REPRESENTATION

INTRODUCTION

Representation is one of the more problematic concepts in the vocabulary of

democratic theory. The antithesis between direct and representative democ-
racy has been a constant theme in its history. If democracy involves the ideal
of popular sovereignty, of people power, then how can the people rule them-
selves? Do considerations of scale, available time and perhaps also differential
expertise and knowledge of political matters make representation inevitable
in any large-scale political community? If so, does this then open up the
danger of a gap between representatives and represented? Could the former
usurp power, speaking in the name of the people but in practice disregarding
their will?
On this point, as on so many others, Rousseau vehemently stakes out a
clear position. He argues that sovereignty cannot be delegated. In his stark
words, once a people allows itself to be represented, it is no longer free. In fact
for Rousseau the people would then no longer exist. On this line of thought,
representation and popular sovereignty are mutually incompatible. The
English people are free only at election time, says Rousseau. The election of
representatives puts an end to their liberty.
The eighteenth-century philosopher and politician Edmund Burke advocates
the opposite point of view in his equally classical speech to the electors of
Bristol. He rejects the idea that the representatives are or should be bound by
instructions or a mandate from their constituents. Parliamentary representa-
tives cannot be so bound, and must decide on issues according to their own
judgement, after hearing the debate in the representative arena and making up
their mind accordingly. Burkes views have been taken as the clear statement

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 SECTION 3 REPRESENTATION 143

of the role of the parliamentary representative, as opposed to that of a del-

egate, constrained to keep strictly to the views of those whom they represent,
irrespective of their personal judgements.
The Utilitarian philosopher James Mill, in his essay On Government,
salutes representation as the grand discovery of modern times. He sought
to reconcile the conundrum that this great discovery could give rise to new
problems. If representation was a necessity of modern politics, then how is it
possible to prevent the representatives from themselves following their sinister
interest at the expense of the interests of the community? His solution lay in
the institution of checks and controls over the representatives. They should be
allowed to hold ofce only for limited periods, though this would not preclude
representatives being re-elected repeatedly if they showed themselves compe-
tent and honest. Mill thus places his faith in what his friend and contempo-
rary Jeremy Bentham called the dislocative power, or what in more popular
contemporary language might be called the power to throw the rascals out.
James Mill is thus highlighting a central strand of democratic theory and prac-
tice, the principle of accountability of representatives to represented, and the
need for institutions to put this principle into practice.
More contemporary discussion has also grappled with the problem of what
it is to represent, and how this should be done, whether the bases of repre-
sentation should be individual or group-based. The contemporary American
political philosopher Hanna Pitkin argues that representation in a democratic
system must involve ideas of responsiveness. The people must not be passive
objects of manipulation, nor would it be enough for a government to be
responsive to public opinion and initiative only on occasions when it suited it
to respond. There have to be institutions to secure this governmental respon-
siveness, and these commonly include elections to create a representative body.
But, as Pitkin interestingly observes, there could be a tension between the prac-
tice of representation, its embodiment in certain institutional bodies (like par-
liaments), and the democratic principles of accountability and control which
those bodies are meant to realise. Some of these problems were highlighted by
elitist theorists (see the extract by Michels in Part Three, Section 6 below), who
drew the conclusion that representative bodies would inevitably give rise to the
domination of the few over the many. Representative democracy would give
way to oligarchy and elitism.
The debate about representation also involves the problem of inclusion and
exclusion. Who is being represented, and on what terms? Should representa-
tion be of individuals, as in the classic liberal tradition? In that case, this may
lead to the exclusion of particular groups, and especially of marginalised or
oppressed minorities. Anne Phillips suggests the need for a politics of pres-
ence which would give voice to groups hitherto excluded or marginalised by
the individualist representation of liberal-democracy. New social movements
have, she suggests, put this question on the agenda. This raises the question
that the traditional modes of representation in parliamentary democracy
(voting for members of a representative legislature or parliament) may not be

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144 SECTION 3 REPRESENTATION

adequate to ensure reection of different groups and identities in the political

system.
Similar concerns are articulated by Iris Marion Young. She argues for rep-
resentation not of individuals but of groups. This would prevent the exclusion
of disadvantaged interests from the political system. She suggests the possibil-
ity of a Rainbow Coalition articulating the interests of Blacks, Hispanics,
women, gay men and lesbians, poor and working class people, disabled people,
students, which would enrich the quality of democratic politics. The debate
thus involves the problem of whether representation is, as the Utilitarian
philosopher James Mill suggested, the grand discovery of modern times.
Others take a more sceptical view, fearing that representation can at best
weaken genuine democracy, at worst lead to its destruction. For some political
theorists, it spells the death knell of any genuine forms of participation.
Some of the most vehement criticisms of representation have come from
thinkers within the tradition of anarchism. In this section we provide two brief
extracts from Bakunin and Proudhon, two of the most prominent gures in
nineteenth-century anarchism. For both of them, representation can never be
anything but a fraud. A representative system cannot realise the freedom it
promises, because representatives inevitably become distant from those they
represent. Whatever their intentions, they grow out of touch with the daily
life of citizens, and become prone to corruption and ambition. Parliamentary
politics in their day (and in ours?) provides classic examples of this integration
of radical politicians into the existing order. For anarchists, this scepticism of
representative politics stems from a wider rejection of organisation and power
as by their very nature negating freedom. This raises the question of whether
the popular participation and spontaneous forms of politics advocated by
anarchists are possible in large-scale and complex contemporary democracies.
Is their rejection of all forms of organisation and representation too sweeping,
and is their alternative a feasible one?
The debate on some of these issues in a contemporary setting is taken up
in the concluding part on contemporary issues. Can democracy develop new
forms and modes of representation that are open and participatory, which
avoid the dangers which traditional forms of representation may entail?

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