TORTS (BATCH 1, 2 and 3)

PICART vs. SMITH, JR.

G.R. No. L-12219
March 15, 1918

FACTS: On the Carlatan Bridge in La Union. Picart was riding on his pony over said
bridge. Before he had gotten half way across, Smith approached from the opposite
direction in an automobile. As the defendant neared the bridge he saw a horseman
on it and blew his horn to give warning of his approach. He continued his course
and after he had taken the bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as it
appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was not observing the rule
of the road.

Picart saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. However, being
perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he pulled
the pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of
going to the left. He says that the reason he did this was that he thought he did not
have sufficient time to get over to the other side. As the automobile approached,
Smith guided it toward his left, that being the proper side of the road for the
machine. In so doing the defendant assumed that the horseman would move to the
other side. Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of
veering to the right while yet some distance away or slowing down, continued to
approach directly toward the horse without diminution of speed. When he had
gotten quite near, there being then no possibility of the horse getting across to the
other side, the defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape
hitting the horse; but in so doing the automobile passed in such close proximity to
the animal that it became frightened and turned its body across the bridge, got hit
by the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with
some violenceAs a result of its injuries the horse died. The plaintiff received
contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical
attention for several days.

From a judgment of the CFI of La Union absolving Smith from liability Picart has
appealed.

ISSUE: WON Smith was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil obligation
to repair the damage done

HELD: the judgment of the lower court must be reversed, and judgment is here
rendered that the Picart recover of Smith damages

YES

The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may
be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that
person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of
negligence. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by
reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law
considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary
intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. The question as to what
would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course
be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts
involved in the particular case.

Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of
the course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions
to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by ignoring of
the suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be
held to exist. Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for determining the
existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when
a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect
harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or
guarding against its consequences.

Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case we think that
negligence is clearly established. A prudent man, placed in the position of the
defendant, would in our opinion, have recognized that the course which he was
pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore have foreseen harm to the
horse and the rider as reasonable consequence of that course. Under these
circumstances the law imposed on the Smith the duty to guard against the
threatened harm.

It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was
guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road.
But as we have already stated, Smith was also negligent; and in such case the
problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and directly responsible.
It will be noted that the negligent acts of the two parties were not
contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence
of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is that
the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do
so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of
the other party.

UMALI vs. BACANI and SAYNES

G.R. No. L-40570
January 30, 1976

FACTS: a storm with strong rain hit the Municipality of Alcala Pangasinan. During
the storm, the banana plants standing on an elevated ground along the barrio of
said municipality and near the transmission line of the Alcala Electric Plant were
blown down and fell on the electric wire. As a result, the live electric wire was cut,
one end of which was left hanging on the electric post and the other fell to the
ground under the fallen banana plants.
On the following morning, the barrio captain who was passing by saw the broken
electric wire and so he warned the people in the place not to go near the wire for
they might get hurt. He also saw Baldomero, a laborer of the Alcala Electric Plant
near the place and notified him right then and there of the broken line and asked
him to fix it, but the latter told the barrio captain that he could not do it but that he
was going to look for the lineman to fix it.

Sometime after the barrio captain and Baldomero had left the place, a small boy of
3 years and 8 months old whose house is just on the opposite side of the road,
went to the place where the broken line wire was and got in contact with it. The boy
was electrocuted and he subsequently died. It was only after the electrocution of
the child that the broken wire was fixed on the same morning by the lineman of the
electric plant.

Petitioner claims that he could not be liable under the concept of quasi-delict or tort
as owner and manager of the Alcala Electric Plant because the proximate cause of
the boys death electrocution could not be due to any negligence on his part, but
rather to a fortuitous event-the storm that caused the banana plants to fall and cut
the electric line-pointing out the absence of negligence on the part of his employee
Baldomero who tried to have the line repaired and the presence of negligence of
the parents of the child in allowing him to leave his house during that time.

HELD: WON petitioner is guilty of negligence for the death of the child

ISSUE: WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court is affirmed.

A careful examination of the record convinces Us that a series of negligence on the

part of defendants employees in the Alcala Electric Plant resulted in the death of
the victim by electrocution.

First, by the very evidence of the defendant, there were big and tall banana plants
at the place of the incident standing on an elevated ground and which were higher
than the electric post supporting the electric line, and yet the employees of the
defendant who, with ordinary foresight, could have easily seen that even in case of
moderate winds the electric line would be endangered by banana plants being
blown down, did not even take the necessary precaution to eliminate that source of
danger to the electric line.

Second, even after the employees of the Alcala Electric Plant were already aware of
the possible damage the storm could have caused their electric lines, thus
becoming a possible threat to life and property, they did not cut off from the plant
the flow of electricity along the lines, an act they could have easily done pending
inspection of the wires to see if they had been cut.

Third, employee Baldomero was negligent on the morning of the incident because
even if he was already made aware of the live cut wire, he did not have the
foresight to realize that the same posed a danger to life and property, and that he
should have taken the necessary precaution to prevent anybody from approaching
the live wire.

On defendants argument that the proximate cause of the victims death could be
attributed to the parents negligence in allowing a child of tender age to go out of
the house alone, We could readily see that because of the aforementioned series of
negligence on the part of defendants employees resulting in a live wire lying on the
premises without any visible warning of its lethal character, anybody, even a
responsible grown up or not necessarily an innocent child, could have met the same
fate that befell the victim.. Stated otherwise, even if the child was allowed to leave
the house unattended due to the parents negligence, he would not have died that
morning where it not for the cut live wire he accidentally touched.

Art. 2179 of the Civil Code provides that if the negligence of the plaintiff (parents of
the victim in this case) was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause
of the injury being the defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover
damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. This law may
be availed of by the petitioner but does not exempt him from liability. Petitioners
liability for injury caused by his employees negligence is well defined in par. 4, of
Article 2180 of the Civil Code, which states:

The owner and manager of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible

for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the
latter are employed or on tile occasion of their functions.

The negligence of the employee is presumed to be the negligence of the employer

because the employer is supposed to exercise supervision over the work of the
employees. This liability of the employer is primary and direct. In fact the proper
defense for the employer to raise so that he may escape liability is to prove that he
exercised, the diligence of the good father of the family to prevent damage not only
in the selection of his employees but also in adequately supervising them over their
work. This defense was not adequately proven as found by the trial Court.

Culion Ice v. Philippine Motors (G.R. No. L-32611)

Facts:

Culion Ice and Fish was the registered owner of the motor schooner, Gwendoline,
which it uses for its fishing trade. In order to save costs in running the boat, Culion
Ice decided to have the engine changed from gasoline consumer to a crude oil burner.
Quest, general manager of Philippine Motors, a domestic corporation engaged in
machinery engines and motors, agreed to do the job. Upon inspection, Quest came
to conclusion that a carburetor needed to be installed. In the course of the work, it
was observed that the carburetor was flooding and that the gasoline and other fuel
was trickling freely to the floor but this concern was dismissed by Quest. During the
boats trial run, the engine stopped and upon being started, a back fire occurred
which then instantly spread and finally engulfed Gwendoline. The crew members
safely escaped but Gwendoline was destroyed. Culion Ice moved for the recovery of
the damages against Philippine Motors. The trial court ruled for Culion Ice. Philippine
Motor asserts that the accident was not due to the fault of Quest.

Issue:

Whether or not Quest was negligent.

Ruling: YES.

When a person holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring

professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit
the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts
to do. The proof shows that Quest had had ample experience in fixing the engines of
automobiles and tractors, but it does not appear that he was experienced in the doing
of similar work on boats. For this reason, possibly the dripping of the mixture form
the tank on deck and the flooding of the carburetor did not convey to his mind an
adequate impression of the danger of fire. But a person skilled in that particular
sort of work would, we think have been sufficiently warned from those
circumstances (risks) to cause him to take greater and adequate
precautions against the danger. In other words Quest did not use the skill that
would have been exhibited by one ordinarily expert in repairing gasoline engines on
boats. There was here, in our opinion, on the part of Quest, a blameworthy
antecedent inadvertence to possible harm, and this constitutes negligence. The
burning of the Gwendoline may be said to have resulted from accident, but this
accident was in no sense an unavoidable accident. It would not have occurred but for
Quests carelessness or lack of skill. The test of liability is not whether the injury was
accidental in a sense, but whether Quest was free from blame.

Transportation Case Digest: Cangco v. MRR (1918)

G.R. No. L-12191 October 14, 1918

FACTS:

January 20, 1915 around 7 to 8 p.m.: Jose Cangco arose from his seat in the
2nd class-car where he was riding and, making, his exit through the door,
took his position upon the steps of the coach, seizing the upright guardrail
with his right hand for support
As the train slowed down another passenger and also an employee of the
railroad company Emilio Zuiga got off the same car alighting safely at the
point where the platform begins to rise from the level of the ground.
When the train had proceeded a little farther Cangco stepped off but 1 or
both of his feet came in contact with a sack of watermelons so his feet
slipped from under him and he fell violently on the platform.
 o His body rolled from the platform and was drawn under the moving
car, where his right arm was badly crushed and lacerated.
the car moved forward possibly 6 meters before it came to a full
stop
He was bought to the hospital in the city of Manila where an examination was
made and his arm was amputated
o operation was unsatisfactory so he had second operation at another
hospital was performed and the member was again amputated higher
up near the shoulder expending a total of P790.25
It is customary season for harvesting these melons and a large lot had been
brought to the station for the shipment to the market
CFI: favored Manila Railroad Co. (MRR)- Cangco had failed to use due
caution in alighting from the coach and was therefore precluded form
recovering

ISSUE: W/N MRR should be held liable.

HELD: YES. lower court is reversed, and judgment is hereby rendered plaintiff for
the sum of P3,290.25

It can not be doubted that the employees of the railroad company were
guilty of negligence. It necessarily follows that the defendant company is
liable for the damage thereby occasioned unless recovery is barred by the
plaintiff's own contributory negligence.
In resolving this problem it is necessary that each of these conceptions of
liability, to-wit, the primary responsibility of the defendant company and the
contributory negligence of the plaintiff should be separately examined
Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to obligations arising ex
contractu, but only to extra-contractual obligations or to use the technical
form of expression, that article relates only to culpa aquiliana and not
to culpa contractual
o article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to acts of negligence
which constitute the breach of a contract
two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence
of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that
there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in
selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after the
selection, or both; and (2) that that presumption is juris tantum and not juris
et de jure, and consequently, may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if
the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and
supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a
family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability.
As a general rule . . . it is logical that in case of extra-contractual culpa, a
suing creditor should assume the burden of proof of its existence, as the only
fact upon which his action is based; while on the contrary, in a case of
negligence which presupposes the existence of a contractual obligation, if the
 creditor shows that it exists and that it has been broken, it is not necessary
for him to prove negligence.
The test by which to determine whether the passenger has been guilty of
negligence in attempting to alight from a moving railway train, is that of
ordinary or reasonable care. It is to be considered whether an ordinarily
prudent person, of the age, sex and condition of the passenger, would have
acted as the passenger acted under the circumstances disclosed by the
evidence. This care has been defined to be, not the care which may or should
be used by the prudent man generally, but the care which a man of ordinary
prudence would use under similar circumstances, to avoid injury.
o Women, it has been observed, as a general rule are less capable than
men of alighting with safety under such conditions, as the nature of
their wearing apparel obstructs the free movement of the limbs. Again,
it may be noted that the place was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff as
it was his daily custom to get on and of the train at this station. There
could, therefore, be no uncertainty in his mind with regard either to
the length of the step which he was required to take or the character
of the platform where he was alighting. Our conclusion is that the
conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train was yet
slightly under way was not characterized by imprudence and that
therefore he was not guilty of contributory negligence.
at the time of the accident, was earning P25 a month as a copyist clerk, and
that the injuries he has suffered have permanently disabled him from
continuing that employment. Defendant has not shown that any other gainful
occupation is open to plaintiff. His expectancy of life, according to the
standard mortality tables, is approximately thirty-three years. We are of the
opinion that a fair compensation for the damage suffered by him for his
permanent disability is the sum of P2,500, and that he is also entitled to
recover of defendant the additional sum of P790.25 for medical attention,
hospital services, and other incidental expenditures connected with the
treatment of his injuries.

PRECIOLITA V. CORLISS vs. THE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY

G.R. No. L-21291
March 28, 1969

FACTS:

Ralph Corliss Jr. was an air police of the Clark Air Force Base. The jeep he was
driving while accompanied with a P.C. soldier, collided with a locomotive of Manila
Railroad Company (MRC) close to midnight at the railroad crossing in Balibago,
Angeles, Pampanga, in front of the Clark Air Force Base. Corliss Jr. died of serious
burns at the hospital the next day, while the soldier sustained serious physical
injuries and burns.

In the decision appealed from, the lower court, after summarizing the evidence,
concluded that the deceased in his eagerness to beat, so to speak, the oncoming
locomotive, took the risk and attempted to reach the other side, but unfortunately
he became the victim of his own miscalculation.

The negligence imputed to MRC was thus ruled out by the lower court, satisfactory
proof to that effect, in its opinion, being lacking. Hence this appeal direct to us, the
amount sought in the concept of damages reaching the sum of P282,065.40.

ISSUE: WON the lower courts decision is erroneous

HELD: The decision of the lower court dismissing the complaint, is affirmed.

NO

The lower court judgment has in its favor the presumption of correctness. It is
entitled to great respect. In the absence of compelling reasons, [the factual]
determination is best left to the trial judge why had the advantage of hearing the
parties testify and observing their demeanor on the witness stand.

But more importantly, this action is predicated on negligence, the Civil Code making
clear that whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
negligence, is under obligation to pay for the damage done. Unless it could be
satisfactorily shown, therefore, that MRC was guilty of negligence then it could not
be held liable. The crucial question, therefore, is the existence of negligence.

Negligence was defined by us in two 1912 decisions, United States v. Juanillo and
United States v. Barias. Cooley formulation was quoted with approval in both the
Juanillo and Barias decisions. Thus: Judge Cooley in his work on Torts (3d ed.),
Sec. 1324, defines negligence to be:

The failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that
degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstance justly demand
whereby such other person suffers injury.

There was likewise a reliance on Ahern v. Oregon Telephone Co. Thus:

Negligence is want of the care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or

comparative, not an absolute term and its application depends upon the situation of
the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances
reasonably require. Where the danger is great, a high degree of care is necessary,
and the failure to observe it is a want of ordinary care under the circumstances.

To repeat, by such a test, no negligence could be imputed to MRC and the action of
Corliss must necessarily fail. The facts being what they are, compel the conclusion
that the liability sought to be fastened on MRC had not arisen.

Finally, each and every case on questions of negligence is to be decided in

accordance with the peculiar circumstances that present themselves. There can be
no hard and fast rule. There must be that observance of that degree of care,
precaution, and vigilance which the situation demands.

LILIUS, ET AL. vs. THE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY

G.R. No. L-39587
March 24, 1934

FACTS: Lilius was driving with his wife and daughter for sightseeing in Pagsanjan
Laguna. It was his first time in the area and he was entirely unacquainted with the
conditions of the road and had no knowledge of the existence of a railroad crossing.
Before reaching the crossing in question, there was nothing to indicate its existence
and, it was impossible to see an approaching train. At about seven or eight meters
from the crossing the plaintiff saw an autotruck parked on the left side of the road.
Several people, who seemed to have alighted from the said truck, were walking on
the opposite side. He slowed down and sounded his horn for the people to get out
of the way. With his attention thus occupied, he did not see the crossing but he
heard two short whistles. Immediately afterwards, he saw a huge black mass fling
itself upon him, which turned out to be locomotive No. 713 of the MRCs train. The
locomotive struck the plaintiffs car right in the center. The 3 victims were injured
and were hospitalized.

Lilus filed a case against MRC in the CFI. Answering the complaint, it denies each
and every allegation thereof and, by way of special defense, alleges that the Lilius,
with the cooperation of his wife and coplaintiff, negligently and recklessly drove his
car, and prays that it be absolved from the complaint.

The CFI decided in favor of Lilius. The 2 parties appealed said decision, each
assigning errors on said judgement.

ISSUE:

1. WON Manila Railroad Company is liable for damages

2. WON the sums of money fixed by the court a quo as indemnities for damages
proper

1. Injuries sutained by Lilius

2. for injuries sustained by wife and child
3. for loss of domestic service of wife to husband

HELD: The judgment appealed from is affirmed in toto, with the sole modification
on interest to be added on the indemnity in favor of Lilius.

1. YES. Upon examination of the oral as well as of the documentary evidence, this
court is of the opinion that the accident was due to negligence on the part of the
defendant-appellant company alone, for not having had on that occasion any
semaphore at the crossing to serve as a warning to passers-by of its existence in
order that they might take the necessary precautions before crossing the railroad;
and, on the part of its employees the flagman and switchman, for not having
remained at his post at the crossing in question to warn passers-by of the
approaching train

Although it is probable that the defendant-appellant entity employed the diligence

of a good father of a family in selecting its aforesaid employees, however, it did not
employ such diligence in supervising their work and the discharge of their duties.
The diligence of a good father of a family, which the law requires in order to avoid
damage, is not confined to the careful and prudent selection of subordinates or
employees but includes inspection of their work and supervision of the discharge of
their duties.

2. a. With respect to the plaintiffs appeal, the first question to be decided is that
raised by Lilius relative to the insufficiency of the sum of P5,000 which the trial
court adjudicated to him by way of indemnity for damages consisting in the loss of
his income as journalist and author as a result of his illness. As to the amount of
P10,000 claimed by Lilius as damages for the loss of his wifes services in his
business, which services consisted in going over his writings, translating them into
foreign languages and acting as his secretary, in addition to the fact that such
services formed part of the work whereby he realized a net monthly income of
P1,500, there is no sufficient evidence of the true value of said services nor to the
effect that he needed them during her illness and had to employ a translator to act
in her stead.

b. Taking into consideration the fact that the wife in the language of the court,
which saw her at the trial young and beautiful and the big scar, which she has
on her forehead caused by the lacerated wound received by her from the accident,
disfigures her face and that the fracture of her left leg has caused a permanent
deformity which renders it very difficult for her to walk, and taking into further
consideration her social standing, neither is the sum adjudicated to her for
patrimonial and moral damages, excessive.

As to the indemnity in favor of the child neither is the same excessive, taking into
consideration the fact that the lacerations received by her have left deep scars that
permanently disfigure her face and that the fractures of both her legs permanently
render it difficult for her to walk freely, continuous extreme care being necessary in
order to keep her balance in addition to the fact that all of this unfavorably and to a
great extent affect her matrimonial future.

c. Lilius also seeks to recover the sum of P2,500 for the loss of what is called Anglo-
Saxon common law consortium of his wife, that is, her services, society and
conjugal companionship, as a result of personal injuries which she had received
from the accident now under consideration.

Under the law and the doctrine of this court, one of the husbands rights is to count
on his wifes assistance. This assistance comprises the management of the home
and the performance of household duties. However, nowadays when women, in
their desire to be more useful to society and to the nation, are demanding greater
civil rights and are aspiring to become mans equal in all the activities of life,
marriage has ceased to create the presumption that a woman complies with the
duties to her husband and children, which the law imposes upon her, and he who
seeks to collect indemnity for damages resulting from deprivation of her domestic
services must prove such services. In the case under consideration, apart from the
services of his wife as translator and secretary, the value of which has not been
proven, Lilius has not presented any evidence showing the existence of domestic
services and their nature, rendered by her prior to the accident, in order that it may
serve as a basis in estimating their value.

Furthermore, inasmuch as a wifes domestic assistance and conjugal companionship

are purely personal and voluntary acts which neither of the spouses may be
compelled to render, it is necessary for the party claiming indemnity for the loss of
such services to prove that the person obliged to render them had done so before
he was injured and that he would be willing to continue rendering them had he not
been prevented from so doing

NOTES:

However, in order that a victim of an accident may recover indemnity for damages
from the person liable therefor, it is not enough that the latter has been guilty of
negligence, but it is also necessary that the said victim has not, through his own
negligence, , contributed to the accident.

It appears that Lilius took all precautions which his skill and the presence of his wife
and child, driving his car at a speed which prudence demanded according to the
circumstances and conditions of the road, slackening his speed in the face of an
obstacle and blowing his horn upon seeing persons on the road. If he failed to stop,
look and listen before going over the crossing, in spite of the fact that he was
driving at 12 miles per hour after having been free from obstacles, it was because,
his attention having been occupied in attempting to go ahead, he did not see the
crossing in question, nor anything, nor anybody indicating its existence, as he knew
nothing about it beforehand. The first and only warning, which he received of the
impending danger, was two short blows from the whistle of the locomotive
immediately preceding the collision and when the accident had already become
inevitable.

Vda. da Bataclan v. Medina

Facts:

The deceased Juan Bataclan was among the passengers of Medina Transportation,
driven by Conrado Saylon and operated by Mariano Medina. On its way from Cavite
to Pasay, the front tires burst and the vehicle fell into a canal. Some passengers were
able to escape by themselves or with some help, while there were 4, including
Bataclan, who could not get out. Their cries were heard in the neighbourhood. Then
there came about 10 men, one of them carrying a torch. As they approached the bus,
it caught fire and the passengers died. The fire was due to gasoline leak and the
torch. Salud Villanueva Vda. de Bataclan, in her name and on behalf of her 5 minor
children, sought to claim damages from the bus company. The CFI favored the
plaintiff, and the Court of Appeals forwarded the case to the Supreme Court due to
the amount involved.

Issue:

What was the proximate cause of the death of Juan and the other passengers?

Held:

We agree with the trial court that the case involves a breach of contract of
transportation for hire, the Medina Transportation having undertaken to carry
Bataclan safely to his destination, Pasay City. We also agree with the trial court that
there was negligence on the part of the defendant, through his agent, the driver
Saylon. There is evidence to show that at the time of the blow out, the bus was
speeding, as testified to by one of the passengers, and as shown by the fact that
according to the testimony of the witnesses, including that of the defense, from the
point where one of the front tires burst up to the canal where the bus overturned
after zig-zaging, there was a distance of about 150 meters. The chauffeur, after the
blow-out, must have applied the brakes in order to stop the bus, but because of the
velocity at which the bus must have been running, its momentum carried it over a
distance of 150 meters before it fell into the canal and turned turtle.

There is no question that under the circumstances, the defendant carrier is liable.
The only question is to what degree. A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is
found in Volume 38, pages 695-696 of American jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-
appellants in their brief. It is as follows:

. . . 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any

efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred.' And more comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause
is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other
events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each
having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event
in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of
the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible
for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to
some person might probably result therefrom.

In the present case under the circumstances obtaining in the same, we do not
hesitate to hold that the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus, this for the
reason that when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back,
the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the
coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not
only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the conductor
themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers
had to carry a light with them, and coming as they did from a rural area where
lanterns and flashlights were not available; and what was more natural than that said
rescuers should innocently approach the vehicle to extend the aid and effect the
rescue requested from them. In other words, the coming of the men with a torch was
to be expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping
of some of its passengers and the call for outside help. What is more, the burning of
the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through is
driver and its conductor. According to the witness, the driver and the conductor were
on the road walking back and forth. They, or at least, the driver should and must
have known that in the position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and
must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus,
this aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially over a large area, can
be smelt and directed even from a distance, and yet neither the driver nor the
conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not
to bring the lighted torch too near the bus.

[G.R. No. 53401. November 6, 1989.] THE ILOCOS NORTE ELECTRIC

COMPANY, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, (First Division)
LILIAN JUAN LUIS, JANE JUAN YABES, VIRGINIA JUAN CID, GLORIA JUAN
CARAG, and PURISIMA JUAN, respondents.

FACTS:
in the evening of June 28 until the early morning of June 29, 1967 a strong typhoon
by the code name "Gening" buffeted the province of Ilocos Norte, bringing heavy
rains and consequent flooding in its wake. Between 5:30 and 6:00 A.M. on June 29,
1967, after the typhoon had abated and when the floodwaters were beginning to
recede, the deceased Isabel Lao Juan, fondly called Nana Belen, ventured out of the
house of her son-in-law, Antonio Yabes, on No. 19 Guerrero Street, Laoag City, and
proceeded northward towards the direction of the Five Sisters Emporium, of which
she was the owner and proprietress, to look after the merchandise therein that
might have been damaged. Wading in waistdeep flood on Guerrero, the deceased
was followed by Aida Bulong, a Salesgirl at the Five Sisters Grocery, also owned by
the deceased, and by Linda Alonzo Estavillo, a ticket seller at the YJ Cinema, which
was partly owned by the deceased. Aida and Linda walked side by side at a distance
of between 5 and 6 meters behind the deceased. Suddenly, the deceased screamed
"Ay" and quickly sank into the water. The two girls attempted to help, but fear
dissuaded them from doing so because on the spot where the deceased sank they
saw an electric wire dangling from a post and moving in snake-like fashion in the
water. Upon their shouts for help, Ernesto dela Cruz came out of the house of
Antonio Yabes. Ernesto tried to go to the deceased, but at four meters away from
her he turned back shouting that the water was grounded. Aida and Linda prodded
Ernesto to seek help from Antonio Yabes at the YJ Cinema building which was four
or five blocks away.
When Antonio Yabes was informed by Ernesto that his mother-in-law had been
electrocuted, he acted immediately. With his wife Jane, together with Ernesto and
one Joe Ros, Yabes passed by the City Hall of Laoag to request the police to ask the
people of defendant Ilocos Norte Electric Company or INELCO to cut off the electric
current. Then the party waded to the house on Guerrero Street. The floodwater was
receding and the lights inside the house were out indicating that the electric current
had been cut off in Guerrero. Yabes instructed his boys to fish for the body of the
deceased. The body was recovered about two meters from an electric post.

In another place, at about 4:00 AM. on that fateful date, June 29, 1967, Engineer
Antonio Juan, Power Plant Engineer of the National Power Corporation at the Laoag
Diesel-Electric Plant, noticed certain fluctuations in their electric meter which
indicated such abnormalities as grounded or short-circuited lines. Between 6:00
and 6:30 A.M., he set out of the Laoag NPC Compound on an inspection. On the
way, he saw grounded and disconnected lines. Electric lines were hanging from the
posts to the ground. Since he could not see any INELCO lineman, he decided to go
to the INELCO Office at the Life Theatre on Rizal Street by way of Guerrero.

At about 8:10 A.M., Engr. Juan went out of the compound again on another
inspection trip. Having learned of the death of Isabel Lao Juan, he passed by the
house of the deceased at the corner of Guerrero and M.H. del Pilar streets to which
the body had been taken.

In the afternoon of the same day, he went on a third inspection trip preparatory to
the restoration of power. The dangling wire he saw on Guerrero early in the
morning of June 29, 1967 was no longer there.
An action for damages in the aggregate amount of P250,000 was instituted by the
heirs of the deceased with the aforesaid CFI on June 24, 1968.

Defenses:
(1) electric service system of the INELCO in the whole franchise area did not suffer
from any defect that might constitute a hazard to life and property.
(2) service lines, devices and other INELCO equipment in Area No. 9 had been
newly-installed prior to the date in question.
(3) installed safety devices to prevent and avoid injuries to persons and damage to
property in case of natural calamities such as floods, typhoons, fire and others.
(4) 12 linesmen charged with the duty of making a round-the-clock check-up of the
areas respectively assigned to them.
(5) deceased could have died simply either by drowning or by electrocution due to
negligence attributable only to herself and not to petitioner.
(6) deceased, without petitioner's knowledge, caused the installation of a burglar
deterrent by connecting a wire from the main house to the iron gate and fence of
steel matting, thus, charging the latter with electric current whenever the switch is
on.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

(1) CFI Ilocos Norte: defendant is hereby sentenced to pay plaintiffs
ISSUE:
Whether INELCO is liable

RULING:
Yes.

PETITIONER NOT EXONERATED AS VICTIM'S DEATH IS CAUSED BY ITS

NEGLIGENCE. The respondent CA acted correctly in disposing the argument that
petitioner be exonerated from liability since typhoons and floods are fortuitous
events. While it is true that typhoons and floods are considered Acts of God for
which no person may be held responsible, it was not said eventuality which directly
caused the victim's death. It was through the intervention of petitioner's negligence
that death took place.

Under the circumstances of the case, petitioner was negligent in seeing to it that no
harm is done to the general public". . . considering that electricity is an agency,
subtle and deadly, the measure of care required of electric companies must be
commensurate with or proportionate to the danger. The duty of exercising this high
degree of diligence and care extends to every place where persons have a right to
be" (Astudillo vs. Manila Electric, 55 Phil. 427). The negligence of petitioner having
been shown, it may not now absolve itself from liability by arguing that the victim's
death was solely due to a fortuitous event. "When an act of God combines or
concurs with the negligence of the defendant to produce an injury, the defendant is
liable if the injury would not have resulted but for his own negligent conduct or
omission" (38 Am. Jur., p. 649).

A PERSON WHO VOLUNTARILY ASSENTS TO A KNOWN DANGER MUST ABIDE BY

THE CONSEQUENCES; EXCEPTIONS. The maxim "volenti non fit injuria" (To a
willing person, injury is not done) relied upon by petitioner finds no application
in the case at bar. It is imperative to note the surrounding circumstances which
impelled the deceased to leave the comforts of a roof and brave the subsiding
typhoon. As testified by Linda Alonzo Estavillo and Aida Bulong the deceased,
accompanied by the former two, were on their way to the latter's grocery store "to
see to it that the goods were not flooded." As such, shall We punish her for
exercising her right to protect her property from the floods by imputing upon her
the unfavorable presumption that she assumed the risk of personal injury?
Definitely not. For it has been held that a person is excused from the force of the
rule, that when he voluntarily assents to a known danger he must abide by the
consequences, if an emergency is found to exist or if the life or property of another
is in peril (65A C.S.C. Negligence (174(5), p. 301), or when he seeks to rescue his
endangered property (Harper and James, "The Law of Torts." Little, Brown and Co.,
1956, v. 2, p. 1167). Clearly, an emergency was at hand as the deceased's
property, a source of her livelihood, was faced with an impending loss.
Furthermore, the deceased, at the time the fatal incident occurred, was at a place
where she had a right to be without regard to petitioner's consent as she was on
her way to protect her merchandise. Hence, private respondents, as heirs, may not
be barred from recovering damages as a result of the death caused by petitioner's
negligence.

"When a storm occurs that is liable to prostrate the wires, due care requires prompt
efforts to discover and repair broken lines" (Cooley on Torts, 4th ed., v. 3, p. 474).
The fact is that when Engineer Antonio Juan of the National Power Corporation set
out in the early morning of June 29, 1967 on an inspection tour, he saw grounded
and disconnected lines hanging from posts to the ground but did not see any
INELCO lineman either in the streets or at the INELCO office. The foregoing shows
that petitioner's duty to exercise extraordinary diligence under the circumstance
was not observed, confirming the negligence of petitioner.

Singson vs BPI

FACTS: Singson, was one of the defendants in a civil case, in which judgment had
been rendered sentencing him and his co-defendants therein Lobregat and Villa-
Abrille & Co., to pay a sum of money to the plaintiff therein. Said judgment became
final and executory as only against Ville-Abrille for its failure to file an appeal. A
writ of garnishment was subsequently served upon BPI in which the Singsons
had a current account insofar as Villa-Abrilles credits against the Bank were
concerned.

Upon receipt of the said Writ of Garnishment, a clerk of the bank, upon reading the
name of the Singson in the title of the Writ of Garnishment as a party defendants,
without further reading the body and informing himself that said garnishment was
merely intended for the deposits of defendant Villa-Abrille & Co., et al, prepared a
letter informing Singson of the garnishment of his deposits by the plaintiff in that
case.

Subsequently, two checks issued by the plaintiff Julian C. Singson, one in favor of
B. M. Glass Service and another in favor of the Lega Corporation, were dishonored
by the bank. B. M. Glass Service then wrote to Singson that the check was not
honored by BPI because his account therein had already been garnished and that
they are now constrained to close his credit account with them.

Singson wrote to BPI, claiming that his name was not included in the Writ of
Execution and Notice of Garnishment, which was served upon the bank. The
defendants lost no time to rectify the mistake that had been inadvertently
committed.

Thus this action for damages.

ISSUE: WON the existence of a contract between the parties bars a plaintiffs claim
for damages based on torts?

HELD: NO. The existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the
commission of a tort by the one against the order and the consequent recovery of
damages therefore. Indeed, this view has been, in effect, reiterated in a
comparatively recent case. Thus, in Air France vs. Carrascoso, involving an airplane
passenger who, despite his first-class ticket, had been illegally ousted from his first-
class accommodation and compelled to take a seat in the tourist compartment, was
held entitled to recover damages from the air-carrier, upon the ground of tort on
the latters part, for, although the relation between a passenger and a carrier is
contractual both in origin and nature the act that breaks the contract may also
be a tort.

In view, however, of the facts obtaining in the case at bar, and considering,
particularly, the circumstance, that the wrong done to the plaintiff was remedied as
soon as the President of the bank realized the mistake he and his subordinate
employee had committed, the Court finds that an award of nominal damages the
amount of which need not be proven in the sum of P1,000, in addition to
attorneys fees in the sum of P500, would suffice to vindicate plaintiffs rights.

Air France vs Rafael Carrascoso

In March 1958, Rafael Carrascoso and several other Filipinos were tourists en route
to Rome from Manila. Carrascoso was issued a first class round trip ticket by Air
France. But during a stop-over in Bangkok, he was asked by the plane manager of
Air France to vacate his seat because a white man allegedly has a better right
than him. Carrascoso protested but when things got heated and upon advise of
other Filipinos on board, Carrascoso gave up his seat and was transferred to the
planes tourist class.

After their tourist trip when Carrascoso was already in the Philippines, he sued Air
France for damages for the embarrassment he suffered during his trip. In court,
Carrascoso testified, among others, that he when he was forced to take the tourist
class, he went to the planes pantry where he was approached by a plane purser
who told him that he noted in the planes journal the following:

First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that
the captain refused to intervene

The said testimony was admitted in favor of Carrascoso. The trial court eventually
awarded damages in favor of Carrascoso. This was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.

Air France is assailing the decision of the trial court and the CA. It avers that the
issuance of a first class ticket to Carrascoso was not an assurance that he will be
seated in first class because allegedly in truth and in fact, that was not the true
intent between the parties.

Air France also questioned the admissibility of Carrascosos testimony regarding the
note made by the purser because the said note was never presented in court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Air France is liable for damages and on what basis.

HELD: Yes. It appears that Air Frances liability is based on culpa-contractual and
on culpa aquiliana.

Culpa Contractual

There exists a contract of carriage between Air France and Carrascoso. There was a
contract to furnish Carrasocoso a first class passage; Second, That said contract
was breached when Air France failed to furnish first class transportation at
Bangkok; and Third, that there was bad faith when Air Frances employee
compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation berth after he was
already, seated and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he
suffered inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him
mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, resulting
in moral damages.

The Supreme Court did not give credence to Air Frances claim that the issuance of
a first class ticket to a passenger is not an assurance that he will be given a first
class seat. Such claim is simply incredible.

Culpa Aquiliana

Here, the SC ruled, even though there is a contract of carriage between Air France
and Carrascoso, there is also a tortuous act based on culpa aquiliana. Passengers
do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the
carriers employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They
are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language,
indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous
conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for
damages against the carrier. Air Frances contract with Carrascoso is one attended
with public duty. The stress of Carrascosos action is placed upon his wrongful
expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the Air France a case of quasi-
delict. Damages are proper.

Elcano vs Hill

77 SCRA 100 May 26, 1977

Reginald Hill, a minor, caused the death of Agapito (son of Elcano). Elcano filed a
criminal case against Reginald but Reginald was acquitted for lack of intent
coupled with mistake. Elcano then filed a civil action against Reginald and his dad
(Marvin Hill) for damages based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Hill argued that
the civil action is barred by his sons acquittal in the criminal case; and that if ever,
his civil liability as a parent has been extinguished by the fact that his son is
already an emancipated minor by reason of his marriage.

ISSUE: Whether or not Marvin Hill may be held civilly liable under Article 2180.

HELD: Yes. The acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case does not bar the filing of a
separate civil action. A separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal
act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted,
provided that the offended party is not allowed, if accused is actually charged also
criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the
two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e)
of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of
the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as
a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in
the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been
committed by the accused. Briefly stated, culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and
negligent acts which may be punishable by law.

While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child
(Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place by the
marriage of the minor child, it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399,
emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus
Emancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental
authority over the childs person. It shall enable the minor to administer his
property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or
encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian.
He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or
guardian. Therefore, Article 2180 is applicable to Marvin Hill the SC however
ruled since at the time of the decision, Reginald is already of age, Marvins liability
should be subsidiary only as a matter of equity.

Caedo vs Tu Khe Thai, 26 SCRA 419

Facts: Yu was riding in his Cadillac driven by Bernardo saw a carratela about 8
meters away. Instead of slowing down veered to the left to overtake and in so
doing the car hit the carratellas left wheel and skidded obliquely hitting the on
coming car of Caedo who despite slackened speed to avoid the collision was hit
resulting to the injuries of Caedo and his passengers. Yus driver was negligent.
Was Yu liable?

Held: The basis of the master/employers liability in civil law is not respondent
superior but rather the relationship of Pater Familias. The theory is that ultimately
the negligence of the servant, if known to the master and susceptible of timely
correction, reflects the masters negligence if he fails to correct it in order to
prevent the injury or damage (J. Makalintal)

The owner of the car Yu was not liable because he did not see the carretela at a
distance, however, he could not anticipated his drivers sudden decision to pass the
carretela. The time element was such that there was not reasonable opportunity for
Yu to assess the danger involved and warn the driver accordingly.

Former owner of Motor Vehicle are liable for the tortuous acts of the new owner.

PEOPLE vs. RITTER

G.R. No. 88582 March 5, 1991

FACTS

On or about October 10, 1986, accused Ritter brought Jessie Ramirez and
Rosario Baluyot inside his hotel room in Olongapo City. Inside the hotel room, the
accused told them to take a bath. When Rosario came out of the bathroom, she was
told to remove her clothes by the accused and to join him in bed. At that time, Jessie
was already asleep but Rosario touched him to call his attention. When he looked, he
saw the accused placing his penis against the vagina of Rosario and that he was
trying to penetrate but it would not fit. The following morning the accused left after
paying the children. Rosario then told Jessie that the accused inserted something in
her vagina. Sometime the following day, Jessie saw Rosario and he asked her whether
the object was already removed from her body and Rosario said "Yes". However,
Jessie claimed that on the evening of that same date, he saw Rosario and she was
complaining of pain in her vagina and when he asked her, she said that the foreign
object was not yet removed.

Seven months later, Rosario was brought to the hospital with bloodied skirt,
unconscious and foul smelling. After 6 days, Rosario got serious and was pronounced
dead subsequent to her operation with a portion of a sexual vibrator extracted from
her vagina.

A case for Rape with Homicide was filed against Ritter. The Regional Trial Court
of Olongapo rendered a decision declaring him guilty beyond reasonable doubt citing
the rationale of Art 4 of the Revised Penal He who is the cause of the cause is the
cause of the evil caused. The Supreme Court however, reversed the judgment of the
lower court and acquitted Ritter.

ISSUE: Whether or not the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases
him from civil liability

RULING

It does not necessarily follow that the appellant is also free from civil liability
which is impliedly instituted with the criminal action. (Rule III, Section 1) The well-
settled doctrine is that a person while not criminally liable may still be civilly liable.
While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be established beyond
reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action for
damages. (Article 29, Civil Code). The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil
liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which
the civil liability might arise did not exist. (Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA
559).

Rosario Baluyot is a street child who ran away from her grandmother's house.
Circumstances forced her to succumb and enter this unfortunate profession.
Nonetheless, she has left behind heirs who have certainly suffered mental anguish,
anxiety and moral shock by her sudden and incredulous death as reflected in the
records of the case. Though the SC is acquitting the appellant for the crime of rape
with homicide, it emphasizes that it is not ruling that he is innocent or blameless.

It is only the constitutional presumption of innocence and the failure of the

prosecution to build an airtight case for conviction which saved him, not that the facts
of unlawful conduct do not exist. As earlier stated, there is the likelihood that he did
insert the vibrator whose end was left inside Rosario's vaginal canal and that the
vibrator may have caused her death. The Court cannot convict on probabilities or
possibilities but civil liability does not require proof beyond reasonable doubt. The
Court can order the payment of indemnity on the facts found in the records of this
case.

The appellant certainly committed acts contrary to morals, good customs,

public order or public policy (Article 21 Civil Code). As earlier mentioned, the
appellant has abused Filipino children, enticing them with money. The Court cannot
overstress the responsibility for proper behavior of all adults in the Philippines,
including the appellant towards young children. The sexual exploitation committed
by the appellant should not and cannot be condoned. Thus, considering the
circumstances of the case, the Court awarded damages to the heirs of Rosario Baluyot
in the amount of P30,000.00.

The appealed judgment is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant HEINRICH

STEFAN RITTER is ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable doubt. The appellant is
ordered to pay the amount of P30,000.00 by way of moral and exemplary damages
to the heirs of Rosario Baluyot.

Phoenix Construction vs. IAC

March 10, 1987

FACTS:

Petitioners: PHOENIX Construction Inc., and Armando U. CARBONEL

Respondents: The Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) and Leonardo DIONISIO

 1. On November 15, 1975 (Martial Law period), about 1:30AM, respondent
Dionisio, a marketing man, was driving home from a dinner meeting where
he had a shot or two of liquor. He had just crossed an intersection and while
driving down the street, his headlights were turned off. When he switched
on his headlights to bright, he suddenly saw a Ford dump truck some 2
meters away from his Volkswagen car. It was later found out that he did not
a curfew pass that night.
2. The dump truck belonged to co-petitioner Phoenix, and was parked there by
the company driver, co-petitioner Carbonel. It was parked on the right hand
side of the lane that Dionisio was driving on, but it was parked facing the
oncoming traffic. It was parked askew so it was sticking out onto the street,
partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. There were no lights nor were
there any early warning reflector devices set anywhere near the truck,
front or rear.
3. Phoenix permitted Carbonel to take home the truck, which was scheduled to
be used the next morning.
4. Dionisio, upon seeing the truck, tried to avoid a collision by swerving to the
left, but it was too late. His car smashed into the truck.
5. Dionisio suffered physical injuries, including permanent facial scars, a
nervous breakdown and loss of two gold bridge dentures.
6. [See resolution of factual issues by the SC, found on HELD part of this
digest.]

CFI:

7. An action for damages was commenced by Dionisio in the CFI, claiming that
the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in
which Carbonel had parked the dump truck entrusted to him by his employer
Phoenix.
8. Phoenix and Carbonel countered that the proximate cause of Dionisios
injuries was his own recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident,
while under the influence of liquor, without his headlights on, and without a
curfew pass.
9. Phoenix also sought to establish that it had exercised due care in the
selection and supervision of the dump truck driver.
10.The CFI rendered judgment in favor of Dionisio and against Phoenix and
Carbonel.

IAC:

11.Upon appeal to the IAC, that court affirmed the CFIs decision.
12.Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE: WON Dionisios negligence was an intervening, efficient cause
determinative of the accident and the injuries he sustained

DECISION: NO. Although Dionisio was found to be negligent, his negligence was
not an intervening, efficient cause. The legal and proximate cause of the accident
and of Dionisios injuries was the negligence of Carbonel in the manner by which he
parked the dump truck. Petitioners are liable for damages, but these damages
must be mitigated because of Dionisios contributory negligence. Decision modified
whereby Dionisio will shoulder 20% of awarded damages.

HELD:

[Resolution of factual issues]

The Court held that on that night, Dionisio was driving without a curfew pass.
Since he was without a curfew pass, he was hurrying home, driving at a fast speed
in order to avoid the police. Worse, he turned off his headlights as he was driving
down that street in order to escape notice from the nearby police station. However,
the Court held that that the one or two shots of liquor he had did not show that he
was so heavily under the influence of liquor as to constitute an act of reckless
imprudence. Taken all together, however, the Court drew the conclusion that
Dionisio was negligent on the night of the accident.

[Note: During the period of Martial Law, no person was allowed to be outside his
home during curfew hours, unless he has a curfew pass.]

Cause vs. Condition; Almost no distinction between them

Petitioners urge that the Carbonels negligence was merelt a passive and static
condition and that Dionisios negligence was an efficient intervening cause, and
that consequently Dionisios negligence must be regarded as the legal and
proximate cause of the accident rather than the earlier negligence of Carbonel.

However, the distinctions between cause and condition have been almost
entirely discredited.

The Court quotes significantly from Prosser and Keeton. The following parts were
quoted with emphasis:

Cause and condition So far as the fact of causation is concerned, in the sense of
necessary antecedents which have played an important part in producing the result,
it is quite impossible to distinguish between active forces and passive situations,
particularly since, as is invariably the case, the latter are the result of other active
forces which have gone before Even the lapse of a considerable time during
which the condition remains static will not necessarily affect liability Cause and
condition still find occasional mention in the decisions; but the distinction is now
almost entirely discredited. So far as it has any validity at all, it must refer to the
type of case where the forces set in operation by the defendant have come to rest
in a position of apparent safety, and some new force intervenes. But even in such
cases, it is not the distinction between cause and condition which is important,
but the nature of the risk and the character of the intervening cause.

Dionisios negligence is not an efficient intervening cause

Carbonels negligence is far from being a passive and static condition it was an
indispensable and efficient cause. The collision would not have happened had the
truck not been parked askew and without any warning lights or reflector devices.
The improper parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for
anyone driving down the street and for having so created this risk, Carbonel must
be held responsible. Carbonel owed a duty to Dionisio and others similarly situated
not to impose upon them the very risk that Carbonel had created. Dionisios
negligence was not of an independent and overpowering nature as to cut, as it
were, the chain of causation in fact between the improper parking of the dump
truck and the accident, nor to sever the juris vinculum of liability.

The Court quoted parts of Prosser and Keeton. With emphasis were the following:

Foresseable Intervening Causes. If the intervening cause is one which is ordinary

human experience is reasonably to be anticipated, or one which the defendant has
reason to anticipate under the particular circumstances, the defendant may be
negligent, among other reasons, because of failure to guard against it; or the
defendant may be negligent only for that reason There is an intervening cause
combining with the defendants conduct to produce result, and the defendants
negligence consists in failure to protect the plaintiff against that very risk.

Obviously the defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact that the risk
or a substantial and important part of the risk, to which the defendant has
subjected the plaintiff has indeed come to pass. Foreseeable intervening forces are
within the scope of the original risk, and hence of the defendants negligence.

Thus it has been held that one who leaves an obstruction on the road or a
railroad track should foresee that a vehicle or a train will run into it.

The risk created by the defendant may include the intervention of the foreseeable
negligence of others. Xxx The standard of reasonable conduct may require the
defendant to protect the plaintiff against that occasional negligence which is one of
the ordinary incidents of human life, and therefore to be anticipated One who
parks an automobile on the highway without lights at night is not relieved of
responsibility when another negligently drives into it

Dionisio had contributory negligence

The court held that Dionisios negligence was only contributory, that the
immediate and proximate cause of the injury remained Carbonels lack of due
care and that consequently Dionisio may recover damages though such damages
are subject to mitigation by the court.
Hence, on the award of most of the damages, an allocation of 20-80 ratio should be
followed, where 20% shall be borne by Dionisio, while 80% shall be borne by
petitioners.

Last Clear Chance cannot apply

Petitioners ask the application of the last clear chance doctrine. It cannot apply.

The last clear chance doctrine of the common law was imported into our jurisdiction
by Picart vs. Smith but is a matter for debate whether, or to what extent, it has
found its way into the Civil Code of the Philippines. Its historical function was to
mitigate the harshness of another common law doctrine or rule contributory
negligence. The common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant
recovery to a plaintiff who had also been negligent provided that the defendant had
the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so. Accordingly, it is
difficult to see what role, if any, the common law last clear chance doctrine has to
play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory negligence as
an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been
in Article 2179 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

The Court believes that there is no general concept of last clear chance that may
be extracted from its common law matrix and utilized as a general rule in
negligence cases in a civil law jurisdiction. Under Article 2179, the task of a court,
in technical terms, is to determine whose negligence the plaintiffs or the
defendants was the legal or proximate cause of the injury. That task is not
simply or even primarily an exercise in chronology or physics. Chronology of
plaintiffs and defendants negligent acts or omissions is only one of the relevant
factors that may be taken into account. Of more fundamental importance are the
nature of the negligent act or omission of each party and the character and gravity
of the risks created by such act or omission for the rest of the community.

Phoenix is presumed negligent for failing to supervise its employees

properly and adequately

Carbonels proven negligence creates a presumption of negligence on the part of his

employer Phoenix in supervising its employees properly and adequately. Phoenix
was not able to overcome this presumption of negligence. It failed to show any
effort on the part of Phoenix to supervise the manner in which the dump truck if
parked when away from company premises. It is an affirmative showing of culpa in
vigilando on the part of Phoenix. Decision modified as to the allocation of award of
damages.

Sabina Exconde vs Delfin and Dante Capuno

Dante Capuno was a 15 year old boy who was a pupil of Balintawak Elementary
School. In March 1949, he attended a boy scout parade for Dr. Jose Rizal. While
they were inside a jeep, he took control of the wheels which he later lost control of
causing the jeep to go turtle thereby killing two other students, Isidoro Caperina
and one other. Isidoros mother, Sabina Exconde, sued Dante Capuno for the death
of her son. Pending the criminal action, the mother reserved her right to file a
separate civil action which she subsequently filed against Dante and his dad, Delfin
Capuno.

ISSUE: Whether or not Delfin Capuno, as the father of Dante is liable for damages.

HELD: Yes. The civil liability which the law imposes upon the father, and, in case of
his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by the
minor children who live with them, is obvious. This is necessary consequence of the
parental authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the
duty of supporting them, keeping them in their company, educating them and
instructing them in proportion to their means, while, on the other hand, gives
them the right to correct and punish them in moderation. The only way by which
they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all
the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage which Delfin failed
to prove.

On the other hand, the school is not liable. It is true that under the law, teachers
or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or
apprentices while they are under their custody, but this provision only applies to
an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution.

Maria Teresa Cuadra vs Alfonso Monfort

Maria Teresa Cuadra and Maria Teresa Monfort were both classmates in Mabini
Elementary School Bacolod City. In July 1962, their teacher assigned the class to
weed the school premises. While they were doing so, MT Monfort found a headband
and she jokingly shouted it as an earthworm and thereafter tossed it at MT Cuadra
who was hit in her eye. MT Cuadras eye got infected. She was brought to the
hospital; her eyes were attempted to be surgically repaired but she nevertheless
got blind in her right eye. MT Cuadras parents sued Alfonso Monfort (MT Monforts
dad) based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The lower court ruled that Monfort
should pay for actual damages (cost of hospitalization), moral damages and
attorneys fees.

ISSUE: Whether or not Monfort is liable under Article 2180.

HELD: No. Article 2180 provides that the father, in case of his incapacity or death,
the mother, is responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in
their company. The basis of this vicarious, although primary, liability is fault or
negligence, which is presumed from that which accompanied the causative act or
omission. The presumption is merely prima facie and may therefore be rebutted.
This is the clear and logical inference that may be drawn from the last paragraph of
Article 2180, which states that the responsibility treated of in this Article shall
cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

In the case at bar there is nothing from which it may be inferred that Alfonso
Monfort could have prevented the damage by the observance of due care, or that
he was in any way remiss in the exercise of his parental authority in failing to
foresee such damage, or the act which caused it. On the contrary, his child was at
school, where it was his duty to send her and where she was, as he had the right to
expect her to be, under the care and supervision of the teacher. And as far as the
act which caused the injury was concerned, it was an innocent prank not unusual
among children at play and which no parent, however careful, would have any
special reason to anticipate much less guard against. Nor did it reveal any
mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait in the childs character which would
reflect unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the blame could be attributed
to her parents.

ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL vs. COURT OF APPEALS

GR No. 82465 February 25, 1991

FACTS:
Ferdinand Castillo, a 13-year-old freshman student of Section 1-C at the St.
Francis High School (SFHS) wanted to join a school picnic at Talaan Beach,
Sariaya, Quezon. However, his parents, Dr. Romulo Castillo and Lilia Castillo,
because of short notice, did not allow him.
He was only allowed to bring food (adobo) to the teachers for the picnic.
However, the teachers persuaded him to go with them to the beach.
During the picnic, a teacher was apparently drowning. Some students,
including Ferdinand, came to her rescue, but in the process, it was Ferdinand
himself who drowned. He was brought to Mt. Cannel General Hospital but was
pronounced dead on arrival.
Ferdinands parents filed a case for damages against SFHS and the teachers.
The CA declared that the teachers failed to exercise the diligence of a good
father of the family to guard against the foreseen harm. Also, SFHS and
principal Benjamin Illumin was declared jointly and solidarily liable with the
teachers for the death of Ferdinand, under Art 2180.

ISSUE: WON the school SFHS, principal and teachers were liable for the
death of Ferdinand? NO.

HELD:
NO. petitioners were able to prove that they had exercised the required
diligence.
It is the rule in Art 2180 that the negligence of the employees in causing the
injury or damage gives rise to a presumption of negligence on the part of SFHS
and its principal; and while this presumption is not conclusive, it may be
overthrown only by clear and convincing proof that the owner and/or manager
 (SFHS and principal) exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and/or supervision of the employee or employees
causing the injury or damage (in this case, the defendants-teachers).
Art 2180, par. 4 provides:
The obligation imposed by Art 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts
or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though
the former are not engaged in any business or industry.

SC found that CA committed an error in applying Art 2180 of the Civil Code in
rendering SFHS liable for the death of respondent's son.
SC found that the teachers are neither guilty of their own negligence nor guilty
of the negligence of those under them. Consequently they cannot be held liable
for damages of any kind.
At the outset, it should be noted that respondent spouses, parents of the victim
Ferdinand, allowed their son to join the excursion. The fact that he gave money
to his son to buy food for the picnic even without knowing where it will be held,
is a sign of consent for his son to join the same.
In the case at bar, the teachers were not in the actual performance of their
assigned tasks. The incident happened outside the school premises, not on a
school day and most importantly while the teachers and students were holding
a purely private affair, a picnic. This picnic had no permit from the school head
or its principal, because this picnic is not a school-sanctioned activity or an
extra-curricular activity. Mere knowledge by the principal of the planning of
the picnic by the students and teachers does not in any way show acquiescence
or consent to the holding of the same.
It was shown that Connie Arquio, the class adviser of I-C, did her best and
exercised diligence of a good father of a family to prevent any untoward
incident or damages to all the students who joined the picnic.
a. Connie invited co-petitioners Tirso de Chavez (who conducted first aid on
Ferdinand) and Luisito Vinas who are both P.E. instructors and scout
masters who have knowledge in First Aid application and swimming.
b. Even respondents' witness, Segundo Vinas, testified that the teachers
brought life savers in case of emergency.
c. The records also show that both petitioners Chavez and Vinas did all what
is humanly possible to save the child.
Moreover, as already pointed out hereinabove, the teachers are not guilty of
any fault or negligence, hence, no moral damages can be assessed against
them.
Art. 2217. Moral Damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary
computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate
result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission.
While it is true that Ferdinands parents did give their consent to their son to
join the picnic, this does not mean that the school and teachers were already
relieved of their duty to observe the required diligence of a good father of a
 family in ensuring the safety of the children. But in the case at bar, petitioners
were able to prove that they had exercised the required diligence. Hence, the
claim for moral or exemplary damages becomes baseless.
As for Yoly Jaro and Nida Aragones, the two teachers who came to the picnic
late and after the drowning because they previously conducted entrance
examinations in said school, they had no participation in the alleged
negligence. Accordingly, they must be absolved from any liability.

Professional Services Inc. v. Agana

FACTS
Natividad Agana was rushed to Medical City because of difficulty of bowel
movement and bloody anal discharge. Dr. Ampil diagnosed her to be suffering
from cancer of the sigmoid. Dr. Ampil performed an anterior resection
surgery on her, and finding that the malignancy spread on her left ovary, he
obtained the consent of her husband, Enrique, to permit Dr. Fuentes to
perform hysterectomy on her. After the hysterectomy, Dr. Fuentes showed his work
to Dr. Ampil, who examined it and found it in order, so he allowed Dr. Fuentes to
leave the operating room. Dr. Ampil was about to complete the procedure when
the attending nurses made some remarks on the Record of Operation: sponge
count lacking 2; announced to surgeon search done but to no avail continue
for closure (two pieces of gauze were missing). A diligent search was conducted
but they could not be found. Dr. Ampil then directed that the incision be closed.
A couple of days after, she complained of pain in her anal region, but the
doctors told her that it was just a natural consequence of the surgery. Dr. Ampil
recommended that she consult an oncologist to examine the cancerous nodes which
were not removed during the operation. After months of consultations and
examinations in the US, she was told that she was free of cancer. Weeks after coming
back, her daughter found a piece of gauze (1.5 in) protruding from her vagina, so
Dr. Ampil manually extracted this, assuring Natividad that the pains will go away.
However, the pain worsened, so she sought treatment at a hospital, where another
1.5 in piece of gauze was found in her vagina. She underwent another surgery.
Sps. Agana filed a complaint for damages against PSI (owner of Medical
City), Dr. Ampil, and Dr. Fuentes, alleging that the latter are liable for negligence for
leaving 2 pieces of gauze in Natividads body, and malpractice for concealing their
acts of negligence. Enrique Agana also filed an administrative complaint for gross
negligence and malpractice against the two doctors with the PRC (although only the
case against Dr. Fuentes was heard since Dr. Ampil was abroad). Pending the
outcome of the cases, Natividad died (now substituted by her children). RTC found
PSI and the two doctors liable for negligence and malpractice. PRC
dismissed the case against Dr. Fuentes. CA dismissed only the case against
Fuentes.

ISSUE AND HOLDING

 1. WON CA erred in holding Dr. Ampil liable for negligence and malpractice. NO;
DR. AMPIL IS GUILTY
2. WON CA erred in absolving Dr. Fuentes of any liability. NO
3. WON PSI may be held solidarily liable for Dr. Ampils negligence. YES

RATIO
DR. AMPIL IS LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENCE AND MALPRACTICE
His arguments are without basis [did not prove that the American doctors were the
ones who put / left the gauzes; did not submit evidence to rebut the correctness of
the operation record (re: number of gauzes used); re: Dr. Fuentes alleged
negligence, Dr. Ampil examined his work and found it in order].
Leaving foreign substances in the wound after incision has been
closed is at least prima facie negligence by the operating surgeon. Even if it
has been shown that a surgeon was required to leave a sponge in his patients
abdomen because of the dangers attendant upon delay, still, it is his legal duty to
inform his patient within a reasonable time by advising her of what he had been
compelled to do, so she can seek relief from the effects of the foreign object left in
her body as her condition might permit. Whats worse in this case is that he misled
her by saying that the pain was an ordinary consequence of her operation.

Medical negligence; standard of diligence

To successfully pursue this case of medical negligence, a patient must only prove
that a health care provider either failed to do something [or did something] which a
reasonably prudent health care provider would have done [or wouldnt have done],
and that the failure or action caused injury to the patient.

Duty to remove all foreign objects from the body before closure of the
incision; if he fails to do so, it was his duty to inform the patient about it
Breach failed to remove foreign objects; failed to inform patient
Injury suffered pain that necessitated examination and another surgery
Proximate Causation breach caused this injury; could be traced from his act
of closing the incision despite information given by the attendant nurses that
2 pieces of gauze were still missing; what established causal link: gauze pieces
later extracted from patients vagina

DR. FUENTES NOT LIABLE

The res ipsa loquitur [thing speaks for itself] argument of the Aganas does not
convince the court. Mere invocation and application of this doctrine does not dispense
with the requirement of proof of negligence.

Requisites for the applicability of res ipsa loquitur

1. Occurrence of injury
2. Thing which caused injury was under the control and management of the
defendant [DR. FUENTES] LACKING SINCE CTRL+MGT WAS WITH DR.
AMPIL
3. Occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things, would not have
happened if those who had control or management used proper care
 4. Absence of explanation by defendant

Under the Captain of the Ship rule, the operating surgeon is the person in complete
charge of the surgery room and all personnel connected with the operation. That Dr.
Ampil discharged such role is evident from the following:

He called Dr. Fuentes to perform a hysterectomy

He examined Dr. Fuentes work and found it in order
He granted Dr. Fuentes permission to leave
He ordered the closure of the incision

HOSPITAL OWNER PSI SOLIDARILY LIABLE WITH DR. AMPIL [NCC 2180],
AND DIRECTLY LIABLE TO SPS. AGANAS [NCC 2176]
Previously, employers cannot be held liable for the fault or negligence of its
professionals. However, this doctrine has weakened since courts came to realize that
modern hospitals are taking a more active role in supplying and regulating medical
care to its patients, by employing staff of physicians, among others. Hence, there is
no reason to exempt hospitals from the universal rule of respondeat superior. Here
are the Courts bases for sustaining PSIs liability:

Ramos v. CA doctrine on E-E relationship

For purposes of apportioning responsibility in medical negligence cases,
o
an employer-employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals
and their attending and visiting physicians. [LABOR LESSON: power to
hire, fire, power of control]
Agency principle of apparent authority / agency by estoppel

o Imposes liability because of the actions of a principal or employer in
somehow misleading the public into believing that the relationship or
the authority exists [see NCC 1869]
o PSI publicly displays in the Medical City lobby the names and
specializations of their physicians. Hence, PSI is now estopped from
passing all the blame to the physicians whose names it proudly paraded
in the public directory, leading the public to believe that it vouched for
their skill and competence.
o
If doctors do well, hospital profits financially, so when negligence
mars the quality of its services, the hospital should not be allowed
to escape liability for its agents acts.
Doctrine of corporate negligence / corporate responsibility

o This is the judicial answer to the problem of allocating hospitals liability
for the negligent acts of health practitioners, absent facts to support the
application of respondeat superior.
o This provides for the duties expected [from hospitals]. In this case, PSI
failed to perform the duty of exercising reasonable care to protect from
harm all patients admitted into its facility for medical treatment. PSI
 failed to conduct an investigation of the matter reported in the
note of the count nurse, and this established PSIs part in the
dark conspiracy of silence and concealment about the gauzes.
o
PSI has actual / constructive knowledge of the matter, through
the report of the attending nurses + the fact that the operation
was carried on with the assistance of various hospital staff
o It also breached its duties to oversee or supervise all persons who
practice medicine within its walls and take an active step in fixing the
negligence committed
PSI also liable under NCC 2180

o It failed to adduce evidence to show that it exercised the diligence of a
good father of the family in the accreditation and supervision of Dr.
Ampil

Ramos v. CA

Facts:

Erlinda Ramos, a 47-year old robust woman, was normal except for her experiencing
occasional pain due to the presence of stone in her gall bladder. She was advised to
undergo an operation for its removal. The results in the examinations she underwent
indicate that she was fit for the operation. She and her husband Rogelio met Dr.
Hosaka, one of the defendants, who advised that she should undergo
cholecystectomy. Dr. Hosaka assured them that he will get a good anaesthesiologist.
At 7:30 a.m. on the day of the operation at Delos Santos Medical Center, Herminda
Cruz, Erlindas sister-in-law and the dean of the College of Nursing in Capitol Medical
Center, was there to provide moral support. Dr. Perfecta Gutierrez was to administer
the anaesthesia. Dr. Hosaka arrived only at 12:15 p. m. Herminda saw Dr. Gutierrez
intubating the patient, and heard the latter say Ang hirap ma-intubate nito, mali
yata ang pagkakapasok. O, lumalaki ang tiyan. Herminda saw bluish discoloration
of the nailbeds of the patient. She heard Dr. Hosaka issue an order for someone to
call Dr. Calderon. The doctor arrived and placed the patient in trendelenburg position,
wherein the head of the patient is positioned lower than the feet, which indicates a
decrease of blood supply in the brain. Herminda knew and told Rogelio that something
wrong was happening. Dr. Calderon was able to intubate the patient. Erlinda was
taken to the ICU and became comatose.

Rogelio filed a civil case for damages. The trial court ruled in his favor, finding Dr.
Gutierrez, Dr. Hosaka, and the hospital, guilty of negligence, but the Court of Appeals
reversed the decision. Hence, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the
Court of Appeals denied for having been filed beyond the reglementary period.
However, it was found that the notice of the decision was never sent to the
petitioners counsel. Rather, it was sent to the petitioner, addressing him as Atty.
Rogelio Ramos, as if he was the legal counsel. The petitioner filed the instant petition
for certiorari. On the procedural issue, the Supreme Court rules that since the notice
did not reach the petitioners then legal counsel, the motion was filed on time.

Issue:

Whether a surgeon, an anaesthesiologist, and a hospital, should be made liable for

the unfortunate comatose condition of a patient scheduled for cholecystectomy

Held:

Res Ipsa Loquitor

Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means "the thing or the transaction
speaks for itself." The phrase "res ipsa loquitur'' is a maxim for the rule that the fact
of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit
an inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiff's prima
facie case, and present a question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation.
Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the
management of the defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in ordinary
course of things does not happen if those who have its management or control use
proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the
defendant, that the accident arose from or was caused by the defendant's want of
care. It is grounded in the superior logic of ordinary human experience and on the
basis of such experience or common knowledge, negligence may be deduced from
the mere occurrence of the accident itself. However, much has been said that res
ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive law and, as such, does not create or
constitute an independent or separate ground of liability. Mere invocation and
application of the doctrine does not dispense with the requirement of proof of
negligence. It is simply a step in the process of such proof, permitting the plaintiff to
present along with the proof of the accident, enough of the attending circumstances
to invoke the doctrine, creating an inference or presumption of negligence, and to
thereby place on the defendant the burden of going forward with the proof. Still,
before resort to the doctrine may be allowed, the following requisites must be
satisfactorily shown.

(1) The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of
someone's negligence;

(2) It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or

defendants; and

(3) The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible
is eliminated.
Medical malpractice cases do not escape the application of this doctrine. Thus, res
ipsa loquitur has been applied when the circumstances attendant upon the harm are
themselves of such a character as to justify an inference of negligence as the cause
of that harm. Although generally, expert medical testimony is relied upon in
malpractice suits to prove that a physician has done a negligent act or that he has
deviated from the standard medical procedure, when the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
is availed by the plaintiff, the need for expert medical testimony is dispensed with
because the injury itself provides the proof of negligence. Hence, in cases where the
res ipsa loquitur is applicable, the court is permitted to find a physician negligent
upon proper proof of injury to the patient, without the aid of expert testimony, where
the court from its fund of common knowledge can determine the proper standard of
care. When the doctrine is appropriate, all that the patient must do is prove a nexus
between the particular act or omission complained of and the injury sustained while
under the custody and management of the defendant without need to produce expert
medical testimony to establish the standard of care. Resort to res ipsa loquitur is
allowed because there is no other way, under usual and ordinary conditions, by which
the patient can obtain redress for injury suffered by him.

Res ipsa loquitur is not a rigid or ordinary doctrine to be perfunctorily used but a rule
to be cautiously applied, depending upon the circumstances of each case. A
distinction must be made between the failure to secure results, and the occurrence
of something more unusual and not ordinarily found if the service or treatment
rendered followed the usual procedure of those skilled in that particular practice. The
real question, therefore, is whether or not in the process of the operation any
extraordinary incident or unusual event outside of the routine performance occurred
which is beyond the regular scope of customary professional activity in such
operations, which, if unexplained would themselves reasonably speak to the average
man as the negligent cause or causes of the untoward consequence.

We find the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur appropriate in the case at bar. Erlinda
submitted herself for cholecystectomy and expected a routine general surgery to be
performed on her gall bladder. On that fateful day she delivered her person over to
the care, custody and control of private respondents who exercised complete and
exclusive control over her. At the time of submission, Erlinda was neurologically
sound and, except for a few minor discomforts, was likewise physically fit in mind
and body. However, during the administration of anesthesia and prior to the
performance of cholecystectomy she suffered irreparable damage to her brain. Thus,
without undergoing surgery, she went out of the operating room already decerebrate
and totally incapacitated. Obviously, brain damage, which Erlinda sustained, is an
injury which does not normally occur in the process of a gall bladder operation. In
fact, this kind of situation does not in the absence of negligence of someone in the
administration of anesthesia and in the use of endotracheal tube. Furthermore, the
instruments used in the administration of anesthesia, including the endotracheal
tube, were all under the exclusive control of private respondents, who are the
physicians-in-charge. Likewise, petitioner Erlinda could not have been guilty of
contributory negligence because she was under the influence of anesthetics which
rendered her unconscious.

Negligence of the Anaesthesiologist

The pre-operative evaluation of a patient prior to the administration of anesthesia is

universally observed to lessen the possibility of anesthetic accidents. Respondent
Dra. Gutierrez' act of seeing her patient for the first time only an hour before the
scheduled operative procedure was, therefore, an act of exceptional negligence and
professional irresponsibility. Her failure to follow this medical procedure is, therefore,
a clear indicia of her negligence. Erlinda's case was elective and this was known to
respondent Dra. Gutierrez. Thus, she had all the time to make a thorough evaluation
of Erlinda's case prior to the operation and prepare her for anesthesia. However, she
never saw the patient at the bedside. She herself admitted that she had seen
petitioner only in the operating room, and only on the actual date of the
cholecystectomy. She negligently failed to take advantage of this important
opportunity. As such, her attempt to exculpate herself must fail.

Opinion of Expert Witness

An anesthetic accident caused by a rare drug-induced bronchospasm properly falls

within the fields of anesthesia, internal medicine-allergy, and clinical pharmacology.
The resulting anoxic encephalopathy belongs to the field of neurology. While
admittedly, many bronchospastic-mediated pulmonary diseases are within the
expertise of pulmonary medicine, Dr. Jamora's field, the anesthetic drug-induced,
allergic mediated bronchospasm alleged in this case is within the disciplines of
anesthesiology, allergology and pharmacology. On the basis of the foregoing
transcript, in which the pulmonologist himself admitted that he could not testify about
the drug with medical authority, it is clear that the appellate court erred in giving
weight to Dr. Jamora's testimony as an expert in the administration of Thiopental
Sodium. Generally, to qualify as an expert witness, one must have acquired special
knowledge of the subject matter about which he or she is to testify, either by the
study of recognized authorities on the subject or by practical experience. Clearly, Dr.
Jamora does not qualify as an expert witness based on the above standard since he
lacks the necessary knowledge, skill, and training in the field of anesthesiology.
Oddly, apart from submitting testimony from a specialist in the wrong field, private
respondents' intentionally avoided providing testimony by competent and
independent experts in the proper areas.

Proximate Cause

Proximate cause has been defined as that which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred. An injury or damage is proximately caused by an act
or a failure to act, whenever it appears from the evidence in the case, that the act or
omission played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury or
damage; and that the injury or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably
probable consequence of the act or omission. Instead of the intended endotracheal
intubation what actually took place was an esophageal intubation. During intubation,
such distention indicates that air has entered the gastrointestinal tract through the
esophagus instead of the lungs through the trachea. Entry into the esophagus would
certainly cause some delay in oxygen delivery into the lungs as the tube which carries
oxygen is in the wrong place. That abdominal distention had been observed during
the first intubation suggests that the length of time utilized in inserting the
endotracheal tube (up to the time the tube was withdrawn for the second attempt)
was fairly significant. Due to the delay in the delivery of oxygen in her lungs Erlinda
showed signs of cyanosis.

Responsibility of the Surgeon

As the so-called "captain of the ship," it is the surgeon's responsibility to see to it

that those under him perform their task in the proper manner. Respondent Dr.
Hosaka's negligence can be found in his failure to exercise the proper authority in not
determining if his anesthesiologist observed proper anesthesia protocols. In fact, no
evidence on record exists to show that respondent Dr. Hosaka verified if respondent
Dra. Gutierrez properly intubated the patient. Furthermore, it does not escape us
that respondent Dr. Hosaka had scheduled another procedure in a different hospital
at the same time as Erlinda's cholecystectomy, and was in fact over three hours late
for the latter's operation. Because of this, he had little or no time to confer with his
anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia delivery. This indicates that he was remiss
in his professional duties towards his patient. Thus, he shares equal responsibility for
the events which resulted in Erlinda's condition.

Responsibility of the Hospital

Hospitals hire, fire and exercise real control over their attending and visiting
"consultant" staff. While "consultants" are not, technically employees, a point which
respondent hospital asserts in denying all responsibility for the patient's condition,
the control exercised, the hiring, and the right to terminate consultants all fulfill the
important hallmarks of an employer-employee relationship, with the exception of the
payment of wages. In assessing whether such a relationship in fact exists, the control
test is determining. Accordingly, on the basis of the foregoing, we rule that for the
purpose of allocating responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-
employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their attending and
visiting physicians.

The basis for holding an employer solidarily responsible for the negligence of its
employee is found in Article 2180 of the Civil Code which considers a person
accountable not only for his own acts but also for those of others based on the
former's responsibility under a relationship of patria potestas. Such responsibility
ceases when the persons or entity concerned prove that they have observed the
diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damage. In the instant case,
respondent hospital, apart from a general denial of its responsibility over respondent
physicians, failed to adduce evidence showing that it exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the hiring and supervision of the latter. It failed to adduce
evidence with regard to the degree of supervision which it exercised over its
physicians. In neglecting to offer such proof, or proof of a similar nature, respondent
hospital thereby failed to discharge its burden under the last paragraph of Article
2180. Having failed to do this, respondent hospital is consequently solidarily
responsible with its physicians for Erlinda's condition.

Damages

At current levels, the P8000/monthly amount established by the trial court at the
time of its decision would be grossly inadequate to cover the actual costs of home-
based care for a comatose individual. The calculated amount was not even arrived at
by looking at the actual cost of proper hospice care for the patient. What it reflected
were the actual expenses incurred and proved by the petitioners after they were
forced to bring home the patient to avoid mounting hospital bills. And yet ideally, a
comatose patient should remain in a hospital or be transferred to a hospice
specializing in the care of the chronically ill for the purpose of providing a proper
milieu adequate to meet minimum standards of care. Given these considerations, the
amount of actual damages recoverable in suits arising from negligence should at least
reflect the correct minimum cost of proper care, not the cost of the care the family
is usually compelled to undertake at home to avoid bankruptcy.

Our rules on actual or compensatory damages generally assume that at the time of
litigation, the injury suffered as a consequence of an act of negligence has been
completed and that the cost can be liquidated. However, these provisions neglect to
take into account those situations, as in this case, where the resulting injury might
be continuing and possible future complications directly arising from the injury, while
certain to occur, are difficult to predict. Temperate damages can and should be
awarded on top of actual or compensatory damages in instances where the injury is
chronic and continuing. And because of the unique nature of such cases, no
incompatibility arises when both actual and temperate damages are provided for. The
reason is that these damages cover two distinct phases. As it would not be equitable
- and certainly not in the best interests of the administration of justice - for the victim
in such cases to constantly come before the courts and invoke their aid in seeking
adjustments to the compensatory damages previously awarded - temperate damages
are appropriate. The amount given as temperate damages, though to a certain extent
speculative, should take into account the cost of proper care. In the instant case,
petitioners were able to provide only home-based nursing care for a comatose patient
who has remained in that condition for over a decade. Having premised our award
for compensatory damages on the amount provided by petitioners at the onset of
litigation, it would be now much more in step with the interests of justice if the value
awarded for temperate damages would allow petitioners to provide optimal care for
their loved one in a facility which generally specializes in such care. They should not
be compelled by dire circumstances to provide substandard care at home without the
aid of professionals, for anything less would be grossly inadequate. Under the
circumstances, an award of P1,500,000.00 in temperate damages would therefore
be reasonable.

Petitioner Erlinda Ramos was in her mid-forties when the incident occurred. She has
been in a comatose state for over fourteen years now. The burden of care has so far
been heroically shouldered by her husband and children, who, in the intervening
years have been deprived of the love of a wife and a mother. Meanwhile, the actual
physical, emotional and financial cost of the care of petitioner would be virtually
impossible to quantify. Even the temperate damages herein awarded would be
inadequate if petitioner's condition remains unchanged for the next ten years. The
husband and the children, all petitioners in this case, will have to live with the day to
day uncertainty of the patient's illness, knowing any hope of recovery is close to nil.
They have fashioned their daily lives around the nursing care of petitioner, altering
their long term goals to take into account their life with a comatose patient. They,
not the respondents, are charged with the moral responsibility of the care of the
victim. The family's moral injury and suffering in this case is clearly a real one. For
the foregoing reasons, an award of P2,000,000.00 in moral damages would be
appropriate.

Finally, by way of example, exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 are

hereby awarded. Considering the length and nature of the instant suit we are of the
opinion that attorney's fees valued at P100,000.00 are likewise proper.

WHEREFORE, the decision and resolution of the appellate court appealed from are
hereby modified so as to award in favor of petitioners, and solidarily against private
respondents the following: 1) P1,352,000.00 as actual damages computed as of the
date of promulgation of this decision plus a monthly payment of P8,000.00 up to the
time that petitioner Erlinda Ramos expires or miraculously survives; 2)
P2,000,000.00 as moral damages, 3) P1,500,000.00 as temperate damages; 4)
P100,000.00 each as exemplary damages and attorney's fees; and, 5) the costs of
the suit.

Merritt vs Government of the Philippine Islands

The facts of the case took place in the 1910s. E. Merritt was a constructor who
was excellent at his work. One day, while he was riding his motorcycle along Calle
Padre Faura, he was bumped by a government ambulance. The driver of the
ambulance was proven to have been negligent. Because of the incident, Merritt was
hospitalized and he was severely injured beyond rehabilitation so much so that he
could never perform his job the way he used to and that he cannot even earn at
least half of what he used to earn.

In order for Merritt to recover damages, he sought to sue the government which
later authorized Merritt to sue the government by virtue of Act 2457 enacted by the
legislature (An Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government of
the Philippine Islands and authorizing the Attorney-General of said Islands to
appear in said suit). The lower court then determined the amount of damages and
ordered the government to pay the same.

ISSUE: Whether or not the government is liable for the negligent act of the driver
of the ambulance.

HELD: No. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit.
It does not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in
his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely
gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction
of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense. It follows
therefrom that the state, by virtue of such provisions of law, is not responsible for
the damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its
employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office, because
neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the
organization of branches of public service and in the appointment of its agents. The
State can only be liable if it acts through a special agent (and a special agent, in
the sense in which these words are employed, is one who receives a definite and
fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is
a special official) so that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an
agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to him.

In the case at bar, the ambulance driver was not a special agent nor was a
government officer acting as a special agent hence, there can be no liability from
the government. The Government does not undertake to guarantee to any person
the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs, since that would involve it in
all its operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would be
subversive of the public interest.

Palafox vs Province of Ilocos Norte

Facts:

Sabas Torralba was employed as the driver of Ilocos Norte and detailed to the Office
of the District Engineer. While driving his truck, Sabas ran over Proceto Palafox
resulting to the latters death. Sabas was prosecuted for homicide through reckless
imprudence to which he pleaded guilty. The heirs of Palafox instituted a civil case
against him, the Province, the District Engineer and the Provincial Treasurer.
Issue: Whether or not the Province of Ilocos Norte can be held liable.

Held:

NO. The general rule is that local government units are not liable for negligent acts
of its employees while they are performing governmental functions or duties. In this
case, the driver was involved in the construction or maintenance of roads which was
a governmental duty. Therefore, the province cannot be held liable for his negligent
act. However tragic and deplorable it may be, the death of Palafox imposed on the
province no duty to pay monetary consideration.

MCKEE v IAC, TAYAG

FACTS:

- A head-on-collision took place between a cargo truck owned by private respondents,

and driven by Ruben Galang, and a Ford Escort car driven by Jose Koh. The collision
resulted in the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim Koh McKee and Loida Bondoc, and physical
injuries to George Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and Araceli Koh McKee, all
passengers of the Ford Escort.
- When the northbound Ford Escort was about 10 meters away from the southern
approach of the bridge, two boys suddenly darted from the right side of the road and
into the lane of the car. Jose Koh blew the horn of the car, swerved to the left and
entered the lane of the truck; he then switched on the headlights of the car, applied
the brakes and thereafter attempted to return to his lane. Before he could do so, his
car collided with the truck. The collision occurred in the lane of the truck, which was
the opposite lane, on the said bridge.
- Two civil cases were filed on Jan 31, 1977.
- On 1 March 1977, an Information charging Ruben Galang with the crime of
"Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Multiple Homicide and Physical Injuries and
Damage to Property" was filed with the trial court.
- Judge Capulong found Galang guilty of the criminal charge and ordered him to pay
damages. Galang appealed to IAC. IAC affirmed decision.

- Judge Castaneda dismissed the 2 civil cases and awarded private respondents moral
damages and exemplary damages, and attorneys fee. Petitioners appealed to IAC.
In its consolidated decision of the civil cases, it reversed the ruling of the trial court
and ordered the defendants to pay damages. The decision is anchored principally on
the findings that it was Galang's inattentiveness or reckless imprudence which caused
the accident. The appellate court further said that the law presumes negligence on
the part of the defendants, as employers of Galang, in the selection and supervision
of the latter; it was further asserted that these defendants did not allege in their
Answers the defense of having exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in
selecting and supervising the said employee.

- In an MFR, the decision for the consolidated civil cases was reversed. Hence this
petition.
ISSUES

WON respondent Court's findings in its challenged resolution are supported by

evidence or are based on mere speculations, conjectures and presumptions.

HELD

YES

- Findings of facts of the trial courts and the Court of Appeals may be set aside when
such findings are not supported by the evidence or when the trial court failed to
consider the material facts which would have led to a conclusion different from what
was stated in its judgment.

- The respondent Court held that the fact that the car improperly invaded the lane of
the truck and that the collision occurred in said lane gave rise to the presumption
that the driver of the car, Jose Koh, was negligent. On the basis of this presumed
negligence, IAC immediately concluded that it was Jose Koh's negligence that was
the immediate and proximate cause of the collision. This is an unwarranted deduction
as the evidence for the petitioners convincingly shows that the car swerved into the
truck's lane because as it approached the southern end of the bridge, two boys darted
across the road from the right sidewalk into the lane of the car.

- Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by

those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would
do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do

- The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case: Did
the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution
which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not,
then he is guilty of negligence.

- Using the test, no negligence can be imputed to Jose Koh. Any reasonable and
ordinary prudent man would have tried to avoid running over the two boys by
swerving the car away from where they were even if this would mean entering the
opposite lane.

- Moreover, under what is known as the emergency rule, "one who suddenly finds
himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best
means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of
negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to
have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought
about by his own negligence.

- Assuming, arguendo that Jose Koh is negligent, it cannot be said that his negligence
was the proximate cause of the collision. Proximate cause has been defined as: that
cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred; the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury,
either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and
continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural
and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the
person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent
person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that
an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.

- Although it may be said that the act of Jose Koh, if at all negligent, was the initial
act in the chain of events, it cannot be said that the same caused the eventual injuries
and deaths because of the occurrence of a sufficient intervening event, the negligent
act of the truck driver, which was the actual cause of the tragedy. The entry of the
car into the lane of the truck would not have resulted in the collision had the latter
heeded the emergency signals given by the former to slow down and give the car an
opportunity to go back into its proper lane. Instead of slowing down and swerving to
the far right of the road, which was the proper precautionary measure under the
given circumstances, the truck driver continued at full speed towards the car.

- The truck driver's negligence is apparent in the records. He himself said that his
truck was running at 30 miles (48 km) per hour along the bridge while the maximum
speed allowed by law on a bridge is only 30 kph. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code,
a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was
violating any traffic regulation.

- Even if Jose Koh was indeed negligent, the doctrine of last clear chance finds
application here. Last clear chance is a doctrine in the law of torts which states that
the contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the claim for damages
if it is shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and
prudence, have avoided the consequences of the negligence of the injured party. In
such cases, the person who had the last clear chance to avoid the mishap is
considered in law solely responsible for the consequences thereof.

- Last clear chance: The doctrine is that the negligence of the plaintiff does not
preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it appears that the
defendant, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious
consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff's negligence. The doctrine
of last clear chance means that even though a person's own acts may have placed
him in a position of peril, and an injury results, the injured person is entitled to
recovery. a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an
accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third person
imputed to the opponent is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences
of the accident. The practical import of the doctrine is that a negligent defendant is
held liable to a negligent plaintiff, or even to a plaintiff who has been grossly negligent
in placing himself in peril, if he, aware of the plaintiff's peril, or according to some
authorities, should have been aware of it in the reasonable exercise of due care, had
in fact an opportunity later than that of the plaintiff to avoid an accident.

- As employers of the truck driver, the private respondents are, under Article 2180
of the Civil Code, directly and primarily liable for the resulting damages. The
presumption that they are negligent flows from the negligence of their employee.
That presumption, however, is only juris tantum, not juris et de jure. Their only
possible defense is that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent the damage. The answers of the private respondents in the civil cases did
not interpose this defense. Neither did they attempt to prove it.

On the separate civil and criminal actions

- The civil cases, which were for the recovery of civil liability arising from a quasi-
delict under Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, were filed ahead
of criminal case. They were eventually consolidated for joint trial. The records do not
indicate any attempt on the part of the parties, and it may therefore be reasonably
concluded that none was made, to consolidate criminal case with the civil cases, or
vice-versa.

- Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court, which seeks to avoid a multiplicity of suits,
guard against oppression and abuse, prevent delays, clear congested dockets to
simplify the work of the trial court, or in short, attain justice with the least expense
to the parties litigants, would have easily sustained a consolidation, thereby
preventing the unseeming, if no ludicrous, spectacle of two judges appreciating,
according to their respective orientation, perception and perhaps even prejudice, the
same facts differently, and thereafter rendering conflicting decisions. Such was what
happened in this case.

- The responsibility arising from fault or negligence in a quasi-delict is entirely

separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal
Code. In the case of independent civil actions under the new Civil Code, the result of
the criminal case, whether acquittal or conviction, would be entirely irrelevant to the
civil action. What remains to be the most important consideration as to why the
decision in the criminal case should not be considered in this appeal is the fact that
private respondents were not parties therein.
Batch 4

Li vs Spouses Soliman
GR No. 165279 June 7, 2011

Facts: On July 7, 1993, respondents 11 year old daughter, Angelica Soliman underwent a biopsy
of the mass located in her lower extremity at the St. Lukes Medical Center (SLMC). Results
showed that Angelica was suffering from osteosaucoma, ostiobiostic type, a high-grade (highly
malignant) cancer of the bone which usually affects teenage children. Following this diagnosis,
Angelicas right leg was amputated by Dr. Tamayo in order to remove the tumor. As a adjuvant
treatment to eliminate any remaining cancer cells, and hence minimizing the chances of recurrence
and prevent the decease from spreading to other parts of the patients body, chemotherapy was
suggested by Dr. Tamayo and referred Angelica to another doctor at SLMC, herein petitioner Dr.
Rubi Li, a medical oncologist.

On July 23, 1993, petitioner saw the respondents at the hospital after Angelicas surgery and
discussed with them Angelicas condition. Petitioner told respondents that Angelica should be
given 2-3 weeks to recover from the operation before starting the chemotherapy. Respondents were
apprehensive due to financial constraints as Reynaldo earns only from P70,000-150,000 a year
from his jewelry and watching repair business. Petitioner, however, assured them not to worry
about her professional fee and told them to just save up for medicines to be used.

As the chemotherapy session started, day by day, Angelica experience worsening condition and
other physical effect on the body such as discoloration, nausea, and vomiting.

Petitioner claimed, that she explained to respondents that even when a tumor is removed, there are
still small lesions undetectable to the naked eye and that adjuvant chemotherapy is needed to clean
out the small lesions in order to lessen the chance of cancer to recur. She did not give the
respondents any assurance that chemotherapy will cure Angelicas cancer. During these
consultations with respondents, she explained the following side effects of chemotherapy
treatment to respondents: 1.) Falling hair; 2.) nausea and vomiting; 3.) loss of appetite; 4.) low
count of WBC, RBC, and platelets; 5.) possible sterility due to the effects on Angelicas ovary; 6.)
Damage to kidney and heart; 7.) darkening of the skin especially when exposed to sunlight. She
actually talked to the respondents four times, once at the hospital after the surgery, twice at her
clinic and fourth when Angelicas mother called her through long distance. This was disputed by
respondents who countered that petitioner gave them assurance that there is 95% chance of healing
for Angelica if she undergoes chemotherapy and that the only side effects were nausea, vomiting
and hair loss. Those were the only side effects of chemotherapy mentioned by petitioner.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner committed medical malpractice.

Held: No. The type of lawsuit which has been called medical malpractice or more appropriately,
medical negligence, is that type of claim which a victim has available to him or her to redress a
wrong committed by a medical professional which has caused bodily harm. In order to successfully
pursue such claim, a patient must prove that a health care provider in most cases a physician, either
failed to do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have done or that
he or she did something that a reasonably health care provider would not have done; and that
failure or action caused injury to the patient.

Medical negligence cases are best proved by opinions of expert witnesses belonging in the same
general neighborhood and in the same general line of practice as defendant physician or surgeon.
The deference of courts to the expert opinion of qualified physicians stems from the formers
realization that the latter possess unusual technical skills which layman in most instances are
incapable of intelligently evaluating, hence the indispensability of expert testimonies.

The doctrine of informed consent within the context of physician-patient relationships goes as far
back into english common law. As early as 1767, doctors were charged with the tort of battery if
they have not gained the consent of their patients prior to performing a surgery or procedure. In
the United States, the seminal case was Schoendorff vs Society of New York Hospital which
involved unwanted treatment performed by a doctor. Justice Bejamin Cardozo oft-quoted opinion
upheld the basic right of a patient to give consent to any medical procedure or treatment; every
human being of adult year and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his
own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patients consent commits an
assault, for which he is liable in damages. From a purely ethical norm, informed consent evolved
into a general principle of law that a physician has a duty to disclose what a reasonably prudent
physician in the medical community in the exercise of reasonable care would disclose to his patient
as to whatever grave risk of injury might be incurred from a proposed course of treatment, so that
a patient, exercising ordinary care for her own welfare and faced with a choice of undergoing the
proposed treatment, as alternative treatment, or none at all, may intelligently exercise his
judgement by reasonably balancing the probable risk against the probable benefits.

There are four essential elements a plaintiff must proved in a malpractice action based upon the
doctrine of informed consent: 1.) the physician had a duty to disclose material risks; 2.) he failed
to disclose or inadequately disclosed those risks; 3.) as a direct and proximate result of the failure
to disclose, the patient consented to treatment she otherwise would not have consented to; and 4.)
plaintiff was injured by the proposed treatment. The gravamen in an informed consent requires the
plaintiff to point to significant undisclosed information relating to the treatment which could have
altered her decision to undergo it.

Examining the evidence, we hold that there was adequate disclosure of material risks inherent in
chemotherapy procedure performed with the consent of Angelicas parents. Respondents could
not have been unaware in the course of initial treatment and amputation of Angelicas lower
extremity that her immune system was already weak on account of the malignant tumor in her
knee. When petitioner informed the respondents beforehand of the side effects of chemotherapy
which includes lowered counts of white and red blood cells, decrease in blood platelets, possible
kidney or heart damage and skin darkening, there is reasonable expectation on the part of the doctor
that the respondents understood very well that the severity of these side effects will not be the same
for all patients undergoing the procedure. In other words, by the nature of the disease itself, each
patients reaction to the chemical agents even with pre-treatment laboratory tests cannot be
precisely determined by the physician. That death can possibly result from complications of the
treatment or the underlying cancer itself, immediately or sometime after the administration of
chemotherapy drugs, is a risk that cannot be ruled out, as with most other major medical
procedures, but such conclusion can be reasonably drawn from the general side effects of
chemotherapy already disclosed.

Gacal vs. Philippine Airlines

G.R. No. 55300 March 16, 1990

Facts: Plaintiffs Franklin Gacal, his wife and three others were passengers of PAL plane
at Davao Airport for a flight to Manila, not knowing that the flight, were Commander Zapata
with other members of Moro National Liberation Front. They were armed with grenades
and pistols. After take off, the members of MNLF announced a hijacking and directed the
pilot to fly directly to Libya, later to Sabah. They were, however, forced to land in
Zamboanga airport for refueling, because the plane did not have enough fuel to make
direct flight to Sabah. When the plane began to taxi at the runaway of Zamboanga airport,
it was met by two armored cars of the military.

An armored car subsequently bumped the stairs leading inside the plane. That
commenced the battle between the military and the hijackers, which led ultimately to the
liberation of the planes surviving crew and passengers with the final score of ten
passengers and three hijackers dead.

Issue: Whether or not hijacking is a case fortuito or force majeure, which would exempt
an aircraft from liability for, damages to its passengers and personal belongings that were
lost during the incident?

Held: In order to constitute a caso fortuito that would exempt from liability under Art 1174
of the civil code, it is necessary that the following elements must occur: (a) the cause of
the breach of obligation must be independent of human will; (b) the event must be
unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event must be such as to render it impossible for
the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; (d) the debtor must be free from any
participation in or aggravation of the injury to the creditor.

Applying the above guidelines, the failure to transport the petitioners safely from Davao
to Manila was due to the skyjacking incident staged buy the MNLF without connection to
the private respondent, hence, independent of will of PAL or its passengers.

The events rendered it impossible for PAL to perform its obligation in a normal manner
and it cannot be faulted for negligence on the duty performed by the military. The
existence of force majeure has been established thus exempting PAL from payment of
damages.