite but
entangled actions, both of which can be regarded as schemata alternative
to a dominant hylomorphic mode of explaining relation: the first, under-
stood as the political control of signs, translates a co-existence of becom-
ings (as manifested by the war machine) into a historical succession,
making the State pass from an attractor which virtually impinges upon
non-State actors to an institutional and temporal reality; the second
defines a co-existence and articulation of becomings in terms of the
assemblage of heterogeneous entities and the formation of territories.
What is paramount in both instancesis the affirmation of the event-bound
and transformative character of relationality (or interaction), such that
capture, whether understood as control or assemblage,is always an onto-
logically constructive operation and can never be reduced to models of
unilateral causation.
Connective
( lrrpit rrlisnr
C APTU R E + POL ITIC S +l
CAPTURE + POLITICS
Paul Patton
Deleuzeand Guattari deny that the Stateis an apparatuswhich emerged
asthe resultof prior conditionssuchasthe accumulationof surplusor the
emergence of privateproperty.Instead,they arguethat Stateshavealways
existedand that they are in essencealwaysmechanismsof capture.The
earliestforms of Stateinvolvedthe captureof agricultural communities,
the constitutionof a milieu of interiority and the exerciseof sovereign
power. The ruler became'the sole and transcendentpublic-property
owner,the masterof the surplusor stock,the organiserof large-scale works
(surpluslabour),the sourceof public functionsand bureaucracy'(D&G
1987:428).Historically the most important mechanismsof capturehave
beenthoseexercisedupon land and its products,upon labourand money.
Thesecorrespondto Karl Marx's 'holy trinity' of the modern sourcesof
capitalaccumulation,namely ground rent, profit and taxes,but they have
long existedin other forms.In all cases, we find the sametwo key elements:
the constitutionof a general spaceof comparisonand the establishment of
a centre of appropriation.Together,these define the abstractmachine
which is expressedin the different forms of State,but also in non-state
mechanismsof capture such asthe captureof corporealrepresentationby
faciality,or the captureof political reasonby public opinion.
Consider first the capture of human activity in the form of labour.
Deleuzeand Guattari arguethat 'labour (in the strict sense)beginsonly
with what is calledsurpluslabour' (D&G 1987:490).Contraryto the wide-
spreadcolonial presumption that indigenouspeopleswere unsuited for
labour,they point out that 'so-calledprimitive societiesarenot societiesof
shortageor subsistence due to an absenceof work, but on the contraryare
societiesof freeactionand smoothspacethat haveno usefor a work-factor,
anymorethan they constitutea stock'(D&G 1987:491).Inthesesocieties,
productiveactivity proceedsunder a regimeof 'free action' or activity in
continuousvariation.Such activity only becomeslabour once a standard
of comparisonis imposed,in the form of a definitequantityto be produced
or a time to be worked.The obligationto providetaxes,tribute or surplus
labourimposessuchstandardsof comparison,therebyeffectingthe trans-
formationof freeaction into labour.
The sametwo elementsare presentin the conditionswhich enablethe
extractionof ground rent, which Deleuzeand Guattari describeas 'the
vcry modcl of an apparatusof capture' (D&G 1987:441).From an eco-
nomicpoint of vicw,thc cxtrtrctionof grounclrcnt prcsllpposcs r mcansof
conrpirrirrg thc prtlcluctivity
ol'dill'crcntprlrtirlnsof' llrrrcl
sinrrrltirrrcorrsly
 42 c AR R o L L , L Ew IS (r832-98)
exploited,or of comparingthe productivity of the sameportion succes-
sively exploited. The measurementof productivity provides a general
spaceof comparison;a measureof qualitativedifferences betweenportions
of the earth'ssurfacewhich is absentfrom the territorial assemblage of
hunter-gatherersociety.Thus, 'labour and surpluslabourare the appara-
tus of captureof activityjust asthe comparisonof landsand the appropri-
ation of land are the apparatusof captureof territory' (D&G 1987:442).
One further condition is necessaryin order for ground rent to be
extracted:thedifference in productivitymustbelinkedto a landowner(D&G
1987: 441). In other words, from a legal point of view, the extraction of
ground rent is 'inseparablefrom a processof relative deterritorialization'
because'insteadof peoplebeingdistributedin an itinerantterritory,pieces
of landaredistributedamongpeopleaccordingto a commonquantitativecri-
terion' (D&G 1987:441).The conversionof portionsof the earthinhabited
by so-calledprimitivepeoplesinto an appropriable and exploitableresourte
thereforerequiresthe establishment of a juridical centreof appropriation.
The centreestablishes a monopolyover what has now becomeland and
assigns to itselfthe right to allocateownershipof portionsof unclaimedland.
This centreis the legalsovereignand the monopolyis the assertionof
sovereigntyover the territoriesin question.That is why the fundamental
jurisprudentialproblemof colonisationis the mannerin which the terri-
toriesof the originalinhabitantsbecometransformedinto a uniform space
of landedproperty.In thosecolonieswhich wereacquiredand governedin
accordancewith British common law, the sovereignright of the Crown
meantthat it hadthe powerboth to createandextinguishprivaterightsand
interestsin land. In this sense,Crown land amountsto a uniform expanse
of potentialreal property which coversthe earth to the extentof the sov-
ereignterritory.It followsthat, within thesecommon-lawjurisdictions,the
legalimpositionof sovereigntyconstitutesan apparatusof capturein the
precisesensewhich Deleuzeand Guattari give to this term. The imposi-
tion ofsovereigntyeffectsan instantaneous deterritorialisation
ofindigen-
ous territoriesand their reterritorialisationas a uniform spaceof Crown
land centredupon the figureof the sovereign.
CARROLL, LEWIS (1832-98)- referto the entrieson'art'and 'incor-
poreal'.
(lt'lZANNIi, PAUL (ltl39-1906)- rcfcr to rhc cnrricson 'irrr', 'sclrs:r-
t c:ittcrttlt'.
liort',trtd 'scttsltlioit
L
C H A OS +3
CHAOS
Alberto Toscano
This term canbe saidto receivetwo maintreatmentsin the work of Deleuze
and Guattari,one intra-philosophical,the other non-philosophical.In the
first acceptation,chaos designatesthe type of virtual totality that the
philosophyof differenceopposesto the foundationaland self-referential
totalities proposedby the philosophiesof representation.In polemical
juxtapositionto those systemsof thought that lie beyond the powersof
representation, this Deleuzianchaos,in which all intensivedifferencesare
contained- 'complicated'but not 'explicated'- is equivalentto the onto-
logicallyproductiveaffirmationof the divergenceof series.Put differently,
chaosenvelopsanddistributes,without identifying,the heterogeneities that
makeup the world. In other words,Deleuzianchaosis formlessbut not
undifferentiated.Deleuze thus opposesthis Joyceanand Nietzschean
chaosmos,in which the eternal return selectssimulacrafor their diver-
gence)to the chaosthat Platoattributesto the sophist,which is a privative
chaosof non-participation.Moreover,he considerssucha chaosmos asthe
principal antidoteto the trinity sustainingall philosophiesof representa-
tion and transcendence: world, God and subject(man).
In A Thousand, Plateaus,having moved away from the structuralist-
inspiredterminologyof series(which chaoswasseento affirm), Deleuze
and Guattari provide a critique of both chaosmosand eternal return as
an insufficientbulwark againsta (negative)return of 'the One' and of
representation.Against this they proposethe conceptsof 'rhizome' and
'plane of immanence'.When chaosmakesits reappearancein What is
Philosophy? it is asthe sharedcorrelateof the threedimensionsof thought
(or of the brain), alsodesignatedas chaoids;science,art and philosophy.
In this context,chaosis not definedsimply by the mannerin which it con-
tains (or complicates)differences,but by its infinite speed,such that the
particles,forms and entities that populate it emergeonly to disappear
immediately,leavingbehind no consistency, referenceor any determinate
consequences.
Chaosis thus definednot by its disorderbut by its fugacity.It is then the
taskof philosophy,throughthe drawingof planesof immanence,invention
of conceptualpersonaeand compositionof concepts,to giveconsistency to
chaoswhilst maintainingits speedand productivity.Chaosis thus both the
intimatethreatand the sourceof philosophicalcreation,understoodasthe
impositiononto the virtual of its own typeof consistency, for examplea con-
sistcncyothcrthrn thoscprovidcclby frrnctir)ns or percepts.Phiklsophy can
thusbc tccirstit1tcrtrtsof'iln cthicsof'chiuls,it pitrticularwrtyof'livirrgwith
 +4 CINEM A
chaos- and againstthe sterile clich6sof opinion (doxa)- by creating
conceptualformscapableof sustainingthe infinitespeedof chaoswhilst not
succumbingto the stupidity,thoughtlessness or folly of the indeterminate.
Philosophicalcreationis thus poisedbetween,on the one hand,the subjec-
tion of the planeof immanenceto somevarietyof transcendence that would
guaranteeits uniquenessand, on the other, the surging up of a chaosthat
would dissolveanyconsistency, any durabledifferenceor structure.
Chaosand opinion thus provide the two sourcesof inconsistencyfor
thought, the one determinedby an excessof speed,the other by a surfeit
of redundancy.Though chaosis a vital resourcefor thought,it is alsoclear
that the struggleis twofold through and through, in as much as it is the
inconsistencyor idiocy of a chaotic thought that often grounds the
recourse to the safety and identity of opinions. In the later work with
Guattari it is essentialto the definition of philosophicalpracticeand its
demarcationfrom and interferencewith the other chaoids,that chaosnot
be consideredsimply synonymouswith ontologicalunivocity,but that it is
accordeda suigeneris statusasthe non-philosophicaldimensiondemanded
by philosophicalthought.
Connectives
Plato
Representation
Thought
CINEMA
Constantine Verezsis
Following his work on A ThousandPlateaus,Deleuze'sCinemabooks-
Cinemal: The mooement-image and Cinema2: The tirne-image- under-
stand film as a multiplicity, a phenomenon simultaneouslyoriented
toward a network of reproductive forces, which make it a-signifying
totality (a 'being-One'), and equally toward a network of productiae
forces, that facilitate the connection and creation of an encounter
(a 'becoming-Other').The first interpretation of film finds its clearesr
expressionin two Breatmechanismsof cinematicovercoding- historical
poeticsand textualanalysis- that havedominatedanglophone,academi-
ciscclfilm intcrprctationsincethe mid-1970s.Eachof theseapproaches
turrdcrstrrncls
rcpctitionas a kind of rcdundirncy, one that contril'rutcsto
lhc. huhiluul rccttgttitioltof'tlrc sllnlc: ilr.rindustrirl rcprcscrrtirtiorrirl
C IN E MA 45
model, a symbolic blockage. Within these totalising and homogenising
approaches to film, repetition (redundancy) functions as a principle of
unification, limiting - but never totally arresting - cinema's potentially
active and creative lines of flight. In place of these nomalising - infor-
mational and/ or symbolic - accounts of cinema, another approach devel-
ops an experimental-creative understanding of film in which an attentive
misrecognition abandons representation (and subjectification) to sketch
circuits - and . . . and . . . and - between a series of images. The latter
describes Deleuze's 'crystalline regime', an intensive system which
resists a hierarchical principle of identity in the former present, and
a rule of resemblance in the present present, to establish a communica-
tion betweentwo presents (the former and the present) which co-exist in
relation to a virtual object - the absolutely different. This direct presen-
tation of time - a becoming-in-the-world - brings cinema into a relation
not with an ideal of Truth, but with powers of the false: opening, in the
place of representation, a sensation of the present presence of the
moment, acreative stammering (and . . . and . . . and).
These two critical interpretations of film correspond to, yet cut across'
the separateaspectsof cinema dealt with in each of the Cinema books. In
Cinema 1, Deleuze identifies the classical or 'movement-image' as that
which gives rise to a 'sensory-motor whole' (a unity of movement and its
interval) and grounds narration (representation) in the image. This
movement-image, which relates principally to pre-World War II cinema,
contributes to the realism of the 'action-image', and produces the global
domination of the American cinema. In Cinema 2, Delguze describes a
post-war crisis in the movement-image, a break-up of the sensory-motor
link that gives rise to a new situation - a neo-realism - that is not drawn
out directly into action, but is 'primarily optical and of sound, invested by
the senses'(D 1989: 4). As Deleuze describesit, even though this optical-
sound image implies a beyond of movement, movement does not strictly
stop but is now grasped by way of connections which are no longer
sensory-motor and which bring the sensesinto direct relation with time
and thought. That is, where the movement-image and its sensory-motor
signs are in a relationship only with an indirect image of time, the pure
optical and sound image - its 'opsigns' and 'sonsigns' - are directly con-
nected to a time-im age- a 'chronosign' - that has subordinated movement.
Appealing to Henri Bergson's schemataon time, Deleuze describesa situ-
ation in which the optical-sound perception enters into a relation with
genuinely airtualelements. This is the large circuit of the dream-image
('onirosign'), a type of intensive system in which a virtual image (the
'diffcrcnciittor') bccomes actual not directly, but by actualising a different
i nri tgc,w hi ch it sclf plays t hc r r llc of t hc vir t uit l im agc bcing r t ct ualiscdin
+6 CI NEM A + W ERNER HERZOG
another, and so on. Although the optical-sound image appears to find its
proper equivalent in this infinitely dilated circuit of the dream-image, for
Deleuze the opsign (and sonsign) finds its true genetic element only when
the actual image crystallises with its own virtual image on a small circuit.
The time-image is a direct representation of time, a crystal-imagethat con-
sists in the indivisible unity of an actual image and its own virtual image so
that the two are indiscernible, actual and,virtual at the same time. Deleuze
says:'what we seein the crystal is time itself, a bit of time in the pure state'
(D 1989:82).
In a brief example, Chinatown(1973) is a perfectly realised(neo-
classical)Hollywood genrefilm bur one that exhibitsan ability to exceed
itself. Chinatzwncanbeunderstoodasa representationaland symbolictext
- a detectivefilm and an Oedipaldrama.But its subtlepatterningof rep-
etitions- the motifsof waterand eye- while contributingto the film's nar-
rative economysketch the complementarypanoramicvision of a large
circuitindifferentto the conditionsof meaningand truth. Additionally,the
film's final repetition- a woman'sdeathin Chinatown- brings the detec-
tive Gittes'pastandpresenttogetherwith hallucinatoryexactitudeto form
a smallcircuit in which the virtual correspondsto the actual.The final act
gesturestowardneithera diegeticnor oneirictemporality,but a crystalline
temporality.
Connectives
Crystal
Lines of flight
Time imase
CINEMA + WERNERHERZOG
Alberto Toscano
Deleuze's affinity with WernerHerzog exceedsthe explicit references to
the German filmmaker in the Cinema volumes. Herzog's films and docu-
mentaries of the 1970sare unmatched as contemporary representativesof
a heterodox fidelity to romanticism, separating the latter from its Kantian
presuppositions and Hegelian consequencesin order to discover a dimen-
sion in which materiality and ideality, nature and production, become
irrdisccrniblc.'l'his is thc kincl of romanticism which, in the referenceto
lf rrclrrrcrirt thc vcry ot.ltscrt
ol' ,'lnti-Octlipus,is a progcrritorof thc schiz<l-
r t t t r t lvitl ' s liln(' c .
C IN E MA * WNRNER H E R ZOG +7
This thinking of the impersonal, of an earth beyond man, is given
remarkable,albeit divergent expression in films such as Fitzcarraldo (1982)
or Stroszek(1977), where it is accompaniedby the depiction of figures that
approximate what Deleuze called structuralist heroes: pure individuals or
larval subjects capableof sustaining their habitation by pre-individual sin-
gularities and deformation by spatio-temporal dynamisms, attaining a point
of non-distinction between man and nature. Herzog immerses the viewer
in the (micro- and macro-) cosmosof sensationborne by beings of remark-
able fragility (akin to Bartleby) and great hallucinating, doomed visionar-
ies.The cinematic ideasextracted from the work of Herzog intervene at two
very significant moments in Deleuze's confrontation with cinema, first in
terms of the large form and the small form of the action-image in Cinerna
1, then in Cinema2 with the momentous introduction of the crystal image.
Herzog's 'action films' provide two extreme realisationsof those cinematic
schematapreoccupied with the transformative interaction of action and sit-
uation. In the idea (or vision) of the large form (SAS'), a situation (S) poses
a problem to a character requiring an action (A) whereby the initial situ-
ation (and the character herself) will be transformed (S'). Herzog's varia-
tion on this schemaentails the staging of actions whose delirium is to try to
transform situations that does not make any such requirement on the char-
acter. These are in turn split between a sublime or hallucinatory aspectthat
seeksto equal an unlimited nature, and a heroic or hypnotic one, which tries
to confront, through an excessiveproject, the limits imposed by nature.
What Deleuze isolatesin Herzog is thus a pure idea of the large, staged
as a mad attempt to delve into the abyssof nature by linking man and land-
scapein the creation of a sublime situation. While Herzog operateson the
large form by excess,making the two situations (S and S') incommensur-
able, he transforms the small form (ASA ) by weakening it to the extreme,
such that the actions and the characters bearing them are stripped oftheir
use, reduced to entirely inoperative and defencelessintensities (whether in
Kinski's foetal figure in Nosferatu (1979) or in the films starring the schiz-
ophrenic actor Bruno S.). Sublimity and a kind of bare life are the meta-
physical foci of Herzog's implementation of the action image, which
reaches its most accomplished moments precisely when it stages their
reversibility (the sublimity of bare life in Kaspar Hauser (1975), the desti-
tution of visionary greatnessin Aguirre (1972)).
The metaphysical import of Herzog's work is even more prominent in
Cinema 2, where he is accorded the rare praise of having best realised the
crystal image: the smallest possible circuit joining, in a kind of perpetual
oscillation irnd indiscernibility, the actual and the virtual. This point of
irrdisccrnibility signrrls il purc cxpcriencc of timc (indisccrnible from
ctcrni t.y) i rrr d ol' c: r cr r t ion( indiscclr r iblc lir r r r t lhc int p: t ssivc) .I I cr z. og's
 48 CO G I TO
Heart of Glass(1976) is the key locus for the cinematic manifestation of
this exquisitelymetaphysicaltype of image.Following on from an intu-
ition of Gilbert Simondon,Deleuzeunderstandsthis film in terms of the
relation betweena germ capableof crystallisationand a milieu of appli-
cation which is qualified as actually amorphous.But this amorphous-
nessis not that of a mere prime matter,sincefrom anotherperspectiveit
is a virtually differentiatedstructure; and the germ, initially qualified a
virtual image,is understoodasactual.Thus, thoughactualand virtual are
ultimately indiscernible,they can be distinguishedby the perspecive
taken on the relation at hand (for example germ/milieu). Heart of Glass
is, in Deleuze'seyes,a kind of alchemicaladventure,haunted by the
uncertainty of the crystal, in which what is at stake is the encounter
betweenthe red crystalglassand the world, suchthat the former canpass
from virtual to actualimageand effectthe passageof the latter from actual
amorphousnessto virtual and infinite differentiation. We can thus see
how the crystalimageis not simply a matter of a certainkind of intuition,
but involvesthe construction of scenarioswith their own very special
kinds of actions, revealing Herzog's genius for joining the most
deprived and infinitesimal of creatures with the most cosmic and
grandioseof projects,an inspiration that can perhapsbe tracked else-
where in Deleuze'soeuvre.
COGITO
James Williams
Deleuze'scritical approachto the cogito of Ren6Descartes;the 'I think,
thereforeI am' from the Discourse onMethodor the 'I think, I am' from the
Meditations,can be divided into a critique of the Cartesiananalytic
method, a critique of the self-evidenceof the cogitoand an extensionof
the Cartesianview of the subject.
Descartes'foundationalmethod is the rationalist construction of a
systemof analytictruths. That is, he believesthat certainpropositionsare
true independentlyof any others and that thereforethey can stand as a
ground for the deductionof further truths accordingto reason.Deleuze's
synthetic and dialectical method, developedin Dffirence and,Repetition,
dependson the view that all knowledgeis partial and opento revision.
Thus, any relativetruth is open to extensionthrough syntheseswith
further discoveriesand through further experiments.The relation
bctwccnthcsctruths is dialectical rathcrthananalytical and foundational,
'fhcrc is r rcciprtrcirlproccssof rcvisionand changcbctwccnthcm, as
t"
C OGITO 49
opposedto Cartesianmovesfrom secureand inviolable basesout into the
unknown.Where Descartessituatesreasonat the heart of his method,as
shownby the role of thinking in the cogito,Deleuzeemphasises sensation.
Sensationis resistantto identity in representation.Thought must be
responsiveto sensationsthat go beyond its capacityto representthem.
Thesepoint to a realmof virtual conditionsdefinedasintensitiesand Ideas
(the capitalindicatesthat thesearenot ideasto be thought of asernpirical
things in the mind, rather they are like Kantian Ideasof reason).
Deleuzeholdsthat no thought is freeof sensation.The cogitocannotbe
self-evident,becausesensationalwaysextendsto a multiplicity of further
conditionsand causes. The Cartesianhope of defeatingsystematicdoubt
through the certaintyof the cogitomust thereforefail. Deleuzeoften turns
to dramatisationsfrom art, literature and cinemato convinceus of the
insufficiency of the cogito. Wherever we presume to have found pure
thought,or pure representations, the expressivityofthe artspointsto sen-
sationsand deeperldeas.
A thought, such as the cogito,is thereforeinseparablefrom sensations
that themselves bring a seriesof intensitiesandIdeasto bearon the subject.
The 'I' is thereforenot independentbut carriesall intensitiesand all Ideas
with it. These are related to any singularthought in the way it implies
differentarrangements of intensitiesand differentrelationsof clarity and
obscuritybetweenIdeas.
You do not think without feeling.Feelingdefinesyou as an individual.
That singulardefinition brings someintensitiesto the fore while hiding
others(morehating,lessanger,greatercaring,lessjealousy).In turn, these
intensitieslight up Ideas in different ways making somerelationsmore
obscureand others more distinct (The Idea of love for humanity took
centre stage,after their sacrifice).
The subjectis thereforeextendedthrough the sensationsof singular
individualsinto virtual intensitiesand Ideas.Unlike the Cartesiancogito,
which is positedon the activity of the thinking subject,Deleuze'sindi-
vidual has an all-important passiveside.We cannot directly chooseour
sensations, we are thereforepassivewith respectto our virtual 'dark pre-
cursorst.
Deleuze'sphilosophydependson Descartes'rationalistcritics,notably
BaruchSpinoza,for the syntheticmethodandfor the oppositionto the free
activity of the subject, and Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz, for the
extensionof the subjector monad to the whole of reality.Deleuzeis not
simply anti-Cartesian;rather, he extendsthe activesubjectthrough pas-
sivity and through the conditionsfor sensation.The cogitois an important
moment in philosophy,but it requirescompletingthrough synthesesthat
bclic its indcpcndcncc,
 50 CO NCEPTS
Connectives
Kant
Sensation
CONCEPTS
CliffStagoll
Deleuzeunderstandsphilosophyas being the art of inventingor creating
concepts,or putting conceptsto work in new ways.He doesnot considerit
to be very useful or productive,however,when it createsand usesconceprs
in themannerthathethinkshastypifiedmuchof westernphilosophyto date.
Too often, Deleuzeargues,philosophyhas used real experiencemerely as
a sourcefor extractingor deducingabstractconceptualmeansfor categoris-
ing phenomena. [t hastendedthen to employthesesameconceptseitherto
determineor expressthe essence of phenomena,or elseto order and rank
them in termsof the concept.An exampleis Plato'sconceptof Forms,the
absoluteand changeless objectsand standardsof knowledgeagainstwhich
all humanknowledgeis but an inferior copy.Sucha conceptdoesnot help
us appreciateor contributeto the richnessof lived experience,Deleuze
argues,but only to order,labelandmeasureindividualsrelativeto anabstract
norm. It is true, he argues,that conceptshelp us in our everydaylives to
organiseand representour thoughtsto others,makingcommunicationand
opinion-formationsimpler; but Deleuzeinsists such simplicity detracts
from the varietyand uniqueness evidentin our experiencesof the world.
For Deleuzeand Guattari, conceptsought to be meansby which we
movebeyondwhat we experienceso that we canthink of new possibilities.
Ratherthan bringing things rogetherunder a concept,he is interestedin
relatingvariablesaccordingto newconceptssoasto createproductivecon-
nections.Conceptsought to expressstatesof affairsin terms of the con-
tingent circumstances and dynamicsthat leadto and follow from them, so
that eachconceptis relatedto particularvariablesthat changeor ,mutate'
it. A conceptis createdor thought anew in relation to every particular
event,insight, experienceor problem,therebyincorporatinga notion of
the contingencyof the circumstances of eachevent.On sucha view,con-
ceptscannotbe thoughtapartfrom the circumstances of their production,
and so cannotbe hypotheticalor conceiveda priori.
l)clcuzc'stheoryof conceptsis part of a potentcriticismof much phil-
osophyto drrtc.Hc is arguingthilt iuryphikrsophyfrrilingto rcspcctthc par-
tictrlitlilyol' coltsc-iottsncss
irr lirvoulol' broirdcorrccpluirlskctchcsis
C ON C E P TS 51
subject to metaphysicalillusion. The application of abstractconcepts
merely gatherstogether discrete particulars despitetheir differences,and
privilegesconceptsover what is supposedto be explained.For example,
one might understandthings as instancesof Being or usefulness,thereby
presupposingan ontologicalor epistemological privilegefor the conceptof
'Being' or 'utility' that is not evidentin immediateexperience.By bearing
in mind that the conceptat work relatesjust to this being or this useful
thing, hereand now,suchillusionsareavoided.
In Deleuze'swork, conceptsbecomethe meansby which we move
beyond experienceso as to be able to think anew.Rather than 'standing
apart' from experience,a concept is defined just by the unity that it
expresses amongstheterogeneous elements.In other words,conceptsmust
be creativeor activerather than merelyrepresentative, descriptiveor sim-
plifying. For this reason,in his work on David Hume, Deleuzegoesto
somelengthsto showhow causationis a truly creativeconceptby explain-
ing how it brings us to expectand anticipateoutcomesbeforethey occur,
and evenoutcomesthat we don't observeat all. In suchcases,anticipatory
creationis so powerfulthat it becomesa normal part of life, and causation
is a conceptthat representsthe creationof other conceptswithout the
requirementfor senseperceptionsto ground them.
Moving from a reiterativehistory of philosophyto the practiceof philo-
sophymeansengagingwith inherited conceptsin new ways.This means
for Deleuzethat philosophersought to engagein new linesof thinking and
new connectionsbetweenparticularideas,argumentsand fieldsof special-
isation.Only then doesphilosophytakeon a positivepower to transform
our waysof thinking. In his own work, Deleuzereappropriates numerous
conceptsinheritedfrom the greatphilosophersof the pastin termsof new
problems,uses,terms and theories.Henri Bergson'sconceptsof duration
and intuition, Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz's monad,Hume's associa-
tionism, and numerousconceptsfrom literature,film, criticism, science
and evenmathematicsare reworkedand put to work in new and creative
ways. The apparent inconsistencyof their meaningsand uses,whilst
a challengefor his reader,is a sign of Deleuze'srefusalto giveany concept
a single purpose or referent. By cutting routinely acrossdisciplinary
boundaries,Deleuzeabidesby his proposalthat concept-creationbe an
'open ended'exercise,such that philosophycreatesconceptsthat are as
accessible and usefulto artistsand scientistsasto philosophers.
Connectives
llcrgson
|)urrtion
52 CO NCEPTS + U T OPIA
Hume
Plato
CONCEPTS + UTOPIA
EugeneHolland,
The centralactivityof philosophyfor Deleuzeis the creationof concepts,
and it is an activity forcedupon rather than initiated by the philosopher.
What is it that befallsphilosophersthat forcesthem to think?In the course
of his career,Deleuzehasgiventhreekindsof answerto this question.In his
early works,it is paradoxthat provokesthought; here,the provocationto
thoughtis internalto thoughtitself.In the latercollaborations with Guattari
(and perhapsbecauseof that collaboration),the locus of the stimulusto
thought shifts steadilyoutsideof thought, and eventuallyevenoutsideof
philosophy.The secondkind of provocationconsistsof topicsor problems
within philosophy(no longerlimited to logicalcontradictionsor paradoxes)
that, in the estimationof a creativephilosopher, havebeenpoorlyconceived
and hencedemandto be reconceived. The third kind of provocationarises
from the connectionbetweenphilosophy and its socio-historicalcontext;
herethe problemsare not strictly speakingor originallyphilosophical,but
theynonetheless provokephilosophical thoughtto furnishsolutionstq or at
leastnewand improvedarticulationsof, thoseproblems- solutionsor artic-
ulationsthat areindeedphilosophical. Here,philosophydoesnot respondto
problemsof its own', but to problemspresentedto it or forcedupon it by
its real-worldmilieu. And it is this kind of connection,betweenphilosophy
and socio-historical context that Deleuzeand Guattari will call utopian:
'utopiais what links philosophywith its own epoch'(D&G 1994:99).
One of Deleuzeand Guattari'smain concernsis to distinguisha prop-
erly philosophicalrelationbetweenconceptand context from the better-
known scientific(or socialscientific)relation basedon 'representation'.
Unlike the socialand natural sciences,philosophyis creative,servingas
a kind of relaybetweenone practicalorientationto the world and another,
new and improvedone.Philosophyrespondsto problemsthat arisewhen
a givenmodeof existenceor practicalorientationno longersuffices.Such
problemsarerealenough,but they arenot reducibleto reality.The purpose
of philosophyis not to representthe world, but to createconcepts,and
thcscconccptsservenot to replicateaccuratelyin discoursespecificseg-
rrcntsof thc w<lrklrrsit rc:rllyis (m scicnccckrcs), but to proposcarticula-
tions ol'itttd/rlr soltttiorrsto problclns,to oll'cr rrcw ancl clill'crcnt
pcrsgtcctivcs ortrlricrrlrlions
l()wilr(lllrc wrlrlcl,
C ON TR OL SOC IETY 53
So the connectionbetweenphilosophyand its socio-historicalmilieu is
essentiallydiagnosticratherthan representative-scientific.Sciencesaim to
graspstatesof affairsasthey are;the point is to get reality right, to settle
on a correctunderstandingof the world. Philosophyaimsneverto settle,
but on the contraryalwaysto unsettleand to transformour understanding
of certainproblems,becausethey arethought to havebeenbadly posed,or
not posedat all, by previousthinkers,and/or becausethe problemsarehis-
toricallynew or havechangedso radicallyover time asto renderprevious
responses inadequate.HenceDeleuzeand Guattari insist that philosophy
for them 'doesnot consistin knowingand is not inspiredby truth. Rather
it is categorieslike Interesting,Remarkable,or Important that determine
[its] successor failure' (D&G 1994:82).The creationof conceptsis thus
cruciallyselectiveaswell as(or aspart ofbeing) diagnostic,and in extract-
ing a philosophicalconceptfrom a historicalstateofaffairs, philosophical
thoughtidentifiescertainaspectsof that stateof affairsasproblemsrequir-
ing new solutions.The utopianvocationof concept-creation thus consists
in proposingsolutionsto the pressingproblemsof the time; in this way,
philosophybecomespoliticaland 'takesthe criticismof its own time to the
highest level' (D&G 1994:99).
CONTROL SOCIETY
John Marks
Deleuzedevelopshis notion of the 'control society'at the beginningof the
1990s.In the 1970sMichel Foucaultshowedhow, during the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries, a d,isciplinarysociety had developedthat was
based on strategiesof confinement.As Deleuze points out, Foucault
carriedout this historicalwork in order to showwhat we had inheritedof
the disciplinarymodel,and not simply in orderto claim that contemporary
societyis disciplinary.This is the senseof the actualin Foucault'swork, in
the senseof what we are in the processof differing from. Deleuzeuses
Foucault'sinsightsasa startingpoint to claim that we aremoving towards
controlsocietiesin which confinementis no longerthe main strategy.
Deleuze reminds us that disciplinary societiessucceeded'sovereign'
societies,and that they concentratedon the organisationof life and pro-
duction rather than the exerciseof arbitrary entitlementsin relation to
thesetwo domains.Disciplinarysocietiesdevelopeda networkof sitesand
institutions - prisons,hospitals,factories,schools,the family - within
which indiviclualswcrc locatcd, traincd ancl/<lrpunishcclrt vlrious
tinrcsirrthcir lifc. Irr this wiry,thc figurcof'thc'po;rtrlirtior.r'cnrcrgcs
irsan
54 CO NTRO L SO CIE T Y C ON TR OL SOC IETY * STETE TH EOR Y 55

observable,measurableobject, which is susceptibleto various forms of The critiqueof contemporarysocietiesthat the notion of controlsociety
manipulation.Essentially, the disciplinarysystemis one of contiguity:the entailsmight in somewaysbe unexpectedin Deleuze'swork, giventhat it
individual movesfrom site to site,beginningagaineachtime. In contrast sometimeslooks like a conventionaldefenceof the individual threatened
to this, societiesof control - which emerge particularly after World by the alienatingforcesof globalcapitalism.One might expectDeleuzeto
War II - are continuousin form. The variousforms of control constitute be in favourof a movetowardssocietieswhich do awaywith the constraints
a network of inseparablevariations.The individual, in a disciplinary of individuality.However,it is the preciseway in which control societies
society,is placedin various'moulds' at differenttimes,whereasthe indi- dismantlethe individual that alarms Deleuze.Rather than encouraging
vidual in a contemporarycontrol societyis in a constantstateof mod,ula- a real socialengagementwith the pre-personal,they turn the individual
tion. Deleuze uses as an examplethe world of work and production. into an objectthat hasno resistance, no capacityto 'fold' the line of mod-
The factory functioned accordingto somesort of equilibrium betweenthe ulation.Although the Body without Organslacksthe discreteness of what
highest possibleproduction and the lowest possiblewages.Just as the we conventionallyknow asan individual that is not to sayit doesnot have
worker was a componentin a regulatedsystemof massproduction, so resistance.On the contrary,it is a zoneof intensity.It may be traversedby
unions could mobilisemassresistance.In control societies,on the other forces,but it is not simply a relay for those forces.
hand,the dominantmodel is that of the business,in which it is more fre-
quently the task of the individual to engagein forms of competitionand
Connectives
continuingeducationin order to attain a certainlevelof salary.There is a
deeperlevel of modulation, a constantvariation, in the wagespaid to Body without Organs
workers.In generalterms) the duality of massand individual is being Fold
brokendown.The individualis becominga'dividual',whilst the massis Foucault
reconfiguredin terms of data,samplesand markets.Whereasdisciplinary Intensity
individualsproducedquantifiableand discreteamountsof energy,'divid-
uals' are caught up in a processof constantmodulation.In the caseof
medicine,which claimsto be movingtowardsa system'withoutdoctorsor
CONTROL SOCIETY + STATE THEORY
patients',this meansthat the figurein the individualis replacedby a divid-
ual segmentof codedmatter to be controlled.
Kenneth Surin
Although he is in no way suggestingthat we shouldreturn to disciplin-
ary institutions, Deleuze clearly finds the prospectof the new control In his shortbut prescientessay'Postscript on ControlSocieties'Deleuze says
societyalarming.In the domainsof prison,education,hospitalsand busi- that in the ageof the societies (as
of control opposedto the disciplinary soci-
ness,the old institutionsare breakingdown and, althoughthesechanges etiesof the previousepochfamouslyanalysedby Michel Foucault),capital
may be presentedasbeingmore closelytailored to the needsof individuals, hasbecomea vast'internationalecumenicalorganisation'that is ableto har-
Deleuzeseeslittle more than a new systemof domination.It may evenbe moniseinto a singleoverarchingassemblage eventhe most disparateforms
the case,he suggests, that we may cometo view the harshconfinementsof (commercial,religious,artistic,and so forth) and entities.In this new dis-
disciplinarysocietieswith somenostalgia.One reasonfor this is obviously pensation,productivelabour,dominatednow by the myriad forms of intel-
that techniquesof control threatento be isolatingand individualising. lectuallabourandserviceprovision,hasexpandedto covereverysegmentof
We may regret the lossof previoussolidarities.Another reasonwould be society:the exponentiallyextendedscopeof capitalis coterminouswith the
that we areconstantlycoercedinto forms of 'communication'.This means constantavailabilityof everythingthat createssurplus-value. Human con-
that we aredeniedthe privilegeof havingnothing to say,of cultivatingthe sciousness, leisure,play,andsoon, areno longerleft to'private' domainsbut
particularkind of creativesolitudethat Deleuzevalues.It appearsthat we areinsteaddirectlyencompassed by the latestregimesof accumulation. The
will incrcasinglylack a spacefor creative'resistance'.He suggeststhat the boundarybetweenhome and workplacebecomesincreasinglyblurred, as
movc towarclscontinuous:lsscssmcnt in schoolsis bcing cxtendedto doesthe demrrcationbetween'regular'work and'casual'labour.Capitalism
socictyirt gcncral,with thc cll'cctthat muchof lif'ctrrkcson thc tcxturc<lf bccomcsinfilrmrrliscd, cvcnasit bccomcsubiquitous.()apitalism's teloshx
llrc Hnrncslrowor lhc nrrrrkclirrg
sc,rnirrirr'. irlwnys irrvolvcd of irnccon<lmic
thccrcirti<ln oldcrthrt will bclrlllcto dispcnsc
 56 CO NTRO L SO CI ETY + STATE THEORY
with the State,and in its current phasethis teloshasbecomemore palpably
visible.WhereDeleuzeis concerned,this development doesnot requirethe
Stateandits appurtenances to beabolished. Rather,thetraditionalseparation
betweenStateandsocietyis nowno longersustainable. SocietyandStatenow
form one all-embracing matrix, in which all capitalhasbecometranslatable
into socialcapital,and so the productionof socialcooperation,undertaken
primarily by the serviceand informationalindustriesin the advanced
economies,hasbecomea crucial one for capitalism.
This needto maintainconstantcontrol overthe forms of socialcooper-
ation in turn requiresthat education,training, business,never end: the
businesstime-scaleis now '2+/7'so that the Tokyo stockexchangeopens
when the one in New York closes,in an unendingcycle;training is'on the
job' as opposedto being basedon the traditional apprenticeshipmodel
(itself a holdover from feudalism); and education becomes'continuing
education', that is, something that continues throughout life, and is not
confined to those aged six to twenry-rwo. This essentially dispersive
propensity is reflected in the present regime of capitalist accumulation,
whereproduction is now meta-production,that is, no longer focusedin the
advancedeconomieson the useof raw materialsto producefinished goods,
but rather the sale of services(especiallyin the domain of finance and
credit) and already finished products. Social control is no longer left to
schoolsand police forces,but is now a branch of marketing, asevenpolit-
ics hasbecome'retail politics', in which politicians seekdesperatelyfor an
imageof themselvesto market to the electorate,and when public relations
consultants are more important to prime ministers and presidentsthan
goodand wisecivil servants.Recording,whetherin administration or busi-
ness,is no longer basedon the written document kept in the appropriate
box of files, but on bar-codingand other forms of electronictagging.
The implicationsof the above-mentioned developments for statetheory
are momentous. The state itself has become fragmented and compart-
mentalised,and has accruedmore power to itself in somesphereswhile
totally relinquishingpowerin others.However,if the Statehasmutatedin
the era of control societies,it retainsthe function of regulating,in con-
junction with capital,the 'accords'thatchannelsocialand politicalpower.
In his book on Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz, Deleuzemaintainsthat
stateand non-stateformationsare constitutedon the basisof such 'con-
certs' or 'accords'.These 'accords'are organisingprincipleswhich make
possiblethe grouping into particular configurationsof whole rangesof
events,personages, processes, institutions,movements)and so forth, such
that the resultingconfigurationsbecomeintegratedformations.As a setof
rtcc<lrds rlr axiomsgovcrningthe accords thatrcgulatcthc opcrations of the
vnriouscomponcnts of ln immcnsclypowcrfhlnndcomprchcnsivc systcm
L
C R EATIVE TR AN SFOR M ATION 57
of accumulation,capital is situatedat the crossing-pointof all kinds of
formations,and thus hasthe capacityto integrateand recomposecapital-
ist and non-capitalistsectorsor modesof production.Capital,the 'accord
of accords'par excellence, can bring togetherheterogeneous phenomena,
and makethem expressthe sameworld, that of capitalistaccumulation.
Accordsareconstitutedby selectioncriteria,which specifywhat is to be
includedor excludedby the termsof the accordin question.Thesecriteria
also determinewith which other possibleor actual accordsa particular
accord will be consonant(or dissonant).The criteria that constitute
accordsare usually defined and describedby narratives governed by
a certainnormativevision of truth, goodnessand beauty(reminiscentof
the so-calledmediaevaltranscendentals,albeit translatedwhere necessary
into the appropriate contemporary vernacular).A lessportentous way of
making this point would be to say that accordsare inherently axiological,
value-laden.What seemsto be happening today, and this is a generalisa-
tion that is tendentious, is that these superimposednarratives and the
selectioncriteria they sanction,criteria which may or may not be explicitly
formulated or entertained, are being weakenedor qualified in ways that
deprive them of their force. Such selectioncriteria, policed by the State,
tend to function by assigningprivileges of rank and order to the objects
they subsume ('Le Pen is more French than Zidane', 'Turks are not
Europeans',and so on), asthe lossor attenuationof the customaryforce of
such accords makes dissonancesand contradictions difficult or even
impossibleto resolve,and, correlatively,makesdivergenceseasierto affirm.
Events, objects and personagescan now be assignedto severaldivergent
and even incompossibleseries.The functioning of capital in the control
societiesrequiresthat the Statebecomeinternally pluralised.
CREATIVE TRANSFORMATION
Ad,rian Parr
In developingthe idea of 'creative transformation' Deleuze draws on
a variety of philosophicalsources.Initially in his work on Henri Bergson
he picks up on the philosopher'sconceptof 'creativeevolution'and 'dur-
ation', revampingthesein Dffirence and,Repetitioninto a discussionof the
productiveunderstandingof repetition,all the while embracinga concept
of differencethat beliesthe negativestructureof a 'differenceto or from'
in favourof 'differencein itself'. Keen to expandupon the generativeand
dynamicimplicationsof Bergsoniancreativeevolutionhe turns to Baruch
Spinoza'sEthic's,in particularthe conceptionof bodiesthat Bergsonand
58 CREATI VE TRANSFO R M A T I O N
Spinozashare:a body is constitutedon an immanent plane. The next
philosophicalinfluencein Deleuze'suseof creativetransformationwould
haveto be Friedrich Nietzsche'sconceptof the 'eternalreturn'. Then, in
his collaborationwith Guattari, creative transformation takes a turn
through biophilosophy,bypassingboth the human condition and teleo-
logical theoriesof evolution characteristicof Jean-BaptisteLamarck in
favourof a transhumantheoryof heredity.
The questionof 'life', namelythe force that persistsover time and the
changesthat ensue,is addressedby Deleuzeasan experimental,spontan-
eous, and open processof transformation. As it was articulated in
Dffirence and Repetitiozl, evolutionis construedasa processof repetition
that is inherently creative:it is productiveof difference.In the handsof
Deleuze(remember,like Michel Foucault,conceptsaretools for Deleuze),
creativetransformationbecomesa systemof involutionwheretransversal
movementsengagematerialforcesand affects.
In both his 1956 essayon Bergson and his 1966 book Bergsontsm
(D 1988a)Deleuzeutilisesthe idea of 'evolution'proposedby Bergsonin
terms of transmission.Expandingon this a little more,Deleuzeshiftsthe
focusof inheritanceawayfrom determinationandthe continuance of a fixed
essence that is passedon overtime.Like Bergson,Deleuzechooses to bring
to our attentionthe creativedimensioninherentin evolution.It is the force
of life that persists,thus,through change,the vitality of life and difference
are affirmed.Accordingto this schemacreativetransformationis imma-
nent, taking placeon a planeof consistencythat precedesunivocalBeing.
In BergsonDeleuzefindsthe possibilityfor a philosophythat graspslife in
termsof durationandthe inhuman.The temporalityof durationis not con-
ceivedof chronologically,wherebythe end of onemomentmarksthe begin-
ning of the next; nor is it a measurabletime, that is broken down into
seconds,minutes,hours,days,months,or years.Put differently,Deleuzian
durationneedsto be construedasthe flow of time; it is intensiveasmuchas
it is creativein so far as it is the movementof time that marks the force of
life. Hence,durationmaintainslife in an openstateof indeterminacy.
The theory of creativeinheritanceand the emphasisplacedon non-
organiclife is then given a makeoverand turned into the conceptof the
'rhizome' in his collaboration with Guattari. Early on in A Thousand,
PlateausDeleuze and Guattaricharacterise a rhizomeasindeterminateand
experimental.Steeringthe emphasisawayfrom representational interpret-
ative frameworks,they clearly state that a rhizome is a map not a trace.
Explaining this distinction they write that what 'distinguishesthe map
from thc tracingis that it is entirelyorientedtowardan experimentationin
contlrctwith thc rcal' (D&G 1987:12).'l'hc rhizomcis conccivcclof asan
o;rcnnrultiplicity,rrndrrlllifb is r rlrizonrlticnrrxlco1'clungcwithoutfirm
C R Y S TA L 59
and fixed boundariesthat proceeds'from the middle, through the middle,
comingand goingratherthan startingand finishing'(D&G 1987:25).It is,
however,importantto notethat their useof 'open' hereis not conceivedof
negatively,which is to sayit is not the antithesisof being 'closed';rather,
the machinic character of a rhizome arises out of the virtual and the
dynamicboundariesthat constituteit.
In A Thousand, Plateausthe force of life is describedby Deleuze and
Guattari asinherently innovative and social.Inheritance is not articulated
within an essentialistframeworkthat placesthe emphasison species,genes
andorganisms,because Deleuzeand Guattarirecognisethat it is the power
of affect that is creative- to produce affectsand being open to being
affected.Here creativity is taken to be a machinic mode of evolution that
is productivein and of itself. The whole question of transformationis
clearlysituatedby both Deleuzeand Guattari in an experimentalmilieu
and the creativityof this milieu is necessarily
social.
Connectives
Bergson
Difference
Representation
Spinoza
CRYSTAL
Felicitjt J. Colm.an
The multifacetednatureof a geologicallyproducedcrystalform fascinated
Deleuze.Initially he co-joinsexistingscientificand artisticconceptionsof
the formal properties and concepts of a crystal to work through the
Platonic conceptionof a real image and its counterpoint:virtual image.
The crystalthen becomesa conceptthat Deleuzemethodologicallyusesin
his considerationof thought, time and differencesin becoming.The
conceptof the 'crystal' is engagedby Deleuzein his book Cinerna2: The
Time-Image asthe'crystallinesign'or'hyalosign',the'crystal-image',and
the 'crystallinestate'.Thesevaryingconceptsareenmeshedwith the idea
that the figure of the crystal is representativeof specificstatesof tempora-
lity, as discerned through images.The crystal is configured through
Deleuze'samalgamationof writers, philosophersand filmmakerswhose
workscrcatcdfigurcsof time-spacc.T'hescincludeHenri Bcrgson'svital-
ism; Mauricc Mcrlclu-Ponty'scxpcrimcntswith thc lrticulirtionof' thc
60 CRYSTAL
perceptionof things; Friedrich Niezsche's suspicionof linguistic phe-
nomenology; Gaston Bachelard'sstudy of reciprocal, affective imagery;
and Alain Robbe-Grillet and Alain Resnais'play with socialfolds of time,
contextand form.
Deleuzedescribesa crystallinestructureas a processand placeof the
'exchange'thatis enactedbetweenthe actualand virtual (D 1989:69).This
processis from Bergson'sconceptof'reflective perception',describedin
his 1896bookMatter and.Memory (B 1994:105)that Deleuzereworksin
his second book on cinema: The Time-Irnage(D 1989: 289). Deleuze
describesthat the exchangestructureof virtual-actualrelationsmeansthat
the crystal-image is an amalgamatedform of virtual and actual in its
various stagestoward infinity. In The Time-Image,where examplesof the
crystal-imageand the conceptof 'crystallinenarration' are discussedat
length, Deleuzeequatesthe crystallinestructureof the cinemawith the
nature of its self-reflexivity and the temporal medium. A crystal-image
involves a multilayered and infinite register of montaged 'realities'. As
Deleuzedescribesit, cinema'stechniqueof acknowledgement and exper-
imentationwith the crystal-image's medium achieves divergentmodalities
of the image. Dependent upon the component layers of time-space
montage,the resultant crystal-imagein turn producesan external repre-
sentationof an imageof thought.The crystalis thusa philosophicalmech-
anism that is illustrative of concept production, and in relation to the
image,the crystalconceptis the productionand apprehensionof time.
In TheTime-Image,Deleuze describesa threefoldsystemfor the crystal's
variationsof past-present-futuretime. This systemis from St Augustine's
understandingof temporalrelations,and Deleuzeutilisesit to describean
image'sconfigurationof a memory,or recollectionof an event.Together
with the Bergsonianconceptof time as a 'thought-image',Augustine's
system enablesDeleuze to discuss the crystal-image as a modality of
knowing time and its possibleconstitution. Over time, the effectsof time
alter the molecularstructureof things (includingcinematicinformation),
and the crystal-imageis employedby Deleuzeto encompass vastshifts in
meaningcausedthrough the exchangesbetweenpast, presentand future
images,in their variousstatesof virtual and real.Through thesethree vari-
ationsof the crystal-image, Deleuzedescribesthe cognitiveand physical
apprehension of time asperceptual'affectation'and 'modification'.
Configuringthe crystalasa temporalconceptwith affectiveproperties
enablesDeleuze to addressthe associatedimplications for relationships
generatedby movement,time, memory, perception and affect - each
within a particular circuit of meaning,medium or surround. Deleuze's
'crystal' sccks to dcscribc a cognitivc processwhcrcby the temporal
rcgistrltiono1'fhcmovcnrcrrts irnd firrnrsof lffcct lrc cxprcsscd,
and put
D EATH 6T
into effect. Affection may not be instantaneous;affectiveexperiencesmay
be delayedin their consciousor corporeal acknowledgement,perception
and utilisation. The crystal'sspecificstatesof formation, mutation and
transformationarethus effectsof differentprocesses of time.
Connectives
Actuality
Affect
Bergson
Time-image
Virtual/Virtuality
DEATH
Bruce Baugh
Death is many things: a state of affairs,when a body's parts, through
external causes,enter into a relation that is incompatiblewith that body's
continued existence;an impersonal event of dying, expressedthrough an
infinitive verb (mourir,to die); the experienceof zero 'intensity' that is
implicit in a body's feelingor experienceof an increaseor decreasein its
forceof existence;a 'model' of immobility and of energythat is not organ-
isedand put to work; and finally the 'deathinstinct', capitalism'sdestruc-
tion of surplusvaluethrough war,unempleyment,famineand disease.
A body existswhen its parts composea relationthat expresses the sin-
gular forceof existenceor 'essence'of that body,and ceases to be when its
parts are determined by outside causesto enter into a relation that is
incompatiblewith its own. Death in this sensealwayscomesfrom outside
and assuchis both fortuitousand inevitable:it is the necessary and deter-
mined resultof a body'schanceencounterswith otherbodies,governedby
purely mechanicallawsof causeand effect.Sinceeverybody interactswith
other bodies,it is inevitablethat at somepoint it will encounterbodiesthat
'decompose'the vital relation of its parts,and causethoseparts to enter
into new relations,characteristicof other bodies.
Dcath, as thc dccompositionof a body's characteristicrclation, forms
thc brrsisof thc pcrsonal:rndprcscntclcathof thc Sclf or cgo.'lir thisclcath,
62 DEATH
asfoundedin the personalself and the body,Deleuzecontraststhe 'event'
of dying, which is impersonaland incorporeal,expressedin the infinitive
verb 'to die' and in the predicatemortal. Dying is not a processthat takes
placein things,nor is 'mortal' a quality that inheresin things or subjects.
Rather,the verb and the predicateexpressmeaningsthat extendover the
past and future, but which are never physicallypresentin bodies and
things,eventhoughthe deathof a body effectuates or actualises this dying.
In impersonaldying,'one'dies,but oneneverceases or finishesdying.The
deathof the Self or 'I' is when it ceases to die and is actuallydead:when
its vital relationsaredecomposed, and its essence or powerof existenceis
reducedto zerointensity.Yet,at this very instant,impersonal dying makes
deathloseitself in itself,asthe decompositionof one living body is simul-
taneouslythe compositionof a new singularlife, the subsumptionof the
deadbody'sparts under a new relation.
During its existence, bodiesexperienceincreases or diminutionsof their
poweror forceof existing.Other bodiescancombinewith a body either in
a way that agreeswith the body's constitutiverelation,that resultsin an
increasein the body'spowerfelt asjoy,or in a waythat is incompatiblewith
that relation,resultingin a diminution of power felt as sadness. Poweris
physicalenergy,a degreeof intensity,so that everyincreaseor decrease in
poweris an increaseor decrease in intensity.When the body dies,and the
Self or the egowith it, they are returnedto the zero intensityfrom which
existenceemerges.Every transitionfrom a greaterto a lesserintensity,or
from a lesserto a greater,involvesand envelopsthe zero intensity with
respectto which it experiences its powerasincreasingor decreasing. Death
is thus felt in everyfeeling,experienced'in life and for life'.
It is in that sensethat the life instincts and appetitesarise from the
emptinessor zero intensity of death. The 'model' of zero intensity is
thus the Body without Organs(BwO), the body that is not organisedinto
organswith specificfunctions performing specifictasks,the energy of
which is not put to work, but is availablefor investment,what Deleuze
calls death in its speculativeform (taking 'speculative'in the senseof
financialspeculation).Sincethe BwO doesnot perform any labour,it is
immobile and catatonic.ln TheLogicof Sense,the catatonicBwO arises
from within the depthsof the instincts,asa deathinstinct, an emptiness
disguisedby everyappetite.In Anti-Oedipus,Deleuzeretainshis defini-
tion of the deathinstinct asdesexualised energyavailablefor investment,
and as the source of the destructivenessof drives and instincts, but
arguesthat ratherthan a principle,the deathinstinctis a productof the
sociallyclctcrmincclrclationsof procluctionin thc capitalistsystcm.
| )crrtlrbccomcsrn instinct,a cliflirscdirndimnrirncntttnction of thc c:rp-
itrrlistsystcrrr. spccilicirlly,
crr;ritrrlisrrt's
itbsorptiorrot'llrc surplusvirltrc
D ESIR E 63
it producesthrough anti-production or the production of lack, such as
war, unemployment,and the selectionof certain populationsfor starva-
tion and disease.The death instinct is thus historical and political, not
natural.
Connectives
Body
Body without Organs
DERRIDA, JACqUES (1930-2004) - referto theentrieson'becoming*
and'virtual/virtuality'.
cinema','nonbeing'
DESCARTES, RENf (1596-1650) - referto theentrieson 'arborescent
tplanet,'Spinozat
tcogito','Hume',timmanence',
schemat, and'thought'.
DESIRE
Alison Ross
'Desire' is one of the central terms in Deleuze'sphilosophicallexicon.
In his work with Guattari, Deleuzedevelopsa definition of desireaspos-
itive and productive that supports the conception of life as material
flows.In eachof the featuresusedto definethis conceptionof desire,an
alternativeconception of desire as premised on 'lack' or regulated by
'law' is contested.The psychoanalyticconceptionof desire as an insa-
tiable lack regulatedby Oedipal law is one of the main inaccuraciesof
desire that Deleuze tries to correct. Instead of desire being externally
organisedin relation to prohibitions that give it a constitutiverelation to
'lack', for Deleuzedesireis definedasa processof experimentationon a
plane of immanence.Added to this conceptionof desireas productive,
is the conceptionof desireaspositive.Whereasin psychoanalytictheory
desireis locatedwithin the individual as an impotent force,the positive
and productive dimension Deleuze ascribesto desire makesit a social
Thus rcinterpretcd,desireis vicwcdnot iust as an cxperimental,
flrrrcc.
procluctivcfirrcc, but also as :r f<lrcclblc t<l firrm conncctionsand
cnlrrrrrcctlrc lxrwclol'bodicsirrthcir cor.rrcclion.'l'lrcsclwo lcrttttrcs
arc
6+ DESI RE
used to distinguish the experimentationof desire from any variant of
naturalism; and Deleuze defines desire accordingly in his work with
Guattari as assembledor machined. This conception of desire works
across a number of themes in Deleuze's writing with Guattari.
Productive and positive desire works in their writing as an operative
vocabularythrough which they explain fascismin politics as the desire
for the repressionof desire,and they advancea new ethics of'schizo-
analysis' whose task is the differentiation between active and reactive
desires, all the while explaining simple activities such as sleeping
walking or writing as desires.
Desire is alsoa crucial elementin Deleuze'scritique of philosophical
dualism.Such dualism,whetherin ImmanuelKant or psychoanalysis, is
ableto submit desireto a iuridical systemof regulationpreciselybecause
it first distinguishes the domain of existencefrom those transcendent
valuesthat arrangeit in relation to ordering principles.In the caseof
psychoanalysis this exerciseof transcendentregulationerroneouslycon-
tainsdesireto the field of the subject'ssexualityandturns it into a problem
of interpretation.Against psychoanalysis, Deleuzetries to de-sexualise
and de-individualisedesire.Sexualityis one flow that entersinto coniunc-
tion with others in an assemblage.It is not a privileged infrastructure
within desiringassemblages, nor an energyableto be transformed,or sub-
limatedinto other flows(D 1993b:140).
Deleuzeis particularlycriticalof thealliancebetweendesire-pleasure-lack
in which desireis misunderstood aseitheran insatiable
internallack,or asa
processwhosegoalis dissolutionin pleasure.Whetherdesireis relatedto the
law of lack or the norm of pleasureit is misunderstoodasregulatedby lack
or discharge. Againstthis allianceDeleuzedescribes desireasthe construc-
tion of a planeof immanence in which desireis continuous.Insteadof a reg-
ulationof desireby pleasureor lackin whichdesireis extractedfrom its plane
of immanence, desireis a processin which anythingis permissible. Desireis
accordinglydistinguishedfrom that which 'would come and break up the
integralprocessof desire'(D 1993b:140).This integralprocessis described
inA Thousand, Plateaus asthe constructionof assemblages. The term, which
is developed in response to the subjectivistmisinterpretationof the desiring-
machinesof Anti-Oedipus,underlinesthe view that desireis experimental
and relatedto an outside.It is this relationto an outsidethat underpinsthe
social dimension given to desire in Deleuze'sthought. Understood as an
assemblage, desire in Deleuze'svocabularyis irreducible to a distinction
between naturalism/artificeor spontaneity/law.For this reason when
Deleuzearguesagainstthe dualismthat prohibitsor intcrruptsdesircfrom
thc cxtcrnd pointsof lackrlr plcirsurc, hc alsomakcsasccsis an important
conditiorrfilr thc proccsscs thirtc<lnstruct
irsscmhhgcs <lf'clcsirc.
D ESIR E + SOC IAL _ PR OD U C TION 65
Connectives
Immanence
Kant
Lacan
Oedipalisation
Psychoanalysis
Schizoanalysis
DESIRE + SOCIAL-PRODUCTION
EugeneHolland,
Schizoanalysis usesthe pivotalterm 'desiring-production',in tandemwith
'social-production',to link SigmundFreud and Karl Marx: the term con-
joinslibido andlabour-powerasdistinctinstances of production-in-general.
Justasbourgeoispoliticaleconomydiscoveredthat the essence of economic
value doesnot inhere in objectsbut is investedin them by subjectiveactiv-
ity in the form of labour-power,bourgeoispsychiatry discoveredthat the
essence of eroticvaluedoesnot inherein objectsbut is investedin them by
subjectiveactivityin the form of libidinal cathexis.Schizoanalysis addsthe
discoverythat labour-powerand libido arein essence two sidesof the same
coin,eventhoughthey areseparated by capitalismin its historicallyunique
segregation ofreproductionfrom productionat largevia the privatisationof
reproduction in the nuclearfamily.
The conceptof desiring-productionpreventsdesirefrom beingunder-
stoodin terms of 'lack' (asit hasbeenin westernmetaphysicsfrom Plato
to Freud): desiring-productionactually produces what we take to be
reality (in the sensethat a lawyerproducesevidence)through the invest-
ment of psychicalenergy (libido), just associal-productionproduceswhat
we take to be reality through the investmentof corporeal energy (labour-
power).Desireis thus not a fantasyof what we lack:it is first and foremost
the psychicaland corporealproduction of what we want - eventhough
under certainconditionswhat we want subsequentlygetstakenawayfrom
us by the repressivefigure of a castratingfatheror the oppressivefigureof
an exploitativeboss(amongothers).By restoringthe link betweendesir-
ing-production and social-production,schizoanalysisdeprives psycho-
analysisof its excusefor and justification of repression;that psychic
repressionis somehowautonomousfrom social oppression,and exists
independentof socialconditions.Schizoanalysis insistson thc contrary
thrt 'sucill-productionis purcly nnd simply dcsiring-prrrcluction itsclf
66 DETERRIToRI ALI s ATI oN, / RETERR IToRIALISATIoN
under determinateconditions'(D&G 1983:29),and that psychicrepres-
sion therefore derives from social oppression: transform those social
conditions,and you transformthe degreeand form of psychicrepression
aswell.
There are two basicforms of desiring-production:schizophrenia,the
free form of desire promoted half-heartedly by capitalism and whole-
heartedlyby schizoanalysis; and paranoia,the fixed form of desiresub-
jected to socially-authorised belief (in God, the father, the boss, the
teacher,theleader,and soon). There arethreemodesof social-production,
eachof which oppresses,/represses desiring-productionin a specificway.
Of the three,capitalismis the mostpromising,because it at leastis ambiva-
lent: it activelyfostersboth forms of desiring-production,whereasits pre-
decessors alwaysdid their utmost to crush the one in favourof the other.
Capitalism frees desiring-productionfrom capture and repressionby
codes and representations,while at the same time it recapturesand
represses desiring-productionin mostly temporarycodesand representa-
tions,but alsoin the moreenduringforms of State-sponsored nationalism,
the Oedipuscomplexand the nuclearfamily.
It is becauseschizoanalysis insiststhat social-productionalwayspro-
videsthe determinateconditionsunder which desiring-productiontakes
shapethat it can hold the mode of social-productionresponsiblefor that
shape;that is, schizoanalysis evaluates a modeof social-production accord-
ing to the form of desiring-productionit makespossible.The valueof cap-
italism as a mode of social-productionis not only the extraordinary
materialproductivity so admiredby Marx, but evenmore its propensity
for generatingschizophreniaas the radically free form of desiring-
production.And the correspondingchallengeto schizoanalysis asa revo-
lutionarypsychiatryis to eliminatethe countervailingforcesthat recapture
free desire and subject it to paranoiaand belief, forcesoperating in insti-
tutions ranging from the nuclearfamily and Oedipal psychoanalysis, to
the bureaucracyof private enterprise,all the way up to and including
the State.
DETERRITORIALISATION / RETERRITORIALISATION
Adrian Parr
There are a variety of ways in which Deleuze and Guattari describe
thc proccss<rfdetcrritorialisation.In Anti-Oedipusthcy speakof deterri-
trrriirlisrfionrrs 'il corning unclonc'(l)&G l9tl3: 322). In A 'l'housuntl
l'ltttttttsdclcrrit<lriitlisittiort
cortstilutcs
lhc cultingcdgcol'ln irsscnrltlirgc
D E T E R R ITo R TAL TsATIo N ,/R ETER R TTo R TAL IsATTo N 67
(D&G 1987:88).In their book on the novelistFranzKafka, they describe
a Kafkaesqueliterary deterritorialisationthat mutates content, forcing
enunciationsand expressionsto 'disarticulate'(D&G 1986:86). In their
final collaboration- What isPhilosophy? -Deleuze and Guattari posit that
deterritorialisationcan be physical,mental or spiritual (D&G 1994:68).
Given this seemingly broad spectrum of descriptions two questions
emerge.First, how doesthe processof deterritorialisationwork?Second,
how is deterritorialisationconnected to reterritorialisation?Perhaps
deterritorialisationcan best be understood as a movement producing
change.In so far as it operatesas a line of flight, deterritorialisation indi-
catesthe creativepotential of an assemblage. So, to deterritorialiseis to
free up the fixed relationsthat contain a body all the while exposingit to
new organisations.
It is important to rememberthat Deleuze,as well as Guattari, is con-
cerned with overcomingthe dualistic frameworkunderpinning western
philosophy(Being/nonbeing,original/copyand soon). In this regard,the
relationshipdeterritorialisationhasto reterritorialisationmust not be con-
struednegatively;it is not the polar oppositeof territorialisationor reter-
ritorialisation(when a territory is establishedonce more). In fact, in the
way that Deleuzeand Guattari describeand usethe concept,deterritori-
alisationinheresin a territory asits transformativevector;hence,it is tied
to the very possibilityof changeimmanentto a giventerritory.
Qralitatively speakingthere are two different deterritorialisingmove-
ments:absoluteand relative.Philosophyis an exampleof absolutedeter-
ritorialisationand capital is an exampleof relative deterritorialisation.
Absolutedeterritorialisationis a way of moving and assuchit hasnothing
to do with how fast or slow deterritorialisingmovementsare; such
movementsare immanent, differentiatedand ontologicallyprior to the
movementsof relative deterritorialisation.Relative deterritorialisation
movestowardsfixity and as such it occursnot on a molecularbut molar
plane as an actual movement.Put succinctly,absolutedeterritorialising
movementsare virtual, moving through relativedeterritorialisingmove-
mentsthat areactual.
There are severaldifferent theoretical contexts Deleuze and Guattari
discussandusedeterritorialisationin. Theseinclude:art, music,literature,
philosophyand politics.For instance,in the westernvisualarts,facesand
landscapesare deterritorialised.Meanwhile in philosophy,thought is
deterritorialisedby all that is outsideof thought.In this regard,it is not the
questionthat is deterritorialisingbut the problem,becausethe question
sccksan answcr,whcreasthe problcm positsall that is unrccognisable or
unknowrrblc. 'l'hcy suggcsttlrlt whirt is dctcrriturialisccl irr music rrrc
frtrnrrrrrvoiccsirnd thc rcli'nirr(ritournrllt).A hclplirlcxirrrrplchcrc would
 68 DETERR TToRTALt s ATI oN, / RETER R T T o R T A L I s A T T o N
be the composerOlivier Messiaenwho, from around 1955on, usedbird-
songin his compositions.[n theseworkshe did not iust imitate the songs
of birds; rather he brought birdsong into relation with the piano in a
mannerthat transformedthe territory of the musicalinstrument (piano)
and the birdsongitself Here the distinctiverone, timbre and tempo of
birdsongswere fundamentallychangedthe moment theseelementscon-
nected with musical organisation.Similarly Messiaen'scompositional
style alsochangedwhen it enteredinto a relationwith birdsong,whereby
thesecompositionscould be describedin rermsof a becoming-bird.
Yet asthe bird singsits songis it simply beingrerritorial?Here we may
considerthe way in which the bird refrainis a territorial sign.Deleuzeand.
Guattari usethe biologicalunderstandingof 'territoriality' asdiscussedin
the studiesof birds conductedduring the earlyto mid-twentiethcentury;
however,they push this work in a different direction. Bernard Altum,
Henry Eliot Howard and Konrad Lorenz all suggested malebirds aggres-
sively defenda particular territory as a way of sociallyorganisingthem-
selves.These studies of bird activiry undersrood territoriality as a
biological drive pitched towards the preservationof species.Instead,
Deleuzeand Guattari addressterritoriality from the position of what is
produced by the biologicalfunction of mating hunting, earing and so
forth, arguing that territoriality actually organisesthe functions. The
problemthey havewith Lorenz, for example,is that he makes,aggressive-
nessthe basisof the territory'(D&G 1987:315).They claim functions,
suchasmating,areorganised'because they areterritorialised'(D&G 1987:
3 I 6). In this wag they usethe undersrandingof territory advancedby the
ethologistJakobvon Uexkiill, to help shift the focusawayfrom a mechan-
istic understandingof life onto an expressive one.
Von Uexkiill proposed thar there is no meaning outside of a milieu
(Umweh).For him a 'territory' refers to a specificmilieu that cannotbe
separatedfrom the living thing occupyingand creatingthe milieu, so that
the meaningof a milieu for Von Uexkiill is affective.This is important
when we cometo considerthe supposedslippagebetweendeterritorialis-
ation and decodingthat happensin Anti-Oedipusbutnot in A Thousand,
Plateaus.To decode,in the waythat Deleuzeand Guattariintend it, means
to strike out at the selfsamecodesthat producerigid meaningsasopposed
to translatingmeaning.Rather than understandingdeterritorialisationas
destabilisingthat which produces meaning, in A ThousandPlateaus
Deleuzeand Guattariregardit asa transversalprocessthat definesthe cre-
ativity of an assemblage: a nonlinearand nonfiliativesystemof relations.
Apart from biologythc tcrm'tcrrit<lrialisation'can alsobc foundin psy-
choirnirlysis. As crrrlyrrs l9fifi Guattari uscclthc psychoanrrlytic tcrm -
isitliritt' : in his lxx>k Piltrfuutlutlltsc
'f crrilrrrirtf tt 'l'rtnstttrytlit(.llcra.
D E T E R R ITOR IAL ISATION ,/N ETER R ITOR IAL ISATION 69
it wasthe French psychoanalyst JacquesLacan who influencedGuattari.
For Lacan, 'territorialisation'refers to the way in which the body of an
infant is organisedaround and determined by erogenouszones and the
connectionsit forms with part-objects.This organisationalprocessis one
of libidinal investment.As the infant undergoesa processof territorial-
isationits orificesand organsareconjugated.In the psychoanalyticsense,
to deterritorialiseis to free desirefrom libidinal investment.This freeing
up of desire includes setting desire free from Oedipal investment
(desire-as-lack). Accordingly,the upshotof Deleuzeand Guattari'srecon-
figuration of Lacanian'territorialisation'is that the subjectis exposedto
new organisations;the principal insight being: deterritorialisationshat-
ters the subject.
In additionto the bioethologicaland psychoanalytic antecedentsfor the
concepts of deterritorialisationand reterritorialisation,Deleuze and
Guattari extend a political use to them. Leaning upon Karl Marx, they
posit that labour-poweris deterritorialisedthe momentit is freedfrom the
meansof production. That selfsamelabour-powercan be describedas
beingreterritorialisedwhen it is then connectedto anothermeansof pro-
duction. Eugene Holland explains, when the English Enclosure Acts
(1709-1869)enclosedcommon land for purposesof sheep-grazing,the
peasants wereconcomitantlybanished(or 'freed') from one meansof pro-
duction only to havetheir labour-powerreterritorialisedonto other means
of production, such as when they becamefactory workers in the textile
industry (H 1999: 19-20). During the early phasesof industrialisation
when capitalismwas really gaining momentum, a systemof deterritori-
alising flows prevailed:markets were expanding,social activities were
undergoingradicalchanges,and populationsmoved from rural to urban
environments.In one sense rural labour-power was deterritorialised
(peasantand landowner) but in another senseit was reterritorialised
(factory worker and industrial capitalist).Commenting on capitalism,
Deleuzeand Guattari insistthat deterritorialisedflowsof codearereterri-
torialisedinto the axiomaticof capitalismand it is this connectionbetween
the two processes that constitutesthe capitalistsocialmachine.
Connectives
Becoming
Lacan
Lines of flight
Nomadicism
PirrtirlObjcct
Ithizonrc
70 DETERRI TO RI ALI SATI O N + POLITICS
DETERRITORIALISATION + POLITICS
Paul Patton
The concept of deterritorialisationlies at the heart of Deleuze and
Guattari'smaturepoliticalphilosophy.Processes of deterritorialisationare
the movementswhich definea givenassemblage sincethey determinethe
presenceandthe qualityof 'linesof flight' (D&G 1987:508).Lines of flight
in turn define the form of creativity specific to that assemblage,the
particular waysin which it can effect transformation in other assemblages
or in itself (D&G 1987:531).From the point of view of socialor political
change,everythinghingeson the kinds of deterritorialisationpresent.
Deleuzeand Guattari define deterritorialisationas the movementby
which somethingescapesor departsfrom a given territory (D&G 1987:
508).The processes of territory formation, deterritorialisationand reter-
ritorialisationare inextricablyentangledin any given social field: 'The
merchantbuys in a territory,deterritorialisesproductsinto commodities,
and is reterritorialised on commercial circuits' (D&G 1994: 68).
Deterritorialisationis alwaysa complexprocessinvolvingat leasta deter-
ritorialisingelementand a territory which is being left behind or recon-
stituted. Karl Marx's account of primitive accumulation in Capital
illustratesthe operationof'vectors of deterritorialisation'in a socialand
economicterritory: the developmentof commodity marketsdeterritori-
alisesthe socio-economicterritory of feudal agricultureand leadsto the
emergenceof large-scale commercialproduction.
Deterritorialisationis alwaysbound up with correlativeprocessesof
reterritorialisation,which doesnot mean returning to the original terri-
tory but rather the ways in which deterritorialisedelementsrecombine
and enter into new relations. Reterritorialisationis itself a complex
processwhich takesdifferent forms dependingupon the characterof the
processesof deterritorialisationwithin which it occurs. Deleuze and
Guattari distinguishbetweenthe 'connection'of deterritorialisedflows.
which refersto the waysin which distinct deterritorialisations can inter-
act to accelerate one another,and the 'conjugation'of distinct flowswhich
refers to the ways in which one may incorporateor 'overcode'another
thereby effectinga relativeblockageof its movemenr(D&G 1987:220).
Marx's accountof primitive accumulationshowshow the conjugationof
the streamof displacedlabour with the flow of deterritorialisedmoney
capital provided the conditions under which capitalist industry could
dcvelop.In this casc,thc reterritorialisationof thc flows of capital and
hbour lclclst<ltlrc cnrcrgcnccof ir ncw kinclof lsscmbhgc,nirnrclythc
itxiontut ic ol' cirllitirlisnr.
D IA GR A M 7l
When Deleuzeand Guattari suggestthat societiesare definedby their
lines of flight or by their deterritorialisation,they meanthat fundamental
socialchangehappensall the time, evenasthe societyreproducesitself on
other levels.Sometimeschangeoccurs by degrees,as with the steady
erosionof myths aboutsexualdifferenceand its role in socialand political
institutions. Sometimes,changeoccurs through the eruption of events
which breakwith the pastand inauguratea new field of social,politicalor
legal possibilities.The rioting of May 1968 was an event of this kind,
'a becomingbreakingthroughinto history' (D 1995:153).Other examples
include the suddencollapseof EasternEuropeancommunismor the dis-
mantling of apartheidin South Africa. These are all turning points in
history after which somethings will neverbe the sameasbefore.The key
question,however,is not whetherchangeis slowor suddenbut whetheror
not it is animatedby a positiveforceof absolutedeterritorialisation.
Deleuzeand Guattaridistinguishfour typesof deterritorialisationalong
the twin axesof absoluteand relative,positiveand negative(D&G 1987:
508-10).Deterritorialisationis relativein so far asit concernsonly move-
ments within the actual order of things. Relativedeterritorialisationis
negatiyewhen the deterritorialisedelementis immediatelysubjectedto
forms of reterritorialisationwhich encloseor obstructits line of flight. It is
positivewhenthe line of flight prevailsoversecondaryreterritorialisations,
eventhoughit may still fail to connectwith otherdeterritorialisedelements
or enter into a new assemblage. Deterritorialisationis absolutein so far as
it concernsthe virtual orderof things,the stateof 'unformedmatteron the
planeof consistency'(D&G 1987:55-6). Absolutedeterritorialisationis
not a further stagethat comesafter relativedeterritorialisationbut rather
its internal dynamic, since there is 'a perpetualimmanenceof absolute
deterritorialisationwithin relative deterritorialisation'(D&G 1987:56).
The differencebetweenpositiveand negativeforms of absolutedeterrito-
rialisation correspondsto the differencebetweenthe connection and the
conjugationof deterritorialisedflows.Absolutedeterritorialisationis pos-
itive when it leadsto the creationof a new earth and new people:'when it
connectslinesof flight, raisesthem to the powerof an abstractvital line or
drawsa planeof consistency'(D&G 1987:510).Sincereal transformation
requiresthe recombinationof deterritorialisedelementsin mutually sup-
portiveways,socialor politicalprocesses aretruly revolutionaryonly when
they involveassemblages of connectionratherthan conjugation.
DIAGRAM - rcfcr to thc cntries on 'axiomatic'.'black hole'. 'fold'.
* t'old','plirtciru','scntiotics'irncl'virtuitl/virturlity'.
'[,'ouctrult
72 DIF F ERENCE
DIFFERENCE
CliffStagoll
Deleuzeis often labelledas a 'philosopherof difference',an assessment
that highlightsthe criticalplaceof 'difference'in his work. He is concerned
to overturn the primacy accordedidentity and representationin western
rationality by theorising differenceas it is experienced.In doing so,
Deleuze challengestwo critical presuppositions:the privilege accorded
Being and the representational model of thought. He considersboth to
haveimportantand undesirablepolitical,aestheticandethicalimplications
that a disruptionof traditionalphilosophycanhelp to surmount.Deleuze
useshis notion of empiricaland non-conceptual'difference in itself in the
serviceof sucha disruption.
Differenceis usuallyunderstoodeither as'differencefrom the same'or
differenceof the sameover time. In either case,it refers to a net variation
betweentwo states.Sucha conceptionassumes that statesarecomparable,
and that thereis at basea sameness againstwhich variationcanbe observed
or deduced.As such, differencebecomesmerely a relative measureof
sameness and, being the product of a comparison,it concernsexternal
relationsbetweenthings. To think about such relationstypically means
groupinglike with like, and then drawingdistinctionsberweenthe groups.
Furthermore,overand abovesuchgroupingsmight be positeda uniztersal
grouping, such as Being, a conceptionof presencethat alonemakesthe
groups wholly consistentand meaningful.It is becauseGeorg Wilhelm
Friedrich Hegel drew a comprehensive and cohesiveworld of Being that
madehim sucha significanttargetfor Deleuze'scritique.
On such an account, difference is subordinatedto sameness,and
becomesan objectof representationin relationto someidentity.As such,
it is never conceivedin terms of 'difference-in-itself',the uniqueness
implicit in the particularity of things and the momenrsof their concep-
tion and perception.Rather,differenceis understoodin terms of resem-
blance,identity, opposition and analogy,the kinds of relations used to
determine groupings of things. Yet this rendencyto think in terms of
samenessdetracts from the specificity of concreteexperience,instead
simplifying phenomenaso that they might 'fit' within the dominant
model of unity. Deleuze's'liberation' of differerrcefrom sucha model has
two parts.First, he developsa conceptofdifferencethat doesnot rely on
a relationshipwith sameness and,second,he challcngcs the philosophyof
rcprcscntirti<ln.
l)clcuzcilrgucstlrlt wc ought n<ttto prcsunlcir prc-cxistingunity,but
irtstcirdlirkcscliorrsly.thcnirlurcol'thc worldirsit is llcrccivcd, l,irr hinr,
D IFFER EN C E
1a
IJ
every aspctof reality evidencesdifference,and there is nothing 'behind'
suchdifference;differenceis not groundedin anythingelse.Deleuzedoes
not mean to refer, however,to differencesof degree,by which he means
distinctionsamongstitemsthat areconsideredidenticalor in anysensethe
same.Instead,he meansthe particularityor'singularity'of eachindividual
thing, moment,perceptionor conception.Such differenceis internalto a
thing or event,implicit in its beingthat particular.Evenif thingsmight be
conceivedashavingsharedattributesallowingthem to be labelledasbeing
of the samekind, Deleuze'sconceptionof differenceseeksto privilegethe
individual differencesbetweenthem.
Such individuality is, for Deleuze,the primary philosophicalfact, so
that, rather than theorisinghow individualsmight be grouped,it is more
importantto explorethe specificand uniquedevelopmentor'becoming'of
eachindividual. The genealogyof an individual lies not in generalityor
commonality,but in a processof individuationdeterminedby actualand
specificdifferences,multitudinous influencesand chanceinteractions.
Deleuze'sdifference-in-itselfreleasesdifferencefrom domination by
identity and sameness. Indeed, on this account,identity must alwaysbe
referredto the differenceinherentin the particularsbeing'sweptup'in the
processof constructinga relationshipbetweenthem. To realisethis is to
meetDeleuze'schallengeof developinga new perspectivein orderto resist
transcendence. However,to do so routinely is not easy.Only by destabilis-
ing our thinking, disrupting our facultiesand freeing our sensesfrom
established tendenciesmight we uncoverthe differenceevidentin the lived
world, and realisethe uniquenessof eachmoment and thing.
Deleuze'stheory of differencealso challengesthe traditional theory
of representation,by which we tend to consider each individual as
re-presenting('presentingagain')somethingas iust anotherinstanceof a
categoryor original.On sucha view,differenceis somethingthat might be
predicated of a concept, and so logically subordinated to it, whilst the
conceptcan be applied to an infinite number of particular instances.To
think in terms of difference-in-itselfmeansto set the conceptasideand
focusinsteadon the singular,and the unique circumstances of its produc-
tion. Awarenessof such specificcircumstances meansthat the notion of
some'thing in general'canbe setasidein favourof one'sexperienceof this
thing, hereand now.
Connectives
Crcativetransformation
T'ltcrnirlrcturn
llcpctition
74 DI FFERENCE + PO LI T I C S
DIFFERENCE + POLITICS
Paul Patton
Deleuze'sontologicalconceptionof a world of free differencessuggestsa
defenceof the particularagainstall forms of universalisation or representa-
tion. Every time there is representation, he argues,there is an 'unrepre-
sentedsingularity' which does not recogniseitself in the representant
(D 1994:52).However,neither this critique of representationnor rhe onro-
logicalpriority of differenceestablishes a politics of difference.Identities
presupposedifferencesand are inhabited by them, iust as differences
inevitablypresuppose andareinhabitedby identities.A politicsof difference
requiresthe specification of politicallyrelevantkindsof difference.
Deleuze and Guattari's concept of minority and their support for
minoritarian politics provides a novel understandingof the kind of
differencewhich is relevantfor democraticpolitical change.They define
minority in oppositionto majority,but insist that the differenceberween
them is not quantitativesincesocialminoritiescanbe morenumerousthan
the so-calledmajority.Both minority and majorityinvolvethe relationship
of a group to the largercollectivityof which it is a part. Supposerhereare
only two groups and supposethat there is a standardor ideal type of
member of the larger collectivity: the majority is defined as the group
which most closely approximatesthe standard,while the minority is
defined by the gap which separatesits membersfrom that standard.In a
socialcollectivity,majority cantakemany simultaneousforms:
Let ussuppose thattheconstant or standardistheaverage adult-white-heterosexual-
European-male speakinga standard language. . . It is obviousthat'man'holdsthe
majority,evenif heislessnumerous thanmosquitoes, children,
women, peas-
blacks,
ants,homosexuals, etc.That is because he appears twice,oncein the constantand
againin thevariablefrom whichtheconstantis extracted. Majorityassumesa state
of poweranddomination, nottheotherwayaround.(D&G 1987:105,cf.291)
A liberal politics of differencewould simply defend the right of the
minoritiesto be includedin the majority.In other words,it would seekto
broadenthe standardsothat it becomesmaleor female- Europeanor non-
European- hetero or homosexualand so on. Social minorities are here
conceivedas outcastsbut potentially able to be included among the
majority.Deleuzeand Guattari insist upon the importanceof suchpiece-
mcll changcsto thc [<lrmandcontentof a givcnmajrtrity.After rcdescrib-
irrg thc non-coinciclcncc of minority and mliority in thc lirnguirgcof
irxiolrrirlic
sctthcory,'thcy itsscrr,'this
is trotlo silythrrltlrcstrugglcon thc
D IFFE R E N T IA TION ,/D IFFE R E N C IA T I ON 75
levelof the axiomsis without importance;on the contrary,it is determin-
ing (at the most diverselevels:women)sstrugglefor the vote,for abortion,
for jobs;the struggleof the regionsfor autonomy;the struggleof the Third
World . . .'(D&G 1987:470-l). At the sametime, however,in order to
draw attentionto the sensein which the reconfigurationof the majority is
dependentupon a prior processof differentiation,they introducea third
term in addition to the pair majority-minority,namely'becoming-minor'
or 'minoritarian',by which they meanthe creativeprocessof becoming-
different or diverging from the maiority.
This processof becoming-minor,which subjectsthe standardto a
processof continuousvariationor deterritorialisation(D&G 1987:106),is
the real focus of Deleuze and Guattari's approach to the politics of
difference.They do not denythe importanceof the installationof newcon-
stantsor the attainmentof maiority status,but they stressthe importance
of the minoritarian-becomingof everyone,including the recognised
bearersof minority statuswithin a given maiority. They insist that the
powerof minorities'is not measuredby their capacityto enter and make
themselvesfelt within the majority system,nor evento reversethe neces-
sarilytautologicalcriterion of the majority,but to bring to bearthe forceof
the non-denumerablesets, however small they may be, against the
denumerablesets. . .' (D&G 1987:471).By this they meanthat the limits
of the potentialfor transformationarenot determinedby the normalising
power of the majority but by the transformative potential of becoming-
minor, or becoming-revolutionary. They do not mean to suggestthat
minoritiesdo not enter into and produce effectsupon the majority.
Their insistenceon the transformativepotentialof minoritarianbecom-
ingsdoesnot imply a refusalof democraticpolitics.Thoseexcludedfrom the
majority as definedby a given set of axioms,no lessthan thoseincluded
within it, arethepotentialbearersof thepowerto transformthat set,whether
in the directionof a new setof axiomsor an altogethernewaxiomatic(D&G
1987:471).Everyonemay attain the creativepowerof minority-becoming
that carrieswith it the potentialfor new earthsand new peoples.
DIFFERENTIATION/DIFFERENCIATION
Adrian Parr
The conceptsof 'differentiation'and 'differenciation'are primarily eluci-
datcd by Dcleuzc in Bergsonism(D 1988a: 9G8) and Dffirence and
(l) 1994:20tt-14)rnd the distinctionhe formsbetweenthe two
Rcpctition
is ln imporfiultinFrc(licntof'his dill'crcntialontrtkrgy.'ftr bcgin with hc
76 D IF F EREN T IAT I O N,/D IF F ERE N C I AT I O N
appealsto the mathematicalconceptof differentiationin order to unlock
his understandingof the Whole asa unified system,preferring insteadto
think of openwholesthat continuallyproducenew directionsand connec-
tions. In effect, what are differentiated are intensitiesand heterogeneous
qualities and this is what makesthe virtual real but not actual. In short,
differentiationin the way Deleuzeintendsit happensonly in the virtual
realm. Continually dividing and combining, differentiation can be likened
to a zone of divergenceand as such it is fundamentally a creativemove-
ment, or flow,that conditionsa wholein all its provisionalconsistency.
Meanwhile,what is differenciatedis the heterogeneous seriesof virtual
differentiation.ln BergsonisrnDeleuze pointsout that differenciationis an
actualisationof the virtual. Actualisationcan be either conceptualor
material such as an 'eye' which Deleuze describesin Dffirence and
Repetition asa'differenciatedorgan'(D 1994:21l).The problemthis poses,
given that Deleuze is not a representationalthinker, is how difference
differenciates without itself turning into a systemof representation? That
is to say,if differenciationis the processof actualisingthe virtual how does
this avoidthe representational trap of similitude and identity?Why isn't
differenciationsimilar to, or a version o( the virtual it differenciates?
For Deleuze,the actualiseddifferencesof differenciationdo not enioy
a privileged point of view over the differencesmaking up the flow of
differentiation,nor is differenciationa processthat unifies heterogen-
eous qualities; rather it simply affirms these qualities and intensities
without completelyhalting the flow in its tracks.The actualisationthat
differenciationproducesis not'like'differentiation, as this would imply
that the differentiationit is like is in itself a fixed subjectmore than an
intensivesystemcontinually undergoingchange.Put simply, what this
meansis that the processof differenciationis a questionof variationmore
than identity and resemblance becauseDeleuzeprefersto think of it as
a dynamicmovementthat bringsdifferencesinto relationwith oneanother.
Overall,Deleuzeconsidersactualisationin termsof creativitll whereby
the processdoesnot simply mark a changeinto what waspossiblein the
first instance.To be truly creative,differenciationneedsto be understood
assomethingnew insteadof somethingthat resembles virtuality.Carrying
on from here he outlines that the virtual differenciatesitself; without this
the virtual could not be actualisedbecausethere would be no lines of
differenciationthat could enableactualisationto happen(D 1988a:97).
Connectives
Acturrlity
Irrdivirlurrt
ion
D ISJU N C TIVE SYN TH ESIS 77
Representation
Virtual/Virtuality
DISJUNCTIVE SYNTHESIS
Claire Colebrook
At its most general,the disjunctivesynthesisis the production of a series
of differences. The significanceof the conceptof disjunctionin Deleuze's
work is threefold.First, whereasstructuralismconceivesdifferencenega-
tively,suchthat an undifferentiatedor formlessworld is then differentiated
by a structure.Deleuzeregardsdifferencepositively,so disjunction is a
mode of production.There is a potentialin life to produceseries:a desire
can attachto this, or this or this; a vibration of light can be perceivedas
this, or this, or this. Second,the differencesofdisjunction aretransversal.
There is not one point or term (suchas consciousness or language)from
which differencesare unfolded or connected;consciousnesscan connect
with a language,a machine,a colour, a sound, a body, and this meansthat
seriesmay traverseand connect different potentials.Sexual desire,for
example,might leavethe seriesof body parts- breast,or mouth, or anus,
or phallus - and invest different territories - the desire for sounds,for
colour,for movements.Finally, disjunctionis not binary.Life should not
be reducedto the miserablelogic of contradictionor excludedmiddle -
eitheryou wantliberalismor you don't; eitheryou'remaleor female;either
you're for the war or for terrorism - for disjunction is open and plural:
neitherliberalismnor terrorism,but a further extensionof the series.
The conceptof synthesisis centralto both Dffirence andRepetitionand
Anti-Oedipus. ln Dffirence and, Repetition Deleuze rewrites Immanuel
Kant's three syntheses(from the Critique of Pure Reason).For Kant, our
experiencedworld of time and spaceis possibleonly becausethere is a
subject who experiencesand who connects (or synthesises)received
impressionsinto a coherentorder. For Deleuze,by contrast,there is not a
subject who synthesises.Rather, there are synthesesfrom which subjects
are formed; thesesubjectsare not personsbut points of relativestability
resultingfrom connection,what Deleuzerefersto as 'larval subjects'.In
Anti-Oed,ipu.r Deleuze and Guattari expand the concept of the three
synthesesinto political terms: association,disjunction and conjunction.
Association is thc connection, not justof data(asin Kant'sphilosophy), but
alsoof'bodicsor tcrmsinto somcmanifillclrlr cxpcricnccd thing,an'asscm-
blitgc'.l)isjunclion,llrc sccorrclsyrrtlrcsis,
is lhc subscr;ucntpossibiliry
ot'
78 DURATI O N ( DUR E E ) D U R ATIo N ( D U R EE) 79

relationsbetweenor among such assembledpoints of relative stability,
while conjunctionor the third synthesisis the referralof thesetermsto the
ground or planeacrosswhich they range.
The disjunctivesynthesisis important for two reasons.First, Deleuze
arguesthat all syntheses (or waysof thinking aboutthe world) havelegit-
imate and illegitimateuses,or an immanent and transcendentemploy-
ment. Synthesesare immanent when we recognisethat there are not
subjectswho synthesisethe world; there is not a transcendentor external
point beyond the world from which synthesisemerges.Rather, there are
connections,syntheses, (desires)from which pointsor terms areeffected.
No point or term canbe setoutsidean eventof synthesisasits transcend-
ent ground,sotherecanbe no transcendental synthesising subjectasthere
wasfor Kant. Second,the subjectionof modernthought liesin the illegit-
imate use of the disjunctivesynthesis.From relationsor syntheses(pas-
sions,sympathies)among bodiescertain terms are formed, such as the
mother,fatherand child of the modern family.We should,then,.seemale-
femalerelationsor genderasa production,asa way in which bodieshave
beensynthesised or assembled. One canbe maleor female.
The Oedipuscomplexis the disjunctivesynthesisin its transcendent and
illegitimateform: eitheryou identify with your fatherand becomea subject
(thinking'man') 0r yottdesireyour mother and remainother than human.
An immanentuseof the synthesiswould refusethisexclusioe disjunctionof
'one mustbe this or that, maleor female'.Insteadof insistingthat onemust
line up beneaththe signifierof man or womanand submit to the systemof
sexualdifference,Deleuzeand Guattariopenthe disjunctivesynthesis:one
can be this or this or this, and this and,this and,this: neither mother nor
fatherbut a becoming-girl,becoming-animal or becomingimperceptible.
Connectives
Becoming
Desire
Kant
Oedipalisation
DURATTON(DURir)
CliffStagoll
I lcrrrillcrgsonintcrcstsl)clcuzcbccrtusc dcparturcfiom philrr
of'hisrrrdicrrl
solrfty's rlrlltockrxy.
| )unrtionQlurttt)is orrcol'scvclirlol' llcrgs<ln's
kcy iclcirs
adoptedby Deleuzewhen developinghis philosophyof difference.Typical
of Deleuze'susualapproachto Bergson,his interpretationand use of the
conceptis at oncealmostentirelysympatheticbut strikinglyidiosyncratic.
Accordingto Deleuze,one canonly comprehendthe notion of duration
by using Bergson'smethod of philosophicalintuition (intuitionphilor
ophique),a deliberatereflectiveawarenessor willed self-consciousness.
Intuition revealsconsciousness (or, more generally,mental life) to be essen-
tially temporal; ongoing mental activity that constitutes,in its dynamism
and the mutual interpenetrationof its states,a time internal to one'sself.
Mental life is, then,a kind of flowingexperience, anddurationis the imme-
diateawareness of this flow
Bergsonbelievesthat intuition's findingsare bestexpressedin images,
and soexplainsduration by usinganalogieswith music.Mental statesflow
togetheras if parts of a melody,with previousnoteslingering and future
onesanticipatedin the unity of a piece,the permeationof eachnote by
othersrevealingthe extremecloseness of their interconnection.To try and
graspthis flow asa completeset of notesis pointless,becausethe musicis
alwayson the vergeof endingand alwaysalteredby the addition of a new
note. To speakof 'mind' or tconsciousness' as a comprehensive systemis
to ignore an analogousattribute of duration: it is alwaysflowing, overtak-
ing what might be calledthe 'not yet' and passingawayin the 'already'.
Bergsonconsidersquantificationof duration to be inconsistentwith its
immediate,lived reality.It can be contrastedwith 'clock time', the time of
physicsandpracticallife, which eitherspatialises time by situatingelemental
instantsend-to-endon a referential grid or usesthe digitsof a time-pieceas
a crassandimprecisephysicalimage.Whenarrangedin accordance with these
models,timebecomes a seriesof separable inst4nts,consciousness is'situated'
in time asa seriesof temporallydisparate mentalstates, andmovementis con-
ceivedin terms of relationsbetweenstatic positions. In other words,clock
time abstractsfrom the notion of duration by distorting its continuity.
But constitutiveintegrationof momentsof duration must not be over-
emphasised.Bergson'sintuition confirms also that consciousness is not
'one long thought', asit were,but a flowing together of mental states that
are different from one anotherin important ways.Bergsoncontendsthat
differencesbetweenmentalstatesallow us to mark one kind of thought or
one particular thought from another,whilst constituting simultaneously
a singularflow,a mergingof thoughtsasone consciousness. As such,dur-
ation is the immediateawareness of the flow of changesthat simultaneously
constitutedifferencesand,relationshipsbetweenparticulars.
Scvcralcharacteristics of durationarecriticalfor Deleuze.In his early
workson DrrvidHumc, l)clcuzcusccldurationasan cxplicatoryt<xrl,rcn-
dcringlncw I lunrc'sirccounts o1'hrbit,itssociittion lncl tintc.Subscqucntly,
 80 EARTH,/LAND(rrRftr)
Deleuzeadoptsit asa meansfor exploringdifferenceand becomingaskey
elementsof life. If duration 'includes',as it were,all of the qualitative
differences ('differences
of kind') of one'slived experience,
Deleuzeargues,
then it also emphasisesthe productive, liberating potenrial of these
differences.Even in the continuity of one'sconsciousness, there is a dis-
connectionbetweeneventsthat allowscreativityandrenewal.For example,
one is ableto call upon new conceptsto reinterpretone'smemoriesor per-
ceivesomevistaanewin the light of one'sexposureto a work of art.
Deleuze usesduration to make some important philosophicalpoints
abouttime and difference.For philosopherssuchasImmanuelKant, time
is both a form ofreceptiveexperienceaboutthe world and a necessary con-
dition for any human experienceat all. As such, for Kant, time is not an
empiricalconceptbut an a priori necessityunderlyingall possibleexperi-
ence.Furthermore,he considerstime to comprisea homogeneous seriesof
successive instants,standingin needof synthesis.
In contrast,durationis alwayspresentin the'givenness'ofone'sexperi-
ence.It doesnot transcendexperience, andneithermustit be derivedphilo-
sophically.Furthermore,duration, unlike matter,cannotbe divided into
elementswhich, when dividedor reconstituted,remainthe samein aggre-
gateas their unified form. Duration, as lived experience,brings together
both unity and differencein a flow of interconnections. For Deleuze,these
contrastsrepresentthe differencebetweena dictatorialphilosophythat
creates'superior'conceptsthat subsumeand order the multiplicitiesand
creativityof life and one that createsopportunitiesfor changeand variety.
Connectives
Bergson
Intuition
Kant
EARTH/LAND (rrRR.E)
John Proteai
As prrrt<rf'whrtl)clcuzcirnclGuirttaricomcto calla gcophilosophy in llhat
is l'hilovph.y?,in,.1I'hounnl Pluttttus'cilrth'rrkrngwith ,ground'(.vrl)
rrnd
EARTH,/LINo (rnnnn) 8l
'territory' (territoire) expressmanners of occupying terrestrial spaceby
differentsocialmachines:the nomadwar machine,the territorial tribe, the
overcodingState.Earth can also mean the virtual realm or Body without
Organs(BwO), while 'a new earth' (unenouaelleterre),called,for at points in
A Thousand, Plateausand madea focal point of What is Philosophy?, entails
new human relationshipsto the creative potentials of material systemsto
form consistencies, war machines,or rhizomesfrom a varietyof means.
ln A Thousand, Plateau.s, Brian Massumi usestwo English words to
translatethe French terrerwhichcanmeanboth'earth'in the astronomical
senseofour planetand'land' in the geographical senseofa cultivatedarea.
There is no consistencyin Deleuzeand Guattari'suseof the majusculein
the French text; both Terre and,terre are used in the senseof 'earth' and
'land'. The anglophonereadershouldkeepin mind the closeproximity of
terre('earth' and 'land') with territoire('territory').
First, 'earth'is equivalentto the BwO, otherwiseunderstoodby Deleuze
and Guattari as the virtual plane of consistencyupon which strata are
imposed(D&G 1987: 40). Second,'earth' is part of the earth-territory
(terre-territoire)systemof romanticism,the becoming-intensive of strata.
Hence 'earth' is the gathering point, outside all territories, of all self-
orderingforces('forcesof the earth') for intensiveterritorial assemblages
(the virtual seenfrom the point of view of territorialisingmachinicassem-
blages).Third, the 'new earth' (nouaelleterre)is the becoming-virtualof
intensive material. Put differently, the 'new earth' is the correlate of
absolutedeterritorialisation(the leavingof all intensiveterritorial assem-
blagesto attainthe planeof consistency); it is the tappingof 'cosmicforces'
(the virtual seenfrom the point of view of the abstractmachinescompos-
ing it, not the machinicassemblages that actualisea selectionof singular-
ities). Hence, it marks new potentials for creation (D&G 1987: 423;
509-10).In this sense,it is unfortunatethat Brian Massumi translateszae
nouaelleterreas'a new land' (D&G 1987:509).
Land,(terre)is constitutedby the overcodingof territoriesunderthe sig-
nifying regimeand the Stateapparatus(D&G 1987:440-l). Land refers
exclusivelyto striatedspace,and is that terrain that canbe owned,held as
stock, distributed, rented, made to produce and taxed. Land can be
gridded, distributed,classifiedand categorisedwithout evenbeing phys-
ically experienced,and a striking exampleof this is the township-and-
rangesystemof the US that imparted striatedspaceto a vast part of the
North Americancontinentaheadof actualsettleroccupation.The system
of stockpilingterritories and overcodingthem as land for the Statedoes
not stop at thc firrm or evcn thc ranch,but extendsto the forestlands(as
'nrttionrl'fbrcsts)irnd to thc unusablcspacesthat becomenltional parks,
bi<lsphcrc rcscrvcsr itnclso filrth. 'l'hcscspilccslrc hcld irsrcftgcs firr Statc
82 ETERNAL RETU R N
subiectswho seekto escapefrom private property to find some sort of
becoming-earthcommons.
ln What is Philosophy?,'a new earth' becomesthe rallying cry in the
'geophilosophy'of Deleuze and Guattari, in which 'stratification' is the
processwherebythe implantationof codesand territoriesform dominat-
ing bodies.This is opposedto the constructionof a 'new earth' that entails
new human relationshipsto the creativepotentialsof material systemsto
form consistencies, war machines,or rhizomesfrom a varietyof means.In
the constructionof the new earth, caremust be takennot to confusethe
structural differenceof strata and consistencywith an a priori moral cat-
egorisation,but ratheralwaysto retainthe pragmaticand empiricalnature
of Deleuzeand Guattari'swork and perform the ethicalevaluationof the
life-affirming or life-denying characterof assemblages.
Strata,along with codesand territories,are alwaysneeded,if only in
providingrestingpointsfor further experimentsin forming war machines.
Strataare in fact 'beneficialin manyregards'(D&G 1987:40),though we
must be carefulnot to laud the stabilityof strataasinstantiatingthe moral
virtue of unchangingself-identityespousedby Platonism.The mere fact
that an assemblage or body politic is flexibleand resilient,however,does
not guaranteeits ethical choice-worthiness,for what Deleuzeand Guattari
call 'micro-fascism'is not rigid at all but rather a suppleand free-floating
body politic.Eveniffascistsarereterritorialisedon the'blackhole'oftheir
subjectivity:'thereis fascismwhen a war machineis installedin eachhole,
in everyniche' (D&G 1987: 214)and not only thosepracticesthat 'intend'
to producea life-affirmingassemblage will resultin such.
Connectives
Body without Organs
Blackhole
Deterritorialisation
Plato
Space
Virtual/Virtuality
ETERNAL RETURN
Lee Sltinks
'l'hc conccptof''ctcrn:rlrcturn', which l)clcuzcclrirwsfrom lfricdrich
Nictzschc,is crucirll lo tltc rrrdicrtlcxlcrtsiot't
ol'tlrc llhikrsollhyof'
ETER N AL R ETU R N 83
immanenceand univocity. In Dffirence and RepetitionDeletzearguesthat
Duns Scotus,Baruch Spinozaand Nietzscheaffirmedunivocalbeing.It is
only with Nietzsche,accordingto Deleuze,that the joyful ideaof univoc-
ity is thought adequately,and this is becauseNietzsche imaginesa world
of 'pre-personalsingularities'.That is, there is not a 'who' or 'what' that
then has variousproperties;nor is there someoneor somethingthat ri.
Each differenceis a power to differ, with no event of differencebeing the
ground or causeof any other. By going through this affirmation of
difference,and by abandoningany ground or being before or beyond
difference, both Nietzsche and Deleuze arrive at the eternal return.
If differenceoccurredin order to arriveat someproperend - if therewere
a purposeor properend to life - then the processof becomingwould have
some ideal end point (even if this were only imagined or ideal). But
differenceis an event that is joyful in itself; it is not the differenceo/this
beingor for this end.With eacheventof differencelife is transformed;life
becomesother than itself becauselife is difference.Consequently, the only
'thing' that 'is' is difference,with each repetition of differencebeing
different.Only differencereturns, and it returns eterna,lly. Time is what
followsfrom difference(time is difference);differencecannotbe locatedin
time. Eternalreturn is thereforethe ultimateidea.
This difficult and enigmatic idea, developedmost concertedly in
Nietzsche'sThus Spake Zarathustra,has proved controversialin phil-
osophicalcircleswhere it has generallybeeninterpreted aseither an exist-
entialor inhumanvision of existence. Accordingto the existentialreading,
the thought of eternalreturn compelsus to considerhow we ought prop-
erly to live. This thought can be expressedin the following way: were we
suddenlyto recognisethat everyaspectofour lives,both painfulandjoyous,
was fated to return in the guiseof a potentiallyinfinite repetition,how
would we needto live to justify the recurrenceof eventhe most terrible and
painful events?Conversely,the inhuman or cosmologicalreadingunder-
standsNietzsche'spropositionasthe fundamentalaxiomof a philosophyof
forces in which active force separatesitself from and supplants reactive
forceand ultimatelylocatesitself asthe motor principleof becoming.
Deleuze'ssignalcontribution to the post-warphilosophicalrevisionof
Nietzschewas to establishthis secondreadingof eternal return as the
return and selectionof forcesat the heart of modern theoriesof power.He
explicitly repudiatesthe naivereadingof Nietzschethat envisages eternal
return asa doctrineproclaimingthe infinite recurrenceof everyhistorical
moment in exactlythe sameorder throughouteternity.The perversityof
this naivcreading,Deleuzeargues,is that it convertsNietzsche'svision of
bcingasthc cndlcssbccomingof clifl'crcntial furccsinto a simplcprinciplc
ot'idcntity.Yctwc firilto undcrstirnd tlrcctcrnirlrcturnif'wc conccivc ot'it
84 ETERNAL RETU R N
as the ceaselessreturn of the same; instead, eternal return inscribes
differenceand becomingat the very heart of being.For it is not being that
recurs in the eternal return; the principle of return constitutes the one
thing sharedby diversity and multiplicity. What is at stakeis not rhe repe-
tition of a universalsameness but the movementthat produceseverything
that d,ffirs. Eternal return is thereforeproperly understoodasa synthesisof
becomingand the being that is affirmed in becoming.It appearsasrhe fun-
damental ontological principle of the differenceand repetition of forces
that will bear the nameof Will to Power.
To think the eternal return is to think the becoming-activeof forces.
The return selectsforcesaccording to the quantity of Will to Power that
they express.Deleuze characterisesthis processas a d,oubleselectionby
the activity of force and the affirmation of the will. In accordancewith
the principle that whateverwe will, we must will it in such a way rhat we
also will its eternal recurrence, the eternal return eliminates reactive
statesfrom the becoming of being. This first selectioneliminates ali but
the most powerfully reactive forces - those which go to rhe active limit
of what they can do and form the basisof the nihilistic impulse and the
will to nothingness.Thesestrongreactiveforcesaresubsequendyincorp-
oratedinto the eternal return in order to effect the overcoming of neg-
ation and the transformation of reactive into active force. Such
revaluationtakesplace becausethe eternal return brings the nihilistic
will to completion:the absolutespirit of negationinvolvesa negationof
reactive forces themselves.Within this negation of negation reactive
forces deny and suppress themselves in the name of a paradoxical
affirmation: by destroying the reactive in themselves, the strongest
spirits come to embody the becoming-active of reactive force. This
movement of affirmation constitutesthe secondor doubled selection
undertaken by the eternal return: the transvaluationofreactive forcesby
meansof an affirmation of negation itself. This secondselectiontrans-
forms a selectionof thought into a selectionof being: somethingnewis
now brought into being which appearsasthe effectof the revaluationof
forces.The eternal return 'is' this movemeRtof transvaluation: accord-
ing to its double selectiononly action and affirmation return while the
negativeis willed out of being.The return eliminateseveryreactiveforce
that resistsit; iu so doing it affirms both the being of becomingand the
becoming-activeof forces.
Connectives
Active/reactive
Ilccoming
E TH IC S 85
Difference
Kant
Multiplicity
Nietzsche
ETHICS
John Marhs
Throughout his work, Deleuzedraws a clear distinction betweenethics
and morality.Morality is a setof constrainingrules that judgeactionsand
intentionsin relationto transcendentvaluesof good and evil. Morality is
a way of judging life, whereasethicsis a way of assessing what we do in
terms of waysof existingin the world. Ethics involvesa creativecommit-
ment to maximising connections,and of maximising the powers that
will expand the possibilitiesof life. In this way, ethics for Deleuze is
inextricably linked with the notion of becoming.Morality implies that we
judge ourselvesand others on the basisof what we are and should,be,
whereasethicsimplies that we do not yet know what we might become.
For Deleuze,there are no transcendentvaluesagainstwhich we should
measurelife. It is rather 'Life' itself that constitutes,itsown immanent
ethics.An ethicalapproachis, in this way,essentiallypragmatic,and it is
no surprise that Deleuze admiresthe American pragmatist model that
substitutesexperimentationfor salvation.Deleuzesetsthe ideal of this
pragmatism- a world which is 'fn process'- againstthe 'Europeanmoral-
ity' of salvationand charity.It rejectsthe searchfor moral consensusand
the construction of transcendentvalues,and it conceivesof societyas
experiment rather than contract: a community of inquirers with an
experimentalspirit.
FriedrichNietzscheand BaruchSpinozaarethe two main influenceson
Deleuze'snotion of ethics.From them, he takesthe idea that ethicsis a
form of affirmation and evaluation.Such an ethics applies the accep-
tancethat the world is, asDeleuzeputs it, neithertrue nor real,but'living'.
To affirm is to evaluatelife in order to set free what lives. Rather than
weighingdown life with the burden of higher values,it seeksto makelife
light and active,and to createnew values.Both thinkers reorientatephi-
losophyby callinginto questionthe wayin which morality conceives of the
relationshipbetweenmind and body.For the systemof morality,mind as
consciousness dominatesthe passionsof the body.Spinoza,however,pro-
posesan ethicalroute that is lator takenup by Nietzsche,by rejectingthe
supcriorityof mind ovcr body.It i$ not r cirscof giving ficc rcign to thc
86 ET HICS
passionsof the body,sincethis would be nothing more than a reversal,a
licenceto act thoughtlessly. Rather in claimingthat there is a parallelism
betweenmind andbody,Spinozasuggests a new,morecreativewayof con-
ceivingof thought.
For Deleuze,Spinozais the greatethicalthinker who breakswith the
Judeo-Christiantradition, and who is followed by four 'disciples'who
developthis ethical approach:Nietzsche,D. H. Lawrence,Franz Kafka
and Antonin Artaud. They areall opposedto the psychologyof the priest,
and Nietzschein particularshowshow judgementsubjectsmanto an infin-
ite debt that he cannotpay.This meansthat the doctrineof judgementis
only apparentlymore moderatethan a systemof 'cruelty' accordingto
which debt is measuredin blood and inscribeddirectly on the body,since
it condemnsus to infinite restitution and servitude.Deleuzegoesfurther
to showhow thesefour 'disciples'elaboratea wholesystemof 'cruelty' that
is opposedto judgement,and which constitutesthe basicsfor an ethics.
The dominationof the body in favourof consciousness leadsto an impov-
erishmentof our knowledgeof the body.We do not fully explorethe cap-
acitiesof the body, and in the sam way that the body surpassesthe
knowledgewe haveof it, so thought also surpassesthe consciousness we
have of it. Once we can begin to explore thesenew dimensions- the
unbnownof the body and the unconscious of thought- we arein the domain
of ethics.The transcendent categories of Good and Evil canbe abandoned
in favour of 'good' and 'bad'. A 'good' individual seeksto makeconnec-
tions that increaseher powerto act, whilst at the sametime not diminish-
ing similar powersin others.The 'bad' individual doesnot organiseher
encountersin this way and either falls backinto guilt and resentment,or
relieson guile and violence.
Deleuze'scommitment to ethicsis closelyconnectedto the conceptof
becoming,and in particular that of becoming-animal.The ethical drive
for the 'great health' that allows life to flourish is all too often channelled
into serving the petty 'human' ends of self-consolidation and self-
aggrandisement.One way of going beyondthis calculationof profit and
lossis to'become'animal. The drive for justice,for example,must over-
come itself by learning from the lion who, as Nietzschesays,refusesto
rage againstthe ticks and flies that seekshelterand nourishmenton its
body. In a more generalpolitical sense,it is a question of maintaining
our 'belief-in-the-world'. We do this by creatingforms of resistanceto
what we are becoming (Michel Foucault's 'actual') and not simply to
what we are in the present. Rather than judging, we need to makc
s<lmcthing cxist.
EVEN T 87
Connectives
Becoming
Nietzsche
Spinoza
EVENT
CliffStasoU
Deleuzeintroduced the conceptof the 'event' in The Logic of Senseto
describe instantaneousproductions intrinsic to interactions between
variouskinds of forces.Eventsare changesimmanentto a confluenceof
partsor elements,subsistingaspure virtualities(that is, real inherentpos-
sibilities)and distinguishingthemselvesonly in the courseof their actual-
isation in somebody or state.Loosely,eventsmight be characterised(as
Deleuzedoes)in termsconsonantwith the Stoicconceptof lekta:asincor-
poreal transformationsthat subsistover and abovethe spatio-temporal
world, but areexpressiblein languagenonetheless.
As the prod,uctof the synthesisof forces,eventssignify the internal
dynamic of their interactions.As such, on Deleuze'sinterpretation,an
eventis not a particularstateor happeningitselflbut somethingmadeactual
in the Stateor happening.In other words,an eventis the potentialimma-
nent within a particularconfluenceof forces.Take as an examplea tree's
changingcolourin the spring.On Deleuze'saccount,the eventis not what
evidentlyoccurs(the tree becomesgreen)becausethis is merelya passing
surfaceeffector expression ofan event'sactualisation,andthus ofa particu-
lar confluenceof bodiesand other events(such as weatherpatterns,soil
conditions, pigmentation effects and the circumstancesof the original
planting).Thereforewe oughtnot to say'thetreebecamegreen'or'the tree
is now green'(both of which imply a changein the tree's 'essence'), but
rather'the tree greens'.By using the infinitive form'to green',we makea
dynamicattribution of the predicate,an incorporealitydistinct from both
the tree and green-nesswhich capturesnonetheless the dynamismof the
event'sactualisation.The event is not a disruption of some continuous
state,but ratherthe stateis constitutedby events'underlying'it that, when
actualised, mark everymomentof the stateasa transformation.
Deleuze'spositionpresentsan alternativeto traditionalphilosophiesof
substance,challengingthe notion that reality ought to be understoodin
88 EVENT
terms of the determinatestatesof things. This notion was expressed
clearlyby Platq who established a contrastbetweenfixed and determinate
statesof things definingthe identity of an objecton the one hand and, on
the other,temporalseriesof causesand effectshavingan impact uponthe
object.Deleuzewould saythat thereis no distinct,particularthing without
the eventsthat define it as that particular,constituting its potential for
changeand rate of change.Instead,an eyentis unrelatedto any material
content,being without fixed structure,position,temporalityor property,
and without beginningor end.
Deleuze'seventis a sign or indicator of its genesis,and the expression
of the productivepotentialof the forcesfrom which it arose.As such, it
highlights the momentaryuniquenessof the nexusof forces(whetheror
not to someobviouseffect)whilst preservinga placefor discontinuity in
terms of someparticular conceptor planeof consistency.Three charac-
teristics highlighted in Deleuze's texts point to this distinctiveness.
First, no event is ever constituted by a preliminary or precedentunity
betweenthe forcesof its production, being insteadthe primitive effect
or changegeneratedat the moment of their interaction.Second,events
are produced neither in the image of somemodel nor as representative
copiesor likenessesof a more fundamentalreality,being insteadwholly
immanent, original and creativeproductions.Third, as pure effect, an
eventhasno goal.
Deleuzeis careful to preservedynamismin his concept.An event is
neither a beginningnor an end point, but rather always'in the middle'.
Eventsthemselves haveno beginning-or end-point,and their relationship
with Deleuze'snotion of dynamicchange- 'becoming'- is neitherone of
'joining momentstogether'nor one in which an eventis the 'end' of one
productiveprocess,to be supplantedor supplementedby the next.Rather,
becoming'moves through' an event, with the event representingiust a
momentaryproductiveintensity.
In his theoryof the event,Deleuzeis not interestedjust in the machin-
ationsof production,but alsoin the productivepotentialinherentin forces
of all kinds.Eventscarry no determinateoutcome,but only new possibil-
ities,representinga momentat which new forcesmight be broughtto bear.
Specificallyin terms of his model of thinking, he doesnot meanjust that
'one thinks and thus creates'butthat thinking and creatingareconstituted
simultaneously. As such,his generaltheoryof the eventprovidesa means
for theorisingthe immanentcreativityof thifking, challengingus to think
differcntlyand to considerthingsanew.This is not to saythat he meansto
chrrffcngcurito think in termsof cvcnts,but rathcrt<lmakcthinkingits own
cvcntby cnrbrrcingthc rich ch:rosof'lifc andthc unitprcncss tnd potcntial
ol' citclt lllo nlc nl.
EXPER IEN C E 89
Connectives
Becoming
Plato
EXPERIENCE
Inna Semetsky
Deleuzeconsideredhimself an empiricist,yet not in the reductive,tabula
rasa-like,passivesense.Experienceis that milieu which provides the
capacity to affect and be affected;it is a-subjectiveand impersonal.
Experienceis not an individual property;rathersubjectsareconstitutedin
relationswithin experienceitself, that is, by meansof individuation via
haecceity. The exteriorityof relationspresents'a vital protestagainstprin-
ciples'(D 1987:55).Experienceis renderedmeaningfurnot by grounding
empirical particulars in abstract universals but by experimentation.
somethingin the experientialworld forcesus to rhink. This somethingis
an object not of recognitionbut a fundamentalencounterthat can be
'graspedin a rangeofaffectiverones'(D 1994:139).In fact,novelconcepts
are to be inventedor createdin order to makesenseout of singular experi-
encesand, ultimately,to affirm this sense.
Experienceis qualitative,multidimensional,and inclusive;it includes
'a draft, a wind, a day,a time of day,a stream,a place,a battle, an illness'
(D 1995:l4l): yet, an experientialeventis subjectless. we are madeup of
relations,saysDeleuze(2000),and experiencemakessenseto us only if we
understandthe relationsin practicebetweenconflicting schemesof the
said experience. The difference embedded in real experience makes
thought encountera shockor crisis,which is embeddedin the objective
structureof an eventper se,therebytranscendingthe facultiesof percep-
tion beyondthe 'given' data of sense-impressions. Differenceis an onto-
logical category,'the noumenonclosestto phenomenon'(D 1994:2zz),
which, however,is neverbeyondexperiencebecauseeveryphenomenonis
in fact conditioned by difference.Transcendentalempiricism is what
Deleuzecalledhis philosophicalmethod:thinking is not a naturalexercise
but alwaysa secondpowerof thought,born under the constraintof experi-
enceasa materialpower,a force.The intensityof differenceis a function
of desire,the latter embeddedin experiencebecauseits objectis .the entire
surroundingl which it traverses' (D&G 1987:30).
If rclati<lns
lrc irrcduciblcto thcir tcrms,then the wholedualisticsplit
llctwccttthrlughtitndworld,thc insidclnd thc outsiclc, bccontcs invalicl.
ancl
90 EXPERI ENCE
relationallogic is the logic of experimentationnot 'subordinateto the verb
to be' (D 1987: 57). This logic is inspired by empiricism because'only
empiricism knows how to transcend the experiential dimension of the
visible'(D 1990:20) without recourseto Ideas,moral universals,or value
judgements.The experientialworld is folded,the fold being'the insideo/
the outside'(D 1988a:96),wherethe outsideis virtual yet realby virtue of
its pragmatics.It unfolds in an unpredictablemanner,and it is impossibleto
know aheadof time what the body (both physicaland mental) can do.
Becausethe body, acting within experience,is defined by its affective
capacity,it is equally impossibleto know 'the affectsone is capableof'
(D 1988b:125):life becomesan experimentaland experientialaffair that
requires,for Deleuze,practicalwisdom in a Spinoziansenseby meansof
immanent evaluationsof experience,or modesof existence.As affective,
experienceis as yet a-conceptual,and Deleuzeemphasisesthe passionate
quality of such an experience:'perhapspassion,the State of passion,is
actuallywhat folding the line outside,making it endurable. . . is about'
(D 1995:116).
The Deleuzianobjectof experience, beingun-thought,is presentedonly
in its tendencyto exist, or rather to subsist,in a virtual, sub-representative
state. It actualisesitself through multiple different/ciations. Deleuze's
method,compatiblewith Henri Bergson'sintuition, enablesthe readingof
the signs,symbolsand symptomsthat lay down the dynamicalstructureof
experience. Experience,in contrastto analyticphilosophy,is not limited to
what is immediatelyperceived:the line of flight or becomingis realevenif
'we don't seeit, becauseit's the leastperceptibleof things' (D 1995:45).
Thinking enriched with desire,is experimentaland experiential:experi-
encethereforeis future-oriented,lengthenedand enfolded,representingan
experimentwith what is new,or cominginto being.Experienceconstitutes
a complexplace,and our experimentationon ourselvesis, for Deleuzerthe
only reality.By virtue of experimentation,philosophy-becoming, like a
witch's flight, escapesthe old frame of referencewithin which this flight
seemslike an immaterialvanishingthrough someimaginaryevent-horizon,
and createsits own terms of actualisationtherebyleadingto the 'intensifi-
cationof life' (D&G 1994:74)by revaluatingexperience.
Connectives
Difference
Force
Power
Spinoza
'llnnsccnclcntnl
cmpiricisnr
EXPER IM EN TATION 9r
EXPERIMENTATION
Bruce Baugh
In French,the word expirience meansboth 'experience'and 'experiment'.
To experimentis to try new actions,methods,techniquesand combinations,
'without aim or end' (D&G 1983:371).We experimentwhen we do not
know what the result will be and haveno preconceptionsconcerningwhat it
shouldbe. As an open-endedprocessthat exploreswhat'snew and what's
cominginto beingrather than somethingalreadyexperiencedand known,
experimentation is inseparablefrom innovationanddiscovery. The elements
with which we experimentare desires,forces,powers and their combina-
tions,not only to 'seewhat happens',but to determinewhat different entities
(bodies,languages, socialgroupings,environmentsand soon) arecapableof.
Deleuzeholdsthat'existence itself is a kind of test',an experiment,'like that
wherebyworkmentestthe quality of somematerial'(D 1992:317).In liter-
ature, politics, painting, cinema,music and living, Deleuzevalorisesan
'experimentation that is without interpretation or significanceand restsonly
on tests of experience'(D&G 1986:7), the crucial experiencebeing the
affectiveone- whether a procedureor combinationproducesan increasein
one'spowerof acting(ioy) or a diminution (sadness).
Experimentationcanbe an investigativeprocedurethat seeksto explain
how assemblages function by analysingthe elementsthat composethem
and the links betweenthoseelements;an'assemblage'being anycompound
in which the parts interact with each other to produce a certain effect.
However, experimentation is also a practical dismantling of assemblages
and the creativeproduction of new combinationsof elements;evenwhen
experimentationconcernsthoughtsor concepts,it is nevermerely theor-
etical. Experimentationdoes not interpret what something,such as a
text, an idea or a desire,'means',but seeksto discoverhow it works or
functions by uncovering an order of causes,namely, the characteristic
relations among the parts of an assemblage- their structures, flows and
connections - and the resulting tendencies.Effects are demystified by
being related to their causesthat explain the functions and usesof an
assemblage, 'what it doesand what is done with it' (D&G 1983:180).
Experimentationis necessary to reveal'what a body or mind can do, in
a given encounter', arrangementor combination of the affects a body is
capableof (D 1988c: 125);and alsoto revealthe effectsof combinationsof
different bodiesand elements,and especiallywhetherthesecombinations
or encounterswill increasethe powersof actingof the elementscombined
into a grcatcrwhole,or whcthcrthe combinationwill destroyor'decom-
posc'onc or nlorc of thc clcmcnts.'l'hc conrpttibilityor incompntihility
92 EXPERIM ENT AT ION
of differentelementsand bodies,and the effectof their combination,can
only be ascertained through experience;we haveno a priori knowledgeof
them through principlesor axioms.An experimentalmethodof discovery
through the experienceof new combinationsof things encounteringeach
other is contrary to any axiomatic-deductivesystemor any system of
judgement using transcendentalcriteria. Becauseoutcomescannot be
known or predicted in advance,experimentationrequires patienceand
prudence,ascertaincombinationsmay be destructiveto the experimenter
and to others.On the other hand, the knowledgegainedthrough experi-
mentationwith differentconjunctionsand combinationsallowsfor an art
of organising'good encounters',or of constructingassemblages (social,
political, artistic) in which powers of acting and the active affects that
follow from them are increased.
Life-experimentation, through a set of practiceseffectingnew combin-
ations and relations and forming powers, is biological and political, and
often involvesexperientiallydiscoveringhow to dissolvethe boundariesof
the ego or self in order to open flows of intensity, 'continuums and con-
iunctions of affect' (D&G 1987: 162). Active experimentation involves
trying new procedures,combinations and their unpredictable effects to
producea 'Body without Organs' (BwO) or a 'field of immanence'or 'plane
of consistency',in which desires,intensities,movementsand flows pass
unimpeded by the repressivemechanismsof judgement and interpret-
ation. Experimental constructions proceed bit by bit and flow by flow,
using different techniquesand materials in different circumstancesand
under different conditions, without any pre-establishedor set rules or
procedures,as similar effects(for example,intoxication) can be produced
by different means(ingesting peyote or 'getting sousedon water'). 'One
neverknowsin advance'(D 1987:47), and,if one did, it would not be an
experiment.Experimentationby its nature breaksfree of the past and dis-
mantlesold assemblages (socialformations,the Self),and constructslines
of flight or movementsof deterritorialisationby effecting new and previ-
ously untried combinations of persons, forces and things, 'the new,
remarkable,and interesting'(D&G 1994:lll). In literature,politics,and
in life, experimentsarepracticesthat discoverand dismantleassemblages,
and which look for the linesof flight of individualsor groups,the dangers
on theselines,andnewcombinationsthat will thwart predictionsandallow
the new to emerge.
Connectives
Body withoutOrgans
I)csirc
E X P R E S S ION 93
Immanence
Lines of flight
EXPRESSION
Claire Colebrook
'Expression' is one of Deleuze's most intense concepts.If we take
Deleuze'sdefinition of a concept- that it is a philosophicalcreationthat
producesan intensivesetofordinates- then expressioncanbe understood
astruly conceptual.Indeed,the conceptof expressionis tied to Deleuze's
understandingof conceptuality.It is not that we havea world of set terms
and relations, which thought would then have to structure, organiseor
name- producing organisedsetsof what exists.Rather, life is an expres-
sive and open whole, nothing more than the possibility for the creation of
new relations;and soa concept,or the thought of this life, must try to grasp
movementsand potential, rather than collectionsof generalities.A struc-
ture is a set of coordinates,a fixed set of points that one might then move
among to establishrelations, and is extensive,with its points alreadylaid
out or set apart from eachother. So a simple mechanismtakesthe form of
a structure; if we read a poem as a set of words that might be linked in
meaning,with the meaninggoverning the proper relation and order of the
words, then we are governed by a structure. If however,we approach a
poem asexpressive,we seethe words as having unfolded from a potential,
a potentialthat will producefurther relations- all the readingsor thoughts
producedby the poem. Thus, expressionis tied to a commitmentto the
creationof concepts;for expressionis the power of life to unfold itself
differently, and one would create a concept in trying to grasp these
differentunfoldings.
Conceptsarenot structuresbecausealthoughthey establishdifferences,
the differencesareintensive.An extensiveterm - suchas'all the catsin the
world that areblack'- is a closedset,whereasan intensiveconceptis infin-
ite in its possiblemovements.In the caseof expression,this conceptcovers
the potentialfor movements;it is not that therearepoints or potentialsin
life which thenundergoan expression.Rather,thereare expressions, with
the unfolding of life in all its differencebeingexceededby expressiveand
excessive potential.The conceptof expressionthereforerefersto intensity,
for it allowsus to think a type of relationbut not anyconcludedsetof rela-
tions,And it is an ordinatefield,establishinga temporalityratherthana set
of terms.Thc conccptof cxpression is a styleor possibilityof thinking.We
cannotundcrstrnclthis conccptof cxprcssionwithout bringingin a ncw
9+ EXT ER I O R I TY, / I N TER I O R I T Y
approachto what it is for somethingto be, and what it isto thinb that being.
With expression,we no longerimaginea world of substance - that which
remainsin itself, remainsthe same,and then haspredicatesaddedto it acci-
dentally.There is not a substancethat then expressesitself in various
different styles.Rather, there are stylistic variations or expressions,and
substanceis the thought of the open whole of all theseexpressions. With
the conceptof expressionwe begin with a relation, rather than a being that
then relates,but the relation is also external: nothing determinesin
advancehow potentiality will be expressed,for it is the nature of expres-
sive substanceto unfold itself infinitely, in an open seriesof productive
relations.
In his conclusionto his book on Baruch Spinoza,a book which is
avowedlydedicatedto expressionism in philosophy,Deleuzedistinguishes
the expressionism of Spinozafromthat of Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz.
For Leibniz thereis not a world that is then expressed or perceivedby sep-
arate subjects.Rather, the world is made up of monadsor points of per-
ception. A being is just its specificperceptionof the world, and each
perceivingmonad is an expressionof one being. God is the only being
who perceivesthe world perfectlyand completely;eachfinite beinggrasps
infinite being only dimly. For Spinoza, a more radical and immanent
expressionis possible,one which allows Deleuze to imagine divergent
expressionsor planesof life. While there is still not a self-presentworld
that precedesexpression,Spinoza'simmanenceprecludesany point of
perfect expressionthat would ground particular expressions.A being iust
is its expression,its powerto act. The world is not an objectto be known,
observedor represented,so much asa planeof powersto unfold or express
differentpotentialsof life.
Connectives
Spinoza
EXTERIORITY/INTERIORITY
Jonathan Rofe
One of the underlying themesof Deleuze'sphilosophyis a reiection of
the valueof interiority in its varioustheoreticalguises.In fact, he goesso
far asto connectthe sentimentof 'the hatredof interiority' to his philoso-
phy. On the other hand, tcrms likc 'outside' and 'cxtcriority' play a
ccntrnlrolc.
Exr ER t o nr r v, / I N T ER I o R I T Y 95
Deleuze'suse of the term 'interiority' refers to the thought, dominant
in westernphilosophysince Plato, that things exist independently,and
that their actions derive from the unfolding or embodying of this essen-
tial unity. The Cartesianegocogitowould be the most familiar exampleof
this thought, whereby the human mind - indivisible and immortal -
forms the interior of the self,and where the body and the physicalworld
in general form a contingent exterior. [n other words, 'interiority' is a
word indexedto transcendentunities,things that haveno necessarycon-
nection to anything else,and which transcendthe external world around
them. Deleuze'sphilosophy is rigorously critical of all forms of tran-
scendence.FIe wants to come to grips with the world as a generalised
exteriority.
In his first book on David Hume (Empiricismand Subjectahy,1953),
Deleuzeinsiststhat for Hume, there is no natural interiority (conscious
willing, for example)involved in human subjectivity. Rather, the subiect
is formed from pre-subjectiveparts which are held together by a network
of relations.This is part of the Humean philosophythat strikesDeleuze
as particularly important, and he comes back to it a number of times.
DeleuzeconsidersHume to be the first to insistthat relationsareexternal
to their terms - and this presagesmuch of Deleuze's mature philosophy.
In other words,in order to understandany stateof affairs,we must not
look to the internal or intrinsic 'meaning','structure' or 'life' of the terms
involved(whetherthey be people,a personand an animal,elementsin a
biological system, and so on). This will not provide anything relevant,
sinceit is in the relationsbetween(or externalto) things that their nature
is decided.
Likewise,in his bookson Baruch Spinoza,he demonstratesthat organ-
ised beings are not the embodiment of an essenceor an idea, but are the
resultof enormousnumbersof relationsbetweenpartswhich haveno sig-
nificanceon their own. In other words, specificbeingsare produced from
within a generalised milieu of exterioritywithout referenceto any guiding
interiority.
So, rather than being a philosophyconcernedwith showing how the
interior reasonor structure of things is brought about in the world - the
interior consciousintentions of a human speaker,or the kernel of social
structure hidden within all of its expressions- Deleuze insists on three
points. First, that there is no natural interiority whatsoever:the whole
philosophical tradition beginning with Plato that wanted to explain
things in referenceto their essenceis mistaken.Second,this meansthat
the interior/exterior division lacksany substantialmeaning,and Deleuze
somctimescaststhc distinctionasidc.Third - and this describesone of
thc grcatcstnspcctsof I)clcuzc'sphilosophicrrl lahrur - hc insiststhrrtthc
96 F ACIAL IT Y
interior is rather produced from a generalexterior, the immanent world
of relations.The nature of this production and its regulationproved to
be one of the foci of his philosophy.Hence,human subjectivityasa pro-
duced interiority undergoeschangesaccordingto its social milieu, its
relations,its specificencounters,and so forth: this is a topic that the two
volumes of Capitalismand,Schizophreniadeal with, and can be summed
up in the following Deleuziansentiment:'The interior is only a selected
interior.'
Finally,on the basisof thesepoints,Deleuze'sphilosophyalsoembodies
an ethicsof exteriority.In sofar asinteriority is a 'caved-in'selectionof the
externalworld of relations,it remainsseparatedfrom the life and move-
ment of this world. The aim of what Deleuzecallsethicsis to reconnect
with the externalworld again,and to be caughtup in its life.
Connectives
Hume
Immanence
Plato
Spinoza
Subjectivity
FACIALITY
Tom Conley
The concept of faciality, theorised in detail in A Thousand.Plateausand
applied to cinema in the chapters of Cinema I: The moztement-image
devotedto the close-up,standsat a crossroadsof subjectivationand sig-
nifiance.The former belongsto the languageof psychogenesis (how a
living beinggrowsinto and negotiatesthe ambientworld) and the latter to
semiotics(denoting,contrary to polysemy,signsthat disseminateinfinite
meaningin both consciousand unconsciousregistqrsand in directionsnot
under the control of languagerules). Subjectivationand signifianceare
correlated,respectively,with the 'blackhole' or unknownareaof the face
in which the subjectinvcstshis or her affectivcencrgics(that can range
from f'carto prtssioi)nnd with thc 'whitc wnll', a surfhccon which signs
FA C IA LITY 97
are projectedand from which they rebound or are reflected.Facialityis
thus constitutedby a systemof surfacesand holes.The face'is a surface:
traits, lines, wrinkles; a long, square,triangular face; the face is a map'
(D 1987:170).A seriesof layersor strata,the facebecomesa landscape
when it is abstractedfrom the world at large and understoodas a deter-
ritorialisedspaceor topography.It is a displacementof what a perceiver
makesof the milieu and the facesthat he or shediscerns.
Deleuzerelatesfaciality to the close-upin film, the cinematictechnique
that generallyusesa lens of long focal length to bring the faceforward and
soften the edgesof the frame, or else,to the contrary,deploysa lens of
shorterlengthto obtain afacialprojectionor distortionat the centreofthe
imagewhile the surroundingmilieu is seenin sharpfocus.In either mode
the rotundity of a person'scheekscanresemblehillocksor mesas;the eyes
might be reflectivepoolsand ponds;the nostrilslairs and caves,and earsat
oncequarriesand cirques.Yet the landscapeor facealsolooksat its spec-
tators, calling their gaze into question or even psychically 'defacing'
them. Suchis the effectof close-upsthat establishsequences in a gooddeal
of classicalcinema (Deleuze's preferred directors being Jean Renoir,
Alfred Hitchcock, David Wark Griffith, Georg Wilhelm Pabst, Sergei
Mikhailovich Eisenstein,Luis Buffuel). The face emits signs from its
surfaceat the sametime that the viewer seeksto fathom meaningfrom its
darkeror hidden regions.If the faceis a 'white wall' it is connotedto be
what resistsunderstandingor semiosisin general.
He further elaboratesthe conceptthrough referenceto literature.For
Marcel Proust,describingin Un amourd,eSwannthe faceof the beloved
(but delightfully crassand despicable)Odette de Cr6cy in the eyesof the
awestruckSwannis an abstractionthat allowshim - aesthetethat he is -
to wax poeticalby recallinginfinite expressions, drawn from memoriesof
worksof art, musicalnotesand sculptedsurfacesin his fantasies. Yet once
she disillusionshim the jealouslover discoversthat her faceis a fetish or
even a black hole. Proust meticulously describesSwann's passionfor
Odette's visage,Deleuze observes,in order to sanctify faciality in the
name of art. To counter Proust's reductiveturn, he showsthat Henry
Miller undoes the face by travelling over it with artistic dexterity. The
authorof Tropicof Capricorn(1939)makesit lessa goalor an essence than
a surface- a white wall or the blank sheetof a future map- on which a cre-
ative itinerary can be drawn. In Miller's descriptionof facesa processof
deterritorialisationmakesthe work of art not an end in itself but a process
and an adventurethat plots the faceinsteadof diving into it.
In A ThousandPlateausfaciality is formulated to serve the ends of
a political polcmic.To discerndetailsof the facewithout wishing to ide-
nliscits iluril or charm constitutcsrrmicropoliticsthtrtcallsinto qucstion
98 F ASCISM
the powerof facialimages.Implied is that Deleuze(with Guattari) seeks,
first, ro be finishedwith the facewhereit would be a site of psychological
inquiry or of a reassuringhuman essenceor goodness.He and Guattari
wish to divest the faceof any auratic or seductivepower of the kind that
contemporarymedia- cinema,advertising,television- conferupon it. By
turning it into an abstraction(but not an idea)and a siteof multiple possi-
bilities of affectivity(and neithera hearthnor a site of warmth) they turn
it into a zoneof intensity.The latter finds a powerful visual correlativein
Deleuze'streatmentof the paintingsof FrancisBacon.The headsof the
artist'sportraitsmeld the faceinto the body and thus confusethe facewith
its tradition asa'veil of the soul'with the humananimal.In'the text of The
Logic of Sensationthat studiesBacon'sportraiture Deleuzeshowsthat the
head is not what lacksspirit; rather, it is the spirit in a corporealform,
a bodily and vital breathwhoseend is that of und,oing thefoce.In sum, a
forceful reconsiderationis madeof the facework in philosophy,aesthetics
and political theory.
Connectives
Bacon
Black hole
Molecular
Subjectivity
FASCISM
John Protezsi
ln Anti-Oed,ipus, the pole of paranoiddesireis opposedto schizophrenic
or revolutionary desire.Perhapswe owe the impressionthat a major focus
of Anti-Oed,ipzsis fascism to Michel Foucault's preface to the English
translation,in which he callsthe text'An Introduction to the Non-Fascist
Life' (D&G 1983:xiii). But in fact historicalmanifestationsof fascism-
asFoucaultacknowledges - are explicitly addressedin Anti-Oed,ipus rela-
tively infrequently. Despite the lack of attention to historical fascism,
Deleuzeand Guattari'scritiqueof analyses of fascismin termsof ideology
is important. Ratherthan being the result of fooling peopleby falsecon-
sciousness, fascistdesirehasits own properconsistency, and spreadsunder
ccrtain social,economicand politicalconditions.Roughlyspeaking,in
,4nti-Ocdipu.rf'ascistdcsircis thc dcsirc for codesto rcplacethc dccoding
thrttf rccsfklwsunttcrcrrpitrrlist
lxiomltics; suchcoclcswould fix subjccts
FA S C IS M 99
to rigid boundariesof thought and actionand fix bodiesto pre-established
patterns of flows, thus attenuating the fascist obsessionwith erotic
perversion.
Deleuze and Guattari discuss both micro- and macro-fascismin
A Thousand Plateaus.Micro-fascismis a cancerousBody without Organs
(BwO). The cancerousBwO is the third type of BwO discussedin
A Thousand, Plateaus,after the 'full' (positively valued in A Thousand,
Plateous,thoughnotin Anti-Oedipzs,where the full BwO is catatonia),and
the 'empty'. The cancerousBwO is the strangest and most dangerous
BwO. It is a BwO that belongsto the organismthat resideson a stratum,
rather than beingthe limit of a stratum. It is runawayself-duplicationof
stratification.Sucha cancercanoccurevenin socialformations,not just in
the stratanamedorganism,significanceand subjectification.The key to
tracking down fascismlies here in the cancerousBwQ that forms under
conditionsof runawaystratification,or more precisely,runawaysedimen-
tation, the first 'pincer' of a stratum.By endlesslyrepeatingthe selection
of homogenisedindividuals in a processof 'conformity' the cancerous
BwO breaksdown the stratum on which it lodges:social cloning and
assembly-line personalities.
The cancerous BwQ then, occurswith too much sedimentation,that is,
too much contentor codingand territorialising,with insufficientovercod-
ing. The result is a cancerof the stratum, a proliferation of points of
capture, a proliferation of micro-black holes: thousandsof individuals
completeunto themselves;legislatorsand subjectsall in one; judge,jury
and executioner- and policeman, private eye, home video operator, the
neighbourhoodwatch organiser.Micro-fascism is then the construction of
a 'thousand monomanias'in 'little neighborhoodpolicemen' resulting
from 'molecularfocusesin interaction. . . rural fascismand city or neigh-
borhoodfascism,youth fascismand war veteran'sfascism,fascismof the
Left and of the Right, fascismof the couple,family, school,and office'
(D&G 1987:214). Such micro-fascismsspreadthroughout a socialfabric
prior to the centralisingresonancethat createsthe molar apparatusof the
State.In micro-fascismeachbody is a 'micro-blackhole that standson its
own and communicateswith the others' (D&G 1987: 228). Although
Deleuzeand Guattari do not do so, we can call micro-fascism'molecular
molarity': eachsubjectiveunit is self-contained, orientedto unity, an indi-
vidual (molar), but they interact in solely local manner,independently
(molecular).
In contrast to Anti-Oedipzs'srelative neglect of historical fascism,
A Thousand Plateausdevotesat leasta few pagesto an analysisof histori-
crrl manifcstirtions of macro-firscism (in its Nazi ftrrm rathcr than its
Italirrnor S;rirnishfirrrns).'l'hc Nazi rcginrcis charnctcriscd,firlkrwirrgthc
t00 F AM IL Y
analysesof Paul Virilio, as a 'suicidestate'rather than a totalitarianone,
which is 'quintessentiallyconservarive'(D&G 1987:230;StalinistUSSR
is the target here).Here it is not a State army taking power,but a war
machine that takesover the institutions of State power.This triggers the
last form of the line of flight, the self-immolating, self-destructiveline.
This reversionof the line of flight to self-destructionhad 'alreadyani-
matedthe molecularfocusesof fascism,and madethem interact in a war
machineinsteadof resonatingin a State apparatus'(D&G 1987:231).
Such a runawaywar machine,onceit reachesa consistencyenablingit to
takeovera Stateapparatus,forms a 'war machinethat no longerhad any-
thing but war asits objectandwould ratherannihilateits own servantsthan
stop the destruction' (D&G 1987:231).ln A Thousand, Plateaus,then,
fascismis too fast, a cancer;what we could call, echoingBataille,a 'solar
nihilism', rather than being too slow or the freezing, paranoid, lunar
nihilism it is portrayed,asin Anti-Oed,ipus.
Connectives
Body without Organs
Desire
Stratification
FAMILY - refer to the entry on 'psychoanalysis'.
FEMINISM
Felicity J. Colman
Deleuze did not advocate'feminism' as the movementhas historically
come to be known. Yet in his writings one messagethat is continually
relayed is: Do not ever smugly assumethat you have reached the limit
edges,or causalorigins of knowledgeof any forn.ror thought. To do so
would be at once to assumeand position an organisationof recognition
basedon prior resemblances, givenstructures,and relationshipsthat have
beencodedaccordingto linguistic and economics_ystems. These systems
operatemost efficientlythrough prescribedgenderwork and leisureroles.
F'cminism'sthcorcticalhistory and legacyhavebeensuchthat its foun-
<htionll prcmiscsof'pointingout thc incclurrliticsandrcstrictionsimposcd
by thirrkingiur(l priictisirrgwithirr givcn hrundirricsbcclmc principll in
FE MIN IS M l0r
activitiesand theoriesconcerningsexuality,equality,difference,subjectiv-
ity, marginalisation, and economics.The conceptof a 'limit to be reached'
is in itself one of the key critical systematicassumptionsthat Deleuzeand
Guattari dismantle.
With the exception of his cinema books,where core conceptualpoints
are made through reference to canonical twentieth-century filmmakers
including MargueriteDuras and ChantalAkerman,referencesto women
are few in Deleuze's works. In A ThousandPlateaas,Deleuze and
Guattari's discussionof 'becoming-woman'focuseson the processesof
subjectiveformation,through the writing of Virginia Woolf. Indicativeof
the twentiethcentury'sdivisionand demarcationof labourrolesaccording
to normative patriarchal gender and biological functions, Deleuze'swrit-
ings are suffusedwith examplesof published male philosophers,writers,
scientistsand artists.
However,Deleuzeis attentiveto the genderbiasesof westernmythology
and the patriarchallyproduced behaviourof both genders.The ethical
constructionof the body asa constituent/contributorof a pre-configured
(and hencegendered)organisationis continuallypointed out by Deleuze.
ln Anti-Oed.ipusDeleuzeand Guattari attack and reject the psychoanalyt-
ically enframedfamilial unit and genderedhistorical zonesfor its bourgeois
hierarchy and assumptionsof an Oedipally figured desire.Valuablefor
feminism is Deleuzeand Guattari's discussionof a body in terms of its
potentialitiesandcapabilities,onceit is conceivedof not in termsof its past
structure,but in terms of a future modality.Deleuzedrawsupon Baruch
Spinozato developthe playwright-poetAntonin Artaud's conceptof the
Body without Organs(BwO). This 'body' is one that affordsa creativesite
for the collection and expressionof the formation of desire. Placing the
body on a platfurm of the systemsof exchangeprovides spatial and tem-
poral zonesfor analysisof genderedcategorisations.
Deleuzeand Guattari's phrase'becoming-woman'is a critique of all
aspectsof anthropocentrism;that is, whereman is regardedasthe central
and most important dynamicin the universe.Becoming-womanrefersto
everydiscoursethat is not anthropocentric,and is thus codedby all eco-
nomic, social,cultural, organic,and political circuits as 'minority'. With
the conceptof a'minority discourset,and tbecomingwomant,Deleuzeand
Guattari take the body not to be a cultural medium but a compositionof
sociallyand politicallydeterminedforces.
Deleuze'suseof the 'difference'of womenundergoestheoreticaldevel-
opment in the 1960s,in turn this changeinfluenceshis later theoriesof
differenceand minority groups,as well as public and capitalistgenerated
clcsircand its cffccton thingsin thc world. Deleuzc'stheoriesrecognisethe
politicrrlrrnclpublicshapingof'an incliviclual's culturitlrcrlm nnd milicu.
 t02 FO LD
This philosophicalposition on the narrarionof the multiple may appear
abstractand antitheticalto feministmethodologies that focuson the analy-
sisand identificationof the personal.YetDeleuze'sideasconsistentlypoinr
out how a method that points toward the 'truth' of a particular represen-
tation hasa universalisingtendencyand doesnot refer to the 'forces'that
shapebeliefs,thoughtsor structures.
Deleuze'swork demonstrates how,becauseof its history,subjectivityis
a political constirurion not the result of an individual community.
Individual historical figures are utilised by Deleuze to examinethe struc-
turation of bodiesvia historicalorganisation,culturalaffiliationsand social
differentiation.The formation and reformationof suchbodiesand things
are questionedin terms of the waysin which relationshipsand qualities
provide identity reality and virtuality.The economic,ethical,logicaland
aestheticconstitution of these bodies is also consideredby Deleuze in
terms of their structuraland systematicconstitution.Deleuze'ssystemof
thinking through conceprsof identity givenby history,and maintainedin
capitalism,providesa valuablerevolutionaryand unorthodoxapproachfor
feminism'scritique of the surfaceeffectsof genderroles,as well as its
projectof rewriting historiesof exclusion.
Connectives
Body
Body without Organs
Desire
Oedipalisation
Psychoanalysis
Woman
FOLD
Simon O'Sulliaan
Although appearingthroughoutDeleuze'swork, the 'fold'is particularly
mobilised in the books on Michel Foucault and Gottfried wilhelm von
Leibniz. In eachcasethe fold is developedin relation to another'swork.
We might even say that thesebooks, like others Deleuze has written,
involvea folding- or doubling- of Deleuze'sown tliought into the thought
of anothcr.We might go further and saythat thought itself,enigmatically,
is rrkinclof ftlld,ln instanccof whatDclcuzecallsthc 'firrccsof thc outsidc'
.
thrrtfirkl thc irrsiclc.
FOL D 103
Specifically, the conceptof the fold allowsDeleuzeto think creatively
aboutthe productionof subjectivityand ultimatelyaboutthe possibilities
for,andproductionof, non-humanformsof subjectivity.In fact,on onelevel
the fold is a critique of typical accountsof subjectivity,that presumea simple
interiority and exteriority (appearanceand essence,or surfaceand depth).
For the fold announcesthat the insideis nothing more than a fold of the
outside.Deleuzegivesus Foucault'svivid illustrationof this relation,that
beingthe Renaissance madman,whq in beingput to seain a ship becomes
a passenger, or prisoner in the interior of the exterior; the fold of the sea.In
Deleuze'saccountof Foucault this picture becomesincreasinglycomplex.
There is a varietyof modalitiesof folds:from the fold of our materialselves,
our bodies,to the folding of time, or simply memory.Indeed,subjectivity
might beunderstoodaspreciselya topologyof thesedifferentkindsof folds.
In this sense.the fold can alsobe understoodasthe namefor one's rela-
tion to oneself (or, the effect of the self on the self). The Greeks were the
first to discover,and deploy,this techniqueof folding,or of (selfmastery'.
They inventedsubjectivationtakento mean the self-productionof one's
subjectivity.Subsequentcultures,suchasChristianity,haveinventedtheir
own forms of subjectivation,or their own kinds of foldings;and of course
it might be saidthat our own time hasits own folds, or eventhat it requires
new ones.This imbuesthe fold with explicitly ethicaland politicaldimen-
sions,for as Deleuzeremarks,the emergenceof new kinds of struggle
inevitablyalsoinvolvesthe productionof new kinds of subjectivity,or new
kinds of fold (hereDeleuzehasthe uprisingsof 1968in mind).
As for Deleuze's use of Foucault and Leibniz, the fold names the
relationship- one entailingdomination- of oneselfto (and 'over') one's
'self', Indeed, one's subjectivity for Deleuze is a kind of Nietzschean
masteryover the swarm of one'sbeing.This canbe configuredasa ques-
tion of ownership,or of folding. To 'have'is to fold that which is outside
inside. Meanwhile, in the Leibniz book we are offered other diagramsof
our subjectivity.One exampleis the two-floored baroquehouse.The lower
floor, or the regimeof matter,is in and of the world, receivingthe world's
imprint asit were.Here matteris foldedin the mannerof origami,whereby
cavernscontainingother caverns,in turn contain further caverns.The
world is superabundant,like a lake teeming with fish, with smallerfish
betweenthesefish, and so on ad infinitum. There is no boundary between
the organicand the inorganichereaseachis foldedinto the other in a con-
tinuoustexturology.
The upper chamberof the baroquehouseis closedin on itself,without
window or opening.It containsinnateideas,the folds of the soul,or if
wc wcrc to folkrwGuattarihere,this might bc dcscribcdasthc incorpor-
cal aspccto1'our subjcctivity.And thcn thcrc is tlrc firlclbctwccnthcsc
 r04 FO LD+ ART+ TECHNO LO G Y
two floors. This fold is like one's sryle in the world, or indeed the style
of a work of art. It is in this sensethat the upper chamber paradoxically
'contains' the Whole world folded within itself. This world is one
amongst many 'possible worlds' each as different as the beings that
expressthem. The world of a tick, for example,is different from that of
a human, involving asit doesiust the perceptionof light, the smell of its
prey and the tactile sensationof where best to burrow. This is not the
tick's representationof the world but the world's expression,or folding
in, of the tick.
As with Deleuze'sbook on Foucault, the later parts of his Leibniz
book attendto future foldings.Deleuzecallsattentionro rhe possibilityof
a new kind of harmony,or fold, betweenthe two floorsof our subjectivity.
This new kind of fold involvesan openingup of the closedchamberof the
upper floor and the concomitantaffirmation of difference,contact and
communication.Echoing his book on Foucault,here we might say that
thesenew foldingsare simply the namefor thosenew kinds of subjectiv-
ity that emergedin the 1960s,in the variousexperimentsin communal
living drug useand sexuality,aswell asin the emergenceof new prosthetic
technologies.
Connectives
Foucault
Leibniz
Nietzsche
Subjectivity
FOLD+ART+TECHNOLOGY
Simon O'Sullitsan
In his appendixto his bookon Michel FoucaultDeleuzecontinueshis naed-
itation on the fold, but looksto the future.If the fold is the operationproper
to man, then the 'superfold'issynonymouswith the superman- understood
as that which 'frees life' from within man. The supermanis in chargeof
animals(the capturing of codes),the rocks(the realmof the inorganic),and
the very beingof language(the realmof affect'below' signification).This
new kind of fold no longerfiguresthe humanbeingasa limiting factoron
thc infinite (the classicalhistoricalformation),nor positionspeoplesolely
in rclationshipto thc frrrccsof finitudc,suchas lifc, labourand language
(thc tirrnrrrtion
of'thcninctccnth ccntury).llrrthcr,in thisncw kind of firld
FOL D +AR T+TEC H N OL OGY 105
a personis involvedin what Deleuzeterms an'unlimited finity' (D 1988b:
131);that being a fold in which a 'finite number of componentsyields a
practicallyunlimiteddiversityof combinations'(D 1988b:13l). This is the
differenceand repetition of Deleuze, or what we might term his 'fractal
ontology'. Put differently, it is the radical discoveryof a person'spotential
or the revolutionary activationof immanence. /
However,the'superfold' still involvesrelationswith an outside.In fact,
for Deleuze,the superfoldwill be the result of three future folds: the fold
of molecularbiology,or the discoveryof the geneticcode;the fold of silicon
with carbon,or the emergenceof third generationmachines,cybernetics
and information technology;and the folding of language,or the uncover-
ing of a 'strangelanguagewithin language',an atypicaland a-signifying
form of expressionthat existsat the limits of language.As with the other
two this is a fold that openshumansout to that which is specificallynon-
human.That is, forcesthat canbe foldedback'into' themselves to produce
newmodalitiesof beingandexpression.The first twofoldsinvolvethe util-
isationof technologyin the productionof new kinds of life and new kinds
of subjectivity.They might producedissenting,politicallyradicalsubjects:
Donna Harraway's'cyborgs'orMichael Hardt and Antonio Negri's'New
Barbarians'for example.But they might equally produce simply new com-
modified and alienatedsubiectivities,or military assemblages. It is in this
sensethe third fold is crucial. It is a fold that breaksdown, or deviatesfrom,
dominant signification,counteractsorder-wordsor simply foregrounds
the affective,intensiveand inherentlycreativenatureof both languageand
life. This amountsto sayingthat the first twofolds must themselvesbe
stammeredby the third.
In Deleuze and Guattari's book on Franz Kafka this attention to
stuttering or stammeringis seenas characteristicof a minor literature.
A minor literatureutilisesthe sameterms asa major one,but in a different
way (it producesmovement from within the major). Another way of
putting this is that a minor literature namesthe becomingrevolutionary
of all literature (the other two accompanyingcharacteristicsof a minor
literature being its inherently collectivenature and its alwaysalready
political nature).Can we perhapsextendthis notion of a minor literature
to other realms?Might there be a sensein which a resistantand radical
politics today must involve a stuttering, or stammering, of language?In
the visual arts, for example,this might involve turning awayfrom domin-
ant regimes of signification, or at least a stammering in and of them to
producenew kinds of 'stuttering' subjectivities.This might be a descrip-
tion of some of the more radical avant-gardegroups of the twentieth
ccntury,ftrr example,Dada or the Situationists(from collageto d'6tourne-
mcnt). It might irls<lnamc thttsc 'cxpandcd prrrcticcs'thitt p<lsition
106 F ORCE
themselvesoutsidethe galleryor simply stutter the dominant languages
of sculpture and painting. Examples would be art practices, from
performanceand installation art to the relational aestheticsof today,that
turn away from typical definitions of art, or indeed typical notions of
political engagement.We might add that many of thesepracices are also
often specificallycollectivein nature.In all thesecasesart doesnot trans-
port us to an elsewherebut utilisesthe stuff of the world (we might say
the stuff of capitalism) albeit in a d,ffirent way. Art here is the discovery
of new combinationsand new waysof folding the world 'into' the sel{ or
put more simply,new kinds of subjectivity.
Of course there may still be other foldings, for example,the Oriental
fold, that asDeleuzeremarks,is perhapsnot a fold at all, and consequently
not a processof subjectivation.The relationof art to this non-fold might
be one of ritual. Which is not to saythe productionof possibleworlds,or
eventhe productionof subjectivity;rather it is both of these,in so far as
they allow accessto something,suchasthe void from which theseworlds
and subjectshaveemerged.There is an unfoldingthen that alwaysaccom-
paniesthe fold that, in turn, producesnew foldswhilst alsoopeningus up
to that which is yet to be folded.
FORCE
CliffStagoll
Deleuze'sconceptionof force is clearestin his interpretativereadingsof
Friedrich Nietzsche,but implicit throughouthis corpus.Much of what he
writes on the subject is borrowed directly from Nietzsche,although the
way in which he usesthe notion to theorise differenceand becoming is
Deleuzetsown.
For Nietzsche,the world comprisesa chaoticweb of natural and bio-
logicalforceswithout anyparticularorigin or goal,and which nevercomes
to rest at a terminal or equilibrium state.Theseforcesinteractceaselessly,
constituting a dynamic world-in-flux rather than a collection of stable
eptities.The world is alwaysin the processof becomingsomethingthar it
is not, so that, for Deleuze,the principal(andeternal)characteristic of the
world of forcesis differencefrom whateverhasgone beforeand from that
which it will become.
Neither Deleuzenor Nietzscheprovidesa clear definition of 'force'.
Deleuzestatesovertlythat he doesnotmeanby it'aggression'or'pressure'
(rrltlrotrghNictzschcis not so clclr). Ir'orl)clcuzc, wc ctn only tr:ulylrer-
rrizrclirrccslty intuitilg thcrrr;thirtis, lly grrrspit'lg
thcm withoutrcf'crcncc
FOR C E t07
to a conceptualunderstandingof existence.To try and capturein a few
words or sentenceswhat is learned through intuition is impossible.
Generally, though, 'force' means any capacity to produce a change or
'becoming',whetherthis capacityand its productsare physical,psycho-
logical,mystical,artistic,philosophical,conceptual,social,economic,legal
or whatever.All of realityis an expressionand consequence of interactions
betweenforces,with eachinteractionrevealedas an 'event' (in Deleuze's
specificsenseof the term). Every event,body or other phenomenonis,
then, the netresultofa hierarchicalpatternofinteractionsbetweenforces,
colliding in someparticular and unpredictableway.
This enigmatic characterisationof forces is developed in Deleuze's
accountof their activity.Every force exertsitself upon others.No force can
exist apart from its inter-relationshipswith other forcesand, sincesuch
associationsof struggle are alwaystemporary,forces are alwaysin the
processof becomingdifferentor passingout of existence,so that no par-
ticular forcecanbe repeated.
Deleuze holds that types of forcesare defined in both quantitativeand
qualitativeterms,but in specialways.First, the d,ffirencein quantity li the
quality of the differencein forces.Second,a forceis'active'if it seeksdom-
inance by self-affirmation, asserting itself over and above another, and
'reactive'ifit startsits struggleby first denyingor negatingthe other force.
Whereas'quality' usually refers to a particular complex, or body that
resultsfrom interactionsbetweenforces,Deleuzeusesit to refer insteadto
tendenciesat the origin of forces,regardlessof the complexthat derives
from them. On his reading,Nietzschefinds the origin of both quantitative
and qualitativecharacteristics of forcesin the Will to Power,and a kind of
genealogyshould be usedto tracequalitativeattributesof forcesto particu-
lar culturesand typesofpeople. I
Having no substance,forcescan act only upon other forces,eYenthough
the interactionsbetweenthem might result in an apparentlysubstantial
reality.'Things'aremerelya temporaryoutcome,andsooughtnot to be con-
sideredashavinganindependentexistence or essence.Contraryto Immanuel
Kant, for example,thereareon this view no 'things-in-themselves', andnor
are there, contrary to Plato, perfect originalsof which all things are but
copies.Furthermore,a physicalworld cannotbe consideredasan inevitable
or permanentconsequence of the cognitiveequipmentof a perceiveror of
the natureof whateveris beingperceived.
Indeed,for Deleuze,this dichotomousunderstandingof the perceiver
and the perceivedis also groundless.In his view, the particularity of a
pcncil, hereand now,involvesnot simply one'gazingupon' an object,but
l complcx sct of circumstantialinteractionsinvolving a whole 'plane' of
cvcntslncl orgiurisingprinciplcsrtnging from thc biologyof sightto the
{l
108 F o u c AU L r, M T c H EL (r gz6-8a)
circumstancesof the pencil's being positionedhere, and the physicsof
carbonstructures.As such,the theory of forceschallengesthe traditional
philosophical dualism between essenceand appearance,and also draws
attention to the contingent and infinitely complex nature of lived reality.
Connectives
Active/Reactive
Body
Event
Nietzsche
FOUCAULT, MICHEL (1926-84\
John Marks
Michel Foucaultand Deleuzeenjoyedan intensephilosophicalfriendship,
and much of Deleuze'swriting on Foucaultmight be locatedwithin the
tradition of the 'laudatory essay'that characteriseda certain strand of
intellectualactivityin post-warFrance.Suchan essayis not a work of criti-
cism, but rather a gestureof affectiveintensity.Talking abouthis writing
on Foucault,Deleuzeemphasises that it is not necessaryto demonstrate
a greatfidelity to the work of a thinker, nor is it necessaryto look for con-
tradictions and blind alleysin a thinker's \Mork:to saythat one part works,
but another part does not. Approaching a writer's work in the spirit of
'friendship'is the sameasa personalfriendship.It is aboutbeingwilling to
be carriedalongby the entiretyof the work, accompanying the thinker on
a journey.Sometimes, it is aboutfollowingthe work, asonemight a person,
to the point that the work becomesa little 'crazy',whereit breaksdown or
comesup againstapparentlyinsurmountableproblems.Friendship in this
sensedoesnot meanthat one necessarily hasthe sameideasor opinionsas
somebodyelse,but ratherthat one sharesa modeof perceptionwith them.
Deleuzeexplainsthat it is a matter of perceivingsomethingabout some-
body and his wayof thinking almostbeforehis thoughtis formulatedat the
level of signification.It is for this reasonthat Deleuzetalks of remember-
ing something'metallic', 'strident' and 'dry' in the gesturesof Foucault.
DeleuzeperceivesFoucaultasan individuation,a singularity,rather than
a subject.It is almostasif Deleuzerespondsto Foucault'sthinking at the
levelof his bodily materialityas much as a set of philosophicalpropos-
itions.Abovcall, DclcuzcsccsFoucaultasa writcr <lfgrcat'passion',and
hc is prrrticulrrrly struck lly thc distiltctionthnt I'irucrrultdrawsbctwccn
FoucAULr, MrcHnr- (r gz6-84) 109
love and passion.Love is a relationshipbetween individuals, whereas
passionis a statein which the individualsdissolveinto an impersonalfield
of intensities.For thesereasons,Deleuzeregardshis own book on Foucault
as an act of 'doubling', a way of bringing out and working with minor
differencesbetweenhimselfand Foucault.Both Deleuzeand Foucaulthad
a similar conceptionof the art of 'surfaces',of making visiblerather than
interpreting,and this is what Deleuzeseeksto do with Foucault'swork.
As with his other readingsof other writers,Deleuzeextractsa dynamic
logic- asopposedto a rational system- from Foucault's work. One of his
main aims in Foucaultis to clear up someof the misunderstandings sur-
rounding the transitionsin Foucault'swork. For example,Deleuzerejects
the notion that Foucault'slate work constitutessomesort of return to the
subject.Insteadhe seesthis later work asaddingthe dimensionof subject-
ification to the analysesof power and knowledgethat Foucault had previ-
ouslycarriedout. The subjectthat Foucaulttalksaboutin his final work is
not a retreator a shelter,but ratherone that is producedby a folding of the
outside.Deleuzealsorejectsthe simplisticnotion that Foucault'sformu-
lation of the 'deathof man' might precludepolitical action.The figure of
'man'is simply one historicallydistinct form of the human.Human forces
confront various other forcesat different times in history, and it is in this
way that a compositehuman form is constructed.
In a doublesense,Deleuzeperceivesthat which is 'vital' in Foucault's
work. That is to say,he concentrateson what Foucault thought out of
absolutenecessity, aswell asthe waysin which Foucault'swork expresses
a commitment to life. Foucault may appearto be preoccupiedwith death,
imprisonmentand torture, but this is becausehe is concernedwith the
waysin which life might be freed from imprisonment.That is not to say
that Deleuzeand Foucaultdid not feel there were points of real tension
betweentheir approaches. Foucault,for his part, found Deleuze'suse of
the term 'desire' problematic,since for him desire would alwaysentail
some notion of 'lack' or repression.He preferred the term 'pleasure',
which wasequallyproblematicfor Deleuze,becausepleasureseemsto be
a transcendent categorythat interrupts the immanenceof desire.However,
rather than thesedifferencesbeingthe basisfor a critical interpretationof
Foucault'swork, they areactuallyconstitutiveof the 'tranv".rulfdiugorrol
line that Deleuze attempts to trace betweenhimself and Foucault. It is in
this way that he hopesto bring out what Foucaultwasstriving to do in his
work, and it is in this spirit that Deleuzeoccasionallyfocuseson one of
Foucault'sapparentlyminor concepts,suchasthat of the 'infamousman'.
Deleuze finds this concept particularly resonant and respondsto its
urgcncgsinccl,irucaultuscsit to attcmptto think throughdifficultprob-
lcmsrclatingto his own undcrstirncling of'powcr.
ll0 FoucAULr f n ' ol n
Connectives
Desire
Transversality
FOUCAULT + FOLD
Tom Conley
The most terseand telling formulation of the fold is found in 'Foldings,
or the Inside of Thought (Subfectivation)',the last chapterof Deleuze's
Foucauhthat examinesFoucault'sthree-volumestudy of the history of
sexuality.Michel Foucualt,saysDeleuze,took sexualityto be a mirror of
subjectivityand subjectivation.Deleuzebroadensthe scopeby subsum-
ing sexualityin a matrix of subjectivity.Every human being thinks as
a result of an ongoingprocessof living in the world and by gainingcon-
sciousness and agencythrough a constantgive-and-takeof perception,
affect and cognition. Subjectivity becomesan ongoing negotiarionof
things perceived,both consciouslyand unconsciously, within and outside
the body.He builds a diagram, principally from TheHistory of Sexuality:
VolumeOne (1976) and The Useof Pleasure(1984),on the foundation of
the earlier writings to sketch a taxonomy and a history of the project.
In TheArchaeologyof Knowledge(1972),Foucault had contendedthat the
'self', the 'I', is alwaysdefinedby the waysit is doubledby another,not a
singleor commanding'other' or Doppelgringer, but simply any of a number
of possibleforces.'It is I who live my life as the double of the orher,' and
when I find the other in myself the discovery'resemblesexactly the
invaginationof a tissuein embryology,or the act of doubling in sewing:
twist, fold, stop,and so on' (D 1988b:105).For Foucault,history wasthe
'doublingof an emergence'(D 1988b:98).By that he meanrthar what was
pastor in an archivewasalsopassed- asmight a speedingcar overtaken
or doubled by another on a highway - but alsomirrored or folded into a
diagram.History wasshownto be what sumsup the pastbut that can be
marshalledfor the shapingof configurationsthat will determine how
people live and act in the present and future. Whether forgotten or
remembered,history is one of the formativedoublesor othersvital to the
processof subjectivation.
Therein beginsDeleuze'srhapsodyof foldsandfoldings.When a doub-
ling producesan inner and an outer surface- a doublurein French,
meaningat once a lining stitchedinto a pieceof clothing,a stand-inin a
cincmaticprocluction, and cvena douhleasAntonin Artaud had uscdthc
FoUcAULT * r 'oln 111
term in his writings on theatre - a new relation with 'being' is born.
An insideand an outsideand a past(memory)and a present(subjectivity)
are two sidesof a singlesurface.A person'srelation with his or her body
becomesboth an archive anda diagram,a collection of subiectivationsand
a mental map charted on the basisof the past and drawn from eventsand
elementsin the ambientworld. Deleuzeassertsthat four folds, 'like the
four rivers of Hell' (D 1988b:104),affectthe subject'srelation to itself.
The first is the fold of the body,what is surroundedor takenwithin cor-
porealfolds;the secondis'the fold ofthe relationbetweenforces',or social
conflict;the third is the 'fold of knowledge,or the fold of truth in so far as
it constitutesa relation of truth to our being' (D 1988b:104),and vice-
versa;the fourth is the fold of 'the outsideitself, the ultimate' (D 1988b:
104) fold of the limit of life and death. Each of these folds refers to
Aristoteliancauses(material,efficient,formal and final) of subjectivityand
hasa variablerhythm of its own. We behooveourselves,Deleuzereminds
us, to inquire of the natureof the four foldsbeforewe reflecton how sub-
jectivityin our time is highly internalised,individualisedand isolated.The
struggle for subjectivity is a battle to win the right to have accessto
difference,variationand metamorphosis.
The human subjectcan only be understoodunder the condition (the
formula, it will be shown, is a crucial one) of the fold and through the
filters of knowledge,power and affect. The fold, a form said to obsess
Foucault, is shown as somethingcreasedbetweenthings stated or said,
and things visible or seen.The distinction openedbetweenvisible and
discursive formations is put forward in order to be drawn away from
intentionality (as understood in Martin Heidegger and Maurice
Merleau-Ponty) that would ally subjectivity with phenomenology.
Things spokendo not refer to an original or individual subjectbut to a
'being-language',and things visiblepoint to a 'being-light'that illumin-
ates'forms, proportions, perspectives'that would be free of any inten-
tional gaze. Anticipating his work on Leibniz, Deleuze notes that
Foucault causesintentionality to be collapsedin the gap between 'the
two monads' (D 1988b:109)of seeingand speaking.Thus, phenomen-
ology is convertedinto epistemology.To seeand to speakis to know,'but
we don't seewhat we are speakingof and we don't speakof what we are
seeing'. Nothing can precede or antedate knowledge (saaoir), even
though knowledgeor knowing is 'irremediablydouble'- hencefolded -
as speakingand seeing,as languageand,light,which are independentof
intending subjectswho would be speakersand seers.
At this juncturethe fold becomesthe very fabricof ontology,the ateaof
philosophywith which Deleuze claims staunchaffiliation.The folds of
being (as a gcruncl)and of bcing (as a noun) are found in Foucault's
 n2 F o U c AU L T * nolo
Heideggerand that of an outside is twisted, folded and doubled by an
inside in the philosopher'sreading of Merleau-Ponty.Surely, Deleuze
observes,Foucault finds theoreticalinspiration in the themesof the fold,
the doublethat hauntsthe archaeologist of knowledge.As a doublingor a
lining the fold separates speechfrom sightandkeepseachregisterin a state
of isolationfrom the other. The gap finds an analoguein the hermetic
differenceof the soundand imagetrack of cinema.From such a division
knowledgeis dividedinto piecesor 'tracks'and thus canneverbe recuper-
atedin anyintentionalform (D 1988b:111).The dividednatureof com-
munication has as its common metaphor the creaseor fold between
visibility and orality. It is no wonder that in his studiesof differenceand
resemblanceFoucault begins at the end of the sixteenth century, at the
moment when writing evacuatesits force of visual analogyfrom its printed
form. At that point, when print-culture becomesstandardisedand
schematicreasoningreplacesmemory in manualsof rhetoric, or when
wordsareno longeranalogous to the thingsthey seemto embodyor resem-
ble, signsbegin to stand,in for their referentsand to be autonomousdoubles
with respectto what they represent.
To demonstratehow the fold is a figure of subjectivationDeleuzecalls
history into the philosophicalarena.He asksin bold and simplelanguage:
'What canI do?WhatdoI know?Vl/hatam1? (D 1988b:I l5). The eventsof
May 1968rehearsedthesequestionsby inquiring of the limits of visibility,
of language,and of power.They brought forward thoughtsabouturopia,
and henceaboutmodesof beingthat would enableresistance in repressive
politicalconditionsand fosterthe birth of ideasvital for new subjectivities.
In a historicalconfiguration'being' is chartedalongan axis of knowing.
'Being' is determinedby what is deemedvisibleand utterable;by the exer-
cise of power,itself determined by relation of force and singularitiesat a
given moment in time; and by subjectivity,shown to be a processor the
placeswherethe fold of the self passesthrough.A grid or a new diagram
makesclearthe oppositionby settingforward variationsof power,know-
ledgeandsubjectivity(in Frenchassauoir,pouaoir,soi).The lastis conceived
asa fold. Foucault,Deleuzeadvances, doesnot divide a history of institu-
tionsorof subjectivationsbutof theirconditionsandof theirprlcesseswithin
creases and foldingsthat operatein both ontologicaland socialfields.
There is openeda dramaticreflectionon rhe characrerof thinking which
belongs as much to Deleuze as to Foucault. Historical formations are
doubledand thus defineassuchthe epistemictraits of knowledge,powerand
subjectivity:in termsof knowledge,ro think is to seeand to speak;in other
words,thinking takesplacein the inrersticesof visibility and discoursc.
Whcn wc think wc causclightningboltsto flashanclflickcr'in the midstof
words,or unlcisht.cry in thc nridstof'visiblcthings'(l) lgtlttb:ll(r).
FR EED OM ll3
Thinking makes seeingand speakingreach their own limits. In what
concerns power, thinking is equivalent to 'emitting singularities', to a
gambler'sact of tossinga pair of dice onto a table,or to a personengaging
relationsof forceor evenconflict in order to preparenew mutationsand sin-
gularities.In terms of subjectivationthinking means'to fold to doublethe
Outsidewith a coextensive inside'(D 1988b:118).Createdis a topologyby
which inner and outerspacesarein contactwith eachother.
History is takento be an archioeor seriesof stratafrom which thinking,
a diagramrepletewith strategies,drawsits force and virtue. To makethe
point clearDeleuzealludesindirectly to'A New Cartographer'(D 1988b:
2347), an earlier chapter that anticipatesmuch of the spatialdynamicsof
The Fold,.When we 'think' we cross all kinds of thresholds and strata.
Followinga fissurein order to reach,asthe poet Herman Melville callsit,
a 'centralroom' where we fear no one will be and where 'man's soul will
reveal nothing but an immense and terrifying void' (D 1988b: l2l).
Ultimately,followinga line of 1,000aberrationsand moving at molecular
speedleadslife into the folds and a centralroom wherethere is no longer
any needto fearemptinessbecausethe self (a fold) is found inside.These
ideasarch back to how Deleuze once describedthe history of forms or an
archiveas 'doubled' (passedor folded over) by a becomingof forceswhere
any number of diagrams- or folded surfacesof thought - plied overeach
other. He calls it the torsion of the 'line of the Outside' that Melville
described,an oceanicline without beginningor end, an oceanicline that
turns and bumpsaboutdiagrams.The form of the line was 1968,the line
'with a thousandaberrations'(D1988b:44).
FREEDOM
Paul Patton
'Freedom'is not a term that appearsoften in Deleuze'swritings,yet there
is a distinctiveconceptof freedomimplicit throughouthis ethico-political
texts written with Guattari. Thesedescribeindividual and collectivesub-
jectsin terms of differentkinds of assemblage, line or modesof occupying
space.For example,they suggestthat we are composedof three kinds of
line: firstly, molar lines which correspondto the forms of rigid segmenta-
tion found in bureaucraticand hierarchicalinstitutions; secondly,mole-
cular lines which correspondto the fluid or overlappingforms of division
characteristicof 'primitive' territoriality; and finally,lines of flight which
arcthc pathsalongwhichthingschangcor bccomctransformcdinto somc-
thing clsc.'l'hc primrrcyof' lincs of'flight in this ontol(,gysystcnrilticillly
ll4 FREEDO M
privileges processesof creative transformation and metamorphosis
through which assemblages may be transformed. Freedom is manifest in
the critical points at which somestateor condition of things passesover
into a different stateor condition. In contrastto the traditional conceptsof
negative and positive freedom, freedom for Deleuze concerns those
momentsin a life after which one is no longer the samepersonasbefore.
This is an impersonaland non-voluntaristicconceptof freedom which
refers to the capacityfor changeor transformationwithin or between
assemblages. In the texts written with Guattari, this concept of freedom
appearsonly in the guiseof other conceptssuchas 'line of flight', 'deter-
ritorialisation'or'smooth space'.
ln A Thousand, Plateaus,the authorsuseE ScottFitzgerald's novella,The
Cracb-Up,to showhow this kind of transformationin a personmight be
definedin terms of the differentkinds of 'line' which characterise an indi-
vidual life (D&G 1987:198-200).Fitzgerald distinguishesthree different
kinds oftransition from one stateor stagein life to another:firstly, the large
breakssuch as those betweenyouth and adulthood, betweenpoverty and
wealth, betweenillness and good health, betweensuccessor failure in a
chosen profession; secondly,the almost imperceptible cracks or subtle
shiftsof feelingor attitudewhich involvemolecularchangesin the affective
constitutionofa person;and finally the abrupt and irreversibletransitions
through which the individual becomesa different personand eventually,
Fitzgeraldwrites, 'the new personfinds new things to care about.' The
subjectof the novellaundergoesa particularly severebreakdowninvolving
lossof faith in his former valuesand the dissipationof all his convictions.
He seeksto effectwhat he calls'a cleanbreak'with his pastself (F 1956:
69-84).Sucha breakamountsto a redistributionof desiresuchthat 'when
somethingoccurs,the Self that awaitedit is alreadydead,or the one that
would awaitit hasnot yet arrived'(D&G 1987:198-9).
This kind of suddenshift towardsanotherquality of life or towardsa life
which is livedat anotherdegreeof intensityis onepossibleoutcomeof what
Deleuzeand Guattaricall 'a line of flight', and it is on this kind of line that
freedomis manifest.The type of freedomthat is manifestin a breakof this
kind cannotbe capturedin liberalor humanistconceptsof negativeor posi-
tive freedom,sincethesedefinefreedomin terms,ofa subject'scapacityto
act without hindrancein the pursuit of its endsor in terms of its capacity
to satisfy its most significant desires.Fitzgerald's characterno longer has
the sameinterestsnor the samedesiresand preferences. In the relevant
senseof the term, he is no longer the samesubject:his goalsare not the
same,nor arethe valueswhich wouldunderpinhis strongevaluations.
Whcrclsthc normativcstiltusof libcralfrccdomis unambiguously posi-
tivc.'ficcdonr'in this | )clcuzirrnscnscis morcitnrbivirlcnt. Frccdonrirr this
GEN EAL OGY ll5
senseis indifferentto the desires,preferencesand goalsof the subjectin
that it may threatenasmuch asadvanceany of these.It is not clearby what
standardssuch freedom could be evaluatedas good or bad. There is no
telling in advancewhere such processesof mutation and change might
lead.Similar commentsmay alsobe madeaboutdeterritorialisation,Iines
of flight or smoothspace.In the absenceof productiveconnectionswith
other forces,lines of flight may turn destructiveor simply lead to new
forms of capture.In the conclusionof the discussionof smoothasopposed
to striated spaceat the end of A ThousandPlateaus,Deleuze and Guattari
reaffirm the normative ambiguity of freedom: 'smooth spacesare not in
themselvesliberatory.But the struggleis changedor displacedin them,
and life reconstitutesits stakes,confrontsnewobstacles, inventsnewpaces'
switchesadversaries. Never believe that a smooth spacewill sufficeto save
us'(D&G 1987:500).The presuppositionhereis that, prima facie,smooth
spaceis the spaceof freedom. It is the spacein which movements or
processesof liberation are possible,evenif thesedo not alwayssucceedor
evenif they are condemnedto the reappearanceof new forms of capture.
Connectives
Deterritorialisation
Lines of flight
Molar
Molecular
Space
FREUD, SIGMUND - refer to the entry on 'psycho-
(1856_1939)
analysis'.
GENEALOGY
Bruce Baugh
'Genealogy'refersto tracing linesof descentor ancestry.Deleuze'suseof
thc tcrm dcrivcsfrom Fricdrich Nictzschc's On the Genculog.yol'Morals,
 ll6 G ENEALO G Y
which traces the descentof our moral concepts and practices.one key
precept of the genealogicalmethod is that effecrsneed not resembletheir
causes,asthe forcesthat producea phenomenonmay disguisethemselves
(for example,a religion of love canariseout of resentment);anotheris that
'slaves',for whom 'good' is merely the negationof 'evil'). In Deleuze's
hands,Nietzscheangenealogyis allied with the philosophiesof imma-
nence (Henri Bergsonand Baruch spinoza), such that the 'past' from
which a phenomenonis descendedis a set of forces immanent in the
phenomenon that expressesthose forces, and thus coexistent with the
present.
activeor reactive,is nothingbut the differencein quantitybetweena super-
ior and an inferior force(D 1983:43), an inferior forcecan defeata super-
ior one by 'decomposing'it and making it reactive,so that the genealogist
must evaluatewhether the forcesthat prevailedwere inferior or superior,
activeor reactive(D 1983:59-60).Poweror the will is eitheraffirmativeor
negative,and designatesthe differentialrelation of forceswhich either
dominate(active)or aredominated(reactive)accordingto whether the will
affirms its difference from that difference it dominates and enjoys, or
whether it negateswhat differs from it and suffers from that difference
(often in the form of resentmen$.The affirmativewill, in affirming itsel{,
wills that it be obeyed;only a subordinate will can obey by converting
'actions' into reactionsto an external forcg and this becoming-reactiveis
the expressionof a negativewill.
Genealogythus interprets and evaluatesthe hierarchicaldifference
betweenactiveand reactiveforcesby referring theseto the hierarchical
'geneticelbment' of a 'will to Power' that is either affirmativeor negative.
will to Powerdifferentiatesforcesasactiveand reactive,asthrough it one
forcedominatesor commandsanorherthat obeysor is dominated(D l9g3:
49-51). However,will to Poweris not externalto the forcesit qualifiesor
conditions,but is an immancnt principle of forcesand the relationsof
forces,their 'internal gcncsis'by conditionsimmanentto the condi-
tioncd(D 1983:9l). Gcncakrgythusconncctsconscqucnccs to premisses,
;rroducts fo thc principlc of' thcir llroduction,by scckingthc scnscof
prERRn-r'f,t-rx ( r g 3o-92) tL7
cuArrARr,
phenomenain the forcesthey express(symptomology),interpreting forces
as active or reactiye (typology), and evaluating the origin of forces in a
quality of will that is either affirmativeor negative.For example,reason,
rather than beingmerelya givenfaculty of the mind, expresses a nihilistic
and negative will which negates the sensesand the sensory world to
producea'True world'beyondappearances (D 1983:91,125,1+5).
Deleuzecontinuesusinghis genealogicalmethodin laterworks.ln Anti-
Oedipus,he traces memory and morality to the debtor-creditor relation
and the primitive practice of inflicting physical pain for unpaid debts.
Originally justiceis the assertionof an equivalencebetweenthe creditor's
pleasurein paininflictedon the debtorand the injury causedby the unpaid
debt; memoryis the product of marksinscribedon the body for a debt not
paid, living reminders that produce the capacity to remember the future
momentat which the promisemust be kept. The sovereignindividualwho
can makeand keeppromisesand defineshimself by powerover himself is
thus the product of punishment: how culture trains and selectsits
members(D 1983:l34J; D&G 1983:144-5,190-2). Deleuzealsouses
genealogyto show that the reactiveforcesand negativewill expressedby
the priest type are also expressedin the figure of the psychoanalyst;both
createguilt out of an infinite and unpayabledebt, whetherthat be to a God
who sacrificeshimself for us, or to the analyst as cure for the condition
the analystproduces(D&G 1983:108-12,269, 332-3; D&G 1987:154).
Even at the basicontologicallevel, aswhen he finds 'the being of the sens-
ible' in 'differencein intensity as the reasonbehind qualitativediversity'
(D 1994: 57), Deleuze remains a genealogist,interpreting phenomena
through the hidden relations of forcesimmanent in them.
Connectives
Active/Reactive
Immanence
Nietzsche
GUATTARI, PIERRE-FELIX ( 1930-92)
Garjt Genosko
Pierre-F6lixGuattari was fifteen when he met psychoanalyst
JeanOury,
founderof Cliniquede la Borde,throughJean'sbrotherFernand,developer
of institutionalpcdagogyin France.By the time he reachedtwentyyears
GurrttrriwastnkcnundcrJcrn'swing.JcanconvinccdGuttttri to abtndon
 l 18 cuArrARr, pTERRE-FfLrx ( r g3o_ gz)
his study of commercialpharmacyand, in the early 1950s,he visited
Jean
at clinique saumery,a precursorof La Borde.saumerywasGuattari'sini-
tiation into the psychiatricmilieu. while a teenagerGuattari had met
Fernandoury through the youth hostellingmovement(Fidiration (Jniedes
Auberges d.eJeunesse).
Fernandoury wasinstrumentalin gettingGuattari
involvedin the summercaravanshe organisedin the paris suburb of La
Garenne-colombes for working-class suburban youth like Guattari
himself,who grew up in the samedepartmenrin nearbyVilleneuve.
Guattari assistedin the foundationalwork at La Borde where he
helpedwrite its constitutiond,elAn 1 the yearit openedin 1953.Guatari,s
next task was to organiseintra-hospitalrherapeutic clubs for patients.
Guattari'sinvolvementincreasedafter 1955.
Guattari's career was also shapedby the friendly tutelage of another
master,whom he had met when he wasjust twenty-three,JacquesLacan.
It wasnot until 1962that Guattari graduatedto a didactictraining ar\aly-
siswith Lacan,joiningthe Ecolefreudiennede parisasan analyst
in 1969.Guartari'sformativeintellectualmilieu wasLacanian. -"-u!,
By the mid-1960s Guattari had developeda formidable battery of
conceptsorganisedaround the problem of deliveringtherapyin institu-
tional settings.Psychanalyse et tra,nsaersalitiexposedthe limits of the psy-
choanalyticunconsciousby arguingthat it wasnot a concernof specialists
treating individualsbut rather perfusedthe socialfield and history.For
Guattarithe subjectwasa group or collectiveassemblage of heterogeneous
componentswhose formation, delinked from monadic individuals and
abstract, universal determinationslike the oedipus myth, structural
matheme and part object, could be seenthrough critical analysesof the
actual vicissitudesof collectivelife in which patientsfound themselves.
A Sartrean-inflectedtheory of groups emerged distinguishing non-
absolutelybetweensubject-groups(activelyexploring self-definedpro-
jects) and subjugated groups (passively receiving directions), each
affectingthe relationsof their membersto socialprocesses and shapingthe
potentialfor subjectformation.
The foundation of what Guattari called schizoanalysiswas laid
in L'inconscient machinique. schizoanalysisrequiresa practical,detailed
semioticsaswell asa politicallyprogressive and provisionaltransformation
of situationalpowerrelations.The analyst'smicropoliticaltaskis to discern
in a particularassemblage the mutationalpotentialof a given component
and explorethe effectsof its passages in and betweenassemblages, produc-
ing and extracting singularitiesby undoing impasses,arienatingand
dcadcningrcdundancies: 'Ratherthan indcfinitclytracingthe samccom-
plcxcs<lrthc samcunivcrsirl "milthcmcs",a schizoirnllytic cirrt<lgraphy will
cxpkrrclnd cxpcrinrcnt wirhan unc.nsci'usin luuality'(G l97t):190).
cuArrARI, pTERRE-r'6ltx (r93o-92) l19
Micropolitical schizoanalysiswill map, in a way specific to each
passage,delinguistifiedand mixed semiotic lines flush with matters of
expression, rhizomes released from arborescent structures, molecular
schizzeson the run from molar bureaucracies,faciality traits loosened
from dominant overcodings,and new machinic connectionsand breaks,
regardlessof their level of formation, elaboratingtheir becomingsand
new terms of referenceacrossthe socialfield. This emphasison molecu-
larity entailsa sociopoliticalanalysisthat privilegescreative,oppositional
flight and eschewsso-calledprofessionalneutrality.Guattari introduced
the machineasa productiveconnectivityirreducibleboth to technologies
and to foundationalsubstances; machinesform assemblages of compon-
ent parts.
The two editionsof La riaolutionmoliculaire(1977and 1980)contained
advancedsemiotic methods, modified from Hjelmslevian and Peircean
roots,adequateto the 'semioticpolycentrism'necessary for engagingin a
genuinetransversalanalysisof the expandedfields of the unconscious,
with a less woodenlydichotomoussenseof super ego on one side and
sociuson the other. Guattari's writings on developmentsin Italy in the
1970sunderlined their potential for new molecular forms of collective
action,what he called'generalizedrevolution'.
Cartographies schizoanolytiques and Chaosmose elaboratednonrepresen-
tationalmapsof the self-engendering processesof subjectification,prag-
matically attending to the specific ways in which singularitiescome
together,through four ontological functions of the unconscious,their
interfaces,and the characterof their components:material fluxes and
machinicphylums; existentialterritoriesand incorporealuniverses.The
former are actual and discursiveon the plane of expression;the latter
virtual and non-discursiveon the planeof content.Emergentassemblages
of enunciationare ontologicallycomplex becausein a given situation a
schizoanalyst triesto bridgethe virtual and actualby discerningthe former
and attending to how they actually work themselvesout relationally
betwixt manifestationandpossibility,processually andexpressively assub-
jcctivity everemerges.
Guattari is internationallyrecognisedfor his collaborationswith Gilles
l)cleuze on Anti-Oedipus,Kafha, A Thousand' Plateau.s,and What is
l'hilosoph.y?,yet his key theoreticalstatementsremainvirtually unknown.
(lonnectives
l,itcitn
l)sychornirlysis
'l i'ansvcrsrlity
 120 HAECCEI TY
HAECCEITY - refer to the entries on 'experience',,individuation',
'percept+ literature','phenomenology
* Husserl'and,post-structuralism
* politics'.
HARDY, THOMAS (1840-1928)- refer to the entries on ,art, and
'percept * literature'.
HEGEL, GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH (1770-1831)
- referto
the entries on tarborescent schema', tBergson', tcapitalism * universal
history', tcapture', 'cinema * Werner Herzog', tdifference', ,immanencet,
'phenomenology'and'Spinoza'.
HEIDEGGER, MARTIN (1889-1976)- refer ro the entries on
'Foucault+ foldt, tnonbeingt,tontology',tphenomenology,,.socius,,.sub-
stance'and 'thought'.
HUME, DAVID (l7tt-76\
CIiffStagoll
David Hume was a Scottish philosopher,historian,economistand reli-
gious theorist,and perhapsthe best known of the philosopherscom-
monly designated'empiricisrs'.Although Hume's grouping with such
thinkers as John Locke'and George Berkeleyis questionable,mid- to
late-twentieth-centuryhistoriesof philosophyplacedthem togetherrou-
tinely.In a chapteron Hume, typically one either encountersa naturalist
extendingand radicalisingthe work of Locke and/or Berkeley(or Ren6
Descartesand NicolasMalebranche),or a scepticwhosecontributionsto
philosophyare largelyor wholly critical. Perhapshis best-knownphilo-
sophicaltheoryis that ideasnot clearlyoriginatingfrom senseimpressions
ought to bc'committcdto flames'.only in thc latc 1960sand early 1970s
HUM E, DAVI o ( r 7r t - 76) t21
did the focusof Anglo-AmericanHume studiesmoveawayfrom such stri-
dent epistemological assertionstowardshis analysisof the passions,prin-
ciplesof association, and suchfeaturesof the mind asinstinct,propensity,
belief, imagination, feeling and sympathy.Deleuze had adopted this
emphasisin 1952and 1953,focusingmainly upon the naturalismevident
in Hume's principlesof human nature.
Deleuze'sshift in emphasisextendedfurther. Whereasit is commonly
held that Hume, finding himself unableto counter his scepticalepistemo-
logical conclusions,turned to history,sociology,religion and economics
out of frustration,DeleuzeconsidersHume's entire corpus to comprise
variousstagesin the developmentof a 'scienceof human nature'.Just as
human life involvesethical,epistemological and aestheticdimensions,so
too it involveseconomic,religiousand historicalones.For Deleuze,one
cannotproperly understandHume's philosophywithout referring to his
work in other disciplines.
In his publishedworks and interviews,Deleuzereturns time and again
to Hume's empiricism.His most detailedand sustainedaccountof it is
Empiricismand,Subjectitsity,hisfirst full book. Deleuze focuseson three
aspectsof Hume's philosophyin particular.The first is Hume's commit-
ment to a philosophy founded upon direct experience,a position that
reappearsas a key tenet of Deleuze's'transcendentalempiricism'. On
Deleuze'sreading, Hume begins his philosophicalinvestigationswith
straightforwardobservationsabout the world: humansseeobiects,posit
the existenceof gods,make ethical judgements,plan work to meet eco-
in somesense.Deleuze
nomicimperatives,and remainawareof themselves
arguesthat, becauseHume is unable initially to find in thought any element
(constancy
of or universality'to which he might refer a psychologyper se'
he developsinsteada 'psychologyof the mind's affections',a theoryabout
socialandpas-
the regular'movement'of the mind accordingto observable
sional circumstances.Rather than building some philosophical edifice,
however,Hume readsthe conceptsneededto explainsuchdynamicsfrom
out of the reality of experience,treating them as contingentexplanatory
toolsthat canalwaysbe replacedor supplemented.
The secondof Deleuze'semphasesis upon Hume's 'atomism'.Hume
conceivesof the mind asa set of singularideas,eachwith a distinct origin
or setof originsin experience. Ratherthan arguingthat the mind precedes
ideasso that experienceis given ro the mind, Hume holds that the mind
just ls theseradicallydisparateideas.On this reading,nothing transcends
the ideasof the mind, and sothe connectionsbetweenthem arein no sense
'pre-programmed'.
Deleuze'sthird emphasisis upon Hume's'associationism'. Sinceideas
lrc not inherently structured, there are any number of waysthat they can
 122 HYSTERI A
be brought together to generatenew patterns of understanding,new
behavioursand so on. For Deleuze,Hume discountsthe possibility of
any universalprinciple or capacityto govern such connections.Ratheq
such creativepotentialis realisedunder the influenceof the life of prac-
tice (that is, pressuresarisingfrom economicand legalstructures,family,
languagepatterns, physical requirementsand so on). The tendencies
evident in human responsesto such influencesmight be called 'general
rules', but rather than trulestin the usualsense,theseare contingentand
impermanent.
The epiphenomenonarising from such complex, contingent and
changingrelationshipsand tendenciesis the human subject,that we call
'I'. This Humean subject is understood by Deleuze as a fiction,
sufficiently stable to have identity posited of it and ro exist in a social
realm, but 'containing' elementsof dynamism with the capacityto tran-
scend hierarchicalthinking of a human being in favour of rhizomatic
thinking of non-humanbecoming.Whilst porrionsof the model become
targetsfor Deleuze'ssubsequentattackson the ontology of identity and
being,othersprovide him with meansof escapeto a radicalmetaphysics
of becoming.
Although Deleuzeis usually faithful ro Hume's writings, his readings
are idiosyncraticand go well beyond the original texts. His focus upon
generalrules, artifice, habit and stabilisingfictions carry an inordinate
weight in Deleuze's early theorisation of the human individual.
Nonetheless,whilst his interpretationof Hume is unusual,it is far less
radicalthan his versionsof Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz and Friedrich
Nietzsche.
Connective
Transcendental
empiricism
HYSTERIA
Jonathan Roffe
A frequent method to be found in Deleuze'sphilosophyis the use of
non-philosophicalterms and perspectivesin a philosophicalmanner.
Particularly good examplesof this are availablein Anti-Oediltusand
A ThousandPlateaus,where Deleuzeand Guattari generaliscand altcr
cortrrinpsychoanalytic conccpts(particularlyschizophrcnia and parrrnoia)
in ordcr to r.rsc
tlrcnrin srrcialirrrrlysis.
lt is in thisscnscthlt l)clcuzctrkcs
H Y S TE R IA 123
the term 'hysteria',derivedfrom nineteenth-centurypsychiatricthought,
and appliesit to the art of the Irish painterFrancisBacon.For Deleuzeand
Guattari, hysteriadescribes- in this generalphilosophicalsense- the
attempt to escapefrom one's own body which is experiencedas a trap.
However,it is not that the hystericis trying to liberatehis soul from the
body - that would be a very traditional philosophicalnotion - but rather
that the organisationof the body itself is oppressive.Hysteria is a namefor
the friction betweenthe body itself and the organisationsthat it undergoes
sociallyand politically.
So, in this context,the body is two things at once.On the one hand, it
is the set of politically acceptable, socialand habitualactswhich makeup
a person.On the other, the body is malleableand transient,without any
fixed organisation.It is in a certain sensethe reality of living life other-
wise, of being-otherwise.Drawing on the writings of Antonin Artaud,
Deleuzeand Guattariin A Thousand, Plateauscall this malleablebody the
'Body without Organs' (BwO). In contrast is the social and politically
organ-isedbody.
Baconcan be seenasa painter of hystericsbecausehis figuresexpress
both the senseof strain that bodies are under (the pressureand struc-
ture of organisation),and the attempt of these bodies to escapetheir
organisation.For example,Deleuzethinks that Bacon'sfamouspainting
Stud,yAfter Wldzquez'sPortrait of PopeInnocentX (1953) - otherwise
referredto asthe ScreamingPope- showsa body trying to leavethrough
the mouth of the figure. Likewise, the link betweenbodies and meat or
fleshshowshow life doesnot take placebeyondthe body,in the mind or
soul, but in the body itself. Rather than seeing Bacon as a painter of
horror and existential meaninglessness,Deleuze proposes that we see
him asa painterof life, depicting the struggleof bodily or fleshlylife with
the shapesthat it is forced to assume.This is the hystericalaspectof
Bacontsart.
Finally,Deieuzearguesthat the term 'hysteria'can be usedto describe
paintingitself.While all art, he insists,mustbe understoodin termsof how
it expressesthe imperceptibleforce of life, painting hasa certain privileged
relation to the body.Pictorial art, Deleuzeclaims,addresses itself to the
cye.However,rather than placingthe eye on the side of the disembodied
mind of the spectator,the encounterwith the forceof painting- which in
thc caseof Baconis particularlymanifestin his useof colour- returns the
cyc to the fleshlybody.In other words,the forceof painting dissolvesthe
rnind/body hierarchy of the organisedbody, offering the spectatoran
opportunity to frcc up the BwQ and therebyto becomeconcretelyfreerin
:r gcncrirlscnsc.'l'his proviclcsthc link bctwcenptlliticsand irrt that occa-
siorrally cnrcrgcs in l)clcuzc'swork.
t2+ I DENTI TY
Connectives
Bacon
Body without Organs
Schizoanalysis
IDENTITY
James Williams
In Deleuze'swork, identity is perhapsthe most heavilycriticisedconcept
from the philosophicaltradition. That criticism takesmany forms and
dependson many different argumentsand aestheticexpressions.However,
these can be simplified through the claim that Deleuze's opposition to
identity is directed at the falsifying power of identity in representation.
Identity works against and covers deeper pure differences.It does so
because of the dominanceof the demandto representin the historyof phil-
osophy.Objects,subjects,faculties,feelings,ideasand thoughtsmust be
representedfor them to becomea legitimatepart of philosophicaldebate.
For this representationto takeplacethey must be identified.
There is a strong descriptionof this historicaldominancein Dffirence
and,Repetition,where Deleuzecharacterises it accordingto a seriesof 'pos-
tulates' presupposedby a certain 'image of thought'. When thought is
associatedby right with truth and with the good, certain unexamined
premissesare at work. Most notably,that truths and goodscan be repre-
sentedin thought and most properly by thought.
So what concernsDeleuze is not only the claim that truths and goods
must be represented, but alsothe belief that thought is dependenton rep-
resentationand on identity for its path to the good and the true. His cri-
tiquesof other philosophers.often dependon showinghow this imageof
thought is operatingunconsciouslyand damaginglyin their works. The
damageis causedbecausereality is a processof becoming,which involves
pure differencesthat cannotbe represented.
By turning us awayfrom reality,the commitmentto identity in repre-
sentationfurthers an illusion that leadsus to repressprocesses of becom-
ing at work in our own existence. The effects<lfthcseprocesses becomeall
thc morc clillicult to work with, oncc that rcprcssionhas takcn placc.
IMMA N E N C E 125
In termsof identity,Deleuze'sphilosophycanbe seenasa critical attempt
to cure us of the self-destructivedependence on identity.
But what is identity accordingto Deleuzel ln Dffirence and.Repetition
he gives an account of it in terms of concepts (though in lMhat is
Philosophy? he and Guattari usethe term in a different sense).Identity is
opposedto multiplicity, in that multiplicity is both uncountableand not
open to a reductive logical or mathematicalanalysis.Thus, if any concept
is definedasa seriesofidentifiable predicatesor properties,then to saythat
all things must be representedthrough conceptsis to further a falseimage
of reality.An identifiablepredicatewould itself be simple,limited and well-
determined, something that could be checkedempirically or through
reasonwith certainty.
Accordingto Deleuzenothing canbe checkedin this way.Conceptsand
representations do not correspondto anythingin reality.This is because
all things are connectedto multiplicities, that is, to uncountableand
unidentifiableprocesses of becoming,rather than existingasfixed beings
with identifiableand limited predicatesor essences.
But this showsthe extremedifficulty of Deleuze'sposition,not only in
terms of communicability,but alsoin terms of how it can be understood.
Do we not needto be ableto representsomethingin order to be ableto talk
aboutit in an open and effectivemanner?Do we not needto be ableto iden-
tify somethingin order to be ableto understandit truthfully?
His answeris that communicationis expressive aswell asidentifying.So
though we representwhat we think and talk about,a seriesof unidentifi-
ableprocesses arealwaysat work behindthat representation. There canbe
no identity without pure differencesstandingin the backgroundasa con-
dition for the illusory appearanceof a pure, well-determinedidentity.
Connectives
Difference
Multiplicity
Representation
Thoueht
IMMANENCE
James Williams
'Ihe distinction drawn between immanenceand transcendenceis all-
importantto I)clcuzc'sphikrsophy. his oppositionto mony
It charactcriscs
t26 IM M ANENCE
metaphysical positions- criticisedasphilosophiesof transcendence. It also
aligns his philosophy with philosophiesof immanence,most notably
Baruch Spinoza.
Immanenceand transcendence are terms about the relationsthat hold
at the heart of different metaphysics.Are the privileged relationsin a
philosophyof the form of a relation 'to' something,or of a relation 'in'
somethinglIf it is 'to' then it is philosophyof transcendence. If it is 'in'
then it is immanence.Deleuzeis radical about immanence,that is, his
philosophyis to be thought strictly in terms of relations'in'.
In thehistoryof philosophy, relationsof transcendence canbe tracedback
to theologicalroots, where a lower realm is related to a higher one:
('Everythingdownhereis relatedto andacquiresvaluesthroughits relation
to God.'). For example,in Ren6Descartes, relationsof transcendence hold
from bodyto mind andfrom createdsubstance to God. Mind is independent
of body and yet body is secondaryto mind and in its grasp.God is independ-
ent of his creation,yet the creationmust be referred to God, for example,
wherehe actsa guarantorfor the validity of clearand distinct perception.
The objectionto relationsof transcendence is that they involve founding
negations(for example,that mind is completelyseparatefrom body).Such
negationsare the groundsfor negativevaluations,both in the senseof a
'lower'realm finding its valueor redemptionin a'higher'one, and in the
senseof the lowerrealmdependingon the higherone for its definition.
For example,if the human realm is seenas transcendedby God, then
definitionsof humanessence may be turned towardsthat higherrealmand
awayfrom a purely humanone.The humanbody and mind will be turned
awayfrom itself and devaluedin the light, for instance,of a transcendent
soul.This leadsto an interestingconcernin Deleuzewith notionsof eter-
nity that resistdefinitionsin termsof transcendence. We arenot immortal
in the way we can rise to a differentrealm (of God or of PlatonicIdeas),
but in the way we participatein eternalprocesses.
This explainsDeleuze'sappealsto, anddeepinterpretationof, Friedrich
Nietzsche'sdoctrine of eternal return (in Nietzscheand Philosophyand
Dffirence and,Repetition)amongothers). Eternal return is an immanent
processthat brings differentiatingand identifying processes together.In
eternalreturn, differenceretufns to transformidentities(the same).This
is why Deleuzealwaysinsiststhat only differencereturnsandnot the sarne.
Deleuze's philosophy of immanence emphasisesconnectionsover
forms of separation.But this connectionmust itself be a connectivity
betweenrelationsand not betweendifferentidentities.This is becausean
external principle would be neededto ground those identitics (for
cxample,identitydcpcndedon the humtn mind - thcrebysettingit up irs
trrnsccnclcnt).
IN C OR P OR E A L t2t
In his Nietzscheand,Philosophy,Deleuze turns on one of the main
targetsof his philosophyof immanencethrough a critique of Hegelian
dialectics,where a principle of negationitself becomesthat which tran-
scends.In contrast, Nietzsche's idea of affirmation emergesout of
processesof negationbut frees itself from them. A creativerelation of
affirmationdoesnot dependon negatingthings,though it may emergeout
of pastnegations.
In Dffirence and Repetitioz,the philosophyof immanenceis set out in
ontologicalterms through a succession of argumentsfrom Duns Scotus,
through Spinoza, to Nietzsche.In these arguments,the difficulties in
developinga philosophyof pure immanencebecomeapparent,as Scotus
then Spinozaare shownstill to dependon someforms of transcendence.
Only Nietzsche'sdoctrineof the eternalreturn of pure differencesallows
for a full immanentontology,becauseall things, whether identifiableor
not, are positedas completeonly through their relation to an immanent
(virtual').
transcendental field of pure differences(Deleuze's
It is important to note that theseclaims on immanenceand the distinc-
tion betweenactual and virtual are a key place for criticisms of Deleuze,
notablyby Alain Badiou. His critical claim restson the idea that the virtual
itself is a transcendentrealm.But this is to missthe necessaryinter-relation
of virtual and actual through a reciprocal determination. Neither is inde-
pendentofthe other and cannotthereforebe said to enter into a relation of
transcendence.
Connectives
Nietzsche
Spinoza
Virtual/Virtuality
TNCORPOREAL
TamsinLorraine
In The Logic of Sense,Deleuze characterisesthe distinction made by
the Stoicsbetweenmixtures of bodiesor statesof affairsand incorpor-
cal entities that 'frolic' on the surface of occurrences(D 1990: 5).
According to Deleuze, this distinction refers to two planes of being,
onc of which concernsthe tensions,physicalqualities,actionsand pas-
sionsof bodics;and thc othcr of which concerns'incorporeal'cntiticsor
cvcntsthrt do not cxist.lrut rrthcr 'subsistor inlrcrc'in stirtcsof'rrllirirs.
 t28 INCORPOREAL
Although incorporealentitiescan neverbe actuallypresent,they are the
effectof mixtures of bodiesand canenter into quasi-causal relationswith
other incorporeals.
The clearestexampleof the incorporealis an eventof sense.A prop-
osition like 'The sun is shining' expressesa sensethat 'inheres' in the
proposition, but is neverreducible to the stateofaffairs ofeither one spe-
cific or even an endless series of specific instances of a shining sun
(D 1990:cf. l9). Deleuze claims that while sraresof affairs have rhe rem-
porality of the living present, the incorporeal eventsof senseare infini-
tives (to shine, to be the sun) that constitute pure becomingswith the
temporality of aion - a form of time independentof matter that always
eludesthe present.Thus, no matter how manytimesthe stateof affairsof
a shining sun is actualised,the senseof 'The sun is shining' is not
exhausted.It is this 'frontier of sense'betweenwhat words expressand
the attributes of bodies that allows languageto be distinguishedfrom
physicalbodies.If the actionsand passionsof bodiesmake sense,it is
becausethat senseis not itself either an action or a passion,but is rather
an incorporealeffectof a stateof affairs that entersinto relations of quasi-
causality with other incorporeal eventsof sense.The virtual relations of
the events of senseconstitute the condition of any given speech-act.
Deleuze refers to the work of Lewis carroll asa revealingexampleof how
these quasi-causalrelations can form a 'nonsense' that subsists in
tcommonsense'language.
rn A Thousand, Plateaus,Deleuzeand Guattari characterisea socialfield
in terms of a 'machinicassemblage' and a 'collectiveassemblage of enun-
ciation'(D&G 1987:88).In additionto bodiesandtheactionsandpassions
affectingthosebodies(the'machinicassemblage', for example,the body of
the accusedor the body of the prison),thereis a set of incorporealtrans-
formationscurrent in a given societythat are attributed to the bodiesof
that society(for example,the transformationof the accusedinto a convict
by the judge'ssentence)(D&G 1987:cf. 8l). We can view the incorporeal
effectsof statesof affairs in terms of either the 'order-words' that desig-
nate fixed relations between statementsand the incorporeal transform-
ations they express,or the deterritorialisingplay of carroll's Alice in
Wond,erland, (1865).ln TheLogic of Sense,Deleuze describesthe actor or
stoic sageassomeoneableto evokean instantwith a taut intensityexpres-
siveof an unlimited future and past,and therebyembodythe incorporeal
effectsof a stateof affairsratherthan merelyits spatio-temporalactualisa-
tion (D 1990:147).Suchactorsdo more than merelyportray a character's
hopesor regrets;they attemptto 'represent'a pure instantat thc point at
whichit dividesinto futurcandpast,thuscmbodyingin thcir performirncc
an intintittiontlf'virtual rclationsbcyondthoscirctunliscd in thc situirtion
IN D IVID U ATION r29
portrayed.If one wills to be just in the mannerof a Stoic sage,one wills
not the repetitionof pastactsof justice,but a justicethat hasalwaysbeen
and hasyet to be - the incorporealeffectof justicethat is nevermadefully
manifestin any concretesituation.When the incorporealeffectsof sense
arereducedto order-words,we ignore the pure becomingsof senseand ter-
ritorialise the infinite variability of meaning into stale repetitions of the
past. When we allow the variablesof corporealbodiesand eventsof sense
to be placedinto constantvariation, evenorder-wordsbecomea passageto
the limit. The movementof new connectionsamongthesevariablespushes
languageto its limits and bodiesto a metamorphicbecoming-other(D&G
1987:108).
Connective
Becoming
INDIVIDUATION
Constantin V Bound,as
Deleuze'sconceptof individuation' is a geneticaccountof individuals.
The conceptemergesfrom a critique of hylomorphismthat exposesthe
error in thinking of an individual asthe end point of a progressivespecifi-
cationof the species.Substitutingthe imageof 'the mould' for a process-
friendly idea of modulation,this critique alsorepudiatesthe idea that an
individual is mouldedin a specificway.As he developshis theory of indi-
viduation, Deleuzeborrows and transformsanalysesmade by Gottfried
Wilhelm von Leibniz and Gilbert Simondon.
Deleuze'stheory of individuation addresses - in the processof virtual,
continuous(intensive)multiplicities becoming(extended)discrete- the
apparentlycontradictory co-existenceof the continuum and the discrete.
The processof individuation is called 'differentiation' with respectto the
continuum, and 'differenciation' with respectto the discrete. Given that
Deleuze'sconcept of becoming is basedon the co-imbrication of the
virtual real and the actualreal,the conceptionof the virtual is in terms of
a differentiatedflow of events,singularitiesand intensities.Meanwhile,the
actualis understoodasthe differenciatedrealm of bodies,their mixtures,
and statesof affairs.Actualisationdoesnot meanthe deathof the virtual.
Hence,Deleuze'sontologygenerates a robusttheoryof individuationthat
sustainsa crcativccvolution dcvelopcd aroundnot iust the non-fixityof
aswcll.
spccicsbut tlrrttof inclividuirls
130 I NDI VI DUATI O N
For the elaborationof his theory,Deleuzeappealsto Leibniz - first, to
Leibniz'sconcepts,eachof which correspondsto an individual;second,to
the Leibnizian method of vice-dictionthat understandsan individual as
the product of the law of a seriesand the internal differencethat distin-
guishesone moment of its becoming from another. Ultimately, though,
Deleuze movesbeyond Leibniz's theory of individuation becauseof the
latter's relianceon a priori harmony the compossibilityof the series,and
the bestpossibleworld.
Finding fresh inspiration in Simondon's theory of individuation
Deleuzeconsiders'modulation'(insteadof the mould of the old imageof
thought) as the processby which metastable(virtual/real) systemsexpli-
catethe potentialenergyimplicatedwithin them. Populatedby singular-
ities and eventsthesesystemsbring about new (acual/real) metastable
systemsin the processof their explication.Their metastabilityis due to
the fact that the virtual does not consist only of elementsand flows
differentiatedfrom one another.Rather the differentiatedvirtual is differ-
enceitself - differencedifferenciatingitself. The modulatingprocessof
individuationis the transduction(Simondon'sterm) of the virtual contin-
uum of intensitiesto the discreteextendedactual,all the while remember-
ing that the actual is never totally devoid of the dynamism of the
pre-individual virtual. Thus, the actual is capableof being reabsorbedby
the virtual. Intensity is what makes the passagefrom the virtual to the
actual possible.Themodulation is in a stateof permanentvariation- a
promiseof becomings- disallowingpredictionsof what an individuation
is capableof
Individuals are not subjects.Deleuze understands'haecceities'as
degreesof intensity (a degreeof heat,a certaintime of the day) that, in
combinationwith other degreesof intensity,bring aboutindividuals.The
individuals they bring about retain the anonymityof the pre-individual
realm.First, haecceities consistentirelyof movementand rest (longitude)
betweennon-formedmoleculesand particles.Second,they havethe cap-
acity to affect and be affected(latitude). As in Baruch Spinoza'sessences,
haecceitiesco-exist on a plane of consistency,eachone of which is com-
possiblewith, and responsiblefor, the generationof the others.In otder to
accentuatetheir impersonality,Deleuze arguesthat we need a new lan-
guageby which to refer to them, one that consistsof proper names,verbs
in the infinitive,and indefinitearticlesand pronouns. l anldea/paradigm for particular instantiationsor for screeningout false
Connectives
Actuality
y'| )iff'crcnciltion
I )if}'crcntiatiorr
IN TE N S ITY 131
Leibniz
Virtual/Virtuality
INTENSITY
Corustantin V Boundas
'Intensity' is a key notion in Deleuze'sphilosophicalproject: it manifests
itself asthe intensivevirtual of his ontology;asthe affirmativeand creative
desireof his ethicsand politics;asthe affectof his aesthetictheory;as the
motivationfor his methodological decisionto opt for transcendental empiri-
cism;and asthe guarantorof a theoryof difference(different/ciation).
Deleuze's ontology of becoming denouncesthe error we commit
when we think exclusivelyin terms of things and their qualities,because
by privileging extensionand extendedmagnitudeswe bypassthe inten-
sive genesisof the extended(transcendentalillusion). In an ontology of
forces like Deleuze's. force refers to the relation between forces. Forces
are experiencedonly through the results they render; and the results of
forcefields are extensive and qualitative. Transcendental empiricism,
therefore,demandsthat the intensitiesthat constitutean extensivebeing
be sensed- the famousDeleuzian'sentiend,um'. It needsto be noted that
this sensingcannot be achievedthrough the ordinary exerciseof our
sensibility.Intensity can be remembered,imagined, thought and said.
Intensitiesarenot entities,they are virtual yet real eventswhosemode of
existenceis to actualisethemselvesin statesof affairs.
The following caveatsthat punctuate Deleuze's writings must be
heeded.First, a virtual intensity existsnowhereelsebut in the extended
that it constitutes.Despitethe fact that it is not identicalwith the extended,
a virtual intensity does not entail ontological separation.Second,the
imperativesthat help us grasp intensity no longer circumscribe the
deontologyof pure reasonalone;they enlargethe scopeof this deontology
so that it encompassesall faculties: from sensibility, to memory, and to
thought. Nevertheless,the encounterof intensity - being the taskof sens-
ibility - is the first necessary
link in the interactionof all facultiesstriving
to generatethe differentiatedvirtual within thought.Third, intensityis not
pretenders.Intensity is a singularity capableof generatingactual cases,
none of which will evercometo resembleit.
Dcleuze'sontologyis built arounda notion of differencethat is not con-
trincclin thc 'from' of thc 'x is differentfrom y', bnt rather he aimsat
ditl'crcnccin itsclf. (,onscrlucntly,l)clcuzc givcs wcight to intcnsity
 132 I NTERI O RI TY
becauseunlike extendedmagnitudeswhosepartesextra,pertespermit their
division without any correspondingchangein their nature, intensities
cannot be subdividedwithout a correspondingchangein their nature.
(distance'
Therefore,intensitiesare incommensurable and their from one
another makeseachone of them a veritable differencein itself. Intensive
magnitudesdo not add up; insteadthey average.Placedin the context of
the two sidesof the Deleuzianontology- the virtual and the actual- inten-
sitiescatalysethe actualisationofthe virtual, generatingextension,linear,
successivetime, extendedbodies and their qualities. The relation of
reversibilitythat obtainsbetweenthe virtual and actualguarantees inten-
sitieswill not suffer the fate of negentropicdeath.
The role of intensity in Deleuze'sethics, politics and aestheticsis also
pivotal. Deleuze'sethics revolvesaround two axes.The first is the Stoic/
Nietzscheanimperativethat we becomeworthy of the virtual event.The
secondis the Spinozistadmonitionto live a life of joy andto multiply power-
enhancing'goodencounters'.The ethicsofjoy and the preferencefor good
encounters increasingour powercouldbelongto a'feel good',self-helptype
of psychologyif it werenot for the intensityof the virtual.Becomingworthy
ofthe event,however,requiresthe ascesisofthe counter-actualisation ofthe
accidentsthat fill our lives,and asa result, our participationin the intensive,
virtual event.Similarly,Deleuze'spoliticswould be a banalcelebrationof
multitudes,if it werenot for the fact that the multipleis not the sameas'the
many'. In the counter-actualisation of the revolutionthat befallsus, the
revolution that never comesand yet never ceasesto passis graspedas the
untimely, virtual, intensive event; the affirmation of which renders us
worthy of our fate. Finally, when in his aestheticsDeleuzesubstitutessen-
sation for form, intensity is what is given priority. What the artist aims
towardsis indeedsensation. Sensationis intimatelyrelatedto the intensity
of the forcesthat it doesnot represent.Sensationis the affect,which is
neithersubjectivenor objective;ratherit is both at once:we becomein sen-
sationand at the sametime somethinghappensbecause of it.
Connectives
Differentiation/Differenciation
Nietzsche
Spinoza
Transcendental empiricism
INTERIORITY : rcf'crto thc cntryon 'cxrcrioritv/intcrioritv'.
IN TU ITION 133
INTUITION
CliffStagoll
Deleuzeusesthe conceptof intuition' in two distinct ways.In someof his
later works (for example,What is Philosophy?,which he co-authoredwith
Guattari), it refers to one of the elementsof a plane of immanence.
Whereasconceptsdefinethe pointsof intensityon a plane,intuition refers
to movementsupon it. As such, intuitions can be consideredas ideasor
even 'lines of thinking' in a general sense,immanent to a particular
problemand the circumstances of its consideration.
More frequently, though, Deleuze usesintuition to refer to a kind of
philosophical method borrowed from Henri Bergson. This is not to
suggestthat Deleuzechampionsany particular philosophicaltechnique.
He would opposeconsistentadoptionof a methodbecauseof the tendency
for anysingleapproachto limit perspectives on a problemand soto hinder
creativethinking. However,when Deleuzed,oes refer to method, he often
meansa modified version of Bergson'sphilosophicalintuition (intuition
philosophique).
According to Bergson, evolution has resulted in the human mind
becomingable to conduct rational investigationsand make consequent
decisionspertainingto the worldsof scienceand practice.The mind is not
so well adaptedto conductingmetaphysicalinquiriesinto the dynamicsof
one's life. Indeed, for Bergson,efforts to turn our analyticalintellect to
philosophicalproblemsresult inevitablyin our consideringlived reality in
terms of somestatic,materialimageupon which we'gazd and which we
then theoriseabstractly.
For Bergson,our lived reality comprisesa flow of consciousstates.
Consciousness is essentiallytemporal:ongoingmental activity constitut-
ing the kind of time internal to one'sself.The continuity and persistence
of this flow makesup our personhood,and its particularity definesour
individuality.Oncewe turn our analyticalmind to lived, consciousexperi-
ence,however,we tend to think insteadin terms of successiveinstantsand
imagessituatedin space.As such, philosophicalprecisionis lost because
reality is no longertheorisedon its own terms.
Intuition is the philosophical methodthat Bergsonchampionsto avoidthe
analyticalmind's tendencyto abstraction.He arguesthat one must enter
into an experience directly,so asto'coincide' and'sympathise'withit. The
rranner in which one achievesthis, though, is notoriously difficult to
clcscribe, with as manycharacterisations as scholarlycommentaries. Some-
timcs llcrgsondigns intuition with artisticsensibilityand awareness, or a
dctlchmcntlrom rcrrlity.At othcr tinrcshc lssociatcs it with purcinstinct.
 134 I NTUI TI O N
On Deleuze'sinterpretation,intuition is somewhatlessmysteriousbut
no less problematic.He conceivesof intuition as a deliberatereflective
awareness or willed selfconsciousness) a concentratedand direct attention
to the operationsof consciousness (in contrastwith mediated'observa-
tions of'consciousnessby consciousness in a quest for transparencyof
thoughtto itself).This depictionalignswith Bergson'saccountof the intu-
ition of consciousness asthe attentionthat mind givesitself,continuingits
normal functionsyet somehowdiscerningsimultaneously
the natureof its
workings.If our naturaltendencyis to graspthingsin terms of spaceand
quantity,such an effort must be extremelydifficult to achieve.(Deleuze
and Bergsonboth suggestat varioustimesthat intuition hasno limits, and
can take us beyond the human condition to 'sympathise'and 'coincide'
with animalsandeveninanimateobjects,but the meansof doing soremain
mysterious.)
Deleuzeis particularlyattractedto intuition becausehis desireto move
from experienceto the contingentconditions of experiencein order to
rediscoverdifferencedemandsa meansfor accessingthe particularityof
consciousness without metaphysical illusions.If he wereto considerreality
in termsof conceptssupposedto makeit (or experienceof it) possible,then
he would substituteone kind of abstractionfor another.Deleuzeinstead
needsto dissociateaspectsof the whole that is called 'I' accordingto
natural articulations,and to graspconsciousand materialaspectsof life
without recourseto abstract or general concepts.Bergson'sintuition
enableshim to achievethis by creating conceptsaccordingto natural
articulationsof experience.From the lived reality of a flow of conscious-
ness,Deleuze'sintuition revealssuch articulationsas memory,faculties,
dreams,wishes,jokes, perceptionsand calculations.As such, Deleuze
maintainsthat there is a resemblance betweenintuition as a method for
division and asa meansfor transcendental analysis.
Interestingly,Bergsonsometimesseemsto hold morereservations about
the precision and generalapplicability of intuition than Deleuze. He
remindshis readersthat to expressin languagethe resultsof an intuitive
study of consciousness is to conceptualiseand symbolise,'andthus to
abstract.Yethe meansintuition to be freefrom formalconceptualandsym-
bolic constraints.Accordingly,to communicateaboutintuition, he argues
that we shouldusemetaphorand suggestiveness to point towardswhat is
otherwiseinexpressible. Deleuzeexpresses few such reservationsovertly,
althoughhis languageusehints at his havingfollowedBergson'ssuggestion.
Connective
Ilcrgson
KAFKA, FRANz ( r 88: - r 924) r35
KAFKA, FRANZ (1883-1924)
John Marks
In KaJba: Towarda Minor Literature, Deleuze and Guattari seekto over-
turn much of the receivedcritical wisdomon Franz Kafka'swork by pre-
sentinghim asa joyful and comic writer, who is positivelyengagedin the
world. Kafka was,Deleuzeand Guattari claim, irritated when peoplesaw
him asa writer of intimacy'.In Deleuzeand Guattari'shandshe becomes
a politicalauthor,and the prophetof a future world. It would, they claim,
be grotesqueto opposelife and writing in Kafka. Kafka seeksto graspthe
world rather than extract impressionsfrom it, and if he is fixated on an
essentialproblem,it is that of escaperatherthan abstractnotionsof liberty.
The tendencytowardsdeterritorialisationin Kafka'swork, for example,is
evidentin his useof animalsin his short stories.
Ratherthan interpretation- sayingthat this meansthat - Deleuzeand
Guattaripreferto look at what they call 'Kafka politics','Kafka machines'
and 'Kafka experimentation'. Many interpretationsof Kafka haveconcen-
tratedon themesrelatingto religionand psychoanalysis, whilst othershave
seenin Kafka'swork the expressionof his own acutehuman suffering:his
work becomesa tragiccri d,ecuur.In contrastto this, Deleuzeand Guattari
show how the Kafka machinegenerates three passionsor intensities:fear,
flight and dismantling.ln TheTrial (1925)it is lessa questionof presenting
an imageof a transcendental and unknowablelaw,andmorea questionof an
investigationof the functioning of a machine.In contrastto the psycho-
analyticalapproach,which reducesKafka's particularly intenseattachment
to the world to a neuroticsymptomof his relationshipwith his own father,
they showhow Kafka'sinaptitudefor marriageand obsession with writing
havepositivelibidinal motiyations.Kafka'sapparentlysolitarynature- his
existenceas an unmarriedwriter - should not be viewedas evidenceof a
withdrawalinto an ivory tower - but rather one componentof a 'bachelor
machine'.This machinehasmultiple connectionswith the socialfield, and
allowsthe bachelorto existin a stateof desirethat is muchmoreintensethan
the psychoanalytic categoriesof incestuousor homosexualdesire.Kafka's
strategyin 'Letter to his Father'is to inflatethe fatherfigureto absurdand
comicproportions,so that he coversthe map of the world. The effectis to
providcr wily out of thc psychoanalytical impasse,a linc of flight awayfrom
thc fhthcrirnclinto thc wrlrkl:iI llcw sct o1'conncctitlns,
 136 KAFKA, FRANZ ( r 88: - t g z 4 )
The book on Kafka constitutesDeleuzeand Guattari's most detailed
readingof literatureasmachine. They claim that Kafka'swork is a rhizome
or a burrow,in which no entranceis more privilegedthan another.They
alsoclaim that the Kafka-machine,composedasit is of letters,storiesand
novels,movesin the direction of the unlimited rather than the fragmen-
tary.Kafka'sceuvreis completeyet heterogeneous: it is constructedfrom
componentsthat do not connectbut are alwaysin communicationwith
each other. The Kafka machine is, paradoxically one of continuous
contiguity. Such a machinic reading of Kafka is called for by Kafka's own
approach, which goes against representation, allegory, symbolism and
metaphor. Instead, Deleuze and Guattari show how he works with the
componentsof reality: objects,charactersand events.The evolution of
Kafka's work is towards a sober 'hyper-realism'that dispenseswith
impressionsand imaginings.Ratherthan metaphor,Kafka'shyper-reality
constructsan immanentassemblage of metamorphosis,a continuum of
reversibleintensities.
For Deleuzeand Guattari,Kafka'swork is a'minor'literature par excel-
lence.A minor literature'deterritorialises'language andprovidesan intim-
ate and immediateconnectionbetweenthe individual and the political.It
is also a form of literature in which everyrhing is expressedin collective
terms and everything takes on a collective value. In short, there is no
subjectin a minor literature,only collectiveassemblages of enunciation.In
a 'major' literature there are forms of individuated enunciation' that
belongto literary masters,and individual concernsabound.Minor litera-
ture can afford no such luxuries, since it is born out of necessityin
restricted conditions. Since major literature is essentiallyrepresenta-
tional in orientation,it movesfrom contentto expression, whereasa minor
literatureexpresses itself out of absolutenecessityand only later concep-
tualises itself. Expression breaks establishedforms and encourages
new directions.This commitment to expressionis evidentin Kafka's inter-
est in 'musical' soundsthat escapeany form of signification,composition
or song.
Deleuzeand Guattari repeatedlyemphasisethe fact that Kafka's soli-
tude giveshim an acutelypolitical,and evenprophetic,vision. Kafka the
bachelor-machineperceivesthe 'diabolical powers of the future' -
Americancapitalism,Sovietbureaucracyand EuropeanFascism- that are
knockingon the door of his study.The literary machineenablesthis vision
becauseit functionsnot like a mirror of the world, but rather like a watch
that is running fast. The tendencyof Kafka's work towardsproliferation
opensup a field of immanencethat takeshis socialand politicalanalysisout
of thc domainof the actualand into the virrual.
KANr, IMMANUEL (rZz4-r8o4) 137
Connectives
Desire
Deterritorialisation/Reterritorialisation
Intensity
Lines of flight
Minoritarian
Psychoanalysis
Rhizome
KANT, TMMANUEL (1724-1804)
Alison Ross
Immanuel Kant's critical philosophymarks a turning point in modern
thought. Kant distinguishesthe 'critical' inquiry he conductsinto reason
from the 'fanaticism'that afflicts the 'dogmatic' philosophyof his competi-
tors.Againstboth the excesses of rationalism- which confuseswhat it is pos-
sibleto think with what it is possibleto know- and empiricism,which scuttle
the possibility of systematicknowledgealtogether,Kant's self-described
Copernicanrevolutionin philosophyfollowsa languageof 'moderation'.
Deleuze rejects the self-conceptionof Kantian philosophy on two
fronts: first, as his own pantheonof selectedinfluencesin the history of
philosophyindicates,his practiceof philosophyunderminesKant's claim
to haveconsignedrationalismand empiricismto history; second,he dis-
putes the style of Kant's philosophyin which thinking is guided by the
moderatinginfluenceof 'commonsense'.The centraltaskof Kantian phi-
losophy is the 'critique' of the faculties of the subject. For Deleuze,
Kantian 'critique' does not extend to the orientating moral valuesof the
Kantian philosophy,and it is Friedrich Nietzsche'spursuit of the critique
againstmoral idealsthat makeshim, in Deleuze'seyes,the truly critical
philosopher.At the same time that Deleuze rejects the false limits
that Kant placeson 'critique' he alsoadaptsthe Kantian project of a cri-
tique of the facultiesof the subjectfor his own proiectof 'transcendental
empiricism'.
Kant's importancefor Deleuzecanbe describedin terms of the way he
altersKant's languageof the 'faculties'to caterfor the primacy of affect.
Deleuze'srevisionof the languageof the 'faculties'callsinto questionthe
dualiststructureof Kant's thought accordingto which a iuridical concep-
tion of rcasonrcgulatcsthc ficld ofexperience.
 138 KA N T , T M M AN U E L ( r7 24- r 8o4)
In Kantian philosophythe subjectoccupiesthe positionof an interface
betweennatureand experience. The subiect'scategories of understanding
constitutethe organisingstructurefor sensationand form the conditionof
possibilityfor experience.Accordingto Kant, the coherenceand form of
experienceare the work of the mind rather than the 'givens'of sensible
experience. Further,the conditionof possibilityfor thecognitionof objects
is the mind's own activity.Hence Kant's famousdictum that'the condi-
tions of the possibilityof experiencein generalare alsothe conditionsof
the possibilityof the objectsof experience.'But if Kant viewsexperience
as a compoundof the dataof impressionsand what our faculty of know-
ledgesuppliesitself, he alsoconceivesof the task of philosophyas a cri-
tique of the categoriesthat redeem experiencefrom the irreducible
particularity of sensibleperceptions.The adjunct of this critique is the
revivalof the pursuit of knowledgeoutsideof sensibilityand the field of
possibleexperience,critical philosophyaimsto securethe ground of this
extensionby its investigationinto the faculty of reason.In stark contrasr,
Deleuzeusesthe languageof the facultiesto demolishthe positionof the
subjectas the pivot betweennatureand experienceand to overturn phil-
osophy'srole as a court that adjudicateson the proper limits of reason.
Instead of a subject with predeterminedfacultiesordering the field of
experience,Deleuzeusesthe languageof the facultiesto describea regis-
ter of affect. The Deleuzian force of affect drives the facultiesconstantly
to surpasstheir acceptedlimits. This is a transcendental projectbecause,
like Kant, Deleuzethinks that philosophyshouldcreateconceptsthat do
not merely trace the 'givens' of sensibleexperience.
Although Deleuze's transcendentalempiricism adapts elementsof
Kant's thought, specificallyhis conceptionof the faculties,it doesso in
order to critique the implacable dualism of Kantian philosophy. Kant's
first two critiques establisha division berweenfreedomand the sensible
world. In the critique of PureReason,the taskof critical philosophyis to
restrainreasonfrom the illusory usethat consistsin confusingwhat it is
possibleto think with what may be known accordingto the sensiblecon-
ditions of thought (K 1996:8). The risk of sucha confusionof ideasand
objectsof possibleexperienceis that a fabrication of reasonmay be con-
fusedfor somethingthat existsin the domainof experience.The critique
of PracticalRea'son)onthe other hand,locatesa dangerin the influenceon
moral action of circumstance.Here the sensibleworld and the subject's
feelingsdo not provide a necessaryorientation for ideas of reason,so
much asthreatento leadit astray.Accordingly,the formalismof the moral
law guardsthe possibility of a moral acrion in the world of sensibility,
clcliningsuch irction:rs r strict adhcrcnccto thc principlcsof rcas<ln.
KANr , I M M ANUEL ( t lz+- r 8o4) 139
Whether it is reason'stendencyto fanaticism- an error that follows the
hubris of limitlessness- or the claim circumstancesmake upon it and
constrainit under a falselimitation, critical restraintin either casefollows
a juridical model.
Kant's textsreinforcethe senseof renunciation- of desiresor of errant
speculation- in the recurrent referencesto 'the court of reason'which
legislatesthe proper use and safeextensionof reason'sideas.Hence the
'revolution' that proceedsby pleasfor moderation is fought on two fronts:
againstthe illusionsof a reason'independentof all experience',aswell as
againstthe claim of circumstanceon action.The final work of the critical
trilogy, the CritiqueofJudgement,tries to mediatethis split betweenexperi-
enceand freedomthrough the faculty of judgement.It is in this work that
Kant's positive influence over Deleuze is strongest.In Deleuze and
Guattari'sWhatis Philosophy? they arguethat Kant's final Critique marks
a significantdeparturefrom the termsof the first and secondCritiques:the
CritiqueofJudgement is'. . . an unrestrainedwork of old agewhich [Kant's]
successors havestill not caughtup with: all the mind's facultiesovercome
their limits, the very limits that Kant had so carefully laid down in the
worksof his prime' (D&G 1994:2).
The juridical conceptionof the facultiesand the legislativerole it gives
philosophyto establishthe limits of reasonunravels,accordingto Deleuze,
in Kant's conceptionof the sublime.It is important to point out that
Deleuze'sreadingof Kant's appendixon the sublimeis an idiosyncratic
account. Within Kant's thought the sublime is used to confirm the
subject'sfacultyof reasonasthat which surpasses any naturalform, and is
arguablythe jewelof Kant's metaphysics. Arguing againstKant's attempt
to confine the faculties to their proper limits - to their nth power -
Deleuze'saccountof this appendixarguesthat in the caseof the sublime
the facultiesenter into unregulatedrelationsand this is what drives the
faculties(seeD 1983,D 1984,and D 1994).
Aside from these points of direct influence over Deleuze's project,
Kant's position within Deleuze'stopography of philosophersis highly
unusual. Deleuze describeshis Kant book as an attempt to know his
'enemy'and this book is the only book that Deleuzedevotesto a thinker
who is not part of his pantheon of selectedinfluences.Kant's peculiar
position needsto be seenas a consequenceof Deleuze'sdescription of
his own proiect as 'transcendentalempiricism'. Deleuze returns to the
very rationalist and empiricist thinkers that Kant believedhis critical
philosophyhad consignedto the past.Deleuze'sreturn, however,is con-
cluctcdthrough thc Kantian languageof 'faculties' and 'transcendental'
thinking.
 140 KLEE, eAUL (t8lg-rg+o)
Connectives
Desire
Transcendentalempiricism
KLEE, PAUL (1879-1940)- refer ro the entrieson .art, and ,utopia'.
LACAN, JACqUES (1901-81)
Alison Ross
JacquesLacan wasa French psychoanalystmost famousfor his structural-
ist interpretationof Freudian psychoanalysis. Despite his ,structuralist'
famehis work canbedividedinto manydifferentphases, includingan early
fascinationwith surrealismand the avant-garde,an interestin the 1950s
and 1960swith saussurianlinguisticsand srructuralism,aswell ashis late
preoccupationwith Borromeanknots and his attemptto mathematisehis
ideas.It is only in this final 'phase'that Lacanposesfor the first time the
questionof what the hitherto distinct elementsof the system,reallimagin-
arylsymbolic (RSI) havein common.
Deleuze's relationshipwith Lacan is complex. There are placesin
Deleuze'soeuvre,suchashis essayon Leopoldvon sacher-Masoch, which
demonstrateexperr familiarity with the labyrinthinedetail of Lacanian
psychoanalysis. Despite rhis essay'scritique of the Freudiancategoryof
'sado-masochism', Deleuzeuseselementsof Lacanianpsychoanalysis as
an operative framework for his own analysisof 'masochism'.similarly, in
the two volumes of capitalisrn and,schizophrenia,Lacan is occasionally
a target of the authors' anti-psychiatric polemics,but he can alsobe cited
as an influenceon their own attempt to liberatedesirefrom its oedipal
ordering in classical,Freudianpsychoanalysis. In this respectthe impor-
tant features of Lacan's thought include his uneven verdicts on the
differentlayersof the subject(RSI) and his interestin psychoticspeech.
on the other hand,Lacanianpsychoanalysis givesa superbillustration
of thc gcncralcomplaintirgainstpsychoanaly sisin Anti-oerlipus,conccrn-
ing rhc crrorsrrf'clcsirc. Lacirncxcnrplificsthc 'crror' thrt clcsircis ,lirck'.
LAcAN, JACeuEs (r9or-8t) l+l
For Lacan desireis the product of the split betweendemandand need.
Demandis the alienationof 'need'in language.It is the failureof language
(demand)adequatelyto represent'need'that producesan impotentdesire
figuredaround'lack'.Although Deleuzeand Guattaricriticise'lack'asone
of the errors of desire they applaud the fact that desire is continuous in
Lacan, despitecontestingthe way it earnsthis statusonly on accountof its
definitionasa 'lack' regulatedby the law of the symbolic.
The complexityof Lacan'splacein the thoughtof Deleuzeand Guattari
can be describedin relation to the genesisand explanatoryscopeof their
conceptof the Body without Organs (BwO). In psychoanalyticdoctrine
the developmentof the individual is describedin the normativeterms of a
gradual shift awayfrom the polymorphous perversity of the infant's body
to the hierarchicalorderingor codingof the body'serogenouszonesin an
ascendingscalefrom pathwaysof fore-pleasure(such as kissing)to end-
pleasure(genital).Accordingto this model,the subjectand its sexualiden-
tity arenot given,but theseemergeby orderingthe drivesthat arein turn
regulatedby Oedipal relations.In the paper Lacan wrote on the 'mirror
stage',this processis describedas the movementfrom organswithout
a clearly defined senseof a body, to the (tenuous and fictional) hold of
socio-sexual identity.
(organs
In contrastto the without a body' that precedesthe processof
acquisitionof socio-sexual identity in Lacan,the BwQ a trm that Deleuze
and Guattari take from Antonin Artaud, is deployedto denaturalisethe
processof developmentdefinedby psychoanalysis. Against the coding of
the body'spartsaccordingto 'natural' functionsand the conceptionof the
organismas a functioning hierarchyof parts on which it depends,this
conceptaims to explain and to maximisepossibleconnectionsbetweenthe
differentparts of the body and its 'outside'.In particular,the authorsuse
this conceptto de-Oedipalisethe descriptionof such connectionsin clas-
sical psychoanalysis. Instead of framing breast-feedingin terms of a
primary anacliticrelationshipbetweenmother and infant that will needto
be brokenby the secondaryidentificationwith the authority of the father,
this connectionis describedas an assemblage of desirein which 'mouth'
and 'breast'replacethe terms'infant' and 'mother'. Despitethe genesisof
this concept in Anti-Oedipusin a polemic against psychoanalysis,a stra-
tegicalliancewith aspectsof Lacaniantheorycanbe discernedin their use
of this concept.
Accordingto Lacanthe infant'sstateof physiologicalfragmentation(the
real)is sealedinto an illusory formation of unity in the mirror stage.Here
thc child foundsits senseof integratedidentity through a visual percep-
tion of unity thrrtdividesit from its 'real'stateof physiological fragmenta-
tion. 'l'his pcrccption of unity, dcsignrrtcd by Lacrrn irs thc 'imlginary',
 t+2 LA M A R C K, J EA N -B Ap rrs rE (r744-t8zg)
establishes
the basisof socio-sexual identity asa unity. This unity is para-
doxicalhowever,giventhat the agencyof its unity is external.For Lacan,
unity only becomesfunctionalwhen the subjectrelinquishesits relation
with the (M)Other in order ro occupya placein the symbolicorder as a
speakingsubject.The primary senseof unity developedby the subjectin
the mirror stage,is dividedin the subjecr'ssecondary identificationwith the
Law of the Father.Deleuzeand Guattari disengage the oedipal narrative
that regulatesthe organisationof socio-sexual unity in psychoanalysis. Yet
in many respectsLacanis an ambiguousresourcefor the hold of the organ-
isedBwo is describedby him asrenuous.It is alsointeresringto norethar
Lacan occasionally sideswith the imaginaryfield of connectionsprior to
symboliclaw and sometimesemphasises the unsurpassable forceof the real
in psychiclife. Thus, despitethe limitationsof his framework,the work of
Lacan differs from his precursorsin classicalpsychoanalysis in that he pro-
posesa porousrelationbetweenthe body and its 'outside'.
Connectives
Desire
Freud
LAMARCK, JEAN-BAPTISTE (1744-1829)- refer to the enrry on
'creativetransformationt.
LEIBNIZ, GOTTFRIED WILHELM
VON (1646_1716\
Brett Nicholls
Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz is drawn into Deleuze'sengagementwith
the history of philosophy with a book length study,TheFrjld: Leibniz and,
the Baroque,and he is presentat strategicmomentsin Deleuze,swider
thinking. ln The Fold Deleuze reinvigoratesLeibniz's concept of the
monad with the notion that the world is 'a pure emissionof singularities'
(D 1993a:60).Leibniz insistedin Monad,ology (written 1714,published
1867)that the universeconsistsof discreteentities:monads.Monads are
simple substances,indivisible and indestructible. with no windows
through which anythingcanpass.The world that we inhabitis constituted
by monadsthat convcrgcin serics.And, for I_,eibniz,varying scricscon-
vcrgciu ir hrrrnoniousunity thrrtis prccstirblishcd
by G<td.
LErBNrz) corrFRIED wILHELM voN (r7 44-t8zg) 143
Existencefor Leibniz and Deleuzebursts forth in its variousforms from
one plane of singularities.This plane can be understoodas the inex-
haustibleand unknowabletotality of monadsthat provide the substance
from which subjectsand objectsin their multifariousmannersemerge'It
would not be remiss,however,to saythat Deleuzeseeksto rescueLeibniz
from idealism.Leibniz ultimatelyconsideredsubstance asimmaterial.For
Deleuzethe 'pure emissionof singularities'is an organicfield of life forces.
His interestis in what he callsan'animal monadology'(D 1993a:109),in
which the 'animal in me' is lessopposedto the alter ego (as in Edmund
Husserlt1859-1938])and rather,an aggregateof vital forces,monads,that
areorganisedor folded in variousways.
The conceptof the fold, expoundedasit is via Leibniz'sinsistenceupon
one substance,enablesDeleuzeto think the order of things in waysnot
determinedby dualism.The distinction betweenthe mind and the body,
for instance,is producedby a kind of matter that hasthe capacityto fold
in upon itself in order to perceive.Matter outsidethe mind doesnot per-
ceive.Enfoldingbringsthe relationof an inner and outer world into being.
Unlike the body, the mind is enclosedmatter, an interior that doesnot
responddirectlyto the outsideworld. This enclosurecanbe understoodas
a form of theatre,one in which thinking, imaginingand reflectingoccur.
Deleuzelinks the form of this theatre to baroquearchitecture,art and
music,which he admiresas'Fold afterfold'(D 1993a:33).
The subject emergesin Deleuze's work upon Leibniz not as an
but as a point upon which seriescon-
attribute of substance,an essence,
(pure
verge.At one level, the universe as emissionof singularities'is thus
reflectedin everyindividual asa virtual predicate,but with a limited point
of view (D 1993a:53). An identity emergesin and through the conver-
genceof a seriesof singularities.This meansthat the subject is deter-
mined rather than determining, and for Leibniz, writing within a
Christiancosmology,the stabilityof the determinedsubiectis guaranteed
by God. This position is outlined in Leibniz's Theodicy(1890).He held
that the subjectis determinedin the convergence of what he callsa 'com-
possibleworld'. Any seriesthat is bound by the samelaw,governedby the
principle of non-contradiction,belongsto the sameworld. It is not pos-
sible,in this view, for Adam to be both a sinner and not a sinner in the
sameworld. And while we can imagine other realities' say a world in
which Adam is not a sinner,the principle of sufficientreasoneffectively
guaranteesthat this and not that is the best possibleworld. Leibniz thus
claimedto havearrived at a solution to the problem of evil; other worlds
would simply be incompossible.
Incompossibility signalsthe impossibilityof thc co-existence of worlds
thrrtdivcrgcfrom thc hw of'non-contrrdiction. I )clcuzc,htlwcvcr,in all of
 r4+ L 6 v rN A S, E M M AN U E L (rgo6-95)
his engagements with Leibniz, goesto work upon this solutionand alters
the trajectoryof Leibniz'sthought.He proposesthat incompossibilityis a
conditionof compossibility. Ratherthan governedby the metaphysical law
of non-contradiction,the world is multiple and the subjectcanbe defined
in relation to foldable, polychronic temporalities, where incompossibles
and compossiblesco-exist.we might think, therefore,of the divergenceof
seriesnot asnegationor oppositionbut aspossibility.
This emphasisupon divergenceas possibility is sustainedin Dffirence
andRepetition(D 1994:123)whereDeleuzereadsagainstLeibniz'sinsist-
enceupon compossibilitywith the notion that'basic seriesare divergent'
sincethey are (constanrlydisplacedwithin . . . chaos'.rn TheLogicofsense
(D 1990:109-17),incompossibilitybecomesthe ground for the overlap-
ping of senseand non-sense.And in Cinema2: The TimeImage(D 1989:
130-l), Leibniz figuresas a thinker who has unwittingly openedup the
problemof time and truth. In eachof theseworks,DeleuzedrawsLeibniz
into his rejectionof dualismand his critique of the order of things.He is
concernedwith pushing Leibniz beyond the limits of the principle of
sufficientreasonto affirm that incompossibles belongto the sameworld.
Living involves,after Deleuze'sLeibniz, not the relation of truth and
falsity but the affirmarion of possibilities,the work of unfoldins and
folding compossible and incompossible series.
Connectives
Fold
Force
Substance
LEVINAS, EMMANUEL (1906-95)- referto rheentrieson ,ontology'
and 'phenomenology'.
LINES OF FLIGHT
Tamsin Lorraine
ThroughoutA Thousand Plateaus,Deleuze and Guattaridevelopa vocabu-
lary that emphasises how things connectrather than how they ,are',and
tendencics that could evolvein creativemutationsratherthan a 'rcality'
thlt is an invcrsion.of'thcpllst.IJc lncl(iuattrriprcf'cr to consiclcrthirrgs
LIN E S OF FLIGH T t+5
not as substances, but asassemblages or multiplicities,focusingon things
in terms of unfolding forces- bodiesand their powersto affectand be
affected- ratherthan staticessences. A 'line of flight' is a path of mutation
precipitatedthrough the actualisationof connectionsamong bodiesthat
werepreviouslyonly implicit (or'virtual') that releases new powersin the
capacitiesof thosebodiesto aq and respond.
Every assemblage is territorial in that it sustainsconnectionsthat define
it, but everyassemblage is also composedof lines of deterritorialisation
that run through it and carry it awayfrom its current form (D&G 1987:
503+). Deleuze and Guattari characteriseassemblages in terms of three
kinds of lines that inform their interactionswith the world. There is the
'molar line' that forms a binary, arborescentsystem of segments,the
and the line of
'molecularline'that is morefluid althoughstill segmentary,
flight that rupturesthe other two lines(D&G 1987:205).While the supple
segmentarityof the molecularline operatesby deterritorialisationsthat
may permit reterritorialisationsthat turn backinto rigid lines,the line of
flight can evolveinto creativemetamorphoses of the assemblage and the
assemblages it affects.In what they admit is a 'summary' example(since
the threelinesco-existand canchangeinto oneanother),they suggestthat
the Roman Empire could be said to exemplify rigid segmentarity;the
migrant barbarianswho come and go acrossfrontiers pillaging, but also
reterritorialisingby integratingthemselvesinto indigenouscommunities,
supplesegmentarity;and the nomadsof the steppeswho escapeall such
territorialisationand sow deterritorialisationeverywherethey go,a line of
flight (D&G 1987: 222-3).
On the one hand an assemblage (for example,an assemblage of the book,
A Thousand, Plateous,and a reader)is a 'machinic assemblage' of actions,
passionsand bodiesreactingto one another(paper,print, binding, words,
feelingsand the turning of pages).On the other hand it is a 'collective
assemblage of enunciation',of statementsand incorporealtransformations
attributed to bodies(the meaningof the book'swords emergesin a reading
assemblage in terms of the implicit presuppositionsextant in the social
field concerningpragmaticvariablesin the useof language)(D&G 1987:
88). Both aspectsofthe book-readerassemblage producevariouseffectsin
their engagementwith other assemblages (for example, the assemblage of
bookand handripping out pagesto feeda fire or the assemblage of a reader
pluggedinto aestheticassemblages inspired by the notion of 'becoming-
imperceptible'to createa work of art). Deleuzeand Guattari deliberately
designedA Thousand. Plateausto foster lines of flight in thinking -
thought-movementsthat would creativelyevolvein connectionwith the
producingnew waysof think-
lincsof flightof othcr thought-movcmcnts,
ing rathcr thnn tcrritorirrlisinginto thc rccognisitblc[4r(x)vcs of what
146 L rN E s oF FLTcHT * anr + pol rrrcs
'passes'for philosophicalthought. Interpretations,accordingto Deleuze
and Guattari,tracealreadyestablished patternsof meaning;mapspursue
connectionsor lines of flight not readily perceptibleto the majoritarian
subjectsof dominant reality.Deleuzeand Guattari wrote their book as
sucha map,hoping to elicit further maps,rather than interpretations,from
their readers.
Although Deleuzeand Guattari clearly value lines of flight that can
connectwith other linesin creativelyproductivewaysthat leadto enliven-
ing transformationsof the social field, they also caution againsttheir
dangers.A line of flight can becomeineffectual,lead to regressivetrans-
formations,and evenreconstructhighly rigid segments(D&G 1987:205).
And evenif it managesto crossthe wall and getout of the blackhole,it can
presentthe dangerof becomingno more than a line of destruction(D&G
1987:229).Deleuzeand Guattari advocateextending lines of flight to rhe
point where they bring variablesof machinic assemblages into continuity
with assemblages of enunciation,transformingsociallife in the process;
but they neverminimisethe risks the pursuit of suchlinesentails.
Connectives
Deterritorialisation
/Reterritorialisation
Majoritarian
Molar
LINES OF FLIGHT + ART + POLITICS
Ad,rian Parr
understandingthe politicalpotentialof art hasbeena concernthat goesas
far backasthe Middle Agesand Renaissance, wherepoliticaland religious
influenceoften definedthe content of art commissionsinscribingpublic
space,this beingthe key concernshapingRichardC. Trexler'sPublicLife
in RenaissanceFlorence(1980).During the early twentieth century,Bertolt
Brecht,GeorgLuk6s,and Ernst Bloch examinedGermanExpressionism,
boldly denouncingthe aestheticisation of politics;this was a debatethat
carried enormous influence for both Theodor Adorno and Walter
Benjamin'sexaminationof the industriesof culture and their subsequent
critique of bourgeoisculture. In the latter part of the twentieth century
Edward Said, and postcolonialtheory in general,insistedin Oriantalism
(1978)that the representation of colonisedpeoplcby thcir coloniscrsis
inhcrcntlypolitical:
rcprcscnting an-<lthcr'sculturcnoton thcirowntcrms
LIN E S OF FLIGH T + ART + P OLITIC S 147
but on the basisof what the occupyingculture believesis relevantand
important.So what might Deleuzecontributeto this longstandingdiscus-
sion concerningthe connectionbetweenpoliticsand art?
To begin with, art at its most creativemutatesas it experiments,pro-
ducing new paradigmsof subjectivity.What this meansis that art has the
potentialto createthe conditionswhereinnew connectionsand combin-
ations can be drawn - socially,linguistically,perceptually,economically,
conceptuallyand historically.For example,Antonin Artaud, a favouriteof
both Deleuzeand Guattari,whoseanimateddrawingsexecutedduring his
confinement in a mental institution, captures a senseof physical and
psychicexhaustion,an exhaustionthat is intensifiedby the anarchiclan-
guagehe developsthrough the combinationof colours,words,soundsand
forms. Artaud's drawings both document and constitute a processof
sensoryoverload,the linesof which strip awaysystemsof signification.In
this way we could useDeleuzeand Guattari'sconceptof a 'line of flight'
to considerhow Artaud's work prompts us to think,differently,to sense
anew and be exposedto affectsin unpredictableways.Hence, by gdnerat-
ing new perceptsand affects,art could be describedasan 'affectivesystem'
of change.
When consideringthe political potential of art, we often look to the way
in which certainpracticesareimmanentto the socialfield and the changes
theseinvoke.A practice that dismantlesconventionalways of thinking
and acting,or one that stimulatesupheavalby looseningup someof the
rules and ordersthat organiseindividualsand socialbodiesis inherently
political. This prompts two key questionsto bubble to the surface.First,
how can politics condition art? Second,and more pertinently,how do we
gaugethe politicalforceof art?
Art at its most socialexposesthe desiring production that organises
space,using desirein its most productive senseto bring to life the affective
dimensionof art. To this extent,the linesof flight emanatingout of certain
practices,suchasArtaud's,resultnot so much from what an audiencecan
seebut more from what they cannotsee.That is to say,the movementof
linesbetweenprimary points of subjectivity- curator,critic, client, artist,
madmanand spectator- and signification- exotica,erotica, insanity,con-
sumerism,history and value - can locatethe majoritarianlines striating
spacein order to extractthe minoritarianforcesimmanentto a particular
space.The reality of such art work is qualitativelydifferent from art that
'representsthe real' or eventhe real of 'reality TV', as this kind of art is
determinedneitherdialecticallynor purely assymbolicgesture.This is an
art practicethat simply makesthe coherencyand rigidity of socialspace
lcak.In thc spirit of l)clcuzc and Guattarithc politicsof art cxposcsthe
vcry propositionput firrwitrtlin tI 'l'housurul of tlight arc
l)lutcu'tls:'l,incs
r48 L INES OF F L IGHT + S U IC ID E
realities;they are very dangerousfor societies,althoughthey can get by
without them, and sometimesmanageto keepthem to a minimum'(D&G
1987:.204).From this viewpoint, art functions asa line of flight, traversing
individual and collectivesubjectivitiesand pushingcentralisedorganisa-
tions to the limit; it combinesa varietyof affectsand perceptsin waysthat
conjugateone another.
In many respectsthe connective,expansiveand deterritorialisingchar-
acter of lines of flight, when consideredin terms of art, draws our atten-
tion to the ethical dimensionof art. Here the questionof ethics in relation
to art is primarily takento be a problemof organisation.Art makespos-
sible,it enablesus to broadenour horizonsand understanding,sensitising
us to our own affectivedimensionin relationto the world asa whole.It is,
therefore, no accident that art often becomesthe primary target once
repressionsinksin, usually setting off alarm bells,and warning us that the
socialsphereis on the vergeof becomingfascistic.
As Deleuzeand Guattari insist in A Thousand, Plateaus,when desire
turns repressiveit finds investmentin fascisticsocialorganisations; at this
point the activelines of flight indicativeof the political undercurrentsof
art aresusceptibleto blockage.This is not to suggestthat art is immune to
fascisticinvestment.It, too,canbe turned againstitself;that is whenart is
consumedby the blackholethat annihilatesthe innovativeradicalityof art.
For example,althoughmanyof the GermanExpressionists wereexempli-
fied asproducersof degenerate art by the GermanNazisin the 1937exhib-
ition, Reflectionsof Decad,ence (in DresdenTown Hall), Luk6s insistedthat
the artists in question in fact participated in the selfsame irrational
impulsesmotivating Nazism. In other words, when positive lines of flight
arewithdrawnor usedto prop up the regulativenatureof negativelinesof
flight, what we are left with is an ethicaldistinctionformed between'the
politics of art' or 'the art of politics'. In effect,then, the politics of art
comesfrom how art engages politicalsubjectivitysustainingan impersonal
reality that allowspre-individual singularitiesto structure and collectively
to orient subjectivity.The politics of art survivesalong the mutative
dimensionspositive and creative'lines of flight' expose;it is not fully
(yet
apparentand still it existsasa to come'.
LINES OF FLIGHT + SUICIDE
RosiBraid,otti
Thc Dcleuziansubjectis a singularcomplexity, onc that enactsirndrrctu-
'l'his 'subjcct'simultrncously
rrliscsa radicrrlcthics of transf<rrmltion.
Lr NES oF FLTcHT * sur cr DE t49
rejectsindividualismand the nihilism of self-destruction.In an ecosophi-
cal sense,Deleuzethinks of the subjectin terms of a connection,one that
takes place between self and others, pushing the subject beyond self-
centredindividualismalsoto includenon-humansor the earth itself.
On the issueof suicide,Deleuze is as clear as Baruch Spinoza:the
choice for self-destructionis not positive,nor can it be said to be free,
becausedeathis the destructionof the conatus- definedas the desireto
actualiseone's power of becoming. Self-preservation,in the senseof a
desirefor self-expression, constitutesthe subject.A conatuscannotfreely
wish its own self-destruction;if it does,this is becausesomephysicalor
psychicalcompulsionnegatesthe subject'sfreedom.As connectivityand
mutual implicationare the distinguishingfeaturesof an intensiveunder-
standingof the subject,dying assuchmeansceasingto partakein this vital
flow of life. Hence. the inter-connectednessof entities means that self-
preservationis a commonlysharedconcern.
Joining forceswith others so as to enhanceone's enjoymentof life is
the key to Deleuzianethics;it is alsothe definition of a joyouslylived life.
The greatestethical flaw is to succumbto externalforcesthat diminish
one's capacityto endure. From this viewpoint, suicide is an unproductive
'blackhole'.
Deleuze'sview of deathis far removedfrom the metaphysics of finitude.
Death is neithera matter of absoluteclosure,nor a borderthat definesthe
differencebetweenexistingor not existing.Instead,the Deleuziansubjectis
producedthrougha multiplicity of connectionsthat unfold in a processof
becoming.This affirmativeview of life situatesphilosophicalnomadicismin
the logic of positivity,rather than in the redemptiveeconomycommonto
classicalmetaphysics. What is more is that this vision of death-as-process,
or a Nietzscheanvision of the 'eternalreturn', emergesout of Deleuze's
philosophyof time: enduranceand sustainability.
Life is the affirmation of radical immanence.What gets affirmed is the
intensityandacceleration ofexistentialspeedcharacteristic ofdesireor the
expressionof potentia.The ethicsof nomadicsubjectsassertsthe positiv-
ity of potentiaitself. That is to say,the singularity of the forces that
composethe specificspatio-temporalgrid of immanencecomposesone's
life. Life is an assemblage, a montage,not a given;it is a set of points in
spaceand time; a quilt of retrievedmaterial. Put simply, for Deleuzewhat
makesone'slife unique is the life project,not a deep-seated essence.
Commentingon the suicidesof Primo Levi andVirginia Woolf,Deleuze
- who alsochoseto end his own life - stressedthat life can be affirmedby
supprcssingyour own life. This he felt wasespeciallytrue in the caseof
failinghcalthor whcn lif'cis spcntin dcgradingsocialconditions,both of
which scriouslycripplc orrc'spowcr to itflirnr lnd cnclurclil'c with ioy.
150 M AJ O RI TARI AN
We do needto exercisesomecautionhere,though,becauseDeleuzeis not
proposinga Christian affirmation of life gearedtoward a transcendent
enterprise; rather he is suggestinglife is not marked by any signifier or
proper noun: Deleuze'svision is of a radicallyimmanentfleshedexistence
intensivelylived.
Deleuze introduces a fundamental distinction between personal and
impersonaldeath.Death is the empty form of time, the perpetualbecom-
ing that canbe actualisedin the presentbut flowsbackto the pastandseeps
into the future. The eternalreturn of death is 'virtual' in that it has the
generativecapacity to engender the actual. Consequently,death is the
ultimate manifestationof the activeprinciple that drivesall living matter,
namely the power to expressthe pre-individualor impersonalpower of
potentia,.Death is the becoming-imperceptibleof the nomadic subjectand
assuchit is part of the cycleof becoming.Yet,deathis still interconnected
with the 'outside'and alwayson the frontiersof incorporeality.
MAJORITARIAN
Tamsin Lorraine
Deleuzeand Guattaridescribea majority asa standardlike 'white-man'or
'adult-male' in comparison to which other quantities can be said to be
minoritarian(D&G 1987:291).Human life in a capitalistsocietyoperates
on the strataof the organism(variouscorporealsystemsorganisedinto the
functioning wholesof biological organisms),'signifiance'(systemsof sig-
nifiers and signifieds that interpreters interpret), and subjectification
(systemsthat distributesubjectsof enunciationand subjectsof the state-
ment - that is, subjectswho are speakers, and subjectsof what is spoken
about). Rather than assumethat the subject is somehowprior to the
societyof which it becomesa member,Deleuzeand Guattari take the
Foucaultianstancethat collectivesystemsof enunciation(thesecould be
comparedto Michel Foucault'sdiscursivesystems,for examplelegal dis-
course)and machinicassemblages (thesecould be comparedto Foucault's
nondiscursivesystems,for examplethe bodies,lay-out and behaviours
relatedto the court room) are the condition of the subjectsthey produce.
What countsasmcaningfulspeechis dictatednot by an individualsubjcct,
but by tlrc svstcmsof 'signifiancc'thtt clctcrnrincwhat nrlkcs scnscin
M AJOR ITAR IAN t5l
a givensituation.What countsasa recognisable subject(to oneselfaswell
as others) is dictated by systemsof subjectificationthat determine a
subject'sposition vis-i-vis others.
Deleuzeand Guattari insist it is the 'axioms'of capitalistsocietythat
constitute majorities (D&G 1987: 469). The axioms of capitalismare
primary statementsthat arenot derivablefrom other statementsand which
enterinto assemblages of production,circulationand consumption(D&G
1987:461).The functional elementsand relationsof capitalismare less
specifiedthanin otherforms of society,allowingthem to be simultaneously
realisedin a wide variety of domains(D&G 1987:454).Whether you are
the workeror businessman or consumerdependsmoreon the function you
are performingand the relationsinto which you enter,than who or what
you are. This gives capitalism a peculiar fluidity. Deterritorialising flows
canbe masteredthroughthe multiplicationor withdrawalof axioms(in the
latter case,very few axiomsregulatethe dominantflows,givingotherflows
only a derivativestatus)(D&G 1987:462).The operativestatementsof
various regionsof the socialfield (statementsconcerning,for example,
schooland the student,the prison and the convict,or the political system
and the citizen)constitutethe majoritarianelementsof a denumerableset.
The majoritarian standardconstituted through thesestatementsspecifies
recognisablepositionson points of the arborescent,mnemonic, molar,
structural systemsof territorialisation and reterritorialisationthrough
which subjectsare sorted and significationsmake sense(cf. D&G 1987:
295). Systemsof signifianceand subjectificationsort socialmeaningand
individual subjectsinto binary categoriesthat remainrelativelystableand
render 'minor' fluctuations invisible or derivative.Minorities are defined
by the gaps that separatethem from the axiomsconstituting majorities
(D&G 1987:469).These gapsfluctuatein keepingwith shifting lines of
flight andthe metamorphoses of the assemblages
involved.Minorities thus
constitute 'fuzzy' sets that are nondenumerable and nonaxiomisable.
Deleuzeand Guattaricharacterise suchsetsas'multiplicitiesof escapeand
flux'(D&G 1987:470).
From the polyvocalsemioticsof the body and its corporealcoordinates,
a single substanceof expressionis produced through the subjectionof
bodiesto disciplineby the abstractmachineof faciality(a'blackhole/white
wall system');the fluxesof the organicstrataare supersededby the strata
of signifianceand subjectification(D&G 1987: 18l). The 'white, male,
adult, ttrational,ttetc.,in short the averageEuropeantis the tcentral'point
by referenceto which binary distributions are organised.All the lines
definedby pointsreproducingor resonatingwith the centralpoint arepart
of thc arbrlrcsccnt systcmthat constitutes'Man' as ir 'giganticmcmory'
(l)&G lt)li7: 293). 'l'hc nrnjoritlrirn strndrrcl is thus this 'irvcnrgc'
152 MA R X ) K AR I- (r8 r8-83)
European constituted throughout the social field in its myriad forms
through the systemsof signifianceand subjectification
of variousdomains.
Connectives
Arborescentschema
Black hole
Deterritorialisation
Foucault
MARX, KARL (1818-83)
Kenneth Surin
Karl Marx doesnot receive dealof explicit attention in the writings
^great
of Deleuze and Guattari, though it is clear that the Marxist paradigm is
a crucial if tacit framework for many of the conceptionsdevelopedin the
two volumes of Capitalismand,Schizophrenia.Especially significant is
Marx's dictum in The Germanld,eology(1932)that 'the nature of individ-
uals dependson the materialconditions determiningtheir production'.
Deleuze,of course,interprets this dictum in a distinctive and even 'post-
Marxist' fashion.The necessityfor this (Deleuzian)reconsrirutionof the
Marxist project stemsfrom the crisis of utopia representedby the demise
of 'actuallyexistingsocialism',markedin particularby the eventsthat led
to the collapseof the SovietUnion in 1989(it should,however,be noted
that for Deleuze and Guattari this crisis had its beginningsin 1968).
Marxism is depictedby them asa set of axiomsthat governsthe field that
is capitalism,and so the crisisof utopia poses,asa matter of urgency,the
questionof the complianceof this field with the axiomsthat constitute
Marxism. To know that capitalismin its current manifestationis congru-
ent with the Marxist axiomaticresort has to be made to a higher-order
principle that, necessarily,is not'Marxist': this metatheoretical specifica-
tion tells us in virtue of what conditionsand principlesthisfield (capital-
ism) is governedby this axioma,tic(Marxism). Deleuze and Guattari
provide this metatheoreticalelaborationby resorting to a constitutive
ontology of power and political practice.This ontology is influencedby
Baruch Spinoza, Friedrich Nietzsche,and Henri Bergson more than
Marx, which perhapsaccountsfor the chargethat the authorsof Capitalism
and,Schizophrenia are'post-Marxist'.
Ccntral for the authors of Caltitalismand Schizophrenia is thc dclin-
cirti<lnof thc moclcof procluction,which is of'courscr crucialnotion filr
M ARx, KARI - ( r 8 r 8- 83) 153
Marx, but the analysisof which had fallen somewhatinto abeyanceas a
result of the emphasison the commodity promoted by the Frankfurt
Schooland cultural studiesin recentdecades.But Deleuzeand Guattari
give this notion a novel twist. First, they eschewdialectics,asa matter of
philosophicalexigency.As they seeit, dialecticsis a speciesof the logic of
identity which collapses'difference' into the rational 'same', and so
inevitablyensuesin a disavowalof multiplicity. Secondly,production is
not simply understoodby them in terms of such items as investment,
manufacturing,businessstrategies,and so on. Instead, Deleuze and
Guattari accordprimacy to 'machinic processes',that is, the modes of
organisationthat link attractions,repulsions,expressions,and so on,
which affectthe humanbody.For Deleuzeand Guattari the modesof pro-
duction are thereforeexpressionsof desire,so that it is desirewhich is
truly productive;and the modesof production aremerelythe outcomeof
generativedesire. Desire has this generativeprimacy
this ceaselessly
becauseit is desire, which is alwayssocial and collective, that makesthe
gun (say)into an instrument of war, or of hunting, or sport, and so forth
(asthe casemay be).
The mode of production is on the samelevel asany other expressionsof
the modesof desire,and so for Deleuze and Guattari there is neither base
nor superstructure in society but only stratifications, that is, accumula-
tions or concatenationsof ordered functions which are expressionsof
desire.What enableseach mode of production to be createdis a specific
amalgam of desires,forces and powers, and the mode (of production)
emergesfrom this amalgam.In the process,traditional Marxist concep-
tions are reversed:it is not the mode that enablesproduction to take place
(the gist of these accounts);rather, it is desiring-production itself that
makesthe mode what it is. Capitalismand,Schizophreniais this ontology of
desiring-production.
Marx maintainedthat it is necessaryfor societyand the State to exist
beforesurplus value is realisedand capitalcan be accumulated.Deleuze
and Guattari alsosaythat it is the Statewhich givescapitalits 'modelsof
realisation'.Before anything can be generatedby capital,politics has to
exist.The linkagebetweencapitaland politicsis achievedby an apparatus
that transcodesa particularspaceof accumulation.This transcodingpro-
videsa prior realisationor regulatedexpenditureof labourpowerand it is
the function of the Stateto organiseits membersinto a particularkind of
productiveforce.Today capitalhas reacheda stagebeyond the one pre-
vailingat Marx's time. Capitalis now omnipresent,and links the mosthet-
crogeneouselements(commerce,religion, art, and so forth). Productive
labour is inscrtcclinto cvery componentof society.But preciselybecause
capitrrlis ubiquitous,and hirsa prior socialc<xtpcrrtionas its cnrrbling
 154 M ARX * eNToNr o NEGR r
condition, it hasits unavoidablelimits. capital needsthis prior organisa-
tion of cooperationin order to succeed,and it followsfrom this that col-
lectivesubjectshavea potential powerthat capitalismitself cannotcapture.
The questionof revolutionis thus the questionof finding a politics that
will usethis collectivesubjectivitysothat the productiveforceof societyis
subjectedto nothing but the desireof its members.
Connectives
Capitalism
Stratification
MARX + ANTONIO NEGRI
Alberto Toscano
Deleuzeencountered the work of Antonio Negri andthe traditionof Italian
workeristMarxism (operaismo) via Guattari,who waspersonallyinvolved
with the free radio movemenrand other politicalinitiativesin the Italy of
the late 1970s,and who met Negri when rhe latter was invited by Louis
Althusser to lecture on Karl Marx's Grundrisseat the Ecole Normale
Sup6rieure,in a seriesof lectureslater publishedasMarx Beyond, Marx.
During Negri'simprisonmentfor his politicalactivitiesin Italy in rhe'years
of lead'(1970s), Deleuzecameto his defencewith a publicletter.It hasbeen
Negri's greatmerit to emphasise the persistence
of Marxist themesin the
writings of Deleuzeand Guattari,and to appropriateand recasta number
of their concepts in his own attempt to transform the vocabulary of
Marxism in light of new modesof political subjectivity,new regimesof
capitalaccumulationand new strategiesof commandand control. whilst
Deleuzeand Guattari'sinfluencecanalreadybe felt in Negri's textsof the
1980s,it is most evidentin Empire(with MichaelHardt), wherenotionsof
virtuality, deterritorialisationand smooth spacefeatureprominently in the
attemptto schematise the changesin the structuresof sovereigntyand the
dynamicsof resistance. The influqnceis by no meansunilateral:alreadyin
A Thousond' Plateaus,the work of Mario Tronti and Negri's uptakeof it is
identified asan important precursorfor an understandingof contemporary
capitalismthat acknowledges the paradoxicalcentralityof 'marginal'forms
of subjectivity(students,women,domesticwork, unemployment,and so
on). Ratherthan speakingof influences,it might be preferableto consider
therelationship of Dcleuze(andGuattari)to Negri in termsof a significant
ovcrhpin whrt thc.yrcgardrrsthc kcy problcmsfircingcontcmprlrrrry phikr-
M AR X + AN TON IO N EGR I 155
sophicaland politicalthought.Among the questionsthey sharearethe fol-
lowing:How canwe be faithful to the legacyof Baruch Spinoza?What are
the stakesof contemporarymaterialism?How can the thought of Marx be
rescuedfrom both structuralismand humanism?In what sensecan con-
temporarycapitalismbe consideredas both immanentand transcendentl
How canwe articulatenewmodelsof subjectivationin light of the critiques
of Cartesianand Kantian imagesof the subject?
Deleuzeand Negri repeatedlysituatetheir work in terms of a continu-
ation of Spinoza'sontology.Both locatein Spinozaa singularbreakwith
the philosophiesof transcendence and legitimation,driven by the consti-
tution of a thoroughgoingimmanentphilosophy.WhereasDeleuze'swrit-
ingson Spinozahighlight the mannerin which Spinoza'sthoughtprovides
us with a practicaland affirmativeextensionof Duns Scotus'thesisof uni-
vocity, Negri's The Sazsage Anomaly (1981), taking into account the
Spinoziststudiesof Deleuze,Pierre Machereyand AlexandreMatheron,
pointsinsteadto the tensionsopenedup at the heartof Spinoza'sontology
by the emergenceof capitalismin seventeenth-century Holland and the
formulationof a notion of absolutedemocracy.Though their methodolo-
giesdiverge,Deleuzepreferring a far more internalistreadingto Negri's
historical materialist approach,both concur on the need to think the flat-
tening of substanceonto its modes,understoodas centresof force and
compositionlaid out on a planeof immanence.It is on the basisof a directly
politicalunderstandingof ontologyasinextricablefrom practice(whether
as communist revolution or ethology) that Negri and Deleuze wish to
extracta materialistlineagein the history of philosophy,one that can be
seento combat the attemptsto legislateover the contingencyof being
through variousforms of representational thought.
In this respect,Negri and Deleuzeconsiderthe critique of transcend-
ence as an eminently political matter, linked to the liberation of forces
capableof entering into compositionwithout the aid of supplementary
dimensions(for examplesovereignty).Their concurrentattemptsto move
with andbeyondMarx in an analysisof contemporarycapitalismandpolit-
ical subjectivity can thus be graspedas passaBes from a transcendentalor
dialecticalmode of thought to an immanentor constructivistone. Their
rcsearchprogrammesconvergeon the notion of contemporarycapitalasa
vcry particularadmixtureof immanenceand transcendence, oneno longer
thinkablein terms of a dialecticaltotality.This is encapsulated in Deleuze
by the conceptof the axiomaticand in Negri by that of Empire. In both
cirscsdialecticalantagonismis transformedinto a figure of conflict that
sccsfirrms of subjcctivityirreducibleto the figuresof peopleor citizenry
(thrrtis collcctivcirsscmblagcs of cnunciirtion,thc multitude)confronted
with it pitritsiticllilgcncytlut scckst() cilpturc,controlrrrclcxpklit thcm.
 15 6 M AT ERIAL ISM
It should be noted that Negri's abiding preoccupationwith the Marxian
concept of real subsumption and his refashioningof class struggle
differentiatehis approachfrom the definitionof capitalismasan axiomatic
(which still demandsmodelsof realisation)and of resistancein terms of
minority (which seemshostileto norionsof classcomposition).
MATERIALISM
John Marks
Deleuze'swork is undoubtedlymaterialistin orientation,but this material-
ism must be consideredin the light of the vitalismand empiricismthat also
characterises this work. Deleuzedrawsinspirationfor his materialismfrom a
varietyof sources, but BaruchSpinoza,FriedrichNiezsche,Henri Bergson
and Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz are all extremely important in this
respect.Spinozaand Nietzschechallengethe devaluationof the body in
favourof consciousness, and in this way proposea materialistreadingof
thought.They showthatthoughtshouldno longerbeconstrained by thecon-
sciousness wehaveof it. BergsonandLeibniz- Deleuzeis alsoinfluencedby
challengeto the matter-formmodel pur forwardby Gilbert Simondon-
influenceDeleuzein the way he developsa challengeto the hylomorphic
model: the metaphysicaldoctrine that distinguishesbetweenmatter and
form. In contrastto this, Deleuzeclaimsthat matteris in continuousvaria-
tion, so that we shouldnot think in termsof formsasmoulds,but ratherin
terms of modulationsthat produce singularities.In A ThousandPlatenus,
Deleuze and Guattari talk of destratified and deterritorialised 'marrer-
movement'and (matter-energy'. FollowingSpinoza,theychallenge the hier-
archyof form andmatterby conceiving of animmanent'plane of consistency'
on which eyerythingis laid out. The elementsof this planearedistinguish-
ableonly in termsof movementand velocity.Deleuzeand Guattarialsotalk
of the planebeingpopulatedby inifinite 'bits' of impalpableandanonymous
matterthat enterinto varyingconnections. Deleuze'slater work on Leibniz
develops this theme,againemphasising thatmatteris not organised asa series
of solidand discreteforms,but ratherinfinitelyfolded.
In order to graspthe originalityof Deleuze'smaterialismit is necessary
to understandwhat he meanswhen he usesthe terms 'machine' and
'machinic'.In his bookon Michel Foucaulr,he speculates on rhe possibil-
ities for new human forms openedup by the combinationof the forcesof
carbonand silicon.However,this statementshouldnot necessarily be read
in termsof the humanbody beingsupplemented or alteredby meansof
rnrrtcrillprosthcscs, 'l'hc sort of nrlchinc thirt I)clcuzcconccivcs<lfis ln
MA TE R IA LIS M t57
abstractphenomenonthat does not depend entirely upon physicaland
mechanicalmodificationsof matter.The machineis insteada function of
what might be thought of as the 'vital' principle of this planeof consist-
ency,which is that of makingnew connections,and in this way construct-
ing what Deleuze calls 'machines'. Nor should Deleuze's machinic
materialismbe seen as a form of cybernetics,accordingto which the
organic and the mechanical share a common informational language.
The fact that cinemaand painting are capableof actingdirectly upon the
nervoussystemmeansthat they function as analogicallanguagesrather
than digital codes.In common with the sort of materialismfavouredby
cyberneticsand theories of artificial intelligence,Deleuze rejects the
notion that there is brain behind the brain: an organisingconsciousness
that harnessesand directs the power of the brain. He conceivesof the
humanbrain asmerelyone cerebralcrystallisationamongstothers:a cere-
bral fold in matter. Deleuze's particular formulation of materialism
depends upon the counterintuitive Bergsoniannotion that matter is
already'image':beforeit is perceivedit is 'luminous' in itself; the brain is
itself an image.However,he alsoeschewsthe reductivemolecularmateri-
alism upon which artificial intelligenceis based.According to such a
reductive materialism,all processesand realities can be explainedby
reducing them down to the most basic components - atoms and
molecules- from which they areconstructed.Again,the fact that he insists
that painting and film can act directly upon the nervoussystemto create
new neuralpathwaysindicatesthat he is not a reductivematerialist.
Ultimately,Deleuzeis unwilling to reduceall matter to a singlestratum
of syntax. Computer technologymay well transform the world of the
future, but it will not be by meansof the developmentof a computational
languagethat is common to the brain and the computer.It will insteadbe
the resultof computersexpandingthe possibilitiesfor thought in new and
perhapsunpredictableways.In this manner,the brain and the computer
will take part in the constructionof an abstractmachine.In his work on
cinema,Deleuzedevelopsthe notion of the brain as a fold of the outside
or a'screen'.He considers,for example,MichelangeloAntonioni'sfilms to
be an explorationof the way in which the brain is connectedto the world,
and the necessity of exploring the potential of these connections.
Antonioni drawsa contrastbetweenthe worn-out body,weigheddown by
the pastandmodernneuroses, and a tcreative'brain,strivingto createcon-
ncctions with the new world around it, and experiencingthe potential
rrmplificationof its powersby 'artificial'brains.For Deleuze,thinking takes
pl:rccwhcn thc brain asa stratum comesinto contactwith other strata.In
sunrmary,| )clcuzc thinks in tcrms <>fan expressiae 'andintensiacmaterial-
isnrirsrrlrlroscdl<t',rrtil.uc'liztr nriltcriillisnr.
:tnd n'/cflsiz,c
 158 MATERTALTsM+ pHrr-osopHy
Connectives
Foucault
Spinoza
MATERIALISM + PHILOSOPHY
Kenneth Surin
For Deleuzeand Guattari,traditionalphilosophyhasalwaysfunctionedon
the basisof codesthat haveeffectivelyturned it into a bureaucracyof the
consciousness. Traditional philosophyhasneverbeenableto abandonits
originsin the codificationsof the despoticimperialState.The taskof phi-
losophynow is to controvertthis traditionalphilosophyin a waythat canbe
revolutionary only if the new or next philosophyseeksto 'transmit some-
thing that doesnot and will not allowitself to be codified'.This 'transmis-
sion' will eschewthe drama of interiority that traditional philosophy had
perforce to invest in as a condition of being what it is, and will instead
involve the creation of conceptsthat can registerand delineatethe trans-
missionof forcesto bodies,that is, it will be a physicsof thought, the think-
ing of a pure exteriority,in the mannerof Deleuze'stwo greatprecursors,
Baruch Spinozaand Friedrich Nietzsche,and as such will be irreducibly
materialist.For Deleuzeand Guattari,philosophythat hasleft behindthe
codificationsof the Statewill be aboutbodiesand forces,and the concepts
designedto bring theseto thought.It will thereforehavean essentialrela-
tion to nonphilosophyaswell, sinceit will be rootedin perceptsand affects.
This materialismthat is philosophywill bring somerhingto life, it will
extricatelife from theplaceswhereit hasbeentrapped,andit will createlines
of flight from thesestases. The creationof theselinesof flight constitutes
eventsand,asevents,they arequite distantfrom the abstractions that con-
stitute the staplediet of traditionalphilosophy.Deleuzeis emphaticthat
abstractions explainnothing,but rather are themselves in needof explan-
ation.So the newphilosophythat will experimentwith the real,will eschew
suchabStractions asuniversals, unities,subjects,objects,multiples,and put
in their placethe processes that culminatein the productionof the abstrac-
tionsin question.Soin placeof universals we haveprocesses of universalisa-
tion; in place of subjects and objects we have subjectificationand
objectification; in placeof unitieswehaveunification;in placeof themultiplc
we havemultiplication;andsoon. Theseprocesses
takeplaceon the plancof
immanence,sincecxpcrimentationcan only takeplaceimmancntly.In thc
cnd ir conccptis only rrsingulrrrity ('rrchild', 'a thinkcr','a musiciirn'),
irnd
M EM O R Y 159
philosophy is the task of arranging theseinto assemblages that constitute
multiplicities.Deleuzeoncesaidthat eachplateauof A Thousand, Plateaus
wasan exampleof suchan assemblage. Philosophyis not so much a form of
reflectionasa kind of constructionism institutedon the planeof immanence.
At the sametime, philosophyis not just a kind of physicalism,insisting
on the substantialityof Being,that is setentirelyapartfrom noology,which
asan immaterialisminsistson the primacyof thought,and in particularthe
image of thought. For Deleuze,the image of thought is a kind of pre-
philosophy,and thus is inextricablybound up with philosophy.The image
of thought operateson the plane of immanence,and constitutesa pre-
philosophicalpresuppositionthat philosophyhasto satisfy.The imageof
thought,evenif it is an immaterialism,is not antitheticalto a strict materi-
alism.The planeof immanencerevealsthe 'unthought' in thought,and its
absoluteincompatibilitywith materialismonly comesaboutwhen philoso-
phers forget that thought and the constitutionof matter havethe funda-
mentalontologicalcharacterof events,and insteadidentify 'matter' with
Body,and 'thought' with Mind, in this way saddlingthemselveswith an
impassethat cannotbe resolvedbecauseMind and Body are saidto possess
mutuallyincompatibleproperties('inert'vs'active','material'vs'spiritual',
and so forth). The ontology of events,by contrast,allowsthe material and
immaterialto be interrelatedand integratedin a ceaseless dynamism.Thus,
the eventof 'a housebeingbuilt' requiresmanymaterialthingsto be given
functions (windows let in light, doors protect privacy stairs enableaccess,
and so on), and these functions in turn involve (immaterial)concepts
(unlessone has the conceptof stairsbeing able to provide accessin this
rather than that way,a ladder,lift or hoist could servejust effectivelyas
stairsin enablingaccessto an upper floor). So conceptsare returned to
materialthings via functions,and things are integratedwith conceptsvia
functions,while functions are immaterialbut can only be embodiedin
thingsevenasthey canonly be expressed in concepts.All the time a radical
immanenceis preserved.For Deleuze the materialismof philosophyis
compromisedonly when the immaterialis harnessedto the transcendent:
without resortto the transcendent,immaterialismand materialismcan be
kept on the sameplane- immanence- and madeto interactproductively.
MEMORY
CliffStagoll
l)clcuzchnslittlc time f<rrmemoryconceivedasa meansfor summoning
Suchir modcl hcks crcltivc p<ttcntillrrndimplicsthat an
olclpcrccptiorts.
160 M EM O RY
object,say,can be re-presentedand re-cognisedas the se,lneone as that
experiencedin the past.But such a view ignoresthe fact that today'srec-
ollectionis quite a differentexperiencetemporallyand contextuallyfrom
either the original experienceor previousrecollections.To theoriseaway
such differencesis to discount the productive potential that Deleuze
considersinherentin the operationof memory in favourof tying oneself
to the past.
Despite proclaiming his lack of enthusiasm for memory as a topic,
Deleuzenonetheless reworkedhis conceptionof it severaltimes.In early
work on David Hume, Deleuzedealt with how the reproductiveand rep-
resentationaleffectsof memoryarecritical to the fiction of personaliden-
tity becauseof their role in establishingrelations of resemblanceand
causation.In his writings on Henri Bergson,though, and in his own
philosophiesof difference,Deleuzemoved beyond such 'habit memory'
to theorisehow 'blocksof history' might be brought into productiveasso-
ciations with the present,such that the past might be lived anew and
differently.
Deleuze'sBergsoniantheoriesof consciousness outline two kinds of
operation.One is the 'line of materiality',upon which he theorisesrela-
tionshipsbetweenthe mind and the materialworld (including the body).
Such activity alwaysoccursin the present,understoodas a purely theor-
eticaldemarcationbetweenpastand future. On this line, our relationship
with matteris wholly materialandunmediated:the world of consciousness
is reconciledwith the world of matterby meansof differentkindsof move-
ment. Such activity is alwaysorientedrowardsthe practicallife of action
rather than pure knowledge.As such, the form of memory at work is
'habit memory', reflex determination of appropriatebodily responses
conditionedby whateverhasprovedusefulin the past,but without'pure
recollection'.
Being distinct from consciousness,the line of materiality cannot
account for the temporality of lived experience.Consequently,Deleuze
invokesBergson'stheory of pure memory on a 'line of pure subjectivity'.
Bergsonbelievesthat pure memorystoreseveryconsciouseventin its par-
ticularity and detail.The perceptionsof acrualexistenceareduplicatedin
a virtual existenceas imageswith the potentialfor becomingconscious,
actualones.Thus everylived moment is both actualand virtual, with per-
ception on one side and memory on the other; an ever-growingmassof
recollections.
Taking his lead from Bergson,Deleuze contendsthat the virtual is
definedby its potentialfor becomingconscious.Ratherthan merelysimu-
lating the real (as in 'virtual reality' media), the virtual might bc
mlclc tctual irnds()hirvcsomcconscqucntncw cffcct.How this potcntirrl
M ER L EAU - Po N TY, M AU R IcE (rgo8-6r) l6l
might be realisedwill be determinedby the precisecircumstancesof its
actualisation.
As a collectionof purely airtual images,memory hasno psychological
existence,being insteada purely ontological'past in general'that is pre-
servedneitherin time nor space.(As such,lossof memoryought not to be
conceivedas a lossof 'contents'from pure memory,but merely a break-
down of recall mechanisms.)The virtual imagesare arrangedin various
patternsthat might be conceivedas 'planes'or'sheets', with everyplane
containing the totality of the experiencedpast distributed relative to some
particularvirtual image,the one from which all otherson the planederive
their meaningand history.
Purememorywill be revealedto consciousness whenthe relevantvirtual
imagesare actualised,a matter rarely mentionedin Bergson'stexts but
central to Deleuze.Such actualisationis the processof recollectionin
which the virtual differentiatesitself by becoming somethingnew - a
recalledmemoryimagerelevantto someactionor circumstance- and thus
assumingpsychologicalsignificance.Deleuze'senigmatic descriptionof
the processhas two parts.First, memory is accessed by meansof a 'leap
into the past', enabling the most relevant plane to be located. Second,
memory is brought to presenceand givena new'life'or contextin terms
of current circumstances.In this moment, psychology interacts with
ontologyin the constitutionof the lived present,a specialkind of synthe-
sisthat Deleuzeconsidersto be essentialto the flow of lived time.
Two aspectsof Deleuze'sBergsoniantheory of memory are critical to
his anti-foundationalism.First, it showsthat one need not conceiveof a
transcendentsubject'owning' memory in order for recollectionto occur.
Indeed, Deleuze arguesthe opposite:memory helps to give rise to the
impressionof a consistentand unifying self.Second,it showsthat memory,
ratherthan merelyredrawingthe past,constitutesthe pastasa new present
relative to presentinterestsand circumstances.Thus conceived,memory
is a creative power for producing the new rather than a mechanismfor
reproducingthe same.
Connectives
Bergson
Virtual/Virtuality
MERLEAU-PONTY, MAURICE (l90tt-61)- rcficrto the cntricson
* fillcl'rnd'phcnomcnology'.
'crystnl','lioucrult
 162 M ICROPOL IT ICS
MICROPOLITICS
Kenneth Surin
Deleuze and Guattari opposemicropolitics to rhe politics of molarisa-
tion. Where the molar (or'arborescent', to use their equivalentterm)
designatesstructuresand principlesthat arebasedon rigid stratifications
or codingswhich leaveno room for all that is flexibleand contingent,the
molecular which is the basis of micropolitics allows for connections
that are local and singular.A molecular logic of production is basically
self-organisingor auto-poetic,whereasits molar counterpart finds its
generating principle in some feature or entity that is external to what is
being produced. The necessityof micropolitics for Deleuze and Guattari
stemsfrom the current conjuncture of capitalistproduction and accu-
mulation. In this conjuncture,capitalhasbecomethe ever-presentcon-
dition that ensuresthe harmonisationof eventhe most disparateforms
(businessand finance,the arts,leisure,and so forth). This is the agethat
Deleuzetitles 'the societiesof control' and it contrastswith the disciplin-
ary societiesof the nineteenthand early twentieth centuries.[n this con-
iuncture, the scopeof labour hasbeen amplified exponentially,ascapital
permeatesevery interstice of society:the ubiquity of capital coincides
with the expansionof everything capableof creating surplus-value,as
human consciousness and all that was hitherto considered(private' is
relentlesslyincorporated into the latest structures of accumulation.
Capitalism has always had as its 'utopia' the capacity to function
without the State and in the current coniuncture this disposition has
become more profoundly entrenched. On the other hand, for Deleuze
and Guattari this is not becauseState apparatuseshave disappeared
(clearly they havenot); rather the rigid demarcationbetweenState and
society is no longer tenable.Society and State now constitute one all-
encompassingreality, and all capital has becomesocial capital. Hence,
the generationof socialcooperation,undertakenprimarily by the service
and informational industries in the advanced economies, has become
a crucial one for capitalism.
In a situationof this kind, a molar politics with its emphasison stand-
ardisationand homogeneitybecomesincreasinglyirrelevant,as the trad-
itional dividing line between'right' and 'left' in politicsbecomesblurred,
and such notions as 'the radical centre' gain credencedespite being
patentlyoxymoronic;and as traditional classaffiliationsdissolveand the
socialdivisionof labouris radicallyrransformedby theemergencc of infor-
mation and serviceindustrics.Thc cnablingconditionsof micrupolitics
clcrivcfrom this sctilf'dcvclopnlcnts. 'l'hc upslrotis thrrtthc orchcstrttion
MIC R OP OLITIC S 163
of affectanddesirehasnow becomemuchmoresignificantfor determining
linesof affiliationin contemporarypolitics.
The orchestrationof desire in micropolitics will have an oscillating
logic,asthe desireconstrainedby the ordersofcapital is deterritorialised,
so that it becomesa desire exterior to capital, and is then reterritorialised
or foldedbackinto the socialfield. When this happensthe liberateddesire
integratesinto itself the flows and componentsof the Socius or social
field to form a 'desiringmachine'.The heart of micropoliticsis the con-
struction of thesenew desiring machinesas well as the creationof new
linkagesbetweendesiring machines:without a politics to facilitatethis
constructionthere can be no productivedesire,only the endlessrepeti-
tion of the non-different, as what is repeated is regulated by logics of
identity, equivalenceand intersubstitutability(this being the underlying
logic of the commodity principle as analysedby Karl Marx). In microp-
olitics the fateof repeatinga differencethat is only an apparentdifference
is avoided,and capitalism'snegative,wasteful and ultimately nonpro-
ductive repetition, a repetition of nonbeing,is supplantedby the poly-
topia of a micropolitics that brings together the strata of minorities,
becomings,incorporealities,concepts,'peoples',in this way launchinga
thought and practice capableof expressingand instantiating a desire to
undo the prevailingworld order.
Micropolitics, therefore,createsan 'ethos of permanent becoming-
revolutionary',an ethosnot constrainedby a politicspredicatedon the now
defunct forms of Soviet bureaucraticsocialismand a liberal or social
democracy.In this ethos, our criteria of belonging and affiliation will
alwaysbe subject to a kind of chaotic motion, and a new political know-
ledgeis createdwhich dissipatesthe enablinglie told us by thosewho now
havepoliticalpower,with their lovefor nation-states, tribes,clans,political
parties,churches,and perhapseverythingdone up to now in the nameof
community.At the sametime, this ethoswill createnew collectivesolidar-
ities not basedon theseold 'loves'.
Connectives
Affect
Becoming
Control society
Desire
lioucault
Molar
Molccuhr
S<rcius
 r64 M INORIT ARIAN
MINORITARIAN
VerenaConley
'Minoritarian' is often used in relation to postcolonial theory and the
conceptof minor literature. The term is developedin connectionwith lan-
guageand the 'order-word',that is, a pass-wordthat both compelsobedi-
ence and opens passages. In this senseDeleuze arguesthat language,
because it dealswith the art of the possible,is fundamentallypolitical.The
scientific undertaking of extracting constantsis alwayscoupled with the
politicalenterpriseof socialcontrol that worksby imposingthem on speak-
ers and transmitting order-words.In order to cope with this condition
Deleuzestatesthat we needto distinguishbetweena major and minor lan-
guage,that is, betweena power (pouaoir)of constants and,a power
Qpuis-
sance)of variables.In the political spherewhere a 'maior' languageis seen
and heard,there alsoinheresin its form a 'minor' elementthat doesnot
exist independentlyor outsideof its expressionand statements.
The morea languagehasor acquiresthe characteristics of a major form,
the more likely it is to be affectedby continuousvariationsthat can trans-
poseit into a minor language.A languagealwayshas internal minorities.
No homogeneoussystemremainsunaffectedby immanent processes of
variation.constantsdo not existsideby sidewith variables;theyaredrawn
from the variablesthemselves.Major and minor aretwo different usagesof
the samelanguage.A minor languageopensa passagein the order-word
that constitutesany of the operativeredundanciesof the major language.
The problemis not the distinctionbetweenmajor and minor languagebut
one of becoming.A person(a subject,but alsoa creativeand activeindi-
vidual) has to deterritorialise the major languagerather than reterritori-
aliseherself within an inherited dialect.Recourseto a minor languageputs
the maior languageinto flight. Minoritarian authorsarethosewho arefor-
eignersin their own tongue.
A minority is not definedby the paucityof its numbersbut by its capacity
to becomeor, in its subjectivegeography,to draw for itself lines of fluctu-
ation that openup a gapand separateit from the axiomconstitutinga redun-
dantmajority.A majorityis linkedto a stateof poweranddomination.what
definesmajoritiesandminoritiesarethe relationsinternal to number.For the
majority,this relationconstitutesa setthat is denumerable. The minority is
nodenumerable,but it may havemany elements.The non-denumerableis
characterised by the presenceof connections, that is, the additiveconjunc-
tion 'and' or the mathematical sign' * ': a minoritarianlanguage is ,x t y and
b f traitsa * a and. . .'. It is producedbetween setsandbclongsto ncithcr.
It cludcsthcmrnclcunsritutcs rrlincof flight.In mrthcmatical tcrmsl)clcuzc
MIN OR ITA R IA N + C IN E MA 165
remarksthat the axiomaticworld of the majority manipulatesonly denu-
merablesets.Minorities,by contrast,constitutenon-axiomatic(or axiomis-
able)sets,that is, massesor multiplicitiesof escapeand flux. The majority
assumesa standardmeasure,representedby the integral integer,say,an
armedwhite maleor thoseactinglike one.Domination alwaystranslatesinto
hegemony.A determination that differs from the constant is considered
minoritarian.Majority is an abstractstandardthat canbe saidto includeno
oneandthusspeakin the nameof nobody.A minority is a deviationfrom the
modelor a becomingof everybody(toutle monde). The majoritarianmodeis
a constantwhile its minoritariancounterpartis a subsystem.Minoritarian is
seenaspotential(puissance), creativeand in becoming.Blacks,Jews,Arabsor
womencan only createby making possiblea becoming,but neverthrough
ownership.Deleuzestatesclearlythat a majorityis nevera becoming.
Deleuzeobserves thatour ageis becomingtheageof minorities.Minorities
aredefinednot by numberbut by becomingand by their lines of fluctuation.
Minorities areobjectivelydefinablestates.One canalsothink of them asseeds
of becomingwhosevalueis to trigger uncontrollablefluctuationsand deter-
ritorialisations.A minor languageis a major languagein the processof
becoming minoq and a minority a majority in the processof change.
Becoming asDeleuzestatestime and againin his work on politics,literature
and the arts, is creation.It is the becomingof everybody.In the processof
becomingminor,the figureof death(nobody)giveswayto life (everybody).
Connectives
Becoming
Deterritorialisation
Maioritarian
Order-word
Power
MINORITARIAN + CINEMA
Constantine Verezsis
ln Cinerna2: Thetirne-image, Deleuzeinvokeshis writing (with Guattari)
on Franz Kafka and minor literatures to describea 'minor cinema'-
firundedin the Third World and its minorities - that connectsimmedi-
irtclyto the qucstionof politics.Sucha (modern)politicalcinemais char-
rctcriscd(rnd oppuscdto clirssicirlcincma)in thrcc wirys.First, a min<lr
cincnu docs not rcplcscnt (or lcldrcss)ln olrprcsscdiurcl subjcctccl
 r66 M I NO RI TARI AN + CINEMA
people,but rather anticipatesa peopleyet to be created,a consciousness
to be brought into existence.Second,a minor cinemadoesnot maintain
a boundary betweenthe private and the public, but rather crossesborders,
merging the personalwith the social to make it immediately political.
And third, recognisingthat the people exist only in the condition of a
minority, political cinemadoesnot identify a new union (a singularity),
but rather creates(and recreates)a multiplicity of conditions.Deleuze
describesthis minor cinemaasone that setsout, not to representthe con-
ditions of an oppressedminority, but rather to invent new valuesand
facilitatethe creationof a peoplewho havehitherto been missing.Like
Kafka's minor literature,a minor cinemais interestedneither in repre-
sentationor interpretation,but in experimentation:it is a creativeact of
becoming.
Deleuzerelateshis accountof minoritariancinemato the work of Third
World filmmakers (Lino Brocka, Glauber Rocha, Chahine Nasserism)
and in doing so implicitly recallsthe notion of 'Third Cinema',advanced
by Latin Americanfilmmakersin the late 1960s.In their founding mani-
festo - Towardsa Third Cinema- Fernando Solanasand Octavio Getino
calledfor a cinemathat wasmilitant in its politicsand experimentalin its
approach.The manifestodescribed'First Cinema'- the so-calledimperial
cinema of big capital - as an objective and representationalcinema.
'SecondCinema' - the authorialcinemaof the petty bourgeoisie- was
describedas a subjectiveand symbolic cinema. By contrasr, 'Third
Cinema'- a politicalor minoritariancinema- wasan attitude,one con-
cerned neither with representation(a being-whole)nor subjectification
(a being-one),but with life-experimentation - the creationand exhibition
of localdifference.In later writing, Solanasexplainedthat Third Cinema,
though initially adaptedto conditionsprevailingin Latin America,could
not be limited to that continent;nor evento the Third World, nor evento
a particularcategoryof cultural objects,but rather constituteda kind of
virtual geographyand conditionalobiecthood.For Solanas,Third Cinema
(as opposedto Third World cinema) was broadly concernedwith the
expressionof new culturesand of socialchange:Third Cinemais ,anopen
category,unfinished,and incomplete'.
Third Cinema- minor cinema- is a researchcategoryone that recog-
nisesthe contingencyand multiplicity - the hybridity - of all cultural
objects.Paul Willemen, in 'The Third Cinema Q3restion',explainsthat
practitionersof rhird cinema refusedro opposeessentialistnotions of
'national identity and cultural authenticity' to the values of imperial
powers,but rather recognisedthe multiplicity or 'many-layeredness of
their own cultural-historicalfrrrmarions'.That is, a minor cincma
(a nrrtionalcincml) is not singulirr,but shtpcclby complcxrrnclnrultiplc
M IN OR ITAR IAN + L ITER ATU R E t67
connectionsestablished betweenlocaland internationalforcesand condi-
tions. A film such as Tran Anh Hung's Cyclo (France-Vietnam,1995)
understandsthis type of approach.On the one hand, the local (or intra-
national)multi-layeredness of Cyclais evidentin its useof variousregional
dialects: for instance,the cyclo-driver of the film's title and his sisterspeak
in the vernacularof the North and of the South of Vietnam.On the other
hand,the hybridisationof global(or international)forcesis evidentin the
film's useof music(Tranh Lam, Radiohead,RollinsBand) and its expres-
sive vocabulary,one that drawsupon influencesas diverseas TheBicycle
Thid(Yittorio De Sica, 1948), Taxi Drizser(Martin Scorsese,1976), and
Himatsuri(Mitsuo Yanagimatchi,1985).
As in the minor useof language,minoritariancinemaceasesto be rep-
resentationaland moves instead towards its limits. This is evident in
Cyclo,where the beginning of the film, situated in the streetsof neo-
realism,and in the daily toil and routine of a cyclo driver, soon takesthe
viewer- through its wayward and itinerant movements- in unpredictable
and evendangerousdirections.The focusof this movementis on becom-
ing, on relations,on what happensbetween:betweenactions,between
affections,betweenperceptions.For Deleuze,a minor cinemais situated
in a logic and an aestheticsof the 'and'. It is a creativestammering(and
. . . and . . . and), a minoritarian use of languagethat the French-
VietnameseTran would sharewith Deleuze'sfavouredexamples(Kafta,
SamuelBeckett,Jean-LucGodard). Cyclocanbeapproachedasa kind of
living reality,a type of creativeunderstandingbetweencolours,between
people,betweencinemas- betweenthe red (of the poet) end.the blue (of
the cyclo) ond,the yellow (of the fish-boy); betweenthe First, and the
Second.and the Third.
MINORITARIAN + LITERATURE
Ronald,Bogue
In a l9l2 diary entry, Kafta reflectson the advantagesCzech and Yiddish
writers enioy as contributorsto minor literatures,in which no towering
figuresdominateand the life of lettersis consumedwith collectivesocialand
politicalconcerns.Deleuzeand Guattariarguethat Kafka'scharacterisation
of minor literaturesactuallymapsKafka's own conceptionof literature's
properfunctionand guideshis practiceasa PragueJew writing in German.
'l'hc csscnccof Kafka'sminor literatureDeleuzeand Guattarifind in three
f'caturcs: of langulgc,thc conncctionof thc individ-
'thc clctcrritorillizittion
tull to ir p<llitical
inrnrcdilcy,rnd thc collcctivcitsscmblitgcol'ctttnciation'
168 M I NO RI TARI AN + LI T E R A T U R E
(D&G 1986:l8). Kafka discoversin PragueGerman the instabilitiesof
a deracinatedgovernmentlanguagesubtlydeformedthroughCzechusage,
and in his writings he further destabilisesthat alreadydeterritorialised
German in an asceticimpoverishmentof diction and syntax.Throughout
his storiesand novelsKafta directly links psychologicaland family conflicts
to extendedsocialand political relations.And though he necessarilywrites
asa solitaryindividual,he treatslanguageasa collectiveassemblage of enun-
ciationandtherebyattemptsto articulatethe voiceof a peopleto come(since
a positive,functioningcollectivityis preciselywhat Kafka findslacking).
In the conceptof minor literature Deleuzeand Guattari connectthe
political strugglesof minoritiesto the formal experimentations typical of
the modernist avant-garde.What makespossiblethis rapprochementof
politics and formal innovation is Deleuzeand Guattari's view of language
asa modeof actionin continuousvariation.Everylanguageimposespower
relationsthrough its grammaticaland syntacticregularities,its lexicaland
semanticcodes,yet thoserelationsare inherently unstable,for linguistic
constantsand invariantsare merely enforcedrestrictionsof speech-acts
that in fact are in perpetualvariation.A major usageof a languagelimits,
organises, controlsand regulateslinguisticmaterialsin supportof a dom-
inant socialorder,whereasa minor usageof a languageinducesdisequilib-
rium in its components,taking advantageof the potentialfor diverseand
divergentdiscursivepracticesalreadypresentwithin the language.
A minor literature,then, is not necessarilyone written in the language
of an oppressedminority,andit is not exclusivelythe literatureof a minor-
ity engagedin the deformationof the languageof a majority.Every lan-
guage,whetherdominant or marginalised,is open to a major or a minor
usage,and whateverits linguistic medium, minor literature is defined by
a minor treatment of the variablesof language.Nor is minor literature
simply literaturewritten by minorities.What constitutesminoritiesis not
their statisticalnumber,which may in actualitybe greaterthan that of the
majority,but their positionwithin asymmetricalpower relationshipsthat
are reinforcedby and implementedthrough linguistic codesand binary
oppositions.Western white male adult humans may be outnumbered
worldwide, but they remain the majority through their position of privil-
ege, and that privilege informs the linguistic oppositionsthat define,
situateand help control non-westernand non-whitepopulations,women,
childrenandnon-humanlife forms.Minorities merelyreinforcedominant
powerrelationswhen they acceptthe categories that definethem. Only by
undoing such oppositions as western/non-western,white/non-white,
male/female,adult/child, or human/animalcanminoritieschangcpower
relations. Only by becoming'other', by passingbetweenthc polcsof binary
oppositionsanclhlurring clcirrcirtcgorics crrnncw possibiliticsfilr social
M IN OR ITAR IAN + M U SIC 169
interaction be created.Such a processof becomingother is central to
minor literatureand its minor usageof languageand this minor becoming
otheris that which turns a dominatedminority into an activeforceof trans-
formation. Hence, minor literature is less a product than a processof
becomingminor, through which languageis deterritorialisedimmediately
socialand political issuesareengaged,and a collectiveassemblage of enun-
ciationmakespossiblethe inventionof a peopleto come.
MINORITARIAN + MUSIC
Marcel Spibod.a
African-Americanand Afro-Caribbeancultures, under certain circum-
tminort culture, and in both casesthere
stances,constituteinstancesof
have been a substantialnumber of cultural formations that one could
describeasbeing'minoritarian'.Among theseone might number the fol-
lowing:bhes, jazz(traditional,be-bop,electric,free,avant-garde), P-funk,
techno,hiphop, all largely developedaspart of African-American culture;
and ska, roots, reggae and dub, all largely developed as part of Afro-
Caribbeanculture. They constitute instancesof minor culture 'under
certaincircumstances'because their historicaldevelopmentis complexand
one cannot locate every developmentexclusivelywithin minoritarian
instances.Sometimesthe creativeand transformativepotential of these
formationsgivesway to the pressuresof capitalismor of appropriationas
part of the dominant(usuallywhite) cultural formations,pressureswhich
often collectivelyconspireto exploit or limit this potential.To the extent
that any of thesecultural developmentscan be said to constitute instances
of the 'minor', it is largelyowing to the followingreasons.
Where it is a questionof language,the variousmusicaldevelopments
listed aboveare subjectto linguistic mediationas part of a languagethat
reinforcesdominant culture. In each and every case,this languageis
English.In order to developa minor useof this language,minor cultural
formations, such as those of Black America, the Caribbean or South
London, haveall had to find waysof altering or recombiningelementsfrom
the dominant languagein order to render them sonorous,as a meansto
foregroundingtheir transformativepotential.That is to saythat minor cul-
tural formationshavehad to deterritorialisethe English language.This
indeed is the first characteristicof a minor cultural formation. For
cxamplc,considerthe work of the African-Americanwriter-activistAmiri
l']arakaand his nsc of thc English language.His writing distorts and
cxposcstlrc nrlrnrntivc,cxpklitirtivcopcrltionsot'thc donrinitntlangttitgc
t70 M I NO RI TARI AN + MUSIC
throughthe wayin which he recombinesits elements,structuredaccording
to an aestheticderivedfrom jazzmusic.Alternatively,considerthe work of
the Jamaican-Britishdub poet, Linton Kwesi Johnson,combining ele-
ments from JamaicanCreoleand British English in the productionof an
oral poetry performedover dub music.When written, his poetry deploys
portmanteaucombinationsof wordsor partsof wordsin order to politicise
the language. In both theseinstances, the majoritarian,dominantuseof the
Englishlanguageis renderedminor in relationto the musicsof the writers'
respectiveculturalmilieus,and in eachcasethe languagebecomesmusical,
or sonorous in its expressions.Consider the title of Linton Kwesi
Johnson's poem Mi Reztalueshanary Fren (Linton Kwesi Johirson, Mi
Repalueshanary Fren: Selected, Poems),written as it is performed with the
word 'revolutionary'phoneticallyrenderedin Creole-Englishas'revalue-
shanary'and therebyconnotingnot only revolution,but alsore-evaluation.
The manipulation of the relation between the sound,of the word and its
written inscription is purposely developedto challengethe alienation of
ethnic groupsasembodiedin a dominant language,and to addressthe spe-
cific concerns of these groups in ways that provoke or challenge the
oppressionexpressedin the language'sdominating operations.This is
minor culture'spoliticalfunction.
The third and final criterion for assessinghow thesemusically-derived
or orientedcultural formationsbecomeminor is the extent to which they
movebeyondthe positionsof individual subjectsor personstowardscol-
lectiveutteranceor enunciation.In order to examinethis aspect,it is nec-
essaryto recall that - for Deleuzeand Guattari - enunciationfunctions
collectivelyin relationto a machinicassemblage of bodies,both humanand
non-human,for examplegeologicalor technologicalbodies.What all these
differentbodieshavein commonis that they operatethrough the inscrip-
tion of surfaces:the layersof rock beneaththe surfaceof the earth, the
skin and its markings,the striation of the muscles,or the groovesof a
record. . . Considerearlyhiphop culture or 'wildstyle',and its character-
istics such as 'bombing' (graffiti) or the isolation of a musical passage
('break'or 'breakdown')by scratchingvinyl records,or eventhe bodiesof
breakdancers whosemovesare only legiblein relation to the surfaceson
which they dance.Theseinscriptionsand their interactingsurfacesat least
partiallyconstitutethe machinicassemblage of earlyhiphop.To the extent
that thesebodiesproduceutterancesor enunciationsit is via the MC whose
rappin' skillsostensiblymark her out asan individual,and yet their func-
tion remainscompletelytied into the hiphop collectiae, comprisingall thc
other aspectsof the hiphop assemblage. Furthermore, rappin' providcs
anotherinstanccof r stratcgicor minor dcploymcnt<lf thc (Anrcricln)
l')nglishlirrrguirgc
ils plrrtof an r.rrbirn
culturirlfirrnrltiorr.
MOLA R t7l
MOLAR
Tom Conley
The adjective'molar' belongsto a chemicalidiolect that Deleuzeusesto
inform his work on aestheticsand politics.In a strict sensethings molar
relateto aggregates of matter and not to either their molecularor atomic
properties,or their motion. In a geologicalsense,'molar' is understoodto
be what pertainsto mass,ground, continenceor telluric substance. It also
pertainsto the generalpatternsofbehaviourtakenby an organor anorgan-
ism, and thus the term can describea trait of personalityor the character
of the ego.Deleuzetendsto jettisonthe psychologicalinflectionsin order
to correlatemolarity with his differentwaysof describingthe world; this
is especiallythe casein his treatmentof 'wholes' (Tout and touts)thathe
describesas being composedof a compact and firm terrestrial oceanic
mass.A molar form caneitherriseup and commanda greatdealof earthly
spaceor be seeneither afloat or drifting in great bodies of water (a point
developedin a very early pieceof writing called'Causesand Reasonsof the
DesertIsland').
Broadeningthe biologicaldefinitions to include philosophy,geologyand
aesthetics,Deleuze conceiveslandscapesas massesof greater or lesser
molarity. He draws Lucretian and pre-Socratic philosophy through the
human sciencesand into an aesthetic domain such that he can detect
difference,vibration, disaggregation,deterritorialisationand metamor-
phosisin terms of molecularactivitiestaking place in and about molar
masses.The term assistshim in studying Perceqtion in its range from
'macro' or totalisingprocessto 'micro' or keendetectionof infinitesimal
differencesin the physicaland biologicalworld.
In his work on cinema,the dyad of molar/molecularis usedto discern
effectsof convectionand atmosphere.When contrastingthe four great
schoolsof montage- American,French, German, Soviet- that grew in
the first thirty yearsof cinema,he notesthat the signatureof poeticrealism
in directors ranging from Ren6 Clair to Jean Vigo and Jean Renoir is
markedby emphasisingthe 'molar' (and not moral) aspectof the physical
world: social contradiction is conveyedthrough imposing and massive
monumentsof Paristhat humblethe lost citizensin TheCrazyRay Q924);
in Vigo's L'Atalante (1934)the cobblestonestreetson the edgesof the
Scine makeobdurateand unyielding stonethe antithesisof fluidity; the
incrt piles of old editions and lithographs cluttering the walls in the
b<xrkscllcr's apartmentin BouduSuaed.fiomDrortning(1932)attestto a
nrolirrityrtgitinstarrclwith whiclr irtrnosphcrc- firg,clrizzlc,mist - clcfincs
r gcrrcritl tttrxxlor stiltcot thingsirr thc tintcof'thc(ircat l)cprcssion.
172 M O LECULAR
ln A Thousand, PlateausDeleuzeand Guattari apply the 'molar' and
'molecular'to political bodies.Molar entiriesbelong to the State or the
civic world. They are well defined,often massive,and are affiliatedwith
a governingapparatus.Their molecularcounterpartsare micro-entities,
politicsthat transpirein areaswherethey arerarelyperceived:in the per-
ceptionof affectivity,wherebeingsshareineffablesensations; in the twists
and turns of conversationhavingnothing to do with the stateof the world
atlarge; in the manner,too, that a pedestrianin a city park seeshow the
leavesof a linden tree might flicker in the afternoon light. The shifting to
and from molar and molecularforms canbe associatednot only with deter-
ritorialisationbut alsothe very substance andeffectof eoentsthatbeginand
end with swarmsand massesof micro-perceptions.
Moleculesoften aggregate and swarminto activemasses of molar aspect
and viceversa.In TheFoldDeleuzesuggeststhateaents) the very productof
philosophyand determiningfeaturesof perception,dependon the prehen-
sion of the texturesof elementsin termsof their wholesand the partsthat
swirl and toss within them or on their very surfaces.The processentails
graspinga 'chaosmos'that becomesdiscerniblethrough the categoriesof the
molar andmolecular.Deleuzeis in turn enabledto study matterasa function
of mass,hardness, andof 'coherence, cohesion'(D 1993a:6). He projectsthe
distinction onto the body in sofar asit canbe appreciatedin its elasticityand
fluidity. Thus, with the 'molar' the philosophercorrelatessurfaceswith
structures,masses with territories,and vibrationsor waveswith landscapes.
Connectives
Body
Deterritorialisation/Reterritorialisation
Event
Molecular
MOLECULAR
Tom Conlejr
Deleuzepairsthe adjective'molecular' with'molar'. Informedby atomistic
philosophy and biology that runs from Lucretius to Gabriel Tarde,
Deleuzestudiesobjectsnot asthey seemto be beforethe nakedeyebut as
dynamic massesof molecules.The chemicaldefinition is broadenedto
include subjectivity.In a psychoanalytical sensemolecularityrclnrcsto
(rs opp<rsccl
indiviclurrl to collcctivc)rcsponscsto phcnomcnaor typcsof'
MOLE C U LA R 173
behaviour.Henceanyperceivedobject,organicor inorganic,hasa life of its
own and is felt through the tensionof its moral massand molecularparts
and pieces.Deleuze uses molecularity to counter the orthogonal and
massivepensive- seeminglyheavyand unwieldy - systemof Cartesian
philosophyto arrive, by way of Leibniz, at a sensibilitytouching on the
chemicalanimismof all things,'the actionof fire,thoseof watersand winds
on the earth,'in varioussystems'of complexinteractions'(D 1993a:9).
Molecular action becomesa vital element in what Deleuze uses to
describethe processes of things and of creation.At a decisivemoment in
his presentationof Bergson'stheseson movementin relation to cinema,
Deleuze uses molecularity to illustrate how wholes (worlds or spatial
aggregates) arerelatedto duration.When a teaspoonof sugaris dissolved
in a glassof waterthe 'whole' is not the containerand its contentsbut the
actionof creationtaking placein the ionisationof the moleculesof sugar,
a sort of 'pure ceaseless becomingwhich passesthrough states'(D 1986:
10). Molecularity goes with the perception of wholes (such as molar
masses) that areopenand dispersethemselvesin a continuumof duration.
Surelythe most compellingcorrelativeto the Bergsonianthesis,not men-
tioned in either of the books on cinema, is the sequencein Jean-Luc
Godard's2 or 3 ThingsI Knop AboutHer (1965),a film in which a man in
a Parisiancaf6,in the midst of the clatter of porcelainand glassesstriking
the zinc surfaceof the bar in the background,contemplatesa cup of coffee.
He dropsa cubeof sugarinto the brown liquid, stirsit with a teaspoon,and
watches.In an extremeclose-upgalaxiesseemto grow from the swirl of
bubblesjust as Godard'sown voice-offspeaksin the name of the man's
thoughtsabout the end of the world and time. Beforea puff of cigarette
smokewaftsoverthe cup,an endlessmomentof pure duration is felt in the
sight of a cosmosbecomingmolecular.
The molecularsensibilityis found in Deleuze'sappreciationof micro-
scopicthings,in the tiny perceptionsor inclinationsthat destabilisepercep-
tion asa whole.They function,he says,to'pulverize the world' and,in the
sameblow,'to spiritualizedust' (D 1993a:87).The microscopicperspective
hasa politicaldimensionaswell. All societies arerent throughby molarand
molecularsegmentarities. They areinterrelatedto the degreethat all action
is conceivablypolitical if politics are understoodto be of both molar and
molecularorders.The former,a governmental superstructure, doesnot dis-
allow the presenceof the latter, 'a whole world of unconsciousmicroper-
cepts,unconsciousaffects,rarefieddivisions'that operatedifferentlyfrom
civic and politicalarenas.Molecularityis tied to a 'micropolitics'of percep-
tion, affcct,and evenerrantconversation(D&G 1987:220).
'l'hc molcculirrcnrblcsDelcuzeto movc from philosophyof relation(or
difl'crcnccrnd rcpctition)to chcnristrics of bcing,anclthcn on to dclicittc
 r74 M O VEM ENT- I M AG E
issuesof perceptionin cinema,music, literatureand painting.As in the
dyad of the 'root' and the 'rhizome', that of molar and molecularforms
bearsno privilegedterm. In Deleuze'sreadingof subjectivationand predi-
cation in Leibniz. both terms arein and of eachother. Each is usedheuris-
tically to test and to determine sensarionbeyond and within the limits of
perception and cognition. The molecular atteststo a creative processat
work in Deleuze'sconcepts,and it alsoindicatesthe mannerin which he
usesconceptsin the contextofphilosophy,scienceand aesthetics.
Connectives
Deterritorialisation/ Reterritorialisation
Leibniz
Molar
Rhizome
Sensation
MOVEMENT-IMAGE
Tom Conlejt
The mooement-image is the title of the first panelof a historicaldiptych,
CinemaI andCinema2,that classifies modesof perceptionand production
of film from its beginningsin 1895up to 1985.In this work and irs com-
plement,The Timelrnage,Deleuzeusescinemato showhow philosophyis
not constrainedto a canonor an academicworld but to life at large.Cinema
is a surface on which viewers reflect their thinking, and in itself it is a
mediumor a machinethat thinkswith autonomywith respectto its viewers
and creators.The movement-imagedefinesand describesthe quality of
cinematicimagesthat prevailin the mediumoverits first fifty years.From
1895to 1945cinemabecamethe seventhart by embodyingimagesnot in
movement but as movement.Motion was at that time the essenceof
cinema. By way of Henri Bergson Deleuze shows that cinema does not
furnish the spectator with 'an image to which it adds movement', but
rather, 'it immediatelygivesus a movement-image'(D 1986:2). A cut
betweentwo shotsis part of the image,and thus a temporalgapthat allows
the eye to perceivean effectof movement.The latter is gainedby a suc-
cessionnot of staticphotographicposesbut of instantsof any kind what-
soever'(D1986:7-8), thatis,of instantsequidistant from oneanother. Thc
cvcnt of thc moving imagethus owcsto a 'distributionof thc pointsof'
il sl)ilccrlr 0f'thc nrr)t'ncnts
<lfirncvcnt,'il momcntsccnili a 'trtnslitti0nin
M OVEM EN T- IM AGE 175
space'(D 1986:7-8). The two componentsof the movement-imageare
found in what happensbetween partsor objects,and in what expresses the
duration of a wholeor a sum, that which might be indeedthe world in the
field of the image.
The cinema most characteristicof the movement-imageis based on
action and its intervals.It is seenin the comediesof Charlie Chaplin and
BusterKeaton,to be sure,but alsoin the molecularagitationof wind, dust
or smokein the films of Louis Lumidre. Movement-imagestend to attach
to the sensori-motorreflexesof the viewer who is drawn to them. The
movement-imageis made of momentsin a given whole, such as a single
shotor aplan-siquence,and it canbe felt in the panoramicor trackingshots
that confer motion upon the field of the image.
At a crucial point in his treatment Deleuze delineatesand redefines
three kinds of movement-images that renew and energisethe traditional
lexiconof cinema.The 'action-image',generallya medium shotor a plan
amiricain, organises and distributes movement in space and time.
Characterisedby a hold-up or a heist, it abounds in film noir. The
'perception-image', often a long shot and a long take,conveysa 'dramaof
the visibleand invisible'within the stagingof action.The spectatorper-
ceivesthe origins and limits of visibility in imagesthat are common to the
classicalwestern.The'affection-image'isbest seenin close-upsin which
facestend to occupythe greaterareaof the screen.Eachof thesetypesof
movement-imageconstitutes'a point of view on the Whole of the film, a
way of graspingthis whole,which becomesaffectivein the close-up,active
in the medium shot, and perceptivein the long shot' (D 1986:70). Other
typesof imagesthat he takesup - the memory-image,the mental-image,
the relation-image- derive from thesethree principal categories.
The movement-imagereachesthe end of its tenure at the time of World
War II, concludesDeleuze,for five reasons.It no longerrefersto a totalis-
ing or syntheticsituation,but a dispersiveone.Charactersbeginto multi-
ply and becomeinterchangeable. It losesits definition as either action,
affectionor perceptionwhen it cannotbe affiliatedwith a genre.An art of
wandering- the cameraseemsto moveon its own - replacesthe storyline,
and plots becomesaturatedwith clich6s.Finally, narrativesare driven by a
needto denounceconspiracy.Realityitself becomes'lacunary and disper-
sive'.At this point, generallyat the end of World War II, the time-image
beginsto mark cinema.Yet, asin most of Deleuze'sdyads,the one term is
alwaysa function of the other that is tied to it. Movement-imagestend to
be the substanceof narrative cinema while time-imagesare especially
cvidentin cxpcrimentalfilm. A studyof genresand stylescouldbe based
on thc rchtion of'movcmcnt:rncltimc and thc typesof imagcsthat define
thcir trrritsanclqualitics.
176 M UL T IPL ICIT Y
Connectives
Cinema
Faciality
Time-image
MULTIPLICITY
Jonathan Roffe
'Multiplicity' is arguablyDeleuze'smost important concept.It is found
throughouthis work, and is the basisfor other important conceptssuchas
rhizome,assemblage, and 'concept'itself. It is alsoone of Deleuze'smost
difficult conceptsto graspbecauseof the many different waysand contexts
in which he puts it to work. Yet,therearesomeessentialtraits to be noted.
A multiplicity is, in the most basicsense,a complexstructurethat does
not referencea prior unity. Multiplicities are not parts of a greaterwhole
that havebeenfragmented,andthey cannotbeconsideredmanifoldexpres-
sionsof a singleconceptor transcendent unity.On thesegrounds,Deleuze
opposesthe dyadOne/Many,in all of its forms,with multiplicity.Further,
he insiststhat the crucialpoint is to considermultiplicity in its substantive
form - a multiplicity - ratherthan asan adjective- asmultipliciry of some-
thing. Everythingfor Deleuzeis a multiplicity in this fashion.
The two peoplewhom Deleuzeregularlyassociates with the development
of the conceptof multiplicity arethe mathematicianGeorgRiemann,and the
French philosopherHenri Bergson.From Riemann,Deleuzetakesthe idea
that any situationis composedof different multiplicities that form a kind of
patchworkor ensemblewithout becominga totality or whole.For example,
a houseis a patchworkofconcretestructuresand habits.Eventhoughwe can
list thesethings, there is finally no way of determining what the essenceof
a particular houseis, becausewe cannot point to anything outside of the
houseitself to explainor to sumit up - it is simply a patchwork.This canalso
be takenasa gooddescriptionof multiplicities themselves.
Deleuze'sdebt to Bergsonhere is more profound. It is in Bergson'ism
(1966)that Deleuzefirst discussesmultiplicity, which receivesan exrended
elaborationin Bergson'sphilosophy.Deleuzenotesfirst of all that thereare
two kinds of multiplicity in Bergson:extensivenumericalmultiplicities
and continuousintensivemultiplicities.The first of thesecharacterises
spacefor Bergson;and the second,time. The differencebetweenextensive
and intensiveis perhapsthe most important point here. In contrast to
spacc,whichcanbedividedup into pnrts(thisis why it is callednumerical),
MU LTIP LIC ITY t77
intensivemultiplicity cannotbe dividedup without changingin nature.In
other words,anyalterationto an intensivemultiplicity meansa total change
in its nature- a changein its intensivestate.This is important for Deleuze
becauseit meansthat thereis no essence of particularmultiplicitieswhich
can remain unaffectedby encounterswith others.
Deleuze also makes the important link betweenthe concept of the
virtual and that of multiplicity in the context of his readingof Bergson,
and it is in connectionwith the themeof virtual intensivemultiplicity that
Deleuzemost palpablyremainsa Bergsonian.Frequentlywhen discussing
the virtual, DeleuzequotesMarcel Proust'sadagein relation to memory:
'Real without being actual,ideal without being abstract'.Virtual multi-
plicity,then, is realwithout beingnecessarily embodiedin the world. And,
rather than expressingabstractalternativepossibilities,virtual multiplic-
ity forms somethinglike the real opennessto changethat inheresin every
particularsituation.
This is perhapsthe most difficult point to graspin Deleuze'sdoctrineof
virtual multiplicities.While virtual multiplicitiesareembodiedin particu-
lar statesof affairs,they must not be consideredto be somehowtranscend-
ent or essentiallyimmutable. As Deleuze shows in his discussionof
Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz in Dffirence and,Repetitioa,the virtual and
the actualare interrelated,and effectchangesin eachother. So, while the
virtual is embodiedin actualsituations,the changesin actualsituationsalso
effectchangesin the virtual multiplicity. Existence,then, is a combination
of actual multiplicities - states of affairs - and virtual multiplicities -
particular intensivemovementsof change.
While these conceptsseemparticularly abstract,they offer Deleuze
groundsupon which to developa very practicalpicture of the world. The
conceptof multiplicity makesno referenceto a transcendentrealmof the
world that contains the structures or laws of existence.Since we live
among actual multiplicities (and are ourselvesmultiplicities), we are
alwayselementsand actorswithin the world. In this sense,both philoso-
phy and human existenceare eminently practical.The virtual counter-
parts of our actualmultiplicities alsomakepossiblecontinuedmovement
and change,even at the points where the world of actualityseemsmost
rigid and oppressive.
Connectives
Bergson
Concepts
Rhizome
Virtual/Virtualitv
178 NIE T Z s c H E , F R T ED R T c H (r8 44-tgoo)
NIETZSCHE, FRIEDRICH (1844-1900)
Lee Spinks , Alongsidethe developmentof the conceptof immanent and univocal
The importanceof Deleuze'sreadingof Friedrich Nietzschecannot be
over-estimated. Although Deleuzeengagescontinuallywith the work of
Baruch Spinoza,Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz, David Hume and Henri
Bergson (and wrote books on all these philosophersand what they
enabled),his approachto the philosophicaltradition is markedfundamen-
tally by the Nietzscheangoal of an affirmative philosophy.When Deleuze
readsa philosopher,he follows Nietzschein examiningwhat their work
enables,what conceptsthey create,the positiveeffectsof the questions
they ask and how their philosophiesrespond to life. While Deleuze is
carefulto locatethe ideaof a practicalphilosophyin the work of Spinoza,
he glimpsesthe radicalpotentialof this tradition for modern thought in
Nietzsche'sdevelopmentof a numberof Spinozistideas.
One way in which Nietzsche'swork becomescentral to Deleuze is
through Nietzsche'sreworking of the Spinozist idea of expressivism.
Expressivismdemandsthat we no longerconceiveof an eventasa predi-
cateattachedto a prior substance;there is not a matter or uniform sub-
stancewhich thenbecomesor takeson a form or quality. On the contrary,
expressivism suggests that thereis nothingotherthanthe becomingof spe-
cific and singularqualities;and thesequalitiesor eventsdo not needto be
related back to someneutral ground or substance.Deleuzearguesthat
Nietzscheis the first philosopheractuallyto considera world composedof
these'pre-personalsingularities'.As Nietzscheargues,we do not needto
relateactionsback to a subjector tdoer', nor do we needto seeeventsas
effectsor as having a pre-existingcause.These ideasprovided Deleuze
with a way of developinga philosophyof immanenceand an understand-
ing of beingasunivocity.If thereis not a substance which thenbecomes, or
a substance which thentakeson qualities,it followsthat thereis no dualist
distinctionbetweenbeingand becoming,or identity and difference.There
is no prior ground, unity or substancewhich then differentiatesitself and
becomes;insteadthere is only a univocalfield of differences.Difference
conceivedin this way is not d,ffirencefrom someoriginal unity; if there is
only one univocalbeing,then differencesthemselves becomeprimary and
constitutiveforces.There is not a hierarchyin which an original unity or
bcingthcnbccomes; thcrcis an originalbccomingwhichexpresscs itsclfin
Nr Er zscHE, FRI EDRI cH ( r 8 44- t goo) 179
the multiplicity of events.The apprehensionof immanent and univocal
being demandsthat we accountfor the eventsof existencefrom existence
itself without positinga transcendentalcondition(suchasGod, the subject
or being).Deleuze'sstresson Nietzscheasaphilosopher whosesignificance
lies in the tradition of univocity differs from the dominant Anglo-
Americaninterpretationof Nietzscheasa moreliterarywriter who avoided
argumentsand principles.
being,Nietzschealsopresenteda vision of life seenas a conflict between
singularand antagonisticforces.Deleuze'suseof the conceptof 'life' in his
readingof Nietzscheis neither biologicalnor humanist. Life is neither
matter(asin biologism)nor the properform or end of matter(asin human-
ism or vitalism). Life is a power of singularisation;a power to create
differences. For Nietzsche,phenomena,organisms,societiesand Statesare
nothing other than the expressionof particular configurationsof forces.
One of his mostinfluentialcontributionsto the understandingof life, con-
sciousness and moral thought wasto conceiveof eachof them asthe effect
of a primary distinction between actioe and reactiaeforces. Nietzsche's
diagnosis,in particular,of the connectionbetweenreactiveformations
suchasressentiment, badconscience and the asceticidealon onehand,and
modesof subjectivityand formsof life on the otherhad a profoundimpres-
sion upon Deleuze'spoliticalthought. Similarly,Nietzsche'sidentification
of Will to Power as the basis for a positive vision of life influenced
Deleuze'selaborationof an immanentand anti-humanistmodeof philoso-
phy. The postulationof such an immanent principle - a principle that
acceptsnothing other than life - enablesthought to focus upon the pro-
duction and legitimationof divisionsbetweendifferentforms of life. Life,
in Nietzsche'sview,is constitutedby a commonand inexhaustiblestriving
for power; human life (with its regulativenorms, moral judgementsand
socialtruths) is merely a form through which life passes.
This Nietzschean
philosophy,which envisageda plurality of forcesacting upon and being
affectedby eachother,and in which the quantityof powerconstitutedthe
differential element between forces, remained of lasting importance to
Deleuze'sown philosophyof life.
Following Nietzsche, Deleuze sought to move beyond the human
investmentin transcendence: the ascriptionof ideasbeyondlife that deter-
mine the goalandvalueof life. His work is markedby the attemptto engage
with the broadermovementsof becomingfrom which our idea of life is
constituted.This led him to concentrateupon a numberof d,ffirentforms
of difference(suchaslanguage,geneticdevelopments andmutations,social
firrms,historicalcvcntsand so on) that bring the imageof the human into
fircus.Dclcuzc alsoclcvclopsNictzschc'sgcncalogicrrl rcintcrprctationof
180 NOM ADICISM
moral ideaswhile taking it in a wholly new direction. Where Nietzsche
exposedthe originsof morality in the manipulationof affectby regimesof
cruelty and force, Deleuze developedthe concept of affect to rethink the
meaningand functionof ideologyand politics.Workingagainsta visionof
the 'political' that conferred privilege upon the ideologicaldetermination
of social codes,Deleuze explored the production of 'politics' and 'ideo-
logy' througha seriesof pre-subiectiveor 'inhuman' stylesand intensities.
Beforethere is a political or ideologicaldecision,Deleuzeclaimed,there
is first an unconsciousand affectiveinvestmentin an imageof life and a
style of morality that is subsequentlyreconceivedasthe moral ground of
life itself.
Connectives
Active/Reactive
Becoming
Difference
Eternalreturn
Plato
Will to Power
NOMADICISM
Claire Colebrook
The conceptsof 'nomad','nomadology'and 'nomadicism'arespelledout
most explicitly inA ThousandPlateaus,butthe conceptdoeshavea signifi-
cant philosophicalheritage.In 1781,in the prefaceto the Critiqueof Pure
Reason,Immanuel Kant lamented that whereasdogmatistshad main-
taineda certaindespotismof reason- givingreasonfixed but unjustifiable
rules - a certainbarbarismhad allowedfor 'a kind of nomadswho abhor
all permanentcultivationof the soil'(K 1998:99).Deleuzeis anythingbut
a Kantian philosopher,for Kant's aim of limiting the principlesof reason
to a legitimateand harmonioususeis counteredby Deleuze'snomadicaim
of allowingprinciplesto be pushedto their maximumpower(D 1984).
Kant's dismissalof the nomadicismthat would be precipitatedby a loss
of dogmaticlaw - a law that is fixed and determinesspacein advance- is
wardedoffin the Critiqueof PureReasonbyan appealto the properdomain
of anyprinciple;while reason,for example,hasa tendencyto think beyond
its own domain(trying to know the unknowable) it oughtto bc contnincd
within its prirtciplC
- it shouldonly actaccordingto whatit canckrin rcrms
N OMA D IC IS M l8l
of goodand commonsense.Reasonhasa properdomain,just asthe power
to feel has a proper domain (art) which should not be carried over into
morality. Deleuze,by contrast, rejectsthe idea that a principle, or a power
or tendencyto think, should be limited by somenotion of common sense
and sound distribution. Nomadicism allows the maximum extensionof
principlesand powers;if somethingcan be thought, then no law outside
thinking, no containmentof thought within the mind of man shouldlimit
thinking'spower(D 1994:37).
In Dffirenceand,Repetition,Deleuze beginsa definitionof nomadicdis-
tribution from the oppositionbetweennomosandlogos.If,asDeleuzeinsists,
we cannothavea hierarchyof beings- such asthe dominanceof mind over
matter, or actualityover potentiality,or the presentover the future - this is
becausebeingis univocal,which doesnot meanthat it is alwaysthe same,
but that eachof its differenceshasas much being as any other. You do not
havesomeideal'whiteness'oressence, which is primary and then varying
derivativet"gt."r of white; for degrees,differencesand intensitiesare all
real, are all differencesof one being.Nevertheless, there are still individ-
uationsand hierarchies, but thesecanbe regardedin two ways.
The first, the point of view of logos,worksby analogy:somebeingsare
truly real(the actual,what is present,what remainsthe same),while others
are only real in relation, or by analogy.And this subordinationof some
differencesto othersis, evenin this earlywork of Deleuze's,relatedto ter-
ritoriesand the agrarianquestion;a spaceis divided,distributedand hier-
archisedby somelaw,logic or voice (logos)that is outside or abovewhat is
distributed.
The secondpoint of view of noTnos or nomadiclaw hasits principle of
distribution within itself. That is. there are still hierarchiesbut theseare
not determinedby a separateprinciple; rather by the power of the prin-
ciple itself.This is extremelyimportant for Deleuze'sphilosophy.Deleuze
wantsto getrid of transcendentandexternalcriteria- say,judgingphiloso-
phy accordingto whetherit will help us to acquiretransferablelife skills,
or judging art accordingto whether it will makeus more moral - but he
doesnot want to get rid of distribution and hierarchyaltogether.
Nomadic distribution judgesimmanently(D 1994:37). A philosophy
would be a great philosophy,not if it could be placedpithin a specificand
delimitedterritory of reason(suchasa correctand consistentlogic)but if
it maximisedwhat philosophycould dq and createda territory: creating
conceptsand stylesof thought that openednew differencesand pathsfor
thinking. An artwork would be greatnot if it fulfilled alreadyexistingcri-
tcria for what counts as beautiful, but if it took the power for creating
bcauty- thc powcr to prompt us to bathein the sensible- and produced
ncw nnclrliffcrcntwaysof confiontingscnsibility.
r82 NOM ADICISM
Even as early as Dffirence and RepetitionDeleuze's referenceto the
'agrarianquestion'marksa politicsof nomadicism:the differencebetween
immanentand transcendentcriteria. If we subjectdifferenceto a logical
distribution then we havea principle that determineslife in advance,just
asland would be distributedaccordingto someexternallaw (say,its most
efficienteconomicuse,or its history of ownershipaccordingto a general
law of property).This is sedentaryspace;the spaceremainswhat it is and
is then divided and distributed. Nomadic space,howeveqis produced
through its distribution.
So we canconsidernomadicspace,not asa spacewith intrinsic proper-
ties that then determinerelations(in the way chesspiecesdeterminehow
movementsmight be enacted),but asa spacewith extrinsicproperties;the
spaceis producedfrom the movementsthat then givethat spaceits pecu-
liar quality (just asin the gameof Go the piecesare not codedaskings or
queens but enter into relations that produce a field of hierarchies).
Nomadicspaceis, in this sense,smooth- not because it is undifferentiated,
but because its differencesarenot thoseofa chessboard (cut up in advance,
with prescribedmoves);the differencescreatepositionsand linesthrough
movement.A tribe dreamsabout,crossesand dancesupon a spaceand in
so doing fills the spacefrom within; the actualspace- the materialexten-
sion ownedby this tribe that might then be measuredand quantifiedby a
Statestructure- would be different from (and dependentupon) virtual,
nomadic space,for if the tribe moved on, dancedand dreamedelsewhere,
then the original spacewould alreadyhave been transformed,given a
different depth and extension,now part of a whole new seriesof desires,
movementsand relations.And if other tribes crossedthat first space,the
spacewould be traversedby differentmaps.On nomadicdistributionthere
is not one law that standsoutsideand determinesspace;law is producedin
the traversalof space.
With Guattari, in A Thousand, Plateaus,Deleuze writes a manifesto
for 'nomadology',which is here tied far more explicitly to the 'war
machine'. The idea of the war machine does have a clear relation to
Deleuze'searlierreiectionof logos.Itis not that there are proper beings,
eachwith their identity,that must then be distributedaccordingto their
essenceand definition, and that.then enter into relation. It is not, for
example,that there are masterswho then dominateand govern the slaves
or slavish;rather,one becomesa masterthrough an exerciseof force and
in so doing the master-slaverelation is effected,a certain distribution
occursin and through the act. Everythingbeginswith forcesor'the war
machine;Statesdo not havean existenceor power outsidetheir warring
power.The distribution of land or territory - its use,seizure,occupation
and measurcrnenf - producesdistinct hierarchiesand identitics,In this
N OMA D IC IS M f C ITIZE N S H IP 183
sense,the war machineis not somethingexercisedby the State,for the
State's sovereigntyand law, or the power to distribute space,has to be
carved out from a radical exteriority of war, of forces and dominations
which the Statemay or may not harnessasits own.
Connectives
Desire
Kant
Nomos
Smoothspace
Space
NOMADICISM + CITIZENSHIP
EugeneHolland,
The conceptof 'nomadicism'that Deleuzeand Guattarideveloprefersless
to placeless,itinerant tribes-peoplethan to groups whoseorganisationis
immanent to the relations composingthem. Put differently, the organiza-
tion of a nomadic group is not imposedfrom aboveby a transcendent
command.An improvisationaljazzbandforms a n6madicgroup, in con-
trast with a symphonyorchestra:in the former, group coherencearises
immanentlyfrom the activity of improvisingitself, whereasin the sym-
phony orchestra,it is imposedfrom aboveby a conductorperforming a
composer'spre-established score.
Until recently,citizenshiphas been thought and practisedmostly in
relationto the nation-state.SocialBroupsconsideredon this scalehaveof
coursealwaysincludeda rich entanglementof heterogeneous groupingsof
varioussizesand kinds,involvingvaryingdegreesof allegianceto families;
neighbourhoods;professionalorganisations;ethnic, sexual, and other
affinity groups;religiousdenominations,and so on. But Statecitizenship
commandsallegianceof a qualitativelydifferent and homogenisingkind,
largelybecause it candeclarewar and therebylegitimatekilling in its name
and demandthe sacrificeof citizens'lives for its own sake(asformulated
in Carl Schmitt's rna,gnum opus,TheConceptof thePolitical). This 'vertical'
master-allegiance to the Statetranscendsall other'horizontal'allegiances
within the State,making State citizenshipliterally a matter of life and
death.
Nomad citizenship is a utopian concept createdto re-articulateand
suggestsolutionsto the problem posedby the lethal nature of modcrn
184 NOM OS
nation-statecitizenship.Terrorisedcitizens- citizensterrorisedin large
part by their own Stategovernmentsby the hypedspectreof someenemy
or other- areall too easilymobilisedto givetheir livesand takeothers'lives
in war; in fact, little elseStatesdo inspire in citizensthe kind of devotion
that war does.At the sametime, war wagedin the nameof the Stategives
capitalisma longer and longer leaseon life by forestallingits perennial
crisesofoverproduction:nothingaddresses over-productionandkeepsthe
wheelsof industry turning like a good war - especiallytoday'shigh-tech
wars in which eachguided missile strike or smart bomb explosionmeans
instantmillionsof dollarsin replacementcosts.In this context,the concept
of nomadcitizenshipis createdin order to breakthe monopolyexercised
by the Stateover conceptionsand practicesof citizenship,and to add or
substitutealternativeforms of belongingand allegiance.
Of course,all kindsof heterogeneous groupsandallegiances alreadyexist,
someof whichwerelistedabove;to the degreethatthesegroupsself-organise
moreor lessspontaneously or immanentlyratherthanundercommandfrom
above,they could imply nomadicforms of citizenship.Yer mosr of these
groupsinvolveor require somedegreeof face-to-facecontactand are hence
understoodto take placeamongfriendsin a sharedspace.But thereis another,
properlyplaceless dimensionto nomadcitizenshipwhich is linked to the bur-
geoningworld marketandexemplifiedin the fair trademovement.Wemighr
call this the economicor market componentof nomad citizenship,for it
dependson the capacityof marketexchange to link far-flunggroupsor indi-
viduals togetherin a socialbond that definesthem neitherasfriendsnor as
enemies, but simply as temporarypartnersin exchange.In this way, the
marketis ableto capitaliseon differenceswithout turning them into enmi-
ties.For the virtue ofmarket exchange - providedofcoursethat it is volun-
tary and fair; that it is apost-capitalistmarket- is that it enrichesthe livesof
nomad citizens by making regional, ethnic, religious, cultural (and many
other) differencesavailableto everyone,regardlessof who or wherethey are.
NOMOS
Jonathan Roffe
'Nomos' is the namethat Deleuzegivesto the wayof arrangingelements-
whetherthey arepeople,thoughtsor spaceitself- that doesnot rely upon
an organisationor permanentstructure. It indicatesa free distribution,
rather than structuredorganisation,of certainelements.
Thc Greck w<trdnomosis normally translatedas law. Dclcuzc notcs,
howcvcr,in onc of' thc fbw instanccsof'ctymol<lgicrrl
considcrttionin his
N OM OS r85
work, that it is derivedfrom the root word nem,which means'to distrib-
ute'. He givesthe exampleof the related word,nem6,which in ancient
(pasture
Greekmeantto livestock'- in otherwords,to sendout the animals
to an unboundedpastureaccordingto no particularpattern or structure.
Deleuzeopposesn0/n0sasdistribution to anotherGreek work, logos.While
difficult to translate well, it means 'word' or treasont.However, for
Deleuze,it canalsobe understoodas'law'. This is becausethe picture of
the world indicatedby logosis one in which everythinghasits right place:
it is a structured and ordered conception of existence.Logosalso implies,
then, a conception of distribution, but one that is founded on a previous
structureand is well-organised.To this well-organisedlegal distribution
of the logos,Deleuzewill opposethe anarchicdistribution of the nomos.
The senseof nomosasanarchicdistribution canbe understoodin refer-
enceto the nomad.Ratherthan existingwithin a hierarchicalstructurelike
a city, nomadic life takesplace in a non-structuredenvironmentwhere
movementis primary.In this context,Deleuzemakesa link betweenlogos
andpolis,wherethe political orderingof statesdrawsits main coordinates
from a prior structuredidea of existence(this is Plato'sprocedurein the
Republic,for example).Fixed points like dwellingsare subordinatedto this
fundamental and lawlessmovement. In other words, while there may be
points of significancein nomadic life, they do not form fixed references
which divide up the movement of life into discreteelements(inside/
outside,the citylthe wilds). As Deleuzegoeson to suggestwith Guattari
in A Thousand, Plateaus,lifeitself is nomadic.
Deleuze first employsthe figure of nomosin Dffirence and,Repetition.
Here, it is a matter of consideringthe nature of Being itself in terms of
non-ordereddistribution rather than the fixed coordinatesof a logically
and hierarchicallystructured universe,such as we find in Plato and
Aristotle.
The most elaboratedevelopmentsof nomos,in contrast to logos,take
placeinA Thousand, Plateaus-Here,Deleuzeand Guattari usethe distinc-
tion to discussopposingmodels of science,mathematicsand space.In
termsof science,Iogosasthe structuredand'good'distributionof elements
leadsto what they call'royal' science,one basedupon universalvalues.It
is alsoa scientificmethodthat naturallyleadsto truth, and is at oncebased
on the valuesof the State and supposedto be unrelatedto the concrete
practicesof life. Scienceundertakenin the nameof nomos,on the other
hand,is an ambulantor minor science.It doesnot proceedfrom universals,
but rather keepscloseto the movementof eventsthemselves- it 'follows'
rirther than 'copies'.Only the practiceof scienceas nomoscan be said to
havc nttaincda truc cxpcrimcntal method, sincc thc /ogo.s presumesthe
rcsultsin ldvlncc in thc firrmof'glollrrlplcsuppositions. Anrbuhntscicncc
18 6 NONBEING
is thus profoundly engagedwith life rather than examiningit from a
supposedneutraloutside.
The two conceptionsof mathematicsare closelyrelatedto this. On the
onehand,thereis the geometricconceptionthat presumesuniversalstruc-
tures: straightline, uniform field and parallellines.This mathematicsis
underwrittenby the ordereddistribution of the logos.On the other hand,
nltvtzssupportsmathematicsin the form of arithmeticsproceedingby local
operations,without presupposinggeneral structures.In this context,
Deleuze also privileges differential calculus in so far as it takes the local
operationof numericalvaluesand determinestheir movement,one that is
unboundedby any one point and cannot be understoodin terms of the
absolutefixity presumedby geometricmathematics.
In keepingwith the two polesof distribution indicatedby nomosandlogos,
DeleuzeandGuattarialsodistinguishtwo typesof space.Logos,theordered
conceptionof existence, offersa pictureof spacethat is primordiallycut up
in variousways,onethat includesintrinsicboundaries. This spaceis termed
'striated'.On the contrary,not only doesnomos indicatethat spacedoesnot
haveanyintrinsicorganisation, and mustbe consideredto be open,or what
Deleuzeand Guattaricall 'smoothspace',but this spaceitself is something
that must be created.The politicalradicalityof nomos, and of nomadicdis-
tribution, is that it proposesthe dissolutionof the imposedstructuresof
logosaslawful structure, and a creationof smooth spacein which encoun-
ters outsideof the orderedconceptionof existence canbecomepossible.
Connectives
Event
Plato
Space
NONBEING
Claire Colebrook
Perhapsthe most profound challengeof Deleuze'swork today is its
rejectionof nonbeing.The questionof nonbeinggoesback to the very
originsof westernphilosophy- in Parmenides- andthe twentieth-century
critique of westernmetaphysics.Traditionally,and this is the problem
openedby Parmenides,if we try to speakof nonbeing,or say what is not,
then we havealreadysaidthat nonbeingri. Negativit$ negationand non-
bcing havebeensubordinatcdto the thought of what is, not only bccausc
N ON BEIN G 187
in speakingwe attributebeingto nonbeing,but also- asMartin Heidegger
insistedin his readingsof Parmenidesand Plato- we passover nonbeing
becausewe havealwaysbegunthinking from the simplebeingsbeforeus,
thosethings which arepresentand remainthe same.The challengewhich
Heideggerput to this tradition, and one which is continuedin different
ways by JacquesDerrida and JacquesLacan, is that before we can have
beings- things that are or are not - and beforewe seenonbeingas the
simpleabsence of being,thereis a nonbeingat the heartof being.First, any
experienceof somethingthat rs must come into presenceor be revealed
through time; being is never fully and finally revealedfor there are always
further experiences. Second,we experiencesomethingassomething only by
bringing it into the open, and therebydisclosingit; it was,therefore,not
alwaysfully present,but must come to presenceor come into being.This
emphasison the nonbeingin being or presenceis intensifiedby Derrida,
who arguesthat presence,or the possibilityfor experience,dependson a
processof tracingwhich is not. And for Lacan,while we live and desirein
a world of structuredand meaningfulbeings,we arenevertheless oriented
towardsthat which is otherthan or beyondbeing,that inarticulabledesired
fullness,Tbelrssa,nce or plenitude that is not a being, not a thing, nothing.
Now Deleuzewill havenone of this death,nonbeing,or negativityin
life; in effectthis is the main affirmativethrust of his work and the inspir-
ation for all his philosophy.There may be effectsof nonbeing,but theseare
productionsfrom the fullness of life. If I experiencemy life as governed
by 'lack' - that I am forced to decide among things but never arrive at the
thing - then this is only becauseof a structure of desire (such as the
Oedipalfantasy)which hasproducedthis negativebeyond.And Deleuze
and Guattari spend much time in showing how this nonbeing beyond
desiredthingsis produced;from all the beingsof life we imaginesomeulti-
matenonbeingor beyond,but this is only becausewe havea far too miser-
ableand limited conceptionof being.From the ordersof speech,structure
andculture,we assumethat what cannotbe namedor givenextendedexist-
enceis nothing,or nonbeing.Againstthis paltry oppositionbetweenbeing
and nonbeingDeleuze,in Dffirence and,Repeition,refersto '?being'.That
is, being cannotbe reducedto the world of presentbeingsor things, or
what we can sayai,but this doesnot meanwe shouldposit somenegative
beyondbeing or nonbeing.Rather,being (as?being)is life understoodas
the potentialfor creation,variationand production in excessof what we
alreadyknow to haveexistence(or beingin its traditionalsense).
Deleuzetendsto readthe historyof philosophyasthoughit is alwaysthe
productionandaffirmationof life,but he drawsparticularlyupon Friedrich
Nictzscheand Henri Bergsonin his criticism of nonbeing.For Nietzsche,
all philosophgcvcn the most morirland flricetic,nccclsto trc undcrstoodas
r88 NO O LO G Y
flowing from life. Those philosopherswho attendto nonbeingaresuffering
from reactivenihilism; they posit someultimategood or being,and when
this cannot be found their piety merely directs itself to nonbeing,the
absence,lack or negationof values.For Bergson,similarly,nonbeingis
formed from a failure to think life in due order.We may perceivean absence
or 'lack'andassumethat somethinglike nonbeinghastorn a holein life; but
we arereallyperceivingmore ratherthanlesslife.If I go into an untidy room
I do not seeanabsenceof order.I seethe room, and thenadd,toitmy expect-
ation of how it ought to be.Following Bergson,who insistedon the fullness
and positivity of life (and who arguedthat negationwassecondaryand illu-
sory),Deleuzerejectsthe negativeideaof nonbeingwhich hasbeenat the
heart of westernmetaphysics. Deleuzewantsto rejectthe strong idea of
negativityor nonbeing,so he doesnot attributea lacb ofbeing or realityto
error, destruction,the assertionthat somethingis not, or evenchangeand
development.But Deleuzealsowantsto affirm a positivenonbeing,which
he alsowritesas?being.On this understanding, nonbeingis not the lackof
presence, suchaswhen we saythat somethingis missingor lackingor not
the case.Nonbeing(as?being)is the positivepowerof life to poseproblems,
to say 'no' to the commonsensical, self-evidentor universallyaccepted.
This nonbeingis fully realand positive.
Connective
Bergson
NOOLOGY
Claire Colebrook
The conceptof 'noology' canbe setagainstphenomenology, or the ground-
ing of thought in what appearsto consciousness, and ideologyor the idea
that thereare systemsor structuresof ideasthat areimposedupon think-
ing. Deleuze's early work The Logic of Sense,while critical of pheno-
menology neverthelessdrew upon Edmund Husserl's 'noeisis/noema'
distinction: the noeisisis the act or subjectiveaspect- remembering,
imagining,desiring,perceiving- while the noemais the obiectivepole- the
remembered,imagined,desiredand perceived.Even in TheLogic of Sense
DeleuzecriticisedHusserlfor restrictingthe noemato being an objectof
consciousness and argued that there were pure noematicpredicates-
colouritself,for example,which is still a relation- betweenlight and cyc -
but a relationlibcratcdfrom anyspccificobscrvcr. Nookrgywould,thcn,bc
OE D IP A LIS A TION 189
a studyor sciencenot ofappearances (phenomenology) nor ideas(ideology)
but noology.If therearepure noema- or 'thinkables'- we canalsoimagine
approachinglife, not as grounded in personalconsciousness, but as a
history of variousimagesof thought,or what counts asthinking. Ideology,
for example,is the imageof a mind that canthink only throughan imposed
or externalstructure;phenomenology is the imageof a mind that forms its
world and whose ideas and experiencesarestructuredby a subjectoriented
towardstruth.
In general,noologycanbe opposedto ideology.Insteadofarguing that we,
as proper subjects,are subiectedto ideasthat are false and that might be
demystified,Deleuzearguesthat it is the ideaof a proper'we' and assump-
tion of the good self or 'mind' which precludesus from actualisingour
potential.Noology,as it is definedinA Thousand Plateaus,is not only the
study of imagesof thought,but alsoclaimsa 'historicity' for images.The
modern subjectwho is subjectedto a systemof signifiersis thereforepro-
ducedand hasits genesisin previousrelationsof subjection.In additionto
its criticalfunction,noologythereforeassumes that if imagesof thoughthave
beencreatedthey can alwaysbe recreated,with the ideal of liberation from
some proper image of thought being the ultimate aim. In Dffirence and,
Repetition,Deleuze arguesthat we havefailedto think truly preciselybecause
we assumeor presuppose an 'imageof thought'. Not only philosophy,but
everydaynotionsof commonsenseand goodsensefail to questionjust what
it is to think. In this regard,the conceptof mind (or,in Greek,nous)hasbeen
an unargued,implicit andrestrictivepostulateof our thinking.Noologydoes
not only studywhat it might meanfor humansubjectsto think; it alsostrives
to imaginethoughtcarriedto its infinite power,beyondthe human.
Connective
Thought
OEDIPALISATION
Tamsin Lorraine
I)clcuzc nnd Guattrrridcscribchumirnbcingsasunfolding
ln Anti-Ocdip,rs,
proccsscsof individurrtionin constflntintcrrctionwith thcir surrttltntlings,
 190 OEDIPAL ISAT ION
and they characterisethree synthesesof the unconscious:connective
syntheses that join elementsinto series('desiring-machines', for example,
mouth and breast),disjunctivesyntheses that resonateseriesin metastable
states('Bodieswithout Organs'(BwO), for example,mouth and breastor
head and arm or milk and stomachresonatingin a state of bliss), and
conjunctivesynthesesthat gather metastablestatesinto the continuous
experienceof consciousawareness. They proposethat Oedipalsubjectiv-
ity is but one form that human sentiencecan take. The synthesesthey
describehaveanoedipalaswell asOedipalforms.'Oedipalisation, is a con-
temporaryform of socialrepressionthat reducesthe forms desiretakes-
and thus the connectionsdesiremakes- to thosethat sustainthe social
formationof capitalism.
Capitalism'semphasison the abstractquantificationof money and
labour(what mattersis how capitaland labourcirculates- not the specific
form wealth takesor who in particular doeswhat) encouragesdesireto
permute acrossthe social field in unpredictableways. Oedipalisation
reducesthe anarchicproductivity of unconsciousdesireto familial forms
of desire.Productivedesirethat flows accordingto immanentprinciples
becomesorganisedin terms of 'lack', thus reducingthe multiple forms
desirecantaketo thoseforms that canbe referredto the personalidentities
of the Oedipaltriangle.On the BwQ desireis the only subject.It passes
from one body to another,producing partial objects,creating breaksand
flows, and making connectionsthat destroythe unity of a 'possessive or
proprietary' ego (D&G 1983:72). Oedipalisationmakesit appearthat
partial objectsare possessed by a person and that it is the person who
desires.Productivedesirethat would fragmentpersonalidentity is reduced
to the desireof a personwho wants to fill in a lack. Oedipalisationthus
ensuresthat the innovationsof deterritorialisingcapitalareconstrainedby
the tightly bound parametersof personalidentity and familial life (or the
triangulatedauthority relationshipsrhar mimic Oedipus in the public
realm).
According to Deleuze and Guattari, Oedipalisationconstitutesan
illegitimate restriction on the productive synthesesof the unconscious
becauseit emphasisesglobal persons(thus excluding all parrial objectsof
desire),exclusivedisjunctions(thus relegatingthe subjectro a chrono-
logicalseriesof momentsthat can be givena coherentnarrativeaccount),
and a segregativeand biunivocaluse of the conjunctivesyntheses(thus
reducingthe identity of the subjectto a coherentor staticset of one side
of a set of oppositions).The subjectionof desireto a phallic paradigm
resultsin a subjectwho experiences himselfas'having'an idcntitythat is
fixedon cithcr onc sidcor the othcr of variousoppositional dividcs(mrrlc
or fcmitlc,whitc or hlack),rrndwho dcsignltcsthc virriousplcnsurlblclncl
ON TOL OGY 19l
painful statesthrough which he passesin terms of the attributes of a
fundamentallyunchangingidentity.
Capitalism'sdrive for ever-newsourcesof profit fostersinnovatingflows
of desirethat, if left to themselves,could so altercapitalistformationsthat
the latter would evolveinto somethingelse.Oedipalisationis a form of
socialrepressionthat funnels the productive capacityof the unconscious
back into the constrictingchannelsof Oedipal desire.Following Oedipal
subjectivityto its limits and beyond entailsliberating unconsciouspro-
ductionsothat desirecancreatenew realities.WhereasOedipaldesirecon-
stitutes the subjectas lacking the object desired,the goal of anoedipal
desireis immanentto its process:it seeksnot what it lacksbut what allows
it to continue to flow. In order to flow, anoedipaldesire must mutate and
transformin a self-differentiating unfoldingimplicatedwith the socialfield
of forcesof which it is a part. Deleuzeand Guattari rejectthe psychoana-
lytic contentionthat the only alternativeto Oedipal subjectivityis psy-
chosisand insteadexploreanoedipalflowsof desireand the schizowho is
a functioningsubjectof suchdesire.Their notion of the unconscioussug-
Bestswaysof approachingits 'symptoms' that point to possibilitiesfor cre-
ativetransformationinevitablylinked with socialchange.
Connectives
Body without Organs
Capitalism
Desire
Deterritorialisation/Reterritorialisation
Psychoanalysis
Subjectivity
ONTOLOGY
Constantin I1 Bound.as
For Deleuze,philosophyis ontology.In this sense,he is one of only two
philosophers(the otherbeingEmmanuelL6vinas)of the generationwe call
'poststructuralists'not to demur in the faceof ontologyand metaphysics.
Deleuze'sontologyis a rigorousattemptto think of processand metamor-
phosis- becoming- not as a transitionor transformationfrom one sub-
stanccto anotheror a movementfrom onepoint to anothcr,but ratherasan
attcmptt<lthink of'thcrcirlilsa proccss.It prcsupposcs,
thcrcforc,an initial
lnd things,lnd ot'(trrrnsvcrsrl)
substitutiono1'firrccsfirr substirnccs lincs
 192 O NTO LO G Y
for points.The real bifurcatesin two inextricablyinterlinkedprocesses
the virtual and the actual- neitherone of which canbe without the other.
Presentstatesof affairs,or bodieswith their qualitiesand mixtures,make
up the actualreal.Meanwhile,incorporealeventsconstitutethe virtual real.
The natureof the latteris to actualiseitself without everbecomingdepleted
in actualstatesof affairs.This bifurcationof the realdoesnot enshrinetran-
scendence andunivocity:becomingis saidin oneandthe samesenseof both
the virtual andthe actual.It shouldbe notedherethat thereis no separation
or ontologicaldifferencebetweenthe virtual andactual.Deleuzeclaimsthe
virtual is in the actual;it is conservedin the pastin itself.Meditating on
temporality,Deleuzeretrievesthe Bergsoniand,urrle,working it into three
interrelatedsyntheses. First, the time of habit;second,the time of memory;
and third, the empty time of the future.
Substitutingforce for substance, and thinking of processes in terms of
series,requiresan ontology of multiplicities.This is becauseforce exists
only in the plural - in the differential relation between forces. Series
diverge,convergeandconjoinonly in the deterritorialisation of themselves
and other series.In the Deleuzian ontology multiplicities, unlike the
'many' of traditionalmetaphysics, arenot opposedto the one becausethey
are not discrete (they are not multiplicitiesof discreteunits or elemenrs),
with divisionsand subdivisionsleavingtheir naturesunaffected.They are
intensivemultiplicitieswith subdivisionsaffectingrheir nature.As such,
multiplicities have no need for a superimposedunity to be what they
become.Forcesdeterminingtheir becomingoperatefrom within - they do
not needtranscendentforcesin order to function. It is in the virtual that
intensivemultiplicities of singularities,seriesand time subsist.It is the
virtual that is differentiatedin terms of its intensivemultiplicities.As the
virtual actualises anddifferenciates itself the seriesit generates
becomedis-
crete,without evererasingthe tracesofthe virtual insidethe actual.
Hence,the ontologyof Deleuzeis firmly anchoredby difference,rather
than being.This is differencein itsel{ not a differenceestablished postquo
betweentwo identities.The ontologicalprimacyDeleuzegivesdifference
can no longerbe sublatedor eliminatedby either resemblance, analogyor
the labour of the negative.In the spaceinscribedby Martin Heidegger
with his Being and,Time, Deleuze erects his ontology of Dffirence and,
Repetition.Being is the d,ffirent/ ciation at work in the dynamic relation-
ship betweenthe virtual and the actual.Actualisationoccursin a presence
that can neverbe sufficientunto itself for three reasons.First, the actual
carriesthe trace of the virtual differencethat brought it about, Second,
actualisationdiffersfrom the 'originary' difference.Third, actualisationis
pregnantwith all the differencesthat the never-before-actualised virtual is
capableof precipitatingat any (and all) time(s),
ORDER-WORD I93
- Connectives
Actuality
Becoming
Differentiation/Differenciation
Force
Post-structuralism
Virtual/Virtuality
ORDER-WORD
VerenaConley
The 'order-word'is a function immanentto languagethat compelsobedi-
ence.The fundamentalform of speechis not the statement(6noncd)of
a judgementor the expression(inonciation) of afeeling,but the command.
Languagegiveslife-orders,and asa resulthumansonly transmit what has
been communicatedto them. All languageis expressedin indirect dis-
course;thus the transmissionof order-wordsis not the communicationof
a sign in so far asit is understoodto containinformation.
Order-wordsarenot restrictedto commands.They arealsothe relation
of every statementwith implicit presuppositionsand speech-actsthat
are realisedin statementsthemselves.The relation between a statement
and speech-actis internal. It is one of redundancy,not of identity.
Newspapersuse redundancyto order their statements;they tell people
what to think. Seenthus,the redundancyof the order-wordis its mostper-
tinent trait. Information is only the minimal conditionfor the transmission
of order-words. An expression always contains collective assemblages;
statementsareindividuatedonly to the degreethat a collectiveassemblage
requiresthem to be transmittedasthey are.
Order-wordstransformbodies.It is the judge'ssentencethat transforms
the accusedinto a convict.What takesplacebeforehand(the allegedcrime
the accusedis saidto havecommitted),or afterwards(the enactmentof the
penalty)are actionsand passionsaffectingbodies(that of victim, convict
or prison)in the largestsense.The instantaneous transformationfrom the
suspectinto the convict is a pure incorporealattributethat takesthe form
of content in a judge's sentence.Order-words are thus alwaysdated.
History recountsthe actionsand passionsof bodiesthat developin a social
field. Yet, history also transmits order-words from one generationto
anothcr,Performativestatementsarenothingoutsideof the circumstances
that qunlifythcm to bc assuch,Transformations apply to boclicsbut arc,
194 O RDER- W O RD
themselves,incorporeal.In the political spherelanguagemobilisesthe
order-word, causingvocabularyand sentencesto vary and changeas also
do the order-words.
Order-words function as explicit commandsor implicit presuppos-
itions. They lead to immanent actsand the incorporealtransformations
expressedin their form. They alsoleadto assemblages of expressions.At
a certain moment thesevariablescombine into a regime of signs.New
order-words ariseand modify the variableswithout being part of a known
r6gime. The scientific enterprise that claims to extract constants is
coupledwith a politicalenterprisethat transmitsorder-words.Constants,
however,are alwaysdrawn from variablesso that certain linguistic cat-
egories- such as languageand speech,competenceand performance-
becomeinapplicable.Languageconsistsof a major and a minor mode.
The former extractsconstantswhile the latter placesthem in continuous
variation. The order-word is the variable that defines the usageof lan-
guage according to one of these two treatments. As the only metalan-
guage,it is capableof accountingfor a doubledirection: it is a 'little' (or
simulated)death,but it is alsoa warning cry or a messageto takeflight.
Through death the body reachescompletion in time and space.As a
warning cry or harbingerof deaththe order-wordproducesflight. All of
a suddenvariablesfind themselvesin a new stateand in continuousmeta-
morphosis.Incorporealtransformationsare again attributed to bodies,
but now in a passageto a limit-degree.The questionis lesshow to elude
the order-word than how to avoid its impact as a death-sentenceand, in
turn, to developa powerof escapefrom within the scope(expressionand
statement)of the order-word.
It is thus imperative that life answerthe order-word of death not by
fleeing but by making flight, in order to accentuateactive and creative
attributes.Beneathorder-words,Deleuze adds,there exist pass-words,
what he otherwisedescribesas words that passand are componentsof
passage.In strong contrast, order-words mark stoppages,they are
arrestive,and in massiveshapethey organisestratifiedcompositions.Yet,
every singlething or word has this twofold nature,a capacityto impose
order and to inspirecreativepassage. For the benefitoflife and flight it is
necessaryto extract the one from the other, that is, to transform the com-
positionsof order into componentsof passage.
Connectives
Body
Death
OR GA N IS M 195
ORGANISM
tohn Proteoi
An 'organism' in the way that Deleuze and Guattari intend it is a
centralised,hierarchised,self-directedbody.It is akin to the'judgementof
God' (He who providesthe model of such self-sufficiency);it is also a
molarisedand stratifiedlife form. The organismis an emergenteffectof
organisingorgansin a particular way,a 'One' addedto the multiplicity of
organsin a'supplementarydimension'(D&G 1987: 21,265).Also import-
ant to note is that an organis a 'desiring-machine',that is, an emitter and
breakerof flows, of which part is siphoned off to flow in the economyof
the body.Organsare a body'sway of negotiatingwith the exteriormilieu,
appropriatingand regulatinga bit of matter-energyflow.
The organismis the unifying emergenteffectof interlocking homeostatic
mechanismsthat quickly compensatefor anynon-averagefluctuationsbelow
certainthresholdsto return a bodyto its 'normal'condition(asmeasured by
species-wide norms; henceDeleuzeand Guattari'ssenseof 'molar'). The
organism as unifying emergent effect is a stratum on the Body without
Organs(BwO),it is hencea construction,a certainselectionfrom the virtual
multiplicity of what a body canbe,and thereforea constraintimposedon the
BwO: 'The BwO howls:"They've mademe an organism!They've wrong-
fully foldedme! They'vestolenmy bodyl"' (D&G 1987:159).
While all actualor intensivebodiesare 'ordered'.that is. containsome
probabilitystructureto the passage of flowsamongtheir organs(only the
virtual BwQ at 'intensity = 0', has removed all patterning among its
organs),the organismis 'organised',that is, its habitualconnectionsare
centralisedand hierarchical.The organsof an organismare patternedby
'exclusivedisjunctions',that is, seriesof virtual singularitiesactualisedin
sucha wayasto precludethe actualisation of other,alternative,patterns;in
complexitytheory terms, an organism is locked into a basinof attraction,
or stereotypedset of such basins.As such a fixed habitualpattern locked
onto normalfunctioningasdeterminedby species-wide averagevalues,the
organismdeadensthe creativityof life;it is'that which life setsagainstitself
in order to limit itself' (D&G 1987:503).Like all stratification,however,
the organismhasa certainvalue:'stayingstratified- organized,signified,
subjected- is not the worst that can happen'(D&G 1987:16l), although
this utility is primarily asa restingpoint for further experimentation.
Constructingan organismout of a body (centralisingor molarisingthe
body)is oneof the threeprinciplestrataseparatinghumansfrom the plane
of consistcncy(abng with signifianccand subicctivity),As a stratum,
 t96 ORGANISM
we canusethe terminology of form-substanceand content-expressionwith
regard to organisms,though we must remember that on the organic
stratum,contentand expressionmust be specifiedat manydifferentscales:
genesand proteins,cells,tissues,organs,systems,organism,reproductive
community,species, biosphere.At the levelof genesand proteinsthe sub-
stanceof content consistsof amino acids.Meanwhile, the form of content
or codingof theseacidscanbe understoodasaminoacidsequences or pro-
teins.Expression,aswe recall,is the putting of contentto work, sothe form
of expressionat this scaleis composedof nucleotidebasesequences that
specifyamino acids,while the substanceof expression,the emergentfunc-
tional unit, is the gene,which determinesprotein shapeand function. It is
importantto notethat in this treatmentwe areoverlookingthe DNA/RNA
relation,the dependence of geneson cellularmetabolism,and the role of
genesin interveningin the self-organisingprocesses of morphogenesis.
Skipping over severalscales(cell, tissueand organ)for simplicity's sake,we
arrive at the levelof organicsystems(for examplethe nervous,endocrine
and digestivesystems),where the substanceof content is composedof
organsand the form of contentis codingor regulationof flowswithin the
body andbetweenthe body and the outside.The form of expressionat this
levelis homeostaticregulation(overcodingof the regulationof flowspro-
vided by organs),while the substanceof expressionis the organism,con-
ceivedas a processbinding the functionsof a body into a whole through
coordinationof multiple systemsof homeostaticregulation.
Contemporarytreatmentof Deleuze'sbiophilosophybeginswith Keith
Ansell Pearson's Germinal Life. Other treatments include Manuel
Delanda, A Thousand, Yearsof NonlinearHistory and,IntensizseScienceand
Virtual Philosophy.While Delanda interprets Deleuzeand complexity
theorysideby side,Mark HansenseesDeleuzeand Guamari'sbiophiloso-
phy as incompatible with complexity theory. For Hansen, Deleuze and
Guattari's devalorisationof the organism, while resonatingwith the
'molecularrevolution'in twentieth-centurybiology,is in markedcontrast
to the treatmentof the organismasirreduciblein the autopoietictheoryof
Humberto Maturana and FranciscoVarela.as well as the valorisation of
speciesas'naturalkinds' found in the complexitytheorybiologyof Stuart
Kauffmanand Brian Goodwin.
Connectives
Body without Organs
Molar
Stratification
Virtull/Virtuulity'
PAR TIAL OBJEC TS t97
PARTIAL OBJECTS
Kenneth Surin
SigmundFreud'smetapsychology wasin essence a theoryof drives,in that
it invokedthe conceptsofenergy and structureto showthat everyhuman
action has its basisin a fundamentaland irreducibleinstinctualground.
Two drives were pre-eminent:the sexualdrive and the drive for self-
preservation.Connectedwith the conceptof drive was the notion of an
object- the psychiceconomywaspopulatedby a plethoraof suchobjects,
with the objectsin questionbeingrelatedto the 'discharge'of an underly-
ing drive. Interestingly,Freud himself was not alwaysclear or consistent
on the relationbetweendrive and object,and changedhis positionin sub-
sequentwritings or sometimessaid incompatiblethings about objectsin
differentparts of the sametext. Yet, the fundamentalpoint remained:the
psychic object is a result of the drive, and the relation to an object is the
function of a drive'sdischarge.Freud and his followersconstruedsuccess-
ful psychicdevelopment,then, asthe capacityan individual psychehasto
form relationswith wholeobjects.Subsequentthinkersin the psychoana-
lytical tradition criticised this emphasison the individual psyche,and
chargedFreud with de-emphasising socialrelationsand group ties,despite
his attemptsto dealwith suchissuesin, for example,Totemanrl Tabooand
Mosesand,Monotheism. Freud wassaidto havefailedto consideradequately
the mechanismsthat link objectsto drivesand objectsto eachother.These
mechanisms- introjection and proiection - are highly flexible in their
operation, and blend objects with each other, as well as decomposing
objectsinto 'partial' or'part' objects.Objectcreationcanalsobe enhanced
by the particulardealingsan individual haswith the externalworld.
The positionstakenby DeleuzeandGuattarion psychoanalysis belongto
this deviantor post-Freudiantradition. Perhapsthe most significantfigure
in this post-FreudianmovementwasKlein. Klein differedfrom Freud in her
insistencethat the drivesare not merestreamsof energy,but possess from
the beginninga directionand structure,that is, they areobject-focused. For
Deleuzeand Guattari, though, Klein remainedwithin the psychoanalytic
tradition: while Klein acknowledgedthe centrality and power of partial
objccts,with thcir changesof intensity,their variableflows,and havingthe
capacityto cbb or cxplodc,shc still locatcdthc tirskof intcrprctingthcsc
objcctsirr rt cotrtritctullrchtion bctwccnirnirlystanclgrllicnt.'l'hc rrrrrrlyst
198 PARTI AL O BJ EC T S
providedan interpretationof thesepsychicobjectsin the contextof the con-
tract that existedbetweenher and the patient.EvenWinnicott,who moved
further from Freudianismthan Klein becausehe dispensedwith the con-
tractualrelationbetweenanalystand patient,wassaidby Deleuzeto have
remainedwithin the psychoanalytic paradigm.For Deleuze,the analystand
patienthaveto sharesomethingbeyondlaw,contractor institution.But the
primary disagreementthat Deleuze and Guattari had with the psychoana-
lytic tradition arose from the latter's insistencethat psychic well-being
residesultimately in a relationshipwith a wholeobject, therebyconsigning
partial objects(the mother'sbreast,the penis,a whisper,a pain, a pieceof
cake,and soon) to a necessarily inferior or prolepticpositionin the psycho-
analyticschemeof things- partialobjectswerealwayssomethingthar one
movedon from, a stagethat onewentthough,in attainingpsychicmaturity.
For Deleuzeand Guattari,however,partialobjects(andevendrives)are
not mere structural phenomenaor stageson a developmentaltrajectory,
but, asthey put itinA Thousand, Plateaus,'entrywaysand exits,impasses
the child livesout politically,in other words,with all the forceof his or her
desire'(D&G 1987:13).Psychoanalysis forcesthe desireof the patientinto
a grid that can then be traced by the analyst,whereasthis desireneedsto
be kept awayfrom any pre-tracedidentity or destiny.Only in this way can
the patient (and the analyst)experimentwith the real. But to underrake
this experimentationit is necessaryto treat psychicobjectsas political
optionsand just as significantly,to refrain from relegatingpartial objects
to a merelysecondaryor provisionalstatusin relationto wholeobjects.
Partialobjectsare invariablysomething'menacing,explosive,bursting,
toxic,or poisonous',and it is this flexibleand plasticquality which makes
them inherentlypolitical.For parts follow a specificcoursewhen they are
detachedfrom a whole or from other parts,or when they are collectedinto
other wholesalongwith one or more otherparts,and sothe questionof the
specific processesthat underlie this detachment or reattachment is
absolutelycrucial: is a particular attachment,detachmentor reattachment
menacing,reassuring,painful, pleasurable,tranquillising, alluring and so
on? What makesit any one (or more) of thesethings?For Deleuzeand
Guattariit is absolutelyessential that weseetheseprocesses andtheir mean-
ingsasinherentlypolitical,asphenomena that movepeopleon, or hold them
back,in the coursestakenby their lives.As they seeit, psychoanalysis, by
privilegingthe wholepsychicobject,canneverdo justiceto politics.
Connectives
Psychoanalysis
Rcrrl
PER C EPT + L ITER ATU R E r99
PERCEPT + LITERATURE
John Marks
Deleuzeis particularlystruck by the way in which the great English and
Americannovelistswrite in percepts,claimingby comparisonthat authors
suchasHeinrich von Kleist andFranzKafka write in affects.The'percept'
is at the heart of Deleuze'simpersonal conceptionof literature,whereby
conventional literary categorieslike character,milieu and landscapeare
read in new ways.In order to explore how the percept works in literature
it is necessaryto understandhow Deleuzeis preoccupiedwith all that leads
to the dissolutionof the ego in art. This might manifestitself in the cap-
acity of Virginia Woolf's charactersto merge with the world, in T E.
Lawrence'sdevastation of his own ego,or evenBartleby'spersistentrefusal
to be 'particular'.The perceptalsohassomethingof childhoodperception
in it, given that small children are unableto distinguishbetweenthem-
selvesand the outsideworld. By meansof the percept,literaturebecomes
a wayof exploringnot how we existin the world, but ratherhow webecome
with the world. It has the capacity to explore our existenceas haecceities
on the planeof consistency;to remind us that we ourselvesarepart of these
compoundsof sensation.The percept makesvisible the invisible forcesof
the world, and it is the literary expressionof the things that the writer has
seenand heardthat overwhelmher or him. Consequentl$it hasa vision-
ary potential.The perceptchallengesconventionalnotions of forms and
subjects.It alsohasa political significance, in that it enablesus to explore
an impersonaland pre-individualcollectivitythat might be the basisfor
a particularsort of ethicalcommunity.
The authors that Deleuze initially refers to in order to illustrate the
function of the percept in literature are Herman Melville and Virgina
Woolf. Moby Dicb is a particularly important referencepoint for Deleuze.
Through his perceptions of the whale, Ahab passesinto the landscape,
which in turn becomesa planeof pure expressionthat escapes form. Ahab
enters into a relationshipof becoming with the whale, and the ocean
emergesasa pure percept,a compoundof sensations. Another important
referencepoint is Virginia Woolf, who talksof 'momentsof the world', in
which a charactersuch asMrs Dalloway'passes into'the town. Similarly,
Deleuze alludesto the way in which the moor functions as a percept
for Thomas Hardy, as doesthe steppefor Anton Chekhovand the desert
for T, E. Lawrence.It canbe seen,then, that the perceptimpliesa particu-
lar relationshipbetweencharacterand landscape.Essentially,the land-
scapcis no longcran cnvironmcntthat cithcr mirrors,mocksor firrmsthc
chirrirctcr. pcrccivcstlrc lrrndscitpc
Nrlr is it thc cirsctlut tlrc clritrirctcr by
200 PHENO M ENO LO G Y
directing a gazeat it. Rather,Deleuzefeelsthat the perceptin literature
showsus how the mind is a sort of membranethat is both in contactwith,
and is actuallypart of, the externalworld. The selfis not a thing that is dis-
tinct from the externalworld, but somethingmorelike a 'fold' of the exter-
nal world, a membranethat capturesother things. The intimate contact
between the outside and inside means that literature can explore the
'private desert' (T E. Lawrence),or the 'private ocean'(Melville) that
results from this contact. As Deleuze puts it, every bomb that T E.
Lawrenceexplodesis a bomb that explodesin himself. He cannot stop
himself from projecting intenseimagesof himself and others into the
desert,with the resultthat theseimagestakeon a life of their own.
Given this emphasison impersonalityand the dissolutionof the egq it
is not surprisingthat the literary hero of the perceptis the 'man without
qualities'.This sort of character- closelyrelatedto what Deleuzecallsthe
'seer' (le aoyeur)in his books on cinema- ultimately has the tendency,at
once modest but also crazy, to'become' everyoneand everything.He
might be a characterwho is literally 'on the road',and an obviousexample
from popular literature would be the opennessto experienceof Jack
Kerouac'snarratorin On theRoad.ln 'taking to the road' and beingopen
to all contacts,Deleuzetalks about how a particular,pragmaticnotion of
democracyis expressedin the way the soul in Americanliterature seeks
fulfilment, rather than salvation.The perceptis primarily a literary form
of experimentation,but it has somethingto contribute to politics. In
simple terms, the percepthasthe effectof drawing us out of ourselvesand
into the world, and of challengingthe individualisingand infantilising
tendencyof much contemporaryculture. It is not enough,Deleuzeand
Guattari argue,to turn our own perceptionsand affectionsinto a novel,to
embarkupon a journey in searchof the father who ultimatelyturns out to
be oneself.
PHENOMENOLOGY
Tamsin Lorraine
Phenomenologyas a philosophicalmovementwas founded by Edmund
Husserl.Ren6Descartes,ImmanuelKant and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
Hegelarbimportantprecursorsto this movementthat insistsupon return-
ing to 'the things themselves',or phenomenaas they appearto us, in
order to ground knowledgein the apodictic certainty of self-evidcnt
truth. Husscrl institutcda methodof 'bracketing'that suspcndsmctir-
physicrrlqucstions.ab<lut whrrt is 'out thcrc', tnd instctd filcuscsolr
P H E N OME N OLOGY 201
phenomenological descriptionsof experienceitself. Husserl took from
is intentional- that is, that
Franz Brentanothe notion that consciousness
it is alwaysconsciouso/something.To investigatewhat liesoutsideof con-
sciousness is fruitless.Instead,we shouldinvestigatethe structureandcon-
tents of our consciousexperiences. By suspendingthe 'natural attitude'
(that is, the assumptionthat our experienceis causedby something'out
there')with its reifyingprejudices,we candiscoveranddescribethe'eidetic
essences' that structureconsciousness. This, in turn, will revealhow our
knowledgeis constitutedand will give us a new method for grounding
knowledgein our'pre-predicativeexperience'(that is, experiencethat has
not yet beenpositedfrom the perspectiveof the naturalattitude).
Martin Heidegger,EmmanuelL6vinas,Jean-PaulSartre,and Maurice
Merleau-Pontyweresomeof thoseinspiredby Husserlto developvarious
responses to versionsof phenomenology. But whereasHusserlthought of
phenomenology asa rigorousscienceof consciousness, thesephilosophers
emphasisethe notion (createdby Heidegger)of 'being-in-the-world'and
direct their attentiontoward the lived experienceof an embodiedsubiect
always already immersed in a world from which she cannot separate
herself. Phenomenology'sinsistenceon describingphenomenaas they
appearthus openedup to philosophicalreflectionthe realm of experience
asit is experienced by ordinaryindividualsin everydaylife prior to the the-
oreticalattitudeof 'objective'thought.It wasembracedby manyasa revit-
alising alternativeto forms of philosophicalthought such as positivism
(anotherimportant philosophicalmovementprominentin the earlytwen-
tieth century) that took the methodsof natural scienceas their paradigm.
On Deleuze'sview,phenomenology's emphasison lived experienceter-
philosophy habitual forms of perceptionand conception
ritorialises onto
(perceptionformed from the point of view of the selfor thoughtin keeping
with the form of the 'I'). Deleuzesoughtto determinean 'impersonaland
pre-individualtranscendental field' that is the conditionof anyactualcon-
scious experience (D 1990: 102). In Foucault,Deleuze lauds Michel
Foucaultfor convertingphenomenologyinto epistemology. There is a gap
betweenwhat we perceiveand what we say'asthoughintentionalitydenied
itself' (D 1988b:109).There is no suchthing asa pure or'savage'experi-
enceprior to or underlyingknowledge.The gap betweenwhat we sayand
what we feel and perceive(aswell asthe Bergsoniangap Deleuzecharac-
terisesin his Cinemabooks that can open up betweenperceptionand
action)indicatesimplicit tendenciesor forcesthat insistin what we sayand
do. The consciousexperiences of an individual are the emergenteffectsof
virtual, as well asactuallyunfolding, forcesof which the individual is, for
thc most part, unawarc.Thc singulariticsor cvcntsdcfiningtheseforccs
constitutca trirnsccndcntrrl ficld of'thc virturrlthrrtmayncvcrbc rctuitlisccl
202 PHENO M ENO LO G Y + HUSS E R L . EDMUND
in individualbodies.Eventsof sense(for example,rhe conceptsof philos-
ophy), as well aseventsof physicalprocesses(for example,the capacityto
fall, to run, to sweat)and their virtual relations'insist' in concretestatesof
affairs,whether or not they actually unfold in specificspeech-actsor phys-
ical states.
Philosophyas 'genuine thinking' does not attempt to representor
describe,but ratherto makethingshappenby creatingconceptsin response
to the problemsof life that actualisethe virrual relationsof rhe transcend-
ental field in novel ways.Phenomenology's invocationof the 'primordial
lived'rendersimmanence in termsof whatis immanentto a subject'sexperi-
encerather than processes unfolding at levelsbelow as well as abovethe
thresholdof consciousness, thus groundingits investigations in whatare,in
Deleuzeand Guattari'sview, opinions that are alreadyclich6sextracted
from experience(D&G 1994:150).The notion of a world 'teaming'with
anonymous, nomadic,impersonaland pre-individualsingularitiesopensup
the field of the transcendental andallowsthinkingof individualsin termsof
the singularitiesthat are their condition,rather than in terms of the syn-
thetic and analyticunitiesofconsciousexperience (D 1990:103).
Connectives
Bergson
Experience
Foucault
Singularity
PHENOMENOLOGY + HUSSERL, EDMUND (1859-1938)
Alberto Toscano
Deleuze's relationship to the philosophy of Edmund Husserl is split
between a critical hostility toward the methodologicalprinciples and
overall aims of his phenomenologyand the isolation, extraction and
transformationof certain moments in Husserl'soeuvreto sustaincon-
ceptual developmentsof his own. The most significant among these
Husserlianinsertionsoccur with regardto the elucidationof (the genesis
of) sensein The Logic of Sensaand in the discussionof the machinic
phylum in A Thousand Plateausinspiredby Gilbert Simondon.Deleuze
finds support for his discussionof sensein Husserl'sdelineationof thc
nocm:rtaand his scparationof a logicof cxprcssion(scnsc)from thc logics
of'dcnotirtion,manif'cstirtion
irnclclcmonstrati<ln.
ln this rcspcct[-Iusscrl
PH EN OM EN OL OGY + H U SSER L . ED M U N D 203
is linked to the key Stoic insight, prolonged by mediaevalnominalism and
by Meinong, regardingthe autonomyof sensewith regardboth to phys-
ical causalityand to the logic of propositions.However,while Husserl is
commendedfor having identified the paradoxicalcharacterof sense,its
statusas both impassiveand genetic,he is criticised for having shirked
from drawing the ultimate conclusionsof his (re)discovery,and falling
back, via his notion of Urdoxa, on the requirementsof generalityand
recognitionthat define the image of thought as a convergenceof good
senseand common sense.Deleuzearguesthat to be faithful to the inaug-
ural Stoic insight one must conceivethe nucleusof the noemaas verb-
like, asan eventand not an attribute or predicate,aswell asmaintain the
paradoxof sense,rather than transcendentally neutralisingit in a Kantian
recourseto an object = x. Otherwise sensebecomesa mere shadowor
doubleof the proposition and is subordinatedto the genericdemandof
unificationprovidedby the concept,on the one hand,and the form ofthe
person,on the other.
Following the arguments put forward by Jean-Paul Sartre in the
Transcendence of the Ego (1937), Deleuze demands a more radical -
becausemoreimpersonal- treatmentof the phenomenological reduction,
such that it would allow accessto the pre-individual singularitiesat the
heartof genesisand sense.This canstill be regardedasthe contextfor his
useof HusserlinA Thousand Plateaus,where the phenomenologist's work
is mined for the notions of anexactitudeand morphologicalessences, in
order to distinguishorganismsfrom bodies (without, incidentally,resort-
ing to Husserl'sown Leib/ Korperdistinction),nomad from royal science
(via Husserl'sintimation of a protogeometry),and to delineateprocesses
of transformation,distortion, ablationand augmentationon the machinic
phylum. Onceagain,Husserlis criticisedfor a certainKantian inspiration
that doesnot allowhim to determineindependentlya dimensionof events
and becomingsthat would be neither objectivenor subjective.Husserl's
commitment to transcendental philosophy forces him instead to
subordinatethe eventsof senseand the anexactbecomingsof matterto an
instanceof legislation(in this case,royal science).The situationis much
the samefor the notion of passivesynthesis,borrowed from Husserl and
translated into empiricist, biophilosophical terms in Dffirence and
Repetition.
Deleuzedevelopshis ontologyof multiplicity againstall dialectics,from
the work of Henri Bergson.Husserl,like Bergson,tried to draw the phil-
osophicaland methodologicalconsequences of the work of Bernhard
Ricmannon topology.What distinguishes thesetwo standpoints, vitalist
lncl phcnomcnologicirl, towitrdmultiplicitics? Whilc llcrgsonandDclcuzc
proposcthnl rr distinctionltctwccntwo typcsof'nrultipliciticsclln ()pcn
20+ PL ANE
onto an understandingof becomingthat would not be subjectedto extrin-
sic measurement,Husserl adopts the notion of multiplicity to formulate
a universalisticand homogeneoustheoreticalscienceof theory (or meta-
science),for which the mathematicalconceptof multiplicity could serveas
the commonformal term. Husserlexplicitly usesmultiplicitiesto distin-
guish object-fieldsof theoriesand to ground the unity of explanationin
eachfield. In this regardhis interestonceagainis with thosequestionsof
foundationand legitimationthat Deleuze'sformulation of an immanent
and intensivelogic of multiplicitiesis designedto undermineor evade.
Theseencounterswith Husserl,aroundthe ideasof sense,the machinic
phylum and multiplicities,permir us to identify rhreealternativenotions
of phenomenologypunctuatingDeleuze'sphilosophicalitinerary: a phe-
nomenologyof events(or rigorous scienceof surfaceeffects),a phenomen-
ology of material fluxes, breaks and assemblages (or phenomenologyof
production),and a phenomenology of the concept.Respectively,
thesecan
be linked to the autonomyof sense,the autonomyof a nomad scienceof
haecceities (or of the practiceof the artisan)and the autonomyof philoso-
phy.Thesearelike the threemomentsof an-otherphenomenology, oneno
longertied to the teleologicalprogrammeof makingimmanenceimmanent
to consciousness or subjectivity.
PLANE
CliffStagoll
Deleuzeusesthe imageof the 'plane'in numerouscontexts.Typically,it is
employedto explaina type of thinking that mediatesberweenthe chaosof
chancehappenings(and the complexityof their ever-shiftingorigins and
outcomes)on the one hand,and structured,orderlythinking on the other.
Deleuzerevealsthe former in his theoriesof multiplicity, becomingand
difference.He proposesthat the lasttypifieshow we dealwith suchchaos:
by imposingstructures,creatinghierarchies,conceivingof things as (the
same'from one moment to the next, using definitionsto limit meanings,
and ignoring new and potentiallycreativeinquiries.The imageof a'plane
of consistency'or 'plane of immanence'both explainsthe relationship
between these two ways of thinking and revealsmore fully the creative
potentialevidentin thinking aboutthe world.
A plane of immanencecan be conceivedas a surfaceupon which all
eventsoccur, where eventsare understoodas chance,productive inter-
actions betweenforcesof all kinds. As such, it representsthc field of
bccoming,a 'spircc'containingall of rhc possibilitics
inhcrcntin firrccs.
P LA N E 205
On this plane,all possibleeventsare brought together,and new connec-
tionsbetweenthem madeandcontinuouslydissolved.To think of this field
of possibilitiesmeansarrangingit accordingto someconcept(in Deleuze's
specificsenseof the word), thereby constructing a temporary and virtual
arrangementaccordingto causal,logical and temporal relations.Such
thinking is alwaysa responseto some particular set of circumstances,
which might be as complex as a philosophicalinquiry or as seemingly
simple as feeling hungry. In the former instance,one might constructa
complexmodel to which one returns time and again over the courseof
one's life whereas,in the latter, it might involve no more than acting to
satisfy hunger. In either case,though, one's world is organisedanew
aroundsomerelevantconceptor setof concepts,suchthat a new planeof
immanenceis constructed,providingthe temporaryconsistencyof think-
ing upon which meaningdepends.
For Deleuze,philosophyis all aboutthe creationof new concepts.Each
new conceptcreatesa new plane;that is, a new imageof thought provid-
ing theoreticalconsistencyfor how life is experiencedand understood.For
example,the cogitoof Ren6Descarteswasthe essentialpreconditionupon
which the Cartesianunderstandingof the world could be developedand
its conceptsusedas explanatorytools.Deleuzeholds that, by thinking in
new waysand proposingnew concepts,everygreatphilosophycreatesits
own planeof immanence.The planecan only be definedin terms of the
conceptsoperatingupon it, and the concept canonly havemeaningrela-
tive to the,forcesat work on the plane.The conceptsact like 'coordinates'
for thinking,providingpointsof focusfor realisingthe potentialof chance
eventsoccurring upon the plane.
Deleuzeusesthe imageof the planequite variously.In his Bergsonian
model of recollection,for instance,Deleuzerefersto 'planes'and 'sheets'
of memories.His explorationsof art refer to a 'plane of percepts',and
A Thousand. Plateausis structured around a range of planesthat seemto
ground life and thinking. However,the key characteristicsascribedto a
planeare alwaysconsistent.First, a planeis alwaysa virtual construction
ratherthan an actualone,unextendedin spaceand imperceptible.Second,
production upon a plane (that is, interconnectionof events)occursat a
'speed'specificto the particular terms of the changesinvolved.Third, a
plane is not the theoreticalfield of some pre-existing subject or self.
Nothing is superior to the plane'smovement.Fourth, a plane doesnot
precedethe connectionsand synthesesbrought aboutbetweeneventsby a
concept,but is constructedpreciselyas they are created.Taken together,
thcsccharactcristics comprisea plane's'immanence'.
Vcry latc in his carccr,Delcuzcraiscda rangcof new issueswhen he
wrotcitbout"l'l lli plrtncof immirncncc', 'l'hc implicrrtions
of'thisconrplcx
 206 PLATEAU
variantof the model are debatable.Deleuzeclearlydoesnot meansome
superiorplaneupon which particular planes(of conceptualconsistency,
art or memory,for example)are inscribed.Rather,he seemsto be pointing
out that there is a planeof immanenceimmanentto all thinkableplanes,
such that eachplaneis merelyone centreof activity or perspective.THE
planeis the field of all events.As such,the unity of rhe cosmosought not
to be thought assometranscendentcontainingthe immanent, but only the
immanentitself conceivedasthe transcendentally necessaryconditionfor
all life: everythingis unified in so far aseverythingis becomingand flux.
whilst this notion is certainlynor new in itself,the modelof the planedoes
provide a new imagefor thinking about the universalityof immanent pro-
duction and becoming.
Connectives
Art
Becoming
Concept
Event
Immanence
Memory
PLATEAU
Tamsin Lorraine
Rather than plotting points or fixing an order,Deleuzeand Guattari wrote
their book, A ThousandPlateaus,as a rhizome composedof (plateaus'.
They claim that the circular form they gave it was ,only for laughs'
(D&G 1987:22).The plateausaremeantto be readin any order and each
plateau can be related to any other plateau. Deleuze and Guattari cite
Gregory Bateson'suse of the word 'plateau' to designatea ,continuous,
self-vibratingregion of intensities'that doesnot developin terms of a
point of culminationor an externalgoal.Plateausareconstitutedwhenthe
elementsof a region(for example,the microsensations of a sexualpractice
or the micreperceptionsof a mannerof attending)arenot subjectedto an
externalplan of organisation.An externalplan imposesthe selectionof
someconnectionsrather than othersfrom the virtual relationsamongthe
elementsthat could be actualised,actualisingvarying capacitiesto affcct
and be affectedin thc process.A plateauemergcswhen the singulariticsof
an indiviclurrl
<lra phnc thrt prcvior,lslyonly 'insistcd'in ir concrctcstirtcof
PL ATEAU 207
affairsareput into play through the actualisationof connectionsthat defy
the impositionof externalconstraints(for example,tantric sexualpractices
in which orgasmis not the goal or meditativestatesthat deliberatelyavoid
goal-orientedthinking).
Deleuzeand Guattari deliberatelyavoidedwriting I Thousand, Plateausin
a stylethat movesthe readerfrom oneargumentto the next, until all the argu-
mentscanbe gatheredtogetherinto the culminatingargumentof the bookas
a whole.Insteadthey presentfifteen plateausthat aremeantto instigatepro-
ductive connectionswith a world they refuseto represent.Throughout
Deleuze'swork and his work with Guattari,he and Guattari createphil-
osophicalconceptsthat they do not want to pin down to any one meaning.
Insteadthey let their conceptsreverberate,expressingsomeofthe variations
in their sensethroughthe shiftingcontextsin which they areput to use.In
A Thousand, Plateaus,they characterisesuchconceptsasfragmentarywholes
that canresonate in a powerful,openWholethat includesall the conceptson
one and the sameplane.This planethey call a 'planeof consistency' or 'the
planeof immanence of concepts,the planomenon' (D&G 1987:35).
Deleuze and Guattari advocateconstructinga Body without Organs
(BwO) and 'abstractmachines'(with a 'diagrammatic'function D&G
1987:cf. 189-90)that put into play forcesthat are not constrainedby the
habitual forms of a personalself or other 'molar' forms of existence.
A BwO is a plateauconstructedin terms of intensitiesthat reverberatein
keepingwith a logic immanentto their own unfoldingrather than conven-
tional boundariesof self and other. An abstractmachine 'placesvariables
of contentand expressionin continuity'(D&G 1987:5l l). It (for example,
the Galileoabstractmachine)emergeswhen variablesof actionsand pas-
sions (the telescope,the movementof a pendulum, the desireto under-
stand) are put into continuous variation with incorporeal eventsof sense
(Aristotelianmechanicsand cosmology,Copernicanheliocentrism),creat-
ing effectsthat reverberatethroughoutthe socialfield (D&G 1987:cf. 5l l).
There are variouswaysin which an assemblage's capacityto increaseits
number of connectionsinto a plane of consistencycan be impeded; cre-
ative connectionscan be replacedwith blockages,strata, 'black holes', or
'lines of death'.An assemblage that multipliesconnectionsapproaches the
'living abstractmachine'(D&G 1987:513).
Connectives
Actuality
lllack hole
Rhizomc
Wholc
208 PLAro (c. +28-c. 348 nc)
PLATO (c. 428-c.348 nc)
Alison Ross
Plato's philosophy exerts a profound influenceover modern thought.
ImmanuelKant's 'Copernicanrevolution'in philosophywas styledas an
invertedPlatonismin which the dependence of a finite consciousness on
sensibleforms to think ideasreversedthe Platonichierarchybetweenthe
intelligible and the sensible.Friedrich Nietzsche,who found Kanr's critical
philosophy inadequatefor such a reversalon account of the primacy in
Kant of the moral idea,definedthe task of the philosophyof the furure as
the'reversalof Platonism'inwhich the distinctionbetweenthe realandthe
apparentworldswouldbe abolished.DeleuzefollowsNietzschein this task
of a reversalof Platonism,but also refines the 'abstract' Nietzschean
formula of this task by askingabout the motivationof Platonism.In his
analysisof this motivationDeleuzefindsin Plato,unlikeNietzsche's(exter-
nal' critique,the conditionsfor the reversalof Platonism.For this reason,
Deleuze'sreversalof Platonismis also better equippedto critique the
dualistontologyof Platonismthat continuesto operatein Kant.
The motive of Plato'stheory of the Ideasneedsto 'be soughtin a will to
selectand to choose'lineagesand 'to distinguishpretenders'(D 1990:
2534).In Plato,the hierarchythat distinguishesIdeasfrom modelsand
copiesdescribes a degradationofuse andknowledge. Accordingto Plato,the
sensibleworld is derivedfrom and modelledasa 'copy' on the realmof the
Ideas.'Copies',that comprisethe sensibleworld, mark a gradeddescent
awayfrom therealmof theIdeasto themerely'apparent' world of the senses.
The copyingof thesecopiesin art marksa further declinein ontology(use)
and epistemology(knowledge).In the Republic,the mimetic mechanismof
art leadsto Plato'shostility to art as a 'copy of a copy' and to the dramatic
arts in particularwhich dissimulatetheir statusasa copyof a copy.The Idea
of 'a bed' is a modeluntrammelledby sensibilityand containsonly thosefea-
turesthat are the necessary conditionsfor any bed (that it is a structureable
to supportthe weightof a person).A sensible'copy'of this ldeanecessarily
placescertainlimitationson this form by makingit a certainheight and
colour.However,the painterwho paintsa copy of this bed copiesall the
things about the bed that are inessentialto its use (that it is a particular
colour,a particularheight,in a particularsetting),but is unableto copyany
of thosefeaturesof the bed that relateto its function(that it hasa structure
ableto supportthe weightof a person).The restrictionof paintingto the
copyingof the mereappearance of the objectshows,for Plato,that thc artist
producesthings whose internal mechanismsthey arc ignorant of. This
dcgradltionofiltsclncl knowlcdgc in thc fabricrrtccl
objcctnrlkcsrrt I futilc,
POL ITIC S + EC OL OGY 209
but harmlessactivity.Dramatic poetry,however,is dangerousbecauseit pro-
ducesa spectacle ableto suspenddisbelief.The spectators of dramaticpoetry
areinductedinto the world of the performancewherean actor playingthe
roleof a statesman or a philosopher'is' this role.For Platothis dissimulation
of its statusasa copyrendersdramaticpoetry dangerousto the proper order
of the Statebecause it trainsin the soulsof its citizensa disregardfor the dis-
tinctionbetweenthe true and falsecopy.This distinctionin Platobetweena
harmlesscopy and the malevolentcopy,that itself becomesa model, is the
key to Deleuze'sproject of a 'reversalof Platonism'.
According to Deleuze the pertinent distinction for the reversal of
Platonismis not model-copybut copy-simulacra. The simulacraare those
falsecopiesthat place'in questionthe verynotationsof copyandmodel'and
the'motivation'ofPlato'sphilosophyis transcribed by Deleuzeastherepres-
sionof the simulacrain favourof the copies(D 1990:256-7).Simulacraare
imageswithoutresemblance to theIdea.As suchtheyunderminethedualism
betweenIdea and imagein Platonicthought, which regulatesand grades
termsaccordingto a presupposed relationof resemblance to the Ideas.It is
becausethe simulacraare not modelled on the Idea that their pretension,
their merely externalresemblanceto the Idea, is without foundation.But it
is alsobecauseof this merelyexternalresemblance that the simulacrasuggest
a conceptionof the world in which identity follows 'deep disparity', and
contestthe conceptionof the world in which differenceis regulatedaccord-
ing to a prior similitude (D 1990: 261). Thus, Deleuze's'reversalof
Platonism'assertsthe rightsof the simulacraoverthe copy.He arguesfor a
pop art ableto 'be pushedto the point whereit changesits nature'asa copy
of a copy(Platonism)to be 'reversedinto the simulacrum'(anti-Platonism)
(D 1990:265).In this way,the essence-appearance or model-copydistinc-
tions usedby modern philosophersto tacklePlatoare shownby Deleuze's
genealogyof Plato to be ineffectivein reversingPlatonism.
Connectives
Kant
Nietzsche
Thought
POLITICS + ECOLOGY
RosiBraidotti
Adlpting llaruch Spinoza'smonism to an ccosophyof transccndcnttl
cmpiricism,l)clcuzcconstructsthc conccptof''inrnrlncncc':
incorpornting
210 PO LI TTCS + ECOL O G Y
strainsof vitalismand yet still bypassingessentialism. Choosingto move
beyond the dualism of human/non-human,Deleuze'secosophyrejects
liberal individualismas much as it does the holism of 'deep ecology'.
Primarily,the ecosophyof Deleuzeaspiresto expressthe rhizomaticstruc-
ture of subjectivity.The subject'smind is 'part of nature'- embeddedand
embodied- that is to sayimmanentand dynamic.As the structureof the
Deleuziansubjectis interactive,it is inherently ethical.In this manner,
when Deleuzeimbues ethical agencywith an anti-essenrialist vision of
'commitment'he accordinglydisplacesthe anthropocentricbias of com-
munitarianism.
The ecosophical ethicsof Deleuzeincorporaresthe physicsand biology
of bodiesthat togetherproduceethologicalforces.Insteadof the essential-
ist question-'What is a body?'- Deleuzeprefersto inflect his questions
slightlydifferently.He asks:'What cana body candol'and'How much can
a body can take?'.We are thereforeinvited ro think about the problemof
ecosophyin terms of affectivity:How is affectivityenhancedor impover-
ished?In this way,ethicalvirtue,empowerment,joy andunderstandingare
implied. However,an act of understandingdoes not merely entail the
mental acquisitionof certain ideas, but it also coincideswith bodily
processes. It is thus an activity that actualises
what is goodfor the subject,
for examplepotentia.Mind and body act in unisonand are synchronised
by what Spinozacallsconatus,that is to saythe desireto becomeand to
increasethe intensityof one'sbecoming.
The selectionof compositepositivepassions,that constituteprocesses
of becoming,worksasa matterof affectiveandcorporealaffinity.An ethical
relation is conduciveto joyful and empoweringencountersthat express
one'spotentiaand increasethe subject'scapacityto enter into further rela-
tions.This expansionis boundboth spatially(environmental)and rempor-
ally (endurance).By entering into ethical relations,nomadicbecomings
engenderpossiblefutures in that, as they produceconnections,they in
turn producethe affectivepossibilityof the world asa whole.
Vitalist ecosophyalso functionsto critique advancedcapitalism;more
specificallycapitalistconsumerismand the over-indulgentconsumptionof
resources. As a temporalsequence, capitalismengenders the schizophrenic
simultaneityof oppositeeffectsand thereforeit short-circuitsthe present.
Thus, it immobilisesasit saturatesthe socialspacewith commodities.The
temporal disjunction induced by the speedyrurnover of availablecom-
modities is not different from the jet-lag one suffers after flying from
London to Sydney.Capitalisminducesa perverselogic of desirebasedon
the deferral of pleasurefulfilment, deferring the gratificationonto thc
'next generation' of tcchnological commoditics andgadgcts:thc picccmcal
instalmcnts of popillarculturcin thc filrm of''infirtirinmcnt'thirtbccomc
POSTC OL ON IAL TH EOR Y 2tl
obsolete at the speed of light. These legal addictions titillate without
release,inducing dependencywithout any senseof responsibility.This
mixture of dependencyand dissatisfactionconstitutespower as a nucleus
of negativepassions, suchasresentment,frustration,envyand bitterness.
Deleuze'secosophyof radical immanenceand intensivesubjectsres-
ponds to the unsustainable logic and internal contradictionsof advanced
capitalism.This Deleuzianbody is in fact an ecologicalunit. Through a
structureof mutual flowsand data-transfer,one that probablyis bestunder-
stoodin referenceto viral contaminationor intensiveinterconnection,this
body is environmentallyinterdependent.This environmentally-bound
intensivesubjectis a collectiveentity; it is an embodied,affectiveand intel-
ligent entity that captures,processesand transforms energiesand forces.
Being environmentally-boundand territorially-basedit is immersed in
fieldsthat constantlyflow and transform.
All in all, Deleuzeexpandsthe notion of universalismto be more inclu-
sive.He doesthis in two ways.First, by affirming biocentredand trans-
speciesegalitarianismasan ethicalprinciple,he opensup the possibilityof
conceptualising a post-humanity.Second,a new senseof globalintercon-
nectionis established asthe ethicsfor non-unitarysubjects,emphasisinga
commitmentto others(includingthe non-human,non-organicand 'earth'
others).By removingthe obstacleof self-centredindividualism,the polit-
ics of Deleuzianecosophyimplies a new way of combininginterestswith
an enlargedsenseof community.Deleuze insists that it is the task of
philosophyto createforms of ethicaland politicalactivitiesthat respondto
the complex and multilayered nature of 'belonging'. In other words,
philosophyin the handsof Deleuzebecomesa nomadicecosophyof mul-
tiple beings.
POSTCOLONIAL THEORY
VerenaConlejt
Postcolonial theory is derived from terms such as 'minoritarian',
'nomadism', 'becoming' and their variants. A worldwide becoming-
minoritarian bearsa potential Qpuissance
or virtuality) that can affectbodies
and words.The contextis oneof sexual of underminingthe power
politics,
(pouaoiror givenforce)of the white malewho hasorder-wordsat his dis-
posal.Minorities havenothing to do with numbersbut with internalrela-
tions. Of importancc are the connectionsbetween bodies and words,
cspcciallyconjunctivcfrrrms(suchils'and' and 'plus')that irugmcntvaluc
to thc tcrmsbctwccnwhichtlrcylrc firund.l')vcrynujor hnguirgcis ridcllcd
2r2 PO STCO LO NI AL THEORY
with minor languagesthat transform order-wordsand deterritorialise or
dispersetheir mortifying effects.The more a languagehasthe characteris-
tics of a major language,the more,toq it is affectedby continuousvariations
that transform it into a 'minor' language.Insteadof criticising the world-
wide imperialism of English in our time by denouncingthe corruption it
introducesinto other languages,one can say that the idiom is necessarily
workedupon by all the minorities of the world that imposediverseproced-
ures of variation:in the handsof minoritariansEnglish becomes-pidgin,
a form that mocksits lawsandstricturesandreterritorialises it for newends.
It is clearthat two languages neverexistadjacentto eachother,and that as
a resulttwo idiomsarereallyonly two treatmentsof the samelanguage.
Ratherthanoperatingbetweensomethingseenand somethingsaid,lan-
guagegoesfrom sayingto saying,utteranceto utterance,and from aphor-
ism to aphorism.Postcolonialtheory does not deal with the 'look' of
phenomenologybut with the transmissionof language.It dealsespecially
with the order-word,or password,that it replaceswith passages. When, in
a passage to the limit, languagelosesits fixed meaning,bodiesenter into a
processof metamorphosis.They losetheir identities and becomecommon
and totalised,the idioms of everybody(tout le monde).
The becoming-minoritarianof bodiesand languageis linked to creativ-
ity. Literature is a privileged field for a becoming-minoritarian.A minor
literature works the maior languagefrom the inside. In a postcolonial
context,minor literaturedealswith the undoingof the majorlanguage, not
by reterritorialisingby mere usage of a dialect but by transforming
imposedor inheritedorder-wordsthat giveit meaningand direction.
The processof becoming-minoritariancan be acceleratedby what
Deleuzecallsthe'war machine'.That is, the axiomaticof the white,mono-
lingual,English-speaking
maleand the worldwideinstitutionof capitalism
needsto be challenged.It is only by leaving,and by neverceasingto leave,
the plan(e)of capitalthat masses from the Third World and the ex-colonies
shift the forcesin the dominantequilibrium. If minoritiesdo not consti-
tute viableStatesin a cultural,political,or economicsense,it is because the
State-form,the axiomaticrule of capitaland their correspondingculture
may not be appropriatefor them. Capitalismmaintainsand organisesnon-
viable States for the precise purpose of crushing minorities. Devolving
upon minorities is the task of countering the worldwide war machine by
meansothor than thoseits juggernaughtimposesupon them.
To becoming-minoritarianis tantamountto undoing closuresand trans-
forming striatedspacesinto smoothand unimpededspaceswhere words
and bodiesmoveat top speedin an ongoingprocssof deterritorialisation.
Becoming-minoritarianis linked to physicaland mental nomrdism. I'br
nomtds,contrirryto migrirntswho g<lfr<tmonc point to irnothcr;cvcry
POST- STR U C TU R AL ISM + POL ITIC S 213
point they reach is a relay. Nomads and migrants can mix, yet their
conditions are not the same.The nomads' trajectory distributes people.
Sedentaryor dominant spaceis striated with walls and roads. Nomadic
spaceis markedonly by'traits'that areeffacedand displacedby the move-
ment of trajectories.The nomad doesnot want to leavethe smooth space
left by the receding forest where the desert advances.Nomadism is
inventedasa responseto this challenge.Nomadshaveabsolutemovement,
that is, speedwhich is intensive.The migrants' movementsare extensive.
Vorticalor swirlingmovementis an essentialfeatureof the war machineof
the nomad. Contrary to the migrants who reterritorialisethemselves,
nomadsfind themselvesin ongoingdeterritorialisation.
In an era of global capitalismorder-wordsare the sameeverywhere.
Minoritarian massesare at the sametime engagedin a worldwideprocess
of becomingand in a creativetransformationof the order-wordsimposed
in the nameof democraticcapitalism.Postcolonialtheory,arguesDeleuze,
is built from these processes.Its practice assumesdifferent forms and
shapesaccordingto the natureofgeography,historyand the inheritedcon-
ditions of conflict.
Connectives
Creativetransformation
Deterritorialisation/Reterritorialisation
Minoritarian
POST.STRUCTURALISM + POLITICS
Alberto Toscano
The post-structuralist,or evenanti-structuralist,characterof Deleuzeand
Guattari can be said to rest on four elements:a theory of subjectivation,
a critique of the notion of ideology,the ontologyof control and an analy-
sisof capitalism.Deleuze'spost-structuralismis bestgauged,not only by
his attack on structuralismin the 1970s,but by consideringhis earlier
appropriation of structuralist themes, especiallyhis formulation of the
fundamental criteria for structuralism in 'How do we Recognize
Structuralism?'(1967,seeStivale1998).This essaystandsout for its atten-
tion to how structuralismarticulatesthe empty placeat the heart of the
symbolic,the accidentsof structure (or spatio-temporaldynamisms)and
irn instirnccof subjcctivity. pcrhapsthc kcy issuc
Rlr Dclcuzc,it inclicatcs
of thc politiurl,undcrstoodrrsthc problcmof novclty(or bccoming),
214 PO ST- STRUCTURALI SM + POLITICS
By portraying the structuralist subject (or hero) as comprising
impersonalindividuations and pre-individual singularities,affectedby
eventsimmanentto the structure,Deleuze,in 1967, formulatedone of the
few,if not the only, consistentdefinition of post-structuralism.By empha-
sising the importanceof praxis in the mutation of structures,Deleuzelays
the ground for a conceptionof politics that leavesstructuralismbehind.
Treating the unconscious,with Guattari, as a factory driven by flows of
desire,rather than asa theatreof representation, Deleuzebreakswith the
whole thematic of ideology (and its critique) that defined the Freudo-
Marxism of the 1960s(and thus continuedhis earlierempiricistconcern
with institutionsand jurisprudence).The emphasison a sub-representa-
tional, libidinal dimensionto socialand psychic(re)productionheraldeda
movefrom a focuson structuresto what might be calleda constructivistor
ethologicalapproach,aimed at discerningthe modalitiesof synthesisat
work in the collectiveproduction of subjectivity.Accompanyingthis shift
wasone from an earlierconcernwith problemsof organisationand genesis
(seethe discussionof the ideaof revolutionin DffirenceandRepetition) to
a focuson formsof individuation(haecceities) populatinga planeof imma-
nencethat cannotbe capturedby any structureof placesand differences.
By shifting the focusof an analysisof capitalismfrom value and labour to
codificationand desire,whilst retaining many elementsof the Marxian
problematic,Deleuzeand Guattarievadea dialecticalcorrelationof polit-
ical subjectivityand systemicchange.Insteadthey prefer an inventoryof
the typesof operations(or syntheses) wherebydesiringsubjectivityis pro-
duced and an outline of how capitalismand its Statesare able to axioma-
tise and capture subjectivity,in order to bend it to the imperativesof
surplusvalue.
Now it is the materialeffectsof the axiomatic(or of capitalistsubjectiv-
ity) on subjects,and not their placementin a structurethrough ideological
interpellation that areat stake.It is not only from the sideof commandthat
Deleuzeand the systemiccorrelation(whetherstructural or dialectical)
betweenpoweror dominationand subjectivationareundermined.In their
formulations of the conceptsof 'minority' and of the 'war machine',
Deleuzeand Guattari alsodelineatethe constructiveautonomyor exter-
nality of certain forms of subiectivationto the mechanismsof control and
exploitation.Rather than identifying the subject with an instancethat
accompanies the structureand appropriatesit heroically,the minoritarian
subject(or the subjectof the war machine)is definedby a line of flight,
which signalsboth its capacityfor independentontologicalcreativityand
the mannerin which it affectsthe societythat perpetuallyseeksto capture
or idcntify it. This attackon symbolicand dialecticalundcrstandings <tf
llolitics is both ir milttcrof principlctnd of conittnctttrc.
POWER 215
On the one hand, Deleuzeand Guattari'sphilosophyis determinedby
an anti-dialecticalimpetus:to think the independenceof becoming,and
the possibilityof an ethicsoutsideany frameworkof legitimationor regu-
lation. Consider their separationof becoming and history, such that
becoming-revolutionaryis a trans-temporal event that can detach itself
from the fateof an actualrevolution.In conjuncturalterms,Deleuze'sdef-
inition of the society of control, following William S. Burroughs and
Michel Foucault,arguesthat we areno longerin a situationwhere,evenat
the formal level,we could speakof a correlation or transitivity betweenthe
systemand its individual subjects.As mechanisms of disciplinecometo be
superseded by technologiesof control, politicsis more and more a matter
of 'dividuality', such that the impersonaland the pre-individualbecome
the very materialof control,but alsoof minoritariansubjectivationand the
constructionof effectivealternatives.Whence Deleuze'spreferencefor
notionsof combator guerrillawarfareover thoseof antagonismor (class)
struggle: for Delduze, the combat betweenand within individuals, as
becoming,is the preconditionof the combatagainstor resistance. This is
what differentiatescombat from war, which takesthe confrontationof
subjectsasprimary.
POWER
Claire Colebrook
Although the conceptof powerin Frenchphilosophyis usuallyassociated
with Michel Foucault,and althoughDeleuzeand Guattari in A Thousand,
Plateausareexplicitlycriticalof Foucault'suseof the word 'power' (rather
than their own 'desire' which they seeas creatingrelations through which
powermight operate),it makesa greatdealof senseto locateDeleuzewithin
a tradition of the philosophyof power.This is not power in the political
sense- a powerexercisedby one body overanotherbody - but is closerto
the positiveidea of plver t0. Deleuze'santecedents in this tradition are
BaruchSpinozaand FriedrichNietzsche.For Spinozaa beingis definedby
its power,its striving or its potential to maintain itself. Rather than seeing
human life ashavinga proper form which it then ought to realise,so that
potentialwouldbe properlyorientedtowardsactualisation, Spinozaregards
potentialityas creativeand expressive;if all life is the striving ro express
substance in all its differentpotentialsthen the fulfilment or jo.yof human
life is the cxpansionof power.Joy,as the realisationof power,is therefore
diffcrcntfrom thc moral oppositionof grxrdirnclcvil, an oppositirlrr that
im;rcdcs powcrby constririning it withinsomcrlrcirdygivcnnrlrnr.
zl6 PO W ER P S Y C H OA N A LY S IS 217

Nietzsche, whose 'Will to Power' for Deleuze is also an affirmation of Connectives

life (and not the assertion or imposition of power), extended Spinoza's
Active/Reactive
expressivephilosophy. Instead of there being bodies or enrities that have
Force
a certain power or potential, Nietzsche begins with powers or forces, from
which beings are effected. A master does not have power because he is
a master; rather, it is the exercise of a certain power which produces
masters and slaves.Deleuze's reading of Nietzsche is concerned primarily PROUST, MARCEL (1871-1922) - referto theentrieson 'art', 'faciality',
with Nietzsche as a philosopher of power and forces, where force has a and'thought'.
'multiplicity','semiotics'
strict metaphysical function. There are powers (or quanta of force) that in
their encounter or connection with other powers produce relations, but
nothing in the power itself determines how it will be actualised, and any
power has the potential to be actualised differently. PSYCHOANALYSIS _ FAMILY, FREUD,
Deleuze's repeated insistence that relations are external to terms has AND UNCONSCIOUS
a twofold significance. First, in line with a philosophy of power, Deleuze
does not begin from beings that then enter into relations; rather, there are Alison Ross
powers to be, powers that are actualised only in their relation to other
powers. So what a power ej is secondaryto its potential; the virtual precedes
Farnily
the actual. Second, if powers are, in this world, actualisedin a certain way,
through the particular relations that have been effected, it is also possible The 'family' hasa pivotalconceptualrole within psychoanalytic theory;its
for different relations to produce different worlds; powers might be actu- primacy in psychoanalysis is neither limited to the bourgeoisnuclear
alised through other relations. family nor the therapeuticpracticeof analysisthat dealswith it. Rather,
For Deleuze, power is positive; there are not beings who then have the through the organisingrole given by Sigmund Freud to the Oedipus
power to act, or who then suffer from power (where power would be the complex,the 'family' actsasan explanatorymodel for the organisationof
corruption of, or fall from, some passivestate). Rather, a being is its power desirein the individual- asseenin his therapeuticpractice- but extends
or what it can do. For Deleuze, then, power posesa problem: How is it that aswell to the historicalforcesinvolvedin the shapingof instinct described
beings can be separated from their power? Why does power appear to be in his meta-psychological writings on civilisation.
something from which we suffer; why does power seem to be repressive? The Oedipuscomplexintroducesthe senseof an externalprohibition
For Deleuze, this is becausewe rest too easily with the effects of power - under which infantilelibido is definitivelyshaped.The significanceof this
its manifestations, what we already are - without intuiting power's force - complex is that unlike the other forcesshapingthe libido, which Freud
how points of power emerge, what we might be, and what we can do. More describesasstandingin a relationof psychicaloppositionto unrestrained
importantly, and following Nietzsche, Deleuze makesan ethical distinction expenditureand which appearto be internally generated,the Oedipus
between active and reactive powers. An active power maximises its poten- complextakesthe form of an externalprohibition and presupposes the tri-
tial, pushes itself to its limit and affirms the life of which it is but one angularrelationbetweenthe child and its parents.The universalityof this
expression.A reactive power, by contrast, turns back upon itself. The usual complexis usedby Freud to explainthe agencyagainstincestthat setsup
concept of political power is reactive.We imagine - from the image of indi- the necessary division for civilisationbetweenwishesand the law Its uni-
viduals who exist together in a possible community - that we then need to versalityis alsoindicativeof the primacyof the family unit asan explana-
form some form of political relation or system (so power in this senseis tory categoryin psychoanalysis.
power between or among beings). But there can only be a polity or indi- The libidinal relationswithin the family havea crucialrole to play asthe
vidual beings ifthere has already been an active power that has crcirtcclsnch prototypcfor adult relations,in which an externalprohibitionorganises
a community or assemblagcof pcrsons;oncc wc rcaliscthis thcn wc nright rttcmptsirt instinctuals:rtisflaction. It is importirntto remember,however,
think of politics ts thc rccrcafion<lrrc:tctiv:rti<ln of' p<lwcr,n<ltirst hc rcclis- tlut lhcsclillidinrrltics rrrcnot clcpcnclcnt upon arrirctuirlnuclcurf'anrily
I lillr r t ion r lr nrrrn rrg trrrc o
rrll ' l )o w c t' . rrrrdllrrrsrrrr()ctlillrrscorrrlllcxt'rrrrbc lirrrttctlwilh it llitlct'ttitl
li;ltrrcot'
218 PSYCHOANAL YSIS
structureof authority,or, in the work of JacquesLacan, an institutional
force such as language,rather than an actualfather.Here, as in Freud's
writings on phylogenesis, the important themein the negotiationof libid-
inousrelationswithin the family is the credenceof the threatof the prohib-
ition placed on incestuous relations. The writings on the topic of
phylogenesisexamine a similar theme in the prohibitive force of the
'primal father' over the'primal horde'.
In Deleuze's writing on psychoanalysis,he attacks the use of the
model of the Oedipal family becausehe seesit as justifying a particular
conceptionof desire.In the Anti-Oed,ipu.s, for instance,he and Guattari
complainnot only aboutthe unhistoricalprojectionof the familial struc-
ture acrosscultures and history, so that some psychoanalystslocate the
figure of the 'primal father' in Neo- and Paleolithic times, but alsq that
the psychoanalyticuse of a familial structure containsdesire to sexual
relations within the family. These relations do not simply constitute
desirein relation to the shapingforce of an externalprohibition but also
mark out intellectual,political and cultural formationsassubstitutesthat
compensatefor the prohibition placed on desire by the incest taboo.
Against the 'daddy-mummy-me' formation of desire described in
Freud's case study of little Flans, or the explanation of Leonardo da
Vinci's curiosity in terms of his infantile memories, they propose a
defamilialisationof desire and consecratethose writers, such as D. H.
Lawrence, who write against the trap of familialism. In particular,
Deleuze and Guattari are critical of the interpretativelicencegiven to
psychoanalysisby its postulate of the familial organisationof desire:
through this postulate, psychoanalysisneither explains desire nor
renders cultural formations legible but, on their view, justifies the mis-
interpretation of desireas a libidinal force capturedwithin and shaped
by familial dynamics.
This critique of the psychoanalyticaccountof the family derivesits
force from Deleuzeand Guattari'sanalysisof the reterritorialisingfunc-
tion of capitalism in the two volumes of Capitalismand,Schizophrenia.
Capital operatesaccording to a logic of deterritorialisation in which the
flowsofcapital areno longerextractedfrom agricultural labour,but, rather
than being tied to the produceof the land, are transnationalor global.
Although capitaltendstowarda deterritorialisation of geographical, famil-
ial and sogialties,it defersthis limit by reiteratingartificialterritorialities.
In this contextpsychoanalysis, but particularlyits useof the family asan
explanatoryunit for desire,is criticisedasone of the paradigmaticmove-
mentsby which the family is reiteratedand the logic of deterritorialising
flowsis capturedby a function of reterritorialisation.
P S Y C H OA N A LY S IS 219
Freud, Sigmund ( I 856-1939)
Sigmund Freud wrote conventionalmedicalcasehistories;studiesin the
particularcategoriesof psychoanalyticresearch:the unconscious,narcis-
sism, dreamsand infantile sexuality;aswell asanalysesof cultural institu-
tions and practicessuch as art and religion. His postulate of a repressed
infantile sexualityat the core of the pathologiesof civilisedlife led to his
isolationfrom the medicalestablishment.This postulate,which formed
the basisfor the interpretativeposturetakenby psychoanalysis towardcul-
tural and therapeutic material, also underpinned its counter-cultural
status.Freud's approachto art and religion was,for instance,a radically
demystifying one, which held that religious belief was an infantile desire
for an irreproachablefather figure and that the products of high culture
were financed by, and legible as, displacedlibidinal drives. Deleuze,
however,is scepticalof the radical statusclaimed by Freudian psycho-
analysis.His criticismsof Freud relateto the way he insistson the Oedipal
orderingof desire,evendespitethe questionsraisedagainstit by clinical
evidenceand the researches of other psychoanalysts.
Nonetheless, important pointsof departurefor someof Deleuze'sideas
can be found in Freud's thought. In the two volumes of Capitalismand
Schizophrenia,Deleuze and Guattari try to marry Freud's conceptionof
libidinal flowswith Karl Marx's conceptionof capital.This project,which
refusesthe dualismbetweenpsychicand materialreality,involvesa recu-
perationof someof the elementsin Freudianthought. Hence they reject
the way desire'sproductivity is confinedto a psychicalreality,but in so
doing they developand radicalisethe Freudian insight that wrests desire
from pre-ordainedfunctions such asreproduction.
Asidefrom rejectingthe impotent,psychicalconfinementof desire,the
constantcomplaintof the authorsin this studyagainstFreud concernshis
willingnessto acceptEugeneBleuler'snegativeaccountof schizophrenics
asautisticfigureswho are cut off from reality.Even here,however,Freud
alsoprovidesan important point of departurefor their defenceof schizo-
phrenia.They argueagainstconfusing,asFreud does,the'clinical'schizo-
phrenic who is rendered ill and autistic with the connective practice of
desire,which fusesconventionallysegregatedstatesand producesassem-
blagesthat they believearemodelledin schizophrenia. In this project,they
follow the practicein someof Freud's writing in which literary and cul-
tural productionsbecomethe diagnosticsourceableto correctand develop
'clinical' terms. Hence,the evidenceof the schizopole of desireis found
in Antonin Artaud and Henry Miller, ratherthan the clinicalcontextthat
pathokrgiscs rncl rcndersimpotcntconnectivcdcsircs.
220 PSYCHOANAL YSIS R EAC TIVE 22r
This strategy,which formed the basisfor Deleuze'sunfinished'critique In Deleuze'sthought,heusesaspects of this psychoanalytic accountof the
and clinical' project, callsinto questionsomeof the central diagnosticcat- unconsciousto argueagainstboth the conceptionof desireasconfiguredin
egories of Freudian psychoanalysis.Freud's conception of 'sado- psychoanalysis in relationto a transcendent principleof'lack', andthe inter-
masochism'asa couplet,for instance,is refutedby Deleuze'sexamination pretativerelationto psychiclife that this relationlicenses.In Anti-Oedipus
of the writing of Leopold von Sacher-Masoch in which he showssadism the 'desiringmachine'is modelledon a conceptionof the unconscious,
and masochismto be completelydistinct, rather than inverseand comple- which is without the regulatingfunctionof a limit that containsit to an indi-
mentarydisorders. vidualsubject.The processes ascribedby Freud to the unconscious - that it
Finally,Deleuze'scriticalrelationto Freud canbe summarisedin terms operateswithoutconcedingto the demandsof socialacceptability dovetail -
of the Freudian drive to teleology.In his meta-psychologyand therapeutic with the features that Deleuze and Guattari ascribe to the desiring
practice,what was of interest to Freud was an accountof the 'origins' machines- thesemachinesform, for instance,conjunctivesynthesesthat
underpinningcurrent circumstances. For the psychoanalyst 'origins' play operateaccordingto an expansive senseof possibility.However,insteadof an
a role in two distinct senses:as an explanatorymodel that the analyst, impotent manifestationof unrealisablewishes, interpretable by psycho-
blockedfrom direct access,had to fathom - in this sensefinding the origin analysisin the form of their distorted manifestationin consciouslife, the
for the symptomsof neurosisalso has a curativefunction. But Freud's desiringmachinesaredefinedin termsof their capacityto forgelinks to an
mode of accessto theseorigins,the interpretativeframe he usedto locate outsideand thereforein terms of their capacityto surpassthe regulating
the eventsthat had becomepathogensin an individuals' life, ought not to force of a higher principle (such as the superego)or natural limit.
obscurethe fact that the interpretative force he gaveto theseoriginating Reinterpretedin theseterms,the unconscious is not an interior localeonly
eventscameto be usedasa predictorfor developmentand a theory,there- ableto be interpretedin its impotent and distortedformations,but is the
fore,of the differentcoursesit waspossiblefor psychiclife to follow.It is logicaccordingto which anarchicconnectionsareassembled or made.
this teleological orientation and its installation of a dualism between Although desiring machines give a positiveaccount of the psychoanalytic
'nature' and 'civilisation'that Deleuzerejectsand that underpinshis crit- categoryof the unconscious, the term 'unconscious'is not directly trans-
ical reworkingof key Freudianideas. posableto that of the 'desiringmachine',or the term 'assemblage' usedin
A ThousandPlateaus.This is becausethe unconsciousdesignateswhat gets
IJnconscious left overin the process of the constructionor shift from onemachine/assem-
blageto another.In suchuses,however,the unconscious is not reconcilable
The'unconscious'inpsychoanalytic terminologyrefersto the accretionof to the Freudianconceptionof a registerof submergedaffects,but refersto
instinctual drives that are repressedby the individual in the processof prior, fractal,materialcomponentsof desiringmachines/assemblages.
adaptationto social demands.Nonetheless,these drives remain active
forceson the psycheandbehaviourof individuals.Dreams,parapraxisand
somatic displacementsof instincts in casesof hysteria provide Freud Connectives
with the proof of the unconscious not as a sealedoff locality, but as Desire
processes and lawsbelongingto a system.In Freud'sfirst topographyof Lacan
the psychical apparatus(unconscious,pre-conscious,conscious),the PartialObjects
unconsciousdesignatesthosecontentsbanishedby repressionfrom the Schizoanalysis
pre-conscious--conscious system. In his second,dynamic conception of
the psyche(id, ego, superego)the unconsciousis replacedby the id or
instinctualpoleof the psyche.Here instinctshavethe statusof agenciesin
the psychicalapparatus.In both cases,the dynamicrole of the unconscious
or instincts takes psychoanalysis away from a descriptive,phenomeno-
logicalapproachto the 'facts'of psychiclife, and designatesthe activerole
of the analyst in the interpretation of the work of systematisation
pcrftrrmcdby thc unconscious. REA(;'tIVli - rcf'crto thc cntrv on 'itctivc/rcilctivc'.
222 REAL
REAL
James Williams
Deleuzesubyertsthe concept'real' throughhis distinctiondrawnbetween
the 'actual'andthe'virtual'. For him, the actualis morelike what we would
ordinarilyunderstandasthe real,that is, a realmof thingsthat existinde-
pendently of our ways of thinking about them and perceivingthem.
Whereasthe virtual is the realmof transcendental conditionsfor the actual,
that is, thingsthat we haveto presuppose for thereto be actualthingsat all.
More seriously,with respectto any discussionof his work in terms of
realism,Deleuzedeniesany priority accordedto human subjects,to their
minds, ideas,perceptualapparatuses or linguistic capacities.If we trad-
itionally frame the oppositionbetweenreal and unreal through the dis-
tinction drawn betweena thing that is dependenton us (the chair I dream
of, or imagine)and an independenrexistenr(the real chair),then we shall
havestartedwith a conceptualframework that doesnot fit Deleuze'sphil-
osophywell at all.
Rather, Deleuze provides us with critical angles against traditional
realismand a new metaphysicalframework for developinga conceptof the
real. Accordingto this conceprthe real is the virtual and the actual.It is
hencebetterto think of realthingsin termsmoreof completethingsrather
than independentones.Note that this commits Deleuze to degreesof
realityand unrealityor illusion.We shouldnot sayrealor unreal,bur more
or lessreal,meaninga more or lesscompleteexpressionof the thing.
It is questionablewhetherwe can saythat a thing is completelyreal,in
Deleuze'swork, other than the metaphysicalstatementthat the real is all
of the actualand of the virtual. Wheneverwe givean expressionof a thing
it will be under an individual form of expressionthat allowsfor further
completion.More importantly,that completionwill involve a synthetic
alterationof the componentsof any earlierreality,to the point whereno
componentcanbe claimedto be finally realor complete.
For example,for Deleuze,a mountainexistsasrealwith all the waysit has
beenpainted,sensed,written aboutand walkedover.It alsoexistswith all the
virtual conditionsfor them, such asideasand different intensitiesof sensa-
tions. The real mountain changescompletelywhen it is paintedand sensed
anew:whenits namechanges,whenit is mined,or movedthroughdifferently.
This meansthat traditionalformsof realismarecomplerelyat oddswith
Deleuze'sphilosophy,sincethe notion that the realstandsin oppositionto
somethingunrealor imaginaryalreadysetsthe real as somethingincom-
plete.So to speakof thc realchairasif it couldbe identifiedinclcpcndcntly
of onr idcrslbout'it is rr mistarkc conccrningthc significirncc of'things,
R EPETITION 223
Reality goeshand in hand with ideal and emotional effects,rather than
being free of them.
Does this mean that Deleuze is an idealist, denying the existenceof an
independentexternal reality and bringing all things into the mind?
Deleuze'sphilosophyis beyondthe idealistand realistdistinction.There
are actualthings and we should pay attention to them. Without them it
doesnot makesenseto speakof virtual ideasor intensities.But, recipro-
cally,it makesno senseto speakof real or actualthings asif they could be
abstractedfrom the idealand emotionalfieldsthat makethem live for us.
Connectives
Actuality
Virtual/Virtuality
REICH, WILHELM (1897-1957)- referto the entry on 'schizoanalysis'.
REPETITION
Ad,rian Parr
The conceptof 'repetition',asit appearsin the Deleuziancorpus,encom-
passesa variety of other conceptssuch as 'difference','differentiation',
'deterritorialisation',and 'becoming'.To begin with, it should be noted
that for Deleuze,repetitionis not a matterof the samething occurringover
and over again. That is to say,repetition is connectedto the power of
differencein terms of a productiveprocessthat producesvariationin and
through every repetition. In this way, repetition is best understoodin
terms of discoveryand experimentation;it allowsnew experiences, affects
and expressionsto emerge.To repeatis to begin again;to affirm the power
of the new and the unforeseeable. In so far as life itself is describedas a
dynamic and active force of repetition producing difference,the force of
which Deleuze encouragesus to think of in terms of 'becoming', forces
incorporate differenceas they repeatgiving rise to mutation.
The first question that arises is: How is repetition produced?For
Deleuze, repetition is produced via difference, not mimesis. It is a
processof ungrounding that resiststurning into an inert systemof repli-
cation.In fact,thc wholePlatonistideaof rcpcatingin ordcr to producc
copicsis complctcly unclcrmincclby l)clcuzc. lior l)clcuzc maintirins
22+ REPETI TI O N
this approachis deeplyflawedbecauseit subsumesthe creativenature of
differenceunder an immobile systemof resemblance.Deleuze refusesto
seekan originary point out of which repetition can cyclically reproduce
itself. He insists that the processdoes not depend upon a subject or
object that repeats, rather it is self-sustainable.Whilst repetition is
potentially infinite, consistingof new beginnings,it is crucial we do not
mistake this to be a linear sequence:the end of one cycle marking the
beginningof the next.
In his innovativediscussionsof Friedrich Nietzsche'sconceptof the
eternalreturn, Deleuzeturns his backon a teleologicalunderstandingof
repetition condemning such interpretations to be flawed. Instead, he
insiststhat the processNietzscheoutlines is considerablymore compli-
cated than that: the return is an activeaffirmation that intensifiesas it
returns. Put differently, heterogeneityarisesout of intensity. In addition,
the return pointsto a wholethat emergesthroughdifferenceand variation:
one and the multiple in combination.In his readingof Nietzsche,Deleuze
explainsin his 1968work Dffirenceand,Repetitionthatthis is the'power of
beginningand beginningagain'(D 1994:136).
This now leadsus on to the secondquestion:What is repeated? First, it
is important to notethat repetitionis not unidirectional,thereis no object
of repetition,no final goaltowardwhich everythingthat repeatscanbe said
to direct itself. What repeats,then, is not models,stylesor identitiesbut
the full force of differencein and of itself, thosepre-individualsingular-
ities that radicallymaximisedifferenceon a plane of immanence.In an
earlyessayfrom 1956on Henri Bergson,Deleuzeinsistsrepetitionis more
a matterof coexistence than succession, which is to say,repetitionis virtual
more than it is actual.It is this innovativeunderstandingof the processof
difference and differentiation that mutates the context through which
repetitionoccurs.
Thus, in a very real sense,repetitionis a creativeactivityof transforma-
tion. When Deleuzespeaksof the 'new' that repetition invokes,he is like-
wise pointing to creativity, whereby habit and convention are both
destabilised. The'new', for Deleuze,is filled with innovationand actually
preventsthe trap of routines and clich6s; the latter characterisehabitual
waysof living. As a power of the new,repetition callsforth a terr&incognita
filled with a senseof noveltyandunfamiliarity.For instance,this is a far cry
from Sigrqund Freud who posited that we compulsivelyrepeat the past,
whereall the materialof our repressedunconsciouspushesus to reiterate
the pastin all its discomfortand pain.Actually,psychoanalysis limits repe-
tition to representation,and what therapyaims to do is stop the process
entirelyalongwith the disordersit givesriseto. Deleuze,on the othcr hirnd,
cncourirgcs us to rcpcirthccausc hc sccsin it thc possibilityof rcinvcntion,
R EPETITION + C IN EM A 225
that is to say,repetitiondissolvesidentitiesasit changesthem, giving rise
to somethingunrecognisableand productive. It is for this reasonthat he
maintainsrepetitionis a positivepower(puissance) of transformation.
Connectives
Active/Reactive
Becoming
Difference
Eternalreturn
Psychoanalysis
REPETITION + CINEMA
Constantine Vereois
Deleuze'sbookson cinema- CinemaI: Themooement-image and Cinema
2: Thetime-imoge- are about the possibility of 'repeating' a film (or films)
within the institution of cinemastudies.As in RolandBarthes'accountof
re-reading, this repetition would not be the re-presentation of identity
(a re-discoveryof the same),but the re-production- the creationand the
exhibition- of the differencethat lies at the heart of repetition (B 1974).
For film studies,Deleuze'sCinemabookscanbe seenasan attempt to nego-
tiate the tension between(film) theory and history via a non-totalising
conceptofdifference,one which canattendto the heterogeneity - the local
and specificrepetitions- of historicalmaterial.
In Dffirence and,Repetition, Delettze puts forward two alternative
theoriesof repetition. The first, a 'Platonic' theory of repetition, posits
a world of difference based upon some pre-established similitude or
identity; it definesa world of copies (representations).The second,a
'Nietzschean'theory of repetition suggeststhat similitude and identity
is the product of some fundamental disparity or difference; it defines
a world of simulacra(phantasms).Taking theseformulations as distinct
interpretationsof the world, Deleuze describessimulacraas intensive
systems constituted by the placing together of disparate elements.
Within these differential series,a third virtual object (dark precursor,
eternal return, abstract machine) plays the role of differenciator,the
in-itself of difference which relates different to different, and allows
divergcntscricsto rcturn asdivcrsityand its rc-production.As systcms
thrrtincluclcwithin thcnrsclvcsthis diff'crcntialpoint of vicw,sinrultcrit
226 R EP ET T T T o N * c l Nrtre
evadethe limit of representation(the model of recognition)to effectthe
intensity of an encounter with difference and its repetition, a pure
becoming-in-the-world.
The idea of the intensivesystem,and its frustration of any attempt to
establishan order of succession, a hierarchyof identity and resemblance
betweenoriginaland copy is nowheremoreevidentthan in the serialrepe-
tition of new Hollywood cinema,especiallythe film remake.The majority
of critical accountsof cinematic remaking understand it as a one-way
process:a movementfrom authenticityto imitation,from the superiorself-
identity of the original to the debasedresemblance of the remake.For
instance,much of the discussionaroundthe 1998releaseof Gus Van Sant's
closeremake('replica') of Alfred Hitchcock'sPsycho(1960)wasan expres-
sion of outrage and confusion at the defilementof a revered classic.
Reviewers and 'Hitchcockians'agreed that VanSantmadetwo fundamental
mistakes:the first, to haveundertakento remakea landmark of cinematic
history; and the second,to have followed the Hitchcock original (almost)
shotby shot,line by line.Evenfor thosewho notedthat the rpmakediffered
in its detail from the Hitchcockfilm, the revisionsaddednothing to what
remainedan intact and undeniableclassic,a semanticfixity (identity) against
which the new versionwasevaluatedand dismissedasa degradedcopy.
Rather than follow theseessentialisttrajectories,Deleuze'saccountof
repetitionsuggeststhat cinematicremakingin its most generalapplication
might - more productively- be regardedasa specificaspectof a broader
and more open-endedintertextuality. A modern classic,Psychohas been
retrospectivelycodedas the forerunnerto a cycleof slashermoviesiniti-
atedby Hallopeen(1978)andcelebratedin the sequelsand seriesthat fol-
lowed.More particularly,the 1970sinterestin the slashermovie sub-genre
sawthe characterof Norman Batesrevivedfor a number of Psychosequels
QI-I\, and the Hitchcock original quoted in a host of homages, notably
the films of Brian De Palma.Eachof theserepetitionscan be understood
as a limited form of remaking,suggestingthat the precursor text is never
singular, and that Van Sant's Psychoremake differs textually from these
other examplesnot in bind,,but only in degree.
While the aboveapproachestablishesa largecircuit betweenPsycho-60
andPsycho-98,there is anotherposition: namely,that Van Sant'sPsychois
not close enough to the Hitchcock version.This suggestion- that an
irreduciblgdifferenceplayssimultaneously betweenthe mostmechanicalof
repetitions- is bestdemonstratedby an earlierremakeof Psycho,Douglas
Gordon's24 Hour Psycho(1993).So namedbecauseit takestwenty-four
hoursto run its course,Gordon'sversionis a videoinstallationthat re-runs
Ps.ycho-60ntapproximately two framesper second,just fastenoughfor cach
imagcto bc pullcclforwardinto thc ncxt. Gordon'sstrltcgy clcmonstratcs
R EPR ESEN TATION 227
that eachand every film is remade- dispersedand transformed- in its
every new context or configuration.Gordon doesnot set out to imitate
Psychobut to repeatit - to changenothing, but at the sametime allow an
absolutedifferenceto emerge.Understood in this way,Psycho-98is not a
perversionof an original identity,but the productionof a new event,one
that addsto (ratherthan corrupts)the serialityof the former version.
REPRESENTATION
lohn Marks
'Representation',for Deleuze, entails an essentiallymoral view of the
world, explicitly or implicitly drawingon what'everybodyknows',and he
conceivesofphilosophy asan antidoteto this view.Representation cannot
help us to encounterthe world asit appearsin the flow of time andbecom-
ing. It constitutesa particularly restrictedform of thinking and acting,
working accordingto fixed norms, and which is unableto acknowledge
difference 'in itself'. ln Dffirence and RepetitionDeleuze challengesthe
representational conceptionof philosophy.Here, he contraststhe 'poet' to
the 'politician'.The poet speaksin the nameof a creativepower,and seeks
to affirm differenceas a stateof permanentrevolution:he is willing to be
destructive in the searchfor the 'new'. The new, in this sense,remains
forever new, since it has the power of beginning anew every time. It
enablesforcesin thought which are not the forcesof recognition,but the
powersof an unrecognisable terra incognita.The politician, on the other
hand, seeksto deny that which differs in order to establishor maintain
a particularhistoricalorder.In philosophicalterms, Deleuzeproposesto
'overturn'Platonism,which distinguishesbetweenthe original- the thing
that most resemblesitself, characterised by exemplaryself-identity- and
the copy,which is alwaysdeficient in relation to the original. Platonism is
incapableof thinking differencein itself,preferringto conceiveof it in rela-
tion to'the thing itself'. In order to go beyondrepresentation,it is neces-
sary,therefore,to underminethe primacyof the originaloverthe copyand
to promote the simulacrum, the copy for which there is no original.
A key influenceon Deleuzeas far as the anti-representational orienta-
tion of his thought is concerned,is Friedrich Nietzsche.Nietzsche's
speculationson metaphorshowthat thereis no 'truth' behindthe maskof
appearances, but rather only more masks,more metaphors.Deleuzeele-
vatesthis insight into somethinglike a generalmetaphysicalprinciple.For
him, thc world is composecl of simulircra:it is a 'swarm'<lfirppcirranccs.
l)clcuzc'slicrgsonism,which cnrphirsiscs ir rirclicalirnrrlysis
of'linrc, is iur
228 REPRESENTATI O N
R E P R E S S ION 229

art asa wayof challengingthe interpretativetendencyof representation

to
important elementof his challengeto representation.In his books on
tracebecomingsbackto origins.
cinem" in particular,Deleuzedraws on Henri Bergson'svery particular
materialismin order to claim that life is composedof images.Rather than
human consciousness illuminating the world like a searchlight,it is the case Connectives
that the world is 'luminous' in itself. Bergson'scritique of the problemat-
Affect
ics of perceptionand action, and matter and thought, springsfrom the
Art
claim that we tend to think in terms of spacerather than time. This ten-
Becoming
dency immobilisesintuition, and to counter this Bergson conceivesof
Difference
materialityin terms of imagesthat transmitmovement.This hasimport-
Sensation
ant consequencesfor perception, which can no longer be conceivedof as
knowledgethat is rootedin consciousness. All life perceivesand is neces-
sarilyopen to the 'outside'and distinctionsbetweenautomatismand vol-
urrr"ry u"t, ,r. only differencesof degree,rather than differencesin kind. REPRESSION
This alternative,non-psychologicalmetaphysics,accordingto which the
world is 'luminous in itself', rather than being illuminatedby a beamof Claire Colebrooh
consciousness.is at the heart of Deleuze's non-representationalproiect,
On the one hand,Deleuzemight appearto be a philosophersetagainstthe
and is exploredat length in his books on cinema.Following Bergson's
dominantimageof repression,that being repressionin its everydaysense
materialisi ontology,accordingto which our body is merely an image
and in its technicalpsychoanalyticsense.At its most generalthe concept
among images,Deleuze opens the self to the outside, the pure form of
of 'repression'would seemto imply a natural self or subjectwho precedes
time. The self comes into contact with a virtual, non-psychological
the operationof power of socialisation(so that all we would haveto do is
memory,a domain of diversity,dffirence, and with potentiallyanarchic
lift the stricturesof repressionto arriveat who we reallyare).The concept
associations, that ieopardisethe senseselfhood'
of repressionseems,then, to be associatedwith the ideaof a pre-socialself
Such forms of anti-representationalthought arethreateningand poten-
who must then undergosocialisationor structuration.Deleuzewants to
tially disorientaring.As Bergsonargues,human beingschooseon the basis
avoid this naivety, and so to a certain extent he acceptsthe productive
of what is the most useful. As such they tend to spa'tialisethe fluidity of
nature of repressionas it was put forward by Sigmund Freud and then
duration, reducingit to a staticand impersonalpublic form. we separate
JacquesLacan.It is only becauseof our existencewithin a symbolicorder,
duration into dissociatedelementsand reconfiguretheseelementsin a
or perceivedsystem,that we imaginethat theremust havebeena real .me'
homogeneousspatial form organisedaround the conventionsof 'public' prior to the net of repression.For psychoanalysis, then, it is not the self
language that conveys widely recognised notions' We like 'simple
who is repressed,for the self - the fantasyof that which exists before
thoughts" Bergsonremarks,and we prefer to rely on customand habit,
speech,relationsand sociality- is an effect of the idea of repression.
replacingdiversitywith simplicity,foregoingthe noveltyof new situations.
This Repressionis primary and producesits own' before'.Deleuzeacceptsthis
In-short, we prefer the comfortsand conventionsof representation.
such an Lacanirn/Freudian picture up ro a point. with Guattari he arguesthat
helps to explain why art - literature, painting and cinema- plays
thereareOedipalstructuresof repression.Living in a modern age,we are
important patt itt Deleuze'swork. For Deleuze,art is not a way of repre-
indeedsubmittedto a systemof signification.we then imaginethat there
ser,ting experiencesand memoriesthat we might 'recognise':it doesnot
must have been a moment of plenitude and,jouissanceprior to Oedipal
showus what the world ri, but rather imaginesa possibleworld. Similarly,
repression,and that we must thereforehavedesiredthe maternalincest
art is concernedwith 'sensation',with creating 'sensibleaggregates', prohibited by the structures of the family. But Deleuze and Guattari
rather than making the world intelligible and recognisable.In order to chal-
regardrepression- or the internalisationof subjection- asa modernphe-
lenge representationalviews of art, Deleuze talks of 'affects'and 'per-
nomenonthat nevcrtheless drawsupon archaicstructuresand imagcs.
cepts'.These are artistic forcesthat havebeenfreed from the organising
Instcad'thcy givcus Dclcuzc ancl Gurttirri's mnin rttack on whirt Michcl I,bucault (in
rcprcscntational framcwgrkof pcrceivingindividuals.
In this way,I)clcuzcsccs T'hc Ilistor.,yol' ,\t.t'uulit.y: l4tlumt Olr,) rcf'crrcd to rrs .tlrc rcPrcssivc
..."*, to I prc-indiiidualworlclof singularitics'
230 REPRESSION
hypothesis'occurs in Anti-Oedipzs.WhereasFreud's Oedipus complex
seeksto explainwhy and how we arerepressed- how it is that we submit
to law and renounceour enjoyment- Deleuze and Guattari arguethat we
sufferfrom the ideaof repressionitself, the ideathat thereis someultim-
ate object that we haveabandoned.Psychoanalysis supposedlyexplains
our repressionby arguing that we all desired our mothers but had to
abandonincestfor the sakeof socialand cultural development.Deleuze
and Guattari arguethat this repressiveidea of renunciationand submis-
sion is a historical and political development.Desire, they insist, is not
the desirefor someforbidden object, a desirethat we must necessarily
repress.Rather,all life is positive desire- expansion,connection,cre-
ation. It is not that we must repressour desirefor incest.Rather,the idea
of incest- that we are inevitablyfamilial and desireonly the impossible
maternalobject- is itself repressive.What it repressesis not a personal
desire,but the impersonality of desire or the intense germinal influx.
To imagine ourselvesas rational individuals, engagedin negotiation
and the managementof our drives- this idea of ourselvesas bourgeois,
selfgoverning, commonsensicalagents - represses the desire for
non-familial, impersonal,chaoticand singularconfigurationsof life. We
arerepressed,then, not by a socialorder that prohibits the natural desire
for incest,but by the imagethat our desires'naturally' take the form of
Oedipal and familial images.
The latemodernunderstandingof the selfor subjectasnecessarily sub-
jectedto law is the outcomeof a history of politicaldevelopmentthat has
coveredover the originally expansive,excessiveand constructive move-
ments of desire.A number of philosophicalmovements,including psy-
choanalysis,have explainedlife from the point of view of the already
repressedsubject,the bourgeoisindividual who hassubmittedhis desires
to the systemof the polity and the market. Against this, Deleuze and
Guattari aim to revealthe positivedesirebehindrepression.In the caseof,
Oedipal repression,it is the desire of the father - the desireof white,
modern, bourgeoisman - that lies at the heartof the ideaof all selvesas
necessarily subjectedto repressivepower.
Connectives
Desire
Foucault
Freud
Oedipalisation
Psychoanalysis
Woman
R H IZOME 231
RETERRITORIALISATION - referto the entry on'deterritorialsa-
tion./reterritorialisation'.
RHIZOME
Felicity J. Colman
'Rhizome'describes the connectionsthat occurbetweenthe mostdisparate
and the most similar of objects,placesand people;the strangechainsof
eventsthat link people:the feelingof'six degreesof separation',the sense
of 'having been here before' and assemblages of bodies.Deleuze and
Guattari'sconceptof the 'rhizome' drawsfrom its etymologicalmeaning,
where 'rhizo'means combining form and the biologicalterm 'rhizome'
describesa form of plant that can extenditself through its underground
horizontaltuber-likeroot systemand developnew plants.In Deleuzeand
Guattari'suseof the term, the rhizomeis a conceptthat 'maps' a process
of networked,relational and transversalthought, and a way of being
without'tracing' the constructionof that map asa fixed entity (D&G 1987:
12). Ordered lineagesof bodiesand ideasthat trace their originary and
individual basesare consideredasforms of 'aborescentthought', and this
metaphorof a tree-likestructurethat ordersepistemologies and forms his-
torical frames and homogeneousschemata,is invoked by Deleuze and
Guattari to describeeverythingthat rhizomaticthought is not.
In addition,Deleuzeand Guattari describethe rhizomeasan actionof
many abstractentities in the world, including music, mathematics,eco-
nomics,politics, science,art, the ecologyand the cosmos.The rhizome
conceives how everything andeverybody- all aspectsofconcrete,abstract
and virtual entities and activities - can be seenas multiple in their inter-
relationalmovementswith other things and bodies.The nature of the
rhizomeis that of a moving matrix, composedof organicand non-organic
partsforming symbioticand aparallelconnections,accordingto transitory
and as yet undeterminedroutes(D & G 1987:10).Such a reconceptual-
isationconstitutesa revolutionaryphilosophyfor the reassessment of any
form of hierarchicalthought, history or activity.
In a world that builds structuresfrom economiccircuits of difference
and desire, Deleuze responds by reconsideringhow bodies are con-
structed.He and Guattari arguethat such structuresconstraincreativity
and position things and people into regulatory orders. In A Thousand
Plateaus,Deleuzeand Guattari stagedthe entire book as a seriesof net-
workcd rhizomatic'plateaus'that operateto counter historicaland phil-
osophicol positionspitchccltowardthc systcmof rcprcscntntion thatIix thc
232 RHI ZO M E
flow of thought. Instead,through a virtuoso demonstrationof the rela-
tional energiesable to be configured through often disparate forms and
systemsof knowledge,they offer the reader an open systemof thought.
Rhizomaticformations can serveto overcome,overturn and transform
structuresof rigid, fixed or binary thought and judgement- the rhizome
is 'anti-genealogy'(D&G 1987:ll). A rhizomecontriburesro rhe forma-
tion of a plateauthroughits linesof becoming,which form aggregatecon-
nections.There are no singular positions on the networkedlines of a
rhizome,only connectedpoints which form connectionsbetweenthings.
A rhizomaticplateauof thought, Deleuzeand Guattari suggest,may be
reachedthrough the considerationof the potentialof multiple and rela-
tional ideasandbodies.The rhizomeis anynetworkof thingsbroughtinto
contact with one another,functioning as an assemblagemachine for new
affects,new concepts,new bodies,new thoughts;the rhizomaticnetwork
is a mapping of the forcesthat move and,/or immobilise bodies.
Deleuzeand Guattari insist bodiesand things ceaselessly takeon new
dimensions through their contact with different and divergent entities
over time; in this way the conceptof the 'rhizome' marksa divergentway
of conceptualising the world that is indicativeof Deleuzianphilosophyas
a whole. Rather than reality being thought of and wrimen as an ordered
seriesof structuralwholes,wheresemioticconnectionsor taxonomiescan
be compiled from complete root to tree-like structure, the story of the
world and its components,Deleuzeand Guattari propose,can be com-
municated through the rhizomatic operations of things - mevements,
intensitiesand polymorphousformations.In opposition to descendent
evolutionary modelsof classification,rhizomeshaveno hierarchicalorder
to their compoundingnetworks.Instead,Deleuzianrhizomaticthinking
functions as an open-ended productive configuration, where random
associationsand connectionspropel, sidetrack and abstract relations
between components.Any part within a rhizome may be connected to
anotherpart, forming a milieu that is decentred,with no distinctiveend
or entry point.
Deleuze'sapparatusfor describingaffectivechangeis the 'rhizome'.
Deleuze viewed every operation in the world asthe affectiveexchangeof
rhizomatically-produced intensities that create bodies: systems,
economies,machinesand thoughts. Each and every body is propelled
and perpetuated by innumerable levels of the affective forces of desire
and its resonatingmaterialisations.Variationsto any given systemcan
occur becauseof interventionswithin cyclical,systematicrepetition. As
the rhizome may be constitutedwith an existingbody - including exist-
ing thoughts one might bring to bear upon anotherbody - the rhizome
is nccessarilysubject to thc principlcs of divcrsity and cliffercncc
R H IZOME 233
through repetition, which Deleuzediscussedin his booksNietzscheand.
Philosophyand Dffirence and,Repetition.
Deleuze acknowledgesFriedrich Nietzsche'sconcept of the eternal
return as the constitution of things through repeatedelements(existing
bodies,modesof thought)that form a'synthesis'ofdifferencethrough the
repetition of elements(D 1983: 46). 'Synthesis' is also describedby
Deleuzeand Guattari as an assemblage of variablerelationsproducedby
the movement,surfaces,elusionsand relations of rhizomes that form
bodies (desiring machines) through composite chains of previously
unattachedlinks (D&G 1983:39, 327).As a non-homogeneous sequence,
then, the rhizome describesa seriesthat may be composedof causal,
chance,and/or randomlinks.Rhizomaticconnectionsbetweenbodiesand
forcesproducean affectiveenergyor entropy.As Deleuzedescribesin his
work on David Hume, the interaction of a socially,politically, or culturally
determinedforceand any givenbody both producesand usesassociations
of ideas(D l99l: ix, 103).The discontinuouschain is the medium for the
rhizome'sexpandingnetwork,just asit is alsothe contextualcircumstance
for the chain'sproduction.
Rhizomaticwriting, being,andlor becomingis not simply a processthat
assimilatesthings, rather it is a milieu of perpetualtransformation.The
relationalmilieu that the rhizome createsgivesform to evolutionaryenvir-
onmentswhererelationsalter the courseof how flowsand collectivedesire
develop.There is no stabilising function produced by the rhizomatic
medium;thereis no creationof a wholeout of virtual and dispersedparts.
Rather,through the rhizome,points form assemblages, multiple journey
systemsassociate into possiblydisconnectedor brokentopologies;in turn,
suchassemblages and typologieschange,divide,and multiply throughdis-
parateand complexencountersand gestures.The rhizome is a powerful
way of thinking without recourseto analogyor binary constructions.To
think in termsof the rhizomeis to revealthe multiple waysthat you might
approachany thought, activity,or a concept- what you alwaysbring with
you are the many and various ways of entering any body, of assembling
thought and actionthrough the world.
Connectives
Affect
Becoming
Desire
Hume
Intensity
Lincs of Flight
234 RHI ZO M E + TECHNOL O G Y
RHIZOME + TECHNOLOGY
VerenaConley
The'rhizome' replacesan arborescent structurethat hasbeendominating
the west and the world for centuries.The rhizome carriesimagesof the
natural world, of pliable grasses,of weightlessness, and of landscapesof
the east. It is horizontal and flat, bearing what the mathematicianin
Deleuzecalls'n-l dimensions'.It is alwaysa multiplicity; it hasno geneal-
ogy; it could be takenfrom different contexts(including Freudian psycho-
analysis);and is neither genesisnor childhood.The rhizome doesaway
with hierarchies.It augmentsits valencesthroughhybrid connectionsthat
consistby virtue of addition, of one thing 'and' another.The rhizome
operatesin a spacewithout boundariesand defiesestablishedcategories
suchasbinariesor pointsthat would mark-offand be usedto fix positions
in extensivespace.It ceaselesslyconnectsand reconnectsoverfissuresand
gaps,deterritorialisingand reterritorialisingitself at once.It workstoward
abstractmachinesand produceslinesof flight.
The rhizome doesnot imitate or represent,rather it connectsthrough
the middle and inventshybrids with virusesthat becomepart of the cells
that scramblethe dominant lines of genealogicaltrees. The'rhizome
createsa web or a network; through capture of code, it increasesits
valencesand is alwaysin a stateof becoming.It createsand recreatesthe
world through connections.A rhizome has no structure or centre, no
graph or regulation.Models are both in constructionand collapse.In a
rhizome, movement is more intensive than extensive. Unlike graphic
arts, the rhizome makes a map and not a tracing of lines (that would
belongto a representationof an obiect).It is a war machine:rhizomatic
or nomadic writing operatesas a mobile war machinethat movesat top
speed to form lines, making alliancesthat form a temporary plateau.
The rhizome is in a constantprocessof making active,but alwaystem-
porary,selections.The selectionscan be goodor bad. Good or bad ideas,
stat'esDeleuzein consortwith Gregory Bateson,can leadto good or bad
connections.
The proximity of the rhizometo digital technologyand the computeris
evident.The connectionwith Donna Haraway'scyborg has often been
made.YetDeleuzeandGuattarido not write muchaboutcomputers.They
derive someof their ideason rhizomesfrom Bateson'sS/epsto an Ecolog.y
of Mind,. They connect with the anthropologist'spronouncementsin
which biology and information theory are conjoined.Batesonarguesthat
a person is not limited to her or his visible body.Of importanceis the
pcrson'sbrainthattransmitsinfurmationasdiscrctediffcrcnces. The brain
sAUssuRE, FERDI NAND DE ( r 852- r gr 3) 235
fires electronsthat move along circuits. Through the transmissionof
differences,the person connects and reconnectswith other humans,
animalsand the world.
Deleuze and Guattari see the potential in Bateson'swork for rhi-
zomatic thinking. The nervous system is said to be a rhizome, web or
network. The terminology is the sameas for computersthough it does
not pertain to them exclusively.Clearly, computers do offer possibilities.
Not only the brain, but humans and the world consist of circuits in
which differencesare transmitted along pathways. Through computer-
assistedsubjectivity,humans can increasetheir valences.Deleuze and
Guattari write about a 'becoming-radio' or 'becoming-television'that
can yield good or bad connections;productive or nefariousbecomings.
Computers and the internet have great potential as rhizomatic war
machines.The way they are being capturedby capitalism,that deploys
order-words, consumer codes, and their multifarious redundancies
makesthem too often becomeendsin and for themselves,in a sphereof
what Deleuze calls a generalised'techno-narcissism'.The scienceof
technologytakesover with its order-words.Yet, in Deleuze'spractical
utopia, iust as every major languageis worked through by minor lan-
guages,so the capitalist war machine is always being threatenedby
mobile nomadic war machinesthat use technolosiesto form new rhi-
zomesand open up to becoming.
SACHER-MASOCH, LEOPOLD VON (1835-95)- refer to the
entrieson tart', 'Lacantand tpsychoanalysis'.
SARTRE, JEAN PAUL (1905-80)- refer to the entrieson 'Guattari',
'phenomenology'and'phenomenology* Husserl'.
SAUSSURE, FERDINAND DE (18.57-1913) - referto theentrieson
'scmiotics'rrncl'significr,
significcl'.
236 s c H rz o A N A L YS Ts
SCHIZOANALYSIS
EugeneHolland,
Schizoanalysisis the revolutionary 'materialist psychiatry' derived pri-
marily from the critiqueof psychoanalysis. As the concept'schizoanalysis'
indicates,SigmundFreud'stheoryof the Oedipuscomplexis the principle
object of critique: schizoanalysis, drawing substantiallyon Karl Marx,
transformspsychoanalysis so asto includethe full scopeof socialand his-
torical factorsin its explanationsof cognitionand behaviour.Yet psycho-
analysisis not rejectedwholesale:schizoanalysis alsodrawssubstantially
on Freud and especiallyon JacquesLacan to transform historical materi-
alism so as to include the full scopeof libidinal and semiotic factors in its
explanationsof social structure and development.Ultimately, though
perhapsleast obviously,both structuralistpsychoanalysis and historical
materialismaretransformedby Friedrich Nietzsche'scritique of nihilism
and asceticismand his transvaluationof difference,which inform both the
libidinal and the socialeconomiesmappedby schizoanalysis. Ultimately,
universalhistory for schizoanalysisoffers the hope and the chancethat the
developmentof productive forcesbeyond capitalismand the expansionof
Will to Powerbeyond nihilism will lead to greaterfreedomrather than
enduringservitude.
The basic question posed by schizoanalysis(following Baruch
Spinozaand Wilhelm Reich)is: Why do peoplefight for their own servi-
tude asstubbornly asif it weretheir salvation?The answeris that people
have been trained since birth in asceticismby the Oedipus complex,
which relayssocialoppressioninto the heart of the nuclear family. Social
oppressionand psychicrepression,thus, arefor schizoanalysis two sides
of the same coin, except that schizoanalysisreversesthe direction of
causality,making psychic repressiondepend on socialoppression.It is
not the child who is father to the man, asthe psychoanalyticsayinggoes,
rather it is the bosswho is father to the man, who is in turn father to the
child: the nuclearfamily imprints capitalistsocialrelationson the infant
psyche. Just as capital denies (through primitive accumulation) direct
accessto the means of production and the means of life, and mediates
betweenthe worker, work, consumergoodsand eventualretirement,so
the father denies(through the threat of castrationenforcing the incest
taboo) direct accessto the mother (the means of life), and mediates
betweenthe child, other family members and eventualmarriage with
a mother-substitute.By denyin"gthe child all the peopleclosestto her,
the nuclcar family programmespeople from birth for asceticismancl
sclf'-clcnirrl.
S C H IZOP H R E N IA 237
The critique of Oedipusis mounted on two fronts. Internally, schizo-
analysis models the psyche on schizophreniarather than neurosis,
thereby revealingthe immanent operationsof the unconsciousat work
beneaththe levelof representation.The Oedipuscomplexis shownto be
a systematic betrayal of unconscious processes,an illegitimate meta-
physicsof the psyche.But it is a metaphysicsthat derivesdirectly from
the realityof capitalistsociety.For in the externalcritique of the Oedipus,
through a comparisonof the capitalistmodeof production with two other
libidinal modesof production, schizoanalysis showscapitalismto be the
only social formation organisedby quantitativerather than qualitative
relations. Capitalism organisesthe socialby the cashnexus of the market
rather than by codes and representation. Furthermore, this is the only
social formation where socialreproduction is isolated from socialpro-
duction at large,through the privatisationof reproductionin the nuclear
family: the nuclearfamily,but alsoOedipalpsychoanalysis itself,are thus
revealedto be strictly capitalistinstitutions.Yet at the sametime that the
nuclear family is capturing and programming desire in the Oedipus
complex,the market is subvertingcodesand freeingdesirefrom capture
in representationthroughout society at large, thereby producing schizo-
phrenia as the radically free form of semiosisand the potential hope of
universal history.
Connectives
Desire
Freud
Marx
Oedipalisation
SCHIZOPHRENIA
RosiBraidotti
The touchstoneof Deleuze and,Guattari's conceptualcritique of psycho-
analysisis their emphasison the positivity of schizophreniclanguage.
Refusingto interpret desireassymptomaticof 'lack' or to usea linguistic
paradigm that interprets desire through the system of metaphor and
metonymy,they insistwe understanddesirein termsof affectivity,asa rhi-
zomicmodcof interconnection.
AlthoughSigmundFrcud rccogniscs thc structurcof affcctivityand thc
hctcrogcncorrs urcl conrplcxplcrstrrcsof' 'polyrnor'phouspcrvcrsity',hc
238 SCHIZ OPHRENIA
endsup policing desirewhen he capturesit in a normativetheory of the
drives. The Freudian theory of drives codesand concentratesdesiring
affectsinto erotogeneouszones.Thus, psychoanalysisimplementsa func-
tional vision of the body that simply turns schizoidlanguageand expres-
sion into a disorder.This is in stark contrastto the schizoanalyticvision
both Deleuzeand Guattarioffer us.
Building on GeorgesCanguilhemand Michel Foucault,Deleuzeand
Guattari blur the distinctiondrawn betweennormal/pathologicaland all the
negativeconnotationsthat this model of desireimplies. Castingaffectivity,
the passions and sexualityalongthe axesof eithernormativeor pathological
behaviour,they say,is complicit with thoseselfsamepolitical forcesof bio-
powerthat disciplineand control the expressivepotentialitiesof a body.The
doubleburden that comesfrom medicalisingemotionsand affects,in con-
junction with reducingsexualexpressionto genitalia,leavesbodily affectsand
intensitiesin animpoverishedstate.Their theoryof the Bodywithout Organs
(BwO) not only critiquespsychoanalysis' complicityin repressionbut the
functionalistapproachto human affectivityas well. Instead,Deleuzeand
Guattariassertthe positivenatureof unruly desirein termsof schizoidflows.
For Deleuze,the distinctionbetweenproperand abjectobjectsof desire
is implementedasa normative index to police and civilise behaviour.The
more unmanageable aspectsof affectivityhaveeither to come under the
disciplinary mechanism of representationor be swiftly discarded.
Deviance,insanityand transgression arecommonlyregardedasunaccept-
ablefor they point to an uncontrollableforceof wild intensity.Thesetend
to be negativelyrepresented:impersonal,uncaringand dangerousforces.
Concomitantly such forces are both criminalisedand renderedpatho-
logical.The schizophrenicbody is emblematicof this violent'outside',one
that is beyondproprietyand normality.
Deleuze'seffortsto depathologise mentaland somaticdeviancy,uncon-
ventional sexualbehaviourand clinical conditions - like anorexia,depres-
sion, suicide,and so forth - is not a celebrationof transgressionfor its own
sake.Instead,it is integralto his intensivereadingofthe subjectasa struc-
ture of affectivity.That is, Deleuzemapsout alternativemodesof experi-
mentationon the levelof sensation,perceptionand affects.The intensity
of thesestatesand their criminalisedand pathologicalsocialstatusoften
makesthem implode into the black hole of ego-indexednegative forces.
Deleuzeis interestedin experimentingwith the positivepotentialof these
practices.What is at stakein this reappraisalof schizophrenia is how other
modesof assemblage and variationsof intensityfor non-unitary subjects
are gesturedto.
A subjectis a gcnealogical entity,possessing a minoritaritn,or countcr-
mcnrory, which in turn is irn cxprcssion<lf clcgrccsof' rrll'ccrivity.
S C H IZOP H R E N IA 239
Genealogical ties createa discontinuoussenseof time, closerto Friedrich
Nietzsche'sDionysiacmode.Hence, spatially,a subjectmay seemfrag-
mented and disunited; temporally, however,a subject developsa certain
amountof consistencythat comesfrom the continuingpowerof recollec-
tion. Here Deleuzeborrows the distinction betweenthe molar senseof
linear,recordedtime (chronos) and the molecularsenseof cyclical,discon-
tinuoustime (aion)that the Greeksoncedescribed.Simply put, the former
is relatedto being/the molar/the masculine;the latter to becoming/the
molecular/thefeminine.The co-occurrenceof past and future in a con-
tinuouspresentmay appearschizophrenicto thosewho uphold a vision of
the subjectasrationaland self-contained,however,we needto havesome
caution here as Deleuze'sphilosophyof immanencerestson the idea of
a transformativeand dynamicsubjectwho inhabitsthe activepresenttense
of continuous'becoming'.Using Henri Bergson'sconceptof 'duration' to
guide him, Deleuze proposesa subjectas an enduring entity, one that
changesas much as it is changedthrough the connectionsit forms with
a collectivity.
Also important to note is that Deleuze disengagesthe notion of
'endurance'from the metaphysicaltradition that associatesit with an
essenceor permanence.Hence, the potency of the Deleuzian subject
comesfrom how it displacesthe phallogocentricvision of consciousness,
one that hingeson the sovereigntyof the 'I'. It can no longer be safely
assumedthat consciousness coincideswith subjectivity,or that either
consciousness or subjectivity chargesthe course of events.Thus, the
image of thought implied by liberal individualism and classicalhuman-
ism is disrupted in favour of a multi-layered dynamic subject.On this
level, schizophreniaactsas an alternativeto how the art of thinking can
be practised.
Together with paranoia,schizoid loops and double-bindsmark the
political economy of affectivity in advancedcapitalism. These enact the
doubleimperativeof consumerconsumptionand its inherent deferralof
pleasure.With capitalismthe deferral of pleasureconcomitantlyturned
into a commodity.The saturationof socialspace,by fast-changingcom-
modities,short-circuitsthe presentinducing a disjunctionin time.
Like the insatiableappetiteof the vampire,the capitalisttheft of 'the
present' expressesa system that not only immobilises in the processof
commodity over-accumulation,but also suspends active desiring-
production in favour of an addictive pursuit of commodity goods.In
response,Deleuzeposits'becoming'as an antidote:flows of empowering
dcsircthat introducemobility and thus destabilise the sedentarygravita-
tionrrl pull of molar formations. 'l'his involvcscxpcrimcntingwith non-
unititryor sclrizoidnrodcsot'bcconring.
2+0 SEG M ENTARI TY
Connectives
Becoming
Bergson
Black hole
Body
Body without Organs
Duration
Molar
Nietzsche
Representation
SEGMENTARITY
Kjtlie Message
'Segmentation' is a fundamental structuring principle that contributes
to organisingthe individual and sociallife of all humans.While Deleuze
and Guattari explore the superficially dichotomous relationship of the
dominant segments- primitive, suppleor molecular,that aredifferentiated
againstthe rigid or molar statesegment- they do so in order to contend
that each of these dominant segments can themselves be sub-
compartmentalised into binary,circularand linearforms.More important
than the distinctionsexistingwithin eachof the terms of the dichotomy,
however, is the idea that yet another - far less discernible and easily
defined- spaceexistsin betweenthesetwo segments.This liminal third
spaceis producedby one or severallines of flight that binds the binary
terms into dialoguewith eachother at the sametime asit worksto enforce
a kind of decodingprocedurefor eachof the segmentedforms. In other
words,it both binds and separates the terms,but ensuresthat a continual
mutability carrieson existingbetweenthe two.
Although Deleuze and Guattari acknowledgethat binary couplings
appearat the basisof their approachto the conceptof segmentation,this
mode of differentiation is consciouslyand cautiouslyinvoked in order to
show that even the most formalised of dichotomous stateshave a rela-
tionship that is in fact more pliable or porous than would first appear.
In this senseeverything is political: every politics is alwaysboth macrop-
olitics and micropolitics.Illustrating the inter-relationshipof the binary
term that is alwaystied into dialoguewith its contrastingfigure (via the
third, liminal spacethat tendsto be occupiedby deterritorialisinglincs of
flight) whilc rrt tho sirmctimc bcing dift'crcntiatcd agrrinstit, indiviclurrls
SEGM EN TAR ITY 241
and societies are understood as being organised according to two
dominant and interwoven modes of segmentation:one molar, the other
molecular. These terms are alwaysclosely related becausethey co-exist
and crossover into eachother.
Exploring the dominant forms of segmentation,Deleuzeand Guattari
contrastthe ideaof a primitive or supplekind of segmentarityagainstthe
notion of modern statehood,whereprimitive societiesexist without dedi-
catedpolitical institutions.Considerablemanoeuvrabilityand communi-
cability aremaintainedbetweenthe differentiated,heterogeneous fieldsof
thesesocieties, primarily becauseof the segmentedrelationshipthat each
of thesefieldsor units shareswith the other.Operatingaccordingto dis-
crete,localisedforms of management,Deleuzeand Guattari characterise
this primitive segmentarityas functioning through polyvocalcodesthat
emergeasa resultof variousrelationshipsand lineages,and asan itinerant
territoriality that is basedon local divisionsthat overlaprather than exist
in any discretestate.Communication,codificationand territorialisation
occur in thesesocietiesvia a processof shifting relationshipsand inter-
sections,rather than any centrally organisingpower.
While these systems of organisation are perhaps more molecular
(focusedon small-scaletrajectoriesand local environments)than thoseof
modern societies,it would not be true to claim that they are more organic
or lesssystematic,and in accordwith their contentionthat the molar exists
within the molecularand vice versa,Deleuze and Guattari explainthat it
is a mistakesimply to contrastthis primitive, suppleor molecularsegmen-
tarity againstthe more rigid global organisationsthat characterisethe
modern Statesociety.Acknowledgingthat the modern political systemis
a unified and unifying globalapparatus,they maintainthat it is organised
in a formationof clearlyorderedsubsystems. However,despitethe reach-
ing agendathat motivatesthis inclusive process,it cannot be entirely
differentiatedfrom the primitive system out of which it has evolved.
Accordingly,the overarchingsystemis neverfreefrom gaps,displacements
and partial processes that interconnectwith eachother and yet it never
attainsproper signification.
To ignore thesespacesof slippagethat exist in betweenthe privileged
or State-sanctifiedunits is a mistake, Deleuze and Guattari counsel,
becausetheseoften indiscernible spacesmay contain either - or perhaps
both in somecases- the rumblings of popular massdissatisfactionwith the
dominantand determining Statebody (asin the socialupheavalsof May
1968),or the quotidian embodiment of extreme State power whereby
cvcrydaycitizensadopta self-regulating attitudeor beliefthat is basedon
thcir inclividualintcrnalisationof a particularpoliticirlcodcor idcalpro-
motcdby thc Statc(irsin Nnzi (icrmany).In hothcilscs,tlrcscrupturcsilrc
242 SEM IOT ICS
micro-fascismsthat threaten to disorganiseor destabilisethe dominant
segmentswithin which they exist.
Just as neither molecularnor molar segmentscan resistbeing entirely
differentiated from the other, Deleuze and Guattari explain that rather
than beinga distinctcharacteristicof the rigid or Statesegment,fascismis
dangerousbecauseof its molecularor micropoliticalpower; as a mass
movementit is more threateningthan a totalitarianorganisation.As such,
fascismattainsmolar (State)significancenot becauseof the public profile
of its leader(evidencedby the larger-than-lifeposters),but becauseit is
imbricated and interiorised throughout the molecular level of everyday
experience.
Connectives
Lines of flight
Molar
Molecular
SEMIOTICS
Inna Semetsky
'semiotics' is, in general, the study of signs and their signification.
Deleuzeand Guattari'ssemioticspresenta conceptualmix of CharlesS.
Peirce'slogic of relativesand Louis Hielmslev'slinguistics;both frame-
works are taken to opposeSaussureansemiology.ln A ThousandPlateaus,
Deleuze and Guattari assertthat content is not a signified, neither is
expressiona signifier:insteadboth are variablesin common assemblage.
An a-signifying rupture ensurestransfer from the form of expressionto
the form of content.Dyadic, or binary significationgivesway to triadic,
a-signifying semiotics,and the authors employ the Peirceannotion of
a'diagram'as a constructivepart of sign-dynamics. A diagramis a bridge,
a diagonalconnectionthat, by meansof double articulations,connects
planesof expressionand contentleadingto the emergenceof new forms.
Fixed and rigid signifiedsgive way to the productionof new meaningsin
accordwith the logic of sense(D 1990).Conceptsthat exist in a triadic
relationshipwith both perceptsand affectsexpresseventsrather than
essencesand should be understood not in the traditional representa-
tional mannerof analyticphilosophy,which would submit a line to a point,
but as a pluralistic, a-signifying distribution of lincs and phncs.
'l'hc
(l) l9tltla; l9t)3t) dclicssigniticittion.
Ontokrgically,''bciirg-its-firkl'
S E MIOTIC S 2+3
transformationalpragmaticsconsistsof destratification,or openingup to
a neq diagrammaticand creativefunction. Accordingto the logic of mul-
tiplicities,a diagramservesasa mediatoryin-betweensymbol,'a third'(D
1987: 131)that disturbs the fatal binarity of the signifier/signifieddis-
tinction. It forms part of the cartographicapproach,which is Deleuzeand
Guattari'ssemioticspar excellence,that replaceslogicalcopulaswith the
radicalconjunction'and'.
For Deleuze,the theory of signs is meaninglesswithout the relation
betweensignsand the correspondingapprenticeshipin practice.Reading
MarcelProustfrom the perspective of triadicsemiotics,Deleuzenoticesthe
dynamiccharacterof signs,that is, their havingan 'increasinglyintimate'
(D 2000:88) relation with their enfoldedand involutedmeaningsso that
truth becomescontingentand subordinateto interpretation.Meaningsare
not givenbut dependon signsentering'intothe surfaceorganizationwhich
ensuresthe resonance of two series'(D 1990:104),the latterconvergingon
a paradoxicaldifferentiator,which becomes'both word and objectat once'
(D 1990:51).Yet,semioticscannotbe reducedto just linguisticsigns.There
are extra-linguisticsemioticcategoriestoo, such as memories,imagesor
immaterialartisticsigns,which areapprehended in termsof neitherobject-
ivenor subjective criteriabut learnedin practicein termsof immanentprob-
lematic instancesand their practicaleffects.Analogously,a formal abstract
machineexceedsits applicationto (Chomskian)philosophyof language;
insteadsemioticsis applied to psychological,biological,social,techno-
logical, aesthetic and incorporeal codings. Semiotically, discursive and
non-discursiveformationsareconnectedby virtue of transversalcommuni-
cation,'transversality' beinga conceptthat encompasses psychic,socialand
evenontologicaldimensions.As a semioticcategory,transversalityexceeds
verbalcommunicationand appliesto diverseregimesof signs;by the same
token, Deleuze and Guattari's schizoanalysis and cartographiesof the
unconsciouspresupposea different semiotictheory from the one appropri-
atedin Lacanianpsychoanalysis. The semioticprocess, basedon the logicof
includedmiddle,is the basisfor the productionof subjectivity.The line of
flight or becomingis a third betweensubjectand objectand is to be under-
stood 'not so much . . . in their oppositionas in their complementarity'
(D 1987:13l). The relationshipbetweensubjectand objectis of the nature
of reciprocalpresupposition.
Brian Massumipoints out that Deleuzereinventsthe conceptof semi-
otics in his various books: in Proustand Signs,Deleuze refers to four
differently organisedsemioticworlds (M 1992).In Cinema-1he presents
sixtecn diffcrent types of cinematic signs. Rlr Deleuze, philosophers,
writcrs and artistsarc first and forcmostscmioticilnsrrndsymptomirt<tl-
ogists:thcy rcitd,intcrprct itnd crcittcsigns,wltich itrc 'lhc synrplonrsot'
2+4 SENSAT ION
life . . . There is a profound link betweensigns,events,life and vitalism'
(D 1995:143).The task of philosophyis the creationof concepts,and a
concept, in accord with a-signifying semiotics,has no reference;it is
autoreferential, positingitself togetherwith its obiectat the momentof its
own creation.A map,or a diagram,engendersthe territory to which it is
supposedto refer;a staticrepresentationof the order of referencesgiving
way to a relationaldynamicsof the order of meanings.
Connectives
Lacan
Schizoanalysis
Signifier/Signified
SENSATION
Tom Conlejt
Biology infusesmuch of Deleuze'sphilosophyespeciallyin the domainof
sensation.It remainsat the basisof perception,perceptionin turn being
what bringsaboutthe creationof events,the very mattercommonto phil-
osophy,art, and science.Sensationopensat the thresholdofsense,at those
momentsprior to when a subjectdiscoversthe meaningof somethingor
entersinto a processof reasonedcognition.Sensationtakesplacebefore
cognitionand thus pertainsto signifiance. In film it is graspedin what takes
placebeforewordsand imagesare grasped, asin Jean-LucGodard'stitle,
Prinorn: Carmen,in which the field of sensationinheres in what comes
prior to the name,beforethe naming of 'Carmen', in what is felt and experi-
encedbefore the name is understoodin a common way (D 1989:154).
In aesthetics,which Deleuzetakesup through his study of FrancisBacon
in TheLogic of Sensation,sensationis what strikesa viewer of a painting or
the readerof a poem beforemeaningis discernedin figuration or a the-
matic design.It has the productivelydeformativepower of defacingthe
representations that causeit to be felt. It is alsowhat vibratesat the thresh-
old of a given form; in other words, what causesthe 'appleness'of the
painter Paul C6zanne'sapplesto be felt as the geometricand painterly
abstractionsthat they becomein the field of his still lifes.
One of Deleuze'smostfamousfigures,the Body without Organs(BwO),
is conceivedas a surfaceof sensations, of a textureand elasticityof cqual
filrccand intcnsityovcr thc cntircty<tfits mass,Scnsati<tn passcstlvcrand
S E N S A TION 245
through the body in wavesand rhythms that meld its perceptiblesitesor
organisationof partsinto vibrationsand spasms.Borrowingfrom Wilhelm
Wiirringer'swritings on the generativityof 'gothic' linearity,Deleuzeand
Guattari'sconceptof BwO is in continuousand autonomousmovement,
endlesslyemanatingsensationlessin its designthan in its process.The line
is continuallybecomingof itself,exudingforce;whatDeleuzecallsthe 'con-
dition of sensation'.Of animaland vegetalcharacter,it hasthe capacityof
turning inward and outward, into the body and along different trajectories,
makingpalpablewhat otherwisecould be sensedin sensationitself. Deleuze
explainsthe point through C6zanne,whom he championsfor having made
visiblethe folding characterof the Mont-Saint-Victoire,the germinating
forceswithin seeds,or the convectionand heat transpiringin a landscape.
Theseelementsarewithin sensationprior to becomingfelt or visualised.
DeleuzeusesBacon'sdistinctionbetweentwo typesof violenceto refine
his 'logic' of sensation.A violenceof public spectacle, seenin athleticand
political arenasand in traditional 'theatresof torture' must be refusedin
orderto reacha kind of sensationthat the British paintercallsa'declaration
of faith in life'. Many of the paintingsplacedeformedbodiesin arenasso
that their abstractioncan embody invisible forces;forcesthat accordingly
condition the uncannysensationthe spectatorfeelsin view of both familiar
and monstroushuman forms. When seenin series(many are diptychs and
triptychs),the paintingsexuderhythms thar are tied to what Baconcalls
'figures',which areneitherfigurativenor beyondfigurationbut accumula-
tions and coagulations of sensation.In anothercontexthe links composite
units of perceptsand affectsto blocksof sensation,in themselvesbeings
that existautonomously, asmuch in paintingsasin the spectatorswho look
at them. The artist finds in the areabetweenthe perceiverand the work a
field of sensation,one that is 'sculpting,composing,writing sensations. As
percepts,sensations arenot perceptionsreferringto an object'(D&G 1994:
166)but somethingthat inheresin its beingand its duration. The taskof
the artist,ashe showswith Baconand C6zanne,is to extractfrom a'block
of sensations, a pure beingof sensation'(D&G 1994:167).
In this respect,in his unique galleryof naturalhistory two of Deleuze's
totemsof sensationarethe tick and the dog.The tick is a creaturethat feels
rhythmic sensationsthat inspire it to fall onro the skin of the animal it
covets.A melodyor 'block' of sensationcausesit to leap.The dog that is
eatingat its food bowl sensesthe arrivalof the masterthat will flog it, prior
to the flogging,with thousandsof sensations that anticipatethe eventitself:
a hostileodour,the sound of footsteps,or the sight of a raisedstick, that
'subtendthe conversionof pleasureinto pain'.Sensations arc mixed with
'tiny pcrccptions'that are'thc passagc from onc perccptionto an<lthcr',
rrnclthcyconstitutc'thclninrll conditionprrrcxccllcncc'(l)l993rr:87),
246 SENSATI O N + CINEMA
Readersof Deleuzenotethat sensationacquiresincreasingresonance in
the works written after 1980. It becomesa common term of speculationon
aesthetics,biologyand philosophyat the sametime asit retrievesthe vital-
ism and intuition of Henri Bergson'sformative work written from the early
1950s.Sensationbecomesa decisiveelementin the style and texture of
Deleuze'swriting, for in its rhythms,its 'blocks'of reflectionand its own
conceptualfigures,conceivedin a manner akin to thoseof his favourite
painters,the writing exudesthe forcesthat it describes.
Connectives
Art
Bacon
Bergson
Body without Organs
Faciality
SENSATION + CINEMA
Constantine Vereois
ln Dffirence and Repetition,Deleuzestatesthat the modern work of art
leavesthe domain of representationin order to becomepure experience:
'a transcendentalempiricism or scienceof the sensible'(D 1994: 56).
Deleuze developsthis idea in FrancisBacon: TheLogic of Sensation,sug-
gestingthat modern paintingtranscendsthe representation of both illus-
trative and narrativefiguration by moving either toward a pure form of
abstraction(asexemplifiedby, say,Piet Mondrian or WassilyKandinsky)
or toward what Deleuzecalls(followingJean-FrangoisLyotard) the purely
figural. For Deleuze (as for Bacon, who refusesboth straight abstraction
and figurative illustration), the preferred option is the latter, for the
abstractpainting,like the figurativeartwork,is ultimatelydirectedtoward
ordinary thought or to the brain, whereasthe figure is the sensibleform
relatedto sensation,to the neraoussystern or to 'vital movement'.Citing
Paul C6zanne,Deleuze describesa 'logic of the senses'that is neither
rational, nor cerebral,but a bodily sensation- an unequal difference
betweenforces- that overflowsand traversesall domains.
Sensation(figure)shifts attentionfrom the form of the artwork, be it
representationalor abstract,to the nature of its encounterwith othcr
btdics, lncl thc'-bccomings- hccoming<lther,bccoming-unlimitcd,
SEN SATION + C IN EM A 247
becoming-intense- that they bring about. Deleuze says: ,I becomein
sensation, andsomethinghappens throughsensation, onethroughthe other
and one in the other' (D 1993b:187).In rhe caseof cinema,narrarive-
representational film canbe understoodasa machineassemblage - a poten-
tiality of intensitiesor sensations- that, on the one hand, is organised
(represented) by an activityof figuration,and on the other,is reproduced-
multiplied and intensified- as a creativefigure of sensation.The first
describesa habitualrecognitionwherethe film is familiar and banalbecause
it is representedin termsof its identity and sameness. The latter describes
a moment of attentiverecognition(of dis-figuration)in which the object
doesnot remainon the oneandthe sameplane,but passes throughdifferent
planes.This is the momentof the crystal,wherepastand future collide;the
momentwhererepetitionis the eternalreturn: differencerepeating.
Sensationcan be related to the concept of'cinephilia,, an obsessive
passionfor cinema- in particularthe Hollywood films of 1940sand 1950s
- that developedin the front rows of the Pariscinimathiques in the 1950s
and 1960s.Paul Willemen suggeststhat the phenomenonof cinephilia,
influencedby still activeresiduesof surrealismin post-warFrenchculture,
involvesa sublime moment of defamiliarisation.an encounterwith the
unpresentable sublime.willemen links cinephiliatoJeanEpstein'snotion
of photoginie,a fleeting moment of experienceor emotionalintensity -
a sensation- that the viewercannotdescribeverballyor rationalisecogni-
tively (W 1994).As in the caseof Deleuze'stime-image,photlginie is
a direct representationof time, a 'crystal-image',or direct sensationof a
presentpresence.Focusingupon that aspectof cinephiliawhich escapes
existingnetworksof critical discourse,willemen describesan encounter-
a 'dangerousmoment' that points to a'beyond of cinema'(241).Ina brief
example,one can find this potential dislocationin the films of David
Lynch: the anamorphicdeformity of the dream in The ElephantMan
(1980),Ben'slip-syncingof 'In Dreams'in Blue ltelaet(1986),the lighting
of a cigarettein Wild,at Heart (1990).
Contemporarycinephilia - which embracesnot only the Hollywood
films of classicalcinephilia and the work of the nouoelle,)ague,but also
Hollywood's delayednouaelleaague(Francis Ford Coppola, Brian De
Palma,Martin Scorsese),the newFrench new waye([ean-Jacques Beineix,
Luc Besson,Leos Carax),and internationalart cinema(PedroAlmodovar,
Takeshi Kitano, Abbas Kiarostami) - can be seenas one of the many
diversereadingstrategiesencouragedby recentcultural technologies. The
developmentsinclude not only new storageand information technolo-
gies(television, video,internet)and agencies of pr<lmotion and commodi-
fication(rcvicws,advcrtiscmcnts, mcrchandisc)but irn irssociirtcclincrcasc
in film and nrcdialitcrrrcyrnd ir moclc<lf'vicwing imbricrrtcdwith nn
 srMoNDoN, crLBERr (1926-87) 249
248 SIGNIF IER,/SIGNIF IED

Understoodin this way, the effect of a languageor conceptualscheme,he also (with Guattari)
intertextualnetworkof masscultural discourses.
conducted an intensepolitical assaulton the ideology or despotismofthe
the reproduction of the cinephile is a type of infinite representation,an
signifier.How is it that we come to think of thought as reducible to a
extensivefunction of a standardised,serialproduct designedto be con-
systemof linguisticsigns?Not only do Deleuzeand Guattari insist, posi-
sumed within globalisedand/or specialisedniche markets.But equally,
tively, that there are r6gimes of signs beyond language,ranging from
the intensive experienceof cinephilia, the resonancecreated within the
musicand the visualartsto the signsof the inhuman world - smokebeing
proliferating,differentialseries,canbe describedasa momentof sensation,
a sign of fire, light being a sign for a heliotropeor a bird's refrain being
a glimpse over the edge of cinematic representation.Contemporary
the sign of its territory, they also conduct a critique of the modern
cinephiliathus becomesboth a generaleconomyof viewing' one which
of the cinematicinstitution, concept of signification, the idea that we are submitted to a system of
guaranteesthe endlesscirculation (sameness)
signsbeyondwhich we cannotthink. On the structuralistunderstanding
and also a point of resistanceto these forms of re-presentation- the
of the signifier, all thought takes place in a system of signs and all
moment at which the founding principle (Idea)breaksdown to become
differencesare mediatedthrough this systemsuch that nothing can be
a positive event, a universal un-founding. The serial repetition of the
(global Hollywood) film product, and the reproduction of the new consideredin itself. Structuralism is often, therefore, consideredto be a
cinephile,becomeboth the confirmationof identity and the affirmationof 'break' in this history of westernmetaphysics,for it concedesthat there
can be no knowledgeof pure presence,only knowledgeof the world as
multiple sensation,the return of the absolutelydifferent.
mediated through signs. According to Deleuze and Guattari, however,
the signifier is yet one more way in which we fail to think differencepos-
itively; one more way in which we mistakealreadystructuredexperience
SIGNIFIER/SIGNIFIED for the positivestructuring powerof life to differ. Signifiers,Deleuzeand
Guattari argue,are just examplesof the waysin which life is expressedor
Claire Colebrook differentiated.Deleuze'sargumentfor positivedifferenceis in direct con-
a language trast with the ideathat there is a systemof relationsthat determineslife
Accordingto the structuralistlinguist,Ferdinandde Saussure,
in advance.On the contrary, Deleuze saysthat while languagecan over-
is madeup of signifiersor differential marks,which then organiseor struc-
of our code other systemsof difference,for we can speakabout other systemsof
ture, not only our language,but also the very conceptualisation
The revolution of structuralistlinguistics lay in the insistence on signs,it is also possiblefor languageto be deterritorialisedthrough the
world.
and on the highly contingent pro- positivepower of difference.If, for example,our r6gimeof visualsignsis
both the arbitrarynatureof the signifier
overturned by an event in cinema, then we might be forced to think
duction of the systemof signification.Whereaslinguistics prior to struc-
differently and createnew concepts.In sucha casethinking would not be
turalism might havestudieda word diachronicallyby looking at the way
governedby a precedingsystem,but would be violated by the shockor
the Latin wordratio comesto form a commonroot (andmeaningfulcause)
treason',trational','rationalise','irrational' and so encounterwith life, a life that emits signswell beyondthoseof the system
for the modern words,
of signification.
on, structuralistlinguisticsis synchronic.One shouldnot study the emer-
genceor genesisof signs,for this is vague,but only signsas they form
a system. So it would be significantthat one languagemight mark a Connectives
differencebetweengrey and blue, or like and love,while anotherlanguage
would not mark out sucha difference.The consequences of this supposed Deterritorialisation/Reterritorialisation
primacy of the signifierextendedwell beyondlinguistics.If it is the case Difference
that we think only within a systemof differences,then thought depends
upon a prior structureand that structurecanonly be studiedor criticised
asa whole.There canbe no intuition of anyterm or thing in itself,for we
SIMONDON, GILBERT (1926-87)- referto the entrieson'cinema*
only know and think within a systemof differenceswithout positivetcrms'
Wcrncr Hcrzog','individuati<ln','m:ltcrialism' *
itnd'phcnomcn<ll<lgy
Not only doesDeleuzefavour the linguisticsof Louis Hiclmslcv ovcr
thilt ilrc not I Iusscrl'.
Sirussurcso that ihcrc irrc irlrcndyf<rrmsor clift'crcntirrtions
250 SIM UL ACRUM
SIMULACRUM
Jonathan Roffe
In his 1990'Preface'toClet-Martin'sbookon his work, Deleuzestatesthat
the conceptof 'simulacrum'wasneveran essentialpart of his philosophy.
However,it doesoffer one of the strongestforms of his critique of identity,
and the affirmation of a world populated by differences-in-themselves
which arenot copiesof any prior model.
Simply put, 'simulacrum'means'copy'. It is in Deleuze'sdiscussionof
Plato in TheLogic of Sensethat simulacraare most closelydiscussed.Plato
offersa three-levelhierarchyof the model,the copy,andthe copyof the copy
which is the simulacrum.The real concern for Plato is that, being a step
removed from the model, the simulacrum is inaccurateand betrays the
model.He usesthis hierarchyin a numberof places,and in eachcaseit is a
matterof distinguishingthe 'falsepretender'or simulacrum.For example,
in the Sophisf,Socratesdiscussesthe meanswith which we might distin-
guishbetweenthe philosopher(thegoodcopy),who is in searchof the Good
(the model), and the sophist(the simulacrumof the philosopher- the bad
copy),who usesthe sameskillsasthe philosopherin searchof profit or fame.
Deleuzenotesthat while the distinctionbetweenthe modelandthe copy
seemsthe mostimportantone for Plato,it is ratherthe distinctionbetween
the true and the falsecopieswhich is at the heartof Platonism.The copy
of the copy,cut offfrom referenceto a model,puts into questionthe model-
copy systemasa whole,and confronts it with a world of pure simulacrum.
This reveals,for Deleuze,the moral natureof Plato'ssystem,which fun-
damentallyvaluesidentity, order, and the stablereferenceto a model over
the groundlessmovementsof simulacra.This doesnot meanthat Deleuze
considersthe world to be madeup of appearances, 'simulations'of a real
world that hasnow vanished.It is the senseof the word 'appearances' itself
that is in question.Simulacrado not refer to anythingbehind or beyond
the world - they make up the world. So what is being underminedby
Deleuze here is a representationalunderstandingof existence,and the
moralinterpretationof existencethat goesalongwith it. Furthermore,this
understandingembodiesa certainnegativitythat is alsoproblematic.For
a copy to be a copy of any kind it must havereferenceto somethingit is not
- a copy standsin for somethingthat is not present.It requiresthis other
thing (whatlinguisticswould call the'referent')to giveit senseand impor-
tance.
The simulacrum,on the otherhand,breakingwith this picture,doesnot
rely upon somethingbeyondit for its force,but is itself forceor power;able
to do thingsandnot merelyrepresent.It is asa resultof this positivepower
S IN GU LA R ITY 251
that simulacracan produceidentitiesfrom within the world, and without
referenceto a model,by enteringinto concreterelations- in this case,the
philosopheris not the one searchingfor the Good, but the one who is able
to createnew conceptsfrom the material availablein the world; concepts
which will do something.We can seehere a hint of the understandingof
the world as a productive-machinethat will emergein Anti-Oedipusand
A Thousand, Plateaus.
Deleuze also connectsthe thought of the simulacrum to that of the
eternal return. As Deleuze frequently argues,we must understandthe
eternal return in terms of the return and affirmation of the different, and
not of the Same.Ratherthan distinguishingbetweengoodand bad copies,
the eternal return rejects the whole model/copy picture - which is
groundedon the valueof the Sameand infusesnegativityinto the world -
in favourof the productivepowerof the simulacrathemselves.
Connectives
Difference
Eternal return
Plato
Representation
SINGULARITY
Tom Conley
In the historiesof cartographyand of the cognition of terrestrialspace,
'singularity'is a term that replacesthat of the mirror. It is first seenin the
earlymodern period. In the Middle Agesthe 'mirror of human salvation'
(speculum humanesalaationis)charteda typology of eventsin human and
divine time that madeclearthe order of the world on the basisof eventsin
the Old Testamentthat alsohaveanaloguesin the New Testament.The
mirror wasthat which assureda reflectionof a totality and the presenceof
God, a reflectivesurface,resemblingperhapsthe pupil of an eyeon which
were gatheredand assembledthe variety and wealth of divine creation,
When, in the later fifteenth century,oceanictravellersventured south and
eastfrom Europe to the Indies by way of Africa or west to the Caribbean
o!easterncoastof SouthAmerica,mostrepresentations of the world could
no long conform to the figure of the speculummund,i.Discovery and
encounterpromptedcosmographers,to registernew,often conflicting,and
sometimesunthinkablethings into works of opcn form. As singularitics
252 SINGUL ARIT Y
theseworks were subjectto changeand revision- indeedwhat Deleuze
often calls'open totalities'.For a brief time, the world itself wastakento
be a massof islandsand continents,of insularshapesthat containeda pos-
sibly infinite measureof singularities.Thus are born works such as Les
singularitisde la Franceantarctique(by Andr6 Thevet) or isolarii ('island-
books', by BenedettoBordone, TomassoPorcacchiand others). They are
conceivedto accountfor, recordand copewith new shapesofalterity and
differencecomingfrom distantspaces.
WhereverDeleuzeinvokessingularityit can be understoodagainstthis
historicalbackground.As a philosopherhe embracesthe idea of virtual
travel, along infinite trajectoriesor lines of flight that lead the thinker any-
where about the world, but first and foremostamongand betweenconcep-
tual islandsor points of singularity.As islands,they are alsopoints that can
be seenin series,asinflexionsor emissionsof events.A singularity,alsoinsu-
larity,is a decisivepoint anda placewhereperceptionis felt in movement.In
Leibniz'sconceptof the monad,Deleuzenoteshow a 'singularity'is fre-
quentlyassociated with condensed events.Singularities arethe'zoneof clear
expression' of the monad.Lessabstractly, in termsof civic geographya sin-
gularity would be a county,a regionaldepartment,or evena topography.
The singularitiesof the monad are what assurethe presenceof a body in
or through which they vibrate.They arethe eventsthat makeit both unique
and common,both an entity of its own perceptualdataand a groundfor the
relationthat the monadholdswith its environs.They arethe placeswhere
the 'singularitiesbelongingto each. . . areextendedup to the singularities
of others'(D 1993a:86).The world asa wholeis perceivedinfinitesimally
in microperceptionsand gigantically,in macroperceptions. Singularity
allows the subject to perceivethe world in both ways,infinitesimally and
infinitely, in hearing the whir of a familiar watermill, in being awareof
wavesof water striking the hull of a boat, or even in sensingmusic that
accompanies a'danceof dust'(D 1993a:86).Theseformulationsaboutsin-
gularityinflectDeleuze'swork on styleand the creativeimagination.With
the samevocabularyhe notesthat greatwriterspossess'singular conditions
of perception'(D 1997b:116).Indeed singularitiesallow greatwriters to
turn aestheticperceptsinto veritablevisions;in other words,to movefrom
a unique site of consciousness to an oceanicone. Such is what makesthe
writer changethe world at large through microperceptionsthat become
translatedinto a style,a seriesof singularitiesand differencesthat estrange
common usagesof languageand make the world of both the writer and
thosein which the readerlivesvibratein unforeseen and compellingways.
Weresingularityassociated with the 'Causesand Reasonsof the Desert
Island',(oneof Deleuze'sfirst piecesof philosophical writing)it wouldbc
conncctcdwith differcnccand rcpctition,onc of thc bascsof'his wurk on
S MOOTH SPACE 253
duration,identity and ideationin Dffirence and,Repetition.A singularityis
a unique point but it is alsoa point of perpetualrecommencement and of
variation.Like other keywords in his personaldictionary, singularityshifts
and bearsdifferent inflections in different contextsbut is alwaysrelated to
perception,subjectivity,affectivity and creation.
Connectives
Event
Leibniz
Lines of flight
SMOOTH SPACE
Tarnsin Lorraine
ln A Thousand, Plateaus,Deleuze and Guattari characteriseliving orBan-
isms in terms of interior milieus' (cellularformation, organicfunctions)
and 'exterior milieus' (food to eat, water to drink, ground to walk on).
Milieus are vibratory blocks of space-timeconstituted by the periodic
repetition of the configurationsof forcesthat makesthem what they are
(D&G 1987:313).All the milieusof the organismhavetheir own patterns
and thesepatternsinteract with the patternsof other milieus with which
they communicate.The rhythm of the interactionsbetweenthesedifferent
milieus operatesin terms of heterogeneous blocksrather than one homo-
geneousspace-time.Thus, an organismemergesfrom chaos('the milieu of
all milieus') as vibratory milieus or blocks of space-time that create
rhythms within the organismas well as with the milieus exterior to the
organism.Territorial animals(includinghumanbeings)arenaturalartists
who establishrelations to imperceptibleas well as perceptibleforces
through the refrainsof song (birds)or movementsand markings(wolves,
rabbits)that createthe rhythms of life-sustainingregularitiesfrom cosmic
chaos.The variousrhythms of the human subject'scomponentsand their
relations to interior and exterior blocks of space-timebecome territori-
alised into the sentient awarenessof one organism living in the 'striated'
spaceof sociallife, cancellingout anomalousinteractionsamongmilieusin
the process.The conventionalnotion of spaceas a homogeneouswhole
within which movement unfolds is thus, for Deleuze and Guattari, a
totalisedconstruct of spacethat emergesfrom heterogeneous blocksof
sprcc-timc.'I'hcy contrastthcir conccptof 'smrxlthspacc'to thc morc
convcntionirl notion of spilcc;'snlrxrthspircc'hrunts itnd citn disru;rtthc
254 SM OOT H SPACE
striationsof conventionalspace,and it unfoldsthrough 'an infinite succes-
sion of linkagesand changesin direction' that createsshifting mosaicsof
space-timesout of the heterogeneous blocksof different milieus (D&G
1987: 494).Deleuzeand Guattari are interestednot in substitutingone
conceptionofspacewith another,but ratherin how forcesstriatespaceand
how at the same time it developsother forces that emit smooth spaces
(D&G 1987:500).
In a discussionof the conceptof the (movement-image'inspired by
Henri Bergson, Deleuze distinguishesmovement from space: 'space
coveredis past, movementis present,the act of covering' (D 1986: l).
Spacescoveredby movementaredivisibleand belongto a single,homoge-
neous space while movement changesqualitatively when it is divided.
Movements, of what Deleuze and Guattari in A ThousandPlateauscall
'deterritorialization',areactsofcoveringthat arenot referredto spacecon-
ceivedasa uniform areaof measurable units within which changesoccur.
A subjectwho orients himself with respectto movements,rather than
a retrospectively createdconstructof space,experiences spacenot in terms
of a totality to which it is connected(I walk acrossthe snowfive milesfrom
the centreof town), but rather in terms of pure relationsof speedand slow-
ness(snowunder moving feet aswind lifts hair) that evokepowersto affect
and be affected,both actualand potential (pushingfeet againstground,
could alsojump or run). A personon a trip to anothercity might orient
himself by followingthe roadmappedout through socialconventionfrom
one point to another.A nomadof the desertin searchof food might orient
himselfdifferently,travellingnot from onepoint to a predesignated destin-
ation, but rather travelling from one indication of food to the next as the
need arises.In the former case,local movementsare charted with respect
to alreadyspecifiedpoints(thusimposinga planeof organisationupon the
movementsthat unfold). In the latter case,spaceshifts with eachmove-
ment in keepingwith shifts in meetingthe needfor food. Theseshifts do
not occur in space;rather they establishdifferent configurationsof nomad
and vegetationand landscape that unfold asthe smoothspaceof the search
for food. The smooth spacesharedwith othersemergesnot with reference
to an 'immobile outside observer',but rather through the tactile relations
of any number of observers(D&G 1987: 493).It is thus a space- like that
of the steppes,the desertor polar landscapes - occupiedby intensities,
forcesand tactilequalities,with no fixed referencepoint (D&G 1987:479).
Connectives
Deterritorialisation/ Rcterritorialisation
Nomadicism
SOC IU S 255
Space
Subjectivity
SOCIUS
Kenneth Surin
Traditional philosophyrelied overwhelminglyon the operationof tran-
scendentalprincipleswhich wererequiredto makeclaimspossible,aswell
as moral aestheticjudgements.There are also transcendentalprinciples,
perhapslesswidely acknowledgedthan the onesthat underlie traditional
philosophy,which subtendthe constitutionof the socialorder.Theseprin-
ciplesare embodiedin what Deleuzeand Guattari call the 'socius'.The
well-known philosophical counter-tradition inaugurated by Friedrich
Nietzsche,and continuedby Martin Heidegger,undertooka dismantling
of the transcendentalbasis of traditional philosophy,and the work of
Deleuzeis to be locatedin this tradition. For Deleuze,asfor Nietzsche,an
entire tradition extendsfrom Plato to Kant. in which it is declaredthat the
yardstick of knowledgeis verisimilitude.In Plato's caseverisimilitude
derivesfrom an ideal 'world of Forms' (the transcendent),whereasfor
ImmanuelKant this world of the transcendentwasbanishedto the realm
of the 'noumenalabsolute'.Kant, though,insistedthat the counterpartto
the noumenalworld, for examplethe world of phenomena,wasconstituted
by the activity of the transcendental (or non-empiricallygiven)subjectof
possibleexperience.In their reflection on the socius,conducted through-
out the two volumes of Copitalism and, Schizophrenia,Deleuze and,
Guattari seekwhat amountsto a comprehensive undoing of the transcen-
dentalbasisofthe constitutionofthe socialorder.In sodoing,they adhere
(transcendental
to the empiricism',in which the basisfor the constitution
(as
of real opposed to possible) experienceis sought.This proiectis 'tran-
scendental'in so far as the conditionsfor real experiencerequire a non-
empirical organisationof the objectsof experience,though the sourceof
this organisationis not a transcendentalsubjecti la Kant, but rather the
very form in which real objectsareexperiencedasactiveand dynamic.
ln Anti-Oed,ipus, the sociusis said to be necessarybecausedesiring-
productionis coterminouswith socialproductionandreproduction,andfor
the latter to takeplacedesirehasto be codedand recoded,so that subiects
canbe preparedfor their socialrolesand functions.The sociusis the terrain
of this codingand recoding.Anotherrationalefor the sociusstemsfrom the
part it playsin consolidating thc capitalistordcr.l)csirc is simultancously
cnablcdrrndlirrritccl whiclrtrccsit fi'onrits prcviouscntboclinrcnts
by crrpitrrl,
256 SO CI US
or codingssothat it canbe placedat the disposalofcapitalisr expansion;and
desire,after this decodingby capital, is reined in or recodedso that it can
subservethe novel requirementsof capitalistproduction.
Coding or 'inscription' are thus central to the constitution of the socius,
and Deleuzeand Guattarirespondto the crucialquestionof the surfaceon
which inscriptiontakesplaceby invokingthe notion of the earth.The earth
precedesthe constitution of the socius,and is the primordial unity or
ground of desireand production.As suchthe earthis the preconditionof
productionwhile alsobeingthe objectof desire.The first form of the socius
has thereforeto involve a territorialisation,undertakenby a 'territorial
machine',which parcelsout the earthinto segmentsof socialmeaning.
Once territorialisationhas occurred, it becomespossiblefor social
machines(the coreof the socius)to operate.Socialmachineshavehumans
as their parts and are essentialto the generationof cultural forms, these
forms being neededto link humansto their (technical)machines.Social
machinesorganiseflowsof powerand desireby codingthem. There areall
kinds of flows:differentkindsof humans,vegetation,non-humananimals,
agricultural implements, flows that involve bodily functions and organs,
and soon. Nothing escapes coding,and sonothing canescapethe purview
of the socius.
If the sociusis a megamachine, the fuel that drivesthis machineis desire,
though desireis shapedand orchestratedby its insertioninto this mega-
machine.In modernsocieties, the natureof this insertionof desireinto the
socialmegamachinehas been significantlyrransformed.To facilitatethe
functioning of capitalism,flows havehad to becomemore abstract,since
capital requires intersubstitutibility,homogeneity,relentlessquantifica-
tion, and exchangemechanismsto work. Hand in hand with this abstrac-
tion goes a privatisationof the social, since an over-valuationof the
individual is requiredto compensatefor the massivecollectivedisinvest-
ment that takesplacein the socialas a result of the inexorablegrowth of
the processes of abstraction.The vehiclesof this privatisationareruled by
the Oedipusprinciple,which functionsasa kind of transcendental r6gime
for the investmentof socialdesire.Other principles,primarily concerned
with morality and punishment, but alsowith death and cruelty, are effect-
ive in this domain too.
Dispensingwith psychoanalysis asthe ontology for how a sociusis con-
stituted, Deleuze and Guattari find it necessaryto replace Freudianism
with a different ontology. The alternative- called 'schizoanalysis'or
'nomadology'- beginsby refusingany kind of transcendentalprinciple
purporting to serveas the ground of the socius.In placeof the logic of
necessityand continuity that characterisedprevious social ontologies,
I)clcuzc and Guttttri opt firr onc that is markcclby rupturcs,limits,
SPAC E 257
singularities,ironies and contingencies.Traditional logic displacesdesire
asthe motor driving the socialmegamachine.Schizoanalysisor nomadol-
ogy provide a new conception of experienceand desiring-production,
emphasisingforms of experimentation not constrained by the ego or
Oedipal structures,aswell asthe needto createnew forms of collective(as
opposedto merelyindividual) liberation.Importantly,this kind of libera-
tion cannotbe sponsoredeither by the Stateor capital.
Connectives
Capitalism
Desire
Earth/Land,
Guattari
Psychoanalysis
Schizoanalysis
SPACE
Tom Conlejt
In a view of a port seenat night at the beginningof Jean-Luc Godard's
Pierrotlefou (1965),one of Deleuze'smodelfilms in his work on the time-
image, a voice quotes a passagefrom Elie Faure on Velasquez:'Space
reigns'. The remark could apply to all of Deleuze'swritings. For the
philosopher,spaceis what is at oncecreatedand exhaustedor annihilated
in the creationof an event.Whereverphilosophycreatesevents,it recoups
literatureandthe artsin general.In an importantessayon SamuelBeckett,
Deleuzenotesthat spaceis rich in potentialitybecauseit makespossible
the realisationof events.A given image or concept,when it is seenor
engaged,createsand dissipatesspacein the time of its perception.Space
is somethingthat is at the edgesof language.Deleuzecallsthe apprehen-
sion of spacean 'exhaustion'of meaning.The artist dissipatesmeaningin
order to makespacepalpableat the moment it is both createdand annihi-
lated.For both Godard and Beckettit could be saidthat the stakesarethose
of 'exhaustingspace'(D 1997b:163).Only then can it be seenand felt in
an event, in a sudden disjunction, that scatterswhat we take to be the
reality in which we live.
The almost mystical tenor of Deleuze'swork on spaceand the event
(cspeciallyin "I'hc Exhaustcd'in .Es.ra.y.s
Criticaland Clinical)is cxplained
by whatthc historirrnof rcligionMichcl clc(lcrtciruwritcsin a l9ll4 study
258 SPACE
of the inventionof everydaylife: Spaceis a discursivepracticeof a place.
A placeis a givenarea,namedand mapped,that canbe measuredin terms
of surfaceor volume.It becomesspaceonly whenit becomesa siteof exist-
entialengagemenr amongliving agentswho mark it with their activitiesor
affiliate with dialogueand acriveperception. Placein this senseis equiva-
lent to Deleuze'sconceptof an espace quelconque,'any-space-whatsoever',
that is determined and given to be what it is without being inflected by a
useror a traveller.The taskof the philosopherand artist is to take the most
innocuous or ineffectual of all placesand to fragment (even atomise or
molecularise)or strip them of their potenrial.The taskof the filmmakeris
to make visible these non-placesbefore fracturing and dispersing them
through creative manipulation. Roberto Rossellini, in Paisan (1947) or
Germany,YearZero (1948)extendsbeforethe eyesof the spectatorprolif-
erationsof any-spaces-whatsoever,'an urban cancer,an indifferent surface,
a wasteland'(D 1986:212) that haveas rheir counterpartsthe clich6sof
everydaylife, that his cameramakesuntenableand inhuman. Accordingly,
the taskof the philosopheris to turn'commonplaces'into matterfor more
exhaustivespeculation.Therein are engenderedother spacesthat can be
hypotheticaland utopian or evenvirtual.
Spaceis elsewhere measuredin Deleuze'spoliticalwritingsaccordingto
degreesof smoothness and striation.A 'smoothspace'is onethat is bound-
lessand possiblyoceanic,a spacethat is without borderor distinctionthat
would privilegeonesiteor placeoveranother.It doesnot belongto a prelap-
sarianworld from which humanshavefallen (asRousseaumight argue),nor
is it utopian unlessit can be thought of in coniunctionwith irs 'srriated'
counterpart,a spacedrawn and riddled with lines of divide and demarca-
tion that name,measure,appropriateand distribute spaceaccordingto
inheritedpolitical designs,history or economicconflict.Without bound-
ariesor measure,smoothspaceis frequently affiliatedwith the unconscious.
It is 'occupiedby eventsor haecceitiesmore than by formed and perceived
things', and thus it is more a spaceof affectsor sensations than properties
(D&G 1987:479).It is definedby a flow of forcesand henceis perceived
hapticallyinsteadof optically.It is 'intensive'wherestriatedspaceis 'exten-
sive'.A Body without Organs(BwO) bearsa surfaceof smoothspacethat
lackszonesor organsthat haveaffectiveprivilegeoverothers.Striatedspace
is one wherelinesand pointsdesignateitinerariesand trajectories.
Smoothspacecanbe perceivedin andthroughstriatedspace,indeedwhat
is seenandexperienced in the world at large,in orderto deterritorialise
given
places.In Deleuze'slexiconthat pertainsto spaceandplace,deterritorialisa-
tion andreterritorialisation areat thebasisof mosrbiologicalandphilosoph-
icalactivity.In this respectthenomadis the personor thinkerwhoconstantly
createsspaccby movingfrom placcto placc.Thc nomacl,thc phiklsophcr;
SPAC E + D IGITAL AR T 259
and the scientistand artist alikeare capableof creatingspacesthrough the
trajectoriesof their passages that movefrom one territory to anotherand
from givenstriationson the surfaceof the world to smoothand intensive
areas,areasthat aretantamountto the folds and creases of eventsthat vibrate
in the body,itself a placethat canbe affectivelyspatialisedin infinite ways.
Connectives
Body without Organs
Deterritorialisation/Reterritorialisation
Nomadicism
Smoothspace
Utopia
Virtual/Virtuality
SPACE + DIGITAL ART
VerenaConlelt
Open spaces,smoothspaces,absenceof boundaries,speed,the firing of elec-
trons, blurrings of sexualor speciesboundaries,rhizomatic connectivities
and the creation of hybrids: all of thesedescriptivesabound in Deleuze's
writings and asa result they makehim a favouriteof digital artists.Deleuze
puts in questiontraditionalconceptsofspacethat, asreselctens&,served asa
passivebackground against which humans stagedtheir dramatic actions.
When arborescence giveswayto rhizomaticthinking, spacecanno longerbe
separatedfrom human actors.Spaceendowedwith virtual qualitiesexists
betweenrhizomatic lines and is more intensivethan extensive.
Rhizomaticthinking makesits way into the virtual spacesof computers
and digital art. It setsout to undo limits and collapsebinaries- nature
versusculture, human versusmachine,human versusanimal,or human
versus cyborg - and creates new spaces.On their computers, network
digital artists experimentwith connectionsbetweendifferent speciesto
create hybrids and becomings.Like philosophers,many digital artists
questionlimits in order to destabilisethe selfthat is definedby the position
it occupiesor owns in the world. Working with Spinozist questions-
'What cana bodydo?'and'Wheredo the senses end?'- digitalartistsundo
thc barriersusedto fix and definethe 'Self'. Digital artistsquestionthe
mrrrkcdand finitc body by disembodying it, by producingrrlloclywithout
Organs([]wO) :rnda machinicboclyof dcsirc.A wcb of'coltncctivitythrrt
is pcrccivcclto hc inlinitc opcnsonlo ncw lrrrdothcr spilccs.'l'his wcb
 260 s P rN o z A) B AR U C H (r632-77)
replacesa stable,finite self and increasesthe possibilitiesof becomingfor
human beings.Digital art emphasises permanentflux, magneticstreams
and fluid desires.In virtual spaces,where experienceis mediatedthrough
the medium rather than narure,digital art createshybrids and opensto
becomings.simulation replacesrepresentation.Emphasisis placed on
constructionand not on finality. Networks are in incessantcirculation,
makingpossiblethe creationof virtual spaces.
Digital art seemsat times to be an extensionof conceptsthat Deleuze
developedwith Guattariin the conrextof informationtheoryand biology.
The philosophers drawfrom GregoryBateson'snotionof the world asa cir-
culation of differencesalong circuits that function as forebearersof com-
philosophyasmuch ascyberneticsand computerscreens. If they seepossi-
bilitiesof becomingthroughconnectionsbetweenhumansand machinesor
the creationof new spaces)they also flatly condemnthe political abuses
through the world of the digital mediaand the internet.Technology,they
argue,can be liberating.It can help createand recreatea world that no
longerexiststo be represented. It canbreakdown barriersbetweenhuman
and machine.It canopento new virtual spacesand infinite becomings.They
warn us that humansshouldnot deludethemselves: information science,
like everyother science,is alsoconstructedaroundorder-words.It exracts
constantsand discouragestrue becomings.Computersand the internet are
presentlyunder the spellof financecapitalism,the latter deploysits order-
words to build barriersand arrestmovementsthat it would otherwisebe
unableto channelfor its own ends.It extractsconstantsand helpsconsoli-
datea societyofcontrol. Spaceslosetheir virtual qualities.
Art, however, has the potential of escaping the capitalist economic
sphereascapitalismconsolidates throughcontrol,whilst digitalart experi-
mentsin and with virtual spacesand, while unravellingboundariesat ver-
tiginous speed,it continuously createsand recreatesrrew virtual spaces
through hybrid connections.
SPINOZA, BARUCH (1632_77\
Kenneth Surin
In the last few dccadcsthc writingsof Louis Arthusscr,Eticnncllalibar,
Picrrc Mrrchcrcy,Antonio Ncgri, I)clcuzc rncl rthcrs. hrvc nrrrrkcdir
sPr NozA) BARUcU ( r 6 32- 77) 261
resurgenceof interest in the thought of Baruch Spinoza, in which
Spinoza'smaterialistontology has been used as a framework for con-
structing a matrix of thought and practice not regimented by the axioms
of Platonicmetaphysics, the epistemologyof Ren6Descartes,andthe tran-
scendentalrationalismof ImmanuelKant and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
Hegel.Also important for thesethinkershasbeenthe useof spinoza asa
resourceto reconceptualisesome of Karl Marx's more important cat-
egoriesand principles.coupled with this resurgencehas been a parallel
developmentin the areaof more technicalcommentaryon Spinoza,asso-
ciated primarily with the massive works of Martial Gueroult and
AlexandreMatheron.Deleuzehimselfdealtwith Spinozain two texts:his
1968doctoralthesisSpinozaet leproblimed,el'expression (D 1992)and the
1970 shorter text Spinoza: Philosophie pratique (D 1988c),though the
thoughtof spinozapermeatesall his works,including the textsco-written
with Guattari.
Deleuzeviews Spinozaas the first thinker to make judgementsabout
truth and virtue inescapablysocial.Hence,for spinoza, notionsof moral
culpability,responsibility,good and evil haveno reality exceprin so far as
they stemfrom the dispositionto obeyor disobeythosein authority.The
Statecannotcompel the individual as long as she is seento obey,and so
DeleuzecreditsSpinozawith beingthe first philosopherto placethought
outsidethe purview of the Stateand its functions:Spinoza,saysDeleuze
in Spinoza: Practical Philosophy,'solicitsforces in thought that elude
obedienceaswell asblame,and fashionsthe imageof a life beyond good
and evil, a rigorousinnocencewithout merir or culpability' (D 1988c:4).
Life for Spinoza,since it cannot be constrainedby the state or milieu
from which it emerges,is irreducibly positive:life cannotbe enhancedif
it is trammelled by the interdictions of priesrs, judges, and generals
whoseown livesare markedby an internal sado-masochism. Needlessto
say,Deleuze's use of Spinoza is inevitably selective.There are many
Spinozas,iust as there are many Platos and Hegels, and Deleuze's
Spinozais a Spinozaread through the eyesof Friedrich Nietzsche,and
especiallyNietzsche's doctrine of the eternal return. For Nietzsche.
accordingto Deleuze,the eternal return meansthat one will be willing
to experiencelife over and over againin exactlythe sameway.Similarly,
where Spinozais concerned,the person who will not be a victim of the
sad passions,the aspirant for beatitude,will be someonewhoseactions
cannot be an occasionfor regret. In both cases,therefore,the individual
concernedwill not want the terms undcr which shc lives life to be any
diffcrcnt.
lror spinozir,tlrcrc ilrc two primirry kirrdsof'firrccs wlriclr dinrinish
lifb - hrrtrcd,whichis tttrttcdtowirldsllrc olhrrr;irrrdllrc birdcorrscicncc.
262 s PrN o z A , BA R U C H ( t6 3z-77)
which is turned inwards.Only a new kind of life, capableof sustaining
experimentationand a new appetitefor living, can overcomethesenega-
tive and reactive passions.Spinoza's works, primarily the Ethics, delin-
eatean intellectualframework(going under the name of an 'ethics') for
leadingthis new life. In this new ontology,a body is definedby its speeds
and slownesses, not its forms and functions, as it was in the age-old
Aristotelianmetaphysicsthat dominatedphilosophyuntil the Enlighten-
ment. Also important in this ontology are the linkagesbetweendifferent
bodies,culminating in the forming of a nexusof connections,eachcon-
nection or set of connectionsproceedingwith its own speedand slow-
ness. Knowledge understood in this way is essentiallymaterial and
contingent, since no individual knows aheadof time what their bodily
affectsare and what they are likely to involve in relation ro other individ-
uals and forces.
Deleuzeand Guattari'skinship with Spinozastemsfrom their percep-
tion that philosophytodayhasto cometo termswith the emergence of new
knowledgesthat havebeen accompaniedby the explosiverise of a whole
rangeof new sciences, basedon the creationof'nonstandard' logicsand
topologiesof changeand relation,and typically devisedto dealwith situ-
ations that have the characterof the irregular or the arbitrary (what
Deleuzeand Guattaricall'nomad thought','rhizomatics','schizoanaly-
sis'). These new logicsand topologiesconcernthemselvesnot only with
the structuralprinciplesofchangeand process,but alsowith surfaces, tex-
tures, rhythms, connectionsand so on, all of which can be analysedin
terms of suchnotionsasthoseof strings,knots,flows,labyrinths,intensi-
tiesand becomings.Spinozais viewedby Deleuzeasthe pre-eminentpre-
cursorof this'nomadthought',thoughclearlyfor them Leibniz, Nietzsche
and Bergsonarealsoexemplarypredecessors.
The appropriationof Spinoza'sthought by Deleuze(and Guattari) is
undeniablyselective.There is a rationalismin Spinozathatisdownplayed
in Deleuze'sinterpretationof him, and while Spinozawascriticalof State
power,he cannoteasilybe madeto sharethe sametheoreticalpremissesas
the anarcho-Marxismof Deleuzeand Guattari.All this notwithstanding,
Spinoza'srigorous immanentismand materialism,mediatedin complex
waysby the thought of severalother thinkers,are very much in evidence
in Deleuze'soeuvre.
Connectives
Eternal return
Immanence
Materialism
SPIN OZA + ETH IC S OF IOY 263
sPrNozA + ETHTCSOF JOY
Constantin Il Bound,as
Deleuzehasoften beenpraisedfor his (Stoic)commitmentto the ethicsof
the event - our becomingworthy of the event through the processof
counter-actualisation of that which is happeningto us. But Deleuzehas
alsolaid claim to an ethic of joy, the articulationof which is the result of
his many encounterswith Baruch Spinoza.The nodal point that repre-
sentsthe linkageof this commitmentis the Nietzscheanaffirmationof the
'eternalreturn' - the lynchpin of Deleuze'sontology and the indispens-
ableimperativeof his ethics.
Deleuze thinks of desire as an affirmative,non-intentionalintensity,
producingconnections- real in their function and revolutionaryin their
multiplicity. Deleuze'sdesire is modelled after Spinoza'sconatus;it is
neithera 'want' nor 'lack' but the effort of an individualentity to persevere
in its own existence,Spinozaalwaysthinks of conatus asbeingdetermined
by its capacityto affect and to be affected;it is not, therefore, difficult to
think of czna,tus as desire.Providedthat we do not separateessencefrom
action,a czna,tus canbe understoodasthe essence ofan entity or its degree
of power.Actions themselvesconstitutea person'saffirmationof life and
his will to exist.
Spinozaspeaksof an order of essences, that is, of an order of intensities,
within which all singularessences cohereand aremutually responsiblefor
eachother'sproduction.In Deleuze'swork, this order helpshim articulate
the virtual/real.But in Spinoza,thereis alsoan orderof organisation,with
its own lawseternallydeterminingthe conditionsfor the cominginto being
and the enduranceof singularentities.On this plane,arrangementsare
made ad infinitum, but not every arrangementis compatiblewith the
others. Spinoza recognisesan order of fortuitous encounters:bodies
encounterotherbodiesand in somecasesthe singulararrangements of one
body are suchthat they 'fit' the singulararrangementsof the bodiesthey
encounter; together they increase each other's power of affectivity.
Sometimeshowever,somebodiesare incompatiblewith others' arrange-
ments,thus when they meet they decrease the powerof one another.
In an effort to think aboutdesireasjoy,Deleuzeborrowsfrom Spinoza's
schemaof intensities.To the extentthat desireis not phantasmatic, desire
is the power that one has, which allows one to go as far as this power
pgrmits: the powerto annexbeing.Here the distinctionbetweenprogres-
sive and regressiveannexationbecomesthe urgent task of the ethicist.
Deleuze'sallegianccto Spinozapermits him to arguethat the questionof
the effort of thc individualto maintainand prokrnghis cxistcnccis tlso
264 STATE
STATE 265

a questionof how to enablethe maximumexperienceof activeaffects.The

and sustaina more sophisticateddivision of labour. Against this view,
order of fortuitousencountersdoesnot giveus an edgebecauseit leadsto
Clastresarguedthe Stateis the condition for undertakingsignificanteco-
the formation of inadequateideas- an inadequareidea being the idea
nomic and political projectsand the division of labour that ensuesfrom
whosecauseis not in our own powerto understand.Nevertheless, evenan theseprojects,and so logically and empirically the division of labour does
inadequateideacausesan affect,and an affect,whoseadequatecausewe are
not condition economicand political projects.Deleuzeand Guattari follow
not, is a passion.Conversely,an adequateidea finds its formal causein our
Clastresin repudiatingthis evolutionisttheory.
power to think and to understand,and also generatesan affectin us, an
In CapitalismandSchizophrenia,Deleuzeand Guattari view the Stateas
affectwhoseadequatecauseis our own powerto think and is, therefore,an
an overarchingpowerthat bringstogetherlabourpowerand the prior con-
action.In this case,we no longercount on accidentalencountersto multi-
ditions for the constitution of labour power, enabling the creation of
ply joyful passions.
surplus-value.As a result, there is a constitutive antagonisticrelation
An entire geneticphenomenologyof the becoming-activeof human
between the State and labour, especiallysince the State supplies capital
beingscanbe found in Spinoza'sEthics,and this is what inspiresDeleuze's
with its modelsof realisation,and sothereis alsonecessarily an antagonism
ethicsof joy. We begin with passivedesires/joysthat increaseour power ro
betweencapitaland labour.Capitalexistsand perpetuatesitselfby organ-
act despite the fact that they are at the mercy of inadequateideas.But,
ising itself to orchestrateand contain this proletarianantagonism.The
then, thanks to thesedesiresand passions,we begin to form common
necessary concomitantof the State'sapparatuses'capacity to engagein this
notions, or adequateideas.Active desire/joy accompaniesthe common
task of organisationis the production of surplus-valueand facilitating
notionsasour powerto act increases. Finally,activeioy replacespassions, accumulation.As a result,capitaland the Stateareunder unceasinginter-
filling us with new capacitiesto be affected;this combinationconsrirutes
nal pressureto neutraliseand containthe antagonismthat, paradoxically,
the activelife of the individual.In turn our capacityro understandsadness
is the very thing that enablesit to exist. The assemblages
createdand main-
and contrariety is enhanced,and as we developa better understandingof
tained by the Stateand capital createa collectivesubiectivity which estab-
theseaffectionsour activejoy increases.
lishes the material aspects of the productive forces that generate
At this time, the influenceof Friedrich Nietzschein Deleuze'sethicsof
surplus-valueandby sodoingmakeproductionandaccumulationpossible.
joy is revealed:the pedagogyfor the formulation of adequateideas
Along with the formationof collectivesubjectivitygoesthe (State's)power
becomesthe processof the counter-actualisation of that which happensto of subjection.
us. It is no longerthe generalityof the commonnotion that standsfor the
The State'scapacityto engagein the formationof a collectivesubjectiv-
cogitandum of practicalreason;it is the eventthat must be graspedthrough
ity, neededto constitute labour as a productive force, doesnot remain the
the processof counter-actualisation.The sadnessin the stateof affairspas-
samethroughout history. The despoticState in early historical times used
sively affecting us is transformed into a ioyful affirmation of the event.
slaveryand serfdomwith their accompanyingforms of subjectivity for this
Passiveaffectionsare turned into activeonesthat are capableof transvalu-
task;industrialcapitalismusedthe figureof the massworkerand disciplin-
ing and transformingstatesof affairs.
ary socialformations;and today, in the age of a globalisedand world-
integrated capitalism,the State is still neededto regulate the flows of
productionand to reproducethe forms of accumulation.But this powerof
STATE dominationis no longermediatory,as wasthe casewith the previouseco-
nomic dispensations,in as much asthe State is no longer neededto create
Kenneth Surin and maintain classesand other socialand economicsubgroupings.Instead,
the function of the State/capitalin the current phaseof capitalistaccumu-
Deleuzeand Guattarihavea conceptionof the Statethat is indebtedto the
lation is to engagein the work of disaggregation,to segment,through
work of the anthropologistand anarchistPierre Clastres.Clastreshad
administrativeproceduresand the useof mediaand informationalsystems,
arguedagainstthe conventionalevolutionistaccountof the emergenceof
the countervailingpowerthat the proletariathasdeveloped.Capital/State
the Stateas a form of political and socialorganisation.Accordingto this
hasa negativerelationshipto the forcesand forms that opposcit.
traditional account,the Statecan developonly when a socictyrcnchcsir
In thc prcscntcapitalistc<tnjuncturc, thc authorsof Cupitulismuntt
ccrtaindcgrccof complcxity,cvidcnccdprimrrrilyby its capacityto crciltc
Sthizophrcnia sry thitt crrpitnlisnr
is an indcpcndcnt,worklwidcirxiolrrirtic
 $t

267
266 ST RAT IF ICAT ION S TR A TIFIC A TION
i
that is like a single City, megalopolis, or 'megamachine' of which the States As such, the term provides both an organising form for discussion, as well
are parts, or neighbourhoods. Towards this end, capitalism will cven create as the subject matter or content contained by that form.
States that are not viable, like Somalia and Rwanda, for its own purposes: The processes(rather than just the effects) of everyday experience are l
subjugating minorities through forced integration and extermination. In invoked by Deleuze and Guattari in order to show interweaving journeys
the present conjuncture, that is, the age of the societies of control (as between statesofconsciousnessand unconsciousnessthat we both take and
opposed to thc disciplinary societies of the previous epoch), capital has make routinely and repetitively. These often forgotten journeys and the
become the ubiquitous milieu that secures the isomorphism of even the non-cognitive decisions that accompany our movements are precisely l
most disparate forms (commercial, religious, artistic, and so forth). In this where a potential line of flight or becoming may be located, and in evoking
milieu, productive labour is inserted into every section of society: the uni- largely taken-for-granted State systems,all processesof becoming occur -
versality of capital is simultaneous with the omnipresence of everything at lcast initially - within these systems.
that createssurplus-value, as human subiectivity' leisure and play, and so In what is perhaps the most useful and accessibleparadox of Plateau 3 of
on, are incorporated into the latest regimes of accumulation. Capitalism A Thousand. Plateaus,a primary point of discussionemergesas the relation-
has always striven to create an economic order that is able to function ship betweenthe production and reception of language(via theoriesof semi-
without the State, and in its current phasethis propensity has become more otics). As paradoxicalmeta-narrativeforms, the chaotic principles motivaring
marked than ever. However, for Deleuze and Guattari this is not because maintenanceof the conccptsof the carth and God function to destabilisethe
the State itself has been abolished, but rather because the separation claims for truth or universality that are often associatedwith somehowmore
between State and society can now no longer be maintained. Society and seamlesssemiotic theorics that attempt to provide a generalisingexplanation
State now constitute a single and unified nexus, and all capital has become for all aspectsof reality. Instead, Deleuze and Guattari show that language,
social capital. Hence the production of social cooperation, undertaken pri- like all systemsand all aspectsof life, is constituted by a seriesof strata that
marily by the service and informational industries in developed countries' have been traditionally contained by physiochemical,organic or anthropo-
has become crucial for capitalism. Deleuze and Guattari insist that the morphic catcgories.Straddling these fields, languageaffects every aspectof
deterritorialising effect of State/Capital merely produces an even more the universe by contextualisingthem within a singlc sphere of interaction.
powerful reterritorialisation, that is, State/Capital only breacheslimits in For Deleuze and Guattari, every articulation (or stratum) consists of
order to impose its own limits. abstract and discrete components. In accord with this, language(and semi-
otics as the scienceof language)can clearly be seenas an organising principle
that presumes to make senseof our experienceof these components that,
Connective when combined, produce realit,v.However, while acknowledging that they
Capitalism need to invoke the system they aim to critique (languagemust be used for
generalcommunication to occur between writers and readers),Deleuze and
Guattari also show that linguistic terms or signifiers rend ro be used in such
generalisingand structural ways that they ceaseto function linguistically in
STRATIFICATION relation to a specific idea or field of content. As such, the signifier comes ro
adopt instead a kind of physical or distinct independenceand objecthood,
K1lie Message whereby the relationship betweensignifier and signified is further obliterated.
Deleuze and Guattari explain 'stratification' is an ongoing, rhizomatic Deleuze and Guattari contend that all articulations are always already a
processthat contributes to the line of emergenceor becoming.This double articulation becausethey are consrituted by the dual components of
processmay (or may not) lead to our reiectionof a unifying subiectivity content and expression. We can understand this to mean that strata come
and embraceinsteadthe forever-formativeBody without Organs(BwO). in pairs and are themselvesmade up of a double articulation that can then
However,the process/term'stratification' alsorefersto whatis cssentially be recognisedas molar and molecular (and bound by the third evcn more
an organising principleof sorts,whercby it assistswritersin thcir rrttcmpt varirblc tcrm/linc <lf nomaclic),<lr which wc miry lltcrnativcly consiclcr
-
irctivclyto ilpply- or put iuto prircticc thcir (.1 'l'httusttntl
iclcas l)ltrlcttrts throttgh tl rc lcr r r r s of ''cxlt r cssior r 'r r ncl 'cr ) nlcnl'( t lr csc r clllr r r . cllr c
rrirls t1 p rrt tillt h ir s c lic s of ' ' 1' r r : t gt t t r t lit ' s 't r tl l t c t 'l l t r t t t r t b s t t 'i t c t t h c o l i e s ) .
.S i tttssttri rttt ol 'sigr r ilict ''r r nt l'sigr r iliet l')I.low't 'r cr ', : rir
cor) ( 'cl) ls s r t lit 'ir t crlrl r
 s u BJ Ec rIVIrY
SU BJEC TIVITY 269
268

in Foucault he writes that 'the struggle for [modern] subjectivity presents

the more generally acceptedbreakdown in referential relations between the
itself, therefore,as the right to difference,variation and metamorphosis' (D
signifier and signified, it is important to note that the layers, planes or dis-
1988b: 106).The reconciliationof thesepositions hinges on our ability to
crete strata of content or expression are arbitrary. There is no referential,
read each one of them as a separateanswer to a distinct question.
signifier-signified, or cause-and-effect relationship regulating their pro-
ln Empiricismand Subjectioity, Deleuze outlines that the inrensive, inre-
duction or existence, despite the fact that the layers may cooperate with
grative act of our practical interesr (extension of an initially intensive - yet
each other or bleed into one another in order to produce new strata or lines
narrow - moral sympathy over those who are not our kin), together with the
of deterritorialisation.
associativerules of our speculative interest, make the organisation of sub-
The concept of 'stratification' is an attempt to promote a new kind of jectivity possible.Far from establishingthe seamlessidentity of the subiect,
thinking about the way language produces an image of reality (and is itself
this organisation shows us that the subiect's constitution is a fiction, for the
reframed as a product of this same activity). Language is an important
subject is an entity out of joint (cracked).There would be no belief in the
point of focus becauseit is both a grand and minor narrative, and an organ-
subject without the (illegitimate and fictitious) belief in God and the World
ising as well as organised principle through which our subiectivity is only
- illegitimate, becauseneither God nor World can evcr be objects of know-
ever provisionally contained.
ledge. Yet, these fictions act as the horizons of all possiblebeliefs, including
the (illegitimate and fictitious) belief in the subject and its unity.
Connectives For Deleuze in Dffirence and Reltetition, the subject is the tensive
arrangement of many larval subjects. A self exists as long as a contracting
Becoming
machine, capableof drawing a difference from repetition, functions some-
Body without Organs
where. There is a self lurking in the eye; another in the liver; a third in the
Lines of flight
stomach.A subject is the inclusive disjunction borne from the contracrion
Rhizome
of all these selves.
Semiotics
In Cultitalism and,Schizophrenia, the subject's recognition of itself as
Signifier/signified
subject is described by Deleuze and Guattari as 'retrospective'. It emerges
Subjectivity
not as the agent of selection but as an after-effect of desiring-production.
Capitalism and the isolation of the nuclear family from society that cap-
italism facilitates provide a perfect rraining ground for the ascetic subject-
SUBJECTIVITY ivity that capitalism requires. It also reproduces patriarchy by producing
hicrarchically gendered subiects in accordance with specific values and
Constantin V Boundas imperatives that thrive within the nuclear family.
Meanwhile, in The Fold a subject is that which comes ro a poinr of view,
Deleuzeabandonsthe old imageof the subiectasa fixedsubstance or foun-
or rather that which remains at the point of view, provided that the point
dation stone, in favour of a subject that is the provisionaloutcomeof
of view is one of variation. It is not the point of view that varies within the
a processof subjectivation.The Deleuziansubiectis an assemblage of het-
subject; on the contrary it is the condition through which an eventual
erogeneous elementswhosesourceis not the interiority of the traditional
subject apprehendsvariation. A subject is a monad that includes in itself -
imageof thought.Deleuzeinsiststhat subiectivityis not given;it is always
and also conveys - the entire World obscurely, by expressing clearly only
underconstruction.
a small region of the world.
At first glance,Deleuze'sshiftingattitudesaboutsubiectivityseemto defy
(a Deleuze and Guattari propose in Foucault that the inside is an operation
reconciliation.First, in Empiricism he outlinesthat subject
and,Subjectialry
ol the outside or a doubling up of the outside. Here, rhe subject is the result
is definedby themovementthroughwhichit is developed' (D l99l: 85' 86).
of a processof subjectivationin accordancewith four foldings. These are
Second,in the Dialogues he explainsthat thereare 'no more subiccts,but
as foll<lws:first, thc mrrtcriirlpirrt of <lursclvcs;sccond,thc f<llclingof firrcc;
dynamic individuations without whichconstitr,rte
subjects, collcctivcilsscm-
thi rcl , thc ti rlclingo1'knowlcdgc;it nd f ir ur t lr , t hc f ir lclir r gof 't hc or r t sidc.A
blirgcs. . . N<lthingbccomcs subjcctivcbut f:tkc
haccccitics shapcrtccording
l ()fl7:().1). l )ct' sol docs
t tt ol lir lt l t hc lilr ccscor r r posir rlht
g 'r r r ,wit lr or r tt hc or r t sit lt . it sr . ll'
I rl t ltc c:rlrtpositiottstll'rtott-strbicct s'
ivcpowcrsrtttdcll'cct (l ) l ,rrst
,
270 suBJEcrrvrry + ARr
also being folded, henceforming a self within a person.Folding is the
memoryof the outside.
Further, the 'other' asit is discussedin TheLogicof Sensemakespossible
the categoriesof 'subject'and 'object'. The other is the structureof all pos-
sible worlds: it inhabits the transitionsfrom one object to another;it rela-
tivisesdistancesand differences;it forms the backgroundfrom which forms
riseup; and the otherspatialises and temporalises.
The intensivebracketing
of 'the other', therefore,is tantamountto the intensivebracketingof 'the
Self'. The familiarworld and the subjectsthat inhabitit, in the presence of
others,release andmolecularise the elementsandsingularities that werepre-
viously sedimentedand stratified inside them. The ideology of 'lack' and
negationthat kept the subject'sdesirecaptiveis now shownto be the result
of socio-historicalprocessesof subjectivation,rather than the irreducible
datum of subjectivity.What emergesafter the bracketingof the other as
structureof all possibleworldsis the 'otherwiseother'- l'autrement qu'autre.
Connectives
Capitalism
Desire
Fold
Memory
SUBJECTIVITY + ART
Simon O'Sullizsan
Deleuzehasbeenportrayedasa philosopherof dissolution,asa thinker of
flowsand intensitiessomehow'outside'ofior'beyond', the human.Indeed
a cursoryreadingof A Thousand, Plateausmight leadone to supposethat
Deleuzeand Guattari are interesredin 'escaping'lived life. Certainlythis
trajectory is there, perhapsmost infamouslyin the notion of the Body
without Organs (BwO), understood as a srrategythat helps free us from
the strata that constitutesus aJ human (that is to say,in a particular con-
figuration). However Deleuze's philosophy is also very much one of
caution,for it is nevera questionof wildly destratifyingbut of dosages, of
finding creatioelinesof flight that leadsomewhere and from which one can
'return'. Deterritorialisationalwaysendsin a reterritorialisationandin fact
needsa territory from which to operate.
It is in this sensethat Deleuzemight alsobe understoodasa construc-
tivephilosophcr. (lcrtainlyhc is involvcdin thc prodigionsconsrruction of
suBJEcrrvrtv * Rnr 271
concepts,asevidencedby this dictionary.However,we might alsoseehim,
asbeinginvolvedin the parallelprojectof
specificallyin his collaborations,
the construction,or production,of subjectivity.This is evenmore the case
with Guattari's own work, which wasalwaysinvolved in thinking through
what Guattaricalled'resingularisation': the potentialityfor, and practical-
ities o( reconfiguringour subjectivities.For Guattari, asfor Deleuze,this
is a pragmaticand specificallymaterialistproject. Through involvement
with certain materialsof expression,with groups and individuals,and
alwayswith an toutside'we can open up new universesof reference:new
waysof seeingand beingin the world. For Guattari La Borde clinic oper-
atedasjust sucha siteof transformation.It encouragednew relationships
and new experiences. At stakehere wasnot the reintegrationof a 'cured'
individual into society,but an encouragementto becomeinvolved, to par-
ticipate,in one'sown processualself-creation.Whateverthe successes or
failuresof the clinic, we havehere an interestingframeworkfor thinking
thosecollaborativeand collectiveart practicesof todaythat might be seen
as producingcommunitiesand subjectivitiesin preciselythis sense.This
field of expandedpractice,or 'relationalaesthetics'asit hasbecomeknown
doesnot requirespectatorsassuch,but participantswho are'transformed'
through their interactionwith the practice.
We might recognise Deleuze's Spinozism here. Indeed Baruch
Spinoza'sethicsinvolvesa similar mappingto the above:the organisation
of one'sworld so as to produce productive- that is joltful - encounters.
Involving the coming togetherof two 'bodies'that essentiallyagreewith
oneanother,suchencountershavethe concomitantresultof increasingour
capacityto act in the world. We might call this a 'rhizomaticsof friend-
ship', the latter understood in its broadest sense.For Spinoza, ethics
involvesexploring what a body,in both the individual and collectivesense,
is capableof that beginswith ethical principlesor guidelines,but ultim-
ately it producesan understandingof one'sself and world - and in fact a
certainovercomingof one'sseparationfrom the world.
Perhapsthe key factor preventingthesetransformationsis habit. Here
'habit' is takento meannot just our daily routinesbut alsoour dominant
refrainsand typical reactionsto the world. In this senseaestheticsbecomes
important.For namingasit doesa'disinterested'response to the world, aes-
thetics can operateas a rupture in otherwisedominant r6gimesof signifi-
cationand expression(the clich6sof our beingand indeedof our consumer
culture).Aestheticshereneednot be a transcendent category,ratherwe can
think of it simplyasthe generationof unexpectedaffectsin andon thebody.
This rupture canand doesproducepossibilitiesfor resingularisation.
Anothcrwayof thinkingthis 'immancntacsthctic'is asinvolvinga kind
of'hcsitationor gilp bctwccnstimulusrnd rcsponsc.In his uscof'llcnri
272 SUBSTANCE
Bergson, Deleuze attends to this: the pause between action and reaction is
what constitutes the human as a particularly complex brain-body assem-
blage. This pause allows a certain amount of freedom and the possibility
for a more creative responseto the world. Put differently, in today's world
it is important to change speed, to slow down sometimes and even at times
to remain still. Art, in fact the contemplationof art, might have a role to play
here (this is also the sensein which meditation can be understood as a cre-
ative technology of self production). In some sensessuch an 'aesthetic' is
'beyond' subjectivity.
Throughout his work, Deleuze attends to those experiences that are
atypical and 'non-ordinary'. For example, what happens to an individual in
a 'world without others'? Here the interaction with the world takes on an
idiosyncratic and perverted character. The individual harnesses cosmic
forces and 'becomesworld'as it were. Again this might be a name for certain
art practices from prehistory to today, those that allow accessto a kind of
immanent beyond to the everyday, and to everyday consciousness.We
might say, then, that this is the aesthetic - and,ritualistic - function of art
that always accompaniesthe latter's ethical or indeed political character.
S UB S T A NC E
Claire Colebrook
Deleuze might appear to be a purely inventive philosopher, avowedly cre-
ating concepts and vocabularieswhile rejecting the constraints of already
formed metaphysical systcms.Certainly, he would seemto be a far cry from
the project of Martin Heidegger that approached Being through its philo-
sophical history. Central to Heidegger's destruction of the history of phi-
losophy was the way in which the concept and grammar of 'substance' had
dominated thinking. In Dffirence and Repetition,Deleuze repeatedly refers
to Heidegger's project of re-activating thinking, and part of this re-
activation depends upon avoiding the logic of a certain understanding of
substance.However, it is not only in his early works on the history of phi-
losophy but also in his later work with Guattari that Deleuze cngageswith
the concept of 'substance'. There are two reasons for the importance of
this concept. Philosophically, the concept of susbstancegoes back to the
Greek term, hypoheimenon,or that which underlies, and to the concept of
ousia, or that which remains present through a series of changcs. We can
think of a substanccthat thenhas variousaccidentalqualitics or ;rlcclicittcs.
'l'lrc lrist<lry<lf mctlphysics has thcrcfilrc clcbltccl just whrrt cor,u'ltsils
(rr th i tl ttl l o tt w l ti c h rrl lo th c r p ropcrti cstl cpcrrtl .l )cl crrzcti rkcs
it s t t bs liur c c,
SU BSTAN C E 273
part in, at the same time as he overturns this debate. For Deleuze, part of
this overturning is to think of substance,not as a noun - something that
is - but as an infinitive: not, 'The tree li green,' but a power 'to green'. So,
Deleuze acceptsthe function of substance- that from which differentiated
beings are expressed- but he does not seesubstanceas some ultimate bcing
or entity, but as a power of creation and expression.
If we think of substance(as it is traditionally defined) as what exisrs in
itself before all relations, requiring no other being in order to be, then this
has two resonances in Deleuze's philosophy. First, following Baruch
Spinoza, Dcleuze argues that substance cannot be numerically several.
This is becauseSpinoza adoptsthe traditional definition of somethingthat
exists iz itself,,but also saysthat substanceis conceived through itself,We do
not need more than one substance- say,the substanceof mind that will
represent or know the substanceof matter. Substance- or what is - unfolds
in two modes: the mode of extension (or spatial matter) and the mode of
thought or mind. So there is iust one substancethat is then expressedboth
in thought and in body. If there were more than one substance- say mind
and body (which is the Cartesian answer) - then we would have to explain
a relation between the two. But it is the very nature of substanceto be inde-
pendent of its relation to anything else. Substancemust then be one, but it
must also expressitself differently. Indeed, real difference is only possible
on such an account. We should not, for example, think of different minds
as different substances.What is numerically several - all the different
minds in the world - is substantially univocal; each mind is an expression
of the one power of life to express itself in the arrribute of mind; each is
a different mode of the one attribute. Becausethere is only one substance
we cannot say that mind is the origin or author of matter, or vice versa; all
dualisms arc invalid and arise from mistaking the expressionsof substance
- the relations unfolded from substance- for relations between substance.
No substanceis the causeor ground of any other; there is just one univocal
substance that expressesitself infinitely, and cannot be reduced to any of
its expressions,effects or accidents. This allows Deleuze to think of sub-
stance in terms of powers or potentials. We cannot reduce life to already
effected relations, for there is alsoa power or potential to produce relations.
In this sense,then, the metaphysical function of substance,as that which
exists in itself before relations, and through itself, forms a vital role in
Deleuze's work.
In traditional metaphysics,a substanceis whatever can exist without
requiring :rny other being in order to be. For instance,there cannot be
whitcncss without somc thing that is whitc; substirnccis thc bcarcr of
prccl i ci ttcsor pr opcr t ics. l) clcuzc's phikr sophy is conccr r r cd wit h t hc
fnthl utt ol ' st t bslit t t cc, lir t 't hc t t st r t l cor r r r r r it nr cr rlo
t sr r llslir r r cclr llows
27+ TERRI TO RY
philosophersto establishan ultimate reality or ground - what really is -
before its different expressionsor perceptions.Even more importantly,
God wasestablishedasthe only true substance,while all other beingswere
saidto 'be' only by analogy.Againstontologyand the notion of substance
asa precedingground,Deleuzearguesthat all beingspossess full reality-
whiteness,a memory,a smile, a potentiality - and are equally real and are
formally distinct while numericallyone (that is, are truly different only
becausethereis only one substance and sonothing is a lesserbeingin rela-
tion to anyother).
Connectives
Memory
Real
Spinoza
TERRITORY
Kylie Message
ln A Thousand, Plateaus,Deleuzeand Guattari privilege ideasof spatiality
(evidencedby the privilegedterm of'plateau') and the geographiesand
cartographiesof movement,presentingtheseas an informal antidoteto
history (here they can be distinguishedfrom Michel Foucault).Even in
historyis presentedasbeingsubsirmedwithin
their geologicaldiscussions,
the constitutionof space;it is significantfor the role that time plays in
movement acrossfields (in, for example,its relations of speedand slow-
ness),but nobfor its institutionalisedmodeof categoricaldating.
Rather than denying the affectivityof history Deleuzeand Guattari
reject the universalisingchronologicalgrand narrativestrategiesthat are
frequently associatedwith it. In their preferencefor lines of flight and
becoming,they critique history for beinga tool of the unitary Stateappar-
atus.These,linesare understoodnot only as a deterritorialisingimpulse,
but they alsocontributeto the spatial,materialandpsychological compon-'
ents that constituteor deconstitutea society,group, or individual (those
apparatusesthat comprisehistory as a lived, experientialassemblage of
eventsandcircumstances). All thesecomponentshclp produce the concept
TE R R ITOR Y 275
of a 'territory' that concomitantlyaccompanies the conceptsof 'deterrito-
rialisation'and'reterritorialisation'.
The conceptof'territory' evadeseasycategorisation because ratherthan
being a sedentaryplacemaintainingfirm bordersagainstoutsidethreat,
the territory itself is a malleablesiteof passage. As an assemblage, it exists
in a stateof processwhereby it continually passesinto somethingelse.
However,it alsomaintainsan internal organisation.A territory is alsoan
assemblage that, asa necessary componentof deterritorialisation,accom-
paniesthe conceptof 'nomadology'.A territory refers to a mobile and
shifting centre that is localisableas a specific point in spaceand time. It
doesnot privilegeor maintain the nostalgicor xenophobicprotectionof
any particularhomeland;instead,this centre(that may be more correctly
calleda 'vector' becauseit can resideoutsideof the assemblage/territory)
expresses an experientialconceptthat hasno fixed subjector object.It is
neither symbolicnor representational, and doesnot signify.As an assem-
blage,a territory manifestsa seriesof constantlychangingheterogeneous
elementsand circumstances that cometogetherfor variousreasonsat par-
ticular times.Although a territory establishes connectionsfrom the areas
of representation,subject,conceptand being, it is distinct from a fixed
image, signification or subjectivity.Through this, we can seethat a terri-
tory is primarily marked by the ways movementoccurs over the earth,
rather than by Stateborders.A territory is necessarily lived and produced
asa vagueentity becauseof this desireto avoidcategorisation by language
or other Stateapparatuses. Hence,it is closelyconnectedto molecular-
cognitiveand non-cognitive- modesof movement.
A territory doesnot simply hold backthe processof deterritorialisation,
nor doesit provideit with an opposingor dichotomousterm (Deleuzeand
Guattari contendthat there is no needto leavethe territory to follow a line
of deterritorialisation). Neither doesa territory providea baseor originary
term (home) from which deterritorialisationmay occur.Instead,it is a con-
stantaccompaniment to (andevenproponentfacilitating)the linesof flight
deterritorialisationproposes. o
In addressingthe idea of territory, Deleuzeand Guattari discussmany
examples,from the refrain of the birdcall (which they describeasa mode
of expressionthat both draws a territory and envelopsinto territorial
motifs and landscapes)to the role played by the artist's signature,that
equateswith placing a flag on a pieceof land. However,they frequently
return to the relationshipbetweenterritory and the earth in order to show
that the territory does not escapefrom maintainingits own organising
principleand structure.This exampleis usedto illustratethat sucha rela-
tionship is not dichotomoussimply,in the sensethat one term can be
differentiatedin a straightforwardmanncr from the othcr. lnstead,takcn
276 THEO RY
together, these terms show the magnetic pull that often works toward
accumulating a synthesisof apparently disjunctive terms. As such, territo-
ries cannot contain or encompass the earth, but neither can the earth be
fixed to a single territory. On the other hand, even though the earth
embraces all territories (as a seriesof molecular or nomadic moments col-
lected bytheconjoining'. . . and. . . and. . . and' logic that motivatesit),
it is also the force of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation since its
continuous movements of development and variation unfold new relations
of materials and forces (predicated on a relationship of speed and slow-
ness).So, in contrast to the specific or localisabletime and place offered by
territories, the earth offers up an alternative complex assemblage(and
various productive lines of becoming or fligh$ - the Body without Organs.
Connectives
Body without Organs
Deterritorialisation/Reterritorialisation
Earth/Land
Lines of flight
Nomadicism
THEORY
Bruce Baugh
Deleuze'smost interestingthoughtson theory comein a discussionwith
Michel Foucault,where he puts forward the following idea: 'A theory is
exactlylike a box of tools . . . It must be useful.It must function' (D&F
1977:208).A theory is somethingthat we must constructasa responseto
a problem,and if it ceases to be usefr,rl,
then 'we haveno choicebut to con-
struct others'. This approachto theory is inherently practical,although
Deleuzedistinguishesbetweentheoreticaland practicalactivity while at
the sametime arguingthat theoryis neithera foundationfor practicesthat
would merelyapply universaltheoriesto particularcases) nor the resultof
a reflectionon particularpracticesthat extractuniversalnorms from par-
ticular cases.Rather than being universal,a 'theory is alwayslocal and
relatedto a limited field'. Extendingtheory to practiceis not merely the
applicationof universalrules or theoremsto particularcases,but a 'rclay'
to a 'more or lessdistant field of practice'in responseto 'obstrcles,walls
anclbkrckrrgcs' within thc thcory'sown immirncntcl<lmirin. lly 'rclirying'to
irs'ruroll.rtr
l)rrlcticc lyllc ol'discotrlsc'with rrdill'crcrrl
rl<lrrrairr,
lhcrlr'.y
rrsc:s
I
TH EOR Y 2t7
practice as a way of overcoming its internal difficulties, making practice
serye as 'a set of relays between one theoretical point and another' (D&F
1977: 206). Conversely, theory can serve as a relay from one practice to
another, connecting one practical field to a different one in order to over-
come a practical impasse. In the latter case,theory does not represent or
'speak for' practice, any more than practice 'applies' theory: 'there's only
action - theoretical and practical action' connected in networks and relays.
As an example, Deleuze refers to his and Foucault's work with prisoners as
a way of connecting 'official discoursesof confinement' to the discourse of
the confined themselves,a move that is simultaneously theoretical and prac-
tical. As Foucault puts it in the same dialogue, 'Theory does not express,
translate, or serve to apply practice: it is practice' (D&F 1977:208).
Nowhere else does Deleuze offer such a positivc appreciation of theory,
which he usually downgrades in contrast with thought: 'Thinking's never
just a theoreticalmatter. It has to do with vital problems' (D 1995:105).Yet
thought sharesmany characteristicswith what he said about'theory'in the
dialogue with Foucault. Thought is a practical activity, work; philosophy,
specifically,is thought-experimentation through the creation of concepts,
each concept being a responseto a problem whose conditions and scopethe
concept helps define, and each concept being created in the midst ofalready
existing concepts which encounter impassesor blockagesthat require new
conceptsas'bridgesor crossroads'enablingthem to join up with other con-
cepts responding to problems subject to the same conditions (D&G 1994:
27).'A concept lacks meaning to the extent that it is not connected to other
concepts and is not linked to a problem that it resolves or helps resolve'
(D&G 1994:79). Problems necessarilychangealong with the changing con-
ditions of thought and action. Thought, then, is a strategy in the face of
problems, and seekssolutions through creating concepts, ways of thinking,
and a system of coordinatesthat dynamically relatesthoughts and problems
to one another. On this conception, the 'practice' that serves as a relay
between one theoretical point and another is thought itself, and the singu-
lar theoretical points are concepts in the caseof philosophy, affectsand per-
cepts in the caseof art, and functions in the caseof science.
Deleuze's pragmatic conception of theory also extends to his explan-
ation of Foucault'sdistinction betweenthe'classic'intellectual,who'could
Iay claim to universality' in virtue of the writer's social position being on a
par with jurists and lawyers who represent the universality of law, and the
'specific intellectual' who 'tends to move from one specific place or point
to anothcr', 'producing effectsnot of universalitybut of transversality,and
f r,rnctioning:rs :rn cxchangcr'betwccn cliffcrcntthcorcticirlficlcls,br.rtin thc
corl tcxt of' ;rrr t ct icr t rl ur t l polit ic: r l st lugglcs ( l) l9f ilib: 9l) . 'l'hc syr ccif ic
i nl cl l ccl rrrtl ' cs xpcr t isc or llt cot 'yis ir lwr r yslot : ir l,t 'xllr cssir r gir li'ir gr r r cnlur y
 278 THO UG HT
totality that is necessarily
limited and necessarily runs up againstimpasses
or 'walls' that can be breachedby a strategicrelay or detour through other
theoreticalfields.No intellectual,andno theory cantotalisethe entirefield
of knowledgeand action. A theory multiplies and eruprs in a totally
different areaby finding 'lateral affiliationsand entire systemof networks',
or else it loses its efficacy(D&F 1977: 212). Transversalconnections
betweentheory and practiceon the part of specificintellectualswould
include nuclearphysicistsusing their expertiseto speakagainstnuclear
weapons;a transversalrelayfrom one theoreticaldomainto anotherwould
be Deleuzeand Guattari'sstrategicshift of FriedrichNietzschefrom phil-
osophyto ethnologyin their own theoretical-politicalAnti-oed,ipus(D&G
1983:190-l).
Connectives
Concepts
Foucault
THOUGHT
John Marks
In his earlier work, and in particular Dffirence and,Repethion,Deleuze
talksof a dominant'Imageof thought'that he setsout to challenge,explor-
ing the possibilityof a 'thought without image'.The imagethat Deleuze
challengesis essentiallydogmaticand moral. In this sense,it is represen-
tational in nature, in that it presupposesthat 'everyoneknows, what it
meansto think, and that the only prerequisitefor'thought'is an individ-
ual in possession of goodwill and a 'natural capacity'for thought. Ren6
Descartes,for example,presumesthat everybodyknowswhat is meantby
self, thinking and being. For Deleuze, this image of thought as cognito
natura is extraordinarilycomplacent.Instead,he claims that we think
rarelyand more often under the impulseof a shockthan in the excitement
of a tastefor thinking. Genuinethinking is necessarilyantagonistictowards
the combinationof good senseand common sensethat form the d,oxaof
receivedwisdom,and it frequentlyrequiressomethingmore than the for-
mulationsof commonlanguage.In generalterms,Deleuzechallengesthe
assumptionthat thought hasa natural affinity with the (true'. rnstead,he
claimsthat thoughtis an actof problematisation. Thought may,in this way,
hnvca prophctic rolc in anticipatingthc forcesof thc futurc. It is, morc-
ovcr'itblcto bring out thc 'ncw', ilsopposcdto cstablishcclvalucs,
TH OU GH T 279
Deleuze also arguesthat there is something that he calls an 'image
of thought' that changesthrough history. Works such as The Logic of
Sense,Proust and Signsand A Thousand,Plateausall contribute to the
study of imagesof thought, or 'noology' as Deleuzecalls it. Noology is
different from a history of thought, in that it does not subscribe to
the notion that there is a narrative developmentin thought. It is not
the casethat there is a sort of long-term debatein the courseof which
either some ideas and concepts win the day, or disagreements are
eventuallyturned into consensus.This would be a history of thought as
the uncovering or construction of universals.Deleuze talks instead in
terms of 'geophilosophy';the superimposition of layers of thought.
Drawing on Friedrich Nietzsche'sconcept of the 'untimely', Deleuze
suggeststhat what is new in a philosopher'swork remainsneq and the
reactivationof theseuntimely elementsis an important component of
Deleuze'swork.
As far asnoologyis concerned,an imageof thoughtis a systemof coord-
inates or dynamics:a sort of map that showshow we orientate ourselves
within thought. One of Deleuze'sinfluenceshere is Martin Heidegger,
who claimsthat to think is to be under way,to be on a path that one must
clearfor oneself,althoughone canhaveno certain destinationin mind. For
Deleuze,we must initially makea decisionasto our orientationin relation
to the verticaland horizontalaxes.Should we stretchout, and follow the
'line of flight' on the horizontalaxis,or should we erect vertical axes?In
other words,this constitutesa choicebetweenimmanenceand transcend-
ence.If we choosetranscendence, this entailsa further choiceto be made
betweenthree types of 'universal': contemplation,reflection and commu-
nication. Immanuel Kant seemedequipped to overturn the Image of
thought, but ultimately he was committed to an orientation in which
thought would havean upright nature.
Deleuzeclaimsthat philosopherstend to invent 'conceptualpersonae'
who will help the philosopherin questionto negotiateand establisha new
image of thought that springs from a seriesof intuitions. The conceptual
personafunctionssomethinglike the detectivein crime fiction. He is the
everymanwho must orientatehimself within the imageof thought. So,for
example,Deleuze shows how the 'rational' man of scholasticthought is
replacedby the Cartesian'idiot', who is later replacedby the Russian
'idiot'. This 'undergroundman' haswhat Deleuzecallsin a characteristic-
ally wry statement,the 'necessarymodesty' not to manageto know what
everybodyknows.He is like a characterin a Russiannovel,paralysedand
stupefiedby the coordinatesofproblems that do not correspondto repre-
scntationfllprcsuppositions.Thought may not havcrr history,but it drrcs
hirvcir drrnrttis pcrsonnc.
280 T IM E_ IM AGE
This approachto thought leads Deleuze to value and promote the
'private thinker', asopposedto the'public professor'.The model for this
sort of thinker is Baruch Spinoza,who pursuesa frugal and itinerant
lifestyle,and is in this way ableto avoidthe pitfall of confusinghis purpose
with that of the Stateor religion.Ratherthan a modelof opinion and con-
sensus,Deleuzepreferswhat he callsa 'nomadic'or 'clandestine'form of
thinking. The only form of 'communication' that is suitable ro the
contemporaryworld is the Nietzscheanarrow or Adorno's 'messagein
a bottle'. Thought is fired like an arroq in the hope thar another thinker -
a 'friend'- may pick up the arrow and fire it in turn.
Connectives
Lines of flight
Nomadicism
Noology
Spinoza
TIME-IMAGE
Tom Conley
The time-imageis what tends to govern cinemafrom the end of World
War II until the present. It is the title of the secondor dexter panel of
Deleuze's historical taxonomy of film. It designatesimages that Henri
Bergsonqualifiedas imbued with duration: a componentof time that is
neither successive nor chronological.Seenlessasmatter than felt aspure
duration time-imagesrelatea changein the configurationof the world.
They draw attention to the qualitiesof their own oprical and aural proper-
ties asmuch asthe signsor matter they represent.They tend not to favour
narrativeor beg the spectatorto identify with their content.For Deleuze
the time imageis apt to be read- itis a legibleimage- asmuch asit is seen
or given to visibility.It prompts the spectatorto rhink through the signs
with which it articulatesnarrativemarter.
In the r6gime of the movement-image,intervals are vital to the percep-
tion of motion, sensation,affectionand change;in the time-image,per-
ceptionbecomesa 'perceptionof perception',offeringa shift of emphasis
that is witnessedin the image itself rather than the linkages(or cuts)
betweenimages.What this meansis that whenmontage,the foundationof
classical cinema,losesits hold time beginsto bc increasingly spntirrliscd.
li<rrinst:rncc,in.lilmrutir thc pastor nirrrativcsthat tcll il pcrson'slif'c-strlry
TIM E- IM AGE 281
through his or her point of view is shown in flashbacks.This classical
devicegivesway,in the era of the time-image,to a perpetualduration that
cannotbe locatedin one moment or another.Memory elidestemporal dis-
tinction in wayssuch that only 'is it in the presentthat we makememory,
in order to make use of it in the future when the presentwill be past'
(D 1989:52).The time-imagefrequentlybecomesa siteof amnesiawhere
wavesof actionturn the world at largeinto a matrix in which personages
seemto float indiscriminately.Certainfilms, suchasJeanRenoir'sLa rigle
duj eu (1939)or Orson Welles'TheL ad,yfr om Shanghai (1946),suggestthat
subjectivitycan only be felt through the perceptionof time: humans,be
they spectators or charactersin film aredeterminedby the environsof time
in which they are held. Deleuzecallsthe effectthat of a 'time-crystal',a
way of being that is discoveredin a time insideof the eventthat allowsit
to be perceived.ln La rigle d.ujeuthe time-crystal might be the illuminated
greenhouse or the chateauin which the charactersareheld. In Welles'film
it would be the hall of mirrors in which the charactersshatterthe narra-
tive to pieces.
The time-image(and its crystals)is often discernedin deepfocuspho-
tography, the model par excellencefor Renoir and Welles, for whom
montage is folded into the spatial dynamics given in a single take. Yet it
acquires legibility in Godard's cinema, such as Pierrot le fou (1965) in
which a 'depth of surface'is createdby patterns of writing or abstract
forms paintedon wallsagainstwhich humanplayersseemflattened.Time-
imagesare seenin nappesor 'sheets'in what Deleuzecalls 'mental car-
tographies'of cinema (D 1989: l2l). In Alain Resnais'Hiroshirna, rnon
&mour(1959) the past is a matte surfaceon which traumatic memory-
imagesare reflectedand meld into one another.Time is bereft of dates,
thus inheringin the body and soulof the two loversestrangedin the places
wherethey happento meet.
In this continuum,cinemabecomesa site wherethought itself acquires
a force of becoming unknown to historical time. It is a power of the
irrational or unthought that is essentialto all thinking: somethingincom-
municable,somethingthat cannot be uttered, somethingundecidedor
undecidable. Where the movement-image represented, time,the time-image
is'no longerempirical,nor metaphysical; it is "transcendental"in the sense
that Kant givesthe word: time is out of joint and presentsitself in the pure
state' (D 1989: 271). Through the concept of the time-image Deleuze
(with Guattari) notes that the questionat the basisof all film theory -
'What is cinema?'-that Andr6Bazinposedturns into the question'What
is philosophy?'. Thc time-imagedernonstrates that cinemais a new prac-
ticeof imagcsrrndsignsfirr which phikrsophyis summoncdto constructir
prrcticc.'l'hus,with thc crlrrcsponcling
thcoryitndlt concc;)fr,rill corrccptol'
282 T RANSCENDENT AL EMP IR IC IS M TR A N S C E N D E N TA L E MP IR IC IS M 283

the movement-image
an enduringinquiry into the natureof cinemais set Deleuze argues,transcendentaldeduction reproducesthe empirical in
in place. transcendental form and then shieldsit from further critique.The Kantian
subject,for instance,is constructedas an explanationfor how diverse
experiences are synthesisedand unified, and then employedas the essen-
Connectives
tial precondition for any human experiencewhatsoever.
Becoming Deleuze'sdescription of his philosophy as a transcendentalempiricism
Cinema is a challengeto thesepositionsrather than a unified counter-theory.In
Duration contrastto transcendentalism, Deleuzeseeksafter the conditionsof actaal
Event rather than all possibleexperience.These conditions are not logically
Memory necessar$but contingent upon the nature of experienceas it is lived.
Movement-image Therefore, for Deleuze as for Hume, philosophy must begin with the
immediategiven- real consciousawareness - without presupposingany
categories,conceptsor axioms.Only then should it begin to developcon-
ceptsthat might refer to objectsand their relations,perceptionsand their
TRANSCENDENTAL EMPIRICISM
causes, or anyofa rangeofpsychologicalor physiologicalrelationsevident
in consciousness. It is preciselythe actualityof the empiricaland the pri-
CIiffStagoll
ority accordedrealexperiencethat, for Deleuze,arewaysof avoidingtran-
Empiricism refers to the view that the intelligible derivesalwaysfrom scendentalism's imprecisionand universalisingabstractions.
the sensible,whilst transcendentalism assumesthat experiencemust rest Deleuze's approach is a transcend,ental empiricism becauseit is an
upon somelogically necessaryfoundation. The former position is typified attempt to deducethe conditions of the possibility of consciousexperience
by the work of David Hume, who argued that ideasof consciousness are (such as the apparentconsciousimmediacy to which one refers when
derived just from sensoryimpressions,and that any test of sound reason- saying'I'). Realityasit is experienceddoesnot revealthe preconditionsof
ing shouldrefer to the natureof the connectionbetweenthe two. On this experienceand, becausesuch elementsare inaccessible to consciousness,
view,ideasand philosophicalconceptscanneverfound or logicallyprecede they necessitate transcendental,deductivestudy of their implicit condi-
senseperceptions. tions.Unlike Kant, Deleuzedoesnot conceiveof theseunthought condi-
In theorisingthe human subject,ImmanuelKant developedperhapsthe tions as abstract or necessaryphilosophical entities, but as contingent
bestknown form of transcendentalism. He soughtto identify all of the con- tendenciesbeyond the reach of empirical consciousness. As such, he pre-
ditions of the possibilityof attaining distinctively human knowledge.It is sumesno beingor subjectrohoexperiences. Deleuzefinds that the'I' only
only becausehumanspossessparticularcognitivecapabilities,he argues, everrefersto contingenteffectsof interactionsbetweenevents,responses,
that we experience the world aswe do andareableto makeclaimsaboutthe memory functions,socialforces,chancehappenings,belief systems,eco-
world as it appearsa priori. This set of capabilities- the 'forms' of sens- nomic conditions,and so on that togethermake up a life. By taking a
ibility, understandingand reason- is universaland logicallynecessary for differentapproachto the transcendental philosophersand movingbeyond
human knowledge.On Kant's account,without time and space,a rangeof a view of empiricism based upon just the epistemologicalrelationship
basicconceptsof reason(suchasmodality,quantity and quality), and 'Ideas' between ideas and senseimpressions,Deleuze shifts the philosophical
founding a kind of rational faith, there would be no knowledgeof the kind focus from determining a foundation of likenessamongst humans to
evidentin the humanexperienceof the world. As such,the categories and revealingand celebratingthe contingency,dissimilarityand varietyof each
conditionsuncoveredby Kant areclaimedto be true of all selves. individual life.
Accordingto Deleuze,this argumentfails on two counts.First, it does
not accountfor differencesbetweenwhateveroneknowsofa phenomenon
Connectives
in advanceand what one learnsabout it a posteriori.Second,Kant con-
ceivesof experienceonly in terms of re-presentation and consistencies in Actuality
mcntll functioning from timc to timc irnclpcrson to pcrson. As such, FIunrc
284 T RAN s c EN D E N T A L E M p rR IcrsM + poLITIC S
Kant
Real
Virtual/Virtuality
TRANSCENDENTAL EMPIRICISM + POLITICS
Bruce Baugh
Deleuzeoften quotedAlfred North Whitehead'sdictum that the abstract
doesnot explain,but needsto be explained.This thought standsat the
basisof both Deleuze'stranscendentalempiricism that searchesfor the real
conditions of actual experiencerather than for the abstractconditions of
any possibleexperience, and of his politics.Empiricismwantsto hold onto
the concreterichnessof experience,and to resistabstractuniversalsby
insistingon the situatedand historicalnatureof the conditionsof experi-
ence.Deleuzianpolitics likewiseinsistson the singularityof experiences
and practices,rather than merely seeingtheseas either instancesof some
universalrule or exceptionsto the rule. Yet, in contrast with classical
empiricism and liberalism, transcendentalempiricism holds that the
empirical is not composedof discrete givens,but of concreteparticulars
(individuals,groups)definedby the history of their contingentand actual
relationswith other beings.Againstidealismand Marxism, transcenden-
tal empiricismseesall supposedlynecessary universalsand structuresas
beingeithercausallyor logicallydependenton contingentparticulars,and
thus asthemselves contingent.
Classical empiricism (fohn Locke, George Berkeley, David Hume)
holds that universalclassterms, predicatesand relations('dog', 'black',
'next to') are derived through abstractionfrom particular experiences,
(constant
and linked together through habits of associationbasedon the
conjunction' of those experiences;pnlike in Plato, universals have no
independent standing, and particulars do not depend on universals.
Classicalliberalism(ThomasHobbes,John Stuart Mill andJohn Locke)
similarly holds that aggregatessuch as 'society' and 'the State' are
nothing over and abovethe individuals which composethem, and so are
dependenton individuals,rather than the reverse.The'independence'of
individuals in classicalliberal theory is the basisof its demandfor indi-
vidual rights and liberty, understoodas freedom from the coercionof
societyor the State.
Although Deleuzeagreesthat the universaldependson the particular,
he rejcctsthc 'atomism'of experiences and of individuals.For Deleuze,
scnsntions itrc not 'givcns',but musthc cxplaincdby crtnditittns involving
TR AN SVER SAL ITY 285
a complexand mostly unconscioussetof relationsamongdifferentbodies'
powersof acting and reacting.Similarly,individualsare conditionednor
just by other individualswith whom they interact,but by factorscommon
to all ofthem (language, socialrelations,biologicalstructures,technology).
Liberalism's'individual' is supersededby what Deleuzecalls an 'assem-
blage'(agencement): a conjunctionof a numberof persons,forcesand cir-
cumstances, capableof its own collectiveexperiencesand actions.Rather
than the rights and libertiesof individuals,power or agencyis the prime
concernof Deleuzianpolitics.Ratherthan universalprinciplesbeing the
criteriaby which practicesareevaluated,pracricesarejudgedentirelywith
respectto whether their effectsincreaseor decreasesomeone'sor some-
thing's power of acting. Principlesemergeas a reflectionon how much
certain practicesincreaseor decreaseagency,as an a,posteriorigeneralisa-
tion, rather than an a priori necessary condition.
Like Deleuze,Marxismalsoarguesthat socialrelations- particularlyeco-
nomic relations- condition individual experienceand agency.Yet, unlike
classicalMarxism,Deleuzedoesnot believethat'classes'are basicunits of
analysis,or that the economicbaseis more fundamentalthan the ideological
superstructure.Socialand economicstructures,forms of thought, norms of
action, are all producedthrough particular and contingentconjunctionsof
desires,actionsand affects,and are all part of an assemblage in which each
elementis conditionedby all the others.'Classes'are abstractin relation to
assemblages that are not just subdivisionswithin classes,but can cut across
differentsocio-economic classes.
To someextent,classicalMarxism retains
the precedenceof abstractuniversalsover singular assemblages that -
whethertheuniversalbe a class,aparty,the Stateor history- suppresses cre-
ativity and blocksthe emergenceof the new.Subjectionto higher universals
cuts offassemblages from their powerand is alwaysreactive.
Transcendentalempiricismwould be the basisof a politics of positive
individuality and difference,valorisingagencyand creativepower, but
mindful of the oppressiveconditioning of individualsand our voluntary
servitudeto universalnorms.
TRANSVERSALITY
Ad,am Bryx and,Gary Genosho
A. critical conceptfor literary criticism, 'transversality'is introducedby
Deleuzein the secondedition of Proustand Signs.Thc conccptconcerns
the kind of communicationpropcr to thc trnnsvcrsirldimcnsion of'
machinic litcrlry ;rrrxluction.'l'rlnsvcrsalitydcfincsir nrodcrn wiry of'
286 T RANSVERSAL IT Y
writing that departsfrom the transcendentand dialecticpresuppositions
of the Platonicmodelof reminiscence. andenvisionsan immanentandsin-
gularisingversion instead.
Also termed an' anti-logosstyle', transversalityassembles heterogeneous
componentsundera unifyingviewpoint,which is far from totalising.
Unlike
the Platoniccounterpartthat strivesto imitatethe Ideaand thus reproduce
what is both stableand transcendent, Proust'sreminiscencedepartsfrom
subjectiveassociations and culminatesin an originatingviewpoint. The cri-
tique of Platocentreson the issueof intelligencealwayscomingbefore,where
the disjunctive useof facultiesmerely servesas a prelude for the unifying
dialecticfound in a singlelogos.Thedisiunctiveuseof facultiesin Proustis
unhinged from this transcendentand dialecticmodel, and works on an
immanentprinciple where intelligencealwayscomes after.
The transversaldimension of fiction fundamentallycountersthe prin-
ciples of the world of attributes, logos,analytic expression,and rational
thought with the characteristicsof the world of signsand symptoms,pathos,
hieroglyphs,ideogramsand phoneticwriting.Whereorderhascollapsedin
statesof the world, the viewpointprovidesa formulaby which fiction can
constitute and reconstitutea beginning to the world. Such a beginning is
necessarilysingularising;the transversaldimension or the never-viewed
viewpoint drawsa line of communicationthrough the heterogeneous pieces
and fragmentsthat refuseto belongto a whole,that are parts of different
wholes,or that haveno wholeotherthanstyle.The ephemeralimages,mem-
ories and signsof the odours,flavoursand drafts of particular settingsare
swept along at various rhythms and velocitiesin the creation of the non-
totalisingtransversaldimensionof fiction that is not reproductive,imitative
or representative, but dependssolelyon its functioning.
Deleuzefinds third partiesthat will communicateaberrantlybetween
partitioned partial objects of hermaphroditic bodies and plants. The
famous apiarianbestiaryof Deleuze showsitself here.But the pollinating
transversalinsectis not simply natural or organic,for that is a trope of the
/agas.Rather, it is a line ofpassage,azig-zaggingflight, or eventhe narra-
tion of involuntarymemory,that productivelytransverses. Transversality
is machinic.The literary machineproducespartialobjectsand resonances
betweenthem. The fore-mentionedviewpoint,understoodasan essential
singularity,is superior to the partitioned obiects,yet not beyond them, for
the self-engenderingliterary machineworks in and upon itself.
Connectives
Guattari
Psvchoanalvsis
TRANSvERSALTTy + cuATTARr . r f , lt x 287
TRANSVERSALITY + GUATTARI, FELIX
Gary Genosko
'Transversality',is a corecriticalconceptintroducedby Guattari in a con-
ferencepaper 'Transversality'in 1964and published,in psychanalyse et
transaersaliti. The conceptof 'transversality'is usedas a therapeuticand
political tool by Guattari in his analyticalcritique of experimentationwith
institutional formarions of subjectivity at clinique de la Borde in cour-
ChevernyFrance,wherehe workedfrom 1955to his deathin 1992.
Guattari reintroducedsocialdemands,problemsand realitiesinto the
analyticencounter.Guided by sigmund Freud's remarkson the funda-
mentally socialbeing of individualsin the survivalof sourcesof anxiety
beyond the stagesof psychogenesis, Guattari consideredthe object of
institutional analysisto be outside both family, linguistic structure and
oedipal myth. The problemof socialreproductionsof superegos (political
leaders,for example,despitetheir actualinfluence)as constantsourcesof
anxiety in advancedindustrial societies(capitalist and socialist) led
Guattari provisionally to 'arrive at a modification of the superego's
"accommodation" of databy transmuting this data in a kind of new,,ini-
tiatic" reception,clearingfrom its path the blind socialdemandof a certain
castrativeprocedurero the exclusionof all else'(G 1972:75).The goalis
to bring aboutacceptance of new data,rather than interminablecastration
anxietyprecipitatedby everysuperegofigurehead,primarily by establish-
ing new demands and setting up innovative points of reference within
existing attachmentsto institutions. Guattari's therapeutic focus shifted
awayfrom the dual analysisof psychotherapy andonto'real patientswhere
they actuallyfind themselves'in clinicalsetrings.This directly challenged
innumerableinheritedanalyticmethods.
Guattari foregrounds institutional attachmentsby analysing groups.
The desireof a de-individuatedsubject,understoodasa group or collective
assemblageof heterogeneouscomponentsfreed from abstract determin-
ationssuchasthe archaicinheritancesof Freudiananalysis,or the official
objectsthat supportthe symbolicorder (definedby JacquesLacan,D. W.
winnicott, and Melanie Klein) is undersroodthrough critical analysesof
the organisationaltexturesof actualgroups.
Guattari distinguishednon-absolutelybetweensubject(activelyexplor-
ing self-definedprojects) and subjugatedgroups (passivelyreceiving
directions), each affecting the relations of their members to social
processes, shapingtheir potentialfor subjectformation,the amountof risk
they can tolerate,and how they can usesuch groups.'l'hc moclilicationof
alicnatingfirntnsicswould pcrmit crcativit$ rcnr(,vcirrhibitions,rrnd
 288 TRANSVERSALI TY + GUATTARI. Ff,LIX
encourage the self-engendering of group-subjects, whereas a subject-
group could decay into a subjugated group through bureaucratic auto-
mutilation by reversing its transversal potentiality.
Guattari set about experimenting with ways to heighten and maximise
an institution's 'therapeutic coefficient' by unfixing rigid roles, thawing
frozen hierarchies, and opening hitherto closed blinkers. He accomplished
this through an institutional technique called 'the grid', a complex, rotar-
ing system of tasks and responsibilities that he developed with colleague
Jean Oury ('La grille'[1987] 1998). This role redefinirion scrambled exist-
ing relations of power between doctors and nurses, interns and nurses,
nurses and patients, medical and non-medical staff, bureaucrats and
unions, hospital bureaucraciesand State funding bodies.
tansversality replaced the psychoanalytic concept of transference
(movement of positive and negative affect back and forth from patient and
doctor). Guattari placed rapport in a collective clinical context beyond the
dual analytical situation. If rransference is the artificial relation in which
the unconscious becomes conscious, transversality is the measure of an
institution's influence on all its denizens. It is the group's unconscious,
which entails that a descriptive analytics of overt power relations and
objective laws inscribed in either verrical (pyramid) or horizonral (field of
distribution) terms is insufficient. This is an unconscious that perfuses the
social field and history.
Transversality:
'tends to be realisedwhen communicationis maximisedbetweendifferentlevels
and aboveall in differentdirections.It is the objecttowardwhich a subject-group
moves.our hypothesisis this: it is possibleto modify the differentcoefficientsof
unconscioustransversalityat differentlevelsofan institution. (G 1972:80)
Among a group of interns there may exist great potential for transver-
sal relations. As a group, interns normally have little real power, work long
hours, are dangerously tired, and so on. Their high level of transversality
would remain latent to the extent that its the group's institutional effects
would be extremely limited. It is not an easy task to find the group rhat
actually holds the key to 'regulating the latent transversality of the entire
institution'; objectively weak interns may engage in intimate and authen-
tic relations among themselves or with nurses which have therapeutic
effects for patients. tansversality in an institution is thus uneven. But this
is the task of institutional analysis:to locate the group's unconscious desirc
in relation to every member's attempt to negotiateit. 'The grid' madc it
possiblcto :rnalyscactualrclationsof firrcc by proviclirrg:lcorltcxt irr whiclr
t hc t lir r r s v c l s adl i n rc rrs i o no f' fh c i n s ti tu l i o n coukl l l c l crrctrcd.
TR U TH 289
TRUTH
James Williams
Deleuze's work is opposed to the coherence theory of truth and to the
correspondencetheory of truth. The first claims that the truth of a propos-
ition depends on its coherence with some other propositions. The second
claims that the truth of a proposition depends on its correspondence to
some objective facts. So a proposition is either true due to certain logical
relations or due to a relation to things in the world.
For Deleuze, both theories are wrong-headed from their very premisses.
That is, propositions are false simplifications of reality and cannot be
bearers of truth in any significant sense.Objective facts do not exist and
cannot be identified or shown, becausereal things are limitless and always
caught in endlessprocessesofbecoming. To abstract from these processes
is to give a false irnage of reality.
So, in contrast to the two traditional and dominant theories of truth,
Deleuze defines truth in terms of creativity and construction. We create
truth in complex constructions of propositions and sensationsthat express
the conditions for the genesis and development of events. Truth then
would not be a property of single propositions in a book or in a paper. It
would be a property of a seriesof them through a work as it captured and
changed our relation to the events expressedin the'work.
Deleuze is apt to mock philosophical theories based on simple prop-
ositions that say little of the world. According to him, it is a mistake to
begin an enquiry about truth with abstracted propositions such as 'The
cat is on the mat'. Instead, truth only appears in more complex works
such as a series of paintings or literary and philosophical works. It is a
mistake to think that the truth of such works depends on the truth of
their components becausethe significanceof the components only appears
when they are in context.
It is not so much that simple propositions have no relation to truth at all.
It is rather that truth is a matter of degrees.The more a work, or a prop-
osition in a work, expressesabout reality and the inter-relation of all things,
and the more a work creates with that inter-relation in order to be able to
expressit, the more truth it will carry. This carrying is itself a matter of the
transference of significance and intensity in the event, rather than a repre-
sentation of it.
Thus, to say something is true is not to say somethingverifiablcin somc
way,but to sirysomcthing that vivifics irnd nltcrs it situation. A pocrr itbout
W l rl cl W u' I t hlr tr r r ukcsus scr 'r sc it ir r r dlivc t hlough r r r r rwit
l lt it ir r it dillcr cr r t
w i ry i s trrrt lr lir l. A slr t t ist iclt llor t l llt c wiu'lllill is t t ol r t ct r r t r r pr r t r itlt'tyl
290 TRUTH
sensations andtransformationsis not truthful. The lessstatisticstransform
and giveus signsof the deeperideasand intensesensations at work in the
war, the lesstruthful they are.
This meansthat Deleuzeis caught in a difficult position of opposing
conceptsof truth, but without beingableto saythat we cansomehowmove
beyondtruth or stop usingthe conceptat all. In Nietzsche andPhilosophy,
he noteshow truth and the searchfor truth fixes worlds, in the senseof
settingdown truths that becomeimmutableand settledrepresentations
statesof things.Instead,truth should be a destructiveand transforming
process.Similarly, traditional conceptsof truth turn us away from the
world, in the senseof searchingfor truths that are not here or missing;
whereas,for Deleuze,truths are alwayslatentand it is a matter of drama-
tising them, of bringing them out and allowing them to transform us,
rather than a matter of projectingourselvesinto an identifiabletruthful
future.
Again followingFriedrich Nietzsche,Deleuzeseestruth asnecessarily
involvedin moral presuppositions. Truth is associatedwith the morally
goodand it is assumedthat throughtruth we arriveat the moral good.For
Deleuzethis cannotbe the casebecauseboth the moral goodand truth are
part of a strugglebetweendifferentvalueswith no externalway of divid-
ing them into true and false,goodand evil. Instead,the goodand the true
arerelativeto differentattitudesto life - whereDeleuzeand Nietzscheseek
thosethat affirm becomingoverbeing,transformation(or transvaluation)
over identity and sameness.
In Cinema2,Dele:uzeextendsthis view of truth asbecomingand part of
the complex struggle for life, by pointing out rhar there are no simple
oppositionsof the true and of the false.This is alreadyan idea from his
Dffirence and,Repetition,where the false can have an affirmative power
and where the deep opponentof both the rrue and the false(and life) is
stupidity - definedasthe desirefor simpleoppositions,for commonsense
and for transcendentlife-denying values.Thus, in Cinema2, Deleuze
emphasises the variationof truth over time and hencethe powerof false-
hoodsto vary thosetruths (anygivensettledseriesof truths must be chal-
lengedby falsehoodsfrom their angle,but truths from a different one).
Falsehoods, for examplein cinematicnarration,havethe power to reveal
differentand more affirmativeviewsof life.
It could be objectedthat when Deleuzemovesawayfrom truth as an
arbiter of propositions,it is as if he doesnot careabout factsand logical
necessity. That is not the case.He believesthat factsand logicalnecessity
haverolesto play,but theseare secondaryto a much highcr voclltionfor
truth; which is to rcvcaldccpconnections hctwccnall thingsanclto:rlklw
us to livc rrp to thc cvcntsthirtnukc:rnd trirnsfilrrrrus. In llris rcsllcct,
U N IVOC AL 29r
a temperaturereading has some importance but a film capturing the
significanceof the crackingice-capsis more truthful.
Connectives
Difference
Nietzsche
of
UEXKULL, JACOB VON (1864-1944)- refer to the entrieson
'becoming* music' and'deterritorialisation/reterritorialisation'.
UNCONSCIOUS - referto the entry on'psychoanalysis'.
UNIVOCAL
Claire Colebrooh
Accordingto one of Deleuze'smost important critics,Alain Badiou,'uni-
vocity' is the central concept of Deleuze's proiect. ln Dffirence and,
Repetition,Deleuzedescribesan alternativehistory of philosophycom-
prising thosephilosophersdaring enoughto think of being as univocal:
John Duns Scotus,Baruch Spinozaand Friedrich Nietzsche.If philoso-
phy has been dominated by Platonism, this is becausebeing has been
deemedto be equivocal:only one being truly is, while other beingsare
dependent,secondary,either not truly substancesor different types of
substance. Mind is elevatedabovematter; original is elevatedabovecopy;
the actualis the privilegedand properlocusofthe potential;only the actual
is realor proper being,while the potentialcannotbe saidto be in the same
sense.Against this equivocity,Deleuzearguesfor univocity: no eventor
phenomenon is morerealthananyother.There is only onc bcing:perccp-
tions,anticipirtions, mcmoricsand fictionsarcasrcll ts iltoms,univcrsitls,
conccptsor bodics.l"rom his lristuryof'univocrrl phikrsophcrs, l)clcuzc
cnrphlsiscs idcits.
thrccrcvrlluIirlttitt'y
 292 UNI VO CAL
From Duns Scotus,Deleuzeinsiststhat only with univocity can there
be real difference. If there is only one being then we cannot relate
differences- say,differencesof colour - asdifferencesa/some grounding
neutral being,a beingwhich is, and which then hassecondaryor lessreal
qualities.Rather,eachdifferenceis fully real: eachshadeofa colour, each
fleck of light, each sound or affect is fully real and therefore different in
itself, not merely a different way in which someother subtendingbeing
is grasped.From Spinoza'sunivocity,Deleuzearticulatesthe conceptof
immanence.If there is only one substancethen there cannot be a creat-
ing God outside creation;the divine is nothing outside irs expression.
Mind and matter are,accordingly,not two distinct substances; nor does
one depend on or derive from the other. Mind and matter are attributes
of the one divine substanceand eachbody - such as a human body - is
just one expressionor mode of the attribute of mind and the attribute of
matter.
There is not some transcendentbeing which then createsor grounds
different beings,beingsthat can be said to be only by analogy.Each being
is fully real and is so becauseit just is the expressionof the divine sub-
stance,which is nothing outsideits expressions. Immanencefollowsfrom
univocity preciselybecausethe commitment to one substanceprecludes
any point outside being; everything that is rs equally, possessingfull
reality.
From Nietzsche, Deleuze's favoured philosopher of univocity,
(eternal
Deleuzeaffirms the conceptof return'. There is only one being
but this does not mean that there cannot be radically new events and
futures.On the contrary,eternalreturn and univocity precludethe idea
that a stateof completion or rest will ever comeabout. We should neither
wait nor hope for a better world, nor should we imagine an apocalyptic
break with this world in order to achievea radical future. If there is only
one being then all life, all futures,all events,will be actualisationsof this
immanent life, which in all its virtual power can continually create and
differentiatenew experiences.Eternal return describesa future that is
positive becauseit repeats and affirms this life. There are two ways in
which this one immanent life can be affirmed univocally.The first would
be a biologistor vitalist account,wherebylife could be identifiedwith the
actual, material being that already exists - nature as it is commonly
understood; if this were so then futures, events and becomings would
already exist in potential and would then unfold. So we could say, for
example, that the potential that createdWilliam Shakespearewould,
eventually,produceanotherShakespeare. After all, there is only one life,
and all potential would eventually be repeated. But this is where
Deleuze's conception of life differs from a grounding on actual life.
L
U TOPIA 293
Imagine that we were to find someof Shakespeare's DNA and were to
we
clone Shakespeare; would not have a Renaissance bard who would
then write Hamlet. Why? Becausethis would only be possiblein an
equivocal life, one where life in all its becoming and difference was
submitted to pre-given forms, 'a Shakespeare' would have had to
emerge.But becauselife is univocal, becausethere is no form, idea or
principle that governsor grounds life, all we have is the potential for
differenceand variation.Cloning would not producelife's effects;indeed
really to repeatlife is to repeatcreation,difference.By life Deleuzerefers
not to what actuallyis, but the virtual power from which life is unfolded.
The potential that produced Shakespearewould, if it were repeated,
produce as much differenceand variation as the 'original'. And this is
becausethe original life was not an actuality - something that simply
was,and then had to go through time and alteration- but a 'pre-personal
singularity', a power of variation that is singularbecauseit is radically
different from the stable, definable and general forms it effects.Only if
we seerepetition as a pale copy or resemblancedo we need to think of
the radically new as other than this already full life. If, however, we
graspeachrepetition of the world's virtual power asthoroughly new we
will recognisethat univocity - one life, one being yielding infinite
difference - is also difference and futuritv.
Connectives
Eternal return
Immanence
Nietzsche
Spinoza
UTOPIA
Jonathan Roffe
The term 'utopia' designatesfor Deleuzethe political vocationof phil-
osophy:the attempt to bring about different ways of existihg and new
contextsfor our existencethrough the creation of concepts.The word
'utopia', however,hasbeenassociated with manydifferent conceptionsof
political thought and actionin ways that would seemantitheticalto the
philosophyof Deleuze.On the one hand, there is the real naivety with
which doctrines of utopia are often propounded,On thc othcr, as the
word itself indicntcs(u-topia,no-place),thc iclcnof utopia$ccmstrl rcfcr
29+ UTO PI A
to a world totally disconnected from the real social engagementsthat
characterise life hereand now,asif we could leapoutsideof our concrete
existenceinto a fundamentally different kind of society,free of any kind
of strife. Despite these concerns, Deleuze makes pivotal use of the
concept (while noting thesepotential problems),even if theseusesare
few in number.
The primary locationof the useof utopia in his philosophyis in l[/hat
is Philosophy.z,written with Guattari. Utopia namesthe point of contact
between the present state of affairs and the activiry of philosophy. No
ideal future is involved, but rather the view that the present can always
be negotiatedwith philosophicallyin order to bring aboutmore freedom.
Philosophy therefore has two temporal loci: the present and the future.
While engaging with the concrete present situation as it in fact is, phil-
osophy'saim ought to be the breakingwith or resistingof the presentfor
the future. We can think here of Friedrich Nietzsche's statement in his
UntimefuMed,itations,that philosophy actson the present, and therefore
against it, for the benefit of a time to come. This task is undertaken by
philosophybecauseit is, accordingto Deleuze and.Guattari, the creation
of concepts.Unlike many other ideasof philosophy,conceptsare not to
be thought of as representationsof reality or tools for uncovering the
truth. Rather,conceptsaretrue creations,and philosophyasthe creation
of conceptsmakespossiblenew waysof existingthrough them. Art and
science also undertake the same creative task, but through their own
waysof thinking that do not include the concept.In the context of dis-
cussionsabout the creation of concepts,Deleuze often brings up the
artist Paul Klee's claim that the audiencefor a work of art doesnot pre-
exist the artwork itself - the peopleare lacking,ashe says- but is called
into being by it. For Deleuze,all creativethought calls for a new people
and a new earth.
So utopia is what links philosophywith its own time, but is alsothat
which givesit the forum for its criticalpoliticalactivitythat hasits focusin
the future (D&G 1994:99). This conception of politics clearly doesnot
concernstatementsaboutthe idealnatureof socialexistence(unlikemany
utopianphilosophies), but seespoliticsasthoseactsthat offer resistance to
the norms and valuesof the present.Finally, for Deleuze,we cannotclaim
in advancethat certain conceptswill necessarilylead to a better future.
While reSistingthe present and opening up the f,uturefor us, there is no
guaranteethat the world thus opened will be freer. These decisionscan
only be made on the difficult path of practical,empiric4l learning and'"
carefulattention.
VAR IATION 295
Connectives
Art
Concepts
Freedom
VAN GOGH, VINCENT (1853-90)- referto the entry on 'art'.
VARIATION
Jonathan Roffe
Deleuzemobilisesthe conceptof variation in order to insist on what is
perhapshis most fundamental theme, that existenceis not characterised
primarily by unities, but rather by a continual senseof movementand
change.That is, to recall the philosopherHeraclitusas Deleuzedoeson
occasion,beingis becoming.In turn, the unitiesand structuresthat we find
in life are thereforethe result of organisingthis fundamentalmovement,
and not the other way around.
Deleuzeoffersa numberof examplesfor the conceptof 'variation'in his
work, oneof which is music.Music is traditionallyunderstoodon the basis
of scalesthat are fixed moments of pitch extracted from the whole range
of frequencies.In westernmusic,there is alsothe conceptof the octavethat
dividessoundup into repeatablescalarunits. For Deleuze,we must con-
siderthesestructuresto be secondaryin relationto the movementof sound
itself,which hasno intrinsic notesor scales.There is, fundamentally,only
the continuousvariationof pitch - a pure movementof differencewithout
identity. Likewise, for Deleuze,if we examinelanguageuse,we do not find
the fixed categoriesof a logicaFgpmmar or innate structure. Rather, the
useof wordsis alwaysshifting around,dependingon the context.ofits use.
In A Thousand, Plateaus,Deleuzeand Guattari describethis as the inher-
ent variability of language.The fact that languageuse does not remain
fixed but is fluid is the very natureof languageitself.We can alsoconsider
the importantexampleof space.Deleuzeand Guattariofferthe opposition
 296 v IR T U AT -/v rn ru ALrry
betweensmooth and striated space.Smooth spaceis the type of spacein
which thereare no fixed points or boundaries,and in which movementis
uninhibited.In smoothspace,movementis thereforecontinuousvariation.
In contrast, striated spaceis structured and organised,creating fixed
pointsand limits betweenwhat movementscanbe undertaken.As a result,
thereis a senseasa resultthat the natureandconstructionof certainspaces
formsoneof the primary concernsof politics,sincesmoothspaceis by def-
inition the spaceof freedom.on a morefundamentallevel,natureitself for
Deleuzeis continuousvariation.Even animalspeciesmust be understood
in termsof a movementof life which hasbeenstructuredinto localisedpat-
terns of stability.
Perhapsthe fundamentalpoint with regard to variation in Deleuze's
work comesin connectionto the theme of difference-in-itself,pursued
most systematicallyin Dffirence and Repetition.Rather than seeing
differenceasa differencebetweentwo things,differencemust be thought
of asthe continualmovementof self-differing,like the continualvariation
of a soundrising and loweringin pitch without stoppingat notesin a scale.
In other words,differenceis continuousvariation.This is in contrastto the
bulk of the westerntradition of philosophysinceParmenid,es that from the
outsetpostulatesa primary identity.The wholeof Deleuze'sthought is in
this sensebasedupon the primary valuehe givesto continuousvariation.
As a result,Deleuze'sbooksand conceptsmust alsobe consideredaccord-
ing to the principleof continuousvariation.No one on its own canbe con-
sideredto be definitive,but each works best when placedalongsidehis
other texts and concepts,that vary from eachother,outlining the move-
ment of his thought rather than the doctrinesthat he espousesalong
the way.
Connectives
Difference
Freedom
Space
VIRTUAL/VIRTUALITY
Constantin 11Boundas
In Deleuze'sontology,the virtual and the actualare two mutually exclu-
sive,yet jointly sufficient,characrerisations
of the real.The actuirl,/rcirlirrc
'l'hc virtrrirl/rcirl
strttcsof itfthirs,brrlics,bodilymixturcsand incliviclr.rals.
V IR TU A I-,/V IN TU A LITY 297
are incorporealeventsand singularitieson a plane of consistency,belong-
ing to the pure past - the past that can never be fully present.Without
beingor resemblingthe actual,the virtual nonetheless hasthe capacityto
bring aboutactualisationand yet the virtual nevercoincidesor canbe iden-
tified with its actualisation.Deleuze leansupon Duns Scotus when he
insiststhat the virtual is not a potential.Other philosophicalinfluencesfor
his conceptof the virtual include Henri Bergsonand his critique of the
possible,Baruch Spinoza'sidea of one substancethat is differentiatedin
its infinite attributesand alwaysin the processof being further differ-
enciatedin its modes,and finally Friedrich Nietzsche'sconcept of the
teternalreturn'.
One way of characterisingbecoming is with the following schema:
virtual/real<+actual/real<+virtual/real. What sucha diagrampointsto is
that becomingis not a linear processfrom one actualto another;rather it
is the movementfrom an actualisedstateof affairs,through a dynamicfield
of virtual,/realtendencies, to the actualisationof this field in a new stateof
affairs.This schemasafeguards the reversiblenatureof virtual and actual
relations.
Meanwhilein differentcontextsDeleuzehascharacterised the virtual as
the d,urieand ilan oital in his studiesof Bergson;as Ideas/structures and
the realm of problems in Dffirence and Repetitiozwhereby the diverse
actualisationsof the virtual are understood as solutions; and finally
throughout many of his texts he referredto the virtual as an event.The
variety of characterisations given the virtual by Deleuzeraisesthe ques-
tion of how the virtual ought to be understoodand the extentto which each
characterisation is complicit in the next. That the virtual is the Bergsonian
d,urdeand 6lan oital stemsfrom the basicagreementbetweenDeleuzeand
Bergsonregardingthe structureof temporality.Any actualpresentpasses
only becauseall presentsareconstitutedboth aspresentand aspast.In all
pastpresentsthe entirepastis conservedin itself,and this includesthe past
that hasneverbeenpresent(the virtual).
The idea of a past that has never been present(the immemorialpast)
canalsobe foundin the writingsofJacquesDerridaandEmmanuelL6vinas.
The reasonsfor its postulationvary from one thinker to another,but there
is onething that they havein common:anyphilosophythat puts a premium
on the de-actualisation of the present,in order to tap the resourcesof the
pastor the future, runs the risk of reifying the past(asin Plato'srecollec-
tion) and the future (asin someapocalypticeschatologies). To preventthis
reification,the notions of the immemorialpast and the messianicfuture
(Deleuzcprcfersto talk of the purc pastirndof thc ctcrnalrcpctitionof the
diffcrcnt)succcccl in safcgr.rarding thc idcirof ir proccssthirl prcsupposcs
'l'hc
tcndcncics. pitstis citllcd'pttrc'itt ordcrlo cntphitsisc
non-tlctcrrttittirtg

298 VI RTUAL/ VI RTUAL I T Y
that it is the site of problems and the source of actualisations;that the realm
of solutions is limited in numbers and, unlike the virtual past, it is rich in
extention and poor in intensity; and that, occasionally,a great artist may
assist something past to reveal its real being as if in a time that has been
nobody's present. To the extent that both Deleuze and Bergson agreed,urtie
is not empty; rather it is an immanently differentiated dynamic processof
the real whose nature is always to actualiseitself in novel differenciations.
Hence, the appropriate name 'dlan aital .
Boldly transforming Kantianism in Dffirence and,Repetition,Deleuze
begins to identify the virtual with Ideas. An ldea, for Immanuel Kanr, has
no instantiations in the empirical world, yet at the same time it must be
thought. Deleuze retains this imperative when he thinks of the virtual (for
example, the cogitandum)but he moves beyond pure Kantianism when he
multiplies Ideas by making them the gerundives of all faculties (the meml-
randum, the loquend,urn, and so on). The claim that Ideas are structures in
large part comes from the prevailing structuralist vocabulary Deleuze uses
throughout Dffirence and Repetition. ln later work, Deleuze elaborates
upon this claim that Ideas are structures when he describes the nature of
the virtual in terms of a plane of consistency.Most important for Deleuze
is that the virtual is not to be understood as duplicating or resembling the
actual, nor should it be taken to mean transcendence.Simply put, prob-
lems do not resemble or represent their solutions.
Were we to understand the relationship between virtual singularities and
actual individuals in terms of resemblanceor analogy,we would reduce the
notion of repetition that Deleuze advancessimply to a repetition of the
same.To understand how the virtual may be characterisedas an event we
need to recall Deleuze's theory of sense,which is given in the infinitive of
verbs (a verb, unlike a noun or an adjective, is better suited for an ontology
of becoming). In their infinitival modes, verbs best introduce the untimely
nature of the virtual, and the absenceof subjects or objects; yet they also
introduce the strange combination: the impassive and dynamic aspectsof
multiplicities in the processof actualisation.
Connectives
Becoming
Bergson
Differentiation /Differenciation
Duration
Eternal return
Event
Spinozir
I
WH OL E 299
M
W H OLE
jonattan Roffe
As early as his first book, Empiricism and Subjectiuity, Deleuze rejects the
idea of total unities, and works to analysehow things which are practically
speaking unified - like human beings, societies and ideas of God and the
world - come to be so.
Deleuze's procedure for coming to grips with the thought of unity
throughout his philosophy is threefold. First of all, he maintains that there
are no pre-existent wholes. Not only does nature itself not make a whole,
but things themselves exist only one by one. They do not fit into an over-
arching structure and cannot be 'added up' to make a total picture of exist-
ence becauseeverything is unique. We simply do not have any grounds for
taking the unique things which make up existenceas members of a species
which could ground a unifying perspective.This point is closely connected
to Deleuze's concept of 'multiplicity' that describesunique things in terms
of their own complex constitutive relations. The most substantial treat-
ment of the concept of the 'whole' in this senseis given in the discussion
I
of Stoic philosophy in The Logic of Sense.
Second, it is important to note we seem, in fact, to be surrounded by
l! unities of many kinds: human subjectivity, a unified and coherent basis for
t thinking, the unity of natural languages, and so on. For Deleuze, these
1
kinds of transcendent totalities are fundamentally illusory. They are the
product of certain habitual ways of thinking common to western culture
and the metaphysical tradition Deleuze calls 'dogmatic image of thought'.
The most significant discussion of the illusory nature of such totalities is
undertaken in Dffirence and Repetition.
Finally, Deleuze goes on to argue that there are, in fact, unities but that
these are produced by and in very particular social contexts. The unity of
human experience, for example, or the idea of the world as a whole, is the
very real and concrete result of the kinds of social experience that we have.
As such, produced wholes are subject to the variations in the social context
that is theirs. Their wholeness cannot be guaranteed, since it has no tran-
scendentalprinciple of unity but only the support of thc sociirlfrrrccsof its
gcncsisand thc nririntcnirnccof its c<lnsistcncy. 'l'irkcn togcfhcr,tlrcscthrcc
cl csclilr clhc consllr r ct ivistnr ct hodologvol'l) clcr r zt 'r 'or t ccr t t it t rl-t ill
1' l oi nts
rrrri ti es.A t ot r r lit v is r r t on( 'c non cxist cr r t( r r r t he lr iuls( : ( 'll( l( 'nl,
r t lt solt t lt '
L
 300 W I LL TO P O WE R
sense), illusory (with regard to thinking), and concretely produced in a
certain way by our social context.
At certain points, Deleuze himself seems to be advocating a kind of
primary oneness to existence, particularly concerning his thesis of
ontological univocity, or the univocity of being. In shorr, this is the position
that claims all existing things are within a single world - everything rhat
exists is 'said' in the same way ('uni-vocalised'). Univocity disqualifies in
advance any thought of a transcendent ordering realm that is higher or
more pure than the world of events.Ontological univocity is closely related
to the thesis of monism that claims there is a single substancefrom which
individual things are formed. Whilst this emphasis in Deleuze's work
involves a certain thought of unity, we cannot consider him to be a 'holist'
in any direct sense.Univocity must be understood rather as the emphasis
on the common world of relations for everything that exists - a certain
thought of general interconnectednessand proximity that would allow us
to consider Deleuze's ontology as a kind of ecology of being. As he states
in Empiricism and,Subjectiaity, nature is unique - but this does not mean
that it is unified.
Connectives
Multiplicity
Singularity
W I LL TO POWER
Lee Spinks
Friedrich Nietzsche's famous formulation of the 'Will to Power' represents
the culmination of his attempt to develop an immanent and inhuman vision
of life. Its image of existenceas a ceaselessstruggle for power and domin-
ion is 'inhuman' becauseit claims that alllife, not just human life, is united
by a common striving for power. The conception of the Will to Power also
afforded Nietzsche the opportunity to overcomethe 'metaphysical' distinc-
tion between being and becoming or appearanceand reality by conceiving
of a principle of life immanent and interior to life rather than elevatedabove
and beyond it in the form of transcendentalreason.According to this prin-
ciple, the whole of life is a single field of forces expressingan inhuman Will
to Power that produces forms such as consciousncss,languagc :rncl nrorirl
iclcitsits scctlnclaryirnclrcuctivccft'ccts.'l-hc cntirc gcncsislncl clcvcklpnrcnl
of ' lilc is t lc t c rn ti n c tlb y th c c o n l l i c l b c tw c c nthc w i l l to l hc rrccrrrrrrrl rrtiol
on'
\,
WIL L TO POWER 30r
force and everything that resists subordination to stronger will. Life at a
primordial level 'is' this struggle between appropriation and resistance;the
issue at stake in every event of life is the quantity of superior power it
expressesand the quantity of resistancethat opposesit.
The Will to Power is the genealogical element of force: it is both an
expression of the constitutive conflict between forces and the differential
element internal to force itself. Will to Power is internal to force becauseit
I interpretsrelative levels of force by establishing the extent to which one has
successfully incorporated another into its domain. 'Force' in this senseis
I defined by the quantitative difference that obtains between different forces;
I we know this quantitative difference as a force's quality. The Will to Power,
I Deleuze emphasises,should be understood as the principle of the synthe-
N sis of forces: it names the element that establishes the quantitative
difference between forccs and the element of quality that this difference
I
'f
expresses. Within this synthesis, forces contend continually over the
differential relation that defines them; the eternal return is therefore the
mode of synthesis that expressesthe genetic and differential element of the
Will to Power.
The vision of life as Will to Power revealsthat there is no other form of
causality than the movement of domination between one will and another.
'Will' must therefore be rigorously detached from anthropomorphic psy-
chologicalcategorieslike'desiring'and 'demanding'which posit an ideaor
subjectivity behind and before the expression of forces. The Will to Power
is not a secondary effect of force nor is it separablefrom a determined con-
figuration of forces. Yet if Will to Power cannot 6e separatedfrom force
neither should itbe confused, with force. The concept of 'force' names what
is triumphant in the struggle between forces; but the outcome of this strug-
gle remains perpetually indeterminate unless another element is intro-
duced to gauge the quantitative difference between forces that determines
their relative difference in quality. It is this element that Nietzsche and
Deleuze describe as the Will to Power. The Will to Power is therefore both
the genetic and differential element of force: the element that produces the
quality accorded to each force within a particular relation.
Because the Will to Power determines the relation between forces, it
divides force into its active and reactive components. The difference
between a dominant and dominated force is determined by a quantitative
difference; the distinction between active and reactive forces manifests
a difference in quality. The quantitative difference between forces is
exprcsscd by their relative difference in quality. The clistinction bctwccn
qu:rliticsof firrcc is dcfincd by thc tcrms':rctivc'irncl'rcrctivc'; but thc corr-
sti ftrti vcqu r r lit yot 't lr c Will t <ll) owcr llr ir t dct cr r r r ir r cs f ir r ccis cxpr csscrbv l
l hc tl i sti rtctiot t llclwccn ir llir r r r lrivc
t ir r r t lr r t 'gr rivt
t ' t ; t r r r lit
v. Allir r r r ir t ion: r r r r l
302 W O M AN
negationgo beyond action and reactionbecausethey are interior to the
movementof becomingitself. Affirmation is the power to becomeother;
negationis the processof becoming-reactive.These powersare interior to
actionand reactionand bring thesequalitiesinto being.What is at stakein
the distinctionbetweenaffirmationand negationand actionand reaction
is nothing lessthan the distinctionbetweeninterpretationand evaluation.
Interpretation, Deleuze points out, determinesthe relation of forces;
evaluationdeterminesthe Will to Power that confers value upon a thing.
It is the elementof Will to Powerthat determinesthe nature of values:the
value of a value is establishedby the quality of Will ro Power that it
expresses. The valueof value inheresin this differentialelement;conse-
quently genealogical and immanentcritique seeksro establishthe quality
of Will to Powerat the origin of everyevaluativegesture.
Connectives
Active/Reactive
Nietzsche
WOMAN
RosiBraidotti
Like all formationsof identity in Deleuze'sthought, 'woman' is a molar
entity that pertainsto and sustainsthe political economyof a majority.
However,in a much broaderphallogocentrichistoricalsystem'woman'is
alsopositionedas'other'. Deleuzeshowsgreatsensitivityin his treatment
of 'woman'neithercastingher asthe mistressof alterity,nor fetishisingher
as the privileged object of masculinedesire.Rather Deleuzeavoidsthe
tropescommon to philosophicaldiscourseon the feminine,choosingto
remain polymorphouson the topic of sexuality,all the while performing
a doubledisplacementat the levelof both Platonicrheoriesof representa-
tion and psychoanalytic theoriesof desire.
Deleuzerejectsthe speculativeself/other relationshipof dialecticsand
arguesinstead that these terms are not linked by negation, but are two
positively different systemseach with its specificmode of activity. Thus
'woman'is not the sexualised 'secondsex'of the phallicsystem,but a posi-
tive term: as the other, she is a matrix of becoming.Deleuze also
rejectsthe psychoanalytic emphasison negativity(lack)andthe equationof
bodily matcrialitywith the originarysite of rhe maternal.Insteadof thc
r6gimcof'thc phrrllusirncl<lfits spccuhrothcr- womiln- |)clcuzcprcfcrs
WOM AN 303
heterogeneous multiplicitiesand internal differentiation.In this sensehe
empowers'woman' through positivefigurationssuch as the non-Oedipal
little girl of Alice in Wonderland,who hasnot yet beendispossessed of her
body by the phallic law of the father; or in the equally empoweredposition
of Ariadne,thephilosopher's fianc6ewho expresses the femininefaceof phi-
losophyand is alsothe sourceof ethicaltransmutation,turning negativeor
reactivevaluesinto affirmativeones.Transcendingthe negativepassions
that the Oedipalisingeconomyof the phallusinducesis in effecta Deleuzian
engineof the transformation,what Deleuzeotherwisecalls'becoming'.
The role of 'woman' in Deleuze'stheory of becomingis noteworthy.
'Becoming'is the actualisationof the immanentencounterbetweenforces
which areapt mutually to affectand exchangepartsof eachother in a cre-
ativeand empathicmanner.The notion of 'forces'accomplishes a double
aim, which is centralto Deleuze'semphasison radicalimmanence:on the
one hand it givespriority to affectivity in his theory of the subject;and on
the other,it emphasises the embodiedstructureof the subjectand the spe-
cific temporalityof the embodiedhuman.A forceis a degreeof affectivity
or of intensity,in that it is openand receptiveto encounteringotheraffects.
The transformationthat occurs in the processof becomingassertsthe
affirmative,joyful affectsover and abovethe negativeones.
Womannot only can enactprocesses of becoming-minoritarianbut also,
especiallyfor Guattari, constitutesthe main bloc of becoming for all
processes of deterritorialisation. 'Becoming-woman' is both integralto the
conceptandprocessof becomingand alsouncomfortablywritten into it asa
constitutiveparadoxof Deleuze'snomadicsubjectivity.The womanin ques-
tion hereis not an empiricalreferent,but rather a topologicalposition,which
marksdegreesandlevelsof intensityandaffectivestates.It expresses imper-
sonaland ungenderedforces;and, asis to be expected,this hasgenerateda
lively andoftencriticaldebatewith feministpoststructuralist philosophers.
Moreover,tbecoming-woman'is a moment, a passaBe, a line of flight
which bypassesempirical women per se. Processesof becoming are not
predicatedupon a stable,centralised'self' who supervisestheir unfolding.
Rather, they rest on a non-unitary, multilayered, dynamic subject.
Becomingwoman,/animal/insectis an affectthat flows;like writing it is a
composition,or a location that needsto be constructedin the encounter
with others.All becomingsare minoritarian,that is to saythey inevitably
and necessarily moveinto the directionof the 'others' of classicaldualism
(suchassexualised, racialisedand/or naturalised'others').Yet becomings
do not stop there; they becomedisplacedand are reterritorialisedin the
process.Thus, 'becoming-woman'marks thc thresholdof pattcrnsof
'bccoming-minoritariirn' thirt crossthrough thc lnimrrl irnclgo into tlrc
'bccoming-irrtpcrccpriblc' ltnd llcyottd.'l'hcrc ru'cn(, syslcrnirtic,
lincitror
 304 wooI-F, vrRGrNrA ( r 88z- rg4r)
teleologicalstagesof becoming;eachplateaumarks a framed and sustain-
ableblock or moment of transformation that is actualisedimmanently.
Alternatively, patterns of becoming can be visualisedas an affirmative
deconstructionof dominant subject-positions(masculine/white/hetero-
sexual/speaking a standardlanguage/property-owning/urbanised and so
on). Or else,becomingscanbe understoodassteppingstonesto a complex
and open-endedprocessof depersonalisation of the subject.Internally
self-contradictory, becomingcanbestbe expressed by figurations:the wasp
and the orchid;the womanand the turning of the waves;the soundand the
fury, signifyingnothing.In this way,the processof becomingis not about
signification,but aboutactualisingnew modesof affectiveinteraction:it
assertsthe potency of expression.Expressionis the non-linguistically
coded affirmation of an affectivity whose degree, speed, extension and
intensitycanonly be measuredmateriallyand pragmatically,caseby case.
And it is thereforeinterestingto note that womenarenot a priori molecu-
lar; they too haveto becomewoman.
Connectives
Becoming
Expression
Force
Lines of flight
Molar
Psychoanalysis
wooLR vrRGrNrA(1882-1941)
Claire Colebrook
One of the challengesDeleuzepresentsto late twentieth-centuryphilo-
sophyand theory is his critique of linguisticism,or the idea that we can
only think within a languageand that languagestructuresour perception.
His ideathat true thinking must plungebackinto the life from which lan-
guageemerges,rather than remain within a language,is profoundly mod-
ernist and continuesan early twentieth-centuryconcernwith the genesis
of systemsof signs.Although Deleuzewrites positivelyabout a seriesof
modernist writers and artists,including JamesJoyce,his and Guattari's
celebrationof virginia woolf inA Thousand, Plateausis significantfor two
reasons.First, Woolf's own work is contemporaneous with Henri Bergson
who wasso importantfor Deleuze.It is possiblethat woolf 's concernwith
wooLF, vIRGINIA (r882-rg4r) 305
pre-linguistic perception may well have emerged from the same
intellectualmilieu to which Deleuzeappeals.Woolf's Bloomsburycircle
wasconcernedwith the autonomy of the aestheticand its differencefrom
the fixed categories of logic.Bergson'sappealto the undividedflow of cre-
ativelife from which fixed terms emergewaspart of a broadermodernist
reactionagainstreification,intellectualismand technologicalrationalisa-
tion of which Woolf 's styleis perhapsthe greatestexpression.Second,the
most explicit appealmade by Deleuze and Guattari to Woolf is in the
'becoming-woman'sectionof A ThousandPlateaus.
If modernism in generalsharesthe Bergsoniandistastefor a world
reducedto clock time, mathematicalspaceand impoverishedexperience,
Virginia Woolf 's response.is uniquely positive and affirmative. Unlike
other modernistswho used techniquessuch as the fragmentationof lan-
guage,quotation,allusion,punning and parataxis* linguistictechniques-
to showsignsoperatingasmachinesbeyondhumanintent, Woolf usedlit-
eratureto think and expressthe extra-literary.This is perhapswhy, when
Deleuze and Guattari want to think about becoming, they turn to
becoming-womanand Virginia Woolf.
Whereas'man' is the presupposeduniversalsubjectof the systemof
speechand the being to whom all becomingis represented,womanis the
key to all becomings.Womanis not the Other of man, not that which lies
outsidelanguageas unrepresentable, negativeand undifferentiated.If we
want to think the life, becomingor perceptionsfrom which the subject
emergesthen we need to move beyond 'man' as subject or ground to
woman as becoming,expressionand creation.Woolf is crucial here not
becausesheis a womanwriter, expressingwomen'sexperiencein language
(for shearguesin A Roomof One'sOwn(1929)that it is fatal,when writing,
to think of one'ssex).Rather,Woolf's style is becoming-woman.
On the one hand,Woolf's writing is aboutperception;her sentences in
The Watses (1931)createcharacterswho are their perceptions,and whose
world is not a setof staticobjectssomuch asa perceptionof others'worlds.
Charactersreceiveimpressionsnot as extendedobjects in time but as
intensitiesor becoming,'blocksof becoming'.On the other hand,Woolf's
work is not just about perceptionand a world of impressions;she also
enactsbecomingand intensity at the levelof style,with many of her sen-
tences complicating and subverting the subject-predicatestructure of
standardspeechand logic.
Connectives
Becoming
Bergson
306 W R I TI NG
Power
Woman
Writing
WRITING
RosiBraidotti
Deleuze'sphilosophicalmonism makesno categoricaldifferencebetween
thinking and creating,painting and writing, conceptand percept.These
areall variationsof experimentation, morespecifically, an experimentation
with intensities that foster patterns of becoming. Experimentation
expresses differenttopologicalmodes;they enacta creativeprocessthat is
not configured by unfolding a fixed essenceor telos.Creativity is under-
stoodasa multiple and complexprocessof transformation,otherwisethe
flux of becoming.Put simply, creativity affirms the positive structure of
difference.
Writing then, is not the self-assertion of a rationallyordainedimagina-
tive subject,rather its eviction. It has to do with emptying out the self,
openingit up to possibleencounterswith a number of affectiveoutsides.
The writer's eye capturesthe outside world by becomingreceptiveto
minute and seeminglyirrelevant perceptions.During such momentsof
floatingawareness, when rationalcontrol releases its hold, 'reality' vigor-
ously rushesthrough the sensorial/perceptive appararus.This onslaught
of data,information and affectivitysimultaneouslypropelsthe self out of
the blackhole of its atomisedisolation,dispersingit into a myriad of data-
imprints. Ambushed,the self not only receivesaffects,it concomitantly
recomposes itself aroundthem. A rhizomic bond is thus establishedthat,
through the singulargeometryof the affectsinvolvedand their specific
planeof composition,confirmsthe singularityof the subjectproducedon
a particularplaneof immanence.
One needsto be ableto sustainthe impactof affectivity:to'hold'it. But
holding or capturing affectivity does not happen dialecticallywithin a
dominantmodeof consciousness. Instead,it takesthe form of an affective,
depersonalised, highly receptivesubjectwhich quite simply is not unified.
The singularityof this rhizomic subjectivityrestson the spario-temporal
coordinatesthat make it coincidewith nothing more than the degrees,
levels,expansionsand extensionsof the 'outside' as it rusheshead-on.
moving inwardsand outwards.What are mobilisedare one'scapaciticsto
feel,sense, process andsustainthe impactin c<lnjunction with thc complcx
mrrtcrialityofl thcoutsiclc;ir sort of fluid but sclflsustrrining scnsibility,rlr
WR ITIN G 307
stream-of-consciousness that is porous to the outside.Our culture has
tendedto codethis as 'feminine'. Pure creativity is an aestheticmode of
absoluteimmersionalongwith the unfolding and enfoldingof one'ssens-
ibility in the field of forcesone inhabits- music,colour,light, speed,tem-
peratureand intensity.
Becauseof the historicalbond that ties writing to r6gimesof power,the
activityof writing playsa specialpragmaticrole;it is a tool that canbe used
to decodethe despoticpower of the linguistic signifier.In this way,the
intensivewriting style particularto Deleuzespellsthe end of the linguis-
tic turn, ashe releases the subjectfrom the cageofrepresentationalthink-
ing. Writing is therefore,not explainedwith referenceto psychoanalytic
theoriesof symbolic'lack', or reducedto an economyof guilt, nor is it the
linguistic power of the mastersignifier.Writing is an intensiveapproach
that stressesthe productive,more than the regressive.Put differently,
Deleuzeinsists writing is the structure of affectivity that animatesthe
subject.At the heart of Deleuze'srhizomaticsis a positivereadingof the
human as affirmative,a pleasure-pronemachinecapableof all kinds of
empoweringforces.It is just a questionof establishingthe most positiveor
evenjoyful connectionsand resonances.
For Deleuzewhat is at stakein writing is not the manipulationof a set
of linguisticor narrativeconventions;nor is it the cognitivepenetrationof
an object;nor eventhe appropriationof a theme.Writing is an orientation;
it is the skill that consistsin developinga compassof the cognitive,afftict-
ive and ethicalkind. It is quite simply an apprenticeshipin the art of con-
ceptual and perceptualcolouring.
A new image,or philosophicalconcept,is an affectthat breaksthrough
establishedframesand representations. It illuminatesa territory through
the orientationof its coordinates;it makesvisible/thirikable/sayable/hear-
ableforces,passionsand affectsthat were previouslyunperceived.Thus,
the questionof creationis ultimately technological:it is one of 'how?'.It
is alsogeological:it is about'where?'and'in which territory?'.Ultimately,
it is ethical:it is concernedwith wherelimits canbe setand how to sustain
alteredstatesor processes ofchange.
Connectives
Black hole
Creativetransformation
Difference
Immancncc
Powcr
Rcprcscltlitl
iott

B i b l i o g ra p hy
DELEUZE
D 19 5 6 Deleuze,Gilles (1956),'La conceptionde la diff6rencechez
Bergson', Les Etudes Bergsoniennes, vol. 4, Paris: Presses
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Presses Universitaires
de France.
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Interpretatioz,New York: Delta Books, pp. 142-9.
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Hugh Tomlinson,London: Athlone Press.
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Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, London:
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L
B IB LIOGR A P H Y 309
D 1991 Deleuze,Gilles (1991), Empiricismand,Subjectiohy:An Essay
on Hume's Theory of Human Nature, trans. Constantin V.
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D 1993b ConstantinV. Boundas(ed.),TheDeleuzeReader,New York:
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D 1997a 'Desire and Pleasure',trans. Daniel W. Smith, in A. I.
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DELEUZE AND GUATTARI
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Capitalismand,Schizophrenia,vol. l, trans. Robert Hurley,
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D&G 1987 Deleuze, Gilles and F6lix Guattari (1987), A Thousand,
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DELEUZE AND FOUCAULT
D &F 1977 Deleuze,Gilles and Michel Foucault(1977),'Intellectuals
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K1992 Kant, Immanuel (1992),Critiqqeof judgement,trans.J. C.
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K 1993 Kant, Immanuel(1993),Critiqueof PracticalReason,trans.
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L 1977 Lacan,Jacques(1977),Ecrits,trans. A. Sheridan,New York
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W 1994 Willemen, Paul (199+), 'Through the Glass Darkly:
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USING DELEUZE (AND GUATTARI)
Ansell Pearson, Keith (ed.) (1997), The Deleuze and' Philosophy: The
Dffirence Engineer,London: Routledge.
Ansell Pearson,Keith (1999),GerminalLife: TheDffirence andRepetition
of Deleuze,London: Routledge.
Badiou, Alain (2000), Deleuze: The Clamour of Being, trans. Louise
Burchill, Minneapolis:University of MinnesotaPress.
Bogue,Ronald(1989),Deleuzeand,Guattari,London: Routlege.
Bogue, Ronald (2003), Deleuzeon Music, Painting and the Arts, London:
Routledge.
Bogue, Ronald (2004), Deleuze'sWahe: Tributesand,Tributaries,Albany:
StateUniversity of New York Press.
Boundas, Constantin V. and Dorothea Olkowski (eds) (1994), Gilles
New York: Routledge.
Deleuzeand the Theaterof Philosoph.y,

t Lc'wisWhitc Bcck, 3rd edn, New York: MacMillan. Ncw York:

in Cznleml)nrll1FeministT'hcor,y,, (krlumbia Univcrsity Prcss.
3t2 BIBL IOGRAPHY
Buchanan,Ian (ed.) (1997),A DeleuzianCentury?,specialissueof The
SouthAtlantic Q,tarterly96: 3 (Summer).
Buchanan, Ian (2000), Deleuzism:A Meta-Commentar)l,Edinburgh:
EdinburghUniversityPress.
Buchanan,Ian and Claire Colebrook(eds)(2000),Deleuzeand Feminist
Theory,Edinburgh:EdinburghUniversity Press.
Buchanan,Ian and Marcel Swiboda (eds) (2004), Deleuzeand Music,
Edinburgh:EdinburghUniversity Press.
Clet-Martin, Jean (1993), Variations:La philosophied,eGilles Deleuze,
Paris:Payotet Rivages.
Colebrook, Claire (2002),GillesDeleuze,London: Routlege.
Critical Horizons:Journal of Socialand Critical Theory,(2002)4:2.
De Certeau,Michel (1984),ThePracticeof EaerydayLrfe, trans.Sreven
rendall,Berkeley:University of CaliforniaPress.
Del-anda,Manuel (1997),A ThousandYearsoJ'Non-LinearHistory,New
York: Zone Books.
Delanda, Manuel(2002),I ntensip eScience and VirtuaI Philosop hy, London:
Continuum.
Goodchild, Philip (1996a),Deleuzeand Guattari: An Introtluctionto the
Politicsof Desire,London: Sage.
Goodchild,Philip (1996b),GillesDeleuzeand theQtestionof Philosophy,
London: AssociatedUniversity Press.
Grosz, Elizabeth(ed.) (1999),Becomings: Explorationsin Tirue,Memory,
and,Futures,Ithaca:Cornell University Press.
Grosz, Elizabeth (2001),Architecturefrom the Outside,Massachusets:
MIT Press.
Guattari, F6lix (1977), La riaolution moliculaire, Fontenay-sous-Bois:
Recherches.
Guattari, F6lix (1980),La riaolution moliculaire,Paris:Union g6,n6raIe
d'6ditions.
Guattari,F6lix ( 1989),Cartographiesschizoanalytiques, Paris:Galil6e.
Guattari,F6lix (1992),Chaosmose, Paris;Galil6e.
Hansen,Mark (2000),'BecomingasCreativeInvolution?:Contextualizing
Deleuze and Guattari's Biophilosophy', Postmod,ern Culture ll.l
http:,//muse.jhu.edu/journals/postmodern_culture
Hardt, Michael (1993a),GillesDeleuze:An Apprenticeshilt in Philosolth.y,
Minneapolis:University of MinnesotaPress.
Hardt, Michael (1993b),GillesDeleuze,London: UCL Press.
Hardt, Michael and Antonio Negri (2000),Empire,Cambridge:Harvard
UniversityPress.
Kaufmrn,IifcirnorandKcvinJonIlcllcr(ctls) (l99tt),Dcltuxt:unlOrtrtuttri :
B IB LIOGR A P H Y 313
New Mappings in Politics, Philosophy, and Culture, Minneapolis:
Universityof MinnesotaPress.
Lorraine, Tamsin (1999),Irigaray and Deleuze:Experimentsin Visceral
Philosoph.y, Ithaca:Cornell University Press.
Massumi, Brian (1992),A User'sGuide to Capitalismand Schizophrenia:
Deaiations from Deleuzeand Gualtari, Cambridge:MIT Press.
Olkowski,Dorothea(1999),GillesDeleuzeand theRuin of Representation,
Berkeley:University of CaliforniaPress.
Parr, Adrian (2003),Exploringthe Workof Leonardoda Vinci in the Context
of Contemporar.y andArt, New York: Edwin Mellen Press.
Philosolth.y
Patton, Paul (ed.) (1996), Deleuze:A Critical Read'er,London: Basil
Blackwell.
Patton,Paul (2000),Deleuzeund thePolitical,London: Routledge.
Patton,Paul andJohn Protevi (eds)(2003),BetpeenDeleuzeand,Derrida,
London: Continuum.
Pisters,Patricia(ed.) (2001),Miuopolitics of Media Culture:Readingthe
Rhizomesof Deleuzeuntl Guattari,Amsterdam:AmsterdamUniversity
Press.
Raichman,John (1998), Constructions, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
Rodowick,D. N. (1997),GillesDeleuze'sTimeA4achine,Durham:Duke
University Press.
Stivate,CharlesJ.(1998),The Tpo-Fold Thoughtof Deleuzeand Guattari:
Interseclions andAnirnatiozs.New York: Guilford Press.
OTHER REFERENCES IN ENGLISH
Foucault,Michel (1966),TheOrderof Things,London: Routledge.
Foucault, Michel (1977), Language,Counter-Memor.y, Practice,Oxford:
Blackwell.
Foucault,Michel (1979),TheHistory of Sexuality: Volumel: TheWill, the
Knowled,ge,London: Allen Lane.
Foucault,Michel ( I 980),Power/ Knowledge,Brighton: Harvester.
Foucault,Michel (1986),TheHistory of Sexuality: VolumeII: The UseoJ'
Pleasure,London: Penguin.
Foucault,Michel (1988),TheHistory of Sexuality: VolumeIII: TheCare
of theSelf,London: Penguin.
Freud,Sigmund(1939),MosesandMonotheism, trans.K. Jones,New York:
VintageBooks.
Frcud,Sigrrrunrcl ( 19.50),'l'o
t cu unl.' l'uhoo.Lonclon: Routlcclgc.
(irrr_y
(icrr<rskrr, (ctl.)(199(r),'l'ht(luttttri IIcultr,Orfirrcl:Ilrrsillllirckwcll.
314 BIBL IOGRAPHY

Genosko,Gary (2002),Filix Guattari: An AberrantIntroduction,London: N otes on C ontr i butor s

Continuum.
Guattari, F6lix (1984), Molecular Reztolution, trans. RosemarySheed,
London:Penguin.
Guattari, F6lix (1995),Chaosmosis: An Ethico-Aesthetic Paradigm,trans.
Paul BainsandJulianBefanis,Sydney:PowerPublications.
Guattari, F6lix and Antonio Negri (1990), Communists Lihe {./s,trans. Bruce Baugh is AssociateProfessorof Philosophyat the University
Michael Ryan,New York: Semiotext(e). Collegeof the Cariboo.He is the author of FrenchHegel: From Surrealism
Harraway,Donna (1991),Simians,Cyborgs and Women:TheReinaention (2003),aswell asseveralarticleson Deleuze.
to Postmod,ernism
of
N ature,London: Routledge.
Hume, David (1985),A Treatiseof Human Nalure, Harmondsworth: Ronald Bogue is Professorof ComparativeLiterature at the University
Penguin. of Georgia.He is the author of Deleuzeand Guattart(1989),Deleuzeand
Hume, David (1993), An Enquir.y ConcerningHuman Understand,ing, theArts (2003),andDeleuze'sWabe(2004).
Indianapolis:Hackett.
Johnson,Linton Kwesi (2002),Mi Reaalueshanary Fren: Selected Poems, Constantin V. Boundas is ProfessorEmeritus in the Department of
New York and London: PenguinBooks. Philosophyat Trent University. He is the editor of The DeleuzeReader
Kafka, Franz (1954), DearestFalher, trans. Eranst Kaiser and Ethne (1993),and (with Dorothea Olkowski) of GillesDeleuze:The Theaterof
Wilkins, New York: SchockenBooks. Philosophy(1994).
Leibniz, Gottfried (1973), PhilosophicalWritings, ed. G. Parkinson,
London:Dent. Rosi Braidotti is Professorof Gender Studies in the Humanities at
Leibniz, Gottfried (1988),G. W Leibniz: Philosophical Texts,trans.R. S. Utrecht University.She is the author of Metamorphoses (2002);Nomadic
Woolhouseand RichardFranks,Oxford; Oxford UniversityPress. Subjects(199+)andPatternsof Dissonance (1991),aswell asof severaledited
Nietzfche, Friedrich (1969), Thus Spahe Zarathusra, trans. R. S. volumeson Continentalphilosophyand feminism.
Hollingdate,Harmondsworth:Penguin.
Reich,Wilhelm (1961),Selectedl4/ritings,New York: Farrar, Straussand Adarn Bryx is a graduatestudentin Englishat LakeheadUniversity.He
Cudahy. has co-translated,with Gary Genosko,interviews and articles by Jean
Reich,Wilhelm (1969),TheSexualReoolution, London: Vision. Baudrillardand Paul Virilio.
Solanas, Fernandoand OctavioGetino(1983),'Towards a Third Cinema:
Notesand Experiencesfor the Developmentof a Cinemaof Liberation Claire Colebrook is Professorof Literary Theory at the University of
in the Third World', in Michael Chanan(ed.), Twent.y-Fioe Yearsof the Edinburgh. She is the author of New Literary Histories(1997),Ethicsand
N ewLatin AmericanCinema,London:British Film Institute, pp. l7 -27 . Representation Deleuze(2003),
(1999),GillesDeleuze(2002), [Inderstand,ing
Spinoza,Baruch(1989),Ethics,ed., with rev.trans.G. H. R. Parkinson, Ironlt: The New Critical ld,iom (2003), Irony in the Work of Philosophy
London:J. M. Dent. (2003) and Gender(2003).She is also the editor (with Ian Buchanan)of
Uexkiill, Jakobvon (1957),'A Stroll through the Worlds of Animals and Deleuzeand FeministTheory(1999).
Men', in Claire H. Schillcr (ed.), InstinctiaeBehaaior,New York:
InternationalUniversities. Felicity J. Colrnan teachescontemporarytheoriesof commodity cul-
Weismann,August (1893), The Theory of Heredit.y,trans. W. Newton tures) avant-garde,experimental,and feminist practicesof visual and
Parkerand H. Ronnfeldt,London: WalterScott. screenculture in the CinemaProgramat the University of Melbourne.
Willemen,Paul(1994),'The Third CinemaQuestion',in PaulWillemen,
LooksundFriclions:Essu.ys in CulturulStudicsuntl,Itilrn'l-hutry,London: Torn Conlcy is l)rotcssorof ltomitnccLitnguagcsin thc Dcpartmcntof
llritishFilm Institutc,pp. 175-20.5. It<rnrancc llirrvirrdLJnivclsity.
l,irrrgrr:rgcs, llc is tlrc atttlrot'of 'l'ht:^Stll-
Mult Mup (l()()(r) (
uxl ltiltu llirn44lyphsl()()l);:ttttltrr cditol ol' llrutitl,
316 NO TES ON CO NTRI B U T O R S
Papers(1996).He has translateda number of books,including Gilles
Deleuze'sTheFoldandwritten on Deleuzein Le CinimachezDeleuze.
Iris,
TheSouthAtlantic Qrarterly and other journals.
Discourse,
Verena Anderrnatt Conley teaches in Literature and Romance
Languagesand Literatures at Harvard University. She has written on
Marxism in post-warFrance,theoriesof feminism,technologiesand the
environment.Sheis currently interestedin space,subjectivityand global-
isationin Frenchthought.
Gary Genosko is CanadaResearchChair in Technocultureat Lakehead
University. He has publishedextensivelyon the life and work of F6lix
Guattari.
Eugene W. Holland haspublishedextensivelyon Deleuzeand Guattari,
including a book on Baud,elaireand. Schizoanalyvs(1993) and an
Introd,uctionto Schizoanalysis(1999).
Tarnsin Lorraine is an associateprofessorat SwarthmoreCollege.Sheis
the author of lrigara.y and Deleuze: Experimentsin VisceralPhilosophy
(1999)and is currently at work on a book tentativelytitled Feminismand.
DeleuzianSubjectiaitlt.
John Marks is Readerin FrenchStudiesat NottinghamTrent University.
He is the author of GillesDeleuze: Vitalismand Multiplicity (1998) and is
the editor of a forthcomingissueof Paragraphon Deleuzeand Science.
Kylie Message is ResearchFellow in the Centre for Cross-Cultural
Researchat the AustralianNationalUniversity.Prior to this shewasPost-
doctoral ResearchFellow in the Department of English with Cultural
Studiesat the University of Melbourne.Publishedwidely,her work uses
the interdisciplinarymethodologyof cultural studiesto engagecritically
with the new museummodelasit is emersinEacrossthe world.
Brett Nicholls lecturesin Film and Media Studies at the University
of Otago,and is the author of variousarticleson art, politics and digital
technologies.
Sirnon O'Sullivan is a lecturerin Art History/VisualCultureat Golcl-
smithsCollege,Universityof London.Hc is thc authorof thc forthconring
Art Encountars Dclauzcurul()ualturi: 7'houghtllc.yondllcfrascnkt,tioz
(lo bc
irsplrrlof'l)algrirvc
lrrrlrfislrcrf Mircnrilliur's
llcurtt,irt,ti
l'hilosophl,
scrics).
N OTES ON C ON TR IBU TOR S 3r7
Adrian Parr is Professorof Contemporary Art and Design at the
SavannahCollegeof Art and Design.Shehaswritten a book that explores
the notebooksof f,eonardo through the philosophicallens of Deleuze
(2003), and is the editor, with Ian Buchanan, of Deleuze and the
Contemporar.yl4orldalsoforthcomingfrom EdinburghUniversity Press.
Paul Patton is Professorof Philosophyat the University of New South
Wales.He translatedDifibrenceand,Repetition,edited,Deleuze:A Critical
Rearlerand is the authorof Deleuzeand thePolitical(2000).
John Protevi is AssociateProfessorof French Studiesat LouisianaState
University.He is the authorof TirueandExterionty(1994),PoliticalPh.ysics
(2001)andco-authorof DeleuzeandGeophilosoph.y (2004).He is alsoeditor
of the forthcoming EdinhurghDictionar.yof ContinentalPhilosophy.
Jonathan Roffe is convcnor of the Melbourne School of Continental
Philosophy.He is thc co-editorof UntlerstandingDerrid,a(2004)with Jack
Reynolds,and Derrida'sHeidegger(forthcoming) with Simon Critchley.
He is currently working on the relationbetweenthe work of Alain Badiou
and Deleuze,and on a Deleuzianunderstandingof cities.
Alison Ross teachesCritical Theory in the Centre for Comparative
Literature and Cultural Studiesat Monash University.She specialisesin
modern philosophy,aestheticsand contemporaryFrench thought. Her
book, TheAestheticAnomaly: AestheticPresentationin Kant, Heid,egger
and,
Nancy, is forthcomingin 2006.
Inna Sernetsky is an honorary researchassociatein the School of
Philosophyand Bioethics,Monash University.In 2002shedefendedher
Ph.D. dissertation'Continuities,Discontinuities,Interactions:Gilles
Deleuzeand the DeweyanLegacy'at ColumbiaUniversity.She won the
KevelsonMemorial Award from the SemioticSocietyof America(1999).
Lee Spinks is a senior lecturer in English Literature at Edinburgh
University. He is the author of Fried,richNietzsche(2003) andJamesJoyce
(2005) and is currently completing a study of Michael Ondaatje for
ManchesterUniversity Press.
Cliff Stagoll complctcclhis Ph.D. in Philosophyat thc Univcrsity of
Warwick,with :rtlisscrlatiotron l)clcuzc'slhcorisatiorrof'tlrchrrnr:rn
irrcli-
vidtrrrl.
Ilc is rrt'cscitt'clt ol'thc |)cprrrtrrrcrrl
itssocirtlc ol'l)lrilosolllry
rrttht:
[.Jnivclsity
ol' Ncw SorrtlrWrk's.
31 8 NO TES ON CO NTRTB U T O R S

Kenneth Surin is basedin the Literature Program,Duke University.

Marcel Swiboda receivedhis Ph.D. from the Universityof Leedsin 2003

wherehe currently worksasan associatelecturerin the Schoolof Fine Art,
History of Art and Culrural Studies.He is the co-editor,with Ian Buchanan,
of Deleuzeand,Music,publishedby Edinburgh University Press(2004).

Alberto Toscano teachesin the SociologyDepartment at Goldsmiths

College.He haspublishedarticleson Italian Marxism, Alain Badiou and
Nietzsche.He is the editor of Alain Bad,iou:TheoreticalWritingswith Ray
Brassier (forthcoming) and Antonio Negri: The Political Descarteswith
Matteo Mandarini (forthcoming).

Constantine Verevis lectures in the School of Literary, Visual and

Performance Studies at Monash University. His book Film Remakesis
forthcomingfrom EdinburghUniversity Press.

Jarnes Williams is Readerin Philosophy at the University of Dundee.

His books include Gilles Deleuze'sDifferenceand Repetition:A Critical
Introduction and, Guid,e(2003) and The TransaersalThought of Gilhs
Deleuze(2005).Jamesis grateful for the support of the AHRB Research
LeaveSchemeand the CarnegieTrust for the UniversitiesScotland.