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Reclaiming
Humility
Four Studies in the Monastic Tradition
By
Jane Foulcher
Cistercian Publications
www.cistercianpublications.org
LITURGICAL PRESS
Collegeville, Minnesota
www.litpress.org
A Cistercian Publications title published by Liturgical Press
Cistercian Publications
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Athens, Ohio 54701
www.cistercianpublications.org
Unless otherwise indicated, Scripture texts in this work are taken from
the New Revised Standard Version Bible: Catholic Edition, 1989, 1993,
Division of Christian Education of the National Council of the Churches
of Christ in the United States of America. Used by permission. All rights
reserved.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Foulcher, Jane.
Reclaiming humility : four studies in the monastic tradition / Jane
Foulcher.
pages cm. (Cistercian studies series ; number two
hundred fifty-five)
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 978-0-87907-255-1 ISBN 978-0-87907-728-0 (ebook)
1. HumilityReligious aspectsChristianity. 2. Monastic and
religious life. I. Title.
BV4647.H8F682015
241'.4dc23 2014036385
This book is dedicated to John, Dylan, and Alice:
you have been the faithful bearers of Gods grace and
love in my life.
Siquidem humiliatio via est ad humilitatem.
Humiliation is the way to humility.
Bernard of Clairvaux, Letter 87.11
Contents
Acknowledgmentsxiii
vii
viii Reclaiming Humility
References317
Acknowledgments
xiii
xiv Reclaiming Humility
xvii
xviii Reclaiming Humility
Why Humility?
1. Joan D. Chittister, The Rule of Benedict: Insights for the Ages (New York:
Crossroad, 1992 [repr. 1997]), 6162.
2. Chittister, Rule, 62.
xix
xx Reclaiming Humility
Virtue or Vice?
Humility among the Virtues
humility, n.
1. a. The quality of being humble or having a lowly opinion of
oneself; meekness, lowliness, humbleness: the opposite of pride
or haughtiness.
b. with pl. An act of humility or self-abasement.
2. Humble or low condition, rank, or estate; unpretentiousness,
humbleness.
3. A local name of several N. American birds of the family
Scolopacid.
Oxford English Dictionary
1
2 Reclaiming Humility
18. Casey, Pagan Virtue, vvi. The term pagan is problematic. Michele R.
Salzman notes that contemporary scholarship recognizes this term as an
essentially Christian construction. It became the common term to describe
non-Christians in only the fourth century. In addition, this term tends to
mask the diversity of non-Christian, non-Jewish religious expressions in
the late Roman world. See Michele R. Salzman, Pagans and Christians, in
The Oxford Book of Christian Studies, ed. Susan Ashbrook Harvey and David G.
Hunter (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 186202, here 18789. Casey
recognizes that pagan is a Christian label, but he uses the term to refer to the
ethical tradition arising from Greek philosophical treatment of the virtues.
19. By definition women were excluded from being great-souled.
20. Casey, Pagan Virtue, 199200.
21. MacIntyre, After Virtue, 148.
22. Linda Hogan, Virtue, in The New Westminster Dictionary of Christian
Spirituality, ed. Philip Sheldrake (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox
Press, 2005) 63637, here 636. See also Honderich, ed., Companion to Philosophy,
s.v. Eudaimonia. Hogan suggests that eudaimonia is the state of having
an objectively desirable life and should be carefully distinguished from
Virtue or Vice?9
30. If, then, the magnanimous man makes, and deservedly makes, great
claims, and especially the greatest claims, he must have one special object in
view. Now when one speaks of worth, it is in relation to external goods; and
we should assume the greatest of these to be that which we render to the
gods, and which is most desired by the eminent, and is the prize for the finest
achievements; and that which answers this description is honour, because it
is clearly the greatest external good (Aristotle, Ethics 4.3; 1123b).
31. Casey, Pagan Virtue, 2012.
12 Reclaiming Humility
There are two things to note at this point. The first is con-
temporary discomfort with the contingency of moral goodness
in Aristotles scheme. As Casey says, The notion that what is
obligatory on allmoral goodnessmight be possible only for
people favoured by fortune, or much easier for them, will strike
many of us as a sort of scandal.33 This view is, Casey suggests, in
stark contrast to Christian teaching, where goodness is seen to be
independent of circumstance. Pagan virtues have, from a Chris-
tian perspective, a disturbing worldliness.34 (By worldliness
Casey means that they include an element of self-regard and
rely upon material conditions for their fulfillment.35)
The second, and not unrelated, thing to note is the social di-
mension of Aristotles scheme. Indeed the social setting of Greek
moral thought has sometimes been overlooked in contemporary
philosophical retrievals of humility. For example, against Mac
Intyre and others, Brian Scarlett wants to find a place for humil-
ity in the Greek world.36 He looks initially to Aristotles virtue
of megalopsychos but rejects as nonsense Aristotles vignette
of great-souledness, including its outworkings with regard to
patronage, speech, and demeanor. For Scarlett, Aristotles mag-
nanimous man is not the mean but the excess of self-regard.37
What Scarlett has failed to note is the social embeddedness of
Aristotles portrait. Aristotle is fundamentally concerned with
the arena of honor in his discussion of magnanimity. In Aristotles
world, this self-appraisal cannot be separated from the polis. And,
again, it cannot be separated from fortuna and from ones place
in the scheme of life. No one is self-made; the accidents of birth,
health, wealth, luck, and the favor of the gods all contribute to
33. Casey, Pagan Virtue, 202. A key reason for discomfort with this approach
is that, as Casey notes in his preface (vi), the Western moral outlook has
been substantially shaped by the Christian tradition. See also Cordner,
Aristotelian Virtue, 293.
34. Casey, Pagan Virtue, 208.
35. Casey, Pagan Virtue, viii.
36. Brian Scarlett, Humility: A Monkish Virtue, Preprint Series (Depart
ment of Philosophy, University of Melbourne), no. 14/94 (1994), 120.
37. Scarlett, Humility: A Monkish Virtue, 1112.
14 Reclaiming Humility
All the key elements are here: humility is connected with sordid
manual labor and with social inferiority; the humble are con-
demned to flattery and trod upon like slaves, utterly without
public honor and incapable of higher thought.49
Humility in the Greco-Roman world, then, is primarily a condi-
tion of the socially inferior, whose servile status and dependence
on physical labor precluded them from all that was considered
valuable in public life: freedom, learning, power, riches, influence.
Humility is not a virtue.
75. MacIntyre argues that the inclusion of charity and forgiveness as core
virtues alters the good for man in a radical way; for the community in which
the good is achieved has to be one of reconciliation. This is consonant with
Theissens reading of early Christianity (MacIntyre, After Virtue, 174).
76. Theissen, Primitive Christian Religion, 80.
77. Wengst, Humility, 5457.
Virtue or Vice?25
78. The manuscript for this book was completed before the publication of
Stephen T. Pardues study, The Mind of Christ: Humility and the Intellect in Early
Christian Theology (London: Bloomsbury, 2013). Pardue does not contend with
the identification of humility as a virtue. His primary focus is on humility
in the life of the intellect. Working particularly with Gregory of Nyssa and
Augustine of Hippo, Pardue argues that a Christian understanding of
intellectual humility allows one to avoid post-Kantian apophaticism (182).
Rather, as a response to human limits, humility paradoxically empowers the
individual, through the operation of divine grace, to transcend these limits. I
arrive at a not dissimilar conclusion via a very different route.
79. While the word aret appears occasionally in the New Testament, its use
is different from that of the classical philosophical tradition. See Andr Louf,
The Way of Humility, trans. Lawrence S. Cunningham, MW 11 (Kalamazoo,
MI: Cistercian Publications, 2007), 5. For a broad consideration of the place
of virtue ethics in the Bible, see John Barton, Virtue in the Bible, Studies in
Christian Ethics 12, no. 1 (1999), 1222.
80. John Anthony McGuckin, The Westminister Handbook to Patristic Theology
(Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2004), s.v. Virtue.
26 Reclaiming Humility
81. Jean Porter, Virtue, in The Oxford Handbook of Theological Ethics, ed.
Gilbert Meilaender and William Werpehowski (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2005), 210.
82. George J. Lavere, Virtue, in Augustine through the Ages: An Encyclopedia,
ed. Allan D. Fitzgerald (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999), 87174, here 872.
83. Gerard J. P. ODaly, Augustines Philosophy of Mind (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1987), 5.
84. Augustine, The City of God, trans. Henry Bettenson (London: Penguin,
1984), 19.25, 891. This assessment needs to be read with some caution. Porter
argues that Augustines critique of virtue in his society is actually highly
nuanced and partly directed at the degeneration of ancient ideals. See Porter,
Virtue, in Meilaender and Werpehowski, 20913.
85. Lavere, Virtue, in Fitzgerald, 872.
Virtue or Vice?27
86. Augustine, Expositions of the Psalms (132), trans. Maria Boulding, The
Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century, pt. 3, vol. 15
(Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 2000), Exposition 2, Psalm 31:6b, sec. 18,
pp. 38081.
87. Augustine, Expositions of the Psalms, Exposition 2, Psalm 31:6b, sec. 18.
This reference is cited by Louf, Way of Humility, 7. Louf also cites Sermon
351.4: Humilitas pene una disciplina Christiana est. Humility is practically
the only Christian discipline there is (6). Hill argues, however, that this
is unlikely to be an authentic sermon by Augustine (Augustine, Sermons
[341400] on Various Subjects, trans. Edmund Hill, ed. John E. Rotelle, The
Works of Saint Augustine, A Translation for the 21st Century, pt. 3, vol. 10
[Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 1995], 134n1).
88. Augustines approach to humility and virtue is carefully explored in
Deborah Wallace Ruddy, A Christological Approach to Virtue: Augustine
and Humility (PhD diss., Boston College, 2001).
28 Reclaiming Humility
submitting his neck to the yoke of humility and bowing his head
before the ignominy of the Cross.89
Humility is often named as a virtue in patristic writings, some-
times as the mother of virtue or as the summit of all virtues.
In the preface to the City of God, Augustine speaks of humility as a
virtue which makes it soar above all the summits of this world,
overturning human arrogance by divine grace.90 Crucially here, Au-
gustine carefully links humility and grace. He views humility, using
later terminology, as a theological virtue. Both Basil of Caesarea (ca.
330379) and John Chrysostom (ca. 345407) speak of humility as
the foundational virtue.91 For Basil, humility is an all-encompassing
virtue (panaretos);92 for John Chrysostom, it is the mother, root,
nurse, foundation and center of all the other virtues.93
As the use of virtue language becomes common in the Chris-
tian tradition, however, a number of problems arise. First, there
is a danger that the notion of grace will be compromised. This
issue, in fact, becomes the key reason for the rejection of the no-
tion of virtue in the Protestant Reformation, but it is already a
matter of intense concern in the fourth century. Athanasiuss Life
of Antony, for example, deliberately frames monastic life as a way
of virtue to rival that of the Greeks.94 But how are human efforts
(especially the monastic ascetical regime) and divine grace re-
lated? This question is of critical importance to the early monastic
movement. The monastic theologian John Cassian (ca. 360ca.
435) addresses this question in Conference 13, arguing that the
cultivation of virtue requires human cooperation with divine
95. John Cassian, The Conferences, trans. Boniface Ramsey (New York:
Paulist Press, 1997), Conf. 13, pp. 46791.
96. William Harmless, Desert Christians: An Introduction to the Literature
of Early Monasticism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 398400;
McGuckin, Handbook to Patristic Theology, s.v. Pelagius-Pelagianism;
Columba Stewart, Cassian the Monk (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998),
7681.
97. Louf, Way of Humility, 7.
30 Reclaiming Humility
98. Louf, Way of Humility, 7. Louf also briefly discusses the consequent
difficulties Aquinas has to face in his account of the relationship between
humility and magnanimity (Way of Humility, 8).
99. Harmless, Desert Christians, 218, 312; McGuckin, Handbook to Patristic
Theology, s.v. Virtue.
100. The pioneers of this movement were Elizabeth Anscombe, Philippa
Foot, and Iris Murdoch (Porter, Virtue Ethics, in Gill, 107).
Virtue or Vice?31
101. Button notes, however, that humility has not enjoyed the same
renaissance as other virtues. See Button, A Monkish Kind of Virtue? 840.
102. Norvin Richards, Is Humility a Virtue?, American Philosophical
Quarterly 25, no. 3 (1988): 25359, here 254; see also Norvin Richards, Humility
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992).
103. Button, A Monkish Kind of Virtue? 840.
104. Richards, Is Humility a Virtue? 253. The quotation is from SC 42.
105. Richards, Is Humility a Virtue? 253.
32 Reclaiming Humility
1.7 Conclusion
The notion of humility has a complex and ambiguous heritage.
It cannot be named straightforwardly as a virtue, nor indeed as
109. For example, see Nancey Murphy, Brad J. Kallenberg, and Mark
Thiessen Nation, eds., Virtues and Practices in the Christian Tradition: Christian
Ethics after MacIntyre (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 1997);
Jonathan R. Wilson, Living Faithfully in a Fragmented World: Lessons for
the Church from MacIntyres After Virtue (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press
International, 1997).
110. See, for example, Miroslav Volf and Dorothy C. Bass, eds., Practicing
Theology: Beliefs and Practices in Christian Life (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans,
2002).
111. Louf, Way of Humility, 10.
34 Reclaiming Humility