Land Titles Cases
G.R. No. L-26127 June 28, 1974
(Civil Case No. 3621)
VICTOR BENIN, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
MARIANO SEVERO TUASON y DE LA PAZ, ET AL., defendants. J. M. TUASON & CO., INC., defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-26128 June 28, 1974
(Civil Case No. 3622)
JUAN ALCANTARA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
MARIANO SEVERO TUASON y DE LA PAZ, ET AL., defendants. J.M. TUASON & CO., INC., defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-26129 June 28, 1974
(Civil Case No. 3623)
DIEGO PILI, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
MARIANO SEVERO TUASON y DE LA PAZ, ET AL., defendants. J.M. TUASON & CO., INC., defendant-appellant.
Jose Palarca Law Offices for plaintiffs-appellees.
Manuel O. Chan & Rodolfo M. Caluag for defendant-appellant.
ZALDIVAR, J.:p
Appeal from the decision, dated January 18, 1965, of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, the Hon. Judge Eulogio
Mencias, presiding in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622, and 3623.1
On May 19, 1955 three sets of plaintiffs filed three separate complaints containing substantially the same
allegations.2
In Civil Case No. 3621, the plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and possessors of the three parcels of
agricultural lands, described in paragraph V of the complaint, located in the barrio of La Loma (now barrio of San
Jose) in the municipality (now city) of Caloocan, province of Rizal, having an aggregate area of approximately
278,928 square meters; that they inherited said parcels of land from their ancestor Sixto Benin, who in turn
inherited the same from his father, Eugenio Benin; that they and their predecessors in interest had possessed these
three parcels of land openly, adversely, and peacefully, cultivated the same and exclusively enjoyed the fruits
harvested therefrom; that Eugenio Benin, plaintiff's grandfather, had said parcels of land surveyed on March 4 and
6, 1894, that during the cadastral survey by the Bureau of Lands of the lands in Barrio San Jose in 1933 Sixto Benin
and herein plaintiffs claim the ownership over said parcels of land; that they declared said lands for taxation
purposes in 1940 under Tax Declaration No. 2429; that after the outbreak of the last World War, or sometime in
1942 and subsequently thereafter, evacuees from Manila and other places, after having secured the permission of
the plaintiffs, constructed their houses thereon and paid monthly rentals to plaintiffs.
In Civil Case No. 3622 the plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and possessors of two parcels of agricultural
land, described in paragraph V of the complaint, located in the Barrio of La Loma (now Barrio San Jose) in the
municipality of Caloocan, province of Rizal, having an aggregate area of approximately 148,118 square meters; that
these parcels of land were inherited by them from their deceased father Bonoso Alcantara, who in turn inherited
the same from his father, Juan Alcantara; that plaintiffs Juan Alcantara and Jose Alcantara were the children of
Bonoso Alcantara; that these two brothers inherited the land from their father, and they and their predecessors in
interest had been in open, adverse and continuous possession of the same, planting therein palay and other
agricultural products and exclusively enjoying said products; that on March 28, 1894 plaintiffs' grandfather, Juan
Alcantara, had said lands surveyed; that during the cadastral survey by the Bureau of Lands of the lands in Barrio
San Jose in 1933 Bonoso Alcantara and the plaintiffs filed and registered their claims of ownership over said lands;
that plaintiffs had said lands declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 2390, of Quezon City; that
after the outbreak of the last World War, or sometime in 1942 and subsequently thereafter, evacuees from Manila
and other places, after having secured permission from plaintiffs, settled and constructed their houses on said
lands and plaintiffs collected monthly rentals from them.
In Civil Case No. 3623, plaintiffs alleged that they are the owners and possessors of a parcel of agricultural land
located in the Barrio of La Loma (now San Jose), municipality of Caloocan, province of Rizal, having an area of
approximately 62,481 square meters; that this parcel of land was inherited by plaintiffs from their ancestor Candido
Pili who in turn inherited the same from his parents; that Candido Pili and his predecessors in interest owned,
possessed, occupied and cultivated the said parcel of land from time immemorial; that upon the death of Candido
1
Pili his children Luisa Pili, Pascual Pili, Diego Pili and Manuel Pili succeeded to the ownership and possession and
cultivation of said land; that plaintiffs and their predecessors in interest, as owners and possessors of said land, had
openly, adversely and continuously cultivated the land, planting thereon palay and other agricultural products and
enjoying exclusively the products harvested therefrom; that during his lifetime, Candido Pili ordered the survey of said
land sometime on March 11, 1894, and when the cadastral survey of said land was conducted by the Bureau of Lands in
1933 Candido Pili and plaintiffs filed and registered their claim of ownership over the said parcel of land; that plaintiffs
had the land declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 2597, Quezon City, Philippines; that after the
outbreak of the last World War, or sometime in 1942 and subsequently thereafter, evacuees from Manila and other
places, after securing permission from plaintiffs, settled and constructed their houses in said land and plaintiffs
collected monthly rentals from their lessees or tenants.
The plaintiffs in these three civil cases uniformly alleged, in their respective complaint, that sometime in the year 1951
while they were enjoying the peaceful possession of their lands, the defendants, particularly the defendant J.M. Tuason
and Co. Inc., through their agents and representatives, with the aid of armed men, by force and intimidation, using
bulldozers and other demolishing equipment, illegally entered and started defacing, demolishing and destroying the
dwellings and constructions of plaintiffs' lessees, as well as the improvements consisting of rice paddies (pilapiles),
bamboos and fruit trees, and permanent improvements such as old roads, old bridges and other permanent landmarks
within and outside the lands in question, disregarding the objections of plaintiffs, and as a result plaintiffs were
deprived of the rentals received from their lessees; that plaintiffs made inquiries regarding the probable claim of
defendants, and in 1953 they discovered for the first time that their lands, as described in their respective complaint,
had either been fraudulently or erroneously included, by direct or constructive fraud, in what appears as Parcel No. 1
(known as Santa Mesa Estate) in Original Certificate of Title No. 735 of the Land Records of the province of Rizal in the
names of the original applicants for registration, now defendants, Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, Teresa Eriberta
Tuason y de la Paz, Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, and Augusto Huberto Tuason y
de la Paz.
The plaintiffs in each of the three complaints also alleged that the registered owners mentioned in Original Certificate
of Title No. 735 had applied for the registration of two parcels of land (known as the Santa Mesa Estate and the Diliman
Estate), located in the municipalities of Caloocan and San Juan del Monte, province of Rizal, of which parcel No. 1 (Santa
Mesa Estate) contained an area of 8,798,617 square meters; that the registration proceedings were docketed as LRC No.
7681 of the Court of Land Registration; that the application for registration in LRC No. 7681, containing the boundaries,
technical descriptions and areas of parcel No. 1 (Santa Mesa Estate) and parcel No. 2 (Diliman Estate) was published in
the Official Gazette; that before the decision was handed down in LRC No. 7681, the area, boundaries and technical
descriptions of parcel No. 1 were altered and amended; that the amendments and alterations, which were made after
the publication of the original application, were never published; that on March 7, 1914 a decision was rendered in LRC
No. 7681 based on the amended plan; that pursuant to the decision of March 7, 1914 a decree of registration was
issued on July 6, 1914, known as Decree No. 17431, decreeing the registration in the names of the applicants of the two
parcels of land (Santa Mesa Estate and Diliman Estate); that the decision dated March 7, 1914 in LRC No. 7681 is null
and void because the Land Registration Court had no jurisdiction to render the decision for lack of publication; that
Decree No. 17431 issued pursuant to the decision of March 7, 1914 in LRC No. 7681 is likewise null and void from the
beginning, because it was issued pursuant to a void decision and because the boundaries, technical descriptions and
areas appearing in the decree are different and not identical with the boundaries, technical descriptions and areas in
the application for registration as published in the Official Gazette; that the area of parcel No. 1 as mentioned in Decree
No. 17431 is bigger than the area of parcel No. 1 appearing in the application for registration as published in the Official
Gazette; that Original Certificate of Title No. 735, referring to parcel 1 (Santa Mesa Estate), is also null and void from the
beginning because it was issued pursuant to a void decree of registration; that the area, boundaries and technical
description of Parcel No. 1 appearing in Decree of Registration No. 17431 and in the Original Certificate of Title No. 735
are different from the area, boundaries and technical description appearing in the application for registration as
published in the Official Gazette; that the plaintiffs had not been notified of the proceedings in LRC No. 7681 although
the applicants knew, or could have known, by the exercise of necessary diligence, the names and addresses of the
plaintiffs and their predecessors in interest who were then, and up to the time the complaints were filed, in possession
and were cultivating the lands described in paragraph V of their respective complaint; and that during, before, and even
after the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 the defendants had tacitly recognized the ownership of the
plaintiffs over their respective lands because said defendants had never disturbed the possession and cultivation of the
lands by the plaintiffs until the year 1951; and that all transfer certificates of title issued subsequently, based on
Original Certificate of Title No. 735, are also null and void.3
Land Titles Cases
The plaintiffs in each of the three cases prayed the court: (1) to declare them owners and entitled to the possession
of the parcel, or parcels, of land described in their respective complaint, as the case may be; (2) to revoke the
decision of the Court of Land Registration, dated March 7, 1914 in LRC No. 7681, and to declare Decree No. 17431,
dated July 6, 1914 null and void from the beginning with respect to Parcel No. 1(Santa Mesa Estate) in Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 which include the lands of the plaintiffs; (3) to declare Original Certificate of Title No.
735, particularly as it refers to Parcel No. 1 (Santa Mesa Estate) also null and void; (4) to declare null and void all
transfer certificates of titles issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal and of Quezon City subsequent to, and based
on, Original Certificate of Title No. 735; (5) to order the defendants, in the event Original Certificate of Title No. 735
is declared valid, to reconvey and transfer title over the land described in their respective complaint in favor of the
plaintiffs in each case, as the case may be; (6) to order the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the market value of the
lands in question in case of defendants' inability to reconvey the same; (7) to order the defendants to pay damages
to the plaintiffs; (8) to issue a writ of preliminary injunction against the defendants, their lawyers, their agents and
representatives from disturbing the ownership and possession of the plaintiffs during the pendency of these cases.
The plaintiffs, in the three cases, were allowed by the trial court to litigate as paupers.
Only defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was actually served with summons. The other defendants were ordered
summoned by publication in accordance with Sections 16 and 17 of the Rules of Court. Only defendant J.M. Tuason
& Co., Inc. appeared. The other defendants were all declared in default.
On June 23, 1955 defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss in each of the three cases. This motion
to dismiss was denied by the trial court on July 20, 1955.
On July 18, 1955 the trial court issued an order granting the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by the
plaintiffs in their complaints. The preliminary injunction, however, was lifted by order of the trial court on October
3, 1955, upon the posting by defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. of bonds in the total amount of P14,000.00
pursuant to the order of the court of September 26, 1955.
On August 11, 1955 defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed in the three cases a motion for reconsideration of the
order of July 20, 1955 denying the motion to dismiss. This motion for reconsideration was denied by order of the
court of September 26, 1955.
On November 29, 1955 defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed an answer in each of the three cases. In its answer,
this defendant, among others, specifically denied plaintiffs' claim of ownership of the lands involved in each case.
The answer contains special and affirmative defenses, to wit: (1) that the plaintiffs' cause of action is barred by
prior judgment and res judicata in view of the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in its Civil Case No.
Q-156 which was subsequently elevated to the Supreme Court as G.R. No. L-4998, in which latter case the Supreme
Court affirmed in toto the order of the lower court dismissing the case; (2) that the complaints failed to state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendants; (3) that the plaintiffs' action, assuming that their
complaints state sufficient cause of action, had prescribed either under Act No. 496 or under statutes governing
prescription of action; (4) that defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. is a buyer in good faith and for valuable
consideration of the parcels of land involved in the three cases; (5) that the registration proceedings had in LRC No.
7681 instituted by the defendant's predecessors in interest was in accordance with law, and the requirements for a
valid registration of title were complied with. By way of counterclaim the defendant prayed that the plaintiffs be
ordered to pay damages as therein specified.
The plaintiffs, amended their complaints in the three cases, by including additional parties as plaintiffs, and the
amended complaints were admitted by the trial court. The defendant, J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., filed a manifestation
that it was reproducing and realleging its answers to the original complaints as its answers to the amended
complaints in view of the fact that the amendments to the complaints consist merely in the inclusion of additional
indispensable as well as necessary parties-plaintiffs.4
On June 7, 1962, after the plaintiffs had presented their evidence, defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. presented a
motion to dismiss the cases upon grounds that (1) the actions were barred by the statute of limitations; (2) that the
actions barred by a prior judgment; and (3) that plaintiffs had not presented any evidence to prove their claim of
ownership. The defendant later filed a motion to withdraw the third ground of its motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs
filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss, as well as to the motion of defendant to withdraw its third ground
to dismiss. The trial court, in an order dated December 3, 1962, granted defendant's motion to withdraw the third
ground of its motion to dismiss but denied the motion to dismiss.5
After trial, on January 18, 1965, the lower court rendered a decision for the three cases, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
2
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the Plaintiffs and against the
Defendants as follows:
A Declaring that the decision, the decree and the title issued in LRC No. 7681, are null and void, ab initio, and of no
effect whatsoever;
B Declaring that Original Certificate of Title No. 735 found on page 136 Vol. A-7 of the Registration Book of Rizal is
null and void from the very beginning (and) of no effect whatsoever;
C Declaring that all Transfer Certificates of Title emanating or allegedly derived from Original Certificate of Title No.
735 of the Province of Rizal are likewise null and void;
D Declaring that the plaintiff in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 are the owners and entitled to the possession
of the parcels of land claimed and described in paragraph V of their respective complaints;
E Ordering the defendants and all persons claiming under them to vacate and restore to the plaintiffs the possesion
of the parcels of land described in paragraph V of the complaint in Civil Case No. 3621 and indicated as Parcel A, Parcel
B and Parcel C, in SWO-40187 (Exh. "UU" and Exh. "VV");
F Ordering the defendants and all persons claiming under them to vacate and restore to the plaintiffs the possession
of the parcels of land described in paragraph V of the complaint in Civil Case No. 3623 and indicated as Parcel
D and Parcel F, in SWO-40187 (Exh. "UU" and Exh. 'VV");
G Ordering the Defendants and all persons claiming under them to vacate and restore to the plaintiffs the possession
of the parcels of land described in paragraph V of the complaint in Civil Case No. 3623 and indicated in Parcel E, in
SWO-491187 (Exh. "UU and Exh. "VV");
H Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3621 the sum of P600.00 a month as actual damages for
uncollected rentals from 1951 until such possession is restored to them;
I Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3623 the sum of P600.00 a month, as actual damages
for uncollected rentals from 1951 until such possession is restored to them;.
J Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3623 the sum of P150.00 a month as actual damages
for uncollected rentals from 1951 until such possession is restored to them; .
K Ordering the defendants to pay the costs; .
L The defendants' counterclaim is hereby declared dismissed for lack of merit."6
A motion for new trial was filed by defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. on January 30, 1965. However, before the motion
for new trial was resolved by the court, said defendant, on February 11, 1965, filed a notice of appeal to this Court and
an appeal bond, and on February 12, 1965 he filed the record on appeal.7 The record on appeal, after it had been
corrected and amended, as ordered and/or authorized by the trial court, was approved on September 29, 1965.8
Appellant J.M. Tuason & Co. Inc., in this appeal, contends that the trial court committed the following errors:
I. The lower court erred in holding that the Land Registration Court in GLRO No. 7681 lacked or was without jurisdiction
to issue decree No. 17431 for the alleged reason that:
(1) The amendment to the original plan was not published;
(2) The description of Parcel 1 in the decree is not identical with the description of Parcel 1 as applied for and as
published in the Official Gazette;
(3) Parcel 1 as decreed is bigger in area than Parcel 1 as applied for;
(4) A. Bonifacio Road is the only boundary on the West of Parcel 1.
II. The trial court erred in finding that the transcription of the decree No. 17431 was not in accordance with the law and
that, therefore, said OCT 735 was a complete nullity and the land remains unregistered.
III. The trial court erred in taking cognizance of these cases despite its lack of jurisdiction to hear and decide the same.
IV. The trial court erred in not dismissing these cases on the grounds of prescription and laches, and in denying the
motions to dismiss filed on said grounds.
V. The trial court erred in not dismissing these cases on the ground of res judicata and in denying the motion to dismiss
filed on said ground.
VI. The trial court erred in declaring null and void all certificates of title emanating from OCT 735.
VII. The trial court erred in holding that J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. is not a purchaser in good faith and for value.
VIII. The trial court erred in awarding ownership of the lands claimed by, and in awarding damages to, the appellees.
IX. The trial court erred in denying and in dismissing appellant's counterclaim and in sentencing appellant to pay the
costs of these suits.
As stated by the trial court in its decision, "These cases involve the validity of the decision and the decree issued in LRC
No. 7681 resulting in the issuance of Title No. 735, and the ownership and possession of several parcels of land, claimed
by the plaintiffs in their respective complaints...."
Land Titles Cases
The lower court, summarizing its findings, among others, concluded that: (1) the decision and the decree in LRC No.
7681 are null and void ab initio, having been rendered without jurisdiction; (2) Original Certificate of Title No. 735
issued pursuant to the decree in LRC No. 7681 is null and void, having been issued pursuant to a void degree; (3)
Original Certificate of Title No. 735 is null and void because the No. 17431 in LRC No. 7681, assuming the degree to
be valid, had not been inscribed in accordance with the provisions of Section 41 of Act 496; (4) all Transfer
Certificates of Title allegedly emanating and derived from the void Original Certificate of Title No. 735 are likewise
null and void; and (5) the plaintiffs in these three civil are the owners and entitled to the possession of the parcels
of land described in their respective complaints.
We have carefully examined and studied the voluminous records, and the numerous documentary evidence, of
these three cases, and We find that the conclusions of the trial court are not supported by the evidence and the
applicable decisions of this Court.
The Original Certificate of Title No. 735 that had been declared null and void ab initio by the trial court covers two
big parcels of land, mentioned in said title as Parcel 1, having an area of 8,778,644.10 square meters more or less,
known as the Santa Mesa Estate; and Parcel 2, having an area of 15,961,246 square meters more or less, known as
the Diliman Estate. The three parcels of land involved in Civil Case No. 3621, having an aggregate area of 278,853
square meters, more or less; the two parcels of land involved in Civil Case No. 3622 having an aggregate area of
154,119.7 square meters, more or less; and the one parcel of land involved in Civil Case No. 3623, having an area of
62,481 square meters, more or less, are all included in the area of Parcel 1.9 The trial court, in its decision, states
that the identity of the parcels of land claimed by the plaintiffs is not disputed and that both the plaintiffs and the
defendant admit that the parcels of land litigated are found within the boundaries of the present Sta. Mesa Heights
Subdivision (Parcel 1) covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735.10 It is shown in the survey plans, presented by
both the plaintiffs and the defendant, that the six parcels of lands involved in these three cases are located at the
northwestern portion of Parcel 1. (Exhs. UU, VV; and Exh. 29).
The records show, and it is established by the evidence, that sometime in 1911 Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz,
Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, and
Augusto Huberto Tuason y de la Paz, filed with the Court of Land Registration an application for the registration of
their title over two parcels of land, designated in the survey plans accompanying the application as Parcel 1 with an
area of 8,798,617 square meters, and Parcel 2 with an area of 16,254,037 square meters. The application was
docketed as LRC No. 7681. There was another application covering three other parcels of land, docketed as LRC No.
7680. The application in LRC No. 7681 was set for hearing on November 20, 1911 (Exh. X). The application and the
notice of hearing, containing the technical descriptions of the two parcels of land applied for, were published in the
issue of the Official Gazette of October 25, 1911 (Exh. YY). On November 20, 1911 the Court of Land Registration
issued an order of general default against the whole world except the Insular Government, the Director of Lands
and the municipalities of Caloocan and San Juan del Monte (Exh. 28). On December 23, 1911 the court issued an
order authorizing the amendment of the plan in LRC No. 7681 (Exh. 23). November 11, 1913 the applicants and the
Government entered into an agreement whereby the Government agreed to withdraw its opposition to the
application for registration of title over the portion known as Hacienda Diliman (Parcel 2) on condition that the
roads existing on said tract of land be allowed to remain, and it was further agreed "that the issuance, of the title to
applicants shall be made subject to all the exceptions established by Section 39 of Act 496 as amended by Section 1
of Act 2011" (Exh. 21). On December 29, 1913 the Court of Land Registration rendered a decision (Exh. 24) in both
LRC No. 7680 and LRC No. 7681 which, among others, stated that during the registration proceedings the plans
accompanying the two applications were amended in order to exclude certain areas that were the subject of
opposition, that the order of general default was confirmed, that the Chief of the Surveyor's Division of the Court of
Land Registration was ordered to submit a report as to whether or not the new (amended) plans had included lands
which were not by the original plans, and whether or not the new plans had excluded the lands that had already
been covered by the decree in LRC No. 3563. The decision further stated that in the event that the new plans did
not include new parcels of land and that the lands that were the subject of the proceedings in LRC No. 3563 had
been excluded, an additional decision would be made decreeing the adjudication and registration of the lands that
were the subject of the registration proceedings in favor of the applicants, as follows: To Mariano Severo Tuason y
de la Paz, two sixths (2/6) undivided portion to Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, one sixth (1/6) undivided portion;
to Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, one sixth (1/6) undivided portion; to Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, one
sixth (1/6)undivided portion; and to Augusto Huberto Tuason y de la Paz, one sixth (1/6) undivided portion.
In compliance with the order contained in the decision of December 29, 1913, the Chief of the Survey Division of
the Court of Land Registration, on January 24, 1914, submitted a report (Exh. 22) to the court which, among others,
3
stated that the new plan of Parcel 1 in LRC No. 7681 did not include any land that had not been previously included in
the original plan.
On March 7, 1914 the Court of Land Registration rendered a supplemental decision declaring that, on the basis of the
decision of December 29, 1913 and of the report of the Surveyor of Court of Land Registration, the applicants Mariano
Severo Tuason y de la Paz and others were the owners of the land applied for, as described in the amended plan, in the
proportion mentioned in the decision, and ordering that the land applied for be registered in the names of the
applicants and that a decree of registration be issued in accordance with the decision and the amended plan. On March
27, 1914 the Chief of the Survey Division addressed a communication to the registration court, in connection with LRC
No. 7681, suggesting that the decision of the court of March 7, 1914 be modified such that the decree of registration be
based upon the original plan as published and not upon the amended plan (Exh. Z-3). The Court of Land Registration did
not follow the recommendation of the Chief of the Survey Division. On July 6, 1914 Decree of Registration No. 17431
was issued by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office pursuant to the decision of the Court of Land
Registration of March 7, 1914 in LRC No. 7681. The decree contains the technical description of the two parcels of land
in accordance with the plan as amended. It appears in the decree that Parcel 1 has an area of 8,798,644.10 square
meters, more or less, or an increase of 27.10 square meters over the area of 8,798,617 square meters that was stated in
the application for registration and in the notice of hearing which were published in the Official Gazette of October 25,
1911; and that Parcel 2 has an area of 15,961,246 square meters, more or less, or a decrease of 292,791 square meters
from the area of 16,254,037 square meters that was stated in the application and in the notice of hearing that were
published in the Official Gazette (Exhs. 25 and YY). All in all, there is a decrease of 292,763.90 square meters in the
aggregate area of the two parcels of land sought to be registered.
Subsequently, on July 8, 1914, the Register of Deeds of the province of Rizal issued Original Certificate of Title No. 735
in the names of the applicants, Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, Juan Jose Tuason
y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, and Augusto Huberto Tuason y de la Paz (Exh. 30).
1. We shall now deal with the first error assigned by the appellant.
The lower court declared Original Certificate of Title No. 735 null and void ab initio because, according to said court,
that title was based on Decree of Registration No. 17431 in LRC No. 7681 that was null and void, said decree having
been issued pursuant to a decision of the Court of Land Registration in LRC No. 7681 which had no jurisdiction to render
said decision.
As We have adverted to, Original Certificate of Title No. 735 covers two big parcels of land: Parcel 1, known as the Santa
Mesa Estate, and Parcel 2, known as the Diliman Estate. The records show that these two parcels of land had been
subdivided into numerous lots, and most of those lots had sold to numerous parties Parcel 1 having been converted
into a subdivision known as the Santa Mesa Heights Subdivision, and the lots had been sold to private individual and
entities, such that in that subdivision now are located the National Orthopedic Hospital, the station of Pangasinan
Transportation Co. (Pantranco), Sto. Domingo Church, Lourdes Church and others. Necessarily, as a result of the sales of
the lots into which Parcel 1 was subdivided, transfer certificates of title were issued to the purchasers of the lots, and
these transfer certificates of title were based upon transfer certificates of title that emanated from Original Certificate
of Title No. 735. The trial court declared null and void all transfer certificates of title emanating, or derived, from
Original Certificate of No. 735.
The decision of the trial court declaring null and void ab initio Original Certificate of Title No. 735 would invalidate the
title over the entire area included in Parcel 1 which admittedly includes the six parcels of land claimed by the
plaintiffs-and also the title over the entire area included in Parcel 2. Let it be noted that Parcel 1 has an area of
8,798,644.10 square meters, more or less, and Parcel 2 has an area of 15,961,246 square meters, more or less; while
the six parcels of land claimed by the plaintiffs have an aggregate area of only 495,453.7 square meters, more or less. In
other words, the area of the six parcels of land claimed by the plaintiffs is only a little over two per cent (2%) of the
aggregate area of Parcel 1 and Parcel 2. But the decision of the trial court nullified Original Certificate of Title No. 785,
without any qualification.
The trial court held that the Court of Land Registration had no jurisdiction to render the decision in LRC No. 7681
because during the registration proceedings, after the original application and notice of hearing had been duly
published, the plan of Parcel 1 was amended and no publication regarding the amended plan was made. The trial court
pointed out that the area and the description of Parcel 1 in Decree of Registration No. 17431 are not identical with the
area and description of Parcel 1 applied for and published in the Official Gazette. The trial court stressed on the point
that publication is one of the essential bases of the jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide an application for
registration and to order the issuance of a decree of registration, as provided in Act 496 (Land Registration Act).
Land Titles Cases
We believe that the lower court erred when it held that the Land Registration Court was without jurisdiction to
render the decision in LRC No. 7681. Under Section 23 of Act 496, the registration court may allow, or order, an
amendment of the application for registration when it appears to the court that the amendment is necessary and
proper. Under Section 24 of the same act the court may at any time order an application to be amended by striking
out one or more parcels or by severance of the application. The amendment may be made in the application or in
the survey plan, or in both, since the application and the survey plan go together. If the amendment consists in the
inclusion in the application for registration of an area or parcel of land not previously included in the original
application, as published, a new publication of the amended application must be made. The purpose of the new
publication is to give notice to all persons concerned regarding the amended application. Without a new
publication the registration court can not acquire jurisdiction over the area or parcel of land that is added to the
area covered by the original application, and the decision of the registration court would be a nullity insofar as the
decision concerns the newly included land.11 The reason is because without a new publication, the law is infringed
with respect to the publicity that is required in registration proceedings, and third parties who have not had the
opportunity to present their claim might be prejudiced in their rights because of failure of notice.12 But if the
amendment consists in the exclusion of a portion of the area covered by the original application and the original
plan as previously published, a new publication is not necessary. 13 In the latter case, the jurisdiction of the court
over the remaining area is not affected by the failure of a new publication.14
In the case at bar We find that the original plan covering Parcel 1 and Parcel 2 that accompanied the application for
registration in LRC No. 7681 was amended in order to exclude certain areas that were the subject of opposition, or
which were the subject of another registration case; and the Chief of the Survey Division of the Court of Land
Registration was ordered to determine whether the amended plan included lands or areas not included in the
original plan. In compliance with the order of the registration court said Chief of the Survey Division informed the
court that no new parcels were included in the new (or amended) plan. Thus, in the decision of the Court of Land
Registration in LRC Nos. 7680 and 7681, dated December 29, 1913 (Exh. 24), We read the following:
Despues de las notificaciones y avisos de las dos solicitudes en ambos expedientes, se enmendaronlos planos
unidos a los mismos para excluir ciertas porciones que habian sido objeto de oposicion.
xxx xxx xxx
POR TANTO, ratificando como por la presente se ratifica la declaracion de rebeldia general, se ordena:
"1.o Que el Jefe de la Division de Agrimensores de este Tribunal terreno que no haya sido comprendido en los
planos originales ...."15
On January 24, 1914, the Chief of the Survey Division of the Court of Land Registration made a report to the court
(Exh. 22), from which the report We read the following:.
Cumpliendo lo mandado por el Tribunal en el No. 1 de la parte dispositiva de su Decision de fecha 29 de Diciembre
proximo pasado, el que suscribe, despues de un detenido estudio de los planos unidos a los Expedientes arriba
citados, tiene el honor de informar:
1.o Que los nuevos planos presentados por los solicitantes corresponden a las parcelas 1.a 2.a, y 3.a, del Expedients
No. 7680 y a la 1.a parcela del No. 7681, que son las mismas a que se refiere el plano Exhibito A del No. 7680.
xxx xxx xxx
4. Que los nuevos planos presentados de las parcelas 1.a, 2.a y 3.a del Expediente 7680, y de la 1.a del 7681 no
incluyen terreno alguno que no haya sido comprendido en los planos originales.16
And so, in the supplemental decision of the Court of Land Registration in LRC No. 7681, dated March 7, 1914 (Exh.
24-A), the report of the Chief of the Survey Division was taken into consideration and the court ordered the
registration of the lands applied for by the applicants as described in the amended plan ("como esta descrito en el
plano enmendado"). It is thus shown that the amended plan in LRC No. 7681 did not cover parcels, or areas, that
were not previously included in the original plan which accompanied the application that had been published in the
Official Gazette. There was, therefore, no necessity for a new publication of the amended plan in order to vest the
Court of Land Registration with jurisdiction to hear and decide the application for registration in LRC No. 7681 and
to order the issuance of Decree of Registration No. 17431 upon which Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was
based.
Way back in 1933, this Court had occasion to rule on the validity of the very same Original Certificate of Title No.
735 which the trial court had declared null and void in the three cases now before this Court. In the case of the
Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Acua (59 Phil. 183) the validity of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was assailed
by the appellants (Pascual Acua and others) precisely upon the ground that during the registration proceedings,
which brought about the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, the original plan of the applicants was
4
ordered amended, and no new publication was made of the amended plan and so it was urged that the registration
court did not have jurisdiction to order the issuance of the decree of registration in favor of the applicants. The action in
this case was instituted by the Bank of the Philippine Islands as receiver of the Tuason Entail for the purpose, among
others, of recovering from Pascual Acua and others certain lands included in the Santa Mesa and Diliman hacienda
located in the barrios of Bagobantay and Diliman, in the municipalities of Caloocan and San Juan del Monte Province of
Rizal. Upon hearing, the Court of First Instance of Rizal declared that none of the defendants owned any part of the land
in controversy. On appeal, this Court observed that the character in which the plaintiff sued was not open to question,
and the material facts were as follows: The heirs of the Tuason estate, referred to as the Tuason Entail, held a Torrens
title to a tract of land with an area of about 1,600 hectares located in the province of Rizal. This property was then
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3792 issued in lieu of older certificates dating from July 8, 1914. This
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3792 emanated from Or Certificate of Title No. 735.17The appellants precisely sought to
nullify the title of the heirs of the Tuason estate, which emanated from Original Certificate of Title No. 735, upon the
ground, as now urged by the appellees in the three cases at bar, that during the registration proceedings the original
plan of the lands known as the Sta. Mesa and Diliman was amended, and no publication was made of the amended plan.
Regarding the question of the non-publication of the amended plan, this Court said:
Among the arguments made by the appellants of the Bagobantay group, it is alleged that the Torrens title relied by the
plaintiff is void, and in support of this contention it stated that, during the course of the registration proceedings, an
order was made by the court for the amendment of the applicants and that this order was not followed by new
publication, wherefore, it is supposed the court was without jurisdiction to decree the title to the applicants. In this
connection reliance is placed upon the doctrine stated in the Philippine Manufacturing Co. vs. Imperial (49 Phil. 122).
But the brief for the appellants fails to call attention to the fact that the rule stated in the case cited has reference to an
amendment of the plan by which additional land, different from that included in the original survey is intended to be
brought within the process of registration. In the case before us, the order referred to was for the exclusion of certain
portions of the land covered by the original survey, and the doctrine of the case cited cannot apply. Apart from this it
does not appear that the portion intended to be excluded comprehended any part of the land which had been
usurped. 18
The appellees, however, asserts that the case of the Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Acua, supra, is not applicable to
the three cases now before this Court because what was involved in said case was Parcel 2 of Original Certificate of Title
No. 735, and not Parcel 1 which is the land involved in these cases. This assertion of the appellees is not correct. The
decision in that case states that the action was instituted by the Bank of the Philippine Islands, as receiver of the Tuason
Entail, for the purpose, among others, of recovering from Pascual Acua and others "certain lands contained in the Sta.
Mesa and Diliman Hacienda located in the barrios of Bagobantay and Diliman in the municipalities of Caloocan and San
Juan del Monte."19 But what matters is the doctrine that was laid down by this Court in that case that is: that when the
original survey plan is amended, after the publication of the application in order to include land not previously included
in the original survey, a new publication of the amended plan is necessary in order to confer jurisdiction upon the
registration court to order the registration of the land that is added to what was included in the original survey plan.
The ruling of this Court in the Bank of the Philippine Islands case has a decisive application in the three cases now
before this Court.
The trial court laid stress on the point that publication of the amended plan of Parcel 1 should have been made because
it appears in the Decree of Registration No. 17431, and as reproduced in Original Certificate of Title No. 735, that the
area of said parcel is "bigger" than the area stated in the application as published in the Official Gazette; and, also, that
the boundaries of Parcel 1 stated in the decree are not identical with the boundaries stated in the application as
published in the Official Gazette. We paid particular attention on this point of the lower court's decision, and our
impression is that the trial court had exploited certain minor discrepancies between the description of Parcel 1 in the
decree of registration and its description in the original application, in order to bolster its ruling that "to render a
decision on the amended plan, boundary descriptions, and additional lands comprised within Parcel 1 in Decree No.
17431, a republication of such amended plan, boundary description, technical description and additional areas is
necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the Court."20
Oddly enough, when the lower court said that the area of Parcel 1 in the decree of registration is bigger than the area
of Parcel 1 in the application as published, it did not mention the fact that the difference in area is only 27.10 square
meters. We believe that this difference of 27.10 square meters is too minimal to be of decisive consequence in the
determination of the validity of Original Certificate of Title No. 735. It was error on the part of the lower court to lay
stress on this circumstance and made it a basis for ruling that because in the amended plan there is this increase in area
as compared to the area appearing in the application as published, the Land Registration Court did not have jurisdiction
Land Titles Cases
to render the decision decreeing the registration of Parcel 1 in LRC No. 7681. The Chief of the Survey Division of the
Court of Land Registration, in his report to the court of January 24, 1914 (Exh. 22), stated that the new plan of
Parcel 1 did not include any land that was not included in the original plan. That report was made precisely in
compliance with the order of the registration court, in the decision of December 29, 1913 in LRC No. 7681, to
inform the court "si los nuevos planos incluyen o no terreno que no haya sido comprendido en los planos
originales". That report was submitted by the Chief Surveyor "despues de un detenido estudio de los planos unidos
a los expedientes". Under the foregoing circumstances, our inference is that the area of 27.10 square meters was
already included in the original plan, and that the computation of the area in the original survey must have been
inaccurate; and the error was corrected in the recomputation of the area when the amended plan was prepared.
We made a careful study and comparison of the technical description of Parcel 1 appearing in the application as
published, and the technical description appearing in Decree of Registration No. 17431 (Exhs. 19, 19-A and Z-6),
and We accept the explanation of counsel for the appellant that this seeming increase of 27.10 square meters had
been brought about "by the fact that when the amendment of the plan was made, the distances and bearings in a
few points along the southwestern boundary (Please see Exh. 19) were brought to the nearest millimeter and to
the nearest second respectively; whereas, the computation of the survey in the original plan was to the nearest
decimeter and to the nearest minute only".21 We believe that this very slight increase of 27.10 square meters
would not justify the conclusion of the lower court that "the amended plan ... included additional lands which were
not originally included in Parcel 1 as published in the Official Gazette." It being undisputed that Parcel 1 has an area
of more than 8,798,600 square meters (or 879.86 hectares), We believe that this difference of 27.10 square meters,
between the computation of the area when the original plan was made and the computation of the area when the
amended plan was prepared, can not be considered substantial as would affect the identity of Parcel 1.
Moreover, no evidence was presented to identify this area of 27.10 square meters, nor to show its location, in
relation to the entire area of Parcel 1. The appellees did not even attempt to show that this excess area of 27.10
square meters is included within the parcels that they are claiming. We cannot, therefore; consider this area of
27.10 square meters as an area that was separate and distinct from, and was added to, the land that was covered
by the original survey plan, such that the publication of the amended plan would be necessary in order that the
registration court could acquire jurisdiction over that area. As We have pointed out, this increase of 27.10 square
meters was simply the result of the recomputation of the area when the original plan was amended. There is no
showing that the recomputation is incorrect. Neither is there a showing that this small area of 27.10 square meters
belongs to any person and that person had been deprived of his property, or had failed to claim that particular area
because of the non-publication of the amended plan. On the other hand, there is the report of the Chief of the
Survey Division of the Court of Land Registration (Exh. 22) stating that the amended plan of Parcel 1 in LRC No.
7681 did not include any land which was not included in the original plan.
It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that only in cases where the original survey plan is amended during the
registration proceedings by the addition of lands not previously included in the original plan should publication be
made in order to confer jurisdiction on the court to order the registration of the area that was added after the
publication of the original plan.22
The settled rule, further, is that once the registration court had acquired jurisdiction over a certain parcel, or
parcels, of land in the registration proceedings in virtue of the publication of the application, that jurisdiction
attaches to the land or lands mentioned and described in the application. If it is later shown that the decree of
registration had included land or lands not included in the original application as published, then the registration
proceedings and the decree of registration must be declared null and void in so far but only in so far as the
land not included in the publication is concerned. This is so, because the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
land not included in the publication-the publication being the basis: of the jurisdiction of the court. But the
proceedings and the decree of registration, relating to the lands that were included in the publication, are valid.
Thus, if it is shown that a certificate of title had been issued covering lands where the registration court had no
jurisdiction, the certificate of title is null and void insofar as it concerns the land or lands over which the registration
court had not acquired jurisdiction.23
And so in the three cases now before this Court, even granting that the registration court had no jurisdiction over
the increased area of 27.10 square meters (as alleged by appellees), the most that the lower court could have done
was to nullify the decree and the certificate of title insofar as that area of 27.10 square meters is concerned, if that
area can be identified. But, certainly, the lower court could not declare, and should not have declared, null and void
the whole proceedings in LRC No. 7681; and, certainly, the lower court erred in declaring null and void ab
initio Original Certificate of Title 735 which covers not only the supposed excess area of 27.10 square meters but
5
also the remaining area of 8,798,617 square meters of Parcel 1 and the entire area of 15,961,246 square meters of
Parcel 2. The trial court, in its decision, declared Original Certificate of Title No. 735 "null and void from the very
beginning and of no effect whatsoever", without any qualification. This declaration by the lower court, if sanctioned by
this Court and given effect, would nullify the title that covers two big parcels of land (Parcels 1 and 2) that have a total
area of 24,759,890.10 square meters, or almost 2,476 hectares. And not only that. The trial court declared null and void
all transfer certificates of title that are derived, or that emanated, from Original Certificate of Title No. 735, regardless
of whether those transfer certificates of title are the results of transactions done in good faith and for value by the
holder of those transfer certificates of title.
It must be noted that the appellees in the present cases claim six parcels that have an area of some 495,453.7 square
meters (about 49.5 hectares), whereas the combined area of Parcel 1 and Parcel 2 is 24,759,890.10 square meters
(about 2,476 hectares). It must also be noted that both Parcel 1 and Parcel 2 have been subdivided into numerous lots
(Exhs. 14 and 14-B) which have already been acquired by numerous persons and/or entities that are now holding
certificates of title which can be traced back to Original Certificate of Title No. 735. The decision of the lower court,
however, would render useless Original Certificate of Title No. 735 and all transfer certificates of title emanating, or
derived, therefrom. The decision of the lower court would certainly prejudice the rights of the persons, both natural
and juridical, who had acquired portions of Parcel 1 and Parcel 2, relying on the doctrine of the indefeasibility of
Torrens title. The decision of the lower court would, indeed, prejudice the rights of persons who are not parties in the
present cases. And this is so, because the trial court, in its decision, did not adhere to the applicable decisions of this
Court in resolving the pertinent issues in these cases.
Another reason mentioned by the lower court to support its ruling that Decree of Registration No. 17431 is null and
void is that the description of Parcel 1 in the decree of registration is different from the description of the same parcel
in the notice of hearing of the original application for registration as published in the Official Gazette. The different
description that appears in the decree of registration, according to the lower court, is an amendment to the Original
survey plan that accompanied the application and the amended survey plan should have been republished; and
because there was no such republication the registration court was without jurisdiction to issue the decree of
registration. The lower court also committed an error in making this ruling. We find that the lower court incorrectly laid
stress on differences in the names of the owners, and on differences in the designations, of the lands that adjoin Parcel
1 along its southwestern boundary. We find, however, that these differences are well explained in the record.
In the notice of hearing in LRC No. 7681 (Exhibits YY and YY-2) the boundaries of Parcel 1 are stated as follows:
Bounded on the N. by property of Rosario Negrao and others (Maysilo Estate); E. by the San Juan River; SW. by Parcel 3,
properties of Benito Legarda, Hospital de San Juan de Dios, by Parcel 2, Santa Clara Monastery, by Parcel 1; and W. by a
road, Cementerio del Norte and the Roman Catholic Church.
As described in Decree of Registration No. 17431 (Exh. 25), the boundaries of Parcel 1 are as follows:
PARCEL 1. Bounded on the N. by property of Rosario Negrao y Escobar, et al., (Maysilo Estate): On the E. by San Juan
River; on the SW. by properties of Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al., Benito Legarda, Hospital de San Juan de
Dios and C.W. Rosenstock & Co.; and on the W. by a road, Cementerio del Norte and property of the Roman Catholic
Church ...
It will thus be noted that the boundaries of Parcel 1 on the northern, eastern, and western sides, as they appear in the
notice of hearing that was published and in Decree of Registration No. 17431, are the same. It is in the southwestern
boundary where there appear some differences in the names of the owners, or in the designations, of the adjoining
lands. Thus, in the published notice of hearing, it appears that the names of the owners, or the designations, of the
lands that bound Parcel 1 (of LRC No. 7681) on the Southwest are parcel 3, properties of Benito Legarda, Hospital de
San Juan de Dios, parcel 2, Monasterio de Santa Clara and parcel 1; while in the decree of registration it appears that
the lands that bound Parcel 1 (of LRC No. 7681) on the Southwest are the properties of Mariano Severo Tuason y de la
Paz, et al., Benito Legarda, Hospital de San Juan de Dios and C.W. Rosenstock & Co. Upon a careful examination of the
records, We find that the lands that adjoin Parcel 1 at its southwestern boundary, as indicated in the notice of hearing
that was published in the Official Gazette, are the same lands that are indicated in the decree of registration as the
lands that adjoin Parcel 1 at its southwestern boundary. There is simply a change in the names of the owners or in the
designations, of the lands. We find that parcels 3, 2 and 1, appearing as the boundary lands on the southwestern side of
Parcel 1 in LRC No. 7681, as published, are in fact parcels of land that are owned, and had been applied for registration,
by Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al. in LRC No. 7680. This LRC No. 7680 was heard and decided jointly with LRC
No. 7681 by the Land Registration Court (Exh. 24). These parcels 3, 2 and 1 of LRC No. 7680, being lands owned by
Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al., it may as well be stated in the decree of registration that those lands on the
southwestern side of Parcel 1 in LRC No. 7681 are the properties of Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al., instead of
Land Titles Cases
designating them as parcel 3, parcel 2, and parcel 1 (of LRC 1680). And so, what appears in Decree of Registration
No. 17431 as the properties of Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al., at the southwestern side of Parcel 1 are
no other than those very parcels 3, 2 and 1 that appear in the notice of hearing as the lands that bound Parcel 1 on
the southwest.
In the description of Parcel 1 as published, it appears that one of the boundaries on the southwestern side is Santa
Clara Monastery, while in the decree of registration the words "Santa Clara Monastery" do not appear but, instead,
are replaced by the words "C. W. Rosenstock & Co." It will be remembered that during the registration proceedings
the plan of Parcel 1 was ordered amended, and the surveyor, who prepared the amended plan must have found
that what used to be the property of the Santa Clara Monastery at the time of the original Survey was already the
property of C. W. Rosenstock & Co. when the amended plan was prepared. This can simply mean that there was a
change of ownership from Santa Clara Monastery to C.W. Rosenstock & Co. It must be considered that the original
survey took place from December, 1910 to June, 1911 (Exhibits 18 and 19), while the registration case was decided
on March 7, 1914.
Under Section 40 of Act 496, the decree of registration "shall contain a description of the land as finally determined
by the court." Evidently, the Court of Land Registration acted in consonance with this provision of the law when, in
its decision in LRC 7681, it took into consideration the actual description of Parcel 1 as shown in the amended
survey plan, and when it disregarded the recommendation of the Chief of the Survey Division, dated March 27,
1914, that the decision of the court of March 7, 1914 "be based upon the original plans, as published, and not upon
the amended plan." It may well be said that Decree of Registration N. 17431 simply contains the correct area of
Parcel 1 and the correct names of the owners of the lands that bound Parcel 1 in LRC No. 1681 as of the time when
the decision of the land registration court was rendered.
In this connection, the following pronouncement of this Court in the case of Domingo vs. Ongsiako, 55 Phil. 361,
373-4, is pertinent:
We may further observe that underlying the contention of the plaintiffs is the idea that errors in the plans nullify
the decrees of registration. This is erroneous. It is the land and not the plan which is registered. Prior to the
enactment of Act No. 1875, practically all plans for land registration were defective especially in regard to errors of
closures and areas, but so far no such errors have been permitted to affect the validity of the decrees. If the
boundaries of the land registered can be determined, the technical description in the certificate of title may be
corrected without cancelling the decree. Such corrections have been made in this case by approved surveys which
embrace all of the land here in question. To nullify and cancel final decrees merely by reason of faulty technical
descriptions would lead to chaos.
We have taken note of the fact that the six parcels of land that are claimed by the plaintiffs in the three cases now
before this Court are on the northwestern portion of Parcel 1 (parcels labelled A, B, C, D, E and F, in Exh. UU; and
Exhs. 17, 29 and 29-B). They are far from the southwestern boundary. The circumstance, therefore, regarding the
dissimilarity in the names of the owners, or the designations, of the lands that adjoin the southwestern side of
Parcel 1 is of no moment insofar as the lots claimed by appellees are concerned. What matters is that the lots
claimed by the appellees are included in Parcel 1 of LRC No. 1681 and are located at the northwestern portion of
said Parcel 1. Indeed, it was error on the part of the lower court to make as one of the bases in declaring Decree of
Registration No. 17431 and Original Certificate of Title No. 735 null and void and of no effect whatsoever the
aforestated dissimilarities in the names of the owners, or in the designations, of the lands on the southwestern side
of Parcel 1, because those dissimilarities are well explained in the records of these cases.
The lower court committed still another error when it made the finding that the only boundary of Parcel 1 on the
western side is "A. Bonifacio road" and then declared that the lands situated west of the A. Bonifacio road were
never the subject of the registration proceedings in LRC No. 7681. The lower court declared the lands west of A.
Bonifacio road as unregistered lands and awarded the ownership of those lands to the plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos.
3621 and 3622 (appellees in G.R. Nos. L-26127 and L-26128). This finding of the lower court is contrary to the
evidence presented by the parties in these cases. Both the appellees and the appellant submitted as their evidence
the notice of hearing of the application as published in the Official Gazette (Exhibit X, YY and YY-2; and Exhibit 26)
and the decree of registration No. 17431 (Exhibit Y, and Exh. 25) wherein are clearly stated that the boundaries of
Parcel 1 on the West are: (1) a road, (2) Cementerio del Norte and (3) Roman Catholic Church (Exhs. Z-6, UU, and
Exhs. 6, 18, 19 and 20). But the lower court considered the A. Bonifacio road as the only boundary on the West, and
ignored the two other boundaries on the West that are mentioned both in the notice of hearing as published and in
the decree of registration. The sketches and the survey plans, forming part of the evidence on record, show that
the road, labelled as "A. Bonifacio", goes alongside the western boundary of Parcel 1 (separating Parcel 1 and the
6
Cementerio del Norte), until it reaches a point where it traverses the northwestern portion of Parcel 1, such that from
the point where it enters the area of Parcel 1 what is left as the boundaries on the western side are the Cementerio del
Norte and the Roman Catholic Church (Exhibits UU, VV, 17, 19 and 29). Ignoring the existence of the Cementerio del
Norte and the Roman Catholic Church as the other boundaries of Parcel 1 on the West, the lower court declared that
the lands west of the A. Bonifacio road, which form part of the lands that are claimed by the plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos.
3621 and 3622, are outside the boundary of Parcel 1 on the west and that those particular areas had remained as
unregistered lands and are not covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735. This finding of the lower court is contrary
to the very admission of the appellees in these three cases that all the lands (six parcels in all) that they claim are
included in the area of Parcel 1 mentioned in Original Certificate of Title No. 735. In paragraph XIV of the original, as
well as in the amended complaint, in each of these three cases, the plaintiffs alleged that the lands that they claim "had
either been fraudulently or erroneously included ... in Parcel 1 (known as Santa Mesa Estate) of the Original Certificate
of Title No. 735 of the Land Records of the Province of Rizal."24 In their appeal brief, the appellees categorically stated
that "Both the appellees and the appellant admit that these parcels of land claimed by the plaintiffs in these three (3)
civil cases are located within Parcel 1 (Santa Mesa Estate) covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735".25 In the
pre-trial order of the lower court of December 18, 1957, it was stated that the parcels of land litigated in these are
portions of the lands covered by OCT No. 735.26The lower court itself, at the earlier part of its decision, stated that
"both the plaintiffs and the defendants admit that the parcels of land litigated in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623
are found within the boundaries of the present Santa Mesa Heights Subdivision covered by Original Certificate of Title
No. 735"27 The appellees in these two cases had never asserted that part of the lands that they claim are outside the
boundaries of Parcel 1, nor did they assert that part of the lands that they claim have remained unregistered and not
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735. The lower court had made a finding not only contrary to the evidence of
the appellees but even more than what the appellees asked when it said in its decision that the western boundary of
Parcel 1 is only the A. Bonifacio road and that the lands claimed by the appellees west of this road had never been
registered. This Court certainly can not give its approval to the findings and rulings of the lower court that are patently
erroneous.
2. The lower court also erred when it declared Original Certificate of Title No. 735 null and void upon the ground that
the decree of registration was not transcribed in the Registration Book in accordance with the provisions of Section 41
of Act 496. In its decision, the lower court said:
During the trial, the Book of Original Certificate of Title was brought to the Court. The Court had occasion to see and
examine the `ENTRY' made in the Registration Book. The Court found that the Face of the Title which, under ordinary
circumstances, should be Page 1 is found as Page 2. The sheet containing the technical description which should be
page 2 is Page 1. The FACE of the Title, which should have been Page 1, contained the last portion of the description of
the land described in the decree. The sheet containing the bulk of the description of the lands decreed should have
been Page 2. The so-called Original Certificate of Title No. 735 found on Page 138, Book A-7 of the Register of Deeds of
Rizal is, therefore, null and void because the provisions of Section 41 of the Land Registration Law have not been
complied with. Said Section requires that the entry in the Registration Book must be a transcription of the Decree and
the paging should consist of a leaf or leaves in consecutive order .... 28
The pertinent provisions of Section 41 of Act 496 reads, as follows:
SEC. 41. Immediately after final decision by the court directing the registration of any property, the clerk shall send a
certified copy of such decision to the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, who shall prepare the decree in
accordance with section forty of Act numbered four hundred and ninety-six, and he shall forward a certified copy of
said decree to the register of deeds of the province or city in which the property is situated. The register of deeds shall
transcribe the decree in a book to be called the "Registration Book" in which a leaf, or leaves in consecutive order, shall
be devoted exclusively to each title. The entry made by the register of deeds in this book in each case shall be the
original certificate of title, and shall be signed by him and sealed with the seal of his office....
The pertinent provisions of Section 40 of Act 496 reads, as follows:
SEC. 40. Every decree of registration shall bear the day of the year, hour, and minute of its entry, and shall be signed by
the clerk. It shall state whether the owner is married or unmarried, and if married, the name of the husband or wife. If
the owner is under disability, it shall state the nature of the disability, and if a minor, shall state his age. It shall contain
a description of the land as finally determined by the court , . . The decree shall be stated in a convenient form for
transcription upon the certificates of title hereinafter mentioned.
Section 29 of Act 496 provides that as soon as the decree of title has been registered in the office of the register of
deeds, as provided in Section forty-one, the property included in said decree shall become registered land under the
Act. Section 42 of Act 496 provides that the certificate shall take effect upon the date of the transcription of the decree.
Land Titles Cases
This Court has held that as defined in Section 41 of Act 496, the certificate of title is the transcript of the decree of
registration made by the register of deeds in the registry.29
The appellant presented as evidence a photostat of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, as found in the Registration
Book in the office of the register of deeds of Rizal (Exhibit 50).30 We have examined this document very carefully,
and We find that it is a copy of the original that satisfies all the requirements of a valid Torrens title as provided for
in Sections 40 and 41 of Act 496.
On the face, or on the first page, of this title, there is the certification of the Chief of the Land Registration Office
that the decree of registration was registered in Manila on July 6, 1914 at 7:41 a.m.; and the certification of the
Register of Deeds of Rizal that the decree was received for transcription in his office on July 8, 1914 at 3:30 P.M. It
is also stated on the face of this title that it was entered pursuant to Decree No. 17431 of the Court of Land
Registration, dated at Manila on the 7th day of March 1914, in Case No. 7681 of said court. The names of the
declared owners, their civil status, their spouses if married, and their respective interest or share in the lands
covered by the title are stated on the face of this title. We have noted that the technical descriptions of the lands
(Parcels 1 and 2) covered by the title are copied on the sheets constituting the title. We have compared the
technical descriptions of Parcels 1 and 2 as they appear on this photostat of Original Certificate of Title No. 735
(Exhibit 50) with the technical descriptions of these lands as they appear in the decree of registration (Exhibit Y for
the plaintiffs, and Exhibit 25 for the defendant), and We find that the technical descriptions appearing on the title
are the complete and faithful reproduction, or transcription, of the technical descriptions appearing in the decree
of registration.
We have noted what the lower court found, that the technical descriptions of Parcels 1 and 2 do not begin on the
face, or on the first page, of this title, as a technical description is ordinarily copied on the certificate of title. What
appears on the face of this title is the last part of the technical description of Parcel 2. The technical descriptions of
Parcels 1 and 2 begin on the second page and end on the first page. This circumstance, that is, that the technical
descriptions of Parcels 1 and 2 do not begin on the face, or on the first page, of the title, is the basis of the lower
court in ruling that the decree of registration was not transcribed in the registration book in accordance with
Section 41 of Act 496, and so Original Certificate of Title No. 735 is null and void. We have noted, however, that in
its decision the lower court made no mention that in the transcription of the decree in the registration book any of
the data that is required in Section 40 of Act 496 to be included had been omitted. We have also noted and this
fact is undenied that the technical descriptions of Parcels 1 and 2 as they appear in Decree of Registration No.
17431 are fully and faithfully transcribed on the photostat of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 (Exhibit 50). There
is no showing that the manner of transcribing the decree, as it appears on that photostat, was done for a
fraudulent purpose, or was done in order to mislead. Considering that the decree of registration is fully transcribed
in the Registration Book, and also as copied in Original Certificate of Title No. 735, the circumstance that the
beginning of the technical descriptions is not found on the face, or on the first page, of Original Certificate of Title
No. 735 is not a ground to nullify the said certificate of title. We agree with the lower court that the transcription of
the technical descriptions should begin, or should have been started, on the face, or on the first page, of the title.
We hold, however, that the fact that this was not so done in the case of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 should
not be taken as a factor in determining the validity of Original Certificate of Title No. 735. This defect in the manner
of transcribing the technical descriptions should be considered as a formal, and not a substantial, defect. What
matters is that the original certificate of title contains the full transcription of the decree of registration, and that
the required data provided for in Section 40 of Act 496 are stated in the original certificate of title. The lower court
made a literal construction of the provisions of Section 41 of Act 496 and strictly applied its construction in the
determination of the validity of Original Certificate of Title No. 735. We believe that the provisions of Section 41 of
Act 496 should be interpreted liberally, in keeping with Section 123 of said Act which provides that "This Act shall
be construed liberally so far as may be necessary for the purpose of effecting its general intent." If We adopt a
literal construction of the provisions of Section 41 of Act 496, as was done by the lower court, such that the defect
in the manner or form of transcribing the decree in the registration book would render null and void the original
certificate of title, then it can happen that the validity or the invalidity of a certificate of title would depend on the
register of deeds, or on the personnel in the office of the register of deeds. The register of deeds, or an employee in
his office, can wittingly or unwittingly render useless a decree of registration regularly issued pursuant to a decision
of a registration court and thus nullify by the error that he commits in the transcription of the decree in the
Registration Book an original certificate of title that has been existing for years. This strict interpretation or
construction of Section 41 of Act 496 would certainly not promote the purpose of the Land Registration Law (Act
496), which generally are to ascertain once and for all the absolute title over a given landed property 31; to make, so
7
far as it is possible, a certificate of title issued by the court to the owner of the land absolute proof of such title32; to
quiet title to land and to put a stop forever to any question of legality of title33; and to decree that land title shall be
final, irrevocable and
indisputable.34
We, therefore, hold that the formal defect in the transcription of Decree of Registration No. 17431 in the Registration
Book did not render null and void Original Certificate of Title No. 735. Consequently, We declare that the two parcels of
land (Parcel 1 which includes the lands claimed by the appellees, and Parcel 2) covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
735 are properly registered under the Torrens System of registration.
3. The principal issue that has to be resolved in the present appeal is whether or not the lower court had correctly
declared that "Original Certificate of Title No. 735 ... is null and void from the very beginning and of no effect
whatsoever. 35
In the preceding discussions, We have held that the lower court erred when it declared null and void Original Certificate
of Title No. 735. We have found that the registration proceedings that brought about the decree of registration upon
which was based the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 were in accordance with the provisions of Act 496,
as amended. We have held that the Land Registration Court that ordered the issuance of the decree of registration had
jurisdiction to hear and decide the application for registration filed by Mariano Severo, Teresa Eriberta, Juan Jose,
Demetrio Asuncion, and Augusto Huberto, all surnamed Tuason y de la Paz. The records show that the notice of hearing
of the application, which embodied the technical descriptions of the two parcels of land (Parcel 1, known as the Sta.
Mesa Estate, and Parcel 2, known as the Diliman Estate), was duly published as required by law. The records show that
the hearing on the application was regularly held, and that the registration court had seen to it that no land which was
not included in the original survey plan and not covered by the original application was made the subject of the
registration proceedings. We have found that the decree of registration was properly issued by the Land Registration
Office pursuant to the decision of the Land Registration Court, and that said decree of registration was fully transcribed
in the Registration Book in the office of the Register of Deeds of the province of Rizal. We have found also that the six
parcels of land that are claimed by the appellees. in the three cases now before Us are all included in Parcel 1 that is
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735.
In view of Our findings and conclusion that Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was issued in accordance with the
provisions of Act 496, and that the six parcels of land that are claimed by the appellees in the present cases are covered
by said certificate of title, what is left for this Court to decide is whether or not the appellees still have any legal right
over the six parcels of land that they claim.
Let it be noted that, as maintained by counsel for the appellees, the action of the appellees is principally to recover the
ownership and possession of the six parcels of land mentioned and described in their complaints. The appellees would
accomplish their objective through alternative ways: (1) secure the nullification of the decision of the Land Registration
Court in LRC No. 6781, the nullification of the Decree of Registration No. 17431 and the nullification of Original
Certificate of Title No. 735; (2) if they fail in their efforts to secure the desired nullifications, with Original Certificate of
Title No. 735 being considered valid and effective, they seek the reconveyance to them by the defendants named in
their complaints, including herein appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., of the six parcels of land that they claim; and (3) if
they cannot secure a reconveyance, they seek to secure payment to them by the defendants named in their complaints
of the actual value of the six parcels of land that they claim.
It appears to Us that the appellees are not sure of their stand, or have not adopted a definite stand, in asserting the
rights that they claim.
It is the settled rule that a party seeking the reconveyance to him of his land that he claims had been wrongly registered
in the name of another person must recognize the validity of the certificate of title of the latter. It is also the rule that a
reconveyance may only take place if the land that is claimed to be wrongly registered is still registered in the name of
the person who procured the wrongful registration. No action for reconveyance can take place as against a third party
who had acquired title over the registered property in good faith and for value. And if no reconveyance can be made,
the value of the property registered may be demanded only from the person (or persons) who procured the wrongful
registration in his name.36
The lower court accepted, and sustained, the assertion of the appellees that the proceedings in LRC No. 7681 of the
Court of Land Registration were null and void and that Original Certificate of Title No. 735 is null and void ab initioand
of no effect. The trial court even went to the extent of declaring that some of the parcels of land claimed by the
appellees in Civil Cases Nos. 3621 and 3622 (now G.R. Nos. L-26127 and L-26128 before this Court) were not covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 735. The lower court forthwith declared the appellees the owners of the parcels of land
claimed by them, as described in their complaints. Strangely enough, the lower court, upon declaring Original
Land Titles Cases
Certificate of Title No. 735 null and void, did not make any statement, or observation, regarding the status or
situation of the remaining lands (Parcels 1 and 2) covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735 after adjudicating
to the appellees the six parcels of land claimed by them in their complaints.
In the present appeal counsel for the appellees had maintained, and has endeavored to show, that the lower court
was correct in annulling Original Certificate of Title No. 735 and in adjudicating in favor of the appellees the
ownership and possession of the six parcels of land claimed by them in their complaints.
But, as hereinbefore held by Us, the lower court erred in declaring Original Certificate of Title No. 735 void and of
no effect. We have held that Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was issued as a result of the registration
proceedings in LRC No, 7681 which was regular and that said certificate of title is valid and effective. The
proceedings in LRC 7681 being in rem, the decree of registration issued pursuant to the decision rendered in said
registration case bound the lands covered by the decree and quieted title thereto, and is conclusive upon and
against all persons, including the government and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the
application, notice or citation, or included in the general inscription "To whom it may concern", and such decree
will not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any
proceedings in any court for reversing judgment or decree. Such decree may only be reopened if any person
deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud would file in the
competent court of first instance a petition for review within one year after entry of the decree, provided no
innocent purchaser for value had acquired an interest on the land, and upon the expiration of said period of one
year, the decree, or the certificate of title issued pursuant to the decree, is incontrovertible (See. 38, Act 496). In
the case now before Us, the Decree of Registration No. 17431 in LRC 7681 was entered on July 8, 1914. It is
undisputed that no person had filed any petition for review of the decree of registration in LRC 7681 within the
period of one year from July 8, 1914. That decree of registration, and Original Certificate of Title No. 735 issued
pursuant thereto, therefore, had been incontrovertible since July 9, 1915.
Moreover, innocent purchases for value had acquired interest in the lands covered by Original Certificate of Title
No. 735.37
The Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was issued on July 8, 1914 in the names of the original an applicants for
registration, namely, Mariano Tuason y de la Paz, Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz,
Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz and Augusta Huberto Tuason y de la Paz. Herein appellant J.M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc. is not one of those who were registered as the original owners mentioned in Original Certificate of Title No.
735. When the original complaints were filed in these three cases in the Court of First Instance of Rizal the parties
named defendants in each of the three cases were Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de
la Paz, Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, Augusta Huberto Tuason y de la Paz, the
heirs of each one of these defendants (without naming them), and J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. Of all the defendants
named in the three complaints only defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. appeared and filed its answer to the
complaints. All the other defendants did not appear, and so they were all declared in default.38 It had to happen
that way because as of the time when the three complaints were filed on May 19, 1955 the ownership of Parcel 1
that was originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735 had already passed to defendant J.M. Tuason &
Co., Inc. In fact this defendant had caused Parcel 1 to be subdivided and had sold the subdivision lots.
The records show that Parcel 1 in Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was part of the properties of the Mayorasgo
Tuason (Tuason Entail) which became involved in a litigation in the Court of First Instance of Manila. 39 During the
pendency of the case the properties of the Mayorasgo Tuason were administered by the Bank of the Philippine
Islands as the judicial receiver. In the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dated May 5, 1938, in Civil Case
No. 24803, the Bank of the Philippine Islands, as receiver, was authorized, directed and ordered to execute, upon
payment to it of the sum of P763,925.75, a deed of transfer and assignment in favor of the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc.
of the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31997, which was originally Parcel 1 included in Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 (Exh. 13-B). On June 13, 1938 the receiver Bank of the Philippine Islands executed the
deed of transfer and assignment (Exh. 13-A). Transfer Certificate of Title No. 34853 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal
was forthwith issued in the name of the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. (Exhs. 12-b and 36). The deed of transfer and
assignment was approved by the court in an order dated June 17, 1938. This conveyance to the Heirs of D. Tuason,
Inc. took place at a time when the Supreme Court had already decided the case of Bank of the Philippine Islands vs.
Acua (59 Phil. 183) wherein this Court upheld the validity of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 and also the
validity of the transfer certificate of title emanating therefrom.40
The circumstances attending the acquisition by the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. of the land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 31997 which was formerly Parcel 1 covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735
8
clearly indicate that said corporation acquired its title in a regular transaction as purchaser in good faith and for value.
On June 15, 1938 the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. in turn sold the same property to J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., and Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 35073 was issued in the name of the latter (Exhs. 12-c and 37).
The lower court declared that herein appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was a purchaser in bad faith. We do not find any
evidence in the record that would sustain such a finding of the lower court. One reason given by the lower court in
declaring appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. a purchaser in bad faith is the fact that the incorporators of the Heirs of D.
Tuason, Inc. and the incorporators of J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. were practically the same persons belonging to the same
Tuason family. We do not see anything wrong if some incorporators of the Heirs of D. Tuason Inc. are also incorporators
of the J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. During these days when businesses are promoted, operated, and managed, through
corporate entities, it is not surprising to see two or more corporations organized by the same persons or group of
persons with different purposes, for different lines of business and with distinct or separate assets and interests.
Besides, as has been shown, the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. acquired the land (Parcel 1 in Original Certificate of Title No.
735) from the Bank of the Philippine Islands, the receiver of the properties of the Mayorasgo Tuason, in a sale that was
authorized, and subsequently approved, by the court. The Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. paid the sum of P763,950.80 for the
property. Certainly if the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. had acquired the land originally covered by Original Certificate of Title
No. 735 in a transaction that was authorized by the court, for a valuable consideration, thereby acquiring a good title
over the property as a purchaser in good faith and for value, the title that it transferred to J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. when
it sold same property to the latter was also a good title, and J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was also a purchaser in good faith
and for value even if it appears that the incorporators of the two corporations belong to the same Tuason family.
The records of these cases are bereft of any evidence which would indicate that the sale of Parcel 1 in question by the
Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. to J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was fraudulent.
Another reason given by the lower court in declaring appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. a buyer in bad faith is that when
said appellant bought Parcel 1 originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735 it was aware of the fact that the
appellees or their predecessors in interest were in possession of, and were cultivating, the six parcels of land that they
now claim in these cases. The conclusion of the lower court is too strained. It should be remembered that the
registered property bought by J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had an area of some 879 hectares. It could happen that certain
relatives or ancestors of appellees had been squatting on some portions of the land and claimed certain areas as their
own, to the extent of having the areas claimed by them declared for taxation purposes in their names. Thus the
appellees presented in evidence tax declarations that appear to have taken effect as of 1941. We have noted, however,
that at the back of those tax declarations are written the words "This parcel is a duplicate of the land under Tax No.
764-J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc." (Exhs. E-Alcantara, F-Alcantara, FF-1-Benin, GG-Benin, HH-Benin, BBB-Pili, and
BBB-1-Pili).41 These annotations simply reveal that when the predecessors of the appellees had those tax declarations
made to cover the lands that they claim, those lands were already included in the tax declaration of appellant J. M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. Appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had been exercising, and asserting, its proprietary rights over the
lands in question after it bought the same from the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc.42This is borne by the statement in the order,
dated September 26, 1955, issued by Judge Juan P. Enriquez who at the time was presiding the branch of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal where these three were pending, as follows:
3. It having been shown that J. M. Tuason & Co. had title covering the land in question which they are subdividing into
small lots for sale and in view of the observation under paragraph 2 hereof the Court finds that there is no justifiable
reason to maintain the writ of preliminary injunction that has been issued. This is particularly true in Civil Case No. 2622,
defendants having secured a final judgment against plaintiffs Juan Alcantara and Jose Alcantara for ejectment before
the Municipal court of Quezon City; and such injunction would annul the order of the execution issued by the Quezon
City courts. It should be noted that the herein plaintiffs at the beginning pleaded to the Court that the area on which
their respective houses stand be not touched and their possession thereof be respected by defendant J. M. & Co. In
other words, each plaintiff is merely asking for about 250 square meters each which represents the land on which the
house stands and their immediate yard, and not the whole land covered by these three or 68 hectares. On the other
hand, the Court requires J. M. Tuason & Co. to put up a bond of P2,000 in favor of each of the defendant (sic) to answer
for whatever damages he may suffer by reason of the continuance during the action of the acts complained
of. 43
Besides, the possession by the appellees, either by themselves or through their predecessors in interest, if there was
such possession at all, would be unavailing against title holder of a Torrens certificate of title covering the parcels Of
lands now in question. From July 8, 1914 when Certificate of Title No. 735 was issued, no possession by any person of
any portion of the lands covered by said original certificate of title, or covered by a subsequent transfer certificate of
title derived from said original certificate of title, could defeat the title of the registered owner of the lands covered by
Land Titles Cases
the certificate of title. In this connection, let it be noted that appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. became the
registered owner of Parcel 1, which was originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735, only on June 15,
1938, or almost 24 years after Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was issued.
It can well be said that J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had relied on the title of the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. when it bought
the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.34853, and the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. likewise had relied on
the title of the Mayorasgo Tuason (Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al.) when it bought the land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31997 from the judicial receiver, duly authorized and approved by the court. We,
therefore, can not agree with the lower court when it declared appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. a purchaser on
bad faith.
The evidence shows that appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had converted the land originally covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 735, including the six parcels claimed by appellees into a subdivision, and numerous persons
and entities had purchased the subdivision lots, and the purchasers in turn were issued transfer certificates of title
covering the lots that they bought, based on the transfer certificate of title in the name of J. M Tuason & Co., Inc.
The buyers of the lots relied upon the certificate of title in the name of J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and because they
paid for the lots they certainly are purchasers in good faith and for value. The purchasers of these lots have built
thereon residential houses, office buildings, shops, hospital, even churches. But the lower court, disregarding these
circumstances, declared null and void all transfer certificates of title that emanated, or that were derived, from
Original Certificate of Title No. 735. This is a grave error committed by the lower court. And the error is
compounded when the lower court ordered appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and all those claiming under said
appellant, to vacate and restore to the appellees the possession of the parcels of lands that are claimed by them in
the present cases. The possessors of the lots comprised within the six parcels of land in question, and who hold
certificates of title covering the lots that they bought, are not parties in the present cases, and yet the decision of
the lower court would annul their titles and compel them to give up the possession of their properties. To give
effect to the decision of the lower court is to deprive persons of their property without due process of law.44 The
decision of the lower court would set at naught the settled doctrine that the holder of a certificate of title who
acquired the property covered by the title in good faith and for value can rest assured that his title is perfect and
incontrovertible.45
In view of the foregoing discussions, it is obvious that the action of the appellees in the three cases now before this
Court must fail..
It has been shown that appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had acquired a valid title over the land which includes the
six parcels that are claimed by the appellees. The fact, that the predecessors in interest of the appellees or any
person, for that matter had not filed a petition for the review of the decree of registration in LRC No. 7681
within a period of one year from July 8, 1914 when the decree of registration was issued, is a circumstance that had
forever foreclosed any proceeding for the review of said decree. As We have adverted to, that decree of
registration had become incontrovertible. An action, similar to one brought by the appellees in each of the present
cases, which attack collaterally the said decree of registration cannot be entertained.46 Neither may the action of
the appellees for reconveyance of the lands in question be entertained because such action had already prescribed,
barred by laches, considering that Original Certificate of Title No. 735 had been issued way back in 1914 and the
complaint in the present cases were filed only on May 19, 1955, or after a lapse of some 41 years. Moreover, as of
the time when these complaints were filed the six parcels of land claimed by the appellees are no longer covered
by the certificate of title in the names of the persons who procured the original registration of those lands. The title
to Parcel 1, which includes the six parcels of land claimed by the appellees, had passed to the hands parties who
were innocent purchase for value. This Parcel 1 which was one of the two parcels originally covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 735, was subsequently covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31997. As has been shown,
this Parcel 1 was part of the properties of the Mayorasgo Tuason and it was conveyed by order of the court in Civil
Case No. 24803 of the Court of First Instance of Manila to the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc., and the latter in turn
conveyed the same to J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 34853 in the name of the Heirs of D.
Tuason, Inc. was cancelled and transfer Certificate of Title No. 35073 was issued in the name of J. M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc. It has also been shown that J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had converted Parcel 1 to a subdivision. Numerous persons
and entities bought those subdivision lots, and to those buyers were issued transfer certificates of title covering the
lots that they acquired. It is very clear, therefore, that an action for reconveyance cannot prosper against appellant
J. M. Tuason & Co., much less against the registered owners of the lots that form parts of the six parcels of land
that are claimed by the appellees.47
9
Neither may the appellees have a cause of Action for damages against appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc., considering
that said appellant is not one of the original registered owners that procured the registration of the land. There is no
evidence that J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had anything to do with the registration proceedings which brought about the
issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 even supposing that the registration was procured fraudulently.
4. Numerous cases have been decided by this Court, dealing on questions regarding the validity and ineffectiveness of
Original Certificate of Title No. 735. The rulings of this Court in those cases are necessarily relevant to, and of decisive
bearing in, the resolution of the issues involved in the three cases now at bar.
(a) We have earlier cited the case of the Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Acua (59 Phil., 183), where the jurisdiction of
the Court of Land Registration that issued the decree which was the basis of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was
questioned, and this Court upheld the jurisdiction of the registration court and categorically pronounced the validity of
Original Certificate of Title No. 735.
(b) There is the case of Jose Alcantara, et al., versus Mariano Tuason y de la Paz, et al. (G.R. No. L-4998, Mar. 13, 1953,
92 Phil. 796), where this Court declared that Original Certificate of Title No. 735 is incontrovertible and is conclusive
against all persons claiming, either by themselves or by their predecessors in interest, rights over the lands covered by
said certificate of title.
We find that the Alcantara case is intimately related to the three cases at bar, and the rulings of this Court in that
former case are of decisive application to these three cases.
On August 29, 1950 a complaint was filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City Branch) by Jose Alcantara,
Elias Benin, Pascual Pili, Alejandro de Dios, Tomas Bagagonio, Quintina Sandoval, and Tomasa Lazaro against Mariano
Tuason y de la Paz, Heirs of Mariano Tuason, J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and Gregorio Araneta, Inc. This case was docketed
as Civil Case No. Q-156. It will be noted that three of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Q-156, namely, Jose Alcantara, Elias
Benin, and Pascual Pili, are among the original plaintiffs in the three cases now before this Court; Elias Benin, in Civil
Case No. 3621; Jose Alcantara, in Civil Case No. 3622; and Pascual Pili, in Civil Case No. 3623. Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin
and Pascual Pili, as plaintiffs in that Civil Case No. Q-156 claimed that they were the lawful owners of six (of the ten)
parcels of land described in paragraph 2 of their complaint Jose Alcantara claiming two parcels, Elias Benin claiming
three parcels, and Pascual Pili claiming one parcel. Substantially, it is alleged in the complaint 48 that each plaintiff, by
himself and by his predecessors in interest, as lawful owner, had been in the actual, open and continuous possession of
his own respective parcel, or parcels, of land from time immemorial until January 1950 when the defendants by force
and by the use of armed men started to convert their lands into a subdivision; that on July 8, 1914 the defendants had
obtained Original Certificate of Title No. 735 over a parcel of land which included the lands possessed by them
(plaintiffs) and which they and their ancestors had been enjoying as owners, for more than thirty years before the
issuance of the title; that the silence and inaction of the defendants since the date of their original certificate of title
showed that said certificate of title did not express the status of the their claim to the said parcels, that plaintiffs were
not given formal notice by the defendants of the registration of the lands, such that defendants' certificate of title No.
735 was not in accordance with law, and that defendants did not have proper title for registration to the parcels of land
owned by the plaintiffs, as described in the complaint; and that because the certificate of title issued by the register of
deeds was still in the names of the defendants, successors in interest of the Tuasons y de la Paz, and has not passed to
innocent parties for valuable consideration, the conveyance of the same to the plaintiffs was in order. The plaintiffs
prayed that therein defendants be ordered to execute deeds of conveyance of the parcels of land described in their
complaint in favor of the plaintiffs, that the defendants' certificate of title be cancelled and the corresponding
certificate be ordered issued in the names of the plaintiffs. We quote from the decision:
The material allegations of the complaint are: that plaintiffs are owners of the parcels of land set forth in their
complaint, which parcels are situated along Bonifacio street, barrio of San Jose, Quezon City, and that they have been in
actual, open, and continuous possession and enjoyment thereof without molestation from defendants from time
immemorial to the present; that on July 8, 1914, defendants obtained a certificate of title (No. 735) over a parcel of
land, which included the lands by plaintiffs, and which they and their ancestors had been enjoying as owners more than
30 years before the issuance of said title; that on June 23, 1950, defendants caused the removal of two houses of
plaintiffs on the land; and that defendants did not file any action against plaintiffs before the inclusion of the lands in
their title, in violation of the "due process of law" clause of the Constitution. There are other allegations which really
are arguments of legal discussion, thus: that defendants could not acquire title by the registration proceedings against
the lawful holder, especially without formal notice, because registration is to confirm title, not to acquire it; that the
silence of the defendants since the issuance of their title shows that this does not express the lawful status of their
claim, etc. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it states no of action and that, if it does,
the same is barred by the statute of limitations. The court sustained this motion on the second ground. Subsequently,
Land Titles Cases
plaintiffs filed an amended complaint with the same substantial allegations, but with new ones, i.e., that it was in
January, 1950, that they learned that their lands were included in the registration proceedings which culminated in
the issuance of defendants' title; that defendants never claimed ownership to the lands, but directly or indirectly
allowed plaintiffs to continue exercising their rights of ownership over the same. This amended complaint was
denied admission, and the motion for the reconsideration of the order of dismiss was also denied. Hence the
appeal.
In affirming the order of the lower court dismissing the complaint, this Court held:
Without considering whether the trial court's refusal to admit the amended complaint is erroneous or not we are
constrained to hold that the dismissal of the action, even with the amended complaint is a basis thereof, is correct.
From the allegations of both the original and amended complaints, it appears that the defendants are holders of a
certificate of title issued on July 8, 1914 as a consequence of registration proceedings. There is no allegation in both
original and amended complaints that the plaintiffs were not notified, or were not aware, of the registration
proceedings. It is presumed, therefore, that as occupants proper notices thereof were served on them and that
they were aware of said proceedings. If this is so, then the plaintiffs, who were, or whose predecessors in interest
were, on the land during the registration proceedings, were bound by said proceedings. The latter are in rem and
bind the whole world, whether served with notice personally or not. (Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil., 49). And the
decree of registration, in pursuance of which defendants' title was issued, binds the land and quiets title thereto,
and is conclusive against the plaintiffs. (Section 38, Land Registration Act). The supposed right of plaintiffs by
reason of their alleged continued possession for thirty years was, therefore, destroyed fully and completely by the
registration proceedings, and their supposed ignorance of the inclusion of the lands can not exclude them from the
effects of the registration proceedings, and the supposed conduct of defendants in allowing plaintiffs to continue
on the land after registration can not serve as basis of any title or right thereto, because acts of a possessory
character by tolerance of an owner does not constitute possession (Article 1942, Spanish Civil Code), and because
no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession (Section 46, Land Registration Act).
Thus, in the Alcantara case, as in the Bank of the Philippine Island vs. Acua case, supra, this Court upheld the
validity of the registration proceedings which culminated in the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735. This
Court declared that "the decree of registration, in pursuance of which defendants' title was issued, binds the land
and quiets title thereto and is conclusive against the plaintiffs." In other words, in virtue of that decision, the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Q-156, among them Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili, and their
successors-in-interest, could no longer question the validity of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, nor claim any
right of ownership over any portion of the land that is covered by said certificate of title.
But Elias Benin, Jose Alcantara, and Pascual Pili again came to court to claim ownership over portions of the land
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735. On May 19, 1955 Elias Benin, joined by his brother Victor Benin and
his sister Marta Benin, filed Civil Case No. 3621; Jose Alcantara joined by his brother Juan Alcantara, filed Civil Case
No. 3622; and Pascual Pili, joined by his sister Luisa Pili, filed Civil Case No. 3623. These are the three cases which
originated in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City Branch) which are now before this Court on appeal.
In the earlier part of this decision, We have pointed out that the complaints in these three cases had been
amended so as to include as parties plaintiffs all the heirs of the persons who were alleged to be the owners of the
parcels of land claimed by the plaintiffs in each case. Thus, the complaint in Civil Case No. 3621 was amended to
include all the heirs of Sixto Benin, the alleged owner of the three parcels of land described in the complaint and
the common predecessor in interest of all the plaintiffs in the case. The complaint in Civil Case No. 3622 was
amended to include all the heirs of Bonoso Alcantara, the alleged owner of the two parcels of land described in the
complaint and the common predecessor in interest of all the plaintiffs in the case. The complaint in Civil Case No.
3623 was amended to include all the heirs of Candido Pili, the alleged owner of the one parcel of land described in
the complaint and the common predecessor in interest of all the plaintiffs in the case.
In those three cases, in the court below, herein appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. (defendant therein) filed a motion
to dismiss upon the principal ground "that the cause of action (assuming there is one) is barred by prior judgment,
or by the statute of limitation". In its motion to dismiss J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. contended that the decision of the
Supreme Court in the Alcantara case is a bar to the action of the plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623
of the Court of the First Instance of Rizal. The lower court, however, denied the motion to dismiss. In its answer to
the complaint in each of these three cases, J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. set up as affirmative defenses the very grounds
of its motion to dismiss. After the plaintiffs had closed their direct evidence, J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed another
motion to dismiss upon the ground that the action was barred by the statute of limitations and by a prior judgment,
and that the plaintiffs had not presented evidence to prove their claim of ownership. This second motion to dismiss was
also denied by the lower court.49
In its decision, which is now on appeal before this Court, the lower court held that the decision in the Alcantara case
was not a bar to the action in these three cases, ruling that there is no identity, of the parties, of the subject matter,
and of the cause of action, between Civil Case No. Q-156, on the one hand, and Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622, and 3623,
on the other.
It is now contended by appellant J.M. Tuason & Co. Inc., in the present appeal, that "the trial court erred in not
dismissing these cases on the ground of res judicata and in denying the motion to dismiss filed on said ground."50
Does the judgment in the aforementioned Alcantara case operate as a bar to the action of the appellees in the three
cases at bar?
In order that the rule of res judicata may apply, the following requisites must be present: (a) the former judgment must
be final; (b) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the parties; (c) it
must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be, between the first and the second actions, identity of parties,
of subject-matter, and of cause of action (San Diego vs. Cardona, 70 Phil. 281-283).
We find that the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-156 (G.R. No. L-4998) is a final judgment on the merits that was rendered
by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties. The only requisite for res judicata which we
have to determine is whether between Civil Case Q-156 (G.R. No. 4998), on the one hand, and Civil Cases Nos. 8621,
3622 and 3623 (G.R. Nos. L-26127, 26128 and 26129), on the other, there is identity of parties, of subject matter and of
cause of action.
In our examination of the records and the evidence, We find that there is identity of subject matter. In the lower court's
pretrial order dated December 18, 1957, which was based on the agreement of the parties, it is stated
That the parcels of land in litigation in Case No. Q-156 are substantially identical to the same parcels of land litigated in
them cases Nos. 3621, 8622 and
3623. 51
We also find that there is identity of cause of action. It is apparent, upon reading the original complaint (Exhibit 1) in
Civil Case Q-156 and the decision in the Alcantara case (G.R. No. L-4998), that the cause of action in Civil Case Q-156
was based on the alleged fact that the defendants had dispossessed and deprived the plaintiff therein of the parcels of
land described in the complaint, which were claimed by the plaintiffs as their own and of which they had been in actual,
open and continuous possession from time immemorial, and that said lands were wrongly included in Certificate of Title
No. 735 that was obtained by the defendants. In the three cases at bar, plaintiffs (now appellees) also complain of
having been dispossessed and deprived by the defendants of the parcels of land of which they were absolute owners
and possessors, by themselves and through their predecessors in interest, since time immemorial and that their said
lands wrongly included in Parcel 1 of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 that was obtained by the defendants. In Civil
Case No. Q-156, on the one hand, and in the three cases now at bar, on the other, the plaintiffs therein seek the
nullification of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, and the reconveyance to them of the parcels of land that they claim
as theirs.52 It appears clear to Us that in Civil Case No. Q-156 and in the three cases at bar, the object or purpose of the
plaintiffs is to recover the ownership and possession of the same parcels of land.
As far as the parties are concerned, We find that there is no exact identity of parties between Civil Case No. Q-156, on
the one hand, and Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623, on the other. It appears that of the plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos.
3621, 3622 and 3623 only Elias Benin, Jose Alcantara and Pascual Pili were plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Q-156. In Civil Case
No. Q-156, the defendants were Mariano Tuason y de la Paz, Heirs of Mariano Tuason, J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and
Gregorio Araneta, Inc., while in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 the defendants were Mariano Severo, Teresa
Eriberta, Juan Jose, Demetrio Asuncion, Augusta Huberto, all surnamed Tuason y de la Paz (the persons appearing as
registered owners in Original Certificate of Title No. 735), their heirs, and J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. We find that the
natural persons surnamed Tuason, and the heirs, refer to the persons who belong to the Tuason family that secured the
registration of Parcel 1 in Original Certificate of Title No. 735. The defendant Gregorio Araneta Inc. in Civil Case No.
Q-156 is the administrator of the Tuason properties. So, the parties defendants in all these cases are practically the
same. We find, however, that in Civil Case No. Q-156 as well as in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623, it was the
defendant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. that actually controverted the claims of the plaintiffs.
After a careful study, We are of the considered view that the judgment in the Alcantara case is a bar to the action of the
plaintiffs who are the heirs of Elias Benin in Civil Case No. 3621 (G.R. No. 26127), of plaintiff Jose Alcantara in Civil Case
No. 3622 (G.R. No. 26128), and of plaintiff Pascual Pili in Civil Case No. 3623 (G. R. No. 26129) under the doctrine of res
adjudicata. We are likewise of the considered view that the decision in the Alcantara case would serve to rule out the
action of the other plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 under the doctrine of stare decisis.
10
Land Titles Cases
In Civil Case No. 3621 the original plaintiffs were Victor Benin, Marta Benin, and Elias Benin--two brothers and a
sister. In the amended complaint it was alleged that these three original plaintiffs had another brother, and another
sister, namely Esteban Benin and Felipa Benin. But because all the five Benin brothers and sisters died, they were
all substituted by their heirs, such that as of the time when Civil Case No. 3621 was decided the plaintiffs were: (1)
the heirs of Victor Benin; (2) the heirs of Marta Benin; (3) the heirs of Elias Benin; (4) the heirs of Esteban Benin,
and (5) the heirs of Felipa Benin.
In Civil Case No. 3622 the original plaintiffs were Juan Alcantara and Jose Alcantara. Juan Alcantara died, and he
was substituted by his heirs, such that as of the time Civil Case No. 3622 was decided the plaintiffs were: (1) the
heirs of Juan Alcantara, and (2) Jose A. Alcantara.
In Civil Case No. 3623 the original plaintiffs were Pascual Pili and Luisa Pili. In the amended complaint, it was alleged
that Luisa Pili and Pascual Pili had two brothers who were already dead, namely, Diego Pili and Manuel Pili, so they
were substituted by their heirs. Luisa Pili died, and she was substituted by her heirs, such that as of the time Civil
Case No. 3623 was decided, the plaintiffs were: (1) the heirs of Diego Pili; (2) the heirs of Manuel Pili; (3) the heirs
of Luisa Pili, and (4) Pascual Pili.
It would thus appear that of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3621 Elias Benin is the only one who was a plaintiff in
Civil Case No. Q-156; of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3622 Jose E. Alcantara, who is still living, is the only one who
was a plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-156; of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3623 Pascual Pili, who is still living, is the
only one who was a plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-156.
It being Our finding that the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-156 (G.R. No. L-4998-the Alcantara case) is a final
judgment on the merits that was rendered by a court that had jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the
parties, and that there is identity of subject matter and cause of action between Civil Case No. Q-156, on the one
hand, and Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622, and 3623, on the other; and it appearing that Elias Benin is a party-plaintiff
both in Civil Case Q-156 and Civil Case No. 3621; that Jose Alcantara is a party-plaintiff in both Civil Case No. Q-156
and Civil Case No. 3622; that Pascual Pili is a party-plaintiff in both Civil Case No. Q-156 and Civil Case No. 3623; and
that the defendants in Civil Case No. Q-156 and in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 are practically the same
persons and/or entities, We hold that the doctrine of bar by a previous judgment or res adjudicata squarely applies
to Elias Benin, or to his heirs and successors in interest in Civil Case No. 3621; to Jose Alcantara and his heirs or
successors in interest in Civil Case No. 3622; and to Pascual Pili and his heirs or successors in interest in Civil Case
No. 3623.53
We now consider the case of the other plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623.
It will be noted that in Civil Case No. 3621 the plaintiffs base their claim of ownership of the three parcels of land
described in the complaint on their being heirs or successors in interest of Sixto Benin who died in 1936. In Civil
Case No. 3622 the plaintiffs base their claim of ownership over the two parcels of land described in their complaint
on their being the heirs and successors in interest of Bonoso Alcantara who died in 1934. In Civil Case No. 3623 the
plaintiffs base their claim of ownership of the one parcel of land described in their complaint on their being the
heirs and successors in interest of Candido Pili who died in 1931.
When Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili, alleged in their complaint in Civil Case No. Q-156 (which was filed
in 1950) that they were the owners of the parcels of land specified in their complaint, having inherited the same
from their ancestors and had been in possession of the same from time immemorial, each was claiming a right as
an heir of Bonoso Alcantara, Sixto Benin, and Candido Pili, respectively. Similarly, in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and
3623, the source of the rights claimed by the plaintiffs Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili and all the other
plaintiffs were their respective ancestor, or predecessor in interest, namely Bonoso Alcantara, Sixto Benin and
Candido Pili, as the case may be.
Inasmuch as Sixto Benin died in 1936, Bonoso Alcantara died in 1934, and Candido Pili died in 1931, it is obvious
that during all the time when the registration proceedings in LRC No. 7681 were taking place before the Court of
Land Registration, which culminated in the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 on July 8, 1914, Sixto
Benin, Bonoso Alcantara and Candido Pili were living. The records show that no one of these three persons, or their
representative, had filed any opposition to the application for registration in said LRC 7681, nor did any one of
them, or their representative, file any petition for review of the decree of registration No. 17431 that was issued in
said LRC No. 7681.
It is Our view, therefore, that the decision of this Court, in G.R. No. L-4998, which affirmed the order of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal dismissing the complaint of Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili (along with four other
plaintiffs) in Civil Case No. Q-156 should apply not only against the heirs, of Elias Benin, against Jose Alcantara, and
against Pascual Pili, as plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623, respectively, but also against all the other
11
plaintiffs in those cases. We find that the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3621 do not claim a right which is different from
that claimed by Elias Benin in Civil Case No. Q-156. Likewise, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3622 do not claim a right
different from that claimed by Jose Alcantara in Civil Case No Q-156. And, also, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3623 do
not claim a right different from that claimed by Pascual Pili in Civil Case No. Q-156. They all claim the same right, based
on the alleged ownership of their respective common predecessor in interest in Civil Case No. 3621 the common
predecessor in interest being Sixto Benin; in Civil Case No. 3622 the common predecessor in interest being Bonoso
Alcantara; and in Civil Case No. 3623 the common predecessor in interest being Candido Pili. In Civil Case No. Q-156
Elias Benin based his claim of ownership upon the ownership of his predecessor in interest who necessarily must be
Sixto Benin; Jose Alcantara, upon the ownership of his predecessor in interest who necessarily must be Bonoso
Alcantara; and Pascual Pili, upon the ownership of his predecessor in interest who necessarily must be Candido Pili. It
follows, therefore, that the decision of this Court in G.R. No. L-4998 (Civil Case No. Q-156), which held untenable the
cause of action of the successors in interest, of Sixto Benin, of Bonoso Alcantara and of Candido Pili, to recover the
ownership and possession of any land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735, would also foreclose a similar
cause of action of all other persons who claim to be successors in interest of Sixto Benin, of Bonoso Alcantara and of
Candido Pili over any land covered by said certificate of title. As We have adverted to, Sixto Benin died in 1936, Bonoso
Alcantara died in 1934, and Candido Pili died in 1931. These three predecessors in interest of the appellees died long
after the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, which took place on July 8, 1914.
And so, even if there are plaintiffs (now appellees) in these three cases who are not privies to plaintiffs Jose Alcantara,
Elias Benin, and Pascual Pili in Civil Case No. Q-156 (G.R. No. L-4998 the Alcantara case) and were not parties in that
case, still the ruling of this Court in that former case, to the effect that therein plaintiffs or their predecessors in interest
were bound by the proceedings in the registration court which culminated in the issuance of Original Certificate of Title
No. 735, holds and applies to those plaintiffs in these three cases, because the claim of ownership of these plaintiffs is
based on the same predecessors in interest of plaintiffs Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili in said Civil Case No.
Q-156. 54 It may well be said that the interests of the appellees in G.R. No. L-26127 (Civil Case No. 3621) who claim
rights as heirs or successors in interest of Sixto Benin were represented by Elias Benin in Civil Case No. Q-156 (G.R. No.
L-4998); the appellees in G.R. No. 26128 (Civil Case No. 3622) who claim rights as heirs or successors in interest of
Bonoso Alcantara were represented by Jose Alcantara in Civil Case No. Q-156 (G.R. No. L-4998); the appellees in G.R. No.
26129 (Civil Case No. 3623) who claim rights as heirs or successors in interest of Candido Pili were represented by
Pascual Pili in Civil Case No. Q-156 (G.R. No. L-4998).
(c) In the case of Albina Santiago, et al. vs. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. (G.R. No. L-14223, November 23, 1960) 55, where
Original Certificate of Title No. 735, was also in question, this Court ruled on issues akin to the issues involved in the
three cases now at bar. Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Quezon
City, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-2918, against J. M. Tuason & Co. Inc. alleging, substantially, that their ancestor,
Inocencio Santiago, was the owner of a parcel of land, evidenced by a document (attached to their complaint as Annex
A) issued by the Spanish government on May 12, 1848 56; that Inocencio Santiago had since then been in possession of
the aforesaid land as owner, publicly, continuously and adversely until his death, when his two children, Isaias and
Albina, succeeded and continued to own and possess said land pro indiviso in the same character as that of their
predecessor that upon the death of Isaias Santiago his one-half share of the land was inherited by his eleven children
who, together with their aunt Albina, continued to own and possess the land in the same character as that of their
predecessors; that Albina and her co-plaintiffs came to know that J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had previously filed in the
Court of First Instance of Quezon City Civil Case No. Q-27 for "quieting of title and recovery of possession" against five
of the children of Isaias Santiago involving the parcel of land of which they were co-owners; that J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc.
had claimed that parcel to be part of the land covered by its Transfer Certificate of Title No. 119; that the judgment in
Civil. Case No. Q-27, in which they (Albina Santiago, et al.) were never impleaded as parties, had already become
final57; that J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had executed the judgment against them, excluding and rusting them from the
enjoyment and possession of the land. Albina and her co-plaintiffs also alleged that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 119
(37679) of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., as well as Original Certificate of Title No. 735 from which the former was derived, did
not include the parcel claimed by them; that even granting that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 119 included the parcel
claimed by them the inclusion of that parcel in the certificate of title of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was done through fraud
because they, nor their predecessors, were not actually notified of the registration proceedings. As ground for
cancellation of the certificate of title of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs further alleged that
the technical description in Original Certificate of Title No. 735 had been falsified to include areas never brought within
the jurisdiction of the Land Registration Court, since they were areas not included in the application and publication in
the registration proceedings; that long before the predecessors of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. applied for, and secured,
Land Titles Cases
registration of the land which included their parcel of land they had already acquired ownership thereof not only by
the document, Annex A of their complaint, but also by acquisitive prescription. Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs
prayed, that J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. be ordered to desist from enforcing Civil Case No. Q-27 against them; that a
resurvey be ordered to determine whether or not Transfer Certificate of Title No. 119 (37679) included the land
described in their complaint; that a reconveyance to them be ordered of whatever portion of the land claimed by
them may be found included in transfer Certificate of Title No. 119; that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 119 and
Original Certificate of Title No. 735 be ordered cancelled and substituted with a new certificate of title embracing
only those lands included in the application, publication and/or decree in LRC No. 7681 of the Court of Land
Registration.
Upon motion of defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dismissed the
complaint of Albina Santiago, et al., upon the grounds that there was no cause of action, that the case was barred
by a prior judgment in Civil Case No. Q-27 which was affirmed by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-5079, and that
the action of the plaintiffs, if they had any, had prescribed.
This Court affirmed the order of the lower court dismissing the complaint of Albina Santiago and her
co-plaintiffs.58Regarding the contention of Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs that the judgment in the previous
case (Civil Case No. Q-27, affirmed in G.R. No. L-5079) would not operate as res judicata against them because they
were not parties in that suit, and that they did not derive their title from the defendants in the previous suit, this
Court held:
We agree with appellants that the decision in the preceding suit to quiet title, prosecuted by the appellee Tuason &
Co. against other heirs of Ynocencio Santiago (99 Phil., 615; 50 Off. Gaz. 11, 5727), can not constitute res
judicata against these appellants who were not parties to that suit and do not derive their title from the
defendants in the previous litigation (Rule 39, sec. 44 (b). There is authority for the proposition that a judgment
may be made binding in a subsequent litigation upon one who, although not a formal party to a previous suit, has
actually conducted or controlled the action or defense therein (65 ALR 1134), or who was adequately represented
in such previous litigation; but no clear proof of the existence of such exceptional circumstance is before us in the
present case. On the other hand, the rule is that co-owners are not privies inter se in relation to the property
owned in common.
xxx xxx xxx
But granting that the plaintiffs-appellants herein are not privies of the defendants Santiago in the former litigation
over this same property (S.C.G.R. No.
L-5079), still the pronouncement of this Court, made in the former case, to the effect that the Spanish document
(Annex A) issued in favor of Ynocencio Santiago (ancestor of appellants herein) was neither a titulo de informacion
posesoria nor a title by composicion con el estado, and, therefore, vested no ownership over the land therein
described in favor of Ynocencio Santiago, holds and applies to herein appellants, since the quality or the legal effect
of the document does not depend upon the person who invoke it.
If the late Ynocencio Santiago did not become the owner of the disputed property by virtue of the document Annex
A, then appellants herein, as heirs of Ynocencio have not acquired such ownership either. It follows that the first
and second causes of action of their complaint, predicated as they are on the assumption that such ownership and
its consequential rights resulted from Annex A, must necessarily fail. Not being owners, they can complain of no
invasion of dominical rights.
It will thus be noted that in the aforementioned decision in the Santiago case, even if Albina Santiago and her
co-plaintiffs were not considered privies to the defendants in Civil Case No. Q-27, and even if they were not parties
in that previous case, this Court nevertheless applied to them the judgment (G. R. No. L-5079) in that previous case
where it was pronounced that the document, Annex A of the complaint of Albina Santiago, et al., was neither
a titulo de informacion posesoria nor a title by composision con el estado, and it did not establish the right of
ownership of their predecessor in interest, Inocencio Santiago, Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs had based their
claim of ownership on that document (Annex A). 59 This Court held in that previous case that the document was
unavailing against Transfer Certificate of Title No. 119 of J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and against Original Certificate of
Title No. 735.
And so, following the logic of this Court in its decision in the Santiago case, in the three cases at bar We hold that
even if the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3621, except the heirs of Elias Benin, are not privies to Elias Benin and were
not parties in Civil Case No. Q-156; even if the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3622, except Jose Alcantara, are not privies
to Jose Alcantara and were not parties in Civil Case No. Q-156; and even if the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3623,
except Pascual Pili, are not privies to Pascual Pili and were not parties in Civil Case No. Q156, still the
12
pronouncement of this Court in the judgment in that previous case (G.R. No. L-4998), to the effect that the plaintiffs in
that case and their predecessors in interest were bound by the registration proceedings which culminated in the
issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, holds and applies to all the plaintiffs (now appellees) in these three
cases. In that judgment this Court ruled out, or did not sustain, the rights claimed by the predecessors in interest of
herein appellees over the land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735. These appellees, therefore, have not
succeeded to any right that can derrogate the validity and conclusiveness of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, and of
the certificates of title that are derived from said original certificate of title.
Coming back to the Santiago case, as regards the contention of Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs that the
registration proceedings which resulted in the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 were irregular and
fraudulent, this Court held:
(T)he mere fact that appellants herein were not personally notified of the registration proceedings that resulted in a
decree of registration of title in favor of the Tuasons in 1914 does not constitute in itself a case of fraud that would
invalidate the decree. The registration proceedings, as proceedings in rem, operate as against the whole world and the
decree issued therein is conclusive adjudication of the ownership of the lands registered, not only against those parties
who appeared in such proceedings but also against parties who were summoned by publication but did not appear. The
registration by the appellee's predecessors-in-interest freed the lands from claims and liens of whatever character that
existed against the lands prior to the issuance of the certificates of title, except those noted in the certificate and legal
encumbrances saved by law (Yumol vs. Rivera and Dizon, 64 Phil. 13, 17 and cases cited therein). In addition, there
being no allegation that the registered owners procured the non-appearance of appellants at the registration
proceedings, and very much more than one year having elapsed from the issuance of the decree of registration in 1914,
neither revocation of such decree nor a decree of reconveyance are obtainable any more.
Regarding the claim of Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs that they had acquired title by prescription over the parcel
of land claimed by them, this Court held:
It follows also that the allegation of prescriptive title in favor of plaintiffs does not suffice to establish a cause of action.
If such prescription was completed before the registration of the land in favor of the Tuasons, the resulting prescriptive
title was cut off and extinguished by the decree of registration. If, on the contrary, the prescription was either begun or
completed after the decree of registration, it conferred no title because, by express provision of law, prescription
cannot operate against the registered owner (Act 496, section 46).
Thus, in this Santiago case, as in the Alcantara case, this Court declared conclusive and indefeasible Original Certificate
of Title No. 735 which was issued as a result of the registration proceedings in L.R.C. No. 7681 of the Court of Land
Registration. There are many other cases where this Court has made a similar pronouncement regarding Original
Certificate of Title No. 735.60
In view of the findings, and the rulings, that We have hereinbefore made, it follows that, as contended by the appellant,
the lower court also erred when it declared the appellees the owners of the lands claimed by them and in awarding
damages to them, in these three cases.61
We consider it unnecessary to rule on the counterclaim of appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., for damages and attorneys
fees against the appellees 62, considering, as the records show, that the appellees are persons who are not in a position
to pay damages in any form. 63 We believe that the appellees had filed their complaints in the honest, but mistaken,
belief that they have a good cause of action against the appellant corporation and not because they meant to
embarrass or humiliate the persons who are identified or connected with the appellant.
WHEREFORE, the joint decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City Branch) in Civil Cages Nos. 3621, 3622
and 3623, appealed from, is reversed and set aside. The bond filed by appellant in the three cases in the court below for
the lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction is ordered cancelled. No pronouncement as to costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 192896 July 24, 2013
DREAM VILLAGE NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, INC., represented by its Incumbent President, GREG
SERIEGO, Petitioner,
vs.
BASES DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Land Titles Cases
Before us on Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the Decision2 dated September 10, 2009
and Resolution3 dated July 13, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 85228 nullifying and setting
aside for lack of jurisdiction the Resolution4 dated April 28, 2004 of the Commission on the Settlement of Land
Problems (COSLAP) in COS LAP Case No. 99-500. The fallo of the assailed COS LAP Resolution reads, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Declaring the subject property, covering an area of 78,466 square meters, now being occupied by the members
of the Dream Village Neighborhood Association, Inc. to be outside of Swo-00-0001302 BCDA property.
2. In accordance with the tenets of social justice, members of said association are advised to apply for sales patent
on their respective occupied lots with the Land Management Bureau, DENR-NCR, pursuant to R.A. Nos. 274 and
730.
3. Directing the Land Management Bureau-DENR-NCR to process the sales patent application of complainants
pursuant to existing laws and regulation.
4. The peaceful possession of actual occupants be respected by the respondents.
SO ORDERED.5
Antecedent Facts
Petitioner Dream Village Neighborhood Association, Inc. (Dream Village) claims to represent more than 2,000
families who have been occupying a 78,466-square meter lot in Western Bicutan, Taguig City since 1985 "in the
concept of owners continuously, exclusively and notoriously."6 The lot used to be part of the Hacienda de
Maricaban (Maricaban), owned by Dolores Casal y Ochoa and registered under a Torrens title, 7 Original Certificate
of Title (OCT) No. 291, issued on October 17, 1906 by the Registry of Deeds of Rizal. 8 Maricaban covered several
parcels of land with a total area of over 2,544 hectares spread out over Makati, Pasig, Taguig, Pasay, and
Paraaque.9
Following the purchase of Maricaban by the government of the United States of America (USA) early in the
American colonial period, to be converted into the military reservation known as Fort William Mckinley, Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 192 was issued in the name of the USA to cancel OCT No. 291. 10 The US government
later transferred 30 has. of Maricaban to the Manila Railroad Company, for which TCT No. 192 was cancelled by
TCT Nos. 1218 and 1219, the first in the name of the Manila Railroad Company for 30 has., and the second in the
name of the USA for the rest of the Maricaban property.11
On January 29, 1914, TCT No. 1219 was cancelled and replaced by TCT No. 1688, and later that year, on September
15, 1914, TCT No. 1688 was cancelled and replaced by TCT No. 2288, both times in the name of the USA. 12 On
December 6, 1956, the USA formally ceded Fort William Mckinley to the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), and
on September 11, 1958, TCT No. 2288 was cancelled and replaced by TCT No. 61524, this time in the name of the
Republic.13 On July 12, 1957, President Carlos P. Garcia issued Proclamation No. 423 withdrawing from sale or
settlement the tracts of land within Fort William Mckinley, now renamed Fort Bonifacio, and reserving them for
military purposes.14
On January 7, 1986, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2476 declaring certain portions of Fort
Bonifacio alienable and disposable15 in the manner provided under Republic Act (R.A.) Nos. 274 and 730, in relation
to the Public Land Act,16 thus allowing the sale to the settlers of home lots in Upper Bicutan, Lower Bicutan, Signal
Village, and Western Bicutan.17
On October 16, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Proclamation No. 172 amending Proclamation No. 2476
by limiting to Lots 1 and 2 of the survey Swo-13-000298 the areas in Western Bicutan open for disposition.18
On March 13, 1992, R.A. No. 7227 was passed19 creating the Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA)
to oversee and accelerate the conversion of Clark and Subic military reservations and their extension camps (John
Hay Station, Wallace Air Station, ODonnell Transmitter Station, San Miguel Naval Communications Station and
Capas Relay Station) to productive civilian uses. Section 820 of the said law provides that the capital of the BCDA will
be provided from sales proceeds or transfers of lots in nine (9) military camps in Metro Manila, including 723 has.
of Fort Bonifacio. The law, thus, expressly authorized the President of the Philippines "to sell the above lands, in
whole or in part, which are hereby declared alienable and disposable pursuant to the provisions of existing laws
and regulations governing sales of government properties,"21 specifically to raise capital for the BCDA. Titles to the
camps were transferred to the BCDA for this purpose,22 and TCT No. 61524 was cancelled on January 3, 1995 by
TCT Nos. 23888, 23887, 23886, 22460, 23889, 23890, and 23891, now in the name of the BCDA.23
Excepted from disposition by the BCDA are: a) approximately 148.80 has. reserved for the National Capital Region
(NCR) Security Brigade, Philippine Army officers housing area, and Philippine National Police jails and support
services (presently known as Camp Bagong Diwa); b) approximately 99.91 has. in Villamor Air Base for the
Presidential Airlift Wing, one squadron of helicopters for the NCR and respective security units; c) twenty one (21) areas
segregated by various presidential proclamations; and d) a proposed 30.15 has. as relocation site for families to be
affected by the construction of Circumferential Road 5 and Radial Road 4, provided that the boundaries and technical
description of these exempt areas shall be determined by an actual ground survey.24
Now charging the BCDA of wrongfully asserting title to Dream Village and unlawfully subjecting its members to
summary demolition, resulting in unrest and tensions among the residents,25 on November 22, 1999, the latter filed a
letter-complaint with the COSLAP to seek its assistance in the verification survey of the subject 78,466-sq m property,
which they claimed is within Lot 1 of Swo-13-000298 and thus is covered by Proclamation No. 172. They claim that they
have been occupying the area for thirty (30) years "in the concept of owners continuously, exclusively and notoriously
for several years," and have built their houses of sturdy materials thereon and introduced paved roads, drainage and
recreational and religious facilities. Dream Village, thus, asserts that the lot is not among those transferred to the BCDA
under R.A. No. 7227, and therefore patent applications by the occupants should be processed by the Land Management
Bureau (LMB).
On August 15, 2000, Dream Village formalized its complaint by filing an Amended Petition26 in the COSLAP. Among the
reliefs it sought were:
d. DECLARING the subject property as alienable and disposable by virtue of applicable laws;
e. Declaring the portion of Lot 1 of subdivision Plan SWO-13-000298, situated in the barrio of Western Bicutan, Taguig,
Metro Manila, which is presently being occupied by herein petitioner as within the coverage of Proclamation Nos. 2476
and 172 and outside the claim of AFP-RSBS INDUSTRIAL PARK COMPLEX and/or BASES CONVESION DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY.
f. ORDERING the Land Management Bureau to process the application of the ASSOCIATION members for the purchase
of their respective lots under the provisions of Acts Nos. 274 and 730. (Underscoring supplied)
Respondent BCDA in its Answer28 dated November 23, 2000 questioned the jurisdiction of the COSLAP to hear Dream
Villages complaint, while asserting its title to the subject property pursuant to R.A. No. 7227. It argued that under
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 561 which created the COSLAP, its task is merely to coordinate the various government
offices and agencies involved in the settlement of land problems or disputes, adding that BCDA does not fall in the
enumeration in Section 3 of E.O. No. 561, it being neither a pastureland-lease holder, a timber concessionaire, or a
government reservation grantee, but the holder of patrimonial government property which cannot be the subject of a
petition for classification, release or subdivision by the occupants of Dream Village.
In its Resolution29 dated April 28, 2004, the COSLAP narrated that it called a mediation conference on March 22, 2001,
during which the parties agreed to have a relocation/verification survey conducted of the subject lot. On April 4, 2001,
the COSLAP wrote to the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)-Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office-NCR requesting the survey, which would also include Swo-00-0001302, covering the adjacent
AFP-RSBS Industrial Park established by Proclamation No. 1218 on May 8, 1998 as well as the abandoned
Circumferential Road 5 (C-5 Road).30
On April 1, 2004, the COSLAP received the final report of the verification survey and a blueprint copy of the survey plan
from Atty. Rizaldy Barcelo, Regional Technical Director for Lands of DENR. Specifically, Item No. 3 of the DENR report
states:
3. Lot-1, Swo-000298 is inside Proclamation 172. Dream Village Neighborhood Association, Inc. is outside Lot-1,
Swo-13-000298 and inside Lot-10, 11 & Portion of Lot 13, Swo-00-0001302 with an actual area of 78,466 square meters.
Likewise, the area actually is outside Swo-00-0001302 of BCDA.31 (Emphasis ours and underscoring supplied)
COSLAP Ruling
On the basis of the DENRs verification survey report, the COSLAP resolved that Dream Village lies outside of BCDA, and
particularly, outside of Swo-00-0001302, and thus directed the LMB of the DENR to process the applications of Dream
Villages members for sales patent, noting that in view of the length of time that they "have been openly, continuously
and notoriously occupying the subject property in the concept of an owner, x x x they are qualified to apply for sales
patent on their respective occupied lots pursuant to R.A. Nos. 274 and 730 in relation to the provisions of the Public
Land Act."32
On the question of its jurisdiction over the complaint, the COSLAP cited the likelihood that the summary eviction by the
BCDA of more than 2,000 families in Dream Village could stir up serious social unrest, and maintained that Section 3(2)
of E.O. No. 561 authorizes it to "assume jurisdiction and resolve land problems or disputes which are critical and
explosive in nature considering, for instance, the large number of parties involved, the presence or emergence of social
tension or unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring immediate action," even as Section 3(2)(d) of E.O. No. 561
also allows it to take cognizance of "petitions for classification, release and/or subdivision of lands of the public
13
Land Titles Cases
domain," exactly the ultimate relief sought by Dream Village. Rationalizing that it was created precisely to provide a
more effective mechanism for the expeditious settlement of land problems "in general," the COSLAP invoked as its
authority the 1990 case of Baaga v. COSLAP,33 where this Court said:
It is true that Executive Order No. 561 provides that the COSLAP may take cognizance of cases which are "critical
and explosive in nature considering, for instance, the large number of parties involved, the presence or emergence
of social tension or unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring immediate action." However, the use of the
word "may" does not mean that the COSLAPs jurisdiction is merely confined to the above mentioned cases. The
provisions of the said Executive Order are clear that the COSLAP was created as a means of providing a more
effective mechanism for the expeditious settlement of land problems in general, which are frequently the source of
conflicts among settlers, landowners and cultural minorities. Besides, the COSLAP merely took over from the
abolished PACLAP whose functions, including its jurisdiction, power and authority to act on, decide and resolve land
disputes (Sec. 2, P.D. No. 832) were all assumed by it. The said Executive Order No. 561 containing said provision,
being enacted only on September 21, 1979, cannot affect the exercise of jurisdiction of the PACLAP Provincial
Committee of Koronadal on September 20, 1978. Neither can it affect the decision of the COSLAP which merely
affirmed said exercise of jurisdiction.34
In its Motion for Reconsideration35 filed on May 20, 2004, the BCDA questioned the validity of the survey results
since it was conducted without its representatives present, at the same time denying that it received a notification
of the DENR verification survey.36 It maintained that there is no basis for the COSLAPs finding that the members of
Dream Village were in open, continuous, and adverse possession in the concept of owner, because not only is the
property not among those declared alienable and disposable, but it is a titled patrimonial property of the State.37
In the Order38 dated June 17, 2004, the COSLAP denied BCDAs Motion for Reconsideration, insisting that it had due
notice of the verification survey, while also noting that although the BCDA wanted to postpone the verification
survey due to its tight schedule, it actually stalled the survey when it failed to suggest an alternative survey date to
ensure its presence.
CA Ruling
On Petition for Review39 to the CA, the BCDA argued that the dispute is outside the jurisdiction of the COSLAP
because of the lands history of private ownership and because it is registered under an indefeasible Torrens title40;
that Proclamation No. 172 covers only Lots 1 and 2 of Swo-13-000298 in Western Bicutan, whereas Dream Village
occupies Lots 10, 11 and part of 13 of Swo-00-0001302, which also belongs to the BCDA 41; that the COSLAP
resolution is based on an erroneous DENR report stating that Dream Village is outside of BCDA, because Lots 10, 11,
and portion of Lot 13 of Swo-00-0001302 are within the DA42; that the COSLAP was not justified in ignoring BCDAs
request to postpone the survey to the succeeding year because the presence of its representatives in such an
important verification survey was indispensable for the impartiality of the survey aimed at resolving a highly
volatile situation43; that the COSLAP is a mere coordinating administrative agency with limited jurisdiction44; and,
that the present case is not among those enumerated in Section 3 of E.O. No. 56145.
The COSLAP, on the other hand, maintained that Section 3(2)(e) of E.O. No. 561 provides that it may assume
jurisdiction and resolve land problems or disputes in "other similar land problems of grave urgency and
magnitude,"46 and the present case is one such problem.
The CA in its Decision47 dated September 10, 2009 ruled that the COSLAP has no jurisdiction over the complaint
because the question of whether Dream Village is within the areas declared as available for disposition in
Proclamation No. 172 is beyond its competence to determine, even as the land in dispute has been under a private
title since 1906, and presently its title is held by a government agency, the BCDA, in contrast to the case of Baaga
relied upon by Dream Village, where the disputed land was part of the public domain and the disputants were
applicants for sales patent thereto.
Dream Villages motion for reconsideration was denied in the appellate courts Order48 of July 13, 2010.
Petition for Review in the Supreme Court
On petition for review on certiorari to this Court, Dream Village interposes the following issues:
A for families affected by the construction of C-5 Road. It is nowhere claimed that Lots 10, 11 and 13 of Swo-00-0001302
IN ANNULLING THE RESOLUTION OF COSLAP IN COSLAP CASE NO. 99-500, THE HONORABLE CA DECIDED THE CASE
IN A MANNER NOT CONSISTENT WITH LAW AND APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT;
B While property of the State or any
THE HONORABLE CA ERRED IN RULING THAT COSLAP HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE CONTROVERSY BETWEEN
THE PARTIES HEREIN.49
The Courts Ruling
We find no merit in the petition.
The BCDA holds title to Fort Bonifacio.
That the BCDA has title to Fort Bonifacio has long been decided with finality. In Samahan ng Masang Pilipino sa Makati,
Inc. v. BCDA,50 it was categorically ruled as follows:
First, it is unequivocal that the Philippine Government, and now the BCDA, has title and ownership over Fort Bonifacio.
The case of Acting Registrars of Land Titles and Deeds of Pasay City, Pasig and Makati is final and conclusive on the
ownership of the then Hacienda de Maricaban estate by the Republic of the Philippines. Clearly, the issue on the
ownership of the subject lands in Fort Bonifacio is laid to rest. Other than their view that the USA is still the owner of
the subject lots, petitioner has not put forward any claim of ownership or interest in them.51
The facts in Samahan ng Masang Pilipino sa Makati are essentially not much different from the controversy below.
There, 20,000 families were long-time residents occupying 98 has. of Fort Bonifacio in Makati City, who vainly sought to
avert their eviction and the demolition of their houses by the BCDA upon a claim that the land was owned by the USA
under TCT No. 2288. The Supreme Court found that TCT No. 2288 had in fact been cancelled by TCT No. 61524 in the
name of the Republic, which title was in turn cancelled on January 3, 1995 by TCT Nos. 23888, 23887, 23886, 22460,
23889, 23890, and 23891, all in the name of the BCDA. The Court ruled that the BCDAs aforesaid titles over Fort
Bonifacio are valid, indefeasible and beyond question, since TCT No. 61524 was cancelled in favor of BCDA pursuant to
an explicit authority under R.A. No. 7227, the legal basis for BCDAs takeover and management of the subject lots.52
Dream Village sits on the
abandoned C-5 Road, which lies
outside the area declared in
Proclamation Nos. 2476 and 172 as
alienable and disposable.
Pursuant to Proclamation No. 2476, the following surveys were conducted by the Bureau of Lands to delimit the
boundaries of the areas excluded from the coverage of Proclamation No. 423:
Barangay Survey Plan Date Approved
1. Lower Bicutan SWO-13-000253 October 21, 1986
2. Signal Village SWO-13-000258 May 13, 1986
3. Upper Bicutan SWO-13-000258 May 13, 1986
4. Western Bicutan SWO-13-000298 January 15, 198753
However, the survey plan for Western Bicutan, Swo-13-000298, shows that Lots 3, 4, 5 and 6 thereof are inside the area
segregated for the Libingan ng mga Bayani under Proclamation No. 208, which then leaves only Lots 1 and 2 of
Swo-13-000298 as available for disposition. For this reason, it was necessary to amend Proclamation No. 2476. Thus, in
Proclamation No. 172 only Lots 1 and 2 of Swo-13-000298 are declared alienable and disposable.54
The DENR verification survey report states that Dream Village is not situated in Lot 1 of Swo-13-000298 but actually
occupies Lots 10, 11 and part of 13 of Swo-00-0001302: "x x x Dream Village is outside Lot1, SWO-13-000298 and inside
Lot 10, 11 & portion of Lot 13, SWO-00-0001302 with an actual area of 78466 square meters. The area is actually is [sic]
outside SWO-00-0001302 of BCDA."55 Inexplicably and gratuitously, the DENR also states that the area is outside of
BCDA, completely oblivious that the BCDA holds title over the entire Fort Bonifacio, even as the BCDA asserts that Lots
10, 11 and 13 of SWO-00-0001302 are part of the abandoned right-of-way of C-5 Road. This area is described as lying
north of Lot 1 of Swo-13-000298 and of Lots 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Swo-13-000298 (Western Bicutan) inside the Libingan ng
mga Bayani, and the boundary line of Lot 1 mentioned as C-5 Road is really the proposed alignment of C-5 Road, which
was abandoned when, as constructed, it was made to traverse northward into the Libingan ng mga Bayani. Dream
Village has not disputed this assertion.
The mere fact that the original plan for C-5 Road to cross Swo-00-0001302 was abandoned by deviating it northward to
traverse the southern part of Libingan ng mga Bayani does not signify abandonment by the government of the
bypassed lots, nor that these lots would then become alienable and disposable. They remain under the title of the
BCDA, even as it is significant that under Section 8(d) of R.A. No. 7227, a relocation site of 30.5 has. was to be reserved
are part of the said relocation site. These lots border C-5 Road in the south,56making them commercially valuable to
BCDA, a farther argument against a claim that the government has abandoned them to Dream Village.
of its subdivisions patrimonial in
character may be the object of
prescription, those "intended for
14
Land Titles Cases
some public service or for the
development of the national
wealth" are considered property of
public dominion and therefore not
susceptible to acquisition by
prescription.
Article 1113 of the Civil Code provides that "property of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in
character shall not be the object of prescription." Articles 420 and 421 identify what is property of public dominion
and what is patrimonial property:
Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State,
banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for
the development of the national wealth.
Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the preceding article, is patrimonial
property.
One question laid before us is whether the area occupied by Dream Village is susceptible of acquisition by
prescription. In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic,57 it was pointed out that from the moment R.A. No. 7227
was enacted, the subject military lands in Metro Manila
became alienable and disposable. However, it was also clarified that the said lands did not thereby become
patrimonial, since the BCDA law makes the express reservation that they are to be sold in order to raise funds for
the conversion of the former American bases in Clark and Subic. The Court noted that the purpose of the law can
be tied to either "public service" or "the development of national wealth" under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code,
such that the lands remain property of the public dominion, albeit their status is now alienable and disposable. The
Court then explained that it is only upon their sale to a private person or entity as authorized by the BCDA law that
they become private property and cease to be property of the public dominion:58
For as long as the property belongs to the State, although already classified as alienable or disposable, it remains
property of the public dominion if when it is "intended for some public service or for the development of the
national wealth."59
Thus, under Article 422 of the Civil Code, public domain lands become patrimonial property only if there is a
declaration that these are alienable or disposable, together with an express government manifestation that the
property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth. Only
when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public
dominion begin to run. Also under Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, it is provided that before
acquisitive prescription can commence, the property sought to be registered must not only be classified as
alienable and disposable, it must also be expressly declared by the State that it is no longer intended for public
service or the development of the national wealth, or that the property has been converted into patrimonial.
Absent such an express declaration by the State, the land remains to be property of public dominion.60
Since the issuance of Proclamation No. 423 in 1957, vast portions of the former Maricaban have been legally
disposed to settlers, besides those segregated for public or government use. Proclamation No. 1217 (1973)
established the Maharlika Village in Bicutan, Taguig to serve the needs of resident Muslims of Metro Manila;
Proclamation No. 2476 (1986), as amended by Proclamation No. 172 (1987), declared more than 400 has. of
Maricaban in Upper and Lower Bicutan, Signal Village, and Western Bicutan as alienable and disposable;
Proclamation No. 518 (1990) formally exempted from Proclamation No. 423 the Barangays of Cembo, South Cembo,
West Rembo, East Rembo, Comembo, Pembo and Pitogo, comprising 314 has., and declared them open for
disposition.
The above proclamations notwithstanding, Fort Bonifacio remains property of public dominion of the State,
because although declared alienable and disposable, it is reserved for some public service or for the development
of the national wealth, in this case, for the conversion of military reservations in the country to productive civilian
uses.61Needless to say, the acquisitive prescription asserted by Dream Village has not even begun to run.
Ownership of a land registered
under a Torrens title cannot be lost
by prescription or adverse
possession.
15
Dream Village has been unable to dispute BCDAs claim that Lots 10, 11 and part of 13 of Swo-00-0001302 are the
abandoned right-of-way of C-5 Road, which is within the vast titled territory of Fort Bonifacio. We have already
established that these lots have not been declared alienable and disposable under Proclamation Nos. 2476 or 172.
Moreover, it is a settled rule that lands under a Torrens title cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession.62 Section 47 of P.D. No. 1529, the Property Registration Decree, expressly provides that no title to
registered land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.
And, although the registered landowner may still lose his right to recover the possession of his registered property by
reason of laches,63 nowhere has Dream Village alleged or proved laches, which has been defined as such neglect or
omission to assert a right, taken in conjunction with lapse of time and other circumstances causing prejudice to an
adverse party, as will operate as a bar in equity. Put any way, it is a delay in the assertion of a right which works
disadvantage to another because of the inequity founded on some change in the condition or relations of the property
or parties. It is based on public policy which, for the peace of society, ordains that relief will be denied to a stale
demand which otherwise could be a valid claim.64
The subject property having been
expressly reserved for a specific
public purpose, the COSLAP
cannot exercise jurisdiction over the
complaint of the Dream Village
settlers.
BCDA has repeatedly asserted that the COSLAP has no jurisdiction to hear Dream Villages complaint. Concurring, the
CA has ruled that questions as to the physical identity of Dream Village and whether it lies in Lots 10, 11 and 13 of
Swo-00-0001302, or whether Proclamation No. 172 has released the disputed area for disposition are issues which are
"manifestly beyond the scope of the COSLAPs jurisdiction vis--vis Paragraph 2, Section 3 of E.O. No. 561,"65 rendering
its Resolution a patent nullity and its pronouncements void. Thus, the CA said, under Section 3 of E.O. No. 561, the
COSLAPs duty would have been to refer the conflict to another tribunal or agency of government in view of the serious
ramifications of the disputed claims:
In fine, it is apparent that the COSLAP acted outside its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the case. It would have been
more prudent if the COSLAP has [sic] just referred the controversy to the proper forum in order to fully thresh out the
ramifications of the dispute at bar. As it is, the impugned Resolution is a patent nullity since the tribunal which rendered
it lacks jurisdiction. Thus, the pronouncements contained therein are void. "We have consistently ruled that a judgment
for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right or the creator of any obligation. All
acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect."66 (Citation omitted)
We add that Fort Bonifacio has been reserved for a declared specific public purpose under R.A. No. 7227, which
unfortunately for Dream Village does not encompass the present demands of its members. Indeed, this purpose was
the very reason why title to Fort Bonifacio has been transferred to the BCDA, and it is this very purpose which takes the
dispute out of the direct jurisdiction of the COSLAP. A review of the history of the COSLAP will readily clarify that its
jurisdiction is limited to disputes over public lands not reserved or declared for a public use or purpose.
On July 31, 1970, President Marcos issued E.O. No. 251 creating the Presidential Action Committee on Land Problems
(PACLAP) to expedite and coordinate the investigation and resolution of all kinds of land disputes between settlers,
streamline and shorten administrative procedures, adopt bold and decisive measures to solve land problems, or
recommend other solutions.67 E.O. No. 305, issued on March 19, 1971, reconstituted the PACLAP and gave it exclusive
jurisdiction over all cases involving public lands and other lands of the public domain, 68 as well as adjudicatory powers
phrased in broad terms: "To investigate, coordinate, and resolve expeditiously land disputes, streamline administrative
proceedings, and, in general, to adopt bold and decisive measures to solve problems involving public lands and lands of
the public domain."69
On November 27, 1975, P.D. No. 832 reorganized the PACLAP and enlarged its functions and duties. Section 2 thereof
even granted it quasi judicial functions, to wit:
Sec. 2. Functions and duties of the PACLAP. The PACLAP shall have the following functions and duties:
1. Direct and coordinate the activities, particularly the investigation work, of the various government agencies and
agencies involved in land problems or disputes, and streamline administrative procedures to relieve small settlers and
landholders and members of cultural minorities of the expense and time-consuming delay attendant to the solution of
such problems or disputes;
2. Refer for immediate action any land problem or dispute brought to the attention of the PACLAP, to any member
agency having jurisdiction thereof: Provided, That when the Executive Committee decides to act on a case, its
Land Titles Cases
resolution, order or decision thereon shall have the force and effect of a regular administrative resolution, order or
decision, and shall be binding upon the parties therein involved and upon the member agency having jurisdiction
thereof;
xxxx
4. Evolve and implement a system of procedure for the speedy investigation and resolution of land disputes or
problems at provincial level, if possible. (Underscoring supplied)
On September 21, 1979, E.O. No. 561 abolished the PACLAP and created the COSLAP to be a more effective
administrative body to provide a mechanism for the expeditious settlement of land problems among small settlers,
landowners and members of the cultural minorities to avoid social unrest.70 Paragraph 2, Section 3 of E.O No. 561
now specifically enumerates the instances when the COSLAP can exercise its adjudicatory functions:
Sec. 3. Powers and Functions. The Commission shall have the following powers and functions:
1. Coordinate the activities, particularly the investigation work, of the various government offices and agencies
involved in the settlement of land problems or disputes, and streamline administrative procedures to relieve small
settlers and landholders and members of cultural minorities of the expense and time consuming delay attendant to
the solution of such problems or disputes;
2. Refer and follow-up for immediate action by the agency having appropriate jurisdiction any land problem or
dispute referred to the Commission: Provided, That the Commission may, in the following cases, assume
jurisdiction and resolve land problems or disputes which are critical and explosive in nature considering, for
instance, the large number of the parties involved, the presence or emergence of social tension or unrest, or other
similar critical situations requiring immediate action:
(a) Between occupants/squatters and pasture lease agreement holders or timber concessionaires;
(b) Between occupants/squatters and government reservation grantees;
(c) Between occupants/squatters and public land claimants or applicants;
(d) Petitions for classification, release and/or subdivision of lands of the public domain; and
(e) Other similar land problems of grave urgency and magnitude.
xxxx
Citing the constant threat of summary eviction and demolition by the BCDA and the seriousness and urgency of the
reliefs sought in its Amended Petition, Dream Village insists that the COSLAP was justified in assuming jurisdiction
of COSLAP Case No. 99-500. But in Longino v. Atty. General,71 it was held that as an administrative agency,
COSLAPs jurisdiction is limited to cases specifically mentioned in its enabling statute, E.O. No. 561. The Supreme
Court said:
Administrative agencies, like the COSLAP, are tribunals of limited jurisdiction and, as such, could wield only such as
are specifically granted to them by the enabling statutes. x x x.
xxxx
Under the law, E.O. No. 561, the COSLAP has two options in acting on a land dispute or problem lodged before it,
namely, (a) refer the matter to the agency having appropriate jurisdiction for settlement/resolution; or (b) assume
jurisdiction if the matter is one of those enumerated in paragraph 2(a) to (e) of the law, if such case is critical and
explosive in nature, taking into account the large number of the parties involved, the presence or emergence of
social tension or unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring immediate action. In resolving whether to
assume jurisdiction over a case or to refer the same to the particular agency concerned, the COSLAP has to
consider the nature or classification of the land involved, the parties to the case, the nature of the questions raised,
and the need for immediate and urgent action thereon to prevent injuries to persons and damage or destruction to
property. The law does not vest jurisdiction on the COSLAP over any land dispute or problem.72 (Citation omitted)
The Longino ruling has been consistently cited in subsequent COSLAP cases, among them Davao New Town
Development Corp. v. COSLAP,73 Barranco v. COSLAP,74 NHA v. COSLAP,75 Cayabyab v. de Aquino,76 Ga, Jr. v.
Tubungan,77 Machado v. Gatdula,78 and Vda. de Herrera v. Bernardo.79
Thus, in Machado, it was held that the COSLAP cannot invoke Section 3(2)(e) of E.O. No. 561 to assume jurisdiction
over "other similar land problems of grave urgency," since the statutory construction principle of ejusdem generis
prescribes that where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and
specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent but are to be held as applying
only to persons or things of the same kind as those specifically mentioned.80 Following this rule, COSLAPs
jurisdiction is limited to disputes involving lands in which the government has a proprietary or regulatory
interest,81 or public lands covered with a specific license from the government such as a pasture lease agreements,
a timber concessions, or a reservation grants,82 and where moreover, the dispute is between occupants/squatters
and pasture lease agreement holders or timber concessionaires; between occupants/squatters and government
reservation grantees; and between occupants/squatters and public land claimants or applicants.
In Longino, the parties competed to lease a property of the Philippine National Railways. The high court rejected
COSLAPs jurisdiction, noting that the disputed lot is not public land, and neither party was a squatter, patent lease
agreement holder, government reservation grantee, public land claimant or occupant, or a member of any cultural
minority, nor was the dispute critical and explosive in nature so as to generate social tension or unrest, or a critical
situation which required immediate action.83
In Davao New Town Development Corp., it was held that the COSLAP has no concurrent jurisdiction with the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) in respect of disputes concerning the implementation of agrarian reform laws,
since "the grant of exclusive and primary jurisdiction over agrarian reform matters on the DAR implies that no other
court, tribunal, or agency is authorized to resolve disputes properly cognizable by the DAR."84 Thus, instead of hearing
and resolving the case, COSLAP should have simply referred private respondents complaint to the DAR or DARAB.
According to the Court:
The abovementioned proviso Section (3)(2) of E.O. No. 561, which vests COSLAP the power to resolve land disputes,
does not confer upon COSLAP blanket authority to assume every matter referred to it. Its jurisdiction is confined only to
disputes over lands in which the government has proprietary or regulatory interest. Moreover, the land dispute in
Baaga involved parties with conflicting free patent applications which was within the authority of PACLAP to resolve,
unlike that of the instant case which is exclusively cognizable by the DAR.85
In Barranco, COSLAP issued a writ to demolish structures encroaching into private property.1wphi1 The Supreme
court ruled that COSLAP may resolve only land disputes "involving public lands or lands of the public domain or those
covered with a specific license from the government such as a pasture lease agreement, a timber concession, or a
reservation grant."86
In NHA, it was held that COSLAP has no jurisdiction over a boundary dispute between two local government units, that
its decision is an utter nullity correctible by certiorari, that it can never become final and any writ of execution based on
it is void, and all acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect.87
In Cayabyab, it was held that "the jurisdiction of COSLAP does not extend to disputes involving the ownership of private
lands, or those already covered by a certificate of title, as these fall exactly within the jurisdiction of the courts and
other administrative agencies."88
In Ga, Jr., it was reiterated that the COSLAP has no jurisdiction over controversies relating to ownership and possession
of private lands, and thus, the failure of respondents to properly appeal from the COSLAP decision before the
appropriate court was held not fatal to the petition for certiorari that they eventually filed with the CA. The latter
remedy remained available despite the lapse of the period to appeal from the void COSLAP decision.89
In Machado, the high court ruled that COSLAP has no jurisdiction in disputes over private lands between private parties,
reiterating the essential rules contained in Section 3 of E.O. No. 561 governing the exercise by COSLAP of its jurisdiction,
to wit:
Under these terms, the COSLAP has two different rules in acting on a land dispute or problem lodged before it, e.g.,
COSLAP can assume jurisdiction only if the matter is one of those enumerated in paragraph 2(a) to (e) of the law.
Otherwise, it should refer the case to the agency having appropriate jurisdiction for settlement or resolution. In
resolving whether to assume jurisdiction over a case or to refer it to the particular agency concerned, the COSLAP
considers: (a) the nature or classification of the land involved; (b) the parties to the case; (c) the nature of the questions
raised; and (d) the need for immediate and urgent action thereon to prevent injury to persons and damage or
destruction to property. The terms of the law clearly do not vest on the COSLAP the general power to assume
jurisdiction over any land dispute or problem. Thus, under EO 561, the instances when the COSLAP may resolve land
disputes are limited only to those involving public lands or those covered by a specific license from the government,
such as pasture lease agreements, timber concessions, or reservation grants.90 (Citations omitted)
In Vda. de Herrera, the COSLAP assumed jurisdiction over a complaint for "interference, disturbance, unlawful claim,
harassment and trespassing" over a private parcel of land. The CA ruled that the parties were estopped to question
COSLAPs jurisdiction since they participated actively in the proceedings. The Supreme Court, noting from the complaint
that the case actually involved a claim of title and possession of private land, ruled that the RTC or the MTC has
jurisdiction since the dispute did not fall under Section 3, paragraph 2 (a) to (e) of E.O. No. 561, was not critical and
explosive in nature, did not involve a large number of parties, nor was there social tension or unrest present or
emergent.91
In the case at bar, COSLAP has invoked Baaga to assert its jurisdiction. There, Guillermo Baaga had filed a free patent
application with the Bureau of Lands over a public land with an area of 30 has. Gregorio Daproza (Daproza) also filed a
16
Land Titles Cases
patent application for the same property. The opposing claims and protests of the claimants remained unresolved
by the Bureau of Lands, and neither did it conduct an investigation. Daproza wrote to the COSLAP, which then
opted to exercise jurisdiction over the controversy. The high court sustained COSLAP, declaring that its jurisdiction
is not confined to the cases mentioned in paragraph 2(a) to (e) of E.O. No. 561, but includes land problems in
general, which are frequently the source of conflicts among settlers, landowners and cultural minorities.
But as the Court has since clarified in Longino and in the other cases aforecited, the land dispute in Baaga was
between private individuals who were free patent applicants over unregistered public lands. In contrast, the
present petition involves land titled to and managed by a government agency which has been expressly reserved by
law for a specific public purpose other than for settlement. Thus, as we have advised in Longino, the law does not
vest jurisdiction on the COSLAP over any land dispute or problem, but it has to consider the nature or classification
of the land involved, the parties to the case, the nature of the questions raised, and the need for immediate and
urgent action thereon to prevent injuries to persons and damage or destruction to property.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 169397 March 13, 2007
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
RESTITUTO SARMIENTO, represented by his attorney-in-fact, MAGDALENO SARMIENTO, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Restituto Sarmiento (respondent) through his brother-attorney-in-fact Magdaleno Sarmiento (Magdaleno) filed on
November 29, 2000 with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Taguig, Metro Manila an application for
registration1of a parcel of land, delineated as Lot 535-D under Approved Survey Plan Swo-13-000465 with a total
land area of 2,664 square meters and located at Barangay Wawa, Taguig, Metro Manila (the lot).
Respondent claimed to have acquired the lot through donation under a Kasulatan ng Pagkakaloob2 dated July 16,
1988 executed by his father, Placido Sarmiento (Placido), which lot formed part of Lot 535 that was allegedly
inherited by Placido from Florentina Sarmiento (Florentina).
Respondent further claimed that he and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, uninterrupted,
adverse, and public possession of the lot in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years.3
Together with his application for registration, respondent submitted the following documents:
1. Blueprint copy of the Conversion and Subdivision Plan Swo-13-000465 of Lot 535 as surveyed for Magdaleno
Sarmiento, et al;4
2. Photocopy of Geodetic Engineers Certificate;5
3. Technical Description of Lot 535-D;6
4. Owners Copy of Tax Declaration No. EL-009-01681 in the name of Restituto A. Sarmiento;7
5. Photocopy of the Kasulatan ng Pagkakaloob dated July 16, 1988;8 and
6. Special Power of Attorney executed by Restituto Sarmiento appointing Magdaleno Sarmiento as his
attorney-in-fact.9
On January 17, 2001, the Solicitor General, through the Prosecutor of Taguig who was deputized to assist in the
case, filed, as counsel for the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), an Opposition10 to respondents application
for registration. Contending that (1) neither the applicant nor his predecessors-in-interest were in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the lot since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto, as required
under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (The Public Land Act), as amended by Presidential Decree (P.D)
No. 1073;11 (2) respondents muniments of title and/or tax declarations and tax payment receipts do not appear to
be genuine and do not anyway constitute competent and sufficient evidence of his bona fide acquisition of the lot
in the concept of an owner since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto; (3) the claim of ownership in fee simple on the
basis of a Spanish title or grant can no longer be availed of by respondent as he failed to file an appropriate
application for registration within six months from February 16, 1976, as required under P.D. No. 892; 12 and (4) the
lot is part of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, hence, not subject to private
appropriation.
At the initial hearing of the application on April 4, 2001, respondent offered and marked in evidence documents proving
compliance with jurisdictional requirements, following which the MeTC issued an order of general default against the
whole world, except against the government.13
After the conclusion of the testimonies of respondents brother-attorney-in-fact Magdaleno14 and adjoining lot owner
Rodolfo Sta. Ana,15 the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), through the Assistant Regional
Director for Legal Services and Public Affairs, filed its Report16 dated April 16, 2001 reiterating respondents claims as
set forth in his application for registration.
The Land Registration Authority, through the Director of the Department of Registration, also filed a report with the
MeTC with the information that it was not in a position to verify whether the lot was already covered by a land patent
or a previously approved isolated survey.17
Respondents formal offer of evidence18 did not merit comment/opposition from petitioner which in fact waived the
presentation of evidence for the government.19
By Decision20 of May 27, 2002, the MeTC granted respondents application for registration. Thus it disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered and finding the allegations in the application to have been sufficiently established by
the applicants evidence, this Court hereby confirms the title of applicant Restituto Sarmiento, Filipino citizen, of legal
age, married to Betty Sarmiento and a resident of No. 11, Guerrero Street, Wawa, Taguig, Metro Manila over the
subject parcel of agricultural land known as Lot 535-D, MCadm-590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping under Conversion and
Subdivision Plan Swo-13-000465 situated at Barangay Wawa, Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila, consisting of Two
Thousand Six Hundred Sixty Four (2,664) square meters and hereby order the registration thereof in his name.
After the finality of this Decision and upon payment of the corresponding taxes due on the said lot, let an order for the
issuance of decree of registration be issued.
SO ORDERED.21
In granting respondents application, the MeTC found that respondent and his predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession of the lot in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years, viz:
The subject lot was a portion of the parcel of land previously declared for taxation purposes in the name of its original
owner Florentina Sarmiento under Tax Declaration (T.D.) No. 4995 (Exhibit "N"). Upon the death of Florentina
Sarmiento, a portion of said land was inherited by Placido Sarmiento, the father of the herein applicant Restituto
Sarmiento, while the other portion went to Placidos [s]ister Teodora Sarmiento. On July 16, 1988, Placido Sarmiento
transferred the portion of the parcel of land inherited by him from Florentina Sarmiento to his children, namely: herein
applicant Restituto Sarmiento, Magdaleno Sarmiento and Conigunda Sarmiento by virtue of a deed denominated as
"Kasulatan ng Pagkakaloob" (Exhibits "O" and "O-5"). (TSN, June 16, 2001).
On April 24 and June 25, 1998, Magdaleno Sarmiento, among others, caused the survey of the entire area of the parcel
of land x x x According to the said plan, the said survey is inside alienable and disposable area, Project No. 27-B, L.C.
Map No. 2623, certified on January 3, 1968 by the Bureau of Forestry (Exhibit "K-2", supra).
The said property was being planted to rice, watermelons, and other vegetables by Florentina Sarmiento and her
successors-in-interest themselves and by their hired helpers for about fifty years (50) years already. It is not tenanted
and there are no other persons having a claim over the said property since the Japanese occupation. The said parcel of
land is about two (2) kilometers away from the Laguna Lake but it gets flooded for about two (2) months during the
rainy season and sometimes up to three (3) months if the town proper (poblacion) of Taguig is itself underwater. (TSN,
June 6, 2001). x x x
Applicant Restituto Sarmiento and his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the subject parcel of land
continuously, uninterruptedly, openly, publicly, adversely and in the concept of owners for more than thirty (30) years
now. x x x22
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, faulting the MeTC for granting the application despite respondents failure
to comply with the mandatory requirement of submitting the original tracing cloth plan in evidence.23Petitioner
advanced that according to the survey of the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA), the lot is located below the
reglementary lake elevation of 12.50 meters, hence, a part of the Laguna Lake bed which is incapable of private
appropriation.24
By Decision25 of May 20, 2005, the appellate court held that as the lot was sufficiently identified by the blue print copy
of the plan and the technical description, the presentation of the original tracing cloth ceased to become indispensable
for the grant of the application.26
The appellate court further held that petitioners claim that the lot forms part of the Laguna Lake bed cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal, and even assuming that it was properly raised, the purported ground survey of the LLDA
had no probative value since it was not a certified original copy.27
17
Land Titles Cases
The appellate court thus affirmed the decision of the MeTC. Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been
denied by Resolution28 of August 19, 2005, petitioner now comes before this Court on a petition for review on
certiorari.
It is well settled that no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from
the government, and it is indispensable that the person claiming title to public land should show that his title was
acquired from the State or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law.29
While respondent did not state in his application the statutory basis of his application, it can reasonably be inferred
that he seeks the judicial confirmation or legalization of his imperfect or incomplete title over the lot30 which he
claims to be a riceland.
Judicial confirmation of imperfect title is, under the Public Land Act, one of the means by which public agricultural
lands may be disposed.31
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. 1073,32 provides:
Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to
own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to
the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the applications for
confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this chapter.
Under the above-quoted provision, an applicant for confirmation of imperfect title must prove that (a) the land
forms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the public domain; and (b) he has been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership
either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945.33
To support its contention that the lot does not form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain,
petitioner submitted before the appellate court the technical survey data and topographic map of the LLDA
showing that the lot is situated below the reglementary elevation of 12.50 meters. Since that was the first time
petitioner raised the issue, the appellate court correctly glossed over it, for offending basic rules of fair play, justice,
and due process.34 In any event, an examination of what purports to be the technical survey data of the LLDA
shows that it is not a certified original copy but a mere photocopy, the veracity and genuineness of which cannot
be ascertained by this Court.
The absence or weakness of the evidence for petitioner notwithstanding, respondent still bears the burden of
overcoming the presumption that the lot he seeks to register forms part of the alienable agricultural land of the
public domain.35
To discharge the onus, respondent relies on the blue print copy of the conversion and subdivision plan approved by
the DENR Center which bears the notation of the surveyor-geodetic engineer that "this survey is inside the
alienable and disposable area, Project No. 27-B. L.C. Map No. 2623, certified on January 3, 1968 by the Bureau of
Forestry."
Menguito v. Republic36 teaches, however, that reliance on such a notation to prove that the lot is alienable is
insufficient and does not constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption that it remains part of
the inalienable public domain.
To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain,
petitioners relied on the printed words which read: "This survey plan is inside Alienable and Disposable Land Area,
Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by the Bureau of Forestry on January 3, 1968," appearing on
Exhibit "E" (Survey Plan No. Swo-13-000227).
This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides: "All lands of the public domain,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber,
wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. . . ."
For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case) must overcome the presumption that the
land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified
or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Indeed, "occupation
thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title." To
overcome such presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant. Absent such evidence, the
land sought to be registered remains inalienable.
In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor-geodetic engineer's notation in Exhibit "E" indicating that the survey was
inside alienable and disposable land. Such notation does not constitute a positive government act validly changing the
classification of the land in question. Verily, a mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain.
By relying solely on the said surveyor's assertion, petitioners have not sufficiently proven that the land in question has
been declared alienable.37 (Citations omitted; Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
But even assuming that respondent has proven that the lot is alienable, his application would still be denied for failure
to comply with the period of possession requirement.
Originally, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act required applicants to have been in possession and occupation of lands
applied for since July 26, 1894. The law was later amended by Republic Act (RA) 1942 38 which provided for a simple
thirty-year prescriptive period.39 RA 1942 has, however, already been amended by P.D. 1073, approved on January 25,
1977, which requires applicants to have been in possession and occupation of the lands applied for since June 12,
1945.1avvphi1
At the time respondent filed his application on November 29, 2000, he had only been in possession of the lot for more
than 12 years, following his acquisition of ownership thereof from Placido by Kasulatan ng Pagkakaloob40dated July 16,
1988. Respondent seeks to tack his possession with that of his predecessors-in-interest, however.
From respondents evidence, his grandmother Florentina (from whom his father allegedly inherited the lot which was in
turn donated to him) registered the lot for estate tax purposes in 1948.41
From an examination of this 1948 tax declaration, photocopy of which was marked as Exhibit "N"42 by respondent, not
only does it bear no number or the number is illegible; the area of the "palayero" (riceland) cannot be determined as
what is entered under the column "Area" is "1-25-48" which apparently stands for June 25, 1948, the date of
registration for estate tax purposes. While this tax declaration names Florentina as the owner, there is a notation after
her printed name reading deceased. And it names Lucio and Jose Buenaflor as the administrators of the lot.
From the other tax declarations, Exhibits "N-1" up to "N-12"43 inclusive, presented by respondent, it appears that Lucio
and Jose Buenaflor acted as the property administrators only until February 17, 1966 when Tax Declaration No. 8842
(Exhibit "N-2"), which was registered on January 14, 1966, was cancelled by Tax Declaration No. 8952 (Exhibit "N-3")
whereon, for the first time, Placido and Teodoro Sarmiento were named administrators of the lot. On March 30, 1966,
Tax Declaration No. 8952 was cancelled by Tax Declaration No. 9631 (Exhibit "N-4") on which Placido appears as
the owner of Lot No. 535 of which the lot in question forms part.
To this Court, Tax Declaration No. 9631-Exhibit "N-4" does not constitute competent proof of Placidos title over Lot 535.
For one, respondent failed to prove that Placido is an heir of Florentina. For another, respondent failed to prove the
metes and bounds of the "palayero" allegedly owned by Florentina and that the lot actually forms part thereof.
But even assuming arguendo that, as found by the MeTC, Placido was an heir and inherited Lot 535 from Florentina,
respondent still failed to provide proof, nay allege, that Florentina possessed Lot 535 since June 12, 1945 or earlier
under a bona fide claim of ownership.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated May 20, 2005 and
August 19, 2005, respectively, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application for registration filed by respondent,
Restituto Sarmiento, over Lot 535-D, with a total area of Two Thousand Six Hundred Sixty Four (2,664) square meters
situated at Barangay Wawa, Taguig, Metro Manila is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 166577 February 3, 2010
SPOUSES MORRIS CARPO and SOCORRO CARPO, Petitioners,
vs.
AYALA LAND, INCORPORATED, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
In the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioners seek to set aside and
annul the Decision1 dated December 22, 2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 61784, which reversed and
set aside the Summary Judgment2 dated December 22, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Pias City, Branch
18
Land Titles Cases
255. Also subject of the present petition is the CA Resolution3 dated December 16, 2004 which denied the motion
for reconsideration of the earlier decision.
A summary of the facts, as culled from the records of the case, follows:
On February 16, 1995, petitioner spouses Morris and Socorro Carpo (Carpos) filed a Complaint for Quieting of
Title4with the RTC of Makati City against Ayala Corporation, Ayala Property Ventures Corporation (APVC), and the
Register of Deeds of Las Pias, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-292.
In their Complaint, the Carpos claimed to be the owners of a 171,209-square meter parcel of land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 296463 issued in their names.5 They further alleged that Ayala Corporation
was claiming to have titles (specifically, TCT Nos. 125945, T-4366, T-4367 and T-4368) over the property covered by
the Carpos TCT No. 296463 and that Ayala Corporation had made such property its equity contribution in APVC to
be developed into a residential subdivision. Attached as annexes to the complaint were photocopies of:
(a) TCT No. 296463 issued on August 13, 1970 in the name of the Carpos, covering a parcel of land (Lot 3, plan
Psu-56007) located in the Barrio of Almanza, Las Pias with an area of 171,309 square meters;
(b) TCT No. 125945 issued on April 6, 1988 in the name of Ayala Corporation, covering a parcel of land (Lot 3, Plan
Psu-80886) located in Bo. Tindig na Manga, Las Pias with an area of 171,309 square meters;
(c) TCT No. T-4367 issued on May 18, 1988 in the name of Ayala Corporation, covering a parcel of land (Lot 2, plan
Psu-47035) located in the Sitio of May Kokak, Bo. of Almanza, Las Pias with an area of 218,523 square meters; and
(d) TCT No. T-4368 issued on May 18, 1988 in the name of Ayala Corporation, covering a parcel of land (Lot 3, plan
Psu-47035) located in the Sitio of May Kokak, Bo. of Almanza, Las Pias with an area of 155,345 square meters.
No copy of TCT No. T-4366 was attached to the complaint.
According to the complaint, TCT Nos. 125945, T-4366, T-4367 and T-4368 and their derivatives "appear to have
been issued in the name of Ayala and purport to cover and embrace the Carpos property or portion thereof duly
covered registered under the already indefeasible and incontrovertible TCT [No.] 296463 are inherently invalid and
enforceable (sic) for not being the duly issued derivatives of the Carpos title."6 The Carpos additionally applied for
a restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin Ayala Corporation and APVC from doing
construction and development works on the properties in purported violation of the Carpos rights.
The complaint prayed that the trial court render judgment:
(1) canceling and declaring void TCT Nos. 125945, T-4366, T-4367, T-4368 and all alleged derivatives thereof, issued
in the name of Ayala Corporation and/or APVC over the properties or portion thereof embraced in the Carpos TCT
No. 296463 and issuing a writ of possession in favor of the Carpos and/or ordering Ayala Corporation and APVC to
surrender to the Carpos the properties or portion thereof being occupied by the said corporations under inherently
invalid or void titles; (2) declaring TCT No. 296463 issued in their names as valid and the Carpos as the owners of
the property described therein "including the parcels of land being claimed and occupied by Ayala [Corporation]
and APVC withou[t] valid and enforceable titles"; and (3) ordering Ayala Corporation and APVC to pay jointly and
severally the amount of 100,000 as attorneys fees plus costs of suit and litigation expenses.7
On March 10, 1995, before defendants could file an answer, petitioners filed an Amended Complaint, impleading
respondent Ayala Land, Incorporated (ALI) in lieu of Ayala Corporation after purportedly verifying with the Register
of Deeds of Las Pias that the title to the subject property was registered in the name of ALI and not Ayala
Corporation.8
On October 12, 1995 and January 12, 1996, ALI filed its Answer with Counterclaims and Opposition to Application
for Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction9 and Pre-trial Brief with Motion to Admit Amended
Answer,10 respectively.
In its Amended Answer, ALI alleged that APVC no longer exists having been merged with ALI in 1991. ALI pointed
out that the areas covered by TCT Nos. T-4366, T-4367, and T-4368 do not overlap with the Carpos claimed
property and the dispute pertained only to the land covered by the Carpos TCT No. 296463 and TCT No. T-5333 in
the name of Las Pias Ventures, Inc. (LPVI) which was derived from TCT No. 125945 in the name of Ayala
Corporation. It appeared that Ayala Corporation contributed the property to LPVI and LPVI had, in turn, also
merged with ALI. Further, ALI alleged that it is the true owner of the property covered by TCT No. T-5333 as it
traces back its title to Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 242 issued in 1950 while the Carpos title was derived
from OCT No. 8575 issued only in 1970. ALI also claimed the Carpos complaint was barred by res judicata in view of
the 1941 decision of this Court in Guico v. San Pedro11 which upheld the ownership of a certain Eduardo Guico over
the subject property as Lot 3, of Psu-80886 over the claim of a certain Florentino Baltazar who was asserting
ownership of the same under his plan, Psu-56007.
During the pendency of the case, ALI secured a title in its own name, TCT No. T-41262, over the property previously
covered by TCT No. T-5333.12
In the Order13 dated March 6, 1996, the Makati RTC ruled that the present case was an action in rem and directed the
transfer of the case to the RTC of Las Pias where the disputed property is located. The case was thereafter assigned to
Branch 255 of the Las Pias RTC and docketed as Civil Case No. 96-0082.
On December 17, 1996, ALI filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the ground that there was allegedly no genuine
issue as to any material fact and the only issue for the court to resolve was a purely legal one which of the two (2)
titles should be accorded priority. According to ALI, the parties were relying on their respective TCTs, and since ALI
admittedly traces its title to OCT No. 242 which was issued more than twenty (20) years earlier than the Carpos
predecessors title (OCT No. 8575), its title is, thus, superior. Expectedly, the Carpos filed an opposition to the motion
for summary judgment, arguing that there were "genuine issues and controversies to be litigated."
In an Order dated April 7, 1997, the RTC denied ALIs motion for summary judgment. This denial was challenged in a
petition for certiorari with the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 44243.
In a decision14 dated September 25, 1997, the CA granted ALIs petition and ordered the RTC to render a summary
judgment. Both parties moved for reconsideration of the CA Decision. ALI filed a motion for partial reconsideration,
entreating the CA itself to render the summary judgment in the interest of judicial economy and on a claim that the sole
issue was legal. The Carpos, in their motion, insisted that there were genuine issues in this case that must be threshed
out in a trial. Both motions were denied in the CA Resolution dated January 12, 1998.151avvphi1
Both parties elevated the matter to this Court in separate petitions for review on certiorari. In G.R. No. 132259, ALI
assailed the CAs refusal to render a summary judgment, while in G.R. No. 132440, the Carpos assailed the CAs ruling
that trial was unnecessary.
In separate minute Resolutions,16 the Court denied both petitions. Both parties motions for reconsideration were
likewise denied.
Accordingly, the RTC rendered a Summary Judgment dated December 22, 1998, finding the Carpos title superior to that
of ALI and ruling, thus:
Upon the other hand, this Court is not inclined to concur with Ayalas claim of the validity of its TCT No. T-5333 and
alleged OCT No. 242 absent of any admission to that effect by the plaintiffs in their complaint. A reading of the
defendants answer reveals that OCT No. 242 covers the property surveyed under SWO, but the pleadings on file fail to
allege that the same was approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands, thereby justifying this court to be skeptical
of the validity of the issuance of OCT No. 242. In original land registration cases, it is mandatory that the application
should be accompanied by a survey plan of the property applied for registration, duly approved by the Director of the
Bureau of Lands. A survey plan without the approval of the Director of the Bureau of Lands has the character of being of
dubious origin and it is not therefore worthy of being accepted as evidence. The property being claimed by the
defendant ALI, allegedly registered under OCT No. 242, is shown to have been surveyed under SWO and not bearing the
approval of the Director of the Bureau of Lands. Any title issued emanating from a survey plan without the approval of
the Director of the Bureau of Lands is tainted with irregularity and therefore void, as ruled in Republic Cement
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 198 SCRA 734. In the said case, the Supreme Court held: "That unless a survey
plan is duly approved by the Director of Lands the same is of dubious value and is not acceptable as evidence.
Indubitably, therefore, the reported survey and its alleged results are not entitled to credit and should be rejected."
The submission of the plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory character and unless the plan and its technical
description are duly approved by the Director of Lands, the same are not of much value (Republic vs. Vera, 120 SCRA
210). In another case, it was ruled that the Land Registration Commission has no authority to approve original survey
plans (Director of Lands, et al. vs. Honorable Salvador Reyes, et al., 68 SCRA 177).
Evidently, the SWO survey of the property which defendant ALI claimed to have been originated from OCT No. 242 had
not been approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands, but was apparently prepared and approved by the then Land
Registration Commissioner and under the law, the same is void.
It will also be noted that aside from the admissions made by defendant ALI in its answer, it clearly appears in its title
TCT No. T-5333 that the date of survey was on July 28, 1930. Plaintiffs property covered by TCT No. 296463 was
surveyed on January 4-6, 1927. This means that plaintiffs predecessor-in-interest had claimed ownership of the
property ahead of that of defendant ALIs predecessor-in-interest. The principle of prior registration cannot be applied
in this case because the land previously surveyed cannot anymore be the subject of another survey, and there is already
a record of a prior survey in the Bureau of Lands. This is precisely the reason why the survey plan has to be approved by
the Director of the Bureau of Lands. This must be the reason why the later survey in favor of Ayalas
predecessor-in-interest did not anymore bear the approval of the Director of Lands because had it been submitted for
19
Land Titles Cases
approval, the records of the Bureau of Lands will show that an earlier survey of the same land had already been
made and approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands.
Evidently, Ayalas claim of superiority of its title over that of the plaintiffs cannot therefore be sustained. Be that as
it may, the fact that cannot be disputed on the basis of Ayalas answer is its admission that SWO survey without the
approval of the Director of the Bureau of Lands was submitted in the alleged registration proceedings, rendering
the decree and the title issued thereunder to be tainted with irregularity and therefore void.
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing and the prevailing jurisprudence on the matter, judgment is hereby
rendered:
(a) Declaring TCT No. 296463 in the name of the plaintiffs Spouses Morris G. Carpo and Socorro R. Carpo as valid
and legal, and superior to that of defendant Ayalas TCT No. T-5333;
(b) Declaring TCT No. T-5333, TCT No. 125945, TCT No. T-6055, TCT No. 4366, TCT No. 4367 and TCT No. 4368 and
their derivatives as null and void;
(c) Ordering the defendant Ayala Land, Inc. to pay the sum of 100,000.00 as attorneys fees; and
(d) To pay the costs.17
On January 5, 1999, ALI filed a notice of appeal but the same was dismissed by the CA in a Resolution 18 dated May
14, 1999 for failure to pay the full amount of docket fees. In its motion for reconsideration, ALI pointed out that it
paid the full amount assessed by the cash clerk on duty at the RTC Las Pias. The motion was also denied,
prompting ALI to file with this Court a petition for review docketed as G.R. No. 140162. Finding ALIs petition
meritorious, the Court, in a Decision19 dated November 22, 2000, reversed the CAs dismissal of ALIs appeal and
remanded the same to the CA for further proceedings.
On December 22, 2003, the CA rendered the herein challenged decision in favor of ALI, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
FOR THE FOREGOING DISQUISITIONS, the instant appeal is GRANTED, the assailed Summary Judgment of the
Regional Trial Court of Las Pias, Branch 255, dated December 22, 1998, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a
new one is rendered as follows:
(1) TCT No. 41262, formerly TCT No. T-5333, in the name of defendant-appellant Ayala Land, Incorporated is hereby
declared to be the VALID title to the subject property;
(2) TCT No. 296463 issued in the name of plaintiffs-appellees is declared to be NULL and VOID;
(3) The concerned Register of Deeds is hereby ORDERED to cancel plaintiffs-appellees TCT No. 296463, and any and
all titles issued covering the subject property, for being spurious and void, and of no force and effect.20
The Carpos filed their motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated
December 16, 2004. Hence, the instant petition for review filed by Socorro Carpo and the heirs of Morris
Carpo.21The Petition contained the following assignment of errors:
A THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE TITLE OF RESPONDENT IS VALID
EVEN WITHOUT THE REQUISITE SURVEY PLAN APPROVED BY THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS.
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING PETITIONERS GUILTY OF LACHES AND
PRESCRIPTION.
C. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE RTC "RELIED HEAVILY" ON AN
ALLEGED "ADMISSION" BY RESPONDENT OF THE VALIDITY OF THE TITLE OF PETITIONERS
OVER THE DISPUTED PARCEL OF LAND.
D. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THERE IS RES JUDICATA AGAINST
PETITIONERS BASED ON THE CASE OF GUICO V. SAN PEDRO, ET AL., 72 PHIL 415, WITHOUT
PROPER DETERMINATION OF WHETHER THE FACTS IN SAID CASE ARE DIRECTLY APPLICABLE
TO THIS CASE AND WHETHER THE ELEMENTS OF RES JUDICATA ARE PRESENT. 22
Petitioners prayed that this Court render a decision: (a) reversing and setting aside the CA Decision dated
December 22, 2003 and Resolution dated December 16, 2004; (b) reinstating and affirming in toto the RTCs
Summary Judgment dated December 22, 1998; or in the alternative (c) remanding the case to the RTC for further
proceedings.
After a thorough review of the records, we deny the petition and concur with the CA that the Summary Judgment
rendered by the trial court should be reversed and set aside.
Preliminary discussion regarding subject matter of the controversy
At the outset, it should be noted that the trial court in its Summary Judgment declared null and void (a) TCT No.
T-5333 (and its antecedent, TCT No. [125945] T-6055A) covering a parcel of land with an area of 171,309 square
meters; (b) TCT No. T-4366 with a land area of 254,085 square meters; (c) TCT No. T-4367 with a land area of
218,523 square meters; and (d) TCT No. T-4368 with a land area of 155,345 square meters, despite the lack of evidence
of identity of the properties described in TCT Nos. T-4366, T-4367 and T-4368 with the property covered by the Carpos
TCT No. 296463 or any portion of said property claimed by petitioners. This was grievous and palpable error on the part
of the trial court considering that the property being claimed by the Carpos under their TCT No. 296463 had an area of
only 171,309 square meters and the total area of the properties in the titles invalidated by the trial court was 799,262
square meters.
It must be emphasized that in CA-G.R. SP No. 44243, involving the same parties, the CA ruled that:
On the other hand, defendant ALI, in its responsive pleading did not deny the existence of a title in the name of the
plaintiffs/private respondents. Instead, it alleged:
"14. The parcel of land described in TCT No. 296463, issued in the name of the plaintiffs, completely overlaps the
property covered by ALIs TCT No. T-5333. But TCT No. T-296463 traces itself to OCT No. 8575 which was issued on
August 12, 1970, long after OCT No. 242 (the title from which ALIs TCT No. T-5333 was derived) was issued on May 9,
1950 (on the basis of Decree of Registration No. 2917, Record No. 43516). Hence, ALIs TCT No. T-5333 is superior to
TCT No. 296463. xxx."
This is an admission that the private respondents have a title to the property in question, and that the property
described in private respondents TCT No. 296463 completely overlaps the title of petitioner ALI. This fact is further
substantiated by an affidavit of Jose Rizal Mercado, a Geodetic Engineer who, after attesting to his qualifications,
competence and experience, declared under oath:
"9. In connection with the subject case, Affiant was requested to find out, based on the technical descriptions in their
respective titles, if the lots described in the title of plaintiffs, TCT No. 296463, overlaps the lots of ALI covered by TCT No.
41262 (formerly, TCT No. T-5333 of LPVI, and, more previously, TCT No. T (125945) 6055-A, in the name of Ayala
Corporation), TCT No. 4366, TCT No. 4367 and TCT No. 4368, x x x.
9.1. To accomplish this task, Affiant resorted to the plotting of the technical descriptions found in the plaintiffs and
ALIs respective titles. The standard operating procedure, adopted by Affiant in this particular instance, in plotting
properties is to study the technical description in the titles and at the same time, to get all the available survey plans
described in the titles for reference.
9.2. To evidence this plotting that Affiant conducted, Affiant prepared a Sketch Plan reflecting Plaintiffs title vis-a-vis
ALIs title. Attached hereto as Annex "G" is an original copy of the Sketch Plan prepared by the Affiant.
9.3. The orange-shaded portion on the Sketch Plan indicates the area covered by the title of the plaintiffs and it is
clearly shown in this plan that plaintiffs claimed property entirely overlaps ALIs property delineated in TCT No. T-41262.
Plaintiffs claimed property (Lot 3, PSU-56007) is in fact identical to ALIs lot (Lot 3, PSU-80886).
9.4. The blue, pink and green lines on the Sketch Plan indicate the boundaries of ALIs TCT Nos. 4366, 4367 and 4368,
respectively, and it is clearly shown that these do not overlap with plaintiffs claimed property."
The Sketch Plan attached thereto clearly indicates the overlapping and identical boundaries between the private
respondents TCT No. 296463 and petitioners TCT No. 125945, (formerly TCT No. T-5333).23 In addition to the affidavit
of the Geodetic Engineer, the petitioner likewise attached to its Motion for Summary Judgment copies of the following
titles:
xxxx
In contrast, the private respondents never controverted the petitioners allegation that their (private respondents) title,
TCT No. 296463 traces its origin to OCT No. 8575, issued on August 12, 1970, while that of the petitioner has its origin in
OCT No. 242, issued on May 9, 1950. Moreover, the private respondents attached no supporting document to its
Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment.
Thus, as matters stand, the requisites for the grant of summary judgment appear to have been satisfied xxx.
xxxx
Since the existence of two titles over the same property, as well as the fact of overlapping of the technical descriptions
of the two titles are admitted in the pleadings, and substantiated by the supporting documents attached by the
defendant-movant (petitioner herein) to its Motion for Summary Judgment, there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact. If at all, the sole issue is a legal one, to wit: whose title (as to the conflicting ones) is superior and must be
upheld. This issue may be decided on the basis of the affidavits and supporting documents submitted by the parties, as
well as the applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter. In other words, there need not be a protracted trial thereon,
since all that the trial court should do is to apply the law to the issue, taking into consideration the documents attached
by the parties in their respective pleadings and/or submitted together with the motion or the opposition thereto. The
same is true with the other defenses raised by the petitioner in its responsive pleading, to wit: res judicata, prescription
and laches which may likewise be resolved without going to trial.24(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
20
Land Titles Cases
The foregoing CA decision became final and executory after the separate petitions for review filed with this Court
by the parties were denied with finality. The parties, and even the trial court, were bound by the CAs factual
finding therein that the only lots whose technical descriptions overlap are those covered by the Carpos TCT No.
296463 and ALIs TCT No. T-5333 which later became TCT No. T-41262. There was simply no basis for the trial court
to invalidate all the ALI titles mentioned in the complaint.
The incorrectness of this sweeping invalidation of ALI titles in the Summary Judgment is even more evident in the
case of TCT No. T-4367 (Lot 2, plan Psu-47035) and TCT No. T-4368 (Lot 3, plan Psu-47035). Petitioners claims with
respect to these properties are already barred by res judicata. In Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc. v. Intermediate
Appellate Court,25petitioner Morris Carpo already asserted his purported ownership of these two properties based
on a transfer certificate of title with the same survey plan number (Psu-56007) as TCT No. 296463. However, in
Realty, his claim was discredited by the Court when it held that Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc. (Realty), ALIs
predecessor in interest,26 is the one with valid title to these properties. The relevant portions of the Realty Decision
are quoted here:
Two (2) adjacent parcels of land located in Almanza, Las Pias, Metro Manila, having an aggregate area of 373,868
sq. m., situated in the vicinity of the Ayala Alabang Project and BF Homes Paraaque are covered by three (3)
distinct sets of Torrens titles to wit:
1) TCT No. 20408 issued on May 29, 1975 in the name of Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc., which was derived from OCT
No. 1609, issued on May 21, 1958, pursuant to Decree No. N-63394 in LRC Cases Nos. 657, 758 and 976, GLRO
Record Nos. N-29882, N-33721 and N-43516, respectively.
2) TCT No. 303961 issued on October 13, 1970 in the name of Morris G. Carpo, which was derived from OCT No.
8629, issued on October 13, 1970 pursuant to decree No. N-131349 in LRC Case No. N-11-M (N-6217), GLRO Record
No. N-32166.
3) TCTs Nos. 333982 and 333985, issued on July 27, 1971 in the name of Quezon City Development and Financing
Corporation, derived from OCT No. 8931 which was issued on July 27, 1971 pursuant to LRC Case No. P-206 GLRO
Record No. N-31777.
On December 29, 1977, Morris Carpo filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXIII,
presided over by Judge Rizalina Bonifacio Vera (hereafter referred to as Vera Court), for "declaration of nullity of
Decree No. N-63394 and TCT No. 20408." Named defendants were Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc., Macondray Farms,
Inc. and the Commissioner of Land Registration. x x x.
xxxx
In the case at bar, it appears that it was Estanislao Mayuga, father of Dominador Mayuga, predecessor-in-interest
of Realty, who originally filed on June 24, 1927 a registration proceeding docketed as LRC Case No. 657, GLRO
Record No. N-29882 in the Court of First Instance of Rizal to confirm his title over parcels of land described as Lots 1,
2 and 3, Plan Psu-47035. (Lots 2 and 3 are the subject of the instant litigation among Carpo, Realty and QCDFC.)
Case No. 657 was jointly tried with two other cases, LRC Case No. 976, GLRO Record No. 43516 filed by Eduardo
Guico and LRC Case No. 758, GLRO Record No. 33721 filed by Florentino Baltazar, as the three cases involved
identical parcels of land, and identical applicants/oppositors.
xxxx
Carpo bought the disputed property from the Baltazars, the original registered owners, by virtue of a deed
executed before Iluminada Figueroa, Notary Public of Manila dated October 9, 1970. x x x.
xxxx
The Baltazars, predecessors-in-interest of Carpo are heirs of Florentino Baltazar, an oppositor in the original
application filed by Estanislao Mayuga in 1927. As stated earlier, the CFI-Rizal confirmed the title of Estanislao to
Lots 1, 2 and 3 of Plan Psu-47035 "desestimando oposicion de Florentino Baltazar . . . con respeto a dichos
lotes . . ." As such successors of Florentino, they could not pretend ignorance of the land registration proceedings
over the disputed parcels of land earlier initiated by Eduardo Guico, Florentino Baltazar and Estanislao Mayuga, as
when as the decisions rendered therein.
Moreover, it is not disputed that the title in the name of Dominador Mayuga, from whom Realty derived its title,
was issued in 1958, or twelve years before the issuance of the title in the name of the Baltazars in 1970.
In this jurisdiction, it is settled that "(t)he general rule is that in the case of two certificates of title, purporting to
include the same land, the earlier in date prevails x x x. In successive registrations, where more than one certificate
is issued in respect of a particular estate or interest in land, the person claiming under the prior certificate is
entitled to the estate or interest; and that person is deemed to hold under the prior certificate who is the holder of,
or whose claim is derived directly or indirectly from the person who was the holder of the earliest certificate issued in
respect thereof x x x."27 (Emphasis and underscoring ours; citations omitted.)
We now discuss each assignment of error raised in the petition.
First Assignment of Error
Petitioners alleged that the CA erred in declaring that the title of respondent is valid even without the requisite survey
plan approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands.
Petitioners clearly misunderstood or deliberately misread the CAs ruling on this point. It is the CAs view that the trial
courts pronouncement that OCT No. 242 was issued without an approved survey plan was unwarranted in view of the
presumption of regularity that said title enjoys.
We cannot but agree with the CA on this point upon perusing the following portion of the Summary Judgment:
Upon the other hand, this Court is not inclined to concur with Ayalas claim of the validity of its TCT No. T-5333 and
alleged OCT No. 242 absent of any admission to that effect by the plaintiffs in their complaint. A reading of the
defendants answer reveals that OCT No. 242 covers the property surveyed under SWO, but the pleadings on file fail to
allege that the same was approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands, thereby justifying this court to be skeptical
of the validity of the issuance of OCT No. 242. In original land registration cases, it is mandatory that the application
should be accompanied by a survey plan of the property applied for registration, duly approved by the Director of the
Bureau of Lands. A survey plan without the approval of the Director of the Bureau of Lands has the character of being of
dubious origin and it is not therefore worthy of being accepted as evidence. The property being claimed by the
defendant ALI, allegedly registered under OCT No. 242, is shown to have been surveyed under SWO and not bearing the
approval of the Director of the Bureau of Lands. Any title issued emanating from a survey plan without the approval of
the Director of the Bureau of Lands is tainted with irregularity and therefore void, as ruled in Republic Cement
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 198 SCRA 734. In the said case, the Supreme Court held: "That unless a survey
plan is duly approved by the Director of Lands the same is of dubious value and is not acceptable as evidence.
Indubitably, therefore, the reported survey and its alleged results are not entitled to credit and should be rejected."
The submission of the plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory character and unless the plan and its technical
description are duly approved by the Director of Lands, the same are not of much value (Republic vs. Vera, 120 SCRA
210). In another case, it was ruled that the Land Registration Commission has no authority to approve original survey
plans (Director of Lands, et al. vs. Honorable Salvador Reyes, et al., 68 SCRA 177).
Evidently, the SWO survey of the property which defendant ALI claimed to have been originated from OCT No. 242 had
not been approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands, but was apparently prepared and approved by the then Land
Registration Commissioner and under the law, the same is void.28
To begin with, a perusal of the defendants answer or amended answer would show that, contrary to the trial courts
allusions thereto, there is no admission on the part of ALI that OCT No. 242 was issued without a survey plan that was
duly approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands. There is likewise no evidence on record to support the trial
courts finding that the survey plan submitted to support the issuance of OCT No. 242 in the 1950 land registration
proceedings was approved only by the Land Registration Commissioner and not by the Director of the Bureau of Lands.
It would appear the trial court came to the conclusion that OCT No. 242 was issued without a duly approved survey plan
simply because the notation "SWO" appeared in the technical description of the said title which was attached to the
answer and due to ALIs failure to allege in its pleadings that the survey plan submitted in support of the issuance of
OCT No. 242 was approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands.29
It is incomprehensible how the trial court could conclude that the survey plan mentioned in OCT No. 242 was
unapproved by the appropriate authority all from the notation "SWO" which appeared beside the survey plan number
on the face of the title or from a failure to allege on the part of ALI that a duly approved survey plan exists. We quote
with approval the discussion of the CA on this point:
Pursuant to the foregoing, the court a quo erred when, in ruling that the validity of OCT No. 242 is dubious, it gave
emphasis to defendant-appellants failure to allege that the survey plan of OCT No. 242 was duly approved by the
Director of the Bureau of Lands. It is admitted that a survey plan is one of the requirements for the issuance of decrees
of registration, but upon the issuance of such decree, it can most certainly be assumed that said requirement was
complied with by ALIs original predecessor-in-interest at the time the latter sought original registration of the subject
property. Moreover, the land registration court must be assumed to have carefully ascertained the propriety of issuing
a decree in favor of ALIs predecessor-in-interest, under the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
functions by public officers. The court upon which the law has conferred jurisdiction, is deemed to have all the
necessary powers to exercise such jurisdiction, and to have exercised it effectively. This is as it should be, because once
a decree of registration is made under the Torrens system, and the time has passed within which that decree may be
21
Land Titles Cases
questioned the title is perfect and cannot later on be questioned. There would be no end to litigation if every
litigant could, by repeated actions, compel a court to review a decree previously issued by another court forty-five
(45) years ago. The very purpose of the Torrens system would be destroyed if the same land may be subsequently
brought under a second action for registration, as what the court a quo did when it faulted ALIs failure to allege
that its predecessor-in-interest submitted a survey plan approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands in the
original land registration case.
The Court need not emphasize that it is not for ALI to allege in its pleadings, much less prove, that its
predecessor-in-interest complied with the requirements for the original registration of the subject property. A
party dealing with a registered land need not go beyond the Certificate of Title to determine the true owner
thereof so as to guard or protect his or her interest. Hence, ALI was not required to go beyond what appeared in
the transfer certificate of title in the name of its immediate transferor. It may rely solely, as it did, on the
correctness of the certificate of title issued for the subject property and the law will in no way oblige it to go behind
the certificate of title to determine the condition of the property. This is the fundamental nature of the Torrens
System of land registration, to give the public the right to rely upon the face of a Torrens certificate of title and to
dispense with the need of inquiring further.30(Underscoring ours; citations omitted.)
It cannot be gainsaid that the issuance of OCT No. 242 was a result of the registration decree of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, pursuant to land registration proceedings in Case No. 976. In the absence of proof to the contrary,
OCT No. 242 and its derivatives, including ALIs TCT No. T-41262, enjoy the presumption of regularity and ALI need
not allege or prove that its title was regularly issued. That is precisely the nature of such a presumption, it
dispenses with proof. Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 3. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be
contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
xxxx
(m) That official duty has been regularly performed;
(n) That a court, or judge acting as such, whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, was acting in the lawful exercise
of jurisdiction;
(o) That all the matters within an issue raised in a case were laid before the court and passed upon by it; and in like
manner that all matters within an issue raised in a dispute submitted for arbitration were laid before the arbitrators
and passed upon by them; x x x.
Thus, we held in Herce, Jr. v. Municipality of Cabuyao, Laguna31:
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Ordinary Decree Book, LRC (CLR) Rec. No. 6763, showing that
Decree No. 4244 was issued on March 3, 1911, is presumed to have been regularly issued by the accountable public
officers who enjoy the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of their functions. Thus, the proceedings
that led to the issuance of Decree No. 4244 in favor of the Municipality of Cabuyao cannot be overturned without
any countervailing proof to the contrary. In the words of Tichangco v. Enriquez:32
To overturn this legal presumption carelessly more than 90 years since the termination of the case will not
only endanger judicial stability, but also violate the underlying principle of the Torrens system. Indeed, to do so
would reduce the vaunted legal indefeasibility of Torrens titles to meaningless verbiage. (Emphasis supplied.)
The presumption of regularity enjoyed by the registration decree issued in Case No. 976 and OCT No. 242 includes
the presumption that all the requisites for the issuance of a valid title had been complied with. ALI need not allege
or prove that a duly approved survey plan accompanied the issuance of OCT No. 242 in 1950 because it is
presumed. It is the party who seeks to overcome the presumption who would have the burden to present
adequate and convincing evidence to the contrary. This, petitioners did not even attempt to do.
We cannot accept petitioners proposition that they did not have the burden of proof of showing the irregularity of
ALIs title since the burden of proof purportedly did not shift to them since no full-blown trial was conducted by the
RTC.
This specious argument deserves scant credit. Rule 131, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Burden of proof. Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue
necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law.
With the filing of the complaint, petitioners should already have alleged all the bases of their cause of action,
particularly their allegation that ALIs title is null and void and that such title should be cancelled. However, a
scrutiny of the complaint would show that petitioners never alleged the purported lack of an approved survey plan
as a defect of ALIs title. All that the complaint alleged is that ALIs titles should be declared void for not being
derivatives of the Carpos title. Implicit in that allegation is that petitioners were relying solely on the supposed
priority of their own title over ALIs. It stands to reason then that ALI did not have to allege in its Answer that its mother
title, OCT No. 242, was supported by a duly approved survey plan when petitioners did not raise the same as an issue in
their complaint or in any other pleading filed with the trial court.
Indubitably, in view of the CAs Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 44243, this controversy has been reduced to the sole
substantive issue of which between the two titles, purporting to cover the same property, deserves priority. This is
hardly a novel issue. As petitioners themselves are aware, in Realty, it was held that:
In this jurisdiction, it is settled that "(t)he general rule is that in the case of two certificates of title, purporting to include
the same land, the earlier in date prevails x x x. In successive registrations, where more than one certificate is issued in
respect of a particular estate or interest in land, the person claiming under the prior certificate is entitled to the estate
or interest; and that person is deemed to hold under the prior certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived
directly or indirectly from the person who was the holder of the earliest certificate issued in respect thereof x x
x."33 (Emphasis supplied.)
In Degollacion v. Register of Deeds of Cavite,34 we held that "[w]here two certificates of title purport to include the
same land, whether wholly or partly, the better approach is to trace the original certificates from which the certificates
of title were derived."
In all, we find that the CA committed no reversible error when it applied the principle "Primus Tempore, Portior Jure"
(First in Time, Stronger in Right) in this case and found that ALIs title was the valid title having been derived from the
earlier OCT.
Second Assignment of Error
Petitioners contend that it is error on the part of the CA to rule that their cause of action has been barred by
prescription and laches. According to them, since the OCT from which ALI derived its title is void for want of a duly
approved survey plan, their cause of action did not prescribe. However, as discussed above, the conclusion of the trial
court that OCT No. 242 is void was not sufficiently borne out by the evidence on record. Verily, the premise upon which
petitioners build their theory of imprescriptibility of their action did not exist.
In sum, we find no reason to disturb the CAs finding that:
As previously emphasized, OCT No. 242 of ALIs predecessor-in-interest was issued on May 7, 1950, or forty-five (45)
years before plaintiffs-appellees filed their complaint on March 10, 1995. As such, it is the Courts firmly held view that
plaintiffs-appellees claim is barred not only by prescription, but also by laches.
Aside from the fact that OCT No. 242 had become incontrovertible after the lapse of one (1) year from the time a
decree of registration was issued, any action for reconveyance that plaintiffs-appellees could have availed of is also
barred. Although plaintiffs-appellees complaint was for quieting of title, it is in essence an action for reconveyance
based on an implied or constructive trust, considering that plaintiffs-appellees were alleging in said complaint that
there was a serious mistake, if not fraud, in the issuance of OCT No. 242 in favor of ALIs predecessor-in-interest. It is
now well-settled that an action for reconveyance, which is a legal remedy granted to a landowner whose property has
been wrongfully or erroneously registered in anothers name, must be filed within ten years from the issuance of the
title, since such issuance operates as a constructive notice. Since ALIs title is traced to an OCT issued in 1950, the
ten-year prescriptive period expired in 1960.
By laches is meant the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that
the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. It does not involve mere lapse or passage
of time, but is principally an impediment to the assertion or enforcement of a right, which has become under the
circumstances inequitable or unfair to permit. In the instant case, plaintiffs-appellees, as well as their
predecessor-in-interest, have not shown that they have taken judicial steps to nullify OCT No. 242, from which ALIs title
was derived, for forty-five (45) years. To allow them to do so now, and if successful, would be clearly unjust and
inequitable to those who relied on the validity of said OCT, the innocent purchasers for value, who are protected by the
precise provisions of P.D. 1529, thus:
"SECTION 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for value The decree of registration shall not be
reopened or revised xxx subject, however, to the right of any person xxx to file in the proper Court of First Instance a
petition for reopening and review of the decree of registration not later than one year from and after the date of entry
of such decree of registration, but in no case shall such petition be entertained by the court where an innocent
purchaser for value has acquired the land or an interest therein, whose rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase
innocent purchaser for value or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be deemed to include and innocent
lessee, mortgagee or other encumbrances for value."35
Third Assignment of Error
22
Land Titles Cases
The next assigned error involves the question of whether the trial court, in rendering the Summary Judgment,
indeed relied heavily on the alleged admission made by ALI on the validity of Carpos title, as declared by the CA.
Specifically, the CA stated as follows:
In its assailed decision, the court a quo relied heavily on the alleged admission by ALI in it[s] Answer of the
existence and validity of plaintiffs-appellees title. We have read the pertinent pleading and We find ALIs statement
to be of no moment.
Nowhere in ALIs statement was there an admission of the validity of plaintiffs-appellees title. x x x.
The Court cannot comprehend where and how the court a quo could have gotten the impression that ALI was
admitting not only the existence, but also the validity of plaintiffs-appellees certificate of title. x x x.36
An examination of the Summary Judgment of the trial court would readily show that indeed the trial court relied on
ALIs supposed admission of the existence of Carpos title in ruling which of the conflicting titles was valid.
Pertinently, the trial court merely declared:
The existence of plaintiffs TCT No. 296463 has been admitted by defendant Ayala in its answer to have been
originated from OCT No. 8575 which was issued on August 12, 1970. It is very significant that defendant ALI
admitted it in its answer that OCT No. 8575 and plaintiffs TCT No. 296463 both originated from Decree No. 131141
issued on October 15, 1969 in the name of Apolonio Sabater as Annex "G" to defendant ALIs answer. This
admission made by the defendant in its answer is conclusive upon it. It cannot therefore take position contrary to
or inconsistent with its answer, and the facts are to be taken as true (Westminister High School vs. Sto. Domingo, et
al., G.R. No. 12666 R-July 5, 1955; McDaniel vs. Apacible, 44 Phil. 248-255).
Upon the other hand, this Court is not inclined to concur with Ayalas claim of the validity of its TCT No. T-5333 and
alleged OCT No. 242 absent of any admission to that effect by the plaintiffs in their complaint. x x x.37
Although the Summary Judgment did not expressly state that ALI admitted the validity of Carpos title with its
admission of the said titles existence, that is the unmistakable import of the trial courts statements that ALIs
admission of the existence of Carpos title "are conclusive upon it" and bars ALI from taking a "position contrary to
or inconsistent with its answer" followed by the statement that the trial court is "not inclined to concur with Ayalas
claim of validity of its TCT No. T-5333 and alleged OCT No. 242, absent of (sic) any admission to that effect by the
plaintiffs." This is yet another non sequitur argument on the part of the trial court which the CA correctly pointed
out in its own Decision.
Fourth Assignment of Error
As to the issue of res judicata, the Court of Appeals ruled that the decision in the case of Guico v. San Pedro 38 was
binding on the Carpos as it proceeded to discuss, thus:
In Guico vs. San Pedro, the Supreme Court resolved the conflicting claims over a tract of land situated in barrio
Tindig na Manga, Paraaque, Rizal, which was subdivided into eleven (11) lots. The subject land was sought to be
registered by a certain Eduardo C. Guico on the basis of an accompanying plan Psu-80886, which interestingly is
also the basis of ALIs TCT No. T-5333, now TCT No. 41262. Guicos application was opposed by, among others,
Florentino Baltazar, on the basis of plan Psu 56007, under which plaintiffs-appellees title was derived.
It appears that Lots 2 and 3 were adjudicated to Guico on the basis of Psu-80886 (Lot 3 is the subject matter of the
instant case), Lot 10 in favor of Baltazar on the basis of Psu 56007, under which plaintiffs-appellees title was based,
and the rest to the heirs of Narciso Mayuga. While Baltazar claimed Lot 3 on the basis of his Psu-56007, his claim
was rejected and the Lot was adjudicated to Guico on the basis of his Psu-80886.
It is clear, therefore, that whatever claim plaintiffs-appellees have on the subject property on the basis of Lot 3
Psu-56007, through their predecessor-in-interest, Florentino Baltazar, the same had been clearly and finally denied
by the Supreme Court in Guico vs. San Pedro.
For res judicata to apply, four requisites must be met: (1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) it must be
a judgment or an order on the merits; (3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; and (4) there must be, between the first and the second actions, identity of parties, of
subject matter and of cause of action. Plaintiffs-appellees only have objections with respect to the fourth requisite,
offering the lame excuse that it is not bound by such decision, there being no identity of parties in Guico vs. San
Pedro and the instant case.39
We agree with petitioners that it is not apparent from an examination of Guico and the evidence on record that
indeed the predecessors-in-interest of ALI and the Carpos with respect to the subject property are Eduardo Guico
and Florentino Baltazar, especially since the parties respective OCTs were not issued in these persons names but
rather a certain Alberto Yaptinchay and Apolonio Sabater. It cannot be categorically said that there was identity of
parties between the Guico case and the instant case. Clearly, one of the elements of res judicata, i.e., that there
must be, between the first and the second actions, identity of parties, is lacking. In any event, the CAs questioned
Decision had sufficient basis in fact and law even without relying on the Guico case.1avvphi1
In conclusion, we find that the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in setting aside the patently erroneous
Summary Judgment of the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated December 22, 2003 and the Resolution dated
December 16, 2004 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 102858 July 28, 1997
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO ABISTADO, substituted by MARGARITA, MARISSA, MARIBEL, ARNOLD and MARY
ANN, all surnamed ABISTO, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Is newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land registration case mandatory or directory?
Statement of the Case
The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural and that the failure to cause such publication did not deprive
the trial court of its authority to grant the application. But the Solicitor General disagreed and thus filed this petition to
set aside the Decision1 promulgated on July 3, 1991 and the subsequent Resolution2 promulgated on November 19,
1991 by Respondent Court of Appeals3 in CA-G.R. CV No. 23719. The dispositive portion of the challenged Decision
reads:4
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of dismissal appealed from is hereby set aside, and a new one
entered confirming the registration and title of applicant, Teodoro Abistado, Filipino, a resident of Barangay 7,
Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, now deceased and substituted by Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and
Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado, represented by their aunt, Miss Josefa Abistado, Filipinos, residents of Poblacion
Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, to the parcel of land covered under MSI (IV-A-8) 315-D located in Poblacion
Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro.
The oppositions filed by the Republic of the Philippines and private oppositor are hereby dismissed for want of
evidence.
Upon the finality of this decision and payment of the corresponding taxes due on this land, let an order for the issuance
of a decree be issued.
The Facts
On December 8, 1986, Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his title over 648
square meters of land under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529.5 The application was docketed as Land Registration
Case (LRC) No. 86 and assigned to Branch 44 of the Regional Trial Court of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro.6 However,
during the pendency of his petition, applicant died. Hence, his heirs Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary
Ann, all surnamed Abistado represented by their aunt Josefa Abistado, who was appointed their guardian ad litem,
were substituted as applicants.
The land registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989 dismissed the petition "for want of jurisdiction." However,
it found that the applicants through their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and peaceful
possession of the subject land since 1938.
In dismissing the petition, the trial court reasoned:7
. . . However, the Court noted that applicants failed to comply with the provisions of Section 23 (1) of PD 1529,
requiring the Applicants to publish the notice of Initial Hearing (Exh. "E") in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines. Exhibit "E" was only published in the Official Gazette (Exhibits "F" and "G"). Consequently, the Court is of
the well considered view that it has not legally acquired jurisdiction over the instant application for want of compliance
with the mandatory provision requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general circulation.
The trial court also cited Ministry of Justice Opinion No. 48, Series of 1982, which in its pertinent portion provides:8
It bears emphasis that the publication requirement under Section 23 [of PD 1529] has a two-fold purpose; the first,
which is mentioned in the provision of the aforequoted provision refers to publication in the Official Gazette, and is
jurisdictional; while the second, which is mentioned in the opening clause of the same paragraph, refers to publication
not only in the Official Gazette but also in a newspaper of general circulation, and is procedural. Neither one nor the
23
Land Titles Cases
other is dispensable. As to the first, publication in the Official Gazette is indispensably necessary because without it,
the court would be powerless to assume jurisdiction over a particular land registration case. As to the second,
publication of the notice of initial hearing also in a newspaper of general circulation is indispensably necessary as a
requirement of procedural due process; otherwise, any decision that the court may promulgate in the case would
be legally infirm.
Unsatisfied, private respondents appealed to Respondent Court of Appeals which, as earlier explained, set aside
the decision of the trial court and ordered the registration of the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado.
The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in the challenged CA Resolution dared November 19, 1991.
The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General thus elevated this recourse to us. This Court notes that
the petitioner's counsel anchored his petition on Rule 65. This is an error. His remedy should be based on Rule 45
because he is appealing a final disposition of the Court of Appeals. Hence, we shall treat his petition as one for
review under Rule 45, and not for certiorari under Rule 65.9
The Issue
Petitioner alleges that Respondent Court of Appeals committed "grave abuse of discretion"10 in holding
. . . that publication of the petition for registration of title in LRC Case No. 86 need not be published in a newspaper
of general circulation, and in not dismissing LRC Case No. 86 for want of such publication.
Petitioner points out that under Section 23 of PD 1529, the notice of initial hearing shall be "published both in the
Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation." According to petitioner, publication in the Official
Gazette is "necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the trial court, and . . . in . . . a newspaper of general circulation to
comply with the notice requirement of due process."11
Private respondents, on the other hand, contend that failure to comply with the requirement of publication in a
newspaper of general circulation is a mere "procedural defect." They add that publication in the Official Gazette is
sufficient to confer jurisdiction.12
In reversing the decision of the trial court, Respondent Court of Appeals ruled:13
. . . although the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation is
couched in mandatory terms, it cannot be gainsaid that the law also mandates with equal force that publication in
the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court.
Further, Respondent Court found that the oppositors were afforded the opportunity "to explain matters fully and
present their side." Thus, it justified its disposition in this wise:14
. . . We do not see how the lack of compliance with the required procedure prejudiced them in any way. Moreover,
the other requirements of: publication in the Official Gazette, personal notice by mailing, and posting at the site
and other conspicuous places, were complied with and these are sufficient to notify any party who is minded to
make any objection of the application for registration.
The Court's Ruling
We find for petitioner.
Newspaper Publication Mandatory
The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 requiring publication of the notice of initial
hearing reads as follows:
Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. The court shall, within five days from filing of the application,
issue an order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing which shall not be earlier than forty-five days nor
later than ninety days from the date of the order.
The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the application for land registration by means of (1) publication;
(2) mailing; and (3) posting.
1. By publication.
Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the Commissioner of Land Registration
shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however, that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be
sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Said notice shall be addressed to all persons appearing to have an
interest in the land involved including the adjoining owners so far as known, and "to all whom it may concern." Said
notice shall also require all persons concerned to appear in court at a certain date and time to show cause why the
prayer of said application shall not be granted.
xxx xxx xxx
Admittedly, the above provision provides in clear and categorical terms that publication in the Official Gazette
suffices to confer jurisdiction upon the land registration court. However, the question boils down to whether,
absent any publication in a newspaper of general circulation, the land registration court can validly confirm and register
the title of private respondents.
We answer this query in the negative. This answer is impelled by the demands of statutory construction and the due
process rationale behind the publication requirement.
The law used the term "shall" in prescribing the work to be done by the Commissioner of Land Registration upon the
latter's receipt of the court order setting the time for initial hearing. The said word denotes an imperative and thus
indicates the mandatory character of a statute.15 While concededly such literal mandate is not an absolute rule in
statutory construction, as its import ultimately depends upon its context in the entire provision, we hold that in the
present case the term must be understood in its normal mandatory meaning. In Republic vs. Marasigan,16 the Court
through Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. held that Section 23 of PD 1529 requires notice of the initial hearing by means
of (1) publication, (2) mailing and (3) posting, all of which must be complied with. "If the intention of the law were
otherwise, said section would not have stressed in detail the requirements of mailing of notices to all persons named in
the petition who, per Section 15 of the Decree, include owners of adjoining properties, and occupants of the land."
Indeed, if mailing of notices is essential, then by parity of reasoning, publication in a newspaper of general circulation is
likewise imperative since the law included such requirement in its detailed provision.
It should be noted further that land registration is a proceeding in rem. 17 Being in rem, such proceeding requires
constructive seizure of the land as against all persons, including the state, who have rights to or interests in the
property. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. This being so, the process must strictly be
complied with. Otherwise, persons who may be interested or whose rights may be adversely affected would be barred
from contesting an application which they had no knowledge of. As has been ruled, a party as an owner seeking the
inscription of realty in the land registration court must prove by satisfactory and conclusive evidence not only his
ownership thereof but the identity of the same, for he is in the same situation as one who institutes an action for
recovery of realty.18 He must prove his title against the whole world. This task, which rests upon the applicant, can best
be achieved when all persons concerned nay, "the whole world" who have rights to or interests in the subject
property are notified and effectively invited to come to court and show cause why the application should not be
granted. The elementary norms of due process require that before the claimed property is taken from concerned
parties and registered in the name of the applicant, said parties must be given notice and opportunity to oppose.
It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation should be deemed mandatory when the law
already requires notice by publication in the Official Gazette as well as by mailing and posting, all of which have already
been complied with in the case at hand. The reason is due process and the reality that the Official Gazette is not as
widely read and circulated as newspapers and is oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that the notices published
therein may not reach the interested parties on time, if at all. Additionally, such parties may not be owners of
neighboring properties, and may in fact not own any other real estate. In sum, the all-encompassing in rem nature of
land registration cases, the consequences of default orders issued against the whole world and the objective of
disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as possible demand a mandatory construction of the requirements for
publication, mailing and posting.
Admittedly, there was failure to comply with the explicit publication requirement of the law. Private respondents did
not proffer any excuse; even if they had, it would not have mattered because the statute itself allows no excuses.
Ineludibly, this Court has no authority to dispense with such mandatory requirement. The law is unambiguous and its
rationale clear. Time and again, this Court has declared that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language,
there is no room for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation; there is room only for application.19 There is no
alternative. Thus, the application for land registration filed by private respondents must be dismissed without prejudice
to reapplication in the future, after all the legal requisites shall have been duly complied with.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
application of private respondent for land registration is DISMISSED without prejudice. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 171631 November 15, 2010
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
AVELINO R. DELA PAZ, ARSENIO R. DELA PAZ, JOSE R. DELA PAZ, and GLICERIO R. DELA PAZ, represented by JOSE R.
DELA PAZ, Respondents.
24
Land Titles Cases
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated February 15, 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 84206, which affirmed the
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 167, in LRC Case No. N-11514, granting
respondents application for registration and confirmation of title over a parcel of land located in Barangay Ibayo,
Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila.
The factual milieu of this case is as follows:
On November 13, 2003, respondents Avelino R. dela Paz, Arsenio R. dela Paz, Jose R. dela Paz, and Glicerio R. dela
Paz, represented by Jose R. dela Paz (Jose), filed with the RTC of Pasig City an application for registration of
land3 under Presidential Decree No. 1529 (PD 1529) otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree. The
application covered a parcel of land with an area of 25,825 square meters, situated at Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig,
Metro Manila, described under survey Plan Ccn-00-000084, (Conversion Consolidated plan of Lot Nos. 3212 and
3234, MCADM 590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping). Together with their application for registration, respondents
submitted the following documents: (1) Special power of attorney showing that the respondents authorized Jose
dela Paz to file the application; (2) Conversion Consolidated plan of Lot Nos. 3212 and 3234, MCADM 590-D, Taguig
Cadastral Mapping (Ccn-00-000084) with the annotation that the survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623 Proj. No. 27-B
classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development, Quezon City on January 03, 1968; (3)
Technical Descriptions of Ccn-00-000084; (4) Geodetic Engineer's Certificate; (5) Tax Declaration No. FL-018-01466;
(6) Salaysay ng Pagkakaloob dated June 18, 1987; (7) Sinumpaang Pahayag sa Paglilipat sa Sarili ng mga Pagaari ng
Namatay dated March 10, 1979; (8) Certification that the subject lots are not covered by any land patent or any
public land appilcation; and (9) Certification by the Office of the Treasurer, Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila,
that the tax on the real property for the year 2003 has been paid.
Respondents alleged that they acquired the subject property, which is an agricultural land, by virtue of Salaysay ng
Pagkakaloob4 dated June 18, 1987, executed by their parents Zosimo dela Paz and Ester dela Paz (Zosimo and
Ester), who earlier acquired the said property from their deceased parent Alejandro dela Paz (Alejandro) by virtue
of a "Sinumpaang Pahayag sa Paglilipat sa Sarili ng mga Pag-aari ng Namatay5 dated March 10, 1979. In their
application, respondents claimed that they are co-owners of the subject parcel of land and they have been in
continuous, uninterrupted, open, public, adverse possession of the same, in the concept of owner since they
acquired it in 1987. Respondents further averred that by way of tacking of possession, they, through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, public, adverse, continuous, and uninterrupted possession of the same,
in the concept of an owner even before June 12, 1945, or for a period of more than fifty (50) years since the filing
of the application of registration with the trial court. They maintained that the subject property is classified as
alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
The case was set for initial hearing on April 30, 2004. On said date, respondents presented documentary evidence
to prove compliance with the jurisdictional requirements of the law.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the
application for registration on the following grounds, among others: (1) that neither the applicants nor their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
land in question for a period of not less than thirty (30) years; (2) that the muniments of title, and/or the tax
declarations and tax payments receipts of applicants, if any, attached to or alleged in the application, do not
constitute competent and sufficient evidence of bona fide acquisition of the land applied for; and (3) that the
parcel of land applied for is a portion of public domain belonging to the Republic not subject to private
appropriation. Except for the Republic, there was no other oppositor to the application.
On May 5, 2004, the trial court issued an Order of General Default6 against the whole world except as against the
Republic. Thereafter, respondents presented their evidence in support of their application.
In its Decision dated November 17, 2004, the RTC granted respondents' application for registration of the subject
property. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, affirming the order of general default hereto entered, judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING and
CONFIRMING the title of AVELINO R. DELA PAZ, Arsenio R. dela Paz, Jose R. dela Paz and Glicerio R. dela Paz, all
married and residents of and with postal address at No. 65 Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, over a parcel of
land described and bounded under Plan Ccn-00-000084 (consolidation of Lots No. 3212 and 3234, Mcadm-590-D,
Taguig, Cadastral Mapping, containing Twenty-Five Thousand Eight Hundred Twenty-Five (25,825) Square Meters,
more or less, situated at Barangay Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, under the operation of P.D. 1529, otherwise
known as the Property Registration Decree.
After the decision shall have been become final and executory and, upon payment of all taxes and other charges due on
the land, the order for the issuance of a decree of registration shall be accordingly undertaken.
SO ORDERED.7
Aggrieved by the Decision, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal.8 The CA, in its Decision dated February 15, 2006,
dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA ruled that respondents were able to show that they
have been in continuous, open, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject property through themselves and
their predecessors-in-interest. The CA found that respondents acquired the subject land from their
predecessors-in-interest, who have been in actual, continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession in the
concept of an owner since time immemorial. The CA, likewise, held that respondents were able to present sufficient
evidence to establish that the subject property is part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. Hence,
the instant petition raising the following grounds:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENTS' APPLICATION FOR
REGISTRATION OF THE SUBJECT LOT CONSIDERING THAT THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT
RESPONDENTS HAVE BEEN IN OPEN, CONTINUOUS, EXCLUSIVE AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT LOT IN
THE CONCEPT OF AN OWNER.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE REGISTRATION OF THE SUBJECT LOT IN RESPONDENTS' NAME
CONSIDERING THAT NO EVIDENCE WAS FORMALLY OFFERED TO PROVE THAT THE SAME IS WITHIN THE ALIENABLE AND
DISPOSABLE AREA OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.9
In its Memorandum, petitioner claims that the CA's findings that respondents and their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, uninterrupted, public, and adverse possession in the concept of owners, for more than fifty years or even
before June 12, 1945, was unsubstantiated. Respondents failed to show actual or constructive possession and
occupation over the subject land in the concept of an owner. Respondents also failed to establish that the subject
property is within the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain. The subject property remained to be
owned by the State under the Regalian Doctrine.
In their Memorandum, respondents alleged that they were able to present evidence of specific acts of ownership
showing open, notorious, continuous and adverse possession and occupation in the concept of an owner of the subject
land. To prove their continuous and uninterrupted possession of the subject land, they presented several tax
declarations, dated 1949, 1966, 1974, 1979, 1980, 1985, 1991, 1994 and 2000, issued in the name of their
predecessors-in-interest. In addition, respondents presented a tax clearance issued by the Treasurer's Office of the City
of Taguig to show that they are up to date in their payment of real property taxes. Respondents maintain that the
annotations appearing on the survey plan of the subject land serves as sufficient proof that the land is within the
alienable and disposable portion of the public domain. Finally, respondents assert that the issues raised by the
petitioner are questions of fact which the Court should not consider in a petition for review under Rule 45.
The petition is meritorious.
In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, this Court is limited to reviewing only
errors of law, not of fact, unless the factual findings complained of are devoid of support by the evidence on record, or
the assailed judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts.10 It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh
evidence all over again, unless there is a showing that the findings of the lower court are totally devoid of support or
are glaringly erroneous as to constitute palpable error or grave abuse of discretion.11
In the present case, the records do not support the findings made by the CA that the subject land is part of the alienable
and disposable portion of the public domain.
Section 14 (1) of PD 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
From the foregoing, respondents need to prove that (1) the land forms part of the alienable and disposable land of the
public domain; and (2) they, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in open, continuous,
25
Land Titles Cases
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership from
June 12, 1945 or earlier.12 These the respondents must prove by no less than clear, positive and convincing
evidence.13
Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to the
State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been
reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land, or alienated to a private person by the State, remain part of
the inalienable public domain.14 The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the
lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that
the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible
evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.15
To support its contention that the land subject of the application for registration is alienable, respondents
presented survey Plan Ccn-00-00008416 (Conversion Consolidated plan of Lot Nos. 3212 & 3234, MCADM 590-D,
Taguig Cadastral Mapping) prepared by Geodetic Engineer Arnaldo C. Torres with the following annotation:
This survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623 Proj. No. 27-B clasified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest
Development, Quezon City on Jan. 03, 1968.
Respondents' reliance on the afore-mentioned annotation is misplaced.
In Republic v. Sarmiento,17 the Court ruled that the notation of the surveyor-geodetic engineer on the blue print
copy of the conversion and subdivision plan approved by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) Center, that "this survey is inside the alienable and disposable area, Project No. 27-B. L.C. Map No. 2623,
certified on January 3, 1968 by the Bureau of Forestry," is insufficient and does not constitute incontrovertible
evidence to overcome the presumption that the land remains part of the inalienable public domain.
Further, in Republic v. Tri-plus Corporation,18 the Court held that:
In the present case, the only evidence to prove the character of the subject lands as required by law is the notation
appearing in the Advance Plan stating in effect that the said properties are alienable and disposable. However, this
is hardly the kind of proof required by law. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is
alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government, such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators,
and a legislative act or statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the Government that the lands
applied for are alienable and disposable. In the case at bar, while the Advance Plan bearing the notation was
certified by the Lands Management Services of the DENR, the certification refers only to the technical correctness
of the survey plotted in the said plan and has nothing to do whatsoever with the nature and character of the
property surveyed. Respondents failed to submit a certification from the proper government agency to prove that
the lands subject for registration are indeed alienable and disposable.
Furthermore, in Republic of the Philippines v. Rosila Roche,19 the Court held that the applicant bears the burden of
proving the status of the land. In this connection, the Court has held that he must present a certificate of land
classification status issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), or the Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of the DENR. He must also prove that the DENR Secretary had
approved the land classification and released the land as alienable and disposable, and that it is within the
approved area per verification through survey by the CENRO or PENRO. Further, the applicant must present a copy
of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the
official records. These facts must be established by the applicant to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
Clearly, the surveyor's annotation presented by respondents is not the kind of proof required by law to prove that
the subject land falls within the alienable and disposable zone. Respondents failed to submit a certification from
the proper government agency to establish that the subject land are part of the alienable and disposable portion of
the public domain. In the absence of incontrovertible evidence to prove that the subject property is already
classified as alienable and disposable, we must consider the same as still inalienable public domain.20
Anent respondents possession and occupation of the subject property, a reading of the records failed to show that
the respondents by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest possessed and occupied the subject land
since June 12, 1945 or earlier.1avvphil
The evidence submitted by respondents to prove their possession and occupation over the subject property
consists of the testimonies of Jose and Amado Geronimo (Amado), the tenant of the adjacent lot. However, their
testimonies failed to establish respondents predecessors-in-interest' possession and occupation of subject
property since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Jose, who was born on March 19, 1939,21 testified that since he attained
the age of reason he already knew that the land subject of this case belonged to them. 22 Amado testified that he was a
tenant of the land adjacent to the subject property since 1950,23 and on about the same year, he knew that the
respondents were occupying the subject land.24
Jose and Amado's testimonies consist merely of general statements with no specific details as to when respondents'
predecessors-in-interest began actual occupancy of the land subject of this case. While Jose testified that the subject
land was previously owned by their parents Zosimo and Ester, who earlier inherited the property from their parent
Alejandro, no clear evidence was presented to show Alejandro's mode of acquisition of ownership and that he had been
in possession of the same on or before June 12, 1945, the period of possession required by law. It is a rule that general
statements that are mere conclusions of law and not factual proof of possession are unavailing and cannot suffice. 25 An
applicant in a land registration case cannot just harp on mere conclusions of law to embellish the application but must
impress thereto the facts and circumstances evidencing the alleged ownership and possession of the land.26
Respondents earliest evidence can be traced back to a tax declaration issued in the name of their
predecessors-in-interest only in the year 1949. At best, respondents can only prove possession since said date. What is
required is open, exclusive, continuous and notorious possession by respondents and their predecessors-in-interest,
under a bona fide claim of ownership, since June 12, 1945 or earlier.27 Respondents failed to explain why, despite their
claim that their predecessors-in interest have possessed the subject properties in the concept of an owner even before
June 12, 1945, it was only in 1949 that their predecessors-in-interest started to declare the same for purposes of
taxation. Well settled is the rule that tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership or of the
right to possess land when not supported by any other evidence. The fact that the disputed property may have been
declared for taxation purposes in the names of the applicants for registration or of their predecessors-in-interest does
not necessarily prove ownership. They are merely indicia of a claim of ownership.28
The foregoing pieces of evidence, taken together, failed to paint a clear picture that respondents by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, exclusive, continuous and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject land, under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Evidently, since respondents failed to prove that (1) the subject property was classified as part of the disposable and
alienable land of the public domain; and (2) they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation thereof under a bonafide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or
earlier, their application for confirmation and registration of the subject property under PD 1529 should be denied.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 15, 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No.
84206, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 167, in LRC Case No. N-11514,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application for registration and confirmation of title filed by respondents Avelino R.
dela Paz, Arsenio R. dela Paz, Jose R. dela Paz, and Glicerio R. dela Paz, as represented by Jose R. dela Paz, over a parcel
of land, with a total area of twenty-five thousand eight hundred twenty-five (25,825) square meters situated at
Barangay Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 108998 August 24, 1994
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES MARIO B. LAPIA AND FLOR DE VEGA, respondents.
Byron V. Belarmino and Juan B. Belarmino for private respondents.
BIDIN, J.:
Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over a parcel of land which he acquired by purchase while still a
citizen of the Philippines, from a vendor who has complied with the requirements for registration under the Public Land
Act (CA 141)?
The Republic would have us rule on the negative and asks this Court to nullify the decision of the appellate court which
affirmed the judgment of the court a quo in granting the application of respondent spouses for registration over the
lots in question.
On June 17, 1978, respondent spouses bought Lots 347 and 348, Cad. s38-D, as their residence with a total area of
91.77 sq. m. situated in San Pablo City, from one Cristeta Dazo Belen (Rollo, p. 41). At the time of the purchase,
respondent spouses where then natural-born Filipino citizens.
26
Land Titles Cases
On February 5, 1987, the spouses filed an application for registration of title of the two (2) parcels of land before
the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Branch XXXI. This time, however, they were no longer Filipino citizens
and have opted to embrace Canadian citizenship through naturalization.
An opposition was filed by the Republic and after the parties have presented their respective evidence, the court a
quo rendered a decision confirming private respondents' title to the lots in question, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court hereby approves the said application and confirms the title and
possession of herein applicants over Lots 347 and 348, Ap-04-003755 in the names of spouses Mario B. Lapia and
Flor de Vega, all of legal age, Filipino citizens by birth but now Canadian citizens by naturalization and residing at 14
A. Mabini Street, San Pablo City and/or 201-1170-124 Street, Edmonton, Alberta T5M-OK9, Canada.
Once this Decision becomes final, let the corresponding decree of registration be issued. In the certificate of title to
be issued, there shall be annotated an easement of .265 meters road right-of-way.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 25)
On appeal, respondent court affirmed the decision of the trial court based on the following ratiocination:
In the present case, it is undisputed that both applicants were still Filipino citizens when they bought the land in
controversy from its former owner. For this reason, the prohibition against the acquisition of private lands by aliens
could not apply. In justice and equity, they are the rightful owners of the subject realty considering also that they
had paid for it quite a large sum of money. Their purpose in initiating the instant action is merely to confirm their
title over the land, for, as has been passed upon, they had been the owners of the same since 1978. It ought to be
pointed out that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. The Torrens System was not established as a
means for the acquisition of title to private land. It is intended merely to confirm and register the title which one
may already have (Municipality of Victorias vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-31189, March 31, 1987). With particular
reference to the main issue at bar, the High Court has ruled that title and ownership over lands within the meaning
and for the purposes of the constitutional prohibition dates back to the time of their purchase, not later. The fact
that the applicants-appellees are not Filipino citizens now cannot be taken against them for they were not
disqualified from acquiring the land in question (Bollozos vs. Yu Tieng Su, G.R. No. L-29442, November 11, 1987).
(Rollo, pp. 27-28)
Expectedly, respondent court's disposition did not merit petitioner's approval, hence this present recourse, which
was belatedly filed.
Ordinarily, this petition would have been denied outright for having been filed out of time had it not been for the
constitutional issue presented therein.
At the outset, petitioner submits that private respondents have not acquired proprietary rights over the subject
properties before they acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization to justify the registration thereof in
their favor. It maintains that even privately owned unregistered lands are presumed to be public lands under the
principle that lands of whatever classification belong to the State under the Regalian doctrine. Thus, before the
issuance of the certificate of title, the occupant is not in the jurisdical sense the true owner of the land since it still
pertains to the State. Petitioner further argued that it is only when the court adjudicates the land to the applicant
for confirmation of title would the land become privately owned land, for in the same proceeding, the court may
declare it public land, depending on the evidence.
As found by the trial court:
The evidence thus presented established that applicants, by themselves and their predecessors-in-interest, had
been in open, public, peaceful, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the two adjacent
parcels of land applied for registration of title under a bona-fide claim of ownership long before June 12, 1945.
Such being the case, it is conclusively presumed that all the conditions essential to the confirmation of their title
over the two adjacent parcels of land are sought to be registered have been complied with thereby entitling them
to the issuance of the corresponding certificate of title pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1529,
otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree. (Rollo, p. 26)
Respondent court echoed the court a quo's observation, thus:
The land sought to be registered has been declared to be within the alienable and disposable zone established by
the Bureau of Forest Development (Exhibit "P"). The investigation conducted by the Bureau of Lands, Natural
Resources District (IV-2) reveals that the disputed realty had been occupied by the applicants "whose house of
strong materials stands thereon"; that it had been declared for taxation purposes in the name of
applicants-spouses since 1979; that they acquired the same by means of a public instrument entitled "Kasulatan ng
Bilihang Tuluyan" duly executed by the vendor, Cristeta Dazo Belen, on June 17, 1978 (Exhibits "I" and "J"); and that
applicants and their predecessors in interest had been in possession of the land for more than 30 years prior to the
filing of the application for registration. But what is of great significance in the instant case is the circumstance that at
the time the applicants purchased the subject lot in 1978, both of them were Filipino citizens such that when they filed
their application for registration in 1987, ownership over the land in dispute had already passed to them. (Rollo, p., 27)
The Republic disagrees with the appellate court's concept of possession and argues:
17. The Court of Appeals found that the land was declared for taxation purposes in the name of respondent spouses
only since 1979. However, tax declarations or reality tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence of
ownership. (citing cases)
18. Then again, the appellate court found that "applicants (respondents) and their predecessors-in-interest had been in
possession of the land for more than 30 years prior to the filing of the application for registration." This is not, however,
the same as saying that respondents have been in possession "since June 12, 1945." (PD No. 1073, amending Sec. 48 [b],
CA NO. 141; sec. also Sec. 14, PD No. 1529). So there is a void in respondents' possession. They fall short of the required
possession since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto. And, even if they needed only to prove thirty (30) years possession
prior to the filing of their application (on February 5, 1987), they would still be short of the required possession if the
starting point is 1979 when, according to the Court of Appeals, the land was declared for taxation purposes in their
name. (Rollo, pp. 14-15)
The argument is myopic, to say the least. Following the logic of petitioner, any transferee is thus foreclosed to apply for
registration of title over a parcel of land notwithstanding the fact that the transferor, or his predecessor-in-interest has
been in open, notorious and exclusive possession thereof for thirty (30) years or more. This is not, however, what the
law provides.
As petitioner itself argues, Section 48 of the Public Land Act (CA 141) reads:
Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance (now Regional
Trial Court) of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of
title therefor under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except
when prevented by wars or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
(Emphasis supplied)
As amended by PD 1073:
Sec. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the
sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his
predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945.
It must be noted that with respect to possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, the law employs the terms "by themselves", "the applicant himself or through his predecessor-in-interest".
Thus, it matters not whether the vendee/applicant has been in possession of the subject property for only a day so long
as the period and/or legal requirements for confirmation of title has been complied with by his predecessor-in-interest,
the said period is tacked to his possession. In the case at bar, respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the disputed land not only since June 12, 1945, but even as early as
1937. Petitioner does not deny this except that respondent spouses, in its perception, were in possession of the land
sought to be registered only in 1978 and therefore short of the required length of time. As aforesaid, the disputed
parcels of land were acquired by private respondents through their predecessors-in-interest, who, in turn, have been in
open and continued possession thereof since 1937. Private respondents stepped into the shoes of their
predecessors-in-interest and by virtue thereof, acquired all the legal rights necessary to confirm what could otherwise
be deemed as an imperfect title.
At this juncture, petitioner's reliance in Republic v. Villanueva (114 SCRA 875 [1982]) deserves scant consideration.
There, it was held that before the issuance of the certificate of title, the occupant is not in the juridical sense the true
owner of the land since it still pertains to the State.
27
Land Titles Cases
Suffice it to state that the ruling in Republic v. Villanueva (supra), has already been abandoned in the 1986 case of
Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court (146 SCRA 509; and reiterated in Director of Lands v. Iglesia ni
Cristo, 200 SCRA 606 [1991]) where the Court, through then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Narvasa, declared
that:
(The weight of authority is) that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period
prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and
without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property. . . .
Herico in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative:
. . . Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act
No. 1942, which the respondent Court held to be inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the latter's proven
occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by his predecessors-in-interest, title
over the land has vested on petitioner so as to segregate the land from the mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no
longer disposable under the Public Land Act as by free patent . . .
xxx xxx xxx
As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the foregoing provision are complied with, the
possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without the
necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the public domain and beyond
the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of
which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to
be issued upon the strength of said patent.
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of public land which is of
the character and duration prescribed by the statute as the equivalent of an express grant from the State than the
dictum of the statute itself (Section 48 [b]) that the possessor(s) ". . . shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title ..." No
proof being admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little
more than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession claims is of the required character
and length of time; and registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested.
The proceedings would not originally convert the land from public to private land, but only confirm such a
conversion already affected by operation of law from the moment the required period of possession became
complete. As was so well put in Cario, ". . .(There are indications that registration was expected from all, but none
sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever
made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law.
(Emphasis supplied)
Subsequent cases have hewed to the above pronouncement such that open, continuous and exclusive possession
for at least 30 years of alienable public land ipso jure converts the same to private property (Director of Lands v.
IAC, 214 SCRA 604 [1992]; Pineda v. CA, 183 SCRA 602 [1990]). This means that occupation and cultivation for more
than 30 years by an applicant and his predecessors-in-interest, vest title on such applicant so as to segregate the
land from the mass of public and (National Power Corporation v. CA, 218 SCRA 41 [1993]).
The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove that (a) the land is alienable public land and (b) his
possession, in the concept above stated, must be either since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the
Public Land Act (Director of Lands v. Buyco, 216 SCRA 78 [1992]). When the conditions set by law are complied with,
the possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without the
necessity of a certificate of title being issued (National Power Corporation v. CA, supra). As such, the land ceases to
be a part of the public domain and goes beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of.
In other words, the Torrens system was not established as a means for the acquisition of title to private land
(Municipality of Victorias v. CA, 149 SCRA 32 [1987]). It merely confirms, but does not confer ownership. As could
be gleaned from the evidence adduced, private respondents were able to establish the nature of possession of
their predecessors-in-interest. Evidence was offered to prove that their predecessors-in-interest had paid taxes on
the subject land and introduced improvements thereon (Exhibits "F" to "F9"). A certified true copy of the affidavit
executed by Cristeta Dazo and her sister Simplicia was also formally offered to prove that the subject parcels of
land were inherited by vendor Cristeta Dazo from her father Pedro Dazo with the conformity of her only sister
Simplicia (Exhibit "G"). Likewise, a report from the Bureau of Lands was presented in evidence together with a
letter from the Bureau of Forest Development, to prove that the questioned lots were part of the alienable and
disposable zone of the government and that no forestry interest was affected (CA GR No. 28953, Records, p. 33).
In the main, petitioner seeks to defeat respondents' application for registration of title on the ground of foreign
nationality. Accordingly, the ruling in Director of Lands v. Buyco (supra) supports petitioner's thesis.
We disagree.
In Buyco, the applicants therein were likewise foreign nationals but were natural-born Filipino citizens at the time of
their supposed acquisition of the property. But this is where the similarity ends. The applicants in Buyco sought to
register a large tract of land under the provisions of the Land Registration Act, and in the alternative, under the
provisions of the Public Land Act. The land registration court decided in favor of the applicants and was affirmed by the
appellate court on appeal. The Director of Lands brought the matter before us on review and we reversed.
This Court, speaking through Justice Davide, Jr., stated:
As could be gleaned from the evidence adduced, the private respondents do not rely on fee simple ownership based on
a Spanish grant or possessory information title under Section 19 of the Land Registration Act; the private respondents
did not present any proof that they or their predecessors-in-interest derived title from an old Spanish grant such as (a)
the "titulo real" or royal grant (b) the "concession especial" or especial grant; (c) the "composicion con el estado" title
or adjustment title; (d) the "titulo de compra" or title by purchase; and (e) the "informacion posesoria" or possessory
information title, which could become a "titulo gratuito" or a gratuitous title (Director of Forestry v. Muoz, 23 SCRA
1183 [1968]). The primary basis of their claim is possession, by themselves and their predecessors-in-interest, since
time immemorial.
If indeed private respondents and their predecessors have been in possession since time immemorial, the rulings of
both courts could be upheld for, as this Court stated in Oh Cho v. Director of Lands (75 Phil. 890 [1946]):
. . . All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain.
An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his
predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had
never been part of the public domain or that if had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest (Cario v.
Insular Government, 41 Phil 935 [1909]; 212 U.S. 449; 53 Law. Ed., 594) The applicant does not come under the
exception, for the earliest possession of the lot by his first predecessor in interest began in 1880.
. . . alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously
and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30 years under the Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to
private property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure. (Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, supra)
It is obvious from the foregoing rule that the applicant must prove that (a) the land is alienable public land and (b) his
possession, in the concept above stated, must be either since time immemorial, as ruled in both Cario and Susi, or for
the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. As to the latter, this Court, in Gutierrez Hermanos v. Court of Appeals (178
SCRA 37 [1989]), adopted the rule enunciated by the Court of Appeals, per then Associate Justice Hugo R. Gutierrez,
Jr., . . ., that an applicant for registration under Section 48 of the Public Land Act must secure a certification from the
Government that the lands which he claims to have possessed as owner for more than thirty (30) years are alienable
and disposable. It is the burden of the applicant to prove its positive averments.
In the instant case, private respondents offered no evidence at all to prove that the property subject of the application
is an alienable and disposable land. On the contrary, the entire property . . . was pasture land (and therefore inalienable
under the then 1973 Constitution).
. . . (P)rivate respondents' evidence miserably failed to establish their imperfect title to the property in question. Their
allegation of possession since time immemorial, . . ., is patently baseless. . . . When referring to possession, specifically
"immemorial possession," it means possession of which no man living has seen the beginning, and the existence of
which he has learned from his elders (Susi v. Razon, supra). Such possession was never present in the case of private
respondents. . . .
. . ., there does not even exist a reasonable basis for the finding that the private respondents and their
predecessors-in-interest possessed the land for more than eighty (80) years, . . .
xxx xxx xxx
To this Court's mind, private respondents failed to prove that (their predecessor-in-interest) had possessed the
property allegedly covered by Tax Declaration No. 15853 and made the subject of both his last will and testament and
the project of partition of his estate among his heirs in such manner as to remove the same from the public domain
under the Cario and Susi doctrines. Thus, (when the predecessor-in-interest) died on 31 May 1937, he transmitted no
right whatsoever, with respect to the said property, to his heirs. This being the case, his possession cannot be tacked to
that of the private respondents for the latter's benefit pursuant to Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the alternative
ground relied upon in their application . . .
28
Land Titles Cases
xxx xxx xxx
Considering that the private respondents became American citizens before such filing, it goes without saying
that they had acquired no vested right, consisting of an imperfect title, over the property before they lost their
Philippine citizenship. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the application in Buyco were denied registration of title not merely because they were American citizens
at the time of their application therefor. Respondents therein failed to prove possession of their
predecessor-in-interest since time immemorial or possession in such a manner that the property has been
segregated from public domain; such that at the time of their application, as American citizens, they have acquired
no vested rights over the parcel of land.
In the case at bar, private respondents were undoubtedly natural-born Filipino citizens at the time of the
acquisition of the properties and by virtue thereof, acquired vested rights thereon, tacking in the process, the
possession in the concept of owner and the prescribed period of time held by their predecessors-in-interest under
the Public Land Act. In addition, private respondents have constructed a house of strong materials on the contested
property, now occupied by respondent Lapias mother.
But what should not be missed in the disposition of this case is the fact that the Constitution itself allows private
respondents to register the contested parcels of land in their favor. Sections 7 and 8 of Article XII of the
Constitution contain the following pertinent provisions, to wit:
Sec. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has
lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private lands, subject to limitations provided by law. (Emphasis
supplied)
Section 8, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution above quoted is similar to Section 15, Article XIV of the then 1973
Constitution which reads:
Sec. 15. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 14 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who
has lost his citizenship may be a transferee of private land, for use by him as his residence, as the Batasang
Pambansa may provide.
Pursuant thereto, Batas Pambansa Blg. 185 was passed into law, the relevant provision of which provides:
Sec. 2. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship and who has the legal
capacity to enter into a contract under Philippine laws may be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum area
of one thousand square meters, in the case of urban land, or one hectare in the case of rural land, to be used by
him as his residence. In the case of married couples, one of them may avail of the privilege herein granted;
Provided, That if both shall avail of the same, the total area acquired shall not exceed the maximum herein fixed.
In case the transferee already owns urban or rural lands for residential purposes, he shall still be entitled to be a
transferee of an additional urban or rural lands for residential purposes which, when added to those already owned
by him, shall not exceed the maximum areas herein authorized.
From the adoption of the 1987 Constitution up to the present, no other law has been passed by the legislature on
the same subject. Thus, what governs the disposition of private lands in favor of a natural-born Filipino citizen who
has lost his Philippine citizenship remains to be BP 185.
Even if private respondents were already Canadian citizens at the time they applied for registration of the
properties in question, said properties as discussed above were already private lands; consequently, there could be
no legal impediment for the registration thereof by respondents in view of what the Constitution ordains. The
parcels of land sought to be registered no longer form part of the public domain. They are already private in
character since private respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous and exclusive
possession and occupation thereof under claim of ownership prior to June 12, 1945 or since 1937. The law provides
that a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of a private
land up to a maximum area of 1,000 sq.m., if urban, or one (1) hectare in case of rural land, to be used by him as his
residence (BP 185).
It is undisputed that private respondents, as vendees of a private land, were natural-born citizens of the Philippines.
For the purpose of transfer and/or acquisition of a parcel of residential land, it is not significant whether private
respondents are no longer Filipino citizens at the time they purchased or registered the parcels of land in question.
What is important is that private respondents were formerly natural-born citizens of the Philippines, and as
transferees of a private land, they could apply for registration in accordance with the mandate of Section 8, Article
XII of the Constitution. Considering that private respondents were able to prove the requisite period and character
of possession of their predecessors-in-interest over the subject lots, their application for registration of title must
perforce be approved.
The dissenting opinion, however, states that the requirements in BP 185, must also be complied with by private
respondents. Specifically, it refers to Section 6, which provides:
Sec. 6. In addition to the requirements provided for in other laws for the registration of titles to lands, no private land
shall be transferred under this Act, unless the transferee shall submit to the register of deeds of the province or city
where the property is located a sworn statement showing the date and place of his birth; the names and addresses of
his parents, of his spouse and children, if any; the area, the location and the mode of acquisition of his landholdings in
the Philippines, if any; his intention to reside permanently in the Philippines; the date he lost his Philippine citizenship
and the country of which he is presently a citizen; and such other information as may be required under Section 8 of
this Act.
The Court is of the view that the requirements in Sec. 6 of BP 185 do not apply in the instant case since said
requirements are primarily directed to the register of deeds before whom compliance therewith is to be submitted.
Nowhere in the provision is it stated, much less implied, that the requirements must likewise be submitted before the
land registration court prior to the approval of an application for registration of title. An application for registration of
title before a land registration court should not be confused with the issuance of a certificate of title by the register of
deeds. It is only when the judgment of the land registration court approving the application for registration has become
final that a decree of registration is issued. And that is the time when the requirements of Sec. 6, BP 185, before the
register of deeds should be complied with by the applicants. This decree of registration is the one that is submitted to
the office of the register of deeds for issuance of the certificate of title in favor of the applicant. Prior to the issuance of
the decree of registration, the register of deeds has no participation in the approval of the application for registration of
title as the decree of registration is yet to be issued.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 159595 January 23, 2007
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
LOURDES ABIERA NILLAS, Respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The central question raised in this Petition for Review is whether prescription or laches may bar a petition to revive a
judgment in a land registration case. It is a hardly novel issue, yet petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic)
pleads that the Court rule in a manner that would unsettle precedent. We deny certiorari and instead affirm the
assailed rulings of the courts below.
The facts bear little elaboration. On 10 April 1997, respondent Lourdes Abiera Nillas (Nillas) filed a Petition for Revival of
Judgment with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dumaguete City. It was alleged therein that on 17 July 1941, the then
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Negros Oriental rendered a Decision Adicional in Expediente Cadastral No. 14, captioned
as El Director De Terrenos contra Esteban Abingayan y Otros.1 In the decision, the CFI, acting as a cadastral court,
adjudicated several lots, together with the improvements thereon, in favor of named oppositors who had established
their title to their respective lots and their continuous possession thereof since time immemorial and ordered the Chief
of the General Land Registration Office, upon the finality of the decision, to issue the corresponding decree of
registration.2 Among these lots was Lot No. 771 of the Sibulan Cadastre, which was adjudicated to Eugenia Calingacion
(married to Fausto Estoras) and Engracia Calingacion, both residents of Sibulan, Negros Oriental.3
Nillas further alleged that her parents, Serapion and Josefina A. Abierra, eventually acquired Lot No. 771 in its entirety.
By way of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated 7 November 1977, Engracia Calingacion sold her undivided one-half (1/2) share
over Lot No. 771 to the Spouses Abierra, the parents of Nillas. On the other hand, the one-half (1/2) share adjudicated
to Eugenia Calingacion was also acquired by the Spouses Abierra through various purchases they effected from the
heirs of Eugenia between the years 1975 to 1982. These purchases were evidenced by three separate Deeds of
Absolute Sale all in favor of the Spouses Abierra.4
In turn, Nillas acquired Lot No. 771 from her parents through a Deed of Quitclaim dated 30 June 1994. Despite these
multiple transfers, and the fact that the Abierra spouses have been in open and continuous possession of the subject
property since the 1977 sale, no decree of registration has ever been issued over Lot No. 771 despite the rendition of
29
Land Titles Cases
the 1941 CFI Decision. Thus, Nillas sought the revival of the 1941 Decision and the issuance of the corresponding
decree of registration for Lot No. 771. The records do not precisely reveal why the decree was not issued by the
Director of Lands, though it does not escape attention that the 1941 Decision was rendered a few months before
the commencement of the Japanese invasion of the Philippines in December of 1941.
No responsive pleading was filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), although it entered its appearance on
13 May 1997 and simultaneously deputized the City Prosecutor of Dumaguete City to appear whenever the case
was set for hearing and in all subsequent proceedings.5
Trial on the merits ensued. The RTC heard the testimony of Nillas and received her documentary evidence. No
evidence was apparently presented by the OSG. On 26 April 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision6 finding merit in the
petition for revival of judgment, and ordering the revival of the 1941 Decision, as well as directing the
Commissioner of the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue the corresponding decree of confirmation and
registration based on the 1941 Decision.1avvphi1.net
The OSG appealed the RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals, arguing in main that the right of action to revive
judgment had already prescribed. The OSG further argued that at the very least, Nillas should have established that
a request for issuance of a decree of registration before the Administrator of the LRA had been duly made. The
appeal was denied by the appellate court in its Decision7 dated 24 July 2003. In its Decision, the Court of Appeals
reiterated that the provisions of Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which impose a prescriptive period for
enforcement of judgments by motion, refer to ordinary civil actions and not to "special" proceedings such as land
registration cases. The Court of Appeals also noted that it would have been especially onerous to require Nillas to
first request the LRA to comply with the 1941 decision considering that it had been established that the original
records in the 1941 case had already been destroyed and could no longer be reconstructed.
In the present petition, the OSG strongly argues that contrary to the opinion of the Court of Appeals, the principles
of prescription and laches do apply to land registration cases. The OSG notes that Article 1144 of the Civil Code
establishes that an action upon judgment must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action
accrues.8 Further, Section 6 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure establishes that a final and executory
judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry, after which time it
may be enforced by action before it is barred by statute of limitations.9 It bears noting that the Republic does not
challenge the authenticity of the 1941 Decision, or Nillas's acquisition of the rights of the original awardees. Neither
does it seek to establish that the property is inalienable or otherwise still belonged to the State.
The OSG also extensively relies on two cases, Shipside Inc. v. Court of Appeals10 and Heirs of Lopez v. De
Castro.11 Shipside was cited since in that case, the Court dismissed the action instituted by the Government seeking
the revival of judgment that declared a title null and void because the judgment sought to be revived had become
final more than 25 years before the action for revival was filed. In Shipside, the Court relied on Article 1144 of the
Civil Code and Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in declaring that extinctive prescription did lie.
On the other hand, Heirs of Lopez involved the double registration of the same parcel of land, and the subsequent
action by one set of applicants for the issuance of the decree of registration in their favor seven (7) years after the
judgment had become final. The Court dismissed the subsequent action, holding that laches had set in, it in view of
the petitioners' omission to assert a right for nearly seven (7) years.
Despite the invocation by the OSG of these two cases, there exists a more general but definite jurisprudential rule
that favors Nillas and bolsters the rulings of the lower courts. The rule is that "neither laches nor the statute of
limitations applies to a decision in a land registration case."12
The most extensive explanation of this rule may be found in Sta. Ana v. Menla,13 decided in 1961, wherein the
Court refuted an argument that a decision rendered in a land registration case wherein the decree of registration
remained unissued after 26 years was already "final and enforceable." The Court, through Justice Labrador,
explained:
We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant in support of the assignment [of error], except insofar as it
supports his theory that after a decision in a land registration case has become final, it may not be enforced after
the lapse of a period of 10 years, except by another proceeding to enforce the judgment or decision. Authority for
this theory is the provision in the Rules of Court to the effect that judgment may be enforced within 5 years by
motion, and after five years but within 10 years, by an action (Sec. 6, Rule 39). This provision of the Rules refers to
civil actions and is not applicable to special proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is so because a
party in a civil action must immediately enforce a judgment that is secured as against the adverse party, and his
failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes the decision
unenforceable against the losing party. In special proceedings[,] the purpose is to establish a status, condition or
30
fact; in land registration proceedings, the ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be established. After
the ownership has been proved and confirmed by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said
ownership is necessary, except when the adverse or losing party had been in possession of the land and the winning
party desires to oust him therefrom.
Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to Sec. 6, Rule 39, regarding the execution of a
judgment in a civil action, except the proceedings to place the winner in possession by virtue of a writ of possession.
The decision in a land registration case, unless the adverse or losing party is in possession, becomes final without any
further action, upon the expiration of the period for perfecting an appeal. x x x
x x x x There is nothing in the law that limits the period within which the court may order or issue a decree. The
reason is xxx that the judgment is merely declaratory in character and does not need to be asserted or enforced
against the adverse party. Furthermore, the issuance of a decree is a ministerial duty both of the judge and of the
Land Registration Commission; failure of the court or of the clerk to issue the decree for the reason that no motion
therefor has been filed can not prejudice the owner, or the person in whom the land is ordered to be registered.14
The doctrine that neither prescription nor laches may render inefficacious a decision in a land registration case was
reiterated five (5) years after Sta. Ana, in Heirs of Cristobal Marcos, etc., et al. v. De Banuvar, et al.15 In that case, it was
similarly argued that a prayer for the issuance of a decree of registration filed in 1962 pursuant to a 1938 decision was,
among others, barred by prescription and laches. In rejecting the argument, the Court was content in restating with
approval the above-cited excerpts from Sta. Ana. A similar tack was again adopted by the Court some years later
in Rodil v. Benedicto.16 These cases further emphasized, citing Demoran v. Ibanez, etc., and Poras17and Manlapas and
Tolentino v. Llorente,18 respectively, that the right of the applicant or a subsequent purchaser to ask for the issuance of
a writ of possession of the land never prescribes.19
Within the last 20 years, the Sta. Ana doctrine on the inapplicability of the rules on prescription and laches to land
registration cases has been repeatedly affirmed. Apart from the three (3) cases mentioned earlier, the Sta. Anadoctrine
was reiterated in another three (3) more cases later, namely: Vda. de Barroga v. Albano,20 Cacho v. Court of
Appeals,21 and Paderes v. Court of Appeals.22 The doctrine of stare decisis compels respect for settled jurisprudence,
especially absent any compelling argument to do otherwise. Indeed, the apparent strategy employed by the Republic in
its present petition is to feign that the doctrine and the cases that spawned and educed it never existed at all. Instead, it
is insisted that the Rules of Court, which provides for the five (5)-year prescriptive period for execution of judgments, is
applicable to land registration cases either by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and
convenient.23 The Republic further observes that Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529 has no provision on execution of
final judgments; hence, the provisions of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure should apply to land registration
proceedings.
We affirm Sta. Ana not out of simple reflex, but because we recognize that the principle enunciated therein offers a
convincing refutation of the current arguments of the Republic.
Rule 39, as invoked by the Republic, applies only to ordinary civil actions, not to other or extraordinary proceedings not
expressly governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure but by some other specific law or legal modality such as land
registration cases. Unlike in ordinary civil actions governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure, the intent of land
registration proceedings is to establish ownership by a person of a parcel of land, consistent with the purpose of such
extraordinary proceedings to declare by judicial fiat a status, condition or fact. Hence, upon the finality of a decision
adjudicating such ownership, no further step is required to effectuate the decision and a ministerial duty exists alike on
the part of the land registration court to order the issuance of, and the LRA to issue, the decree of registration.
The Republic observes that the Property Registration Decree (PD No. 1529) does not contain any provision on execution
of final judgments; hence, the application of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in suppletory fashion. Quite
the contrary, it is precisely because PD No. 1529 does not specifically provide for execution of judgments in the sense
ordinarily understood and applied in civil cases, the reason being there is no need for the prevailing party to apply for a
writ of execution in order to obtain the title, that Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is not applicable to land
registration cases in the first place. Section 39 of PD No. 1529 reads:
SEC. 39. Preparation of Decree and Certificate of Title. - After the judgment directing the registration of title to land has
become final, the court shall, within fifteen days from entry of judgment, issue an order directing the Commissioner to
issue the corresponding decree of registration and certificate of title. The clerk of court shall send, within fifteen days
from entry of judgment, certified copies of the judgment and of the order of the court directing the Commissioner to
issue the corresponding decree of registration and certificate of title, and a certificate stating that the decision has not
been amended, reconsidered, nor appealed, and has become final. Thereupon, the Commissioner shall cause to be
prepared the decree of registration as well as the original and duplicate of the corresponding original certificate of title.
Land Titles Cases
The original certificate of title shall be a true copy of the decree of registration. The decree of registration shall be
signed by the Commissioner, entered and filed in the Land Registration Commission. The original of the original
certificate of title shall also be signed by the Commissioner and shall be sent, together with the owners duplicate
certificate, to the Register of Deeds of the city or province where the property is situated for entry in his
registration book.
The provision lays down the procedure that interposes between the rendition of the judgment and the issuance of
the certificate of title. No obligation whatsoever is imposed by Section 39 on the prevailing applicant or oppositor
even as a precondition to the issuance of the title. The obligations provided in the Section are levied on the land
court (that is to issue an order directing the Land Registration Commissioner to issue in turn the corresponding
decree of registration), its clerk of court (that is to transmit copies of the judgment and the order to the
Commissioner), and the Land Registration Commissioner (that is to cause the preparation of the decree of
registration and the transmittal thereof to the Register of Deeds). All these obligations are ministerial on the
officers charged with their performance and thus generally beyond discretion of amendment or review.
The failure on the part of the administrative authorities to do their part in the issuance of the decree of registration
cannot oust the prevailing party from ownership of the land. Neither the failure of such applicant to follow up with
said authorities can. The ultimate goal of our land registration system is geared towards the final and definitive
determination of real property ownership in the country, and the imposition of an additional burden on the owner
after the judgment in the land registration case had attained finality would simply frustrate such goal.
Clearly, the peculiar procedure provided in the Property Registration Law from the time decisions in land
registration cases become final is complete in itself and does not need to be filled in. From another perspective,
the judgment does not have to be executed by motion or enforced by action within the purview of Rule 39 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Following these premises, it can even be posited that in theory, there would have been no need for Nillas, or others
under similar circumstances, to file a petition for revival of judgment, since revival of judgments is a procedure
derived from civil procedure and proceeds from the assumption that the judgment is susceptible to prescription.
The primary recourse need not be with the courts, but with the LRA, with whom the duty to issue the decree of
registration remains. If it is sufficiently established before that body that there is an authentic standing judgment or
order from a land registration court that remains unimplemented, then there should be no impediment to the
issuance of the decree of registration. However, the Court sees the practical value of necessitating judicial recourse
if a significant number of years has passed since the promulgation of the land court's unimplemented decision or
order, as in this case. Even though prescription should not be a cause to bar the issuance of the decree of
registration, a judicial evaluation would allow for a thorough examination of the veracity of the judgment or order
sought to be effected, or a determination of causes other than prescription or laches that might preclude the
issuance of the decree of registration.
What about the two cases cited by the Republic, Shipside and Heirs of Lopez? Even though the Court applied the
doctrines of prescription and laches in those cases, it should be observed that neither case was intended to
overturn the Sta. Ana doctrine, nor did they make any express declaration to such effect. Moreover, both cases
were governed by their unique set of facts, quite distinct from the general situation that marked both Sta. Ana and
the present case.
The judgment sought belatedly for enforcement in Shipside did not arise from an original action for land
registration, but from a successful motion by the Republic seeking the cancellation of title previously adjudicated to
a private landowner. While one might argue that such motion still arose in a land registration case, we note that
the pronouncement therein that prescription barred the revival of the order of cancellation was made in the course
of dispensing with an argument which was ultimately peripheral to that case. Indeed, the portion
of Shipside dealing with the issue of prescription merely restated the provisions in the Civil Code and the Rules of
Civil Procedure relating to prescription, followed by an observation that the judgment sought to be revived attained
finality 25 years earlier. However, the Sta. Ana doctrine was not addressed, and perhaps with good reason, as the
significantly more extensive rationale provided by the Court in barring the revival of judgment was the fact that the
State no longer held interest in the subject property, having divested the same to the Bases Conversion
Development Authority prior to the filing of the action for revival. Shipside expounds on this point, and not on the
applicability of the rules of prescription.
Notably, Shipside has attained some measure of prominence as precedent on still another point, relating to its
pronouncements relating to the proper execution of the certification of non-forum shopping by a corporation. In
contrast, Shipside has not since been utilized by the Court to employ the rules on prescription and laches on final
decisions in land registration cases. It is worth mentioning that since Shipside was promulgated in 2001, the Court has
not hesitated in reaffirming the rule in Sta. Ana as recently as in the middle of 2005 in the Paderes case.
We now turn to Heirs of Lopez, wherein the controlling factual milieu proved even more unconventional than that
in Shipside. The property involved therein was the subject of two separate applications for registration, one filed by
petitioners therein in 1959, the other by a different party in 1967. It was the latter who was first able to obtain a decree
of registration, this accomplished as early as 1968.24 On the other hand, the petitioners were able to obtain a final
judgment in their favor only in 1979, by which time the property had already been registered in the name of the other
claimant, thus obstructing the issuance of certificate of title to the petitioners. The issues of prescription and laches
arose because the petitioners filed their action to enforce the 1979 final judgment and the cancellation of the
competing title only in 1987, two (2) years beyond the five (5)-year prescriptive period provided in the Rules of Civil
Procedure. The Court did characterize the petitioners as guilty of laches for the delay in filing the action for the
execution of the judgment in their favor, and thus denied the petition on that score.
Heirs of Lopez noted the settled rule that "when two certificates of title are issued to different persons covering the
same land in whole or in part, the earlier in date must prevail x x x," and indeed even if the petitioners therein were
somehow able to obtain a certificate of title pursuant to the 1979 judgment in their favor, such title could not have
stood in the face of the earlier title. The Court then correlated the laches of the petitioners with their pattern of
behavior in failing to exercise due diligence to protect their interests over the property, marked by their inability to
oppose the other application for registration or to seek enforcement of their own judgment within the five (5) -year
reglementary period.
Still, a close examination of Heirs of Lopez reveals an unusual dilemma that negates its application as precedent to the
case at bar, or to detract from Sta. Ana as a general rule for that matter. The execution of the judgment sought for
belated enforcement in Heirs of Lopez would have entailed the disturbance of a different final judgment which had
already been executed and which was shielded by the legal protection afforded by a Torrens title. In light of those
circumstances, there could not have been a "ministerial duty" on the part of the registration authorities to effectuate
the judgment in favor of the petitioners in Heirs of Lopez. Neither could it be said that their right of ownership as
confirmed by the judgment in their favor was indubitable, considering the earlier decree of registration over the same
property accorded to a different party. The Sta. Ana doctrine rests upon the general presumption that the final
judgment, with which the corresponding decree of registration is homologous by legal design, has not been disturbed
by another ruling by a co-extensive or superior court. That presumption obtains in this case as well. Unless that
presumption is overcome, there is no impediment to the continued application of Sta. Ana as precedent.25
We are not inclined to make any pronouncements on the doctrinal viability of Shipside or Heirs of Lopez concerning the
applicability of the rules of prescription or laches in land registration cases. Suffice it to say, those cases do not operate
to detract from the continued good standing of Sta. Ana as a general precedent that neither prescription nor laches
bars the enforcement of a final judgment in a land registration case, especially when the said judgment has not been
reversed or modified, whether deliberately or inadvertently, by another final court ruling. This qualifier stands not so
much as a newly-carved exception to the general rule as it does as an exercise in stating the obvious.
Finally, the Republic faults the Court of Appeals for pronouncing that the 1941 Decision constituted res judicata that
barred subsequent attacks to the adjudicates title over the subject property. The Republic submits that said decision
would operate as res judicata only after the decree of registration was issued, which did not happen in this case. We
doubt that a final decisions status as res judicata is the impelling ground for its very own execution; and indeed res
judicata is more often invoked as a defense or as a factor in relation to a different case altogether. Still, this faulty
terminology aside, the Republics arguments on this point do not dissuade from our central holding that the 1941
Decision is still susceptible to effectuation by the standard decree of registration notwithstanding the delay incurred by
Nillas or her predecessors-in-interest in seeking its effectuation and the reasons for such delay, following the
prostracted failure of the then Land Registration Commissioner to issue the decree of registration. In this case, all that
Nillas needed to prove was that she had duly acquired the rights of the original adjudicates her
predecessors-in-interest-in order to entitle her to the decree of registration albeit still in the names of the original
prevailing parties who are her predecessors-in interest. Both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals were satisfied that such fact was proven, and the Republic does not offer any compelling argument to
dispute such proof.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
31
Land Titles Cases
G.R. No. 168913 March 14, 2007
ROLANDO TING, Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF DIEGO LIRIO, namely: FLORA A. LIRIO, AMELIA L. ROSKA, AURORA L. ABEJO, ALICIA L. DUNQUE,
ADELAIDA L. DAVID, EFREN A. LIRIO and JOCELYN ANABELLE L. ALCOVER, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
In a Decision of December 10, 1976 in Land Registration Case (LRC) No. N-983, then Judge Alfredo Marigomen of
the then Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch 7, granted the application filed by the Spouses Diego Lirio and Flora
Atienza for registration of title to Lot No. 18281 (the lot) of the Cebu Cadastral 12 Extension, Plan Rs-07-000787.
The decision in LRC No. N-983 became final and executory on January 29, 1977. Judge Marigomen thereafter issued
an order of November 10, 1982 directing the Land Registration Commission to issue the corresponding decree of
registration and the certificate of title in favor of the spouses Lirio.
On February 12, 1997, Rolando Ting (petitioner) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu an application for
registration of title to the same lot. The application was docketed as LRC No. 1437-N.1
The herein respondents, heirs of Diego Lirio, namely: Flora A. Lirio, Amelia L. Roska, Aurora L. Abejo, Alicia L.
Dunque, Adelaida L. David, Efren A. Lirio and Jocelyn Anabelle L. Alcover, who were afforded the opportunity to file
an opposition to petitioners application by Branch 21 of the Cebu RTC, filed their Answer2 calling attention to the
December 10, 1976 decision in LRC No. N-983 which had become final and executory on January 29, 1977 and
which, they argued, barred the filing of petitioners application on the ground of res judicata.
After hearing the respective sides of the parties, Branch 21 of the Cebu RTC, on motion of respondents, dismissed
petitioners application on the ground of res judicata. 31vvphi1.nt
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari which raises the sole issue of whether the decision in LRC No.
N-983 constitutes res judicata in LRC No. 1437-N.
Petitioner argues that although the decision in LRC No. N-983 had become final and executory on January 29, 1977,
no decree of registration has been issued by the Land Registration Authority (LRA);4 it was only on July 26, 2003
that the "extinct" decision belatedly surfaced as basis of respondents motion to dismiss LRC No. 1437-N;5and as no
action for revival of the said decision was filed by respondents after the lapse of the ten-year prescriptive period,
"the cause of action in the dormant judgment pass[d] into extinction."6
Petitioner thus concludes that an "extinct" judgment cannot be the basis of res judicata.7
The petition fails.
Section 30 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree provides:
SEC. 30. When judgment becomes final; duty to cause issuance of decree. The judgment rendered in a land
registration proceeding becomes final upon the expiration of thirty days8 to be counted from the date of receipt of
notice of the judgment. An appeal may be taken from the judgment of the court as in ordinary civil cases.
After judgment has become final and executory, it shall devolve upon the court to forthwith issue an order in
accordance with Section 39 of this Decree to the Commissioner for the issuance of the decree of registration and
the corresponding certificate of title in favor of the person adjudged entitled to registration. (Emphasis supplied)
In a registration proceeding instituted for the registration of a private land, with or without opposition, the
judgment of the court confirming the title of the applicant or oppositor, as the case may be, and ordering its
registration in his name constitutes, when final, res judicata against the whole world.9 It becomes final when no
appeal within the reglementary period is taken from a judgment of confirmation and registration.10
The land registration proceedings being in rem, the land registration courts approval in LRC No. N-983 of spouses
Diego Lirio and Flora Atienzas application for registration of the lot settled its ownership, and is binding on the
whole world including petitioner.
Explaining his position that the December 10, 1976 Decision in LRC No. N-983 had become "extinct," petitioner
advances that the LRA has not issued the decree of registration, a certain Engr. Rafaela Belleza, Chief of the Survey
Assistance Section, Land Management Services, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region
7, Cebu City having claimed that the survey of the Cebu Cadastral Extension is erroneous and all resurvey within the
Cebu Cadastral extension must first be approved by the Land Management Services of
the DENR, Region 7, Cebu City before said resurvey may be used in court; and that the spouses Lirio did not comply
with the said requirement for they instead submitted to the court a mere special work order.11
There is, however, no showing that the LRA credited the alleged claim of Engineer Belleza and that it reported such
claim to the land registration court for appropriate action or reconsideration of the decision which was its duty.
Petitioners insist that the duty of the respondent land registration officials to issue the decree is purely ministerial. It is
ministerial in the sense that they act under the orders of the court and the decree must be in conformity with the
decision of the court and with the data found in the record, and they have no discretion in the matter. However, if they
are in doubt upon any point in relation to the preparation and issuance of the decree, it is their duty to refer the
matter to the court. They act, in this respect, as officials of the court and not as administrative officials, and their act
is the act of the court. They are specifically called upon to "extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land
registration proceedings."12 (Emphasis supplied)
As for petitioners claim that under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court reading:
SEC. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. A final and executory judgment or order may be executed on
motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the
statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion
within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations[,]
the December 10, 1976 decision became "extinct" in light of the failure of respondents and/or of their
predecessors-in-interest to execute the same within the prescriptive period, the same does not lie.
Sta. Ana v. Menla, et al.13 enunciates the raison detre why Section 6, Rule 39 does not apply in land registration
proceedings, viz:
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT THE DECISION RENDERED IN THIS LAND REGISTRATION CASE ON
NOVEMBER 28, 1931 OR TWENTY SIX YEARS AGO, HAS NOT YET BECOME FINAL AND UNENFORCEABLE.
We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant in support of the above assignment, except in so far as it supports
his theory that after a decision in a land registration case has become final, it may not be enforced after the lapse of a
period of 10 years, except by another proceeding to enforce the judgment or decision. Authority for this theory is the
provision in the Rules of Court to the effect that judgment may be enforced within 5 years by motion, and after five
years but within 10 years, by an action (Sec. 6, Rule 39.) This provision of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not
applicable to special proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is so because a party in a civil action must
immediately enforce a judgment that is secured as against the adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce the
same within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes the decision unenforceable against the losing party. In
special proceedings the purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact; in land registration proceedings, the
ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be established. After the ownership has been proved and
confirmed
by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said ownership is necessary, except when the adverse or
losing party had been in possession of the land and the winning party desires to oust him therefrom.
Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to Sec. 6, Rule 39, regarding the execution of a
judgment in a civil action, except the proceedings to place the winner in possession by virtue of a writ of possession.
The decision in a land registration case, unless the adverse or losing party is in possession, becomes final without any
further action, upon the expiration of the period for perfecting an appeal.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing discussions, DENIED.
Costs against petitioner, Rolando Ting.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 123346 March 31, 2009
MANOTOK REALTY, INC. and MANOTOK ESTATE CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT, CORPORATION, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 134385 March 31, 2009
ARANETA INSTITUTE OF AGRI-CULTURE, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF JOSE B. DIMSON, REPRESENTED BY HIS COMPULSORY HEIRS: HIS SURVIVING SPOUSE, ROQUETA R. DIMSON
AND THEIR CHILDREN, NORMA AND CELSA TIRADO, ALSON AND VIRGINIA DIMSON, LINDA AND CARLOS LAGMAN,
LERMA AND RENE POLICAR, AND ESPERANZA R. DIMSON; AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MALABON, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
32
Land Titles Cases
In the Courts Resolution dated 14 December 2007,1 the Court constituted a Special Division of the Court of Appeals
to hear the instant case on remand. The Special Division was composed of three Associate Justices of the Court of
Appeals, with Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga as Chairperson; Justice Lucas Bersamin as Senior Member; and
Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao as Junior Member. We instructed the Special Division to proceed as follows:
The Special Division is tasked to hear and receive evidence, conclude the proceedings and submit to this Court a
report on its findings and recommended conclusions within three (3) months from finality of this Resolution.
In ascertaining which of the conflicting claims of title should prevail, the Special Division is directed to make the
following determinations based on the evidence already on record and such other evidence as may be presented at
the proceedings before it, to wit:
i. Which of the contending parties are able to trace back their claims of title to OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917?
ii. Whether the imputed flaws in the titles of the Manotoks and Araneta, as recounted in the 2005 Decision, are
borne by the evidence? Assuming they are, are such flaws sufficient to defeat the claims of title of the Manotoks
and Araneta?
iii. Whether the factual and legal bases of 1966 Order of Judge Muoz-Palma and the 1970 Order of Judge Sayo are
true and valid. Assuming they are, do these orders establish a superior right to the subject properties in favor of the
Dimsons and CLT as opposed to the claims of Araneta and the Manotoks?
iv. Whether any of the subject properties had been the subject of expropriation proceedings at any point since the
issuance of OCT No. 994 on 3 May 1917, and if so what are those proceedings, what are the titles acquired by the
Government and whether any of the parties is able to trace its title to the title acquired by the Government
through expropriation.
v. Such other matters necessary and proper in ascertaining which of the conflicting claims of title should prevail.
WHEREFORE, the instant cases are hereby REMANDED to the Special Division of the Court of Appeals for further
proceedings in accordance with Parts VI, VII and VIII of this Resolution.
SO ORDERED.2
The Special Division proceeded to conduct hearings in accordance with the Resolution. The parties to these cases,
namely CLT Realty Development Corporation (CLT), Manotok Realty Inc. and Manotok Estate Corporation (the
Manotoks), the Heirs of Jose B. Dimson (Heirs of Dimson), and Araneta Institute of Agriculture, Inc. (Araneta), were
directed by the Special Division to present their respective evidence to the Court of Appeals. Thereafter, the Special
Division rendered a 70-page Report3 (Report) on 26 November 2008. The Special Division submitted the sealed
Report to this Court.
Before taking action on the Report itself, we dispose of a preliminary matter. On February 17, 2009, the Manotoks
filed a motion beseeching that copies of the report be furnished the parties "so that they may submit their
comments and objections thereon in accord with the principle contained in Sec. 10, Rule 32 of the Rules of Court."
We deny the motion.
It is incorrect to presume that the earlier referral of these cases to the Court of Appeals for reception of evidence
was strictly in accordance with Rule 32. Notably, Section 1 of said Rule authorizes the referral of the case to a
commissioner "by written consent of both parties," whereas in the cases at bar, the Court did not endeavor to
secure the consent of the parties before effectuating the remand to the Court of Appeals. Nonetheless, our earlier
advertence to Rule 32 remains proper even if the adopted procedure does not hew strictly to that Rule, owing to
our power under Section 6, Rule 135 to adopt any suitable process or mode of proceeding which appears
conformable to the spirit of the Rules to carry into effect all auxiliary processes and other means necessary to carry
our jurisdiction into effect.
Moreover, furnishing the parties with copies of the Sealed Report would not serve any useful purpose. It would
only delay the promulgation of the Courts action on the Sealed Report and the adjudication of these cases. In any
event, the present Resolution quotes extensively from the sealed Report and discusses its other substantive
segments which are not quoted.
The Report is a commendably exhaustive and pellucid analysis of the issues referred to the Special Division. It is a
more than adequate basis for this Court to make the following final dispositions in these cases.
I.
We adopt the succeeding recital of operative antecedents made by the Special Division in its Report.
THE PROCEDURAL ANTECEDENTS
DIMSON v. ARANETA
CA-G.R. CV. NO. 41883 & CA-G.R. SP No. 34819
[SC-G.R. No. 134385]
33
On 18 December 1979, DIMSON filed with the then Court of First Instance ["CFI"] of Rizal a
complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages against ARANETA. On 7 May 1980, DIMSON
amended his complaint and included Virgilio L. Enriquez ["ENRIQUEZ"] as his co-plaintiff.
In said Amended Complaint, DIMSON claimed that he is the absolute owner of a 50-hectare land
located in Bo. Potrero, Malabon, Metro Manila covered by TCT No. R-15169, [Lot 25-A-2] of the
Caloocan Registry of Deeds. Allegedly, DIMSON had transferred the subject property to
ENRIQUEZ by way of an absolute and irrevocable sale on 14 November 1979. Unfortunately
though, DIMSON and ENRIQUEZ discovered that the subject property was being occupied by
ARANETA wherein an "agricultural school house" is erected and that despite repeated demands,
the latter refused to vacate the parcel of land and remove the improvements thereon.
ARANETA, for its part, refuted said allegations and countered that it is the absolute owner of the
land being claimed by DIMSON and that the real properties in the Araneta Compound are
"properly documented and validly titled." It maintained that it had been in possession of the
subject parcel of land since 1974. For this reason, the claims of DIMSON and ENRIQUEZ were
allegedly barred by prescription.
During the trial, counsel for ARANETA marked in evidence, among others, certifications from the
Land Registration Commission attesting that TCTs Nos. 13574 and 26538, covering the disputed
property, are in the names of ARANETA and Jose Rato, respectively. ARANETA also offered TCT
No. 7784 in evidence to prove that it is the registered owner of the land described therein.
On 28 May 1993, the trial court rendered a Decision upholding the title of DIMSON over the
disputed property xxx
Undaunted, ARANETA interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
41883, which was later consolidated with CA-GR. SP No. 34819 in view of the inter-related
issues of the two cases.
In its 30 May 1997 Decision, the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 41883, sustained the RTC
Decision in favor of DIMSON finding that the title of ARANETA to the disputed land in a nullity.
In CA-GR. SP No. 34819, the Court of Appeals likewise invalidated the titles of ARANETA, relying
on the Supreme Court ruling in Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System v. Court of
Appeals, which declared null and void the certificates of title derived from OCT No. 994
registered on 3 may 1917. It was also held that ARANETA failed to sufficiently show that the
Order sought to be nullified was obtained through extrinsic fraud that would warrant the
annulment thereof.
Dissatisfied still, ARANETA filed a Motion for Reconsideration And/Or New Trial espousing
therein as basis for its entreaty the various letters from different government agencies and
Department order No. 137 of the Department of Justice, among others.
On 16 July 1998, the various Motions of ARANETA were denied by the Court of Appeals.
Nonetheless, the Court ordered DIMSON to maintain status quo until the finality of the
aforesaid judgment.
Consequently, ARANETA filed a petition before the Supreme Court. Refuting the factual finding
of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, ARANETA contended that there in only one OCT 994
covering the Maysilo Estate issued on 3 May 1917 pursuant to the Decree No. 36455 issued by
the Court of Land Registration on 19 April 1917 and added that there were subsequent
certifications issued by the government officials, notably from the LRS, the DOJ Committee
Report and the Senate Committees Joint Report which attested that there is only one OCT 994,
that which had been issued on 3 May 1917.1avvphi1
CLT v. MANOTOK
CA-G.R. CV. No. 45255
[SC-G.R. No. 123346]
On 10 August 1992, CLT filed with the Regional Trial Court ["RTC"] A COMPLAINT FOR
Annulment of Transfer Certificates of Title, Recovery of Possession and Damages against the
MANOTOKS and the Registry of Deeds of Metro Manila District II (Calookan City, Metro Manila)
["CALOOCAN RD"].
In its Complaint, CLT alleged that it is the registered owner of Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate
located in Caloocan City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T- 177013, a derivative
Land Titles Cases
title of OCT No. 994. As a basis of its proprietary claim, CLT averred that on 10 December
1988, it had acquired Lot 26 from its former registered owner, Estelita I. Hipolito
["HIPOLITO"], by virtue of a Deed of Sale with Real Estate Mortgage. HIPOLITOs title was ,
in turn, a direct transfer from DIMSON, the registered owner of TCT No. 15166, the latter
having acquired the same by virtue of a Court Order dated 13 June 1966 issued by the Court
of First Instance of Rizal in Civil Case No. 4557.
On the other hand, the MANOTOKS maintained the validity of their titles, which were all
derivatives of OCT No. 994 covering over twenty (20) parcels of land located over a portion
of Lot 26 in the Maysilo Estate. In substance, it was contented that the title of CLT was an
offspring of an ineffective grant of an alleged undisputed portion of Lot 26 by way of
attorneys fees to its predecessor-in- interest, Jose B. Dimson. The MANOTOKS, in this
connection, further contended that the portion of Lot 26, subject of the present
controversy, had long been disposed of in favor of Alejandro Ruiz and Mariano Leuterio and
hence, there was nothing more in said portion of Lot 26 that could have been validly
conveyed to Dimson.
Tracing the legitimacy of their certificates of titles, the MANOTOKS alleged that TCT No.
4210, which cancelled OCT No. 994, had been issued in the names of Alejandro Ruiz and
Mariano Leuterio on Sept ember 1918 by virtue of an Escritura De Venta executed by Don
Tomas Arguelles and Don Enrique Lopes on 21 August 1918. TCT No. 4210 allegedly covered
an approximate area of 19,565.43 square meters of Lot 26. On even date, TCT No. 4211 was
transferred to Francisco Gonzales on the strength of an Escritura de Venta dated 3 March
1920 for which TCT No. T-5261, covering an area of 871,982 square meters was issued in
the name of one Francisco Gonzales, married to Rufina Narciso.
Thereafter, TCT No. T-35485, canceling TCT No. T-5261, was issued to Rufina Narcisa Vda.
de Gonzales which was later replaced with the names of Gonzales six (6) children. The
property was then subdivided and as a result of which, seven (7) certificates of titles were
issued, six (6),under the names of each of the children while the remaining title was held by
all of them as co-owners.
Eventually, the properties covered by said seven certificates of title were expropriated by
the Republic of the Philippines. These properties were then later subdivided by the National
Housing Authority ["NHA"], into seventy-seven (77) lots and thereafter sold to qualified
vendees. As it turned out, a number of said vendees sold nineteen (19) of these lots to
Manotok Realty, Inc. while one (1) lot was purchased by the Manotok Estate Corporation.
During the pre-trial conference, the trial court, upon agreement of the parties, approved
the creation of a commission composed of three commissioners tasked to resolve the
conflict in their respective titles. Accordingly, the created Commission convened on the
matter in dispute.
On 8 October 1993, Ernesto Erive and Avelino San Buenaventura submitted an exhaustive
Joint Final Report ["THE MAJORITY REPORT"] finding that there were inherent technical
infirmities or defects on the face of TCT No. 4211, from which the MANOTOKS derived their
titles (also on TCT No. 4210), TCT No. 5261 and TCT No. 35486. Teodoro Victoriano
submitted his Individual Final Report ["THE MINORITY REPORT"] dated 23 October 1993.
After the conduct of a hearing on these reports, the parties filed their respective
comments/objections thereto. Upon order of the trial court, the parties filed their
respective memoranda.
Adopting the findings contained in the Majority Report, the RTC, on 10 May 1994, rendered
a Decision, in favor of CLT and ordered, among others, the cancellation of the certificates of
title issued in the name of the MANOTOKS.
The MANOTOKS elevated the adverse RTC Decision on appeal before the Court of Appeals.
In its Decision dated 28 September 1995, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision,
except as to the award of damages which was deleted. The MANOTOKS then moved for
reconsideration, but said motion was denied by said appellate court in its Resolution dated
8 January 1996. After the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration, the MANOTOKS filed a
Petition for Review before the Supreme Court.
34
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT
Before the Supreme Court, the Petitioners for Review, separately filed by the MANOTOKS,
ARANETA and Sto. Nio Kapitbahayan Association, Inc., ["STO. NIO"], were consolidated.
Also submitted for consideration of the Supreme Court were the report of the Fact Finding
Committee dated 28 August 1997 and the Senate Committee Report No. 1031 dated 25 May
1998 which concluded that there was only one OCT No. 994 issued, transcribed and registered
on 3 May 1917.
THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
In its Decision dated 29 November 2005 ["THE SUPREME COURT 2005 DECISION"], the Supreme
Court, through its Third Division, affirmed the RTC Decision and Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals, which declared the titles of CLT and DIMSON as valid.
In invalidating the respective titles of the MANOTOKS and ARANETA, the Supreme Court, in turn,
relied on the factual and legal findings of the trial courts, which had heavily hinged on the
imputed flaws in said titles. Considering that these trial court findings had been affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court highlighted the fact that the same were accorded the
highest degree of respect and, generally, should not be disturbed on appeal.
Emphasis was also made on the settled rule that because the Supreme Court was not a trier of
facts, it was not within its function to review factual issues and examine, evaluate or weigh the
probative value of the evidence presented by the parties.
THE SUPEME COURT RESOLUTION
Expectedly, the MANOTOKS and ARANETA filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration of
the Supreme Court 2005 Decision.
Resolving said motions for reconsideration, with the Office of the Solicitor General ["OSG"]
intervening on behalf of the Republic, the Supreme Court, in its Resolution of 14 December
2007 ["THE SUPREME CCOURT 2007 RESOLUTION"] reversed and nullified its 2005 Decision and
categorically invalidated OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917, which was the basis of the propriety
claims of CLT and DIMSON. However, the Supreme Court resolved to remand the cases to this
Special Division of the Court of Appeals for reception of evidence.
To guide the proceedings before this Special Division of the Court of Appeals, the Supreme
Court made the following binding conclusions:
"First, there is only one OCT 994. As it appears on the record, that mother title was received for
transcription by the Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917, and that should be the date which should
be reckoned as the ate of registration of the title. It may also be acknowledged, as appears on
the title, that OCT No. 994 resulted from the issuance of the decree of registration on (19)* April
1917, although such dated cannot be considered as the date of the title or the date when the
title took effect.
Second. Any title that traces its source to OCT No. 994 dated (19) April 1917 is void, for such
mother title is inexistent. The fact that the Dimson and CLT titles made specific reference to an
OCT No. 994 dated (19) April 1917 casts doubt on the validity of such titles since they refer to an
inexistent OCT. This error alone is, in fact, sufficient to invalidate the Dimson and CLT claims over
the subject property if singular reliance is placed by them on the dates appearing on their
respective titles.
Third. The decision of this Court in MWSS v. Court of Appeals and Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals
cannot apply to the cases at bar, especially in regard to their recognition of an OCT No. 994
dated 19 April 1917, a title which we now acknowledge as inexistent. Neither could the
conclusions in MWSS or Gonzaga with respect to an OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917 bind any
other case operating under the factual setting the same as or similar to that at bar.4
II.
The parties were afforded the opportunity to present their evidence before the Special Division. The Report names the
evidence submitted to the Special Division for its evaluation:
CLT EVIDENCE
In its Offer of Evidence,5 CLT adopted the documentary exhibits and testimonial evidence of witnesses submitted in the
case filed by CLT against STO. NIO in Civil Case No. C-15491, ["CLT-STO NIO CASE"]. These pieces of evidence include,
among others, the Majority and Minority Reports, the Formal Offer of Evidence in the presentation of the
Land Titles Cases
evidence-in-chief and rebuttal evidence in the CLT-STO NIO CASE consisting of various certificates of titles, plans
by geodetic engineer, tax declarations, chemistry report, specimen signatures and letters of correspondence.
MANOTOKS EVIDENCE
The MANOTOKS sought admission of the following evidence: Senate and DOJ Committee Reports; certificates of
title issued to them and their vendees/assignees, i.e., Republic of the Philippines, the Gonzalezes, Alejandro Ruiz
and Mariano Leuterio, Isabel Gil del Sola and Estelita Hipolito; deeds of absolute sale; contracts to sell; tax
declarations and real property tax receipts; the Formal Officer of Evidence of Philville Development & Housing
Corporation; ["PHILVILLE"], in Civil Case No. 15045; this Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CV. No. 52606
between CLT and PHILVILLE; the Orders of Judge Palma dated 13 June 1966 and 16 August 1966 in Case No. 4557
and the billing statements of SSHG Law Office. They also submitted in evidence the Affidavits and Supplemental
Affidavits of Rosa R. Manotok and Luisa T. Padora; Affidavits of Atty. Felix B. Lerio, Atty. Ma. P.G. Ongkiko and
Engineer Jose Marie P. Bernabe; a copy of a photograph of BM No. 9; certified true copy of coordinates and
reference point of L.M. No. 1 and BM No. 1 to 10 of Piedad Estate and TCT No. 177013 of CLT.6
DIMSON EVIDENCE
In their Consolidated Formal Offer of Evidence,7 DIMSON submitted the previous decisions and resolutions passed
relative to these cases, various certifications of different government agencies, OCT 994, subdivision plan of Lot
25-A-2, observations of Geodetic Engineer Reggie P. Garcia showing the relative positions of properties within Lot
25-A; the Novation of Contract/Deed of Sale and Mortgage dated 15 January 1948 between Rato, Don Salvador
Araneta and Araneta Institute of Agriculture; copies of various certificates of titles to dispute some of the titles held
by ARANETA; several letter-requests and official receipts.
ARANETA EVIDENCE
ARANETA, in turn, offered in evidence various certificates of title, specifically, OCT No. 994, TCT No. 8692; TCT No.
21857; TCT No. 26538; TCT No. 26539; TCT No. (7784)-738 and TCT no. 13574. It also marked in evidence the
certified true copies of Decree No. 36577; the DOJ and Senate Reports; letters of correspondence to the Land
Registration Commission and the Register of Deeds of Malabon City; survey plans of Lot 25-A and TCT r-15169 of
Dimson and; the affidavit of Engineer Felino M. Cortez and his curriculum vitae. ARANETA also offered the certified
true copy of TCT No. 6196 in the name of Victoneta, Inc.; TCT No. 13574 in the name of ARANETA; certifications
issued by Atty. Josephine H. Ponciano, Acting Register of Deeds of Malabon city-Navotas; certified true copy of
Judge Palmas Order dated 16 August 1966 in Case No. 4557; Circular No. 17 (which pertains to the rules on
reconstitution of titles as of 19 February 1947) and its official receipt and; the owners duplicate copy of OCT No.
994.89
III.
We now turn to the evaluation of the evidence engaged in by the Special Division. To repeat, the Special Division
was tasked to determine the following issues based on the evidence:
i. Which of the contending parties are able to trace back their claims to Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994
dated 3 May 1917:
ii. Whether the respective imputed flaws in the titles of the Manotoks and Araneta, as recounted in the Supreme
Court 2005 Decision, are borne by the evidence. Assuming they are, are such flaws sufficient to defeat said claims?
iii. Whether the factual and legal bases of the 1966 Order of Judge Muoz-Palma and the 1970 Order of Judge Sayo
are true and valid. Assuming they are, do these orders establish a superior right to the subject properties in favor of
the Dimsons and CLT as opposed to the claims of the Araneta and the Manotoks?
iv. Whether any of the subject properties had been the subject of expropriation proceedings at any point since the
issuance of OCT No. 994 on 3 May 1917, and if so, what are those proceedings, what are the titles acquired by the
Government, and is any of the parties able to trace its title acquired by the government through expropriation?
v. Such other matters necessary and proper in ascertaining which of the conflicting claims of title should prevail.
The ultimate purpose of the inquiry undertaken by the Court of Appeals was to ascertain which of the four groups
of claimants were entitled to claim ownership over the subject properties to which they claimed title thereto. One
set of properties was disputed between CLT and the Manotoks, while the other set was disputed between Araneta
and the Heirs of Dimson.
As can be gleaned from the Report, Jose Dimson was able to obtain an order in 1977 issued by Judge Marcelino
Sayo of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Caloocan City on the basis of which he was able to register in his name
properties belonging to the Maysilo Estate. Judge Sayos order in turn was sourced from a 1966 Order issued by
Judge (later Supreme Court Associate Justice) Cecilia Muoz-Palma of the CFI of Rizal. Dimsons titles reflected, as
their mother title, OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917.10 Among these properties was a fifty (50)-hectare property
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 151169, which apparently overlapped with the property of Araneta
covered by TCT No. 13574 and 26538.11 Araneta was then and still is in possession of the property. The Araneta titles
state, as their mother title, OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917. Consequently, Dimson filed an action for recovery of
possession against Araneta.
Another property in Dimsons name, apparently taken from Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate, was later sold to Estelita
Hipolito, who in turn sold the same to CLT. Said property was registered by CLT under TCT No. T-177013, which also
reflected, as its mother title, OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917.12 Said property claimed by CLT encroached on property
covered by titles in the name of the Manotoks. The Manotoks traced their titles to TCT Nos. 4210 and 4211, both issued
in 1918 and both reflecting, as their mother title, OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917.1avvphi1
It is evident that both the Heirs of Dimson and CLT had primarily relied on the validity of OCT No. 994 dated 19 April
1917 as the basis of their claim of ownership. However, the Court in its 2007 Resolution held that OCT No. 994 dated 19
April 1917 was inexistent. The proceedings before the Special Division afforded the Heirs of Dimson and CLT alike the
opportunity to prove the validity of their respective claims to title based on evidence other than claims to title the
inexistent 19 April 1917 OCT No. 994. Just as much was observed by the Special Division:
Nonetheless, while the respective certificates of title of DIMSON and CLT refer to OCT 994 issued on 19 April 1917 and
that their previous postulations in the present controversies had been anchored on the supposed validity of their titles,
that which emanated from OCT 994 of 19 April 1917, and conversely the invalidity of the 3 May 1917 OCT 994, the
Supreme Court has yet again allowed them to substantiate their claims on the basis of other evidentiary proofs:
Otherwise stated, both DIMSON and CLT bear the onus of proving in this special proceedings, by way of the evidence
already presented before and such other forms of evidence that are not yet of record, that either there had only been
an error in the course of the transcription or registration of their derivative titles, or that other factual and legal bases
existed to validate or substantiate their titles aside from the OCT No. 994 issued on 19 April 1917.13
Were they able to discharge such burden?
A.
We begin with the Heirs of Dimson. The Special Division made it clear that the Heirs of Dimson were heavily reliant on
the OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917.
[DIMSON], on the strength of Judge Sayos Order dated 18 October dated 18 October 1977, was issued separate
certificates of title, i.e., TCT Nos. 15166, 15167, 15168 and 15169, covering portions of the Maysilo Estate. Pertinently,
with respect to TCT No. 15169 of DIMSON, which covers Lot 25-A-2 of the said estate, the following were inscribed on
the face of the instrument.
"IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that said land was originally registered on the 19th day of April in the year nineteen hundred
and seventeen in the Registration Book of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal, Volume NA page NA , as Original
Certificate of Title No. 994 pursuant to Decree No. 36455 issued in L.R.C. Case No. 4429 Record No. ______
This Certificate is a transfer from Original Certificate of Title No. 994/NA, which is cancelled by virtue hereof in so far as
the above-described land is concerned.14
From the above accounts, it is clear that the mother title of TCT no. 15169, the certificate of title of DIMSON covering
the now disputed Lot 25-A-2, is OCT No. 994 registered on 19 April 1917. Manifestly, the certificate of title issued to
DIMSON, and as a matter of course, the derivative title later issued to CLT, should both be voided inasmuch as the OCT
which they emanated had already been declared inexistent.15
The Special Division noted that the Heirs of Dimson did not offer any explanation why their titles reflect the erroneous
date of 19 April 1917. At the same time, it rejected CLTs explanation that the transcription of the erroneous date was a
"typographical error."
As can be gleaned from the records, both DIMSON and their successor-in-interest CLT, had failed to present evidence
before this Court to prove that there had been a mere typographical error in the transcription of their respective titles
with regard to the date of registration of OCT No. 994. CLT specifically harps on this assertion that there had only been
a typographical error in the transcription of its title.16 On the other hand, while DIMSON had refused to categorically
assert that there had been such a typographical error causing the invalidity of their title, their failure to proffer any
reason or argument which would otherwise justify why their title reflects 19 April 1917 and not 3 May 1917 leads this
Court to conclude that they simply had no basis to support their proprietary claim.
Thus, without proffering any plausible explanation as to what led to the erroneous entry of the registration dated of
OCT 994, DIMSON are left without any recourse but to substantiate their claim on the basis of other evidence not
presented during the proceedings below, which would effectively prove that they had a valid proprietary claim over the
disputed properties. This is specifically true because DIMSON had previously placed reliance on the MWSS doctrine to
prove the validity of their title.17
35
Land Titles Cases
Absent such explanation, the Heirs of Dimson were particularly constrained to rely on the 1977 Order of Judge Sayo,
which was allegedly sourced from the 1966 Order of Judge Muoz Palma. On that issue, the Special Division made
the following determinations:
It should be recalled that in their appellees brief in CA-G.R.CV No. 41883, therein appellee Jose Dimson specifically
denied the falsity of TCT No. R-15169 alleging that the contention "is already moot and can be determined by a
controlling decision."18 Jose Dimson expounded on his reliance as follows:
"In Metropolitan Waterworks & Sewerage System (for brevity MWSS) case, Jose B. Dimsons (as private respondent)
title TCT No. 15167 issued for Lot 28 on June 8, 1978 derived from OCT No. 994 registered on April 19, 1917, is
overlapping with MWSS title TCT No. 41028 issued on July 29, 1940 derived from the same OCT 994, registered on
May 3, 1917.
(Same facts in the case at bar; Jose B. Dimson (plaintiff-appellee) title TCT No. R-15169 issued for Lot 25-A-2, on
June 8, 1978, is overlapping with defendant-appellants title TCT Nos. 13574 and 21343, not derived from OCT No.
994."19
So viewed, sans any proof of a mechanical error in the transcription or annotation on their respective certificates of
title, the present inquiry then hinges on whether the Order dated 13 June 1966 issued by then Judge Cecilia
Muoz-Palma of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Civil Case No. 4557 ["PALMA ORDER"] and Judge Sayos Order
dated 18 October 1977 ["SAYOS 18 OCTOBER 1977 ORDER"], can be validated and authenticated. It is so since the
brunt of the proprietary claims of both DIMSON and CLT has its roots on said Orders.
Perforce, in consideration of the foregoing, this leads Us to the THIRD ISSUE as presented by the Supreme Court, to
wit:
"Whether the factual and legal bases of Palmas 13 June 1966 Order and Sayos 18 October 1977 Order are true
and valid. Assuming they are, do these orders establish a superior right to the subject properties in favor of the
Dimsons and CLT as opposed to the claims of Araneta and the Manotoks?"
As it is, in contending that their certificates of title could be validly traced from the 3 May 1917 OCT No. 994,
DIMSON point out that their title was issued pursuant to a court order issued by Judge Palma in Case No. 4557 and
entered in the memorandum of Encumbrance of OCT No. 994. DIMSON also insist that TCT Nos. 8692, 21857 and
26538 were mere microfilmed or certified copies and, therefore, inadmissible. Lastly, DIMSON reiterated the flaws
and irregularities which voided the titles of the ARANETA in the previous proceedings and focused on the burden of
ARANETA to present evidence to defeat their titles.
The foregoing contentions of DIMSON find to factual and legal basis. As we see it, Sayos 18 October 1977 Order,
which apparently confirmed Palmas 13 June 1966 Order, raised serious questions as to the validity of the manner
by which it was arrived at.
It is worthy to note that as early as 25 August 1981, counsel for the ARANETA applied for a subpoena duces
tecum addressed to the Clerk of Court of CFI Pasig for the production of the records of LRC Case No. 4557 for
purposes of determining the genuineness and authenticity of the signature of Judge Palma and also of her Order
granting the confirmation. A certain Atty. Contreras, Officer-in-Charge of the said court, appeared and manifested
in open court that the records pertaining to the petition for Substitution of names of Bartolome Rivera, et al. could
no longer be located inasmuch as they had passed hands from one court to another.
What is perplexing to this Court is not only the loss of the entire records of Case No. 4557 but the admission of
Judge Sayo that he had not seen the original of the Palma Order. Neither was the signature of Judge Palma on the
Order duly proven because all that was presented was an unsigned duplicate copy with a stamped notation of
"original signed." Equally perplexing is that while CFI Pasig had a Case No. 4557 on file, said file pertained not to an
LRC case but to a simple civil case.20 Thus:
"Atty. Directo:
The purpose of this subpoena duces tecum is to present your Honor the Order Order (sic) of Judge Palma in order
to determine the genuineness and authenticity of the signature of Judge Palma in this court order and which order
was a basis of a petition in this court to be confirmed. That is the reason why we want to see the genuineness of
the signature of Judge Palma.
COURT:
No signature of Judge Palma was presented in this court. it was a duplicate copy not signed. There is a stamp only
of original signed.
Atty. Directo:
That is the reason why we want to see the original.
Court:
I did not see the original also. When the records of this case was brought here, I checked the records, there were so
many pages missing and the pages were re-numbered but then I saw the duplicate original and there is a certification of
a woman clerk of Court, Atty. Molo.
Atty. Directo:
That is the reason why we want to see this document, we are surprised why it is missing.
Court:
We are surprised also. You better ask Judge Muoz Palma.
Atty. Contreras:
May I make of record that in verifying our records, we found in our original vault LRC application no. N-4557 but the
applications were certain Feliciano Manuel and Maria Leao involving Navotas property because I was wondering why
they have the same number. There should be only one.
Atty. Directo:
Aside from that, are there other cases of the same number?
Atty. Contreras:
No, there should be only number for a particular case; that must be a petition after decree record.
Atty. Ignacio:
This 4557 is not an LRC Case, it is a simple civil case.
xxxxxx
Moreover, both the MANOTOKS and ARANETA insist that Palmas 13 June 1966 Order had been recalled by a
subsequent Order dated 16 August 1966, ["RECALL ORDER"],21 wherein the trial court dismissed the motion filed by
DIMSON on the courts findings that " x x x whatever portion of the property covered by OCT 994 which has not been
disposed of by the previous registered owners have already been assigned and adjudicated to Bartolome Rivera and his
assignees, as a result of which there is no portion that is left to be given to the herein supposed assignee Jose Dimson."
However, We are reluctant to recognize the existence and due execution of the Recall Order considering that its original
or even a certified true copy thereof had not been submitted by either of the two parties relying on it despite having
been given numerous opportunities to do so.
Be that as it may, even if We are to consider that no Recall Order was ever issued by then Judge Palma, the validity of
the DIMSON titles over the properties in the Maysilo Estate becomes doubtful in light of the fact that the supposed
"share" went beyond what was actually due to Jose Dimson under the Compromise Agreement with Rivera. It should be
recalled that Palmas 13 June 1966 Order approved only the conveyance to Jose Dimson of "25% of whatever share of
Bartolome Rivera has over Lots 25, 26, 27, 28-B and 29 of OCT 994 x x x subject to availability of undisposed portion of
the said lots."22
In relation to this, We find it significant to note the observations contained in the Senate Committee Report No. 1031
that, based on the assumption that the value of the lots were equal, and "(C)onsidering that the share of Maria de la
Concepcion Vidal was only 1-189/1000 percent of the Maysilo Estate, the Riveras who claimed to be the surviving heirs
of Vidal will inherit only 197, 405.26 square meters (16,602,629.53 m2 x 1.1890%) or 19.7 hectares as their
share.23 Even if we are to base the 25% of Jose Dimson on the 19.7 hectares allotted to the Riveras, it would appear
that Jose Dimson would only be entitled to more or less five (5)hectares of the Maysilo Estate. Obviously, basing only on
TCT No. 15169 of Dimson which covered a land area of 50 hectares (500,000 square meters),24 it is undisputable that
the total properties eventually transferred to Jose Dimson went over and beyond his supposed 25% share.
What is more, Palmas 13 June 1966 Order specifically required that "x x x whatever title is to be issued herein in favor
of Jose Dimson, the same shall be based on a subdivision plan duly certified by the Land Registration Commission as
correct and in accordance with previous orders issued in this proceedings, said plan to be submitted to this court for
final approval.
Interestingly however, despite such requirement, DIMSON did not submit Survey Plan LRC (GLRO) Rec. No. 4429
SWO-5268 which allegedly was the basis of the segregation of the lands, if only to prove that the same had been duly
approved and certified correct by the Land Registration Commission. What was submitted before the RTC and this
Court was only the Subdivision Plan of Lot 25-A-2 which notably does not bear the stamp of approval of the LRC. Even
an inspection of the exhibit for CLT does not bear this Survey Plan, which could have, at the very least, proven the
authenticity of the DIMSON title.
Indeed, We find the absence of this piece of evidence as crucial in proving the validity of the titles of DIMSON in view of
the allegation of contending parties that since the survey plan upon which the land titles were based contained the
notation "SWO," meaning that the subdivision plan was only a product of a "special work order," the same could not
have passed the LRC. Neither was it duly certified by the said office.25
36
Land Titles Cases
In addition, the Special Division took note of other irregularities attending Dimsons TCT No. R-15169.
[Firstly], OCT No. 994 showed that Lot 25-A of the Maysilo Estate was originally surveyed on "September 8-27, 1911,
October 4-21 and November 17-18, 1911." Yet, in said TCT No. R-15169, the date of the original survey is reflected
as "Sept. 8-27, 1911" and nothing more.26 The variation in date is revealing considering that DIMSONs titles are all
direct transfers from OCT No. 994 and, as such, would have faithfully adopted the mother lots data. Unfortunately,
no explanation for the variance was ever offered.
Equally worthy of consideration is the fact that TCT No. 15169 indicates that not only was the date of original
registration inexistent, but the remarks thereon tend to prove that OCT No. 994 had not been presented prior to
the issuance of the said transfer certificate. This manifest from the notations "NA" on the face of DIMSONs title
meaning, "not available." It bears emphasizing that the issuance of a transfer certificate of title to the purchaser
without the production of the owners duplicate is illegal (Rodriguez v. Llorente, 49 Phil. 826) and does not confer
any right to the purchaser (Philippine National Bank vs. Fernandez, 61 Phil. 448 [1935]). The Registrar of Deeds
must, therefore, deny registration of any deed or voluntary instrument if the owners duplicate is not presented in
connection therewith. (Director of Lands vs. Addison, 40 Phil. 19 [1926]; Hodges vs. Treasurer of the Phil. 50 Phil. 16
[1927].27
In has also been held that, in cases where transfer certificates of title emanating from one common original
certificate of title were issued on different dates to different persons or entities covering the same land, it would be
safe to conclude that the transfer certificate issued at an earlier date along the line should prevail, barring anomaly
in the process of registration.28 Thus, "(w)here two certificates purport to include the same land, the earlier in date
prevails. X x x. In successive registration, where more than one certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate
or interest in land, the person is deemed to hold under the prior certificate who is the holder or whose claim is
derived directly from the person who was the holder of the earliest certificate issued in respect thereof. x x x"29
xxx
Still another indication of irregularity of the DIMSON title over Lot No. 25-A is that the issuance of the Sayo Order
allegedly confirming the Palma Order was in itself suspect. Gleaning from the records, DIMSON filed the Motion
only on 10 October 1977, or eleven (11) years after obtaining the supposed sanction for the issuance of titles in this
name. Besides, what was lodged by Jose Dimson before the sala of then Judge Palma was not a simple land
registration case wherein the only purpose of Jose Dimson was to establish his ownership over the subject parcels
of land, but, as reflected in the Palma Order, the subject of the case was the confirmation of Jose Dimsons claim
over the purported rights of Rivera in the disputed properties. The case did not partake of the nature of a
registration proceeding and thus, evidently did not observe the requirements in land registration cases. Unlike in a
land registration case, therefore, Jose Dimson needed to file an action before Judge Sayo to seek "confirmation" of
Palmas Order dated 13 June 1966.
So viewed the general rule proscribing the application of laches or the statute of limitations in land registration
cases,30 as well as Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, in relation to its provisions on revival of judgment
applies only to ordinary civil actions and not to other or extraordinary proceedings such as land registration cases,
is clearly not applicable in the present case. The legal consequences of laches as committed by DIMSON and their
failure to observe the provisions of Rule 39 should, therefore, find application in this case and thus, the
confirmation of DIMSONs title, if any, should fail.
Parenthetically, the allegations of DIMSON would further show that they derive the validity of their certificates of
title from the decreased Jose Dimsons 25% share in the alleged hereditary rights of Bartolome Rivera ["RIVERA"] as
an alleged grandson of Maria Concepcion Vidal ["VIDAL"]. However, the records of these cases would somehow
negate the rights of Rivera to claim from Vidal. The Verification Report of the Land Registration
Commission dated 3 August 1981 showed that Rivera was 65 years old on 17 May 1963 (as gathered from the
records of Civil Case Nos. 4429 and 4496).31 It can thus be deduced that, if Rivera was already 65 years old in 1963,
then he must have been born around 1898. On the other hand, Vidal was only nine (9) years in 1912; hence, she
could have been born only on 1905. This alone creates an unexplained anomalous, if not ridiculous, situation
wherein Vidal, Riveras alleged grandmother, was seven (7) years younger than her alleged grandson. Serious
doubts existed as to whether Rivera was in fact an heir of Vidal, for him to claim a share in the disputed portions of
the Maysilo Estate.32
These findings are consonant with the observations raised by Justice Renato Corona in his Concurring and
Dissenting Opinion on our 2007 Resolution. To wit:
TCT No. T-177013 covers Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate with an area of 891,547.43 sq. m. It
was a transfer from TCT No. R-17994 issued in the name of Estelita I. Hipolito. On the other
hand, TCT No. R-17994 was a transfer from TCT No. R-15166 in the name of Jose B. Dimson
which, in turn, was supposedly a direct transfer from OCT No. 994 registered on April 19, 1917.
Annotations at the back of Hipolito's title revealed that Hipolito acquired ownership by virtue of
a court order dated October 18, 1977 approving the compromise agreement which admitted
the sale made by Dimson in her favor on September 2, 1976. Dimson supposedly acquired
ownership by virtue of the order dated June 13, 1966 of the CFI of Rizal, Branch 1 in Civil Case
No. 4557 awarding him, as his attorney's fees, 25% of whatever remained of Lots 25-A, 26, 27,
28 and 29 that were undisposed of in the intestate estate of the decedent Maria de la
Concepcion Vidal, one of the registered owners of the properties covered by OCT No. 994. This
order was confirmed by the CFI of Caloocan in a decision dated October 13, 1977 and order
dated October 18, 1977 in SP Case No. C-732.
However, an examination of the annotation on OCT No. 994, particularly the following entries,
showed:
AP-6665/0-994 Venta: Queda cancelado el presente Certificado en cuanto a una extencion
superficial de 3,052.93 metros cuadrados y 16,512.50 metros cuadrados, y descrita en el lote no.
26, vendida a favor de Alejandro Ruiz y Mariano P Leuterio, el primer casado con Deogracias
Quinones el Segundo con Josefa Garcia y se ha expedido el certificado de Titulo No; 4210,
pagina 163 Libro T-22.
Fecha del instrumento Agosto 29, 1918
Fecha de la inscripcion September 9, 1918
10.50 AM
AP-6665/0-994 Venta: Queda cancelado el presente Certficado el cuanto a una extencion
superficial de 871,982.00 metros cuadrados, descrita en el lote no. 26, vendida a favor de
Alejandro Ruiz y Mariano P. Leuterio, el primer casado con Deogracias Quinones el segundo con
Josefa Garcia y se ha expedido el certificado de Titulo No 4211, pagina 164, Libro T-22.
Fecha del instrumento Agosto 25, 1918
Fecha de la inscripcion September 9, 1918
10:50- AM
Based on the description of Lot No. 26 in OCT No. 994, it has an area of 891,547.43 sq. m. which
corresponds to the total area sold in 1918 pursuant to the above-cited entries. Inasmuch as, at
the time the order of the CFI of Rizal was made on June 13, 1966, no portion of Lot No. 26
remained undisposed of, there was nothing for the heirs of Maria de la Concepcion Vidal to
convey to Dimson. Consequently, Dimson had nothing to convey to Hipolito who, by logic, could
not transmit anything to CLT.
Moreover, subdivision plan Psd-288152 covering Lot No. 26 of the Maysilo Estate described in
Hipolito's certificate of title was not approved by the chief of the Registered Land Division as it
appeared to be entirely within Pcs-1828, Psd-5079, Psd-5080 and Psd-15345 of TCT Nos. 4210
and 4211. How Hipolito was able to secure TCT No. R-17994 was therefore perplexing, to say
the least.
All these significant facts were conveniently brushed aside by the trial and appellate courts. The
circumstances called for the need to preserve and protect the integrity of the Torrens system.
However, the trial and appellate courts simply disregarded them.33
The Court thus adopts these findings of the Special Division on the validity of Jose Dimsons titles, which he obtained
consequent to the 1977 Order of Judge Sayo. Consequently, we cannot give due legal recognition to any and all titles
supposedly covering the Maysilo Estate obtained by Dimson upon the authority of either the purported 1966 Order of
Judge Muoz-Palma or the 1977 Order of Judge Sayo.
B.
Indubitably, as between the titles of ARANETA and the MANOTOKS and their predecessors-in-interest, on one hand,
and those of DIMSON, on the other, the titles held by ARANETA and the MANOTOKS must prevail considering that their
titles were issued much earlier than the titles of the latter.
Our findings regarding the titles of Jose Dimson necessarily affect and even invalidate the claims of all persons who seek
to derive ownership from the Dimson titles. These include CLT, which acquired the properties they laid claim on from
Estelita Hipolito who in turn acquired the same from Jose Dimson. Just as much was concluded by the Special Division
as it evaluated CLTs claims.
37
Land Titles Cases
For its part, CLT contended that even at the trial court level, it maintained that there was
only one OCT No. 994 from where its claim emanates. It argued that its case against the
MANOTOKS, including that of STO. NIO, was never decided based on the doctrines laid
down in Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System v. Court of Appeals34 and Heirs of
Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals.35
Before this Special Division, CLT insists that the MANOTOKS failed to submit "new"
competent evidence and, therefore, dwelling on the alleged flaws of the MANOTOKs titles,
"the findings and conclusions of the court-appointed commissioners as adopted by the trial
court, then upheld by the Honorable Court in its Decision dated 28 September 1995 and
finally affirmed in the Supreme Courts Decision dated 29 November 2005, therefore stand,
as there is no reason to disturb them."
Furthermore, CLT contends that the Orders of Judge Palma and Judge Sayo are no longer
open to attack in view of their finality. Lastly, CLT asserts that the properties covered by the
MANOTOKS titles and those covered by the expropriation proceedings did not property
pertain to and were different from Lot 26 owned by CLT. Thus, it maintains that the
MANOTOKS cannot use as basis for the validity of their titles the expropriation undertaken
by the Government as a means of staking their claims.
To restate, CLT claims the 891,547.43 square meters of land covered by TCT No.
T-17701336 located in Malabon, Caloocan City and designated as "Lot 26, Maysilo Estate,
LRC Swo-5268." TCT No. T-177013 shows that its mother titles is OCT No. 994 registered on
19 April 1917. Tracing said claim, Estelita Hipoloto executed a Deed of Sale with Real Estate
Mortgage in favor of CLT on 10 December 1988. By virtue of this transfer, Hipolitos TCT No.
R-1799437 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, CLTs TCT No. 223677/R-17994 of TCT No.
R-17994. Hipolito, on the other hand, was a transferee of the deceased Dimson who was
allegedly the registered owner of the subject land on the basis of TCT No. 15166.
In view of the foregoing disquisitions, invalidating the titles of DIMSON, the title of CLT
should also be declared a nullity inasmuch as the nullity of the titles of DIMSON necessarily
upended CLTs propriety claims. As earlier highlighted, CLT had anchored its claim on the
strength of Hipolitos title and that of DIMSONs TCT No. 15166. Remarkably and curiously
though, TCT No. 15166 was never presented in evidence for purposes of tracing the validity
of titles of CLT. On this basis alone, the present remand proceedings remain damning to
CLTs claim of ownership.
Moreover, considering that the land title of CLT carried annotations identical to those of
DIMSON and consequently included the defects in DIMSONs title, the fact that whatever
typographical errors were not at anytime cured by subsequent compliance with the
administrative requirements or subjected to administrative correction bolsters the invalidity
of the CLT title due to its complete and sole dependence on the void DIMSON title.38
IV.
The task of the Special Division was not limited to assessing the claims of the Heirs of Dimson and CLT. We likewise
tasked the Special Division to ascertain as well the validity of the titles held by the Manotoks and Araneta, titles
which had been annulled by the courts below. Facially, these titles of the Manotoks and Araneta reflect, as their
valid mother title, OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917. Nonetheless, particular issues were raised as to the validity of
the Manotok and Araneta titles independent of their reliance on the 3 May 1917 OCT No. 994 vis--vis the
inexistent 19 April 1917 OCT No. 994.
A.
We begin by evaluating the Araneta titles. The Special Division quoted the observations of the trial court, which
upheld Dimsons claim over that of Araneta, citing the following perceived flaws of TCT Nos. 26538 and 26539, from
which Araneta derived its titles, thus:
Let us now examine TCT 26538 and TCT 26539 both in the name of Jose Ma. Rato from where defendant was said
to have acquired TCT 13574 and TCT 7784 now TCT 21343 in the name of Araneta and the other documents related
thereto:
1) Perusal of TCT 26538 shows that its Decree No. and Record No. are both 4429. In the same vein, TCT 26539 also
shows that it has Decree No. 4429 and Record No. 4429.
However, Decree No. 4429 was issued by the Court of First Instance, Province of Isabela (Exhibit I) and Record No. 4429,
issued for Ordinary Land Registration Case, was issued on March 31, 1911 in CLR No. 5898, Laguna (Exhibit 8, 8-A
Bartolome Rivera et al.)
How then could TCT No. 26538 and TCT No. 26539 both have Decree No. 4429 and Record No. 4429, which were issued
in Court of First Instance, Province of Isabela and issued in Laguna, respectively.
2) TCT no. 26538 and TCT No. 26539 in the name of Jose Ma. Rato are not annotated in the Original Certificate of Title
994, where they were said to have originated.
3) The Escritura de Incorporacion de Philippine Land Improvement Company (Exhibit I) executed on April 8, 1925 was
only registered and was stamped received by the Office of the Securities and Exchange Commission only April 29, 1953
when the Deed of Sale & Mortgage was executed on August 23, 1947 (Exh. 5 defendant) and the Novation of Contract,
Deed of Sale and Mortgage executed on November 13, 1947 (Exh. M0. So, that when Philippine Land Improvement was
allegedly given a special power of attorney by Jose Ma. Rato to represent him in the execution of the said two (2)
documents, the said Philippine Land Improvement Company has not yet been duly registered.
4) TCT 26538 and 26538 and TCT 26539 both in the name of Jose Ma. Rato, both cancel 21857 which was never
presented in Court if only to have a clear tracing back of the titles of defendant Araneta.
5) If the subject matter of the Deed of Sale & Mortgage (Exhibit 5 defendant) is TCT 26539, why is it that TCT 13574 of
defendant Araneta cancels TCT 6196 instead of TCT 26539. That was never explained. TCT 6196 was not even presented
in Court.
6) How come TCT 26538 of Jose Ma. Rato with an area of 593,606.90 was cancelled by TCT 7784 with an area of only
390,282 sq.m.
7) How was defendant Araneta able to have TCT 7784 issued in its name, when the registration of the document
entitled Novation of Contract, Deed of Sale & Mortgage (Exhibit M) was suspended/denied (Exhibit N) and no title was
received by the Register of Deeds of Pasig at the time the said document was filed in the said Office on March 4, 1948
(Exhibit N and N-1).
Under Sec. 55 of Land Registration Act (Act No. 496) now Sec. 53 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, no new certificate of
title shall be entered, no memorandum shall be made upon any certificate of title by the register of deeds, in pursuance
of any deed or other voluntary instrument, unless the owners duplicate certificate is presented for such endorsement.
8) The sale by Jose Ma. Rato in favor of defendant Araneta is not reflected on the Memorandum of Encumbrances of
TCT 26538 (Exhibit 7-defendant) meaning that TCT 26538 still exists and intact except for the encumbrances annotated
in the Memorandum of Encumbrances affecting the said title (Exhibits 16, 16-A and 16-N David & Santos)
9) In the encumbrances annotated at the back of TCT 26539 (Exhibit 4-defendant) there appears under entry No. 450 T
6196 Victoneta, Incorporated covering parcel of land canceling said title (TCT 26539) and TCT 6196 was issued ( x x x)
which could have referred to the Deed (sic) of Sale and Mortgage of 8-23-47 (Exhibit 5-defendant) entered before Entry
5170 T-8692 Convenio Philippine Land Improvement Company, with Date of Instrument: 1-10-29, and Date of
Inscription: 9-21-29.
In TCT 26838 this Entry 5170 T-8692 Convenio Philippine Land Improvement Company (Exhibit 16-J-1) appears, but the
document, Novation of Contract, Deed of Sale & Mortgage dated November 13, 1947 (Exhibit M) does not appear.
Entry marked Exhibit 16-J-1 on TCT 26538 shows only the extent of the value of P42,000.00 invested by Jose Ma. Rato in
the Philippine Land Improvement Company. Said entry was also entered on TCT 26539.
The Court also wonders why it would seem that all the documents presented by defendant Araneta are not in
possession of said defendant, for according to witness Zacarias Quintan, the real estate officer of the said defendant
Araneta since 1970, his knowledge of the land now in possession of defendant Araneta was acquired by him from all its
documents marked in evidence which were obtained only lately when they needed for presentation before this
Court.3940
The Special Division then proceeded to analyze these factual contentions, and ultimately concluded that the Araneta
claim to title was wholly valid. We adopt in full the following factual findings of the Special Division, thus:
As for the proprietary claim of ARANETA, it maintains that it has established by direct evidence that its titles were
validly derived from OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917. With regard to the imputed flaws, it asseverates that these were
unfounded and thus, labored to refute all of them. ARANETA further expounded on the nullity of the Palma and Sayo
Orders which was the basis of DIMSONs titles.
The documentary exhibits it proffered traced its certificates of title to OCT No. 994 registered on 3 May 1917. From the
titles submitted, its predecessor-in-interest was Jose Ma. Rato y Tuazon ["RATO"], one of the co-heirs named in OCT No.
994, who was allotted the share of nine and five hundred twelve one thousandths (9-512/1000) percent share of the
38
Land Titles Cases
Maysilo Estate.41 For this reason, to ascertain the legitimacy of the derivative title of ARANETA, the origin and
authenticity of the title of RATO need to be reassessed.
Verily, attesting to RATOs share on the property, Entry No. 12343/O-994 of the Owners Duplicate Copy of OCT no.
994, records the following:
"12343/O-994 Auto: Jose Rato y Tuason - - - Queda cancelado el presente seartificado en cuanto a una estension
superficial de 1,405,725.90 metro Cuadrados mas o menos descrita en el Lote No. 25-A-3, an virtud del auto
dictado por el Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Riza, de fecha 28 de Julio de 1924, y que en au lugar se had
expedido el Certificados de Titulo No. 8692, folio 492 del Tomo T-35 del Libro de Certicadads de Transferencia.
Date of Instrument Julio 28, 1924.
Date of Inscription Agosto 1, 1024 10:19 a.m.
SGD. GLICERIO OPINION, Register of deeds
Agosto 19, 192442
In accordance with the decree, RATO was issued on 1 August 1924, TCT No. 8692 43 which covers "Lote No. 25 A-3
del plano del subdivision, parte del Lote No. 25-A, plano Psu-(not legible), "Hacienda de Maysilo," situado en el
Munisipio de Caloocan, Provincia del Rizal x x x."44 The parcel of land covers an approximate area of "UN MILLION
CUATROCIENTOS CINCO MIL SETECIENTOS VEINTICINCO metros cuadrados con NOVENTA decimetros cuadrados
(1,405,725.90) mas o menos." As reflected under Entry No. 14517.T-8692,45 the parcel of land covered under this
certificate of title was subdivided into five (5) lots under subdivision plan Psd-6599 as per Order of the court of First
Instance of Rizal. Consequently, TCT Nos. 21855, 21856, 21857, 21858 and 21859 were issued.
Focusing on TCT No. 21857 issued on 23 May 1932, this certificate of title issued in RATOs name,46 cancelled TCT
No. 869247 with respect to the property it covers. On its face, TCT No. 21857,48 was a derivative of OCT No. 994
registered on 3 May 1917. It covers Lot No. 25 A-3-C of subdivision plan Psd-6589, being a portion of Lot No. 25-A-3,
G.L.R.O Record No. 4429. Thereafter, TCT No. 21857 was cancelled by TCT No. 2653849 and TCT No. 2653950which
were both issued in the name of Jose Ma. Rato y Tuazon on 17 September 1934.
With respect to TCT No. 26539, the certificate of title showed that it covered a parcel of land designated as Section
No. 2 of the subdivision plan Psd-10114, being a portion of Lot 25-A-3-C having an approximate area of 581,872
square meters.51 Thereafter, TCT No. 26539 was cancelled by TCT No. 619652 whose registered owner appears to
be a certain Victoneta, Inc. This parcel of land has an area of 581,872 square meters designated as section No. 2 of
subdivision plan Psd-10114, being a portion of Lot 25-A-3-C.
As shown on its face, TCT No. 6196 issued on 18 October 1947 in the name of Victoneta, Inc. and its mother title
were traced from OCT No. 994 registered on 3 May 1917. Later, TCT No. 6196 was cancelled, and in lieu thereof,
TCT No. 13574 was issued in favor of Araneta Institute of Agriculture on 20 May 1949.53 It covers a parcel of land
designated as section No. 2 of subdivision plan Psd-10114, being a portion of Lot 25-A-3-C. It has an aggregate area
of 581,872 square meters.
On the other hand, appearing under Entry No. 16086/T-No. 13574 of TCT No. 6196 is the following:
"Entry No. 16086/T-No. 13574 SALE in favor of the ARANETA INSTITUTE OF AGRICULTURE, vendee: Conveying the
property described in this certificate of title which is hereby cancelled and issuing in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 13574, page 74, Book T-345 in the name of the vendee. (Doc. No. 149, page 98, Book II, S. of 1949 of
Notary Public for Manila, Hospicio B. Bias).
Date of Instrument May 18, 1949
Date of the Inscription May 30, 1949 at 11:00 a.m.54
TCT No. 2653855 in turn showed on its face that it covers a parcel of land designated as Section 1 of subdivision plan
Psd-10114 being a portion of Lot 25-A-3-C having an area of 592,606.90 square meters.56
On 4 March 1948, TCT No. 26538 was cancelled by TCT No. 7784, which was issued in favor of Araneta Institute of
Agriculture. TCT No. 7784 covers four (4) parcels of land with an aggregate area of 390,282 square meters.57 It
would appear from the records of CA-G.R. SP No. 34819 consolidated with CA-G.R. CV No. 41883 that TCT No. 7784
was eventually cancelled by TCT No. 21343.58 As per attachment of ARANETA in its Answer dated 6 march 1980
filed in Civil Case No. 8050, a mere copy of TCT No. 21343 showed that it covers a parcel of land designated as Lot
6-B of the subdivision plan Psd-24962 being a portion of Lot 6, described as plan Psd-21943, G.L.R.O. Record No.
4429 with an approximate area of 333,377 square meters.59 However, for reasons unknown, a copy of TCT No.
21343, whether original or certified true copy thereof, was not submitted before this Court.
In summation, ARANETA had shown that RATO, as one of the co-owners of the property covered by OCT NO. 994,
was assigned Lot No. 25-A-3. His evidence of ownership is reflected on TCT No. 8692 issued in his name. RATO held
title to these parcels of land even after its subdivision in the 1930s. Further subdividing the property, RATO was
again issued TCT No. 21857, and later TCT Nos. 26538 and 26539, still covering Lot No. 25 A-3-C. In all his certificates of
title, including those that ultimately passed ownership to ARANETA, the designation of the lot as either belonging to or
portions of Lot 25-A-3 was retained, thereby proving identity of the land.
More importantly, the documentary trail of land titles showed that all of them were derived from OCT No. 994
registered on 3 May 1917. For purposes of tracing ARANETAs titles to Oct No. 994, it would appear that the evidence
presented ultimately shows a direct link of TCT Nos. 7784 and 13574 to said mother title. Suffice it to state, the origin
and legitimacy of the proprietary claim of ARANETA had been well substantiated by the evidence on record and on this
note, said titles deserve validation.
Under the guidelines set, we shall now proceed to evaluate the imputed flaws which had been the previous bases of the
trial court in invalidating ARANETAs titles.
One of the flaws observed on the titles of ARANETAs predecessor-in-interest was that TCT No. 26538 and TCT No.
26539 in Ratos name refer to Decree No. 4429 and Record No. 4429, as basis of their issuance. This is being questioned
inasmuch as Decree No. 4429 refers to a decree issued by the CFI of Isabela while Record No. 4429 was issued for
ordinary Land Registration Case No. 31 March 1911 in CLR No. 5898 of Laguna.
Explaining this discrepancy, ARANETA insisted that the same was a mere typographical error and did not have any effect
on the validity of their title. It further contended that the number "4429" was the case number of Decree No. 36455
and was used interchangeably as the record number.
This Court finds that the incorrect entry with respect to the Decree and Record Number appearing on the title of
ARANETAs predecessor-in-interest cannot, by itself, invalidate the titles of ARANETAs predecessors-in-interest and
ultimately, that of ARANETA. To the mind of this Court, the incorrect entries alluded to would not have the effect of
rendering the previous titles void sans any strong showing of fraudulent or intentional wrongdoing on the part of the
person making such entries. Fraud is never presumed but must be established by clear and convincing evidence.60The
strongest suspicion cannot sway judgment or overcome the presumption of regularity. The sea of suspicion has no
shore, and the court that embarks upon it is without rudder or compass.61
The Supreme Court, in Encinas v. National Bookstore, Inc.62 acknowledged that certain defects on a certificate of title,
specifically, the interchanging of numbers, may occur and "it is certainly believable that such variance in the copying of
entries could be merely a typographical or clerical error." In such cases, citing with approval the decision of the
appellate court, the technical description in the title should prevail over the record number.63
Thus, what is of utmost importance is that the designation and the technical description of the land, as stated on the
face of the title, had not been shown to be erroneous or otherwise inconsistent with the source of titles. In ARANETAs
case, all the titles pertaining to Lot No. 25 had been verified to be an offshoot of Decree No. 36455 and are all located in
Tinajeros, Malabon. At any rate, despite the incorrect entries on the title, the properties, covered by the subject
certificates of title can still be determined with sufficient certainty.
It was also opined that TCT No. 26538 and TCT No. 26539 in the name of RATO had not been annotated on OCT No. 994
from which said titles had supposedly originated. It should be stressed that what partially cancelled OCT No. 994 with
respect to this subject lot were not TCT Nos. 26538 and 26539 but TCT No. 8692 issued on 1 August 1924. In fact, TCT
Nos. 26538 and 26539 are not even the immediate predecessors of OCT No. 994 but were mere derivatives of TCT No.
21857. Logically therefore, these two certificates of title could not have been annotated on OCT No. 994, they not being
the preceding titles.
In any case, a perusal of OCT No. 994 shows an entry, which pertains to Jose Ma. Rato but, on account of the physical
condition of the copy submitted to this Court, the entry remains illegible for us to make a definite conclusion. 64 On the
other hand, Entry No. 12343/O-994 found on the Owners Duplicate Copy of OCT No. 994 specifically recorded the
issuance of TCT No. 8692 over Lot No. 25-A-3.65
The other flaws noted on ARANETAs certificates of title pertained to its failure to present TCT Nos. 21857, 6196 and
21343. As we have discussed, ARANETA offered in evidence a certified microfilm copy of TCT No. 21857 and a certified
true copy of TCT No. 6196 marked as Exhibits 5-A1A and 19-A1A, respectively. However, it failed to submit a copy of
said TCT No. 21343. Be that as it may, we will not hasten to declare void TCT No. 7784 as a consequence of such
omission, especially so since TCT No. 21343 appears to be a mere derivative of TCT No. 7784. Given that the validity of
TCT No. 7784 had been preponderantly proven in these proceedings, the authenticity of said title must be sustained.
Besides, ARANETAs failure to submit TCT No. 21343 had never been put into issue in these proceedings.
With respect to the difference in the area of more than 200,0000 square meters between TCT No. 7784 and TCT No.
26538, we find that the trial court failed to consider the several conveyances of portions of TCT No. 26538 before they
finally passed on to ARANETA. Thus, on the Memorandum of Encumbrance of TCT No. 26538, it is apparent that
portions of this piece of land had been sold to various individuals before the same were transferred to ARANETA on 4
39
Land Titles Cases
march 1948. Naturally, since the subject land had been partially cancelled with respect to the portion disposed of,
it could not be expected that the area of TCT No. 26538 will remain the same at the time of its transfer to ARANETA.
Even assuming that the entire area covered by TCT No. 26538 had been disposed of, this fact alone, cannot lend us
to conclude that the conveyance was irregular. An anomaly exists if the area covered under the derivative title will
be much more than its predecessor-in-interest. Evidently, this is not so in the case before us.
The trial court, relying on Exhibit "N", further asserted that ARANETA should not have been issued TCT No. 7784
considering that the registration of the Novation of Contract, deed of Sale & Mortgage was suspended/denied and
no title was received by the Register of Deeds of Pasig at the time the said document was filed in the said Office on
march 4, 1948. A perusal of Exhibit "N" submitted before the trial court, shows that the suspension or denial was
merely conditional considering that the person seeking registration had give days within which to correct the
defects before final denial thereof. As we see it, the Notice merely contained a warning regarding the denial of the
registration of the voluntary deed but, in no way, did it affect the vested rights of ARANETA to be land. The fact that
the title to the land was subsequently issued free from any notation of the alluded defect creates a reasonable
presumption that ARANETA was in fact able to comply with the condition imposed. This is especially true since the
notice itself contained a note, "Just Completed," written across the face of the letter.
Records also reveal the RTCs observation with regard to Aranetas failure to disprove the result of the plotting
made on the subject land (Exhibit K) to the effect that TCT 26538 overlaps portion of TCT 15159 and TCT 26539
also overlaps the other portion of said TCT R-15169. The trial court further noted that "TCT R-15169 (Jose
Dimson) and TCT 26539 (Jose Rato) and TCT 21343 (Araneta) are overlapping each other within Lot 25-A. That
portion of TCT R-15169 (Jose Dimson) along bearing distance points to 17 to 18 to 19 to 20 to 21 to 1 and 2 shaded
in yellow color in the Plan is not covered by TCT 21343 (Araneta)."66
Scrutinizing Exhibit "K," it becomes apparent that the said evidence relied upon was only a private survey
conducted by Geodetic Engineer Reggie P. Garcia which had not been duly approved by the Bureau of Lands and
was based only on photocopies of relevant land titles.67 What is more, said geodetic engineer also failed to
adequately explain his observations, approach and manner of plotting the relative positions of the lots.68 From all
indications, the conclusions reached by said geodetic engineer were anchored on unfounded generalizations.
Another defect cited on ARANETAs title was the absence of any entry on the Memorandum of Encumbrances of
TCT No. 26538 of the alleged sale between RATO and ARANETA. As pointed out by ARANETA, the copy of TCT No.
26538 submitted to the trial court contained entries only up to the year 1947, thus, explaining the (1) lack of entry
with regard to the issuance of TCT No. 7784 in favor of ARANETA considering that the same was issued a year later
and; (2) entry pertaining to Convenio Philippine Land Improvement Company which was entered way back on 21
August 1929.
Nonetheless, it still cannot be denied that Rato and ARANETA together with Don Salvador Araneta, entered into a
voluntary agreement with the intention of transferring the ownership of the subject property. Moreover, no
conclusion should have been reached regarding the total cancellation of TCT No. 26538 inasmuch as TCT No. 7784
cancelled the former certificate of title to the extent only of Three Hundred Ninety Thousand Two Hundred Eighty
Two (390,282) square meters.
Notably also, with the evident intent to discredit and refute the title of ARANETA, DIMSON submitted TCT Nos.
2653869 and 21857,70 which are both derivatives of OCT No. 994 registered on 3 May 1917 and cover parcels of
land located in Malabon, Rizal. However, these certificates of title reflect different registered owners and
designation of the land covered.
Pertinently, Exhibit "M-Dimson" relating to TCT No. 26538, registered on 12 June 1952, points to one Angela
Bautista de Alvarez as the registered owner of a 240 square meter of land designated as Lot No. 19, Block 14 of the
subdivision plan Psd-5254 being a portion of Lot No. 7-A-1-A. This certificate of title cancels TCT No. 14112/T-348
and refers to a certain TCT No. 30473 on the inscriptions.
Exhibit "N-Dimson," on the other hand, pertaining to TCT No. 21857 was issued on 30 March 1951 to one Angela I.
Tuason de Perez married to Antonio Perez. This certificate of Title covers a parcel of land described as Lot No. 21,
Block 16 of the consolidation and subdivision plan Pcs-140, G.L.R.O. Record No. 4429. It ahs an area of 436 square
meters and cancels TCT No. 21856.
Exhibit "Q-Dimson"71 consisting of TCT No. 8692 covers two parcels of land designated as Lot Nos. 1 and 2 of Block
No. 44 of the consolidation Subdivision Plan Pcs-188 with a total area of 3,372 square meters. It was issued to
Gregorio Araneta, Incorporated on 7 May 1948. This certificate of title cancelled TCT No. 46118.
Comparing these titles to those of the ARANETA, it is apparent that no identity of the land could be found. The
Supreme Court, in the case of Alonso v. Cebu City Country Club, Inc. 72 agreeing with the Court of Appeals
dissertation in said case, ruled that there is nothing fraudulent for a certificate of title to bear the same number as
another title to another land. On this score, the Supreme Court elucidated as follows:
"On the question that TCT No. RT-1310 (T-1151) bears the same number as another title to another land, we agree with
the Court of Appeals that there is nothing fraudulent with the fact that Cebu Country Club, Inc.s reconstituted title
bears the same number as the title of another parcel of land. This came about because under General Land Registration
Office (GLRO) Circular No. 17, dated February 19, 1947, and Republic Act No. 26 and Circular No. 6, RD 3, dated August
5, 1946, which were in force at the time the title was reconstituted on July 26, 1946, the titles issued before the
inauguration of the Philippine Republic were numbered consecutively and the titles issued after the inauguration were
numbered also consecutively starting with No. 1, so that eventually, the titles issued before the inauguration were
duplicated by titles issued after the inauguration of the Philippine Republic x x x."
Parenthetically, in their Motion for Partial Reconsideration of this Courts Resolution dated 30 October 2008, DIMSON
objected to the admissibility of Exhibits 4-A1A to 7-A1A on the ground that ARANETA failed to submit the original copies
of these certificates of title and contended that the "originals" contain different "contents" from their own Exhibits M,
N and Q.73 The fact that the entries contained in ARANETAs pieces of evidence are different from that of DIMSONs do
not automatically make ARANETAs exhibits inferior replications or a confirmation of their falsity. Interestingly, the
objection regarding the non-submission of the "original copy" had not been raised by DIMSON in their
Comments/Objections to Consolidated Formal Offer of Evidence (Of Araneta Institute of Agriculture, Inc.).74 In any case,
we find the objections unwarranted considering that certified true copies or certified microfilm copies of Exhibits 4-A1A
to 7-A1A had been submitted by ARANETA in these proceedings.
Lastly, on the alleged non-registration of Philippine Land Improvement Company at the time the special power of
attorney was executed by Jose Ma. Rato to represent him in the execution of the deed of conveyances, the same only
proves that Philippine Land Improvement Company was not yet registered and this does not go as far as proving the
existence or non-existence of the company at which time it was executed. In effect, the company was not precluded to
enter into contracts and be bound by them but it will do so at the risk of the adverse effects of non-registration under
the law.
Ultimately, the question of whether the aforesaid certificates of title constitute as clouds on ARANETAs titles are not
for this Court to rule upon for purposes of the present remand. Needless to state, it is not for the Heirs of Dimson to
rely on the weakness of ARANETAs titles and profit from it. Rather, they should have focused on the strength of their
own titles since it is not within our office to decide in whose hands the contested lands should go, our task being merely
to trace back the parties claims to OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917.75
There is no question that the Araneta titles were derived from OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917, particularly from the
share of Jose Ma. Rato y Tuazon, one of the co-heirs named in OCT No. 994. The Special Division correctly assessed,
among others, the reference to Decree No. 4429 and Record No. 4429 in some of the antecedent titles of Araneta 76 as
mere clerical errors that could not have invalidated said titles, "4429" being the case number of Decree No. 36455, and
the designation and the technical description of the land on those titles not having been shown to be erroneous or
variant with the source title. The Special Division also correctly considered that the trial court had failed to take into
account the several conveyances of TCT No. 26538 before it was ultimately transferred to Araneta in 1948, which
explain the difference in area between TCT No. 7784 and TCT No. 26538. The imputed overlap of TCT No. 26538 and
TCT No. 26539 with the titles held by Dimson was based on a private survey which had not been duly approved by the
Bureau of Lands. The alleged absence of any entry on the Memorandum of Encumbrances of TCT No. 26538 of the sale
of the property between Rato and Araneta did not, according to the Special Division, discount the fact that Rato and
Araneta entered into a voluntary agreement with the intention of transferring the ownership of the subject property.
Finally, the Special Division noted that the titles derived from OCT No. 994, which Dimson had submitted as evidence to
discredit the Araneta claim, pertain to properties wholly different from those covered by the Araneta titles.
There is no cause to dispute the factual findings and conclusions of the Special Division on the validity of the Araneta
titles, and we affirm the same.
B.
It appears that the claim to title of the Manotoks is somewhat more controversial. The Special Division did not discount
the fact that there could have been flaws in some of the intervening titles between the 3 May 1917 OCT No. 994 and
the present titles of the Manotoks. However, the significant event was the expropriation proceedings undertaken by
the Republic of the Philippines sometime in 1947. At least some of the titles in the name of the Manotoks were sourced
from the titles issued to and subsequently distributed by the Republic. The Special Division explained the milieu in full:
VALIDITY OF THE MANOTOK TITLES
40
Land Titles Cases
The notation under Entry No. 6655/O-994, found on page 17 of OCT 994 of the Owners
Duplicate Copy, shows that Lot No. 26 had been a subject of sale in favor of Alejandro Ruiz
and Mariano P. Leuterio.77 The notations reads:
"Ap. 6655/O-994 Venta: Queda Cancelado el presente Certificado en cuanto a una
extension superficial de 3,052.93 Metros cuadrados y 16,512.50 metros Cuadrados y
descrita en elLote No. 26 vendida a favor de Alejandro Ruis y Mariano P. Leuterio, el primar
casado con Diogracias Quinones y el Segundo con Josefa Garcia y se be expedido el
Certificado de Titulo No. 4210, Pagina 163, Libro T-22.
Date of the Instrument Aug. 29, 1918
Date of Inscription Sept. 9, 1918 10:50 a.m.
(GD) L. GARDUNIO, Register of Deeds"
"Ap. 6665/O-994-Venta: Queda Cancelado el presente Cerficiado en cuanto a una extension
superficial de 871,982.00 metros cuadrados, descrita en el Lote No. 26, vendida a favor de
Alejandro Ruiz y Mariano P. Leuterio, el primar casado con Deogracias Quinones y el
Segundo con Josefa Garcia y se be expedido el Certificado de Titulo No. 4211, Pagina 164,
Libro T-No. 22.
Date of Instrument Aug. 21, 1918
Date of Inscription Sept. 9, 1918 10:50 a.m.
(SGD.) L. GARDUNIO, Register of Deeds"
As a result, TCT No. 4211 was cancelled by TCT No. 5261 which was issued in the name of Francisco Gonzales.
Inscribed on the "Memorandum of the Incumbrances Affecting the Property Described in this Certificate" was the
sale executed in favor of
Francisco Gonzales dated 3 March 1920. Thus, on 6 April 1920, TCT No. 5261 was issued in the name of Francisco
Gonzales.78
On 22 August 1938, TCT No. 5261 was cancelled by TCT No. 35486 in the names of Jose Gonzales y Narciso married
to Maria P. Gutierrez, Consuelo Susana Gonzales y Narciso married to Alfonso D. Prescilla; Juana Francisco Gonzales
y Narciso married to Fortunato de Leon; Maria Clara Gonzales y Narciso married to Delfin Hilario; Francisco Felipe
Gonzales y Narciso married to Pilar Narciso, and Concepcion Andrea Gonzales y Narciso married to Melquiades M.
Virata, Jr.
Appearing on the "Memorandum" of TCT No. 5261 is NOTA: Ap 2111 which reads as
follows:79
"A/2111 Adjudicado el torreno descrito en este certificado de titulo, a Rufina Narciso Vda.
de Gonzales, a cuenta de la participacion de osia esta en (not legible) los tienes de la
eseledad de genanciales. Habida entre la misma y el finado Francisco J. Gonzales, per una
orden del Hon. Fernando Jugo, Juez del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Manila Sala II,
dienada el 20 de Septiembre de 19 (not legible), en el Expidiente de intestado del
nombrado Francisco J. Gonzales, No. 49034, se cancela el presente certificado de tituto y se
expide otre a hombre decha Rufina Narciso, con (not legible) No. 35486, folio 86, Tomo
T-168 del libro de transferencias, archivando se la copia de dicha orden da que se ha heche
referencia en al Legajo T-No. 35486.
(SGD) TEODORO GONZALES,
Registrado de Titulos."
The property was later subdivided into seven lots in accordance with subdivision plan Psd-21154.80 Partitioning the
lots among the co-owners, TCT No. 35486 was eventually cancelled and in lieu thereof six (6) certificates of titles
were individually issued81 to Francisco Gonzaless six (6) children, specifically, TCT Nos. 1368-1373 while TCT No.
1374 was issued in favor of all the children.82
As previously mentioned, the properties covered by TCT Nos. 1368-1374 were expropriated by the Republic of the
Philippines and were eventually subdivided and sold to various vendees. Eighteen (18) lots were obtained by MRI
from the years 1965 to 1974, while it acquired the lot covered by TCT No. 165119 in 1988. On the other hand, MEC
acquired from PhilVille Development Housing Corporation Lot No. 19-B by virtue of Deed of Exchange executed in
its favor for which, TCT No. 232568 was issue don 9 May 1991.
The 20 certificates of titles were traced by the MANOTOKS, as follows:
1) TCT No. 7528 registered in the name of MRI covers Lot No. 2 of consolidation-subdivision plan (LRC) Pcs-1828 which
has an area of 4,988 square meters. MRI purchased this lot from one Basilio Caina who was issued TCT No. 7526 which
cancelled TCT Nos. 36657-62 registered in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.83
2) TCT No. 7762, covering Lot 1-C, was obtained by MRI from one Narcisa Buenaventura. The Parcel of land has an
approximate area of 2,876 square meters. Buenaventuras ownership was evidenced by TCT No. 7525,84 deriving the
same from TCT No. 36657-63.85
3) TCT No. 8012 in the name of MRI covers Lot No. 12-1 having an area of 20,000 square meters.86 This certificate of
title was traced from one Filemon Custodio who held TCT No. 7792. Custodio was in turn a transferee of Guillermo
Rivera, the latter having been issued TCT No. 7760 by virtue of sale between him and then Peoples Homesite and
Housing Corporation ["PHHC"]. The latter title eventually cancelled TCT No. 36557-63 of the Republic.87
4) TCT No. 9866 issued to MRI covers Lot No. 21 and has an approximate area of 23,979 square meters. MRIs certificate
of title was derived from TCT No. 9854 registered in the name of Filemon Custodio, a transferee of Jose Dionisio, who
was issued TCT No. 9853. Dionisios title in turn cancelled the Republics TCT No. 36657-63.88
5) TCT No. 21107 issued to MRI covers Lot 22 with an approximate area of 2,557 square meters. MRI acquired the same
by virtue of sale between him and Francisco Custodio, holder of TCT No. 21040. Francisco Custodio was a transferee of
Lorenzo Caina, registered owner of TCT No. 21039 as evidenced by a Deed of Sale between Caina and the PHHC, the
latters certificate of title canceling TCT No. 36557-63 of the Republic.89
6) TCT No. 21485 was issued to MRI by virtue of sale between it and Francisco Custodio, registered owner of TCT No.
21484. The certificate of title covers Lot 20 with an approximate area of 25,276 square meters Custodio was in turn a
transferee of Lorenzo Caina, the latter being the registered owner of TCT No. 21013 by reason of sale between him and
PHHC.90 Under Entry No. 6277/T-21485, it would appear that portions of the property covered under TCT No. 21485
and TCT No. 232568 had been subject of an expropriation proceedings to which the Manotok Estate Corporation, et al.
interposed no objections subject to the payment of just compensation.91
7) TCT Nos. 2640592 and 26406,93 both registered in the name of MRI, cancelled TCT Nos. 9773 and 9774, respectively.
TCT Nos. 9773 and 9774 were registered in the names of Romulo, Rosalina, Lucila, Felix and Emilia all surnamed Jacinto,
[JACINTOS"], before the same were transferred to MRI by reason of sale in favor of the latter. The JACINTOS certificates
of title were in turn derived from TCT Nos. 8014 and 8015 issued in the name of Filemon Custodio94 Both TCT Nos. 8014
and 8015 cancelled TCT 7792/T-39. However, for purposes of tracing TCT No. 7792/T-39 to the Republics certificate of
titles, this certificate of title was not submitted in evidence.
8) TCT No. 2640795 issued to MRI was traced back to the title of Lourdes Mercado Cloribel who was the registered
owner of TCT No. 8404 by virtue of sale between the two, thereby transferring ownership to MRI. On the fact of TCT No.
8404, it would show that it cancelled TCT No. 8013/T41 but there is no showing in whose name TCT No. 8013 was
registered and what certificate of title it cancelled.
9) TCT No. 3390496 of MRI cancelled TCT No. 8017 of Filemon Custodio by virtue of sale between the latter and
MRI.97 We note that TCT No. 8017 cancelled TCT No. 7792/T-39 but there is no showing whether the same could be
traced back to the Republics certificates of title.
10) TCT No. 34255, covering Lot No. 11-Bm, Psd-75797 with an area of 11,000 square meters, reflects MRI as the
registered owner. This certificate of title cancels TCT No. 36557-63 of the Republic.98
11) TCT No. 25487599 bears MRI as the registered owner of Lot 55-A with an area of approximately 1,910 square meters.
This certificate of title cancelled TCT No. 41956 which covers Lot 55, also registered in the name of MRI. It would appear
that MRI acquired the lot covered under TCT No. 41956 from one Joaquin Caina who was the registered owner of TCT
No. 25715 being a vendee of PHHC.100
12) TCT No. 53268 of MRI covered Lot No. 15,101 which was purchased by MRI from one Maria V. Villacorta who held
TCT No. 53155. Villacorta in turn acquired the same land from one Eufrocina Mackay whose TCT No. 7827 was
eventually cancelled by Villacortas land title.102 It would appear that TCT No. 7827 cancelled TCT No. 7826/T-40 but
there is no trace to whom the latter title was registered and what certificate of title it cancelled.
13) TCT No. 55897 shows MRI as the registered owner of Lot 3 of the consolidation-subdivision plan (LRC) Pcs-1828 of
the Maysilo Estate covering an area of more or less 20,531 square meters. This certificate of title cancelled TCT No.
53122 in the names of MRI (19,531 square meters) and one Silvestre Domingo (1,000 square meters). TCT No. 53122 in
turn cancelled TCT No. 21347 registered in the names of Jesus Hipona (19,531 square meters) and Silvestre Domingo
(1,000 square meters). Notably, TCT No. 21347 cancelled TCT No. 21315/T-107 but there is no indication to whom TCT
No. 21315 was registered and what certificate of title it cancelled.103
14) TCT No. C-17272 reflects MRI as the registered owner of Lot 6-C which has an approximate area of 27,850 square
meters. MRIs certificate of title cancelled TCT No. C-17234 registered in the names of MRI (27,750 square meters),
41
Land Titles Cases
Roberto S. David (3,0000 square meters) and Jose Madulid (500 square meters). It would appear that TCT No.
C-17234 cancelled TCT No. 53124 registered in the names of MRI, Spouses Priscila and Antonio Sebastian and Jose
Madulid.104 MRI also submitted in evidence a Deed of Partition between itself, Roberto David and Madulid thereby
subdividing the property into Lots 6-A, 6-B and 6-C as per subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-277091.105 Again, we note that
TCT No. 53124 cancelled TCT No. 21350/T-107 but the records are bereft of any indication what certificate of title it
cancelled and to whom the same was registered.
15) TCT No. C-35267, covering Lot 56-B of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-292683 with an approximate area of 9,707
square meters, was a by-product of TCT No. 25146, also registered in the name of MRI, after the same was
subdivided into two lots, namely, Lot Nos. 56-A and 56-B. TCT No. 25146 cancelled TCT No. 25145 registered in the
name of Quirino Labing-isa by virtue of sale in favor of MRI. In turn, TCT No. 21545 cancelled TCT Nos. (36557)
12836 to (36563) 12842.106
16) TCT No. T-121428, registered in the name of MRI covers Lot No. 5-C of subdivision plan (LRC) psd-315272 which
has an approximate area of 4,650 square meters. It was previously registered in the names of MRI (4,650 square
meters), Ricardo Cruz (941 square meters) and Conchita Umali (1,000 square meters) under TCT No. 53123 by order
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Caloocan City, Branch XII and as per agreement of the parties in Civil Case No.
C-424. TCT No. 53123 in turn cancelled TCT No. 21346 whose registered owners were Conchita Umali (1,000 square
meters), Ricardo Cruz (941 square meters) and Jesus Hipona (4,650 square meters).107 Like some of the other titles,
TCT No. 21346 cancelled TCT No. 21316 but there is no trace of this latter certificate of title.
17) TCT No. 163902, registered in the name of MRI, covers Lot No. 4-B-2 and has an area of more or less 6,354
square meters and a by-product of TCT No. 9022, also in the name of MRI, after the same was subdivided under
subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-334454. TCT No. 9022, in turn, cancelled TCT No. 8994/T-45 registered in the name of
Filemon S. Custodio whose ownership thereon was transferred to MRI by virtue of a voluntary sale.108 TCT No. 8894
cancelled TCT No. 8846/T-45 but this latter certificate of title was not submitted in evidence for purposes of tracing
back to the Republics title.
18) TCT No. 165119109 was issued to MRI by virtue of a Deed of Sale between Spouses Francisca Labing-isa and Juan
Ignacio [SPOUSES IGNACIO] and MRI, as a result of which, TCT No. C-36960 of the SPOUSES IGNACIO was
cancelled.110 It would appear that TCT No. C-39690 cancelled TCT No. 35266/T-173 but TCT No. 35266/T-173 was
not submitted in evidence.
19) TCT No. T-232568 of the Manotok Estate Corporation, covering Lot No. 19-B of subdivision plan Psd-13011152
with an area of 23,206 square meters, was derived from the certificate of title held by PhiVille Development and
Housing Corporation under TCT No. 197357. MEC acquired the subject parcel of land by virtue of Deed of Exchange
between it and PHILVILLE DATED 9 May 1991.111 TCT No. 197357 cancelled TCT No. 195730/T-974 but there is no
trace what certificate of title the latter title cancelled.
By and large, all the certificates of title submitted by the MANOTOKS, including their derivative titles, were all
traced to OCT No. 994 registered on 3 May 1917. Likewise, they declared all the lots covered by such titles for
taxation purposes. Without doubt, MRI had successfully traced back some of their certificates of title to the valid
OCT No. 994, they having acquired the lots from some of the vendees of the PHHC after the same were
expropriated by the Republic from the Gonzalezes.
The fact that these lots were subjected to expropriation proceedings sometime in 1947 under Commonwealth Act
No. 539 for resale to tenants is beyond question, as also enunciated by the Supreme Court in Republic of the
Philippines v. Jose Leon Gonzales, et al. To bolster this fact, paragraph "r" of the Majority Report noted that the
seven properties covered by TCT Nos. 1368 to 1374 were expropriated by the Republic from the Gonzalezes.
The fact that these lots were subjected to expropriation proceedings sometime in 1947 under Commonwealth Act
No. 539 for resale to tenants is beyond question, as also enunciated by the Supreme Court in Republic of the
Philippines vs. Jose Leon Gonzaels, et al. To bolster this fact, paragraph "r" of the Majority Report noted that the
seven properties covered by TCT Nos. 1368 to 1374 were expropriated by the Peoples Homesite and Housing
Corporation which were later consolidated and subdivided into 77 lots for resale to tenants. No sign of protest was
ever raised by CLT on this point.112
The fact of expropriation is extremely significant, for titles acquired by the State by way of expropriation are
deemed cleansed of whatever previous flaws may have attended these titles. As Justice Vitug explained in Republic
v. Court of Appeals,113 and then Associate Justice (now Chief Justice) Puno reiterated in Reyes v. NHA:114 "In an rem
proceeding, condemnation acts upon the property. After condemnation, the paramount title is in the public under
a new and independent title; thus, by giving notice to all claimants to a disputed title, condemnation proceedings
provide a judicial process for securing better title against all the world than may be obtained by voluntary
conveyance."115 This doctrine was derived from the opinion of then Chief Judge (now U.S. Supreme Court Justice)
Stephen Breyer in Cadorette v. U.S.,116 which in turn cited the pronouncement of the U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v.
Carmack117 that "[b]y giving notice to all claimants to a disputed title, condemnation proceedings provide a judicial
process for securing better title against all the world than may be obtained by voluntary conveyance."118
In annulling the Manotok titles, focus was laid on the alleged defects of TCT No. 4211 issued in September of 1918.
However, TCT No. 4211 was issued decades before the property was expropriated. Thus, any and all defects that may
have attended that particular title would have been purged when the property covered by it was subsequently acquired
by the State through eminent domain. The Special Division noted as much:
As it is, the validity of most of MRIs certificates of title should be upheld because they were derived from the Republics
valid certificates of title. In fact, some of the MANOTOKS titles can be traced back to the Governments titles as a result
of the expropriation in 1947.
Relevantly, the titles of the Republic, as the predecessor-in-interest of the MANOTOKS, are presumed valid by virtue of
their acquisition resulting from the exercise of its inherent power of eminent domain that need not be granted even by
the fundamental law. Thus, the alleged flaws concerning the certificates of title issued previous to the exercise of the
State of its inherent power did not affect or render invalid the subsequent transfers after the forced sale. Indeed, when
land has been acquired for public use in fee simple unconditionally, either by the exercise of eminent domain or by
purchase, the former owner retains no rights in the land, and the public use may be abandoned, or the land may be
devoted to a different use, without any impairment of the estate or title acquired or any reversion to the former
owner.119
The Special Division also took exception to the majority report of the Commissioners (Majority Report) who had been
tasked by the trial court to examine the validity of the Manotok titles. The Majority Report
had arrived at several conclusions with respect to the TCTs from which the Manotok titles were derived. 120 The Special
Division, however, concluded that such report was in fact tainted by the fact that it was determined "outside the scope
of the issues framed and agreed upon by the parties." To wit:
In meeting the issue, the MANOTOKS disproved the "opinion" with regard to the alleged defects of their titles inasmuch
as the majority report submitted before the trial court was made outside the scope of the tasks which the trial court
confined them to perform. The MANOTOKS also argued that before this proceeding on remand, CLT failed to introduce
evidence of such flaws neither were the concerned geodetic engineers presented as witnesses. Moreover, the
MANOTOKS further maintained that CLT failed to submit any factual or legal bases to prove the authenticity and validity
of the Palma and Sayo Orders. They insisted that the Palma Order was a void one for being conditional and having
resulted to the issuance of "duplicate certificates of land title."
With respect to the imputed flaws on the MANOTOKS titles which were based on the Majority Report, we find that the
bases of the alleged defects proceeded from unreliable sources thus, tainting the veracity of the said report.
The records of the case between CLT and the MANOTOKS reveal that the parties approved the creation of a commission
to resolve only these two issues, to wit:
"x x x
These issues to be resolved by the 3 Commissioners are as follows:
1) Whether or not the property covered by the Transfer Certificates of Title of defendants pertain to or involve Lot No.
26 of the Maysilo Estate presently titled in the name of the plaintiff; and
2) Whether or not the property covered by the title of the plaintiff and the property covered by the titles of the
defendants overlap.121
Scrutinizing the Majority Report upon which the trial courts conclusions were based, it would appear that the findings
therein were outside the scope of the issues framed and agreed upon by the parties. Specifically, the deductions with
regard to the technical infirmities and defects of TCT Nos. 4211, 4210, 5261 and 35486 do not involve the question of
whether or not the subject properties were identified as Lot No. 26 of the Maysilo estate or whether there was
overlapping of titles. Records bear out that the MANOTOKS took exception to the procedure taken citing therein the
"ultra vires" acts of the two Commissioners.
In addition, the majority report focused on the alleged flaws and inherent technical defects of TCT Nos. 4211, 5261 and
35486, ranging from the language of the technical descriptions, absence of subdivision plan, lot number and survey plan.
Evidently, these defects go only as far as the certificates of title issued prior to those of the Republic. Remarkably, no
specific flaw was found on the MANOTOKS titles indicating any irregularity on their issuance. In fact, the
Commissioners who signed the majority report even concluded that only TCT Nos. 4211, 4210, 5261, 35486, 1368 thru
1324 (sic)122 were irregularly and questionably issued without any reference to the MANOTOKS certificates of
title.123 Otherwise stated, the imputed flaws affect only those certificates of title issued prior to those registered in the
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Land Titles Cases
name of the Republic. No flaw had been specifically identified or established in the proceedings below, which
would taint the titles held by the MANOTOKS in so far as the regularity of their issuance is concerned.124
At the same time, the Special Division was not prepared to uphold the validity of all of the Manotok titles. It took
issue with the particular titles which could not be retraced to the titles acquired by the Republic of the Philippines
by way of expropriation.
Although the MANOTOKS had traced their title from the vendees of PHHC, there are, however, some certificates of
title which could not be traced back to the titles previously held by the Republic specifically, MRIs TCT Nos. 26405
and 26406, 26407, 33904, 53268, 55897, C-17272, T-121428, 163903, 165119 and MECs TCT No. T-232568. As to
these certificates of title, the MANOTOKS failed to make any specific reference to the preceding certificates of title
which they cancelled and to whose names they were subsequently transferred and registered. Thus, we find no
sufficient basis to make a conclusion as to their origins.125
V.
The Special Division supplied the following precise and concise summary of its conclusions:
In prcis, the factual milieu of the present controversy and the evidence on record clearly establish the failure of
DIMSON and CLT to substantiate their titles and overcome the onus of proving that said titles are derivatives of
OCT 994 registered on 3 May 1917, and not 19 April 1917, as what is reflected in their titles. In contrast, the
MANOTOKS and ARANETA, both of which had consistently anchored their proprietary claims on OCT No. 994
registered on 3 May 1917, have, in this remand proceeding, been able to support their claims of ownership over
the respective portions of the Maysilo Estate. Except in the case of the MANOTOKS which had failed to substantiate
the validity of some of their certificates of title, the MANOTOKS and ARANETA presented evidence proving the
identity, the extent and the origin of their titles.
Answering the issues assigned by the Supreme Court relative to the tenability of the respective imputed flaws in
the titles of the MANOTOKS and ARANETA and whether such flaws are sufficient to defeat said claims, this Court
finds that, as discussed above, such flaws are inconsequential and ineffectual in invalidating the MANOTOKS and
ARANETA titles.
Significantly, since the respective certificates of title of herein contending parties are contradictory to each other
and stand to refute the validity of their opposing titles, it cannot be gainsaid that said certificates of title have
correspondingly been subjected to dispute on the basis of separate and distinct imputed flaws. Still, the crucial
difference between the imputed flaws allegedly tainting said contending titles, DIMSON and CLT on one hand, and
the MANOTOKS and ARANETA, on the other, is that the imputed flaws purportedly beleaguering the respective
certificates of title of the MANOTOKS and ARANETA relate to the mechanical and technical aspect of the
transcription of their titles and are therefore inconsequential to the import and validity thereof. Said imputed flaws
do not depart from the fact that the predecessors-in-interest of the MANOTOKS and ARANETA had been clothed
with the right of ownership over the disputed portions of the Maysilo Estate.
On the other hand, the flaws attending the titles of DIMSON and CLT primarily stem from infirmities attending or
otherwise affecting the very crux of their claim of ownership. Having derived their titles from RIVERA, whose title is
questionable and dubious to the core, DIMSON and CLT cannot rightly insist on the validity of their titles. Such flaws
are hard to overcome as they delve into the substance of their proprietary claims. As stated, DIMSON and CLT
miserably failed to overcome their onus and instead opted to hap on the supposed flaws of the adverse parties. For
these reasons, the titles of DIMSON and CLT should be declared a nullity.
xxx
From the foregoing evaluation and in conformity with the Supreme Court 2007 Resolution, this Court arrived at the
following conclusions as to the status of the original title and its subsequent conveyances:
1. As categorically declared by the Supreme Court, there is only one OCT 994, the registration date of which had
already been decisively settled as 3 May 1917 and not 19 April 1917. OCT 994 which reflects the date of 19 April
1917 as its registration date is null and void.
2. In view thereof and in addition to other grounds we have already discussed, the certificates of title of the
deceased Jose Dimson and his successor-in-interest, CLT, having been traced back to OCT 994 dated 19 April 1917,
are NULL and VOID and thus vest no legal right or claim in favor of DIMSON and CLT.
3. The 13 June 1966 Palma Order and the 18 October 1977 Sayo Order, on which DIMSON and CLT anchor the
validity of their respective titles, do not substantiate their proprietary claims. While the existence of said Orders are
admitted, the legal import thereof nonetheless fails to confer a semblance of legality on the titles of DIMSON and
consequently, of CLT, more so, a superior right to defeat the titles of the MANOTOKS and ARANETA, respectively.
4. Portions of Lot No. 26 pertinent to this controversy, particularly that being disputed by the MANOTOKs and CLT, were
expropriated by the Republic of the Philippines sometime in 1947 under Commonwealth Act No. 539 for resale to
tenants. The MANOTOKS, thus as successor-in-interest of the Republic, were able to establish that some of their
certificates of title had indeed originated or were derived from said expropriated parcels of land.
5. The evidence on record confirm that the certificates of title covering the land being claimed by ARANETA were
derived from OCT NO. 994 registered on 3 May 1917 thereby ultimately showing a direct link of TCT Nos. 7784 and
13574 to said mother title. By reason of which, that is either belonging to or portions of Lot 25-A-3 as previously owned
by RATO, had been well substantiated and proven to be superior to that of DIMSON.
6. For reasons above-stated and in view of the established rights of ownership of both the MANOTOKS and ARANETA
over the contested properties, we find that the imputed flaws on their titles cannot defeat the valid claims of the
MANOTOKS and ARANETA over the disputed portions of the Maysilo Estate.126
Inasmuch as we agree with the factual findings and evaluation of the Special Division, we likewise adopt the above
conclusions. As we earlier stated, it was incumbent on the Heirs of Dimson and/or CLT to establish their claim to title for
reasons other than the fact that OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917 is extant. They failed to do so. It should be noted that
the instant cases arose from separate actions filed by Jose Dimson and CLT seeking the recovery of possession and/or
annulment of title against Araneta and the Manotok Group. Thus, the burden of evidence was on Dimson and CLT to
establish the strength of their respective claims of ownership, and not merely to rely upon whatever weaknesses in the
claims of the Manotoks and Araneta for their causes of action to prosper. The well-settled legal principle in actions for
annulment or reconveyance of title is that a party seeking it should establish not merely by a preponderance of
evidence but by clear and convincing evidence that the land sought to be reconveyed is his.127 In an action to recover,
the property must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the
defendant's claim.128
We now proceed to tackle the recommendations submitted by the Special Division. They are as follows:
RECOMMENDATIONS
Apropos to said conclusions, this Court hereby respectfully makes the following
recommendations regarding the validity of the conflicting proprietary claims as interposed by
the herein contending parties:
1. To declare with finality that the certificates of title of DIMSON and CLT including other
derivative titles issued to their successors-in-interest, if any, are NULL and VOID, thus
invalidating their legal claims over the subject parcels of land.
2. To declare LEGAL and VALID the proprietary claims the MANOTOKS over the parcels of land
covered by the following certificates of title:
a) TCT No. 7528 registered in the name of MRI covers Lot No. 2 of consolidation-subdivision plan
(LRC) Pcs-1828 which has an area of 4,988 square meters.
b) TCT No. 7762 covering Lot 1-C, with an approximate area of 2,287 square meters.
c) TCT No. 8012 covering Lot No. 12-1 having an area of 20,000 square meters.
d) TCT No. 9866 covering Lot No. 21 and has an approximate area of 23,979 square meters.
e) TCT No. 21107 covering Lot 22 with an approximate area of 2,557 square meters.
f) TCT No. 21485 covering Lot 20 with an approximate area of 25,276 square meters.
g) TCT No. 34255 covering Lot No. 11-Bm, Psd-75797 with an area of 11,000 square meters.
h) TCT No. 254875 covering Lot 55-A with an area of approximately 1,910 square meters.
i) TCT No. C-35267 covering Lot 56-B of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-292683 with an approximate
area of 9,707 square meters.
With regard to the following certificates of title, namely:
3.A. MANOTOK REALTY INC.
a) TCT No. 26405 covering Lot No. 12-E with an area of 1,0000 square meters.
b) TCT No. 26406 covering Lot No. 12-F with an area of 1,000 square meters.
c) TCT No. 26407 covering Lot No. 12-B with an area of 1,000 square meters.
d) TCT No. 33904 covering Lot No. 12-H with an area of 1,802 square meters.
e) TCT No. 53268 covering Lot No. 15 purchased by MRI from one Maria V. Villacorta with an
approximate area of 3,163 square meters.
f) TCT No. 55897 covering Lot 3 of consolidation-subdivision plan (LRC) Pcs-1828 of the Maysilo
Estate covering an area of more or less 20,531 square meters.
g) TCT No. C-17272 covering Lot 6-C which has an approximate area of 27,850 square meters.
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Land Titles Cases
h) TCT No. T-121428 covering Lot No. 5-C of subdivision plan (LRC) psd-315278, which has
an approximate area of 4,650 square meters.
i) TCT No. 163902 covering Lot No. 4-B-2 with an area of more or less 6,354 square meters
allegedly a by-product of TCT No. 9022, which in turn, cancelled TCT No. 8994/T-45
registered in the name of Filemon S Custodio.
j) TCT No. 165119 which allegedly cancelled TCT No. C-36960 of the SPOUSES IGNACIO by
virtue of a Deed of Sale between said Spouses and MRI.
3.B. MANOTOK ESTATE CORPORATION
a) TCT No. T-232568 covering Lot No. 19-B of subdivision plan Psd-13011152 with an area of
23,206 square meters.
The foregoing certificates of title (3.A and 3.B), failing to make specific references to the
particular certificates of title which they cancelled and in whose name they were registered,
may be declared NULL and VOID, or in the alternative, subject the same to further technical
verification.
4. To declare LEGAL and VALID the title of ARANETA respecting parcels of land covered by
the following certificates of title:
a) TCT No. 13574 covering a parcel of land designated as Section No. 2 of subdivision plan
Psd-10114, being a portion of Lot 25-A-3-C with an aggregate area of 581,872 square
meters;
b) TCT No. 7784 covering four (4) parcels of land with an aggregate area of 390,383 square
meters.129
The first, second and fourth recommendations are well taken as they logically arise from the facts and conclusions,
as determined by the Special Division, which this Court adopts.
The third recommendation that eleven (11) of the titles held by the Manotoks be declared null and void or
subjected to further technical verification warrants some analysis.
The Court has verified that the titles mentioned in the third recommendation do not, as stated by the Special
Division, sufficiently indicate that they could be traced back to the titles acquired by the Republic when it
expropriated portions of the Maysilo Estate in the 1940s. On the other hand, the Manotok titles that were affirmed
by the Special Division are traceable to the titles of the Republic and thus have benefited, as they should, from the
cleansing effect the expropriation had on whatever flaws that attached to the previous titles. However, although
the Special Division did not concede the same benefit to the other Manotok titles named in the third
recommendation, at the same time it did not conclude that such titles were false or fraudulently acquired. Absent
such a finding, we are disinclined to take the ultimate step of annulling those titles.
Said titles have as their origin what we have acknowledged to be a valid mother title OCT No. 994 dated 3 May
1917. This is in stark contrast with the titles of CLT, the oppositors to the Manotoks, which all advert to an
inexistent mother title. On their face, the Manotok titles do not reflect any error or fraud, and certainly the Special
Division do not point to any such flaw in these titles. Nothing on the face of the titles gives cause for the Court to
annul the same.
It is worth mentioning that the Special Division refused to adopt the Majority Report earlier rendered in the case
between the Manotoks and CLT, said report having exhaustively listed the perceived flaws in the antecedent TCTs
from which the Manotoks derived their claim. The Special Division concluded that such findings had been reached
by the Commissioners in excess of their original mandate and, thus, ultra vires. Assuming that such flaws were
extant, they existed on the titles and anteceded the expropriation of the properties by the Government. As stated
earlier, such expropriation would have cleansed the titles of the prior flaws. But even if the Manotok titles
enumerated in the third recommendation could not be sourced from the titles acquired by the Republic through
expropriation, still the rejection of the Majority Report signifies that the flaws adverted to therein could not form
the basis for the annulment of the titles involved. Indeed, the Special Divisions rejection of the Majority Report
further diminishes any ground to annul the Manotok titles referred to in the third recommendation.
Yet, the Court is cognizant that the inability to trace the Manotok titles specified in the third recommendation to
those titles acquired by the Government through expropriation puts such titles in doubt somehow. In addition, the
Court is aware that the ground utilized by the Special Division in rejecting the Majority Report that the
determinations were made outside the scope of the issues framed and agreed upon by the parties -- does not
categorically refute the technical findings made therein. Those circumstances, while insufficient for now to annul
the Manotoks titles listed in the third recommendation, should be sufficiently made public.
Hence, in lieu of annulling the Manotok titles per the Special Divisions third recommendation, the Court deems it
sufficient to require the Registers of Deeds concerned to annotate this Resolution on said titles so as to sufficiently
notify the public of their unclear status, more particularly the inability of the Manotoks to trace the titles without any
gap back to OCT No. 994 issued on 3 May 1917. If there should be any cause for the annulment of those titles from a
proper partys end, then let the proper case be instituted before the appropriate court.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby adopts the Report of the Special Division and issues the following reliefs:
1) The certificates of title of the DIMSONs and CLT including other derivative titles issued to their successors-in-interest,
if any, are declared NULL and VOID, thus invalidating their legal claims over the subject parcels of land;
2. The proprietary claims of the MANOTOKS over the parcels of land covered by the following certificates of title are
declared LEGAL and VALID, to wit:
a) TCT No. 7528 registered in the name of MRI covers Lot No. 2 of consolidation-subdivision plan (LRC) Pcs-1828 which
has an area of 4,988 square meters.
b) TCT No. 7762 covering Lot 1-C, with an approximate area of 2,287 square meters.
c) TCT No. 8012 covering Lot No. 12-1 having an area of 20,000 square meters.
d) TCT No. 9866 covering Lot No. 21 and having an approximate area of 23,979 square meters.
e) TCT No. 21107 covering Lot 22 with an approximate area of 2,557 square meters.
f) TCT No. 21485 covering Lot 20 with an approximate area of 25,276 square meters.
g) TCT No. 34255 covering Lot No. 11-Bm, Psd-75797 with an area of 11,000 square meters.
h) TCT No. 254875 covering Lot 55-A with an area of approximately 1,910 square meters.
i) TCT No. C-35267 covering Lot 56-B of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-292683 with an approximate area of 9,707 square
meters.
3) The following certificates of titles in the name of ARANETA are hereby declared LEGAL and VALID, to wit:
a) TCT No. 13574 covering a parcel of land designated as Section No. 2 of subdivision plan Psd-10114, being a portion of
Lot 25-A-3-C with an aggregate area of 581,872 square meters;
b) TCT No. 7784 covering four (4) parcels of land with an aggregate area of 390,383 square meters.
4) On the following titles in the name of Manotok Realty, Inc. or Manotok Estate Corporation, to wit:
a) TCT No. 26405 covering Lot No. 12-E with an area of 1,0000 square meters;
b) TCT No. 26406 covering Lot No. 12-F with an area of 1,000 square meters;
c) TCT No. 26407 covering Lot No. 12-B with an area of 1,000 square meters;
d) TCT No. 33904 covering Lot No. 12-H with an area of 1,802 square meters;
e) TCT No. 53268 covering Lot No. 15 purchased by MRI from one Maria V. Villacorta with an approximate area of 3,163
square meters;
f) TCT No. 55897 covering Lot 3 of consolidation-subdivision plan (LRC) Pcs-1828 of the Maysilo Estate covering an area
of more or less 20,531 square meters;
g) TCT No. C-17272 covering Lot 6-C which has an approximate area of 27,850 square meters;
h) TCT No. T-121428 covering Lot No. 5-C of subdivision plan (LRC) psd-315278, which has an approximate area of 4,650
square meters;
i) TCT No. 163902 covering Lot No. 4-B-2 with an area of more or less 6,354 square meters allegedly a by-product of TCT
No. 9022, which in turn, cancelled TCT No. 8994/T-45 registered in the name of Filemon S. Custodio;
j) TCT No. 165119 which allegedly cancelled TCT No. C-36960 of the SPOUSES IGNACIO by virtue of a Deed of Sale
between said spouses and MRI;
k) TCT No. T-232568 covering Lot No. 19-B of subdivision plan Psd-13011152 with an area of 23,206 square meters.
the Registers of Deeds concerned are ordered to annotate that as determined in the foregoing Resolution, the
registered owners of the said titles "failed to make any specific reference to the preceding certificates of title which
they cancelled and to whose names they were subsequently transferred and registered," thereby leading the Supreme
Court "to find no sufficient basis to make a conclusion as to their origins."130
Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 142549 March 9, 2010
FIDELA R. ANGELES, Petitioner,
vs.
44
Land Titles Cases
The SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE ADMINISTRATOR, LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS
OF QUEZON CITY, and SENATOR TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
The property involved in this case is covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994, which encompasses One
Thousand Three Hundred Forty-Two (1,342) hectares of the Maysilo Estate, previously described by this Court En
Banc as a "vast tract of land [that] stretches over three cities, comprising an area larger than the sovereign states of
Monaco and the Vatican."1 What we have before us now is touted as "one of the biggest and most extensive
land-grabbing incidents in recent history."2
The existence of several cases already decided by this Court dealing with this infamous estate has made the job of
deciding this particular petition easy, on one hand, as there are cases squarely on point and at the outset,
applicable; but complicated, on the other hand, as such applicability must be determined with thoroughness and
accuracy to come up with a just, equitable, and fair conclusion to a controversy that has now lasted for almost
forty-five (45) years.
Submitted for Decision is a petition for mandamus seeking respondents Secretary of Justice, the Administrator of
the Land Registration Authority (LRA), and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to comply with the Order3 dated
January 8, 1998 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City in Civil Case No. C-424, entitled Bartolome
Rivera, et al. v. Isabel Gil de Sola, et al. (the RTC Order), which was issued a Certificate of Finality on March 12,
1998.
On May 3, 1965, petitioner, together with other individuals, all of them claiming to be the heirs of a certain Maria
de la Concepcion Vidal, and alleging that they are entitled to inherit her proportional share in the parcels of land
located in Quezon City and in the municipalities of Caloocan and Malabon, Province of Rizal, commenced a special
civil action for partition and accounting of the property otherwise known as Maysilo Estate covered by OCT No. 994,
allegedly registered on April 19, 1917 with the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City. This was docketed as Civil Case
No. C-424 in the RTC of Caloocan City, Branch 120.
Some of said alleged heirs were able to procure Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) over portions of the Maysilo
Estate. They also had led this Court to believe that OCT No. 994 was registered twice, thus, in Metropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage Systems (MWSS) v. Court of Appeals,4 reiterated in Heirs of Luis J. Gonzaga v. Court Of
Appeals,5 the Court held that OCT No. 994 dated April 19, 1917, and not May 3, 1917, was the valid title by virtue
of the prior registration rule.
In the RTC Order sought to be implemented, Judge Jaime D. Discaya granted the partition and accounting prayed
for by plaintiffs in that case; directed the respective Registers of Deeds of Caloocan City and Quezon City to issue
transfer certificates of title in the names of all the co-owners, including petitioner, for twelve (12) parcels of land
with an aggregate area of One Hundred Five Thousand and Nine Hundred Sixty-Nine square meters (105,969 sq.
m.), more or less; and ordered that said parcels of land be sold, subject to the confirmation of the Court, and the
proceeds be divided among the plaintiffs in proportion to their respective interests in the property.
The dispositive portion of said Order reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the recommendation of the Commissioners in their Joint Commissioners
Report dated October 21, 1997 and Supplemental Commissioners Report dated December 30, 1997 that the
following lots with transfer certificates of title to be issued by the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City in the names
of all co-owners be sold and the proceeds thereof divided among themselves in proportion to their respective
interest in the property, is approved.
The Register of Deeds of Caloocan City and of Quezon City are hereby directed to issue transfer certificates of title
in the names of all the co-owners for the following lots, namely:
xxxx
Any sale of above-mentioned lots shall be subject to confirmation by this Court pursuant to Section 11, Rule 69 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure.6
Petitioner alleges that the respective Registers of Deeds of Caloocan City and Quezon City refused to comply with
the RTC Order because they were still awaiting word from the LRA Administrator before proceeding. Counsel for
petitioner then requested the LRA Administrator to direct said Registers of Deeds to comply with the Order.
The LRA Administrator, Mr. Alfredo R. Enriquez, sent counsel for petitioner a letter-reply7 dated March 27, 2000,
with two attachments: 1) the 1st Indorsement8 dated September 22, 1997 (the 1st Indorsement) issued by then
Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. (respondent Guingona), and 2) LRA Circular No.
97-119 issued to all Registers of Deeds. The letter-reply reads in part:
We regret to inform you that your request cannot be granted in view of the directive of the Department of Justice in its
1st Indorsement dated 22 September 1997, copy enclosed, as a result of the inquiry conducted by the Composite
Fact-Finding Committee (created under DOJ Department Order No. 137) finding that there is only one OCT No. 994
which was issued by the Rizal Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917 (and not on 19 April 1919) pursuant to Decree No.
36455 in Land Registration Case No. 4429. Pursuant to this DOJ directive, this Authority issued LRA Circular No. 97-11 to
all Registers of Deeds, copy attached, stating the following:
xxxx
In compliance with the DOJ directive, this Authority, in its 1st Indorsement dated 27 March 1998, x x x had
recommended to the Office of the Solicitor General the filing of an appropriate pleading relative to the said Order dated
8 January 1998.
The findings of the DOJ on OCT No. 994 are in fact sustained by the Senate Committee on Justice and Human Rights and
Urban Planning in its Senate Committee Report No. 1031 dated 25 May 1998 x x x.10 (Emphasis ours.)
The LRA Administrator likewise wrote that in Senate Committee Report No. 1031 dated May 25, 1998, the Senate
Committees on Justice and Human Rights and Urban Planning came up with the following findings:
i. There is only one Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994 and this was issued or registered on May 3, 1917[.]
ii. The [OCT] No. 994 dated April 19, 1917 is non-existent. It was a fabrication perpetrated by Mr. Norberto Vasquez, Jr.,
former Deputy Registrar of Deeds of Caloocan City.
iii. The alleged surviving heirs could not have been the true and legal heirs of the late Maria de la Concepcion Vidal as
government findings showed the physical and genetic impossibility of such relationship[.]
iv. Mr. Norberto Vasquez, Jr., former Deputy Registrar of Deeds of Caloocan City, acted maliciously, fraudulently and in
bad faith, by issuing "certifications" and/or written statements to the effect that OCT No. 994 was issued or registered
on April 19, 1917 when in truth and in fact it was issued or registered on May 3, 1917.
v. Atty. Yolanda O. Alfonso, Registrar of Deeds of Caloocan City, likewise acted maliciously, fraudulently and in bad faith,
when she signed the TCTs issued in the name of Eleuteria Rivera which bear a wrong date of the registration of OCT No.
994. Malice was evident because she had previously issued certificates of title in the names of other individuals which
were derived from OCT No. 994 dated May 3, 1917 and she had in fact questioned the falsity of April 19, 1917 as the
correct date of the registration of OCT No. 994.11 (Underscoring in the original.)
The letter-reply further stated that OCT No. 994 was intact and was being kept in the LRA "to prevent its alteration and
tampering." We quote the last portion of said letter-reply:
As found by the Senate Committees, the mess caused by the former Register of Deeds and Deputy Register of Deeds in
making it appear that OCT No. 994 was issued in 19 April 1917, thus giving the wrong impression that there were two (2)
OCT No. 994, resulted in the double, if not multiple, issuance of transfer certificates of title covering the subdivided
portions of the Maysilo Estate, including the parcels of land mentioned in the subject Order dated 8 January 1998. Our
Authority, as the protector of the integrity of the Torrens title is mandated to prevent anomalous titling of real
properties and put a stop to further erode the confidence of the public in the Torrens system of land registration.
With due respect, the Order dated 8 January 1998 which directs the issuance of transfer certificates of title as direct
transfer from OCT No. 994, suffers from certain deficiencies, to wit: OCT No. 994 had long been cancelled totally by the
issuance of various certificates of title in the names of different persons; and that the plan and descriptions of the lands
were not based on a subdivision plan duly approved by the proper government agency but merely sketch plans, in
violation of Section 50 of PD 1529. Obviously, compliance with the Order will result to duplication of certificates of title
covering land previously registered in the names of other persons. Besides, in MWSS vs. CA, the Supreme Court did not
declare the nullity of the certificates of title which emanated from OCT No. 994 issued on 3 May 1917. It merely
invalidates the title of MWSS and recognizes as valid the title of Jose B. Dimson. There was no such declaration as to the
various transfer certificates of title emanating from OCT No. 994. Under the law, there must be a separate action in
court for the declaration of nullity of certificates of title pursuant to the due process clause of the Constitution.
As observed by the Supreme Court in Republic vs. Court of Appeals (94 SCRA 874), "there are too many fake titles being
peddled around and it behooves every official of the government whose functions concern the issuance of legal titles to
see to it that this plague that has made a mockery of the Torrens system is eradicated right now through their loyalty,
devotion, honesty and integrity, in the interest of our country and people at large."12
Petitioner avers that respondent Guingona, in issuing the 1st Indorsement,13 made a substantive modification of the
ruling made by this Court in MWSS v. Court of Appeals and Heirs of Luis Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals. She further avers
that "[n]ot even the Secretary of Justice has the power or authority to set aside or alter an established ruling made by
the highest Court of the land." According to petitioner, respondent Guingona claimed to have made his own finding
that there is only one OCT No. 994 which was issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal on May 3, 1917, and not on April
45
Land Titles Cases
19, 1917, and this finding is a reversal of the decisions of this Court on "what is the valid OCT No. 994." Petitioner
contends that "[t]he rule is well settled that once a decision becomes final[,] the Court can no longer amend,
modify, much less set aside the same" and that respondent Guingona usurped judicial functions and did a
prohibited act which rendered the Order of no effect.14
Petitioner claims that respondent Guingona was the one who caused the issuance by the LRA Administrator of
Circular No. 97-11 dated October 3, 1997, which had the same legal effect on other cases similarly situated without
hearing or notice to the parties-in-interest, and that this was contemptuous and contumacious and calls for
"condemnation and reproof of the highest degree."15
Petitioner alleges that compliance with a final judicial order is a purely ministerial duty, that she and her
co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. C-424 cannot avail of the benefits granted to them by the Order, and that she has no
"plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, other than this action."
In his Comment,16 respondent Guingona raises the following grounds for denial of the petition:
1. Petitioner has no cause of action against respondent Guingona in that the latter is no longer the Secretary of
Justice.
2. The issuance of the 1st Indorsement dated September 22, 1997 was pursuant to the report dated August 27,
1997 made by the committee created by Department Order No. 137 dated April 23, 1997 after conducting an
independent fact-finding investigation. It did not in any way alter or modify any judgment of this Honorable Court.
3. Petitioner was not denied due process as her rights, if any, under the Order dated January 18, 1998 were not yet
in existence at the time the 1st Indorsement was issued.
4. Mandamus is not the appropriate remedy to enforce claims of damages.17
Respondent Guingona contends that he was no longer the Secretary of Justice, therefore, he did not anymore
possess the mandatory duties being compelled to be performed in this case by way of a writ of mandamus; he had
no more duty resulting from the said position and could not perform an act that pertained to said duty, even if he
wanted to; and since he did not have the powers and duties of the Secretary of Justice, he was therefore not a real
party-in-interest in this case.
Respondent Guingona avers that he was prompted to issue DOJ Department Order No. 137 dated April 13, 1997
creating a committee due to several complaints received by the Office of the Secretary of Justice in February 1997.
Among others, the complaints prayed for the investigation of certain actions taken by the LRA officials and
personnel in connection with transactions involving the Maysilo Estate. According to him, the committee was
tasked for the purpose of initiating a fact-finding inquiry:
"(1) to ascertain the circumstances surrounding the issuance of original Certificate(s) of Title (OCT) No. 994 of the
Registry of Deeds of Rizal purporting to cover a mass of land encompassing Malabon, Caloocan City and Quezon
City as well as the issuance and regularity of Transfer Certificates of Titles (TCTs) derived therefrom; (2) in the event
of a finding of the irregular issuance of any such [TCTs], (a) to determine the involvement of and to recommend the
actions to be taken against person(s) and/or officials and employees of this Department or its agencies who may
appear to have participated therein, and (b) to recommend the administrative and/or judicial actions, if any, that
may directly be undertaken by this Department, the Office of the Solicitor General, the Land Registration Authority,
and other units and attached agencies of this Department, with respect to such irregularly issued Transfer
Certificates of Title, taking into account the final decisions of the courts affecting the Maysilo Estate."18
Respondent Guingona contends that it can be gleaned from the purpose of the creation of the committee that its
fact-finding investigation was merely administrative to formulate and recommend policies, procedures and courses
of action which the DOJ, the LRA, the Office of the Solicitor General and other agencies of the DOJ can adopt with
regard to the problem of the proliferation of fake land titles, including those that relate to the Maysilo Estate. He
alleges that based on this committees report dated August 27, 1997, he issued the subject 1st Indorsement which
spelled out the policies, procedures, and courses of action which the LRA, an agency under the DOJ, must follow
not only with respect to OCT No. 994 and its derivative titles covering the Maysilo Estate but to all other original or
transfer certificates of title as well. He contends that the 1st Indorsement was merely an administrative issuance of
the DOJ; thus, it could not be said that it altered or supplanted any judgment of this Court.
Respondent Guingona further states that the 1st Indorsement dated September 22, 1997 was issued long before
the Order dated January 18, 1998, thus it could not be said that petitioner was denied due process as her rights and
interests were non-existent at that time. Furthermore, respondent Guingona alleges that petitioner was accorded
due process when the LRA Administrator gave an opportunity to petitioners counsel to present petitioners case to
the LRA legal staff. Respondent Guingona claims that such opportunity to be heard satisfies the requirements of
due process, as the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard. 19
With regard to the claim for damages, respondent Guingona argues that it is a factual issue which the petitioner must
prove in the course of a trial where petitioners claim for damages can be fully litigated. This Honorable Court, however,
is not a trier of facts. Such being the case, it is inappropriate for petitioner to include in her petition for mandamus a
claim for damages the amount of which she did not even specify. As it is, such claim should be denied by this Honorable
Court. There is also no showing that petitioner paid the required docket fees for her claims for damages. On this score
alone, such a claim should be outrightly dismissed.20
In her Reply,21 petitioner contends that former DOJ Secretary Guingona has to be named as private respondent because
he was the cause of public respondents failure to comply with their ministerial duty. A private respondent is "the
person interested in sustaining the proceedings in the court; and it shall be the duty of such private respondent to
appear and defend, both in his own behalf and in behalf of the public respondents affected by the proceedings x x x."
He is not charged with any improper act, but he is a necessary party as the grant of relief prayed for by petitioner shall
require private respondents active participation. 22
Anent private respondents argument that the 1st Indorsement did not in any way alter or modify any judgment of this
Honorable Court, petitioner counters that the 1st Indorsement and "pertinent acts of private respondent x x x resulted
in the altering or supplanting of a judgment of this Court." The complaints praying that an investigation be conducted
on the irregular issuance of titles in the Maysilo Estate were made to the private respondent by parties who held titles
derived from OCT No. 994 on May 3, 1917, after the Supreme Court had rendered its decision in MWSS v. Court of
Appeals and Heirs of Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals.
Petitioner argues that contrary to private respondents claim, she is entitled to file a petition for mandamus as she and
her co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. C-424 has been suffering from damages and losses incapable of quantification, because
of the wrongful act of the respondents. Petitioner cites the following provisions of the Rules of Court in support of her
argument:
RULE 65
xxxx
SECTION 9. Service and enforcement of order or judgment. A certified copy of the judgment rendered in accordance
with the last preceding section shall be served upon the court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person concerned in such manner as the court may direct, and disobedience thereto shall be punished as
contempt. An execution may issue for any damages or costs awarded in accordance with Section 1 of Rule 39.
RULE 39
SECTION 1. Execution upon final judgments or orders. Execution shall issue as a matter of right, on motion, upon a
judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no
appeal has been duly perfected.
If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may forthwith be applied for in the court of
origin, on motion of the judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified true copies of the judgment or judgments or
final order or orders sought to be enforced and of the entry thereof, with notice to the adverse party.
The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of justice so requires, direct the court of origin
to issue the writ of execution.
Petitioner avers that private respondent seemed to assume a function that did not belong to the Executive Department,
because he had caused the issuance of an LRA Circular that forbade compliance with a court order that had already
become final and executory. Petitioner likewise avers that the doctrine of separation of powers called for each branch
of government to be left alone to discharge its functions within its jurisdiction, as it saw fit.23
Public respondents Secretary of Justice, the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority, and the Register of Deeds
of Quezon City filed their Comment24 on November 16, 2000. Public respondents claim that petitioner and her
co-plaintiffs are not the rightful owners of the property subject of said complaint for partition. Their allegation in the
complaint that they are the heirs and successors-in-interest of the late Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, co-owner of the
parcels of land described in OCT No. 994, and are therefore entitled to the proportionate share, ownership, and
possession of the parcels of land described in paragraphs XI to XV of the complaint, is an untrue statement made with
intent to deceive. This is because the findings embodied in the Report of the Fact Finding Committee created by the
DOJ, which are the result of the joint undertaking of the Department proper, the Office of the Solicitor General, and the
LRA, support the conclusion that petitioner and her co-plaintiffs are not entitled to the issuance of new transfer
certificates of title in their names.25
Public respondents claim the following as facts:
46
Land Titles Cases
The DOJ Report became the subject of [a] Senate investigation. On May 25, 1998, the Honorable Senate of the
Tenth Congress of the Republic of the Philippines reached the conclusion that petitioner and her co-plaintiffs are
not and cannot be true heirs of the late Maria de la Concepcion Vidal (par. 3, p. 33, Senate Report). x x x.
As early as 1917, subject property of the instant case had already been partitioned and divided among the true
owners, namely, Gonzalo Tuason y Patino, Jose Rato y Tuason, Luis Vidal y Tuason, Concepcion Vidal y Tuason,
Pedro Baos, Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, Trinidad Jurado, Bernardino Hernandez, Esperanza Tuason Chua Jap,
Isabel Tuason Chua, Juan Jose Tuason de la Paz, Maria Teresa Tuason y de la Paz, Mariano Severo Tuason y de la
Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, Augusto Hoberto Tuason y de la Paz, Maria Soterrana Tuason y de la
Paz, Benito Legarda y de la Paz, Consuelo Legarda y de la Paz, Rita Legarda y de la Paz, Benito Legarda y Tuason,
Emilia Tuason y Patio, Maria Rocha de Despujols, Sofia OFarrell y Patio, German Franco y Gonzales, Concepcion
Franco y Gonzales, Domingo Franco y Gonzales, Guillerma Ferrer y Tuason, Vicente Ferrer y Tuason, Josefa Tuason
vda. de Flores, and heirs of Filemon Tuazon in proportion to their respective shares, as evidenced by the document
entitled PROYECTO DE PARTICION DE LA HACIENDA DE MAYSILO (PARTITION PLAN OF HACIENDA MAYSILO)
consisting of fifty-two (52) pages which is attached as Annex "D", and its faithful translation into English consisting
of forty-nine (49) pages attached as Annex "E", and both made integral parts hereof.
As a result of said partition, transfer certificates of titles covering the same subject parcels of land were legally
issued in the names of above-enumerated true owners.
The Register of Deeds of Quezon City and Caloocan City, through the undersigned counsel, filed the aforestated
Motion for Reconsideration of the questioned Order of the lower court.
The resolution of said motion and other incidents in related cases pending before the lower court has been held in
abeyance to await the resolution by higher courts of other cases involving the Maysilo Estate.26
We are thus faced with the issue of whether public respondents unlawfully neglected to perform their duties by
their refusal to issue the questioned transfer certificates of title to petitioner and her co-plaintiffs (in Civil Case No.
C-424) or have unlawfully excluded petitioner from the use and enjoyment of whatever claimed right, as would
warrant the issuance of a writ of mandamus against said public respondents.
Considering the factual background and recent jurisprudence related to this controversy as will be discussed below,
we find that it was not unlawful for public respondents to refuse compliance with the RTC Order, and the act being
requested of them is not their ministerial duty; hence, mandamus does not lie and the petition must be dismissed.
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SECTION 3. Petition for mandamus. When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects
the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and
there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the
act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner
by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent.
It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, but not to
compel the performance of a discretionary duty. Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right which is in substantial
dispute or to which a substantial doubt exists.27 It is nonetheless likewise available to compel action, when refused,
in matters involving judgment and discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular
way or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either.28
Therefore, we must look into the alleged right of petitioner and see if compliance with the RTC Order is
compellable by mandamus; or, in the alternative, find out if substantial doubt exists to justify public respondents
refusal to comply with said Order. Did public respondents have sufficient legal basis to refuse to grant petitioners
request?
In this regard, we find our discussion in Laburada v. Land Registration Authority29 instructive, to wit:
That the LRA hesitates in issuing a decree of registration is understandable. Rather than a sign of negligence or
nonfeasance in the performance of its duty, the LRA's reaction is reasonable, even imperative. Considering the
probable duplication of titles over the same parcel of land, such issuance may contravene the policy and the
purpose, and thereby destroy the integrity, of the Torrens system of registration.
xxxx
x x x Likewise, the writ of mandamus can be awarded only when the petitioners' legal right to the performance of
the particular act which is sought to be compelled is clear and complete. Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a
clear legal right is a right which is indubitably granted by law or is inferable as a matter of law. If the right is clear and
the case is meritorious, objections raising merely technical questions will be disregarded. But where the right sought to
be enforced is in substantial doubt or dispute, as in this case, mandamus cannot issue.30 (Emphasis ours.)
As can be gleaned from the above discussion, the issuance by the LRA officials of a decree of registration is not a purely
ministerial duty in cases where they find that such would result to the double titling of the same parcel of land. In the
same vein, we find that in this case, which involves the issuance of transfer certificates of title, the Register of Deeds
cannot be compelled by mandamus to comply with the RTC Order since there were existing transfer certificates of title
covering the subject parcels of land and there was reason to question the rights of those requesting for the issuance of
the TCTs. Neither could respondent LRA Administrator be mandated by the Court to require the Register of Deeds to
comply with said Order, for we find merit in the explanations of respondent LRA Administrator in his letter-reply that
cites the 1st Indorsement issued by respondent Guingona, LRA Circular No. 97-11, and Senate Committee Report No.
1031, as reasons for his refusal to grant petitioners request.31 There was, therefore, sufficient basis for public
respondents to refuse to comply with the RTC Order, given the finding, contained in the cited documents, that OCT No.
994 dated April 19, 1917, on which petitioner and her co-plaintiffs in the civil case clearly anchored their rights, did not
exist.
It is important to emphasize at this point that in the recent case resolved by this Court En Banc in 2007, entitled
Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development Corporation32 (the 2007 Manotok case), as well as the succeeding
resolution33 in the same case dated March 31, 2009 (the 2009 Manotok case), the controversy surrounding the Maysilo
Estate and the question of the existence of another OCT No. 994 have been finally laid to rest. All other cases involving
said estate and OCT No. 994, such as the case at bar, are bound by the findings and conclusions set forth in said
resolutions.
As stated earlier, petitioner anchors her claim on previous cases decided by this Court34 which have held that there are
two existing OCT No. 994, dated differently, and the one from which she and her co-plaintiffs (in Civil Case No. C-424)
derived their rights was dated earlier, hence, was the superior title. Regrettably, petitioners claim no longer has a leg to
stand on. As we held in the 2007 Manotok case:
The determinative test to resolve whether the prior decision of this Court should be affirmed or set aside is whether or
not the titles invoked by the respondents are valid. If these titles are sourced from the so-called OCT No. 994 dated 17
April 1917, then such titles are void or otherwise should not be recognized by this Court. Since the true basic factual
predicate concerning OCT No. 994 which is that there is only one such OCT differs from that expressed in
the MWSS and Gonzaga decisions, said rulings have become virtually functus officio except on the basis of the "law of
the case" doctrine, and can no longer be relied upon as precedents.35
Specifically, petitioner cannot anymore insist that OCT No. 994 allegedly issued on April 19, 1917 validly and actually
exists, given the following conclusions made by this Court in the 2007 Manotok case:
First, there is only one OCT No. 994. As it appears on the record, that mother title was received for transcription by the
Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917, and that should be the date which should be reckoned as the date of registration of
the title. It may also be acknowledged, as appears on the title, that OCT No. 994 resulted from the issuance of the
decree of registration on [19] April 1917, although such date cannot be considered as the date of the title or the date
when the title took effect.
Second. Any title that traces its source to OCT No. 994 dated [19] April 1917 is void, for such mother title is inexistent.
The fact that the Dimson and CLT titles made specific reference to an OCT No. 994 dated [19] April 1917 casts doubt on
the validity of such titles since they refer to an inexistent OCT. x x x.
Third. The decisions of this Court in MWSS v. Court of Appeals and Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals cannot apply to the
cases at bar, especially in regard to their recognition of an OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917, a title which we now
acknowledge as inexistent. Neither could the conclusions in MWSS or Gonzaga with respect to an OCT No. 994 dated 19
April 1917 bind any other case operating under the factual setting the same as or similar to that at bar. 36 (Emphases
supplied.)1avvphi1
To be sure, this Court did not merely rely on the DOJ and Senate reports regarding OCT No. 994. In the 2007 Manotok
case, this Court constituted a Special Division of the Court of Appeals to hear the cases on remand, declaring as follows:
Since this Court is not a trier of fact[s], we are not prepared to adopt the findings made by the DOJ and the Senate, or
even consider whether these are admissible as evidence, though such questions may be considered by the Court of
Appeals upon the initiative of the parties. x x x The reports cannot conclusively supersede or overturn judicial decisions,
but if admissible they may be taken into account as evidence on the same level as the other pieces of evidence
submitted by the parties. The fact that they were rendered by the DOJ and the Senate should not, in itself, persuade the
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Land Titles Cases

courts to accept them without inquiry. The facts and arguments presented in the reports must still undergo judicial
scrutiny and analysis, and certainly the courts will have the discretion to accept or reject them.
There are many factual questions looming over the properties that could only be threshed out in the remand to the
Court of Appeals. x x x.
xxxx
The Special Division is tasked to hear and receive evidence, conclude the proceedings and submit to this Court a
report on its findings and recommended conclusions within three (3) months from finality of this Resolution.37
Thus, in the 2009 Manotok case, this Court evaluated the evidence engaged in by said Special Division, and adopted
the latters conclusions as to the status of the original title and its subsequent conveyances. This case affirmed the
earlier finding that "there is only one OCT No. 994, the registration date of which had already been decisively
settled as 3 May 1917 and not 19 April 1917" and categorically concluded that "OCT No. 994 which reflects the date
of 19 April 1917 as its registration date is null and void."
In the case at bar, petitioner is the last surviving co-plaintiff in Civil Case No. C-424 originally filed on May 3, 1965.
The records bear several attempts of different individuals to represent her as counsel, a matter that could be
attributed to her advanced age and potential access to a vast sum of money, should she get a favorable decision
from this case. It appears, however, that the partition and accounting of a portion of the Maysilo Estate that she
and her co-plaintiffs prayed for can no longer prosper because of the conclusive findings quoted above that the
very basis of their claim, a second, albeit earlier registered, OCT No. 994, does not exist.
The requirements under Rule 65 for the issuance of the writ of mandamus not having been proven by petitioner to
exist, we dismiss the petition for lack of merit.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

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