Collateral Damage from the Afghanistan Wars: Jamaat-ud-Dawa and Lashkar-e-Tayaba

Militancy
Author(s): Humeira Iqtidar
Source: Middle East Report, No. 251, Pakistan under Pressure (Summer, 2009), pp. 28-31
Published by: Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP)
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\JU a M-f* ai?iipy
pfreemedfclne at a hospital set up by Jamaat-ud-Dawa In FREDERIC J.BROWN/AFP/GETTYIMAGES

Collateral Damage from the Afghanistan Wars

Jamaat-ud-Dawa and Lashkar-e-Tayaba Militancy
HuneipaIqtidar

In late November 2008, international media attention was the country. Later, the government placed Hafiz Mohammed
rivetedby a seriesof highly orchestrated attacks across India's Saeed, the amir of the JuD, under house arrestwhile investiga
financial capital,Mumbai, which leftat least 173people dead tions continued. On June 3,2009, Hafiz Mohammed Saeed was
and hundreds more injured. The only attacker taken alive by released when the Lahore High Court ordered that therewas
Indian security forces disclosed his membership in Lashkar insufficientevidence to detain him. Some commentators have
e-Tayaba (LeT), the militant wing of the Pakistani Jamaat seen this as
proof of JuD's continued close relationship with
ud-Dawa (JuD). In February, Pakistan's Interior Minister the secret service in Pakistan, but there can be littledoubt that
finally confirmed that the attack had originated from inside insufficientdirect evidence was a real problem in this case.

Humeira Iqtidar isa research

fellow at theCentre ofSouth Asian Studies and atKings
What exactly was the extent of JuD involvement in the
College, Cambridge University. Mumbai attacks?While thismay take quite some time to

28 MIDDLEEASTREPORT251 SUMMER
2009

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unravel, it is nevertheless instructive to think about the had a transformative effect on Pakistan and its home

seemingly sharp increase in the reach and ambition of alleged militants. At the initial of the current war in
grown stages

JuD militancy.What does suchmilitant adventurism suggest on theMusharraf regime to clamp

Afghanistan, US pressure
about the
changes
in the
organization's
vision and
goals?
down on jihadi organizations impelled a restructuring of
The JuD was established in the late 1980s during the last the JuD-LeT relationship. In 2004, the groups officially
years of the firstAfghan war. Saeed, one of JuD's founders, separated, which allowed JuD to escape another round of
was a member of the student of Jamaat-e-Islami, the Musharraf's at militant
wing attempts banning organizations.
most influential Islamist party in South Asia. He had spent While Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, Jeish-e-Muhammed and
a few years in Saudi Arabia before returning to Pakistan to its
splinter group Jamaat-ul-Furqan, Harkat-ul-Mohajiroon,
support the anti-Soviet jihad inAfghanistan. He was joined Hizbul-Tehrir and Tehreek-e-Jafria (a Shi'i group) were
in this effortby Zafar Iqbal and Abdul Rehman Maki. Saeed banned, JuD remained legal. Although the separation
and Zafar Iqbal taught Islamic studies at theUniversity of between JuD and LeT is largely cosmetic, itmeant that
Engineering and Technology in Lahore. While the two are certain decisions by the latter
are now out of direct control
not scholars and writers in themould ofAbul A'la Maududi, of the JuD amir, Saeed.
the founder of Jamaat-e-Islami, they emphasized the impor A more fundamental shift can be discerned in JuD's
relationship with its patron, the ISI. For the last four
tance of education for their in
organization, particularly
the fields of science and technology.1 Their headquarters decades, ISI has been a key conduit of US interests in
in Muridke, near Lahore, hosts a
computer college
and Pakistan. This relationship was particularly intense during
schools for boys and girls. This emphasis on education the regime of Zia ul Haq when the ISI channeled CIA
and technology distinguishes the JuD from other militant money, weapons and
training
to
support the jihad against

organizations
in Pakistan. the Soviets inAfghanistan. The favored position accorded
Until the early 2000s, the JuD's main focus remained on to JuD, particularly in the last decade, has made itmore

militancy
rather than education and
proselytizing. Young dependent upon the ISI and, in turn, accorded the ISI
men from the smaller towns of were recruited to control. new
Punjab fight greater However, given pressures?both
inAfghanistan. Looking for adventure and/or motivated by domestic and external?in the aftermath of 9/11 and the
the appeal of jihad, these recruits formed the JuD-affiliated restructuring within the ISI itself, the JuD was impelled to
Lashkar-e-Tayaba (which translates as army of the pure). expand its relationship with society.
The vast of LeT's initial members were small-time The venture into social services, in the establish
majority particular
crooks, and criminals. As with many other militant ment of schools, free clinics and relief services,
thugs emergency

groups at the time, the JuD benefited from CIA funding allowed JuD some degree of autonomy but also came at the
which was channeled
through
Pakistan's Inter-Services price of flexibility of operations by the LeT. Certain kinds
Intelligence (ISI). Despite manifold transformations since of activities,
especially
sectarian violence within Pakistan,
its establishment, the JuD has never shaken off allegations could compromise the legitimacy that the JuD derived from
of continued association with intelligence agencies (national its
expanded
societal involvement. In this context, the focus

and foreign) and the criminal world. on Kashmir took on a new salience. Jihad in Kashmir was a

Among jihadi groups, the JuD had been formed rather late legitimate venture in Pakistan, and had the added advantage,
in the
day
when the Soviets were
already beating
a retreat from the ISI's point of view, of occupying jihadis outside
fromAfghanistan. This deprived the JuD of its initialmission of Pakistan while also keeping the Pakistani army's overt
and left the LeT without a clear target for its activities. confrontations with India to a minimum.

Militants from as well as others who

returning Afghanistan,
had trained but not joined the fightwere redirected toward
Societal Entrenchment
fighting sectarian battles within Pakistan and in Kashmir.
Unlike most such groups that became deeply embroiled in How does one measure the depth and significance of the
sectarian violence, LeT militants set up in Pakistani societal entrenchment? measures include
camps JuD's Quantifiable
or Azad (Free) Kashmir and claimed a presence within the number of schools; in 2007, there were 200,
roughly

Indian-occupied Kashmir, too.Up to thispoint, the JuD was mostly in Punjab but a few in Sindh as well, with a total
was
indistinguishable from LeT; there significant overlap in student population
in the range of 35,000. Another measure

leadership and students enrolled in JuD schools often were is the number and circulation size of publications; the JuD
recruited for LeT activities inKashmir and elsewhere. in-house printing press, Dar ul-Andulas, produces pamphlets,
booklets and sixmagazines, including themonthly Al-Dawa
FindingItsNiche ina Changing
World with a circulation of 200,000. The number of treated
people
its free clinics is estimated at 6,000 year,
by patients per
The increased international attention on Islamic and 800,000 vaccinations were administered in
militancy hepatitis
after 9/11 and, in particular, theUS invasion ofAfghanistan 2007.2 Another form of evidence is the number of people

MIDDLEEASTREPORT251 SUMMER
2009 29

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 W??S???

The schoolInMuridke.
Charity ARIF ALI/AFP/GETTYIMAGES

rallied to support the JuD in 2008. Hindus from inner area and
who workshops, offices and government buildings in the
Sindh demonstrated after the JuD was implicated in the came to thismosque because of its proximity.
Mumbai attack in 2008, protesting that the organization The
complex
also includes a women's section that can

was a charity that helped them by providing food and water, accommodate close to 1,000.Women from the neighboring
and that any clamping down would have a negative impact residential areas sometimes came to offer
prayers
at the
mosque.
on their daily lives.3 However, thewomen's section only reached its full capacity
A more nuanced understanding of the JuD's attempts at events and rallies. Attached to the
during JuD-organized
social entrenchment can be derived through a consideration mosque custodian's
living quarters
are two
large
rooms that

of theways inwhich people used the JuD's central Lahore are used for women's
study circles, or dars sessions, and smaller
out
mosque complex when I carried out fieldwork there in gatherings.The wide varietyof pedagogical exercises carried
2005. The Masjid Qadsia is located inwhat used to be an under thebanner ofdars include lecturesand mosque addresses
affluent area, but is now a predominantly lowermiddle class following prayers, discussions of exegetical issues in private
residential and commercial part of Lahore. The complex homes, and before prayers atweddings and funerals.
is dominated by the mosque for men with a capacity of The library in the complex was used by many local men
approximately 2,000. During Friday afternoon prayers, studying in different schools and colleges. For those seeking
worshipers tend to spill out onto the road. A largemajority escape from constant disturbances by familymembers in their
of the men who came to pray at the mosque on Fridays a
cramped homes, the library served as quiet retreat.While
were not members of the JuD. They worked in the shops, some were amenable to JuD saw this
proselytizing, others

30 MIDDLEEASTREPORT251 SUMMER
2009

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unwanted intrusion as the cost to pay are as arms,
they had for
accessing gaining currency drugs
and
personnel
for the

the quiet space in the library.The Masjid Qadsia was war transit as direct US
being Afghan through the country, and
to serve a social akin to attacks the government. Pakistani
opened up function?something go unchallenged by army
a local community center?with limited direct utility for strikes against civilians in the border regions of Sarhad and
recruitment to the ranks of the LeT. However, this was a tenta Balochistan are an added dimension to these trends.
tive opening up of the JuD to the community around it. The JuD's vision of its role changed as the war in
to at to
The JuD's need least appear distinguish itself Afghanistan began to spill over into Pakistan. The rise of
from the LeT, and the fact that the latter's activities in militancy in Sarhad and Balochistan cannot be explained
Kashmir had reached a level beyond which itwas getting only as the retrenchment of Afghan Taliban among their
hard to expand because of resistance from local Kashmiris tribalnetworks inPakistan. The so-called Taliban in Pakistan
(on both sides of the border), meant that the organization (TiP) is comprised of a host of groups with different aims
faced a dilemma in (re)defining its mandate. There was and strategies, some ofwhom reject theTaliban label. Indeed,
an internal tussle within the organization about whether the politics of labeling these groups "Taliban" echoes the
to continue with or to move toward more of a discourse of in Vietnam as the war was
militancy Pentagon policy

socio-political role.A spectacular chance to display its social expanded in Laos and Cambodia.5
service
capabilities
was afforded the
organizations when The ongoing war inAfghanistan has given the option of
a
devastating earthquake hit the Kashmir region in 2005. militancy
a renewed
importance
to an
organization
that only

Thousands of people were left stranded and desperate in the recentlyand very tentativelyhad begun to think about its role
mountainous region.While the Pakistani army waited for beyond violence. While JuD social activities have continued,
NATO-donated Chinook helicopters to arrive before starting theirgrowth has been curtailed due to the renewed impetus for
rescue
operations, JuD and LeT activists rushed to the scene militant engagement within and outside of Pakistan. Fighters
and carried injured people on their backs across the difficult from JuD and LeT are suspected of trainingmilitants in the
terrain to medical In many cases, were the first Pashtun belt, an area where their reach was limited until
help. they
ones to reach the stranded locals. The JuD's humanitarian very recently. Further, it is alleged that LeT has become a
arm, the Idara Khidmat-e-Khalq, maintained field hospitals "militancy consultant" available for hire to train others and
in Muzaffarabad and Balakot, ambulance services to carry out South Asia. Indeed, there is
operated operations beyond
and
surgical camps, constructed 1,000 shelters and
provided
some talk of LeT entering the fold ofthat vast and nebulous

electricity through generators.4 network that is labeled al-Qaeda.6

In the international context where militant Islam It has taken a decade of war, chaos and
post-9/11 approximately
was
increasingly used as the foil against which US policy was senseless loss of life inAfghanistan for "Operation Enduring
defined, JuD needed alternative options. The organization's Freedom" to be acknowledged as a failure inEurope. In the
increased social welfare, humanitarian relief and community US, however, even the current low level of support for the war,

resourcing
built on its
original
recruitment activities, but recentlypolled at 52 percent,7 seems very high to those in the
soon
expanded to draw inmany differentkinds of people and region
who have to live with its consequences. Quite apart

groups. However, the continued US presence in

Afghanistan, from the damage done directly to the people ofAfghanistan
almost a decade
long now, changed
the
dynamics
once
again, and thoseUS soldierswho actually fightthiswar, the calculus
and new to of consequences must include the remilitarization of groups
gave impetus militancy.
like JuD. It seems increasingly likely that any calculation of

Collateral Damage the collateral damage of thiswar inAfghanistan will include

the fragmentation of and increased militancy in Pakistan.
The US-led war inAfghanistan and related American inter
vention in Pakistani politics have exacerbated problems that Endnotes
have the country since its formation. in
plagued Inequity, 1 See Saeed Shafqat, "FromOfficial Islam to Islamism:The Rise of Dawat-ul-Irshad and
such an already deeply unequal society, has increased signifi Lashkar-I-Jhangvi,"inPakistan:Nationalism Without a Nation, ed. C. Jaffrelot(London:
Zed Books, 2002).
cantly in the lastdecade, providing a catalyst for far-reaching 2 Graham Usher, "Dangerous Liaisons: Pakistan, India and Lashkar-eTaiba,"Middle East
militarization of society. To demonstrate a commitment to ReportOnline, December 31, 2008; available at http://www.merip.org/mero/mero123108a.
html.
theUS government, PresidentMusharraf reduced basic state 3Whether thiscan be accuratelyinterpreted as a showof supportremainscontested;some
allege thatmany demonstratorswere brought inunderfalsepretensestoprotestagainstprice
services as resources were directed to the "war on terror." hikes.See "HindusRally forMuslim Charity,"availableat http://news.bDC.co.uk/iVhi/world/
At the same time, themassive infusion of US aid provided south_asia/7786495.stm.
4 See "Earthquake Jihad:The Role of Jihadisand IslamistGroups aftertheOctober 2005
immense benefits to a select few. Crisis Group, July24, 2006; availableat http://www.crisisgroup.
Earthquake," International
org/home/index.cfm?id=4270.
For the within Pakistan, range
marginalized options 5 SeeHumeira Iqtidar,"WhoAre theTaliban inPakistan?"Opendemocracy.com, April 30, 2009;
from to crime, resistance of available at: http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/email/who-are-the-taliban-in-swat.
migration, organized and,
6 See StephenTankel, "Lashkar-e-Taiba:From 9/11toMumbai," International Centre forthe
course, resignation. All of these options have been tried
StudyofRadicalisation and PoliticalViolence, King's College, London, April 19,2009.
in different ways. But increased violence and militancy 7 USA Today,March 16,2009.

MIDDLEEASTREPORT
251 SUMMER
2009 31

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