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On 22 July 1994, the RTC affirmed the decision of the MTCC and
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
ordered the issuance of a writ of demolition directing the sheriff to
demolish private respondents' houses and other improvements which
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised might be found on the subject premises. 4
Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the 26 March 1996
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals declaring the private respondents the
On 29 July 1994, a writ of demolition was issued, and notices of
rightful possessors de facto of the subject lot and permanently
demolition were served upon private respondents. Per Sheriff's
enjoining Sheriff Juan Gato or his representative from effecting the
Report,5 private respondents' houses were demolished on 3 August
demolition of private respondents' houses.
1994, except for two houses which were moved outside the premises
in question upon the plea of the owners thereof.
Culled from the evidence proffered by petitioner Aznar Brothers Realty
Co. (hereafter AZNAR), it appears that Lot No. 4399 containing an
On appeal by the private respondents, the Court of Appeals reversed
area of 34,325 square meters located at Brgy. Mactan, Lapu-Lapu
and set aside the decision of the RTC; declared the private
City, was acquired by AZNAR from the heirs of Crisanta Maloloy-on by
respondents as the rightful possessors de facto of the land in question;
virtue of an Extrajudicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute
and permanently enjoined Sheriff Juan Gato or whoever was acting in
Sale dated 3 March 1964. This deed was registered with the Register
his stead from effectuating the demolition of the houses of the private
of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City on 6 March 1964 as shown on the face
respondents.
thereof. After the sale, petitioner AZNAR declared this property under
its name for taxation purposes and regularly paid the taxes thereon.
Herein private respondents were allegedly allowed to occupy portions In arriving at its challenged decision, the Court of Appeals noted that at
of Lot No. 4399 by mere tolerance provided that they leave the land in the time AZNAR entered the property, the private respondents had
the event that the company would use the property for its purposes. already been in possession thereof peacefully, continuously, adversely
Later, AZNAR entered into a joint venture with Sta. Lucia Realty and notoriously since time immemorial. There was no evidence that
Development Corporation for the development of the subject lot into a petitioner was ever in possession of the property. Its claim of
multi-million peso housing subdivision and beach resort. When its ownership was based only on an Extrajudicial Partition with Deed of
demands for the private respondents to vacate the land failed, AZNAR Absolute Sale, which private respondents, however, claimed to be null
filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTCC) of Lapu-Lapu City a case and void for being simulated and fraudulently obtained. The Court of
for unlawful detainer and damages, which was docketed as Civil Case Appeals further held that where not all the known heirs had
No. R-1027. participated in the extrajudicial agreement of partition, the instrument
would be null and void and therefore could not be
registered.6 Moreover, AZNAR was estopped to assert ownership of
On the other hand, the private respondents alleged that they are the
the property in question, since it had admitted in a pleading in the
successors and descendants of the eight children of the late Crisanta
reconstitution proceedings that the property had never been conveyed
Maloloy-on, whose names appear as the registered owners in the
by the decreed owners. Additionally, from 1988 up to the filing of the
Original Certificate of Title No. RC-2856. They had been residing and
ejectment case on 4 August 1993, AZNAR never registered the
occupying the subject portion of the land in the concept of owner since
extrajudicial partition despite opportunities to do so. Its allegation that
the time of their parents and grandparents, except for Teodorica
private respondents occupied the property by mere tolerance was not
Andales who was not a resident in said premises. Private respondents
proved. Pursuant to the ruling in Vda. de Legazpi v. Avendano, 7 the
claimed that the Extrajudicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of
fact that the right of the private respondents was so seriously placed in
Absolute Sale is void ab initio for being simulated and fraudulent, and
issue and the execution of the decision in the ejectment case would
they came to know of the fraud only when AZNAR entered into the
have meant demolition of private respondents' houses constituted an
land in the last quarter of 1991 and destroyed its vegetation. They then
equitable reason to suspend the enforcement of the writ of execution
filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lapu-Lapu City a complaint
and order of demolition.
seeking to declare the subject document null and void. This case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 2930-L.
AZNAR then elevated the case to this Court, via this petition for review
on certiorari, contending that respondent Court of Appeals erred in
On 1 February 1994, the MTCC rendered a decision ordering the
private respondents to (a) vacate the land in question upon the finality
of the judgment; and (b) pay P8,000 as attorney's fees and P2,000 as 1. . . . reversing the judgments of the Municipal Trial Court
litigation expenses, plus costs.2 and the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-Lapu City despite the
finality of the judgments and the full implementation thereof;
The MTCC delved into the issue of ownership in order to resolve the
issue of possession. It found that petitioner AZNAR acquired 2. . . . invoking lack of prior physical possession over the
ownership of Lot No. 4399 by virtue of the Extrajudicial Partition of land in question by the petitioner as one ground in its
Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale executed by the Heirs of Decision sought to be reviewed;
Crisanta Maloloy-on on 3 March 1964, which was registered with the
Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City on 6 March 1964 as appearing on
3. . . . holding that the Extrajudicial Partition with Deed of
the face thereof. Private respondents' allegation that two of the
Absolute Sale was null and void;
signatories were not heirs of the registered owners; that some of the
signatories were already dead at the date of the execution of the deed;
and that many heirs were not parties to the extrajudicial partition is a 4. . . . holding that petitioner was in estoppel in pais when it
form of a negative pregnant, which had the effect of admitting that the made the allegation that the property was not sold or
vendors, except those mentioned in the specific denial, were heirs and encumbered in its petition for reconstitution of title;
had the legal right to sell the subject land to petitioner. The fact that
some or most heirs had not signed the deed did not make the
document null and void ab initio but only annullable, unless the action 5. . . . applying the ruling in the case of Vda. de Legazpi vs.
Avendano (79 SCRA 135 [1977]).
had already prescribed. Since the private respondents occupied the
land merely by tolerance, they could be judicially ejected therefrom.
That the Deed has not been annotated on OCT RO-2856 is of no We shall jointly discuss the first and fifth assigned errors for being
moment, since said title was reconstituted only on 25 August 1988, interrelated with each other.
while the subject Deed was executed on 3 March 1964. Lastly, the
reconstituted title has not as yet been transferred to a purchaser for
value. In its first assigned error, petitioner argues that the decision of the
MTCC of Lapu-Lapu City had become final and immediately executory
in view of the undisputed failure of the private respondents to post a
Aggrieved by the decision of the MTCC, private respondents appealed supersedeas bond as required by Section 8, Rule 70 of the Revised
to the RTC. Rules of Court.
During the pendency of the appeal, or on 8 March 1994, the RTC, We do not agree. Since the private respondents had seasonably filed
upon Aznar's ex parte motion, issued an order granting the issuance of an appeal with the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City, the judgment of the MTCC
a writ of execution pursuant to Section 8, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Lapu-Lapu City did not become final. And for reasons hereunder
of Court in view of the failure of private respondents to put up a stated, the perfection of the appeal was enough to stay the execution
supersedeas bond. A week later, a writ of execution was issued. The of the MTCC decision.
sheriff then served upon private respondents the said writ of execution
Under the former Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, 8 if the of the subject property is not an indispensable requirement in unlawful
judgment of the municipal trial court in an ejectment case is adverse to detainer cases, although it is indispensable in an action for forcible
the defendant, execution shall issue immediately. To stay the entry. 16 The lack of prior physical possession on the part of AZNAR is
immediate execution of the judgment, the defendant must (1) perfect therefore of no moment, as its cause of action in the unlawful detainer
his appeal; (2) file a supersedeas bond to answer for the rents, case is precisely to terminate private respondents' possession of the
damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment property in question. 17
appealed from; and (3) periodically deposit the rentals falling due
during the pendency of the appeal. 9
We now come to the issue of the validity of the Extrajudicial Partition
with Deed of Absolute Sale.
As a rule, the filing of a supersedeas bond is mandatory and if not filed,
the plaintiff is entitled as a matter of right to the immediate execution of
In an action for ejectment, the only issue involved is possession de
the judgment. An exception is where the trial court did not make any
facto. However, when the issue of possession cannot be decided
findings with respect to any amount in arrears, damages or costs
without resolving the issue of ownership, the court may receive
against the defendant, 10 in which case no bond is necessary to stay
evidence upon the question of title to the property but solely for the
the execution of the judgment. Thus, in Once v. Gonzales, 11 this Court
purpose of determining the issue of possession. 18
ruled that the order of execution premised on the failure to file a
supersedeas bond was groundless and void because no such bond
was necessary there being no back rentals adjudged in the appealed In the instant case, private respondents have set up the defense of
judgment. ownership and questioned the title of AZNAR to the subject lot,
alleging that the Extrajudicial Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale upon
which petitioner bases its title is null and void for being simulated and
Similarly, in the instant case, there was no need for the private
fraudulently made.
respondents to file a supersedeas bond because the judgment of the
MTCC did not award rentals in arrears or damages. The attorney's
fees of P8,000 and the litigation expenses of P2,000 awarded in favor First, private respondents claim that not all the known heirs of Crisanta
of the petitioner need not be covered by a bond, as these are not the Maloloy-on participated in the extrajudicial partition, and that two
damages contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. persons who participated and were made parties thereto were not
The damages referred to therein are the reasonable compensation for heirs of Crisanta. This claim, even if true, would not warrant rescission
the use and occupation of the property which are generally measured of the deed. Under Article 1104 of the Civil Code, "[a] partition made
by its fair rental value and cannot refer to other damages which are with preterition of any of the compulsory heirs shall not be rescinded,
foreign to the enjoyment or material possession of the unless it be proved that there was bad faith or fraud on the part of the
property. 12 Neither were the private respondents obliged to deposit the persons interested; but the latter shall be proportionately obliged to pay
rentals falling due during the pendency of the appeal in order to secure to the person omitted the share which belongs to him." In the present
a stay of execution because the appealed judgment did not fix the case, no evidence of bad faith or fraud is extant from the records. As to
reasonable rental or compensation for the use of the the two parties to the deed who were allegedly not heirs, Article 1105
premises. 13 Hence, it was error for the RTC to order the execution of is in point; it provides: "A partition which includes a person believed to
the judgment of the MTCC. be an heir, but who is not, shall be void only with respect to such
person." In other words, the participation of non-heirs does not render
the partition void in its entirety but only to the extent corresponding to
At any rate, pursuant to Section 21 of the Revised Rules of Summary
them.
Procedure, the decision of the RTC affirming the decision of the MTCC
has become immediately executory, without prejudice to the appeal
before the Court of Appeals. The said Section repealed Section 10 of Private respondents also allege that some of the persons who were
the Rules of Court allowing during the pendency of the appeal with the made parties to the deed were already dead, while others were still
Court of Appeals a stay of execution of the RTC judgment with respect minors. Moreover, the names of some parties thereto were misspelled,
to the restoration of possession where the defendant makes a periodic and others who knew how to read and write their names were made to
deposit of rentals. Thus, immediate execution of the judgment appear to have affixed only their thumbmark in the questioned
becomes a ministerial duty of the court. No new writ of execution was, document. Likewise, the signatures of those who were made parties
however, issued. Nevertheless, the writ of demolition thereafter issued were forged.
was sufficient to constitute a writ of execution, as it substantially
complied with the form and contents of a writ of execution as provided
for under Section 8 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, private The foregoing are bare allegations with no leg to stand on. No birth or
respondents were duly notified and heard on the omnibus motion for death certificates were presented before the MTCC to support the
allegations that some of the parties to the deed were minors and
the issuance of the writ of demolition and were given five days to
remove their houses. 14 others were already dead at the time of the execution of the deed.
What private respondents adduced as evidence was merely a family
tree, which was at most self-serving. It was only when the case was on
Invoking Legaspi v. Avendao, 15 the Court of Appeals held that there appeal with the RTC that the private respondents presented as Annex
was an equitable reason to suspend the enforcement of the writ of "B" of their Memorandum and Appeal Brief a photocopy of the
execution and order of demolition until after the final determination of certificate of death of Francisco Aying, 19 son of Crisanta Maloloy-on,
the civil case for the nullification of the Extrajudicial Partition with Deed who reportedly died on 7 March 1963. This certificate was allegedly
of Absolute Sale. issued on 17 January 1992 by the Parish Priest of Virgen de Regla
Parish, Lapu-Lapu City. The fact remains, however, that this photocopy
was not certified to be a true copy.
In Legaspi, this Court held:
The principle that registration is the operative act that gives validity to
the transfer or creates a lien upon the land "refers to cases involving
conflicting rights over registered property and those of innocent
transferees who relied on the clean title of the properties." 29 This
principle has no bearing on the present case, as no subsequent
transfer of the subject lot to other persons has been made either by
private respondents or their predecessors-in-interest. 30
No pronouncement as to costs.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-17951 February 28, 1963 a month and a half. John W. Legare occasionally visited
them there. In one of said occasional visits the plaintiff told
John that she wanted to go home. The latter told her that it
CONRADO C. FULE and LOURDES F. ARAGON, petitioners,
was not yet safe for her to go home. On May 7, 1953,
vs.
however, John W. Legare came to the hotel, gave the
EMILIA E. DE LEGARE and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
plaintiff a five-peso bill, and told her that she could use the
amount for transportation expenses if she wanted to leave
REGALA, J.: the hotel. On the following morning the plaintiff and Purita
Tarrosa left the hotel and went direct to her house at Sta.
Mesa Boulevard Extension. When they arrived at the house,
This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of
however, they found that it was occupied by strangers, and
Appeals, promulgated on November 16, 1960, in Civil Case No. that all her furniture and personal belongings had
15728-R, entitled" Emilia E. Legare, plaintiff-appellant, versus Conrado disappeared. Inquiring from those strangers how they
C. Fule and Lourdes F. Aragon, defendants-appellants..
happened to occupy the house, the latter told her that John
W. Legare had sold the house to them and that it was no
The facts of this case as found by the Court of Appeals in its decision longer hers. The plaintiff thereupon sought the help of her
are as follows: attorney. It was then discovered that the paper which John
W. Legare had the plaintiff and Purita Tarrosa sign in the
evening of March 29, 1953 was a deed of sale of the lot and
This is an action for annulment of certain deeds of sale and house in question in favor of John W. Legare for the sum of
conveyance covering a parcel of land, together with the P12,000.00, and that it was supposed to have been
improvements existing thereon, situated in the municipality executed on the 7th day of April, 1953, and acknowledged
of San Juan, province of Rizal, and for damages. before a notary public on that date. Exhibit X.
It appears in evidence that the plaintiff, Emilia E. de Legare, It further appears that sometime prior to May 9, 1953, John
was the owner of a parcel of land, together with a residential W. Legare approached Elias B. Fermin, the real estate
house erected thereon, situated at No. 146 Sta. Mesa broker who intervened in the securing of the loan contracted
Boulevard Extension, San Juan, Rizal, her ownership being by the plaintiff from Tomas Q. Soriano, and sought said
evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 21253, issued broker's help to sell the lot and house in question. Elias B.
by the Office of the Register of Deeds of the province of Fermin accepted the commission and offered the property in
Rizal. She was living in that house together with defendant sale to defendants spouses Conrado C. Fule and Lourdes F.
John W. Legare, her adopted son, and a maid named Purita Aragon. Conrado C. Fule read the title papers in the hand of
Tarrosa. On September 26, 1951, the plaintiff, thru a public John W. Legare and inspected the premises, and satisfied
deed, constituted on the above mentioned house and lot a with the result of his inspection, he agreed to purchase the
first class mortgage in favor of defendant Tomas Q. Soriano property for P12,000.00 on condition that the sum of P7,000,
to guarantee the payment of a loan in the amount of the unpaid balance of plaintiff's indebtedness to Tomas Q.
P8,000.00. This deed of mortgage was on the same date Soriano secured by a mortgage thereon, would be deducted
recorded in the Office of the Register of Deeds of the from the price, and that he would assume said mortgage.
province of Rizal and annotated in the memorandum of
encumbrances of transfer certificate of title No. 21253. On
account of certain partial payments made by the plaintiff and The terms offered by Conrado C. Fule being acceptable to
the contracting by the latter of additional loans in small John W. Legare and Tomas Soriano, the parties proceeded
amounts from Tomas Q. Soriano the debt guaranteed by the to formalize the contract. Accordingly, on May 9, 1953,
above mentioned mortgage was reduced to the sum of defendant Tomas Q. Soriano executed a deed of absolute
P7,000.00 as of February 23, 1953. These transactions, sale thereof, free of all liens and encumbrances, in favor of
however, were not annotated on the memorandum of defendant spouses Conrado C. Fule and Lourdes F. Aragon,
encumbrances of the above mentioned certificate of title. Exhibit X-2, and said spouses in turn executed in favor of
Tomas Q. Soriano a deed of mortgage covering the property
for the sum of P7,000.00. Exhibit X-3. These three deeds,
At about 9:00 o'clock in the evening of March 29, 1953, while together with transfer certificate of Title No. 21253, issued in
the plaintiff, John W. Legare, and Purita Tarrosa were the name of the plaintiff, were on that same date presented
seated in the drawing room of the house above referred to, for registration in the Office of the Register of Deeds of the
an unknown man intruded into the room, approached the province of Rizal.
plaintiff, covered her mouth, and, pressing a knife on her
side, demanded that she give him P10,000.00 if she did not
like to be killed. The plaintiff replied that she did not have The latter, following the usual procedure, recorded, first, the
that amount. Thereupon, the intruder told the plaintiff to raise deed of sale executed by the plaintiff in favor of defendant
the necessary amount as he would come back the following John W. Legare (Exhibit 1) and issued in the name of the
morning and once more threatened to kill her if she would latter transfer certificate of title No. 30126 which cancelled
fail to do so. After having made that threat, the intruder left transfer certificate of title No. 21253 (Exhibit Y), then the
the house. John W. Legare did not call for help nor made deed of sale executed by John W. Legare in favor of the
any attempt to defend his mother, and when Purita Tarrosa spouses Conrado C. Fule and Lourdes F. Aragon (Exhibit X-
stood up to go down the house to call for a policeman, he 2) and issued in favor of the latter transfer certificate of title
held the latter by the hand and slapped her on the face when No. 30127 (Exhibit Y-1), which cancelled transfer certificate
she persisted in going down, telling her that the man had of title No. 30126, and then annotated on the memorandum
companions waiting downstairs. of encumbrances of transfer certificate of title No. 30127 the
deed of mortgage (Exhibit X-1) executed in favor of Tomas
Q. Soriano by said spouses. Once these were
After the intruder was gone John W. Legare approached the accomplished, Elias B. Fermin and John W. Legare went
plaintiff, and exhibiting to her a paper told her to sign it as back to the house of the spouses Conrado C. Fule and
with the same he could secure from the U.S. Veterans Lourdes P. Aragon and gave the transfer certificate of title
Administration the amount which they needed to deliver to No. 30127. Thereupon said spouses delivered to John W.
that intruder. The plaintiff, who did not know how to read nor Legare the balance of the purchase price of the property
write, although she could sign her name, asked John W. after deducting therefrom the amount of the mortgage
Legare what that paper was. The latter answered that it was constituted thereon in favor of Tomas Q. Soriano, the
an application for payment of compensation. As plaintiff had brokerage fees and the expenses incident to the execution
confidence in John W. Legare and prior to that occasion she and registration of said deeds and issuance of new
had received from the U.S. Veterans Administration a letter certificates of title, which amounted to a little P4,000.00.
concerning some compensation she was to receive, she
signed that paper. After the paper was signed by the plaintiff,
John W. Legare had Purita Tarrosa sign it as a witness, Upon the evidence, the trial court rendered judgment, the
without however, allowing the latter to read it. dispositive part of which reads as follows:
After that paper was thus signed, John W. Legare told the IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this Court hereby
plaintiff and Purita Tarrosa to pack up their things as they orders:
were leaving the house to hide in a hotel, adding that the
men who came earlier that evening were Huks. Early the 1) the cancellation of Certificates of Title Nos. 30127 and
next morning John W. Legare took the plaintiff and Purita 10126, thereby leaving valid TCT No. 21253 in the name of
Tarrosa to the Windsor Hotel in the City of Manila, and after Emilia E. de Legare together with the encumbrance thereon
conducting them to a room in the hotel, told them not to in favor of Tomas Q. Soriano;
leave the room or peep out of the window as they might be
seen by the men who came to their house in the previous
evening. This advise given, John W. Legare left the hotel. 2) the delivery of the possession of the premises to the
The plaintiff and Purita Tarrosa stayed in that hotel for about plaintiff and the monthly rental of P150.00 a month from May
9, 1953, up to and including the date on which the delivery is It should be noted that the deed of sale was regular upon its face, and
to be made, this obligation being understood to be joint and no one would have questioned its authenticity since it was duly
several insofar as the defendants Fule and Aragon are acknowledged before a notary public. Moreover, even if the petitioners
concerned; had the opportunity to compare the signature of the respondent on the
deed of conveyance with a specimen of her genuine signature, the
effort, nonetheless, would have been in vain since the respondent's
3) the award of P5,000.00 as moral damages in favor of the
signature on the document was admittedly hers. Lastly, it should not be
plaintiff and enforceable against John W. Legare for the
overlooked that the respondent, during the whole period of the
fraud perpetrated by the latter on the former;
negotiation, was nowhere available to confirm or deny the execution of
the deed. She was then in hiding, or, hidden, at the Windsor Hotel in
4) the award of P1,000.00 as attorney's is fees enforceable Manila.
against the defendants Fule and Aragon;
The diligence and precaution observed by the petitioners themselves
And on the cross-claim, the court orders could hardly have been wanting. The records show that they did not
rely solely and fully upon the deed of sale in favor of John W. Legare
and the fact that John had then in his possession the corresponding
1) John W. Legare to refund to the spouses Fule and Aragon
certificate of title of the registered owner. They demanded more. They
the amount paid by the latter on account of the sale insisted that the sale in favor of John W. Legare be first registered and
contained in Exhibit X-2 plus interest thereon at the legal that the transfer in their favor be thereafter likewise registered. It was
rate from the date of the cross-claim;
only after all these were complied with that they paid the purchase
price. In other words, the petitioner spouses relied not really on the
2) the award of P5,000.00 as moral damages in favor of the documents exhibited to them by John W. Legare, but, on the
spouses Fule and Aragon and enforceable against John W. registerability of those documents. This in Our view, satisfies the
Legare for the misrepresentation made by him;. measure of good faith contemplated by law.
3) the reimbursement to the spouses Fule and Aragon by It is true that at the time the herein petitioners purchased the properties
John W. Legare of all amounts which may be paid by the from John W. Legare, he was not yet the registered owner of the
former to the plaintiff by way of rentals for the premises same. This fact alone, however, could not have caused the herein
involved herein, as well as attorney's fees in the amount of petitioners to lose their status as innocent purchasers for value. It
P1,000.00. should be recalled that although the title was in the name of the
respondent Emilia E. de Legare, the certificate of title was in the
possession of her adopted son, John. Under Section 55 of Act 496, as
SO ORDERED. amended, John's possession of the certificate and his subsequent
production of it to the herein petitioners operated as a "conclusive
The Court of Appeals, in deciding the appeal, entered a judgment the authority from the registered owner to the register of deeds to enter a
dispositive portion of which follows:. new certificate."
WHEREFORE, modified as indicated above, i.e., the transfer SEC. 55. xxx xxx xxx
certificate of title No. 21253 issued in the name of Emilia E.
de Legare is revived with the mortgage in favor of appellee The production of the owner's duplicate certificate whenever
Tomas Q. Soriano annotated on its memorandum of any voluntary instrument is presented for registration
encumbrances but reduced to the amount of P7,000.00, and shall be conclusive authority from the registered owner to the
that the award of attorney's fees in the amount of P1,000.00 register of deeds to enter a new certificate or to make a
to be paid by the spouses Conrado C. Fule and Lourdes F. memorandum or registration in accordance with such
Aragon, in favor of the plaintiff, is eliminated therefrom, the instrument, and the new certificate or memorandum shall be
judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed in all other binding upon the registered owner and upon all persons
respects, without special pronouncement as to costs in this claiming under him, in favor of every purchaser for value and
instance. in good faith. ....
IT IS SO ORDERED. While it was true that the transfer in favor of John was still unregistered
when he sought to sell the property to the herein petitioners, it was not
In elevating the judgment of the Court of Appeals to this Tribunal for true that the latter observed no precaution whatsoever from the
review, herein petitioners discussed 6 assignments of error. However, complication of such non-registration. As already discussed above, the
this Court is of the view that, in effect and substance, only one issue petitioners required that the registration of the previous sale (from the
was raised.We have always refrained from reviewing factual findings of respondent to John W. Legare) be first attended to and completed.
the Court of Appeals and the first two errors assigned were but After that was done and the certificate of title thereof was issued to
attempts at disputing the same. The other four were simply detailed John by the Register of Deeds, they still withheld payment till the
aspects of the one, sole issue, to wit: second sale (from John to the petitioners) has in turn registered and
the corresponding certificate of title therefor was issued in their names.
It was only after all these were followed that the entire negotiation was
Were the herein petitioners purchasers in good faith and for terminated with the payment of the balance of the purchase price. All
value of the properties here contested? these, We hold, were adequate safeguards against the objection
interposed. A contrary conclusion would operate to weaken the
Guided by the facts found by the Court of Appeals, We hold the herein reliance of the general public on the indefeasibility of titles registered
petitioners innocent purchasers for value of the house and lot here under the Torrens System.
disputed. In consequence, they are here adjudged the lawful owners
thereof. We have so far demonstrated the good faith of the petitioner spouses.
By the very facts established by the Court of Appeals, however, there
A purchaser in good faith is one who buys property of another, without is still another reason why the property herein in question should be
notice that some other persons has a right to, or interest in, such adjudged to the petitioners.
property and pays a full and fair price for the same, at the time of such
purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other Although the deed of sale in favor of John W. Legare was fraudulent,
persons in the property. Good faith consists in an honest intention to the fact remains that he was able to secure a registered title to the
abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of another (Cui house and lot. It was this title which he subsequently conveyed to the
and Joven v. Henson, 51 Phil. 606). We have measured the conduct of herein petitioners. We have indeed ruled that a forged or fraudulent
the petitioner spouses by this yardstick. deed is a nullity and conveys no title (Director of Lands v. Addison, 49
Phil. 19). However, We have also laid down the doctrine that there are
These facts were uncontroverted. The negotiation and transaction instances when such a fraudulent document may become the root of
which eventually caused the certificate of title to be transferred from valid title. One such instance is where the certificate of title was
the herein respondent to the petitioner spouses were conducted by a already transferred from the name of the true owner to the forger, and
real estate broker licensed since 1938. Nothing in John W. Legare's while it remained that way, the land was subsequently sold to an
person or behaviour suggested anything suspicious. He was the innocent purchaser. For then, the vendee had the right to rely upon
adopted son of the herein respondent, and, to the time that he was what appeared in the certificate (Inquimboy vs. Cruz, G.R. No. L-
contracting with the petitioner spouses, he had not been known to 13953, July 28, 1960).
commit crime or dishonesty. On the contrary, John has had previous
dealings with the real estate broker during which he exhibited the Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of
expected degree of trustworthiness. facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without
prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not
covered by this stipulation of facts.1wph1.t
We have been constrained to adopt the conclusion here set forth
because under the Torrens system, "registration is the operative act
that gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land (Secs.
50 and 51, Land Registration Act). Consequently, where there was
nothing in the certificate of title to indicate any cloud or vice in the
ownership of the property, or any encumbrance thereon, the purchaser
is not required to explore farther than what the Torrens title upon its
face indicates in quest for any hidden defect or inchoate right that may
subsequently defeat his right thereto. If the rule were otherwise, the
efficacy and conclusiveness of the certificate of title which the Torrens
system seeks to insure would entirely be futile and nugatory. (Reynes
vs. Barrera, 68 Phil. 656; De Lara and De Guzman vs. Ayroso, 50 O.G.
No. 10, 4838). The public shall then be denied of its foremost
motivation for respecting and observing the Land Registration Act. In
the end, the business community stands to be inconvenienced and
prejudiced immeasurably.
Besides, the records of this case reveal that the herein respondent is
herself not entirely free from blame. We note that when John
presented to her the document which turned out to be a bed of
conveyance in his favor, she readily affixed her signature thereto upon
the simple representation of John that it was a document pertaining to
her claim with the U.S. Veterans Administration. She could have asked
her maid to read the contents of the same for her and yet she did not.
These, We believe, amount to a lack of prudence and precaution on
the part of Mrs. Emilia de Legare.
The trial court, giving credence to the evidence presented by herein After a careful review of the records of this case and the legal
consideration applicable to the proven facts thereof, we find the
petitioners, defendants therein, ruled in their favor and rendered
judgment disposing as follows: petition at bar to be meritorious. Reconveyance of the land in question
to the original owner is not in order.
At any rate, there are several reasons to doubt the authenticity of the
"Kasabutan sa Prenda." Firstly, it has not been sufficiently explained
why, although it should normally be with the mortgagee, the original
G.R. No. L-42805 August 31, 1987 b) that the loss or damage was sustained through any omission,
mistake, or misfeasance of the clerk of court, or the register of deeds,
his deputy or clerk, in the performance of their respective duties under
THE TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
the provisions of the land Registration Act,' or
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES EDUARDO OCSON and
NORA E. OCSON respondents. 2) Any person who has been deprived of any land or any interest
therein under the following conditions:
CRUZ, J.:
a) that there was no negligence on his part;
The petitioner asks us to reverse a decision of the respondent court
affirming that of the trial court holding the Assurance Fund subsidiarily b) that he was deprived as a consequence of the bringing of his land or
liable for damages sustained by the private respondents under the interest therein under the provisions of the Property Registration
following established facts. Decree; or by the registration by any other persons as owner of such
land; or by mistake, omission or misdescription in any certificate or
owner's duplicate, or in any entry or memorandum in the register or
Sometime in 1965, a person Identifying himself as Lawaan Lopez
other official book, or by any cancellation; and
offered to sell to the private respondents a parcel of land located in
Quezon City and consisting of 1,316.8 square meters, which he
claimed as his property. His asking price was P85.00 per square meter c) that he is barred or in any way precluded from bringing an action for
but after a month's haggling the parties agreed on the reduced price of the recovery of such land or interest therein, or claim upon the same.
P76.00 per square meter. The sale was deferred, however, because
the prospective vendor said his certificate of title had been burned in
A careful reading of the above provision will readily show that the
his house in Divisoria, and he would have to file a petition with the
private respondents do not come under either of the two situations
court of first instance of Quezon City for a duplicate certificate of title.
above mentioned.
He did so and the petition was granted after hearing without any
opposition. Following the issuance of the new duplicate certificate of
title, the said person executed a deed of sale in favor of the private The first situation is clearly inapplicable as we are not dealing here with
respondents, who paid him the stipulated purchase price of any omission, mistake or malfeasance of the clerk of court or of the
P98,700.00 in full. The corresponding transfer certificate of title was register of deeds or his personnel in the performance of their duties.
subsequently issued to them after cancellation of the duplicate
certificate in the name of Lawaan Lopez. 1
The second situation is also inapplicable. The strongest obstacle to
recovery thereunder is that the private respondents acquired no land or
Trouble began two years later when another person, this time a any interest therein as a result of the invalid sale made to them by the
woman, appeared and, claiming to be the real Lawaan Lopez, filed a spurious Lawaan Lopez.
petition in the court of first instance of Quezon City to declare as null
and void the transfer of her land in favor of the private respondents, on
the ground that it had been made by an impostor. 2 After trial, the The petition correctly points out that such sale conveyed no title or any
interest at all to them for the simple reason that the supposed vendor
questioned deed of sale was annulled, (together with the duplicate
certificate of title issued to the impostor and the transfer certificate of had no title or interest to transfer. He was not the owner of the land. He
title in the name of the private respondents) and the real owner's had no right thereto he could convey. Manifestly, the deception
imposed upon them by the impostor deprived the private respondents
duplicate certificate of title was revalidated. 3 Neither the Solicitor
General nor the private respondents appealed the decision, but of the money they delivered to him as consideration for the sale. But
Lawaan Lopez did so, claiming that the defendants should have been there is no question that the subsequent cancellation of the sale did
not deprive them of the land subject thereof, or of any interest wherein,
required to pay damages to her and the costs. The appeal was
dismissed, with the finding by Justices Jose Leuterio, Magno for they never acquired ownership over it in the first place.
Gatmaitan and Luis B. Reyes of the Court of Appeals that there was no
collusion between the private respondents and the impostor. 4 The private respondents argue that from the time the new transfer
certificate of title was issued in their name on January 28, 1965, until it
Subsequently the private respondents filed a complaint against the was cancelled on October 12, 1967, they were the true and exclusive
owners of the disputed property. Hence, the cancellation of their title
impostor Lawaan Lopez and the Treasurer of the Philippines as
custodian of the Assurance Fund for damages sustained by the on the latter date had the effect of depriving them of the said land and
plaintiffs as above narrated. Both the trial court * ruled the respondent so entitles them now to proceed against the Assurance Fund.
court ** ruled in their favor, holding the Assurance Fund subsidiarily
liable for the sum of P138,264.00 with legal interest from the date of The flaw in this posture is that the real Lawaan Lopez had her own
filing of the complaint, in case the judgment could not be enforced genuine certificate of title all the time and it remained valid despite the
against the other defendant who had been defaulted and could not be issuance of the new certificate of title in the name of the private
located. 5 The petitioner, disclaiming liability, is now before us and respondents. That new certificate, as the trial court correctly declared,
prays for relief against the decision of the respondent court which he was null and void ab initio, which means that it had no legal effect
says is not in accord with law and jurisprudence. whatsoever and at any time. The private respondents were not for a
single moment the owner of the property in question and so cannot
The applicable law is Section 101 of Act No. 496 (before its revision by claim to have been unlawfully deprived thereof when their certificate of
title was found and declared to be a total nullity.
P.D. No. 1529) providing as follows:
Sec. 101. Any person who without negligence on his part sustains loss Additionally, the Court observes that the private respondents were not
exactly diligent in verifying the credentials of the impostor whom they
or damage through any omission, mistake or misfeasance of the clerk,
or register of deeds, or of any examiner of titles, or of any deputy or had never met before he came to them with his bogus offer. The fact
clerk or of the register of deeds in the performance of their respective alone that he claimed to have lost his duplicate certificate of title in a
fire, not to mention the amount of the consideration involved, would
duties under the provisions of this Act, and any person who is
wrongfully deprived of any land or any interest therein, without have put them on their guard and warned them to make a more
negligence on his part, through the bringing of the same under the thorough investigation of the seller's Identity. They did not. Oddly, they
seemed to be satisfied that he had an Ilongo accent to establish his
provisions of this Act or by the registration of any other person as
owner of such land, or by any mistake, omission, or misdescription in claim to be the Visayan owner of the property in question. They were
any certificate or owner's duplicate, or in any entry or memorandum in apparently not concerned over the curious fact that for his residence
certificate B the supposed owner had paid only P1.00 although the
the register or other official book, or by any cancellation and who by
the provisions of this Act is barred or in any way precluded from property he was selling was worth to him no less than
bringing an action for the recovery of such land or interest therein, or P98,700.00. 7 Moreover, whereas address in that certificate was
Mandaluyong, Rizal, whereas the address indicated in the records of
claim upon the same, may bring in any court or competent jurisdiction
an action against the Treasurer of the Philippine Archipelago for the the Register of Deeds of the owner of the land in question was Fara-on
recovery of damages to be paid out of the Assurance Fund. Fabrics, Negros Occidental. 8
Commenting on this provision, Commissioner Antonio H. Noblejas, in As for the proceedings for the issuance of a duplicate certificate of title,
his book on Land Titles and Deed 6 notes that recovery from the the private respondents themselves state in their complaint that the
evidence of the petitioner therein was received by the clerk of court
Assurance Fund could be demanded by:
only, without any opposition, and his report was thereafter accepted by
the trial judge who thereupon granted the relief sought by the
1) Any person who sustains loss or damage under the following impostor. 9 It is not likely, given the summary nature of these
conditions: proceedings, that the necessary care was taken by the court to
establish the real identity of the person who claimed to be the owner of
the property in question.
a) that there was no negligence on his part; and
While we may agree that there was no collusion between the parties
respondents and the vanished vendor, we are not prepared to rule
under the circumstances of this case that they are entitled to even
claim the status of innocent purchasers of the land. On the contrary,
we find that for failure to exercise the necessary diligence in
ascertaining the credentials and bona fides of the false Lawaan Lopez,
and as a result of his deception, they never acquired any title to the
said land or any interest therein covered by Section 101 of Act No.
496.
They are, of course, not entirely without recourse, for they may still
proceed against the impostor in a civil action for recovery and
damages or prosecute him under the Revised Penal Code, assuming
he can be located and arrested. The problem is that he has completely
disappeared. That difficulty alone, however, should not make the
Assurance Fund liable to the private respondents for the serious wrong
they have sustained from the false Lawaan Lopez. The Government
like all governments, and for obvious reasons is not an insurer of
the unwary citizen's property against the chicanery of scoundrels.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-79787 June 29, 1989 nutshell, the plaintiffs miserably failed to present or show any title to
Lot No. 662, PLS-854 which should be quieted or freed from any cloud
of doubt as prayed for in their complaint and they further failed to show
APOLONIO EGAO AND BEATRIZ EGAO, petitioners,
that they are entitled to the ownership and possession to Lot No. 662,
vs.
PLS-854. 3
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (NINTH DIVISION),
SEVERO DIGNOS AND SEVERO BONTILAO, respondents.
Private respondents went to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
09539. Setting aside the RTC decision, the appellate court ** held, in
PADILLA, J.:
part, thus-
Marfori and Egao were both held by the Court of Appeals in pari
Private respondents' complaint alleged that they are the legitimate
delicto for violating the five (5) year restriction under Sec. 118,
owners and possessors of two (2) parcels of land situated at Lonocan,
Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended by Act No. 496 against
Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon, per deed of absolute sale dated 21
encumbrance or alienation of lands acquired under a free patent or
December 1979 which, among others, recited thus:
homestead; hence, they cannot, according to the appellate court, seek
affirmative relief, but respondents on the other hand were declared
WHEREAS, the abovementioned Parcels of land Lot No. 662 is innocent purchasers for value who obtained the owner's duplicate copy
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-3559 Free Patent No. of the OCT (still in the name of the Egaos) from Marfori who
298112 registered in the name of APOLONIO EGAO married to transferred to them (respondents) physical possession of the property.
Beatriz Menosa and Lot No. 661 is covered by Original Certificate of Finally, the Court of Appeals held:
Title No. P-3558 Free Patent No. 303249 registered in the name of
RAULITA CONEJOS married to Pedro Conejos, all transcribed in the
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE and
Registration Book in the Register of Deeds for the Province of
a new one is rendered:
Bukidnon;
Petitioners' answer to the complaint asserted that Apolonio Egao is the b. It was only in 1983 when Petitioners wrested possession over the
land from private respondents;
registered owner of the parcel of land known as Lot No. 662, Pls 854
with an area of 3,451 sq. meters evidenced by OCT No. P-3559 issued
by the Register of Deeds of Bukidnon pursuant to Free Patent No. c. Petitioners never denied the sales made in favor of Marfori, in their
298112 dated 12 August 1965; that he (Apolonio Egao) and his family answer;
have been in actual, physical, adverse, open and continuous
possession thereof even before the issuance to him of the free patent; 6
that the land has never been sold by reason of the prohibition against d. Private Respondents are "innocent purchasers for value.
alienation under Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Law); and
that the instant case was the fourth in a series filed against the Egaos and/or for allegedly deciding questions of substance not in accordance
and is part of respondents' scheme to grab said parcel of land from the with law and/or applicable decisions of this Court.
petitioners.
Without giving due course to the petition, the Court required
Judge Felicidario M. Batoy ruled in favor of the Egaos, herein respondents to comment. 7 After comment, the Court resolved to
petitioners (defendants in the court a quo), ordering respondent Severo require petitioners to file a reply, which they did. Respondents filed a
Bontilao (plaintiff in the court a quo) to immediately deliver to the rejoinder. Considering the allegations, issues and arguments adduced,
Egaos the owner's duplicate copy of Original Certificate of Title No. P- the Court resolved to give due course to the petition. Upon submission
3559. Said trial judge held: by the parties of their respective memorandum, the petition was
submitted for decision. 8
In the instant case, granting arguendo, that defendants executed the 2
documents in favor of Marfori (Exhs. A & B) after the filing of the Validity of the Deeds of Sale executed between Marfori (as purchaser)
application for free patent but before the issuance of the latter, without and the petitioners (as sellers) is the main issue to be resolved, in
the approval of the Director of Lands, upon issuance of Free Patent determining respondents' right over the disputed land, the respondents
No. 29811 2 on August 12, 1965, the said deeds of sale (Exhs. A & B) being the transferees of Marfori.
were ipso facto cancelled or superseded by said free patent. Moreover,
it appears from the evidence that defendants never vacated or
abandoned their possession of Lot No. 662 as they have continuously It is undisputed that Free Patent No. 298112 was issued to petitioner
lived on said lot since 1950, a fact admitted by the plaintiffs Apolonio Egao over Lot No. 662 on 12 August, 1965. Sec. 118 of
themselves. Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, prohibits the alienation or
encumbrance, within a period of five (5) years from the date of
issuance of the patent, of lands acquired under free patent or
And as long as Original Certificate of Title No. P-3559 remains in the homestead. Assuming, arguendo, the authenticity of the Deeds of Sale
name of defendant Apolonio Egao, married to Beatriz Menoza Egao, executed by the Egaos in favor of Marfori over portions of Lot No. 662
this is the ultimate and best evidence of title granted by the (the land in question), dated 7 May 1964, 14 January and 6 October
government which must be honored and respected by the courts. In a 1965, it clearly appears that all deeds were executed within the
prohibited period of five (5) years. As correctly found by the appellate Accordingly, respondents who are not innocent purchasers for value
court- have no standing to question petitioners' right to the land and to file an
action for quieting of title.
Section 124 of the Public Land Act provided [sic] that any acquisition,
conveyance, abenation, transfer or other contract made or executed WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA
inviolation of any of the provisions of Sections 118,121,120,122 and G.R. CV No. 09539 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Meanwhile,
123 of this Act shall be unlawful, null and void from its execution and petitioners as registered owners are entitled to remain in physical
shall produce the effect of annulling and cancelling the grant, title, possession of the disputed property. Respondents are ordered to
patent or permit originally issued, recognized or confirmed, actually or deliver the owner's duplicate copy of the OCT (No. P-3559) to
prescriptively, and cause the reversion of the property and its petitioners, without prejudice to an action for reversion of the land,
improvements to the state. 9 which may be instituted by the Solicitor General for the State.
Petitioners deny the authenticity and due execution of the notarized Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Solicitor General.
deeds of sale in favor of Marfori, asserting continued ownership over
the land by virtue of a Torrens Certificate of Title issued in their name.
SO ORDERED.
While the Court is not satisfied with respondents' explanation of their
failure to present the notaries public (who were residents of a
neighboring province) to affirm their participation in the preparation of
the Deeds, the Court also finds as insufficient the mere denials by
petitioners as to due execution and authenticity of said Deeds of Sale.
A notarial document is evidence of the facts in clear unequivocal
mariner therein expressed. It has in its favor the presumption of
regularity To contradict all these there must be evidence that is clear,
convincing and more than merely preponderant. 10 The question of
authenticity being one of fact, the Court will not disturb the conclusions
of the Court of Appeals on the matter.
Original Certificate of Title No. P-3559 over the land in dispute was
issued on 1 March 1966, a few months after the execution by the
Egaos of the last Deed of Sale in favor of Marfori. 11 The OCT is
registered in the name of the Egaos, herein petitioners.
The rule of pari delicto non oritur actio (where two persons are equally
at fault neither party may be entitled to relief under the law), admits of
exceptions and does not apply to an inexistent contract, such as, a
sale void ab initiounder the Public Land Act, when its enforcement or
application runs counter to the public policy of preserving the grantee's
right to the land under the homestead law. 17
Sec. 51, par. 2 of the Property Registration Decree (PD 1529), formerly
Sec. 50 of the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496) expressly provides
that the registration of the Deed is the operative act that binds or
affects the land insofar as third persons are concerned. The law
requires a higher degree of prudence from one who buys from a
person who is not the registered owner, when the land object of the
transaction is registered land. While one who buys from the registered
owner need not look behind the certificate of title, one who buys from
another who is notthe registered owner is expected to examine not
only the certificate of title but all factual circumstances necessary for
him to determine if there are any flaws in the title of the transferor, or in
his capacity to transfer the land. Failing to exercise caution of any kind
whatsoever is tantamount to bad faith.18
Deeds of sale of patented lands, perfected within the prohibited five (5)
year period are null and void (Sec. 124, Public Land Act). No title
passed from the Egaos to Marfori which could be validly transferred to
herein respondents Bontilao and Dignos. Nemo dat quod non
habet (nobody can dispose of that which does not belong to him). 19
While the government has not taken steps to assert its title, by
reversion, to a homestead sold in violation of the Public Land Act, the
vendor or his heirs is better entitled to the possession of the said, the
vendee being in no better situation than any intruder.20
G.R. No. L-32723 October 28, 1977 time filed their answer on 30 April, 1963 alleging that he was the true
owner, and that the question of ownership was already judicially settled
in Civil (Case) No. 895; and in the trial of the case both parties sought
JUAN DACASIN, JOSE MARAMBA, MARIA MARAMBA,
to sustain their respective positions by oral and documentary proofs;
SORAHAYDA MARAMBA, FLORDELIZA MARAMBA and
the gist of plaintiff's position sought to be developed in his evidence
FILIPINAS MARAMBA, petitioners,
being that he ",as the true owner notwithstanding Civil Case No. 895
vs.
because of his long continued possession tacked with that of his
THE COURT OF APPEALS, FELIPE CAPUA, SINFOROSA
predecessors-in-interest while defendants sought to show the reverse,
PADILLA, GUALBERTO CALULOT and OLIMPIA
that the holding on the issue of ownership was already impossible to
LOMIBAO, respondents.
evade having been finally settled in Civil (Case) No. 895 in favor of
their predecessor-in-interest Jose Maramba.
GUERRERO, J.:
After trial, judgment war, rendered in favor of the petitioners Juan
Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals Dacasin et al. in the following wise and
in CA-G.R. No. 42404-R entitled "Felipe Capua, et al., Plaintiffs-
Appellants, vs Juan Dacasin, et al., Defendants-Appellees" reversing
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court rules that
the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan which
defendant, Juan Dacasin is the true and lawful owner of that certain
adjudicated the ownership of the land in controversy to the plaintiffs.
parcel of land described in the above-entitled complaint, having shown
that this title thereto has been acquired in good faith from unpolluted
The original action instituted in the case at bar sought the complaint sources, and is therefore, entitled to. the full and complete possession
filed by the plaintiffs Felipe Capua, Sinforosa Padilla, Gualberto Calulot of the same. The plaintiffs are hereby ordered to respect defendants'
and Olimpia Lomibao (herein respondents) against the defendants possession and to refrain from further molesting defendant Juan
Juan Dacasin, Jose Maramba and Filipinos Maramba (herein Dacasin in the enjoyment of said property. The preliminary injunction
petitioners), docketed as Civil Case No. 1455, Court of First Instance issued by this Court is hereby dissolved and the counterbond filed by
of Pangasinan. the defendant Juan Dacasin is ordered cancelled. The plaintiffs are
also ordered to pay the defendants, jointly severally, the amount of
P500 00 spent by them in defending this suit. The claim made by the
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows: +.wph!1 defendants for damages in the amount of P5,000.00, the same not
having been satisfactorily proven, is hereby denied. Finally, the
IT RESULTING: That the antecedents are quite complicated and it will plaintiffs are also ordered to pay the costs of this proceedings.
be the task of this Court to simplify; sometime prior to January 19,
1943 the property in question, a parcel of rural land in the barrio of SO ORDERED.
Patayac Municipality of Sta. Barbara, Province of Pangasinan
described in paragraph 2 of the complaint was being possessed by
Jose Maramba, Exh. 4; in that month and year a certain Sabina Capua Dagupan City, July 8, 1968. +.wph!1
with companions grabbed possession of the property; and since then
possessed; sometime afterwards on a date not very clear in the record,
SIXTO A. DOMONDON +.wph!1
Jose Maramba filed Civil Case No. 895 of the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan against Sabina Capua and companions
for revindication but that notwithstanding, Sabina remained; while Jose Judge
Maramba had his own declaration of land tax, it will appear that Sabina
also had her own, see Exh. F; while that Civil Case No. 895 was
Not satisfied with the decision of the trial court, the plaintiffs appealed
pending, Sabina sold the property unto Gualberto Calulot on 21 April,
to the appellate court. On July 17, 1970, the Court of Appeals
1950 Exh. A and Gualberto took over there is no evidence that
promulgated its decision reversing the judgment a from, adjudicating
Gualberto was informed or came to know of the pending litigation
the ownership of the lot to the defendant spouses Felipe Capua and
between Jose Maramba and Sabina Capua:
Sinforosa Padilla; made the writ of injunction issued by the trial judge
on March 28, 1963 against the defendants permanent; and set aside
at any rate by decision dated 1 (September), l952, the Court of First the order of the trial judge dated April 29, 1964 dissolving the writ, with
Instance of Pangasinan declared Jose Maramba absolute owner and costs against the defendants. Plaintiffs now appeal to the Court in
condemned Sabina and companions to vacate and deliver to fourteen (14) t of which can be reduced to only one issue, that is,
Maramba. unfortunately decision was not executed within the whether the decision is in accordance with law and jurisprudence.
reglementary period of five (5) years from the time it had become final
pursuant to the Rules; and for his part several years later specifically
The Court of Appeals held "that the question of ownership was litigated
on 27 May, 1960, Exh. C Gualberto sold the same property unto now
by the parties' respective predecessor-in-interest in Civil Case No. 895
plaintiffs spouses Felipe Capua and Sinforosa Padilla; and these last
(and) if this were to be the only point involved there should be no
came in to possess thereafter: meantime the prevailing party in Civil
question that Jose Maramba, defendants predecessor-in-interest
Case No. 895 Jose Maramba having died, his heirs and successors-in-
having been declared the true owner of the property as against Sabina
interest sometime afterwards on 2 August, 1961, Exh. 1, sold the
Capua, plaintiffs predecessor-in-interest litigation must have to be
property to herein defendant Juan Dacasin and his wife; it was at this
decided in the same manner." To this holding of respondent , We are
stage where the trouble came to brew because Jose (Maramba)
in full agreement for the judgment in Civil Case No. 895 file and
having tried to possess and thwarted in his efforts by Felipe Capua,
docketed in the. CFI of Pangasinan on September 8, 1944, and on
went to the Court in Civil (Case) No. 895 and secured a writ of
September 1, 1952 in favor of Jose Maramba, resolved the question of
possession on 3 October, 1960, Exh. G and possession was unto him
title and ownership of the property in litigation as follows: +.wph!1
delivered by the Sheriff on 4 October, 1960, Exh. G-1; from then on
actual possession came to be a seesaw; notwithstanding the writ,
Felipe Capua tried to come in once again; (Jose Maramba) asked to The Court hereby renders judgment in favor of plaintiff and against the
punish him for contempt but the Pangasinan Court by order of 5 defendant, declaring the plaintiffs, Jose Maramba, the absolute owner,
February, 1961 held that there could be no contempt because the writ with rights of possession and enjoyment of the land in question and
of possession having been issued more than 5 years from the date the orders the defendant to vacate the same and deliver to the plaintiff the
judgment had become final became a nullity under Rule 39, Sec. 6 and possession.+.wph!1
so it was that the Pangasinan Court restored Felipe Capua to
possession;
(Record on Appeal, p. 61)
with that development, the heirs of Jose .Maramba filed Civil (Case)
We find in this case at bar the following requisites that concur (1) there
No. D-1292 in the Pangasinan Court on 22 February, 1962 against
Sabina Capua and companions in the old Civil Case No. 895 for revival must be a final judgment or order; (2) the court rendering the same
of the judgment, Exh. X; an In answer to that Sabina alleged that she must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties; (3)
there must be a judgment or order on the merits; and (4) there must be
had already disposed of the property more than ten (10) years
previous to Gualberto Calulot who in turn had sold afterwards to Felipe between the two cases Identity of parties, Identity of subject matter and
Capua, Exh. Y; and the Pangasinan Court after hearing the case for Identity of action. (Santos vs. San Gabriel, 45 SCRA, 288; Viray vs.
Mari;as 49 SCRA 44; Benin v. Tuason, 57 SCRA 531; Pacific
revival of judgment revived it by decision of 21 March, 1963 against
Sabina Capua and her old companions in Civil Case No. 895; now in Commercial and Industrial Bank vs. Pfleider, 65 SCRA
anticipation of repercussions that would have to be produced by that 13). +.wph!1
judgment, Felipe Capua began the present hostilities by filing together
with his wife and his original vendors Gualberto Calulot and wife the The doctrine of res judicata precludes parties from re-litigating issues
present Civil Case No. 1456 against Juan Dacasin and the heirs of actually litigated and determined by a prior and final judgment. It is a
Jose Maramba asking that he, Capua and his wife be declared the rule pervading every well-regulated system of jurisprudence, and is put
absolute owners of the property, virtue of his purchase in good faith upon two grounds embodied in various maxims of the common law;
and by the continuous possession from 21 April, 1950 of his immediate the one, public policy and necessity, which makes it to the interest of
predecessor-in-interest Gualberto Calulot succeeded by himself on 27 the State that there should be an end to litigation the other the
May, 1960 under Exh. C and defendant Juan Dacasin, et al. in due hardship on the individual that he should be vexed twice for the same
cause. A contrary doctrine would subject the public peace and quiet to prevail over his adversary who has not done so. The rule of caveat
the will and neglect of individuals and prefer the gratification of a emptor requires the purchaser to be aware of the supposed title of the
litigious disposition on the part of the suitors to the preservation of vendor and he who buys without checking the vendor's title takes all
public tranquillity and happiness. (Yusingco, et al., vs. Ong Lian, 42 the risks and consequent to such failure. None of the deeds of sale
SCRA 589) evidencing the ownership of Gualberto Calulot and Felipe Capua were
registered in the Registry of Property, hence they cannot prevail over
the rights of the petitioner who holds in his favor the instrument of sale
Respondent court, however, went further, stating that "the trouble is
duly registered.
that plaintiff Felipe Capua has squarely raised the question of his own
title obtained thru acquisitive prescription; paragraph 6, complaint, and
it must have to be admitted that the property being unregistered, 4. The Court has ignored or failed to consider material evidence found
ownership therein could be defeated by acquisitive prescription." The in the records that disproves clearly and positively respondent Felipe
Court held that "throughout the intervening period from 1943 to 1960, Capua's claim of acquisitive prescription, this evidence showing that
or for a space of seventeen (17) years not Jose Maramba but Sabina Felipe Capua's possession was not in truth and in fact in the concept of
Capua and after the sale by Sabina to Gualberto on 21 April, 1950 owner during the required period of time. The deed of sale executed by
under Exh. A afterwards Gualberto, were the ones in possession in the Sabina Capua to Gualberto Calulot (Exhibit A) describes the land sold
concept of owner of the property, and as Gualberto in turn was to be " at P240.00 under Tax No. 17426 for the current year," that is,
succeeded on 27 May, 1960 by herein plaintiff, Felipe Capua, pursuant 1950, the deed having been executed April 21, 1950. When the
to the document Exh. C, and that possession was exclusive, adverse spouses Gualberto Calulot and Olimpia Lomibao sold the same
and continuous, the said successive possession of, namely Sabina property to Felipe Capua under Exhibit C, the land as described in the
Capua from 1943 to 1950, Gualberto Calulot from 1950 to 1960 and deed still bears the same description as in Exhibit A, that is, 'assessed
Felipe Capua herein plaintiff from 1960 up to the institution of the at P240.00 under Tax No. 17426 for the current year." i.e. 1960 as the
present case was enough to perfect a title of ownership. deed was executed on May 27, 1960. The tax number of the lot in
1950 is the same tax number in 1960. The name of Sabina Capua as
the declared owner remained from 1950 to 1964. The tax receipts,
We do not agree to this holding of the Court of Appeals.
Exhibits F-1, F-2, F-3, F-4, showed that Sabina Capua was the
declared owner. In other words, Gualberto Calulot had not declared the
1. In the first place, when Jose Maramba sued Sabina Capua on land in his own name for tax purposes. He had not sought the
September 8, 1944 in Civil Case No. 895, the possession of Sabina cancellation of the tax declaration in the name of Sabina Capua to him
Capua was thereby interrupted by the issuance of the judicial as the vendee, hence the inevitable conclusion is that said Gualberto
summons (Article 1123, New Civil Code). During the pendency of the Calulot did not deem himself the owner thereof and, therefore, his
litigation, from September 8, 1944 to September 1, 1952 when possession was not in the concept of owner. This being so, Calulot's
judgment was rendered, or a period of eight (8) years, the possession occupancy failed in one essential requisite of acquisitive prescription,
of Sabina Capua over the land did not run. It remained interrupted. The which is possession in the concept of owner. The same is true with
land was in custodia legis. The fact that Sabina Capua sold the land on Felipe Capua. Although Gualberto Calulot paid taxes on the land for
April 21, 1950 during the pendency of the case to Gualberto Calulot the year in 1958, there is no evidence that he paid taxes in his name or
cannot revive or restore the possession of the vendor, which we repeat that he paid taxes any other year before or after 1958.
was rendered interrupted by the judicial summons. The successor-in-
interest of Sabina Capua who is the vendee Gualberto Calulot cannot
The claim of the respondents based on acquisitive prescription is,
tack his possession to that of his vendor Sabina Capua not only
therefore, without merit. What remains, therefore, is the sole question
because the judicial summons interrupted the latter's possession but
of ownership which as respondent court itself held - if respondents'
also because she finally lost in the litigation.
claim of acquisitive prescription is defeated - must unquestionably be
rendered in favor of petitioner Jose Maramba and his co-petitioners by
By reason of this interruption, it is not correct to say that the right of res judicata. (Supra at p. 4)
intervening periods of 1943 to 1950 (the possession of Sabina Capua),
then from 1950 to 1960 (possession of Gualberto Calulot and from
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the respondent Court of Appeals is
1960 to 1963 (possession of Felipe Capua up to the institution of the
hereby reversed and the decision of the Court of First Instance of
present suit) the possession was a continuing and uninterrupted
Pangasinan in Civil Case No. 1455 affirmed, with costs against the
occupancy enough to perfect a title of ownership, because there was a
respondents.
gap from 1944 to 1952 (interruption due to judicial summons up to the
termination of the litigation).
Petition granted.
2. The New Civil Code of the Philippines took effect on August 30,
1950. At this point in time, the possession of Sabina Capua was not SO ORDERED.
running for it had been interrupted by the judicial summons in Civil
Case No. 895. Her possession of the land remained interrupted,
passive or suspended up to the date when the judgment was rendered
against her on September 1, 1952.
When possession of the property was taken from Felipe Capua and
given to Jose Maramba by the Provincial Sheriff on October 4, 1960 by
virtue of a writ of possession issued by the court in Civil Case No. 895,
Felipe Capua became aware or came to know that there existed a flaw
in his title or mode of acquisition. Felipe Capua may have acquired the
land in good faith on May 27, 1960 when he bought the property from
Gualberto Calulot but his eviction therefrom thru the writ of possession,
although later annulled in January, 1961, made him aware that he
possessed the land improperly or wrongfully. Consequently, Felipe
Capua cannot claim good faith as to ripe his possession to acquisitive
prescription.
3. The facts are also undisputed that the deed of sale executed
between Jose Maramba as vendee and Emiliana Abad as vendor in
1958 was duly registered in the Registry of Deeds as well as the deed
of sale executed in 1929 between Emiliana Abad and the original
owner Florentino Quinajon. Under the law, Article 709 of the New Civil
Code, titles of ownership or of other rights over immovable property
duly inscribed or annotated in the Registry of Property constitute notice
to third persons and affords protection in favor of him who in good faith
relies upon what appears in the registry. As between two parties
relying on their respective instruments of sale of the same property,
law and justice command that he who has registered his deed must
G.R. No. 138660 February 5, 2004 a) Whether it is necessary for the trial court to first order the LRA "to
cancel Decree No. N-197092 in the name of Maguesun Management
and Development Corporation to enable (the LRA) to issue another
HEIRS OF TRINIDAD DE LEON VDA. DE ROXAS, petitioners
decree in favor of the Heirs of Manuel A. Roxas and Trinidad de Leon
vs.
Vda. de Roxas"? Or is that order necessarily included in the dispositive
COURT OF APPEALS and MAGUESUN MANAGEMENT AND
portion of the Supreme Court decision directing the LRA "to issue with
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
reasonable dispatch the corresponding decree of registration and
certificate of title" in favor of the Roxas heirs? Please note that this
DECISION necessary implication is a consequence of the Supreme Court finding
that the decree in favor of Maguesun was wrongfully issued because it
was "not entitled to the registration decree" as it had no registrable
CARPIO, J.:
title, since "Zenaida Melliza (from whom Maguesun supposedly bought
the lots) conveyed no title over the subject parcels of land to
The Case Maguesun Corporation as she was not the owner thereof."
This is a petition to cite for indirect contempt the officers of b) Whether an order from the trial court is necessary for "the Register
Meycauayan Central Realty Corporation ("Meycauayan") for defying of Deeds concerned to cancel OCT No. 0-515 and all its derivative
the final and executory Decision and Resolution of this Court in G.R. titles"? Or is that order necessarily included in the dispositive portion of
No. 118436 entitled "Heirs of Manuel A. Roxas and Trinidad de Leon the Supreme Court decision directing the LRA to issue the
Vda. De Roxas v. Court of Appeals and Maguesun Management & corresponding decree of registration and certificate of title in favor of
Development Corporation" ("G.R. No. 118436").1 the Roxas heirs, considering that the original certificate of title issued
to Maguesun was basedon an illegal decree of registration as found by
this Honorable Court. Further, the unconditional order of the Supreme
The Antecedents Court to LRA to issue the corresponding certificate of title to the Roxas
heirs necessarily implies that the OCT issued to Maguesun and its
This petition stems from a case filed by Trinidad de Leon Vda. De derivative titles shall be canceled, for it cannot [be] assumed that the
Roxas to set aside the decree of registration over two unregistered Supreme Court intended that the same parcel of land shall be covered
parcels of land in Tagaytay City granted to Maguesun Management by more than one certificate of title.
and Development Corporation ("Maguesun") before the Regional Trial
Court on the ground of actual fraud. The trial court dismissed the c) Whether an order from the trial court is necessary before the LRA
petition to set aside the decree of registration. On appeal, the Court of can comply with the Supreme Court decision directing the LRA "to
Appeals denied the petition for review and affirmed the findings of the issue with reasonable dispatch the corresponding decree of
trial court. On 21 March 1997, this Court reversed the appellate court's registration and certificate of title" in favor of the Roxas heirs?
decision in G.R. No. 118436. The dispositive portion reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby resolves to GRANT petitioners' WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, let a Writ of Possession be
issued against Maguesun Management and Development Corporation
Motion for Clarification together with the Supplement thereto. For this
reason, the dispositive portion of our decision dated March 21, 1997 is in these cases. However, insofar as Meycauayan Central Realty is
clarified, thus: concerned, let a resolution of the motion filed by the movants herein be
deferred until the Supreme Court had resolved with finality the petition
for contempt of herein movant in G.R. No. 138660.
First, the Register of Deeds shall CANCEL OCT No. 0-515 and all its
derivative titles, namely, TCT Nos. T-25625, T-25626, T-25627, T-
On 7 March 2000, the trial court dismissed for lack of merit
25628, T-25688, T-25689, and T-25690, the latter three being already
in the name of Meycauayan Realty and Development Corporation (also Meycauayan's complaint for reconveyance, damages and quieting of
designated as "Meycauayan Central Realty, Inc." and "Meycauayan title. The trial court held that (1) the nullity of OCT No. 0-515, which is
the source of Meycauayan's titles, is now res judicata; (2) the
Realty Corporation").
complaint's prayer for the trial court to annul the decision of the
Supreme Court in G.R. No. 118436 is beyond the trial court's
Thereafter, the Land Registration Authority shall: jurisdiction; and (3) Meycauayan is guilty of forum shopping. 6 The trial
court likewise denied Meycauayan's Motion for Reconsideration in an
Order dated 20 June 2000.7 On 24 August 2000, Meycauayan filed a
(a) CANCEL Decree No. N-197092 originally issued in the name of
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the Court
Maguesun Management and Development Corporation without need of
of Appeals assailing the trial court's dismissal of the complaint.
an order from the land registration court; and
Meanwhile, the Roxas heirs filed on 2 June 1999 this petition to cite for
(b) ISSUE with reasonable dispatch a new decree of registration and a
indirect contempt the officers of Meycauayan.
new original certificate of title (OCT) in favor of petitioners pursuant to
Section 39 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. (Emphasis added)
The Issues
On 11 December 1998, the land registration court issued an order
denying the LRA Report dated 25 March 1998 and the Motion for The parties raised the following issues:
Leave to Intervene filed by Meycauayan since the Supreme Court
Resolution of 29 July 1998 had rendered them moot.
1. Whether this Court's Decision and Resolution in G.R. No. 118436
bind Meycauayan;
The Register of Deeds of Tagaytay City then canceled TCT Nos. T-
25626, T-25627, T-25628, T-25688, T-25689, T-25690 and T-
27390.3 TCT Nos. T-25688, T-25689, T-25690 and T-27390 were 2. Whether Meycauayan's act of filing with the trial court a complaint
derivative titles already in the name of Meycauayan. for reconveyance, damages and quieting of title involving parcels of
land, which were the subject of this Court's Decision and Resolution in
G.R. No. 118436, constitutes indirect contempt under Section 3, Rule
71 of the Rules of Civil Procedure; and
3. Whether Meycauayan is guilty of forum shopping. This Court has thus repeatedly declared that the power to punish for
contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the preservation of
order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments,
The Court's Ruling
orders, and mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due
administration of justice (Slade Perkins vs. Director of Prisons, 58 Phil.
The petition is meritorious. We find Meycauayan's Executive Vice- 271; In re Kelly, 35 Phil. 944; Commissioner of Immigration vs.
President Juan M. Lamson, Jr. guilty of indirect contempt. We also find Cloribel, 20 SCRA 1241; Montalban vs. Canonoy, 38 SCRA 1).
that Meycauayan committed forum shopping, and thus Meycauayan
and its Executive Vice President Juan M. Lamson, Jr. are guilty of
Meycauayan's continuing resistance to this Court's judgment is an
direct contempt.
affront to the Court and to the sovereign dignity with which it is
clothed.9 Meycauayan's persistent attempts to raise issues long since
The Roxas heirs allege that the following acts of Meycauayan laid to rest by a final and executory judgment of no less than the
constitute indirect contempt under Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of highest tribunal of the land constitute contumacious defiance of the
Civil Procedure: (1)Meycauayan's defiance of the final and executory authority of this Court and impede the speedy administration of
Decision and Resolution of this Court in G.R. No. 118436; (2) its act of justice.10
filing pleadings before the land registration court to prevent execution
of the Decision and Resolution; (3) its act of filing a Complaint raising
Well-settled is the rule that when a court of competent jurisdiction has
the same issues in its Petition for Intervention which this Court had
tried and decided a right or fact, so long as the decision remains
already denied and urging the trial court to ignore and countermand
unreversed, it is conclusive on the parties and those in privity with
the orders of this Court.
them.11 More so where the Supreme Court has already decided the
issue since the Court is the final arbiter of all justiciable controversies
On the other hand, Meycauayan alleges that the Decision in G.R. No. properly brought before it.12 As held in Buaya v. Stronghold Insurance
118436 does not bind Meycauayan because it was not a party in the Co., Inc.:13
case. According to Meycauayan, the Decision in G.R. No. 118436 may
be enforced against Maguesun but not against Meycauayan which is a
x x x An existing final judgment or decree - rendered upon the merits,
stranger to the case. Meycauayan insists that as a purchaser in good
without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction acting
faith and for value its rights cannot be prejudiced by the alleged
upon a matter within its authority - is conclusive of the rights of the
fraudulent acquisition by Maguesun of the subject properties.
parties and their privies. This ruling holds in all other actions or suits, in
Meycauayan, therefore, is not liable for contempt of court for filing an
the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction,
action for reconveyance, quieting of title and damages.
touching on the points or matters in issue in the first suit.
For the penalty for indirect contempt, Section 7 of Rule 71 of the Rules
of Court provides:
Direct Contempt
In this case, the Court had already rejected Meycauayan's claim on the
subject lots when the Court denied Meycauayan's Petition for
Intervention in G.R. No. 118436. The Court ruled that there had been
no intervening rights of an innocent purchaser for value involving the
lots in dispute. The Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 118436 is
already final and executory. The filing by Meycauayan of an action to
re-litigate the title to the same property, which this Court had already
adjudicated with finality, is an abuse of the court's processes and
constitutes direct contempt.
Section 5 of Rule 7 of the Rules of Court provides that "if the acts of
the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum
shopping, the same shall be a ground for summary dismissal with
prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for
administrative sanctions." The fact that Meycauayan did mention in its
certification of non-forum shopping its attempt to intervene in G.R. No.
118436, which this Court denied,27does not negate the existence of
forum shopping. This disclosure does not exculpate Meycauayan for
deliberately seeking a friendlier forum for its case and re-litigating an
issue which this Court had already decided with finality.28
The general rule is that a corporation and its officers and agents may
be held liable for contempt. A corporation and those who are officially
responsible for the conduct of its affairs may be punished for contempt
in disobeying judgments, decrees, or orders of a court made in a case
within its jurisdiction.29
The petitioner contends that he cannot be considered to have acted in Article 1544 of the New Civil Code provides that:
bad faith because there is no direct proof showing that Irespe and
Aportadera, his alleged agents, had knowledge of the first sale to
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different
Laureta. This contention is also without merit.
vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person who may
have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be
The Court of Appeals, in affirming the decision of the trial court, said: 14 movable property.
The trial court, in holding that appellant Caram. Jr. was not a purchaser Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the
in good faith, at the time he bought the same property from appellant person acquiring it who in good faith first recordered it in the Registry
Mata, on May 5, 1947, entirely discredited the testimony of Aportadera. of Property.
Thus it stated in its decision:
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shag pertain to the
The testimony of Atty. Aportadera quoted elsewhere in this decision is person who in good faith was first in the possession; and, in the
hollow. There is every reason to believe that Irespe and he had known absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided
of the sale of the property in question to Laureta on the day Mata and there is good faith. (1473)
Irespe, accompanied by Leaning Mansaca, went to the office of Atty.
Aportadera for the sale of the same property to Caram, Jr.,
Since Caram was a registrant in bad faith, the situation is as if there
represented by Irespe as attorney-in-fact. Ining Mansaca was with the
was no registration at all. 19
two Irespe and Mata to engage the services 6f Atty. Aportadera
in the annulment of the sale of his land to Laureta. When Leaning
Mansaca narrated to Atty. Aportadera the circumstances under which The question to be determined now is, who was first in possession in
his property had been sold to Laureta, he must have included in the good faith? A possessor in good faith is one who is not aware that
narration the sale of the land of Mata, for the two properties had been there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates
sold on the same occassion and under the same circumstances. Even it. 20 Laureta was first in possession of the property. He is also a
as early as immediately after liberation, Irespe, who was the witness in possessor in good faith. It is true that Mata had alleged that the deed
most of the cases filed by Atty. Aportadera in his capacity as Provincial of sale in favor of Laureta was procured by force. 21 Such defect,
Fiscal of Davao against Laureta, must have known of the purchases of however, was cured when, after the lapse of four years from the time
lands made by Laureta when he was regimental commander, one of the intimidation ceased, Marcos Mata lost both his rights to file an
which was the sale made by Mata. It was not a mere coincidence that action for annulment or to set up nullity of the contract as a defense in
Irespe was made guardian ad litem of Leaning Mansaca, at the an action to enforce the same.
suggestion of Atty. Aportadera and attorney-in-fact of Caram, Jr.
Anent the fourth error assigned, the petitioner contends that the
The Court cannot help being convinced that Irespe, attorney-in-fact of second deed of sale, Exhibit "F", is a voidable contract. Being a
Caram, Jr. had knowledge of the prior existing transaction, Exhibit A, voidable contract, the action for annulment of the same on the ground
between Mata and Laureta over the land, subject matter of this of fraud must be brought within four (4) years from the discovery of the
litigation, when the deed, Exhibit F, was executed by Mata in favor of fraud. In the case at bar, Laureta is deemed to have discovered that
Caram, Jr. And this knowledge has the effect of registration as to the land in question has been sold to Caram to his prejudice on
Caram, Jr. RA pp. 123-124) December 9, 1947, when the Deed of Sale, Exhibit "F" was recorded
and entered in the Original Certificate of Title by the Register of Deeds
and a new Certificate of Title No. 140 was issued in the name of
We agree with His Honor's conclusion on this particular point, on two
Caram. Therefore, when the present case was filed on June 29, 1959,
grounds the first, the same concerns matters affecting the credibility
plaintiff's cause of action had long prescribed.
of a witness of which the findings of the trial court command great
weight, and second, the same is borne out by the testimony of Atty.
Aportadera himself. (t.s.n., pp. 187-190, 213-215, Restauro). The petitioner's conclusion that the second deed of sale, "Exhibit F", is
a voidable contract is not correct. I n order that fraud can be a ground
for the annulment of a contract, it must be employed prior to or
Even if Irespe and Aportadera did not have actual knowledge of the
simultaneous to the, consent or creation of the contract. The fraud
first sale, still their actions have not satisfied the requirement of good
or dolo causante must be that which determines or is the essential
faith. Bad faith is not based solely on the fact that a vendee had
cause of the contract. Dolo causante as a ground for the annulment of
knowledge of the defect or lack of title of his vendor. In the case of
contract is specifically described in Article 1338 of the New Civil Code
Leung Yee vs. F. L. Strong Machinery Co. and Williamson, this Court
of the Philippines as "insidious words or machinations of one of the
held: 15
contracting parties" which induced the other to enter into a contract,
and "without them, he would not have agreed to".
One who purchases real estate with knowledge of a defect or lack of
title in his vendor can not claim that he has acquired title thereto in
The second deed of sale in favor of Caram is not a voidable contract.
good faith, as against the true owner of the land or of an interest
No evidence whatsoever was shown that through insidious words or
therein, and the same rule must be applied to one who has knowledge
machinations, the representatives of Caram, Irespe and Aportadera
of facts which should have put him upon such inquiry and investigation
had induced Mata to enter into the contract.
as might be necessary to acquaint him with the defects in the title of
his vendor.
Since the second deed of sale is not a voidable contract, Article 1391,
Civil Code of the Philippines which provides that the action for
In the instant case, Irespe and Aportadera had knowledge of
annulment shall be brought within four (4) years from the time of the
circumstances which ought to have put them an inquiry. Both of them
discovery of fraud does not apply. Moreover, Laureta has been in
knew that Mata's certificate of title together with other papers
continuous possession of the land since he bought it in June 1945.
pertaining to the land was taken by soldiers under the command of
Col. Claro L. Laureta. 16 Added to this is the fact that at the time of the
second sale Laureta was already in possession of the land. Irespe and A more important reason why Laureta's action could not have
Aportadera should have investigated the nature of Laureta's prescribed is that the second contract of sale, having been registered
possession. If they failed to exercise the ordinary care expected of a in bad faith, is null and void. Article 1410 of the Civil Code of the
buyer of real estate they must suffer the consequences. The rule Philippines provides that any action or defense for the declaration of
of caveat emptor requires the purchaser to be aware of the supposed the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe.
title of the vendor and one who buys without checking the vendor's title
takes all the risks and losses consequent to such failure. 17
In a Memorandum of Authorities 22 submitted to this Court on March
13, 1978, the petitioner insists that the action of Laureta against Caram
has prescribed because the second contract of sale is not void under
Article 1409 23 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which enumerates
the kinds of contracts which are considered void. Moreover, Article
1544 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines does not declare void a
second sale of immovable registered in bad faith.
The fact that the second contract is not considered void under Article
1409 and that Article 1544 does not declare void a deed of sale
registered in bad faith does not mean that said contract is not void.
Article 1544 specifically provides who shall be the owner in case of a
double sale of an immovable property. To give full effect to this
provision, the status of the two contracts must be declared valid so that
one vendee may contract must be declared void to cut off all rights
which may arise from said contract. Otherwise, Article 1544 win be
meaningless.
The first sale in favor of Laureta prevails over the sale in favor of
Caram.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 91383-84 May 31, 1991 On the other hand, San Jose filed in an apparent attempt to forestall
the extra-judicial foreclosure and public auction sale scheduled on
September 18, 1979, Civil Case No. 34489 on September 17, 1979
SOCORRO COSTA CRISOSTOMO, petitioner,
against respondent Torres. On January 9, 1980 both actions were
vs.
consolidated on motion of the parties and were jointly tried thereafter
COURT OF APPEALS and NORMA SAN JOSE, DIANA J.
(Ibid.).
TORRES, respondents.
In a decision dated March 31, 1986, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig,
PARAS, J.:
Branch CLIV (154) decided in favor of the petitioner, the dispositive
portion of which decision reads:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the: (1) decision * of the
Court of Appeals dated July 31, 1989 in CA-G.R. CV Nos. 11816 and
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered against the defendants in
11817, entitled "Socorro Costa Crisostomo vs. Norma San Jose and
favor of the plaintiff as follows:
Diana Torres", which modified the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 154, Pasig, Metro Manila, and (2) resolution dated December
11, 1989, which denied the motion for reconsideration. In Civil Case No. 34356
As gathered from the records, the facts of the case are as follows: 1) The Deed of Absolute Sale executed by plaintiff over the property
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 39286 of the Register of
Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila, is hereby ordered rescinded;
Socorro Costa Crisostomo (Crisostomo for short) was the registered
owner of a residential house and lot known as Lot No. 6, Block 60,
located in Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and covered by Transfer 2) Transfer Certificate of Title No. 11835 of the Register of Deeds of
Certificate of Title No. 39286 of the Register of Deeds of Pasig. Pasig, Metro Manila, in the name of defendant Norma San Jose is
Crisostomo has occupied the property ever since she had the house hereby ordered cancelled;
built and has introduced other improvements thereon like fruit bearing
trees and ornamental plants (Rollo, Petition, p. 9).
3) Defendant Norma San Jose is hereby ordered to reconvey the title
covering subject property within twenty (20) days from the finality of
Sometime in 1978, Norma San Jose (San Jose for short) offered to this judgment;
buy the above-mentioned parcel of land including the house thereon
for the sum of P300,000.00 which amount was agreed upon to be paid
4) Defendants are also hereby ordered, jointly and severally, to pay
from the proceeds of a loan that was to be obtained by said
plaintiff (a) the amount of P100,000.00 representing moral damages,
respondent San Jose from a bank using petitioner Crisostomo's title as
(b) P20,000.00 as attorney's fees, and (c) the costs;
collateral. As payment, San Jose issued three (3) post dated Far East
Bank and Trust Company checks in the total amount of P300,000.00
(Ibid., p. 4). 5) As a consequence of the rescission of the sale, plaintiff is ordered to
return the amount of P20,000.00 which she received as earnest
money. However, this amount shall be off-set against the amount of
Crisostomo accepted the offer, lent her title to San Jose and on May
damages assessed against defendants;
17, 1978 executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of San Jose
(Rollo, Petitioner's Memorandum, p. 106).
6) The Deed of Real Estate Mortgage executed by defendant Norma
San Jose in favor of defendant Diana Torres is hereby order (sic)
On May 22, 1978, Crisostomo, upon San Jose's request, executed
nullified. The Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila is authorized to
another deed of sale over the same property with the understanding
cancel the annotation of said mortgage on the title to be issued in favor
that said document was for the purpose of reducing San Jose's
of plaintiff.
registration fees and tax liabilities (Ibid.).
After Crisostomo got tired of San Jose's unfulfilled promises to make SO ORDERED. (Rollo, Annex "A", pp. 37-38).
good the postdated checks, the former decided to encash the
postdated checks after their maturity dates with Far East Bank and
Trust Company. Unfortunately, the same were all dishonored and Torres appealed the above-stated decision to the Court of Appeals
returned to Crisostomo with the notation of the Bank as "Account which modified the judgment of the trial court in a decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
Closed." (Ibid.).
Upon inquiry by Crisostomo, San Jose replied that when her WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED in
that the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage in favor of appellant Diana
application for a loan with a second bank, the Philippine Commercial
and Industrial Bank, was not approved, she shifted to Security Bank Torres be noted on the Certificate of Title which is to be re-issued to
and Trust Company. Soon enough, Crisostomo discovered that San the appellee, and, appellant Diana Torres is hereby excluded from
indemnifying the appellee the amounts representing moral damages,
Jose's loan application was disapproved because the collateral was
insufficient for the amount of the loan she was borrowing (Ibid.). attorney's fees, and costs, but is AFFIRMED in all other respects.
Upon Crisostomo's insistence for the return of the title, San Jose
informed Crisostomo that the title was in the possession of Diana J. The Court in its resolution dated June 27, 1990 gave due course to the
Torres, the mortgagee (Rollo, Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 108). petition and required both parties to submit their respective
memoranda (Rollo, Resolution, p. 78).
San Jose never returned the said title as she had promised nor did she
ever make any payment to the petitioner (Ibid.). The only issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether or not
private respondent Diana Torres is a mortgagee in good faith.
A careful study of the records shows that the Court of Appeals erred in
A To facilitate to (sic) processing, according to them." (T.S.N., pp. 16-
finding that private respondent Diana Torres is a mortgagee in good
17, Feb. 5, 1981)
faith on the basis of the evidence.
While feigning ignorance of the owner of subject property, she A Of course, because she is my client.
admitted later on cross-examination that Socorro Crisostomo was the
owner from whom San Jose allegedly bought the property (Hearing of Q And so in that visit of yours, you saw the plaintiff here personally?
April 20, 1983, TSN, pp. 6-11).
A Yes, I saw her then.
Even more persuasive is the fact that when Atty. Martinez personally
inspected the property with San Jose for her client Torres, she allowed
herself to be introduced to Socorro Crisostomo who was then actually Q And you had a conversation with her?
occupying the house, as a Bank Inspector of the Development Bank
of Meycauayan, Bulacan from whom the loan was being obtained, A I had.
obviously to convince Crisostomo that the procedure is in accordance
with her agreement with San Jose.
xxx xxx xxx
A She came at home that evening with Norma San Jose. A She was introduced to me as the Tia Coring.
Q Where were you when Atty. Martinez and Norma San Jose came to Q And from your conversation, did you come to know that the plaintiff
your house? here, Socorro Crisostomo, is the same Tia Coring whom she
mentioned to you she bought the property from? (Emphasis supplied)
A I was at home.
A Yes, the same Tia Coring who sold the property to her. (Emphasis
supplied)
Q Did you have any companion there?
xxx xxx xxx
A I was with my maid.
Q And under these circumstances, you never inquired from the plaintiff
Q Before that date, did you have occasion to meet Atty. Martinez? whom you personally saw why she was there in the property or until
when she would remain in that place? (Emphasis supplied)
A Yes. (sic) That was my first time to meet her.
A No, because it would be unethical to ask that question, she being the
Q Was there any introduction made to you? Tia Coring of (sic) the owner. (Emphasis supplied) (T.S.N., pp. 81-85,
April 28, 1983)
Q Who introduced her to you? Finally, when Torres herself visited the property she carefully evaded
seeing Crisostomo personally, the actual occupant thereof, who could
have easily enlightened her as to the true owner (Rollo, p. 116). Such
A Norma San Jose. unnatural behavior points more convincingly to the fact that she was
aware that San Jose was not its real owner.
Q You mean she was introduced to you to inspect that property in
question? In Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals (153 SCRA 435
[1987]), the Supreme Court had the occasion to rule that a person
dealing with registered land has a right to rely upon the fact of the
A Yes.
Torrens Certificate of Title and to dispense with the need of inquiring
further, except when the party concerned has actual knowledge of
Q Why was that supposed inspection to be made on behalf of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man
the Meycauayan Bank? to make further inquiries (Gonzales vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,
157 SCRA 587 [1988]).
Even assuming that Torres does not in fact know the circumstances of
the sale, she is bound by the knowledge of Atty. Martinez or by the
latter's negligence in her haphazard investigation because the
negligence of her agents is her own negligence (PCIB vs. Villalva, 48
SCRA 37 [1972]).
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 51457 June 27, 1994 The foregoing judgment was reversed by the Court of Appeals which
held that since Lucia Embrado actually agreed with Juan, Pastor and
Matias Carpitanos, the original owners, to the purchase of Lot 564 on
LUCIA EMBRADO and ORESTE TORREGIANI, petitioners,
15 April 1941 12 when she was not yet married, then the lot was her
vs.
paraphernal property since a sale is considered perfected the moment
COURT OF APPEALS, PACIFICO CIMAFRANCA, MARCOS
the parties agree on the object and cause of the contract. In addition,
SALIMBAGAT, EDA JIMENEZ and SANTIAGO
the respondent court declared Salimbagat and Cimafranca buyers in
JIMENEZ, respondents.
good faith since the contrary was not proved. Consequently, the
complaint in the trial court was ordered dismissed by respondent Court
BELLOSILLO, J.: of Appeals.
LUCIA EMBRADO and ORESTE TORREGIANI, spouses, filed this Three (3) issues are herein involved: (a) whether Lot 564 was
petition for review on certiorari from the decision of respondent Court paraphernal property of Lucia Embrado or conjugal with her husband
of Appeals 1 upholding the validity of the Deed of Sale over Lot No. 564 Oreste Torregiani; (b) whether the sale in favor of Eda Jimenez was
executed by petitioner Lucia Embrado in favor of private respondent valid; and, (c) whether vendees Marcos Salimbagat and Pacifico
Eda Jimenez. Cimafranca were buyers in good faith so that the sale to them was
valid, hence, would bar reconveyance.
Lot No. 564 is a 366-square meter lot situated in Dipolog City originally
owned by Juan, Pastor and Matias Carpitanos. On 2 July 1946, We sustain petitioners. While we agree with respondent court that Lot
a Venta Definitiva, a notarized document written entirely in Spanish, 564 was originally the paraphernal property of Lucia, we cannot adopt
was executed by the Carpitanos whereby they sold Lot No. 564 to its conclusion that because Lucia and the original owners agreed in
"Srta. LUCIA C. EMBRADO . . . soltera, con residencia y direccion 1941 for its purchase and sale, ownership was already acquired by
postal Municipio de Dipolog, Provincia de Zamboanga." 2 The Lucia at that moment. Under Art. 1496 of the Civil Code, "ownership of
document provided that even though the deed was prepared and the thing sold is acquired by the vendee from the moment it is
signed on 2 July 1946, the effects of the document would retroact to delivered to him in any of the ways specified in articles 1497 to 1501,
the 15th day of April 1941, the date the lot and its improvements were or in any other manner signifying an agreement that the possession is
actually sold to Lucia C. Embrado. transferred from the vendor to the vendee," and under Art. 1498,
"(w)hen the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution
thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the
The sale was registered and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-99 3 was object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or
issued on 13 February 1948 in the name of Lucia Embrado alone, who cannot clearly be inferred."
was by then already married to petitioner Oreste Torregiani since
1943. However, by virtue of a court order in Misc. Sp. Proc. No. 2330
of the then Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte, the word In the case at bar, the Venta Definitiva over Lot 564 in favor of Lucia
"single" appearing in TCT No. T-99 was canceled and replaced on 19 Embrado was executed by the Carpitanoses on 2 July 1946 when her
October 1970 by the phrase "married to Oreste Torregiani." The marriage to petitioner Oreste Torregiani was already subsisting.
Torregianis then made their conjugal abode on the lot and in 1958 Although ownership was acquired during the marriage and hence
constructed a residential/commercial building thereon. 4 presumed conjugal, the presumption of conjugality 13 was successfully
overcome by the terms of the Venta Definitiva which contains a
positive assertion of exclusive ownership, which was duly supported by
As appearing from a document entitled Absolute Deed of Sale dated 1
the testimony of Matias Carpitanos, one of the original sellers of the
May 1971 5, Lucia Embrado Torregiani sold Lot No. 564, described as lot. 14
her "own paraphernal property," to her adopted daughter, herein
private respondent Eda Jimenez, for the sum of P1,000.00. Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-99 was canceled to give way to TCT No. T- However, a decisive fact appears which prevents us from ultimately
17103 6 in the name of Eda Jimenez, married to Santiago Jimenez. affirming the validity of her sale of Lot 564 to private respondent Eda
Jimenez. The trial court found as a fact the construction in 1958 of a
residential/commercial building 15 on said lot a part of which was
On 6 March 1972, Eda Jimenez sold sixty-five (65) square meters of leased to third persons and another part serving as the Torregianis
Lot 564 to Marcos Salimbagat for P6,500.00, and on 1 August 1972, conjugal dwelling.
conveyed 301 square meters of the same lot to Pacifico
Cimafranca 8 for P30,000. Both sales were duly annotated on TCT No.
T-17103. Although no evidence was presented on the source of funds used in
the construction to determine whether the same was conjugal or
paraphernal, other than the testimony of Torregiani, 16 petitioners
On 25 September 1972, the Torregianis instituted in the Court of First nevertheless enjoy in their favor the presumption that the funds used
Instance, now Regional Trial Court, of Zamboanga del Norte an action were conjugal. 17
for declaration of nullity of contract, annulment of sales, reconveyance
and damages 9 against the spouses Santiago and Eda Jimenez,
Marcos Salimbagat and Pacifico Cimafranca alleging that the sale of The second paragraph of Art. 158 of the Civil Code provides that
Lot 564 by Lucia Embrado to Eda Jimenez was void not only for lack of "[b]uildings constructed, at the expense of the partnership, during the
consideration but also because Oreste Torregiani did not consent to marriage on land belonging to one of the spouses, also pertain to the
the sale, which consent was necessary because Lot 564 was conjugal partnership, but the value of the land shall be reimbursed to the
property. In addition, the petitioners claim that Lucia was misled into spouse who owns the same." Under this article, the land becomes
signing the deed of sale marked as Exh. "D" on the belief that Lot 564 conjugal upon the construction of the building without awaiting
was merely intended as security for a loan that the Jimenez spouses reimbursement before or at the liquidation of the partnership upon the
were then negotiating with the First Insular Bank of Cebu. Since the concurrence of two conditions, to wit: (a) the construction of the
Jimenez spouses did not acquire valid title to the land, the subsequent building at the expense of the partnership; and, (b) the ownership of
sales in favor of Salimbagat and Cimafranca were without legal effect. the land by one of the spouses. 18 The conditions have been fully met
in the case at bench. Thus, even if Lot 564 was originally the
paraphernal property of Lucia as evident from the "Venta Definitiva",
The Torregianis were sustained by the CFI of Zamboanga del the same became conjugal upon the construction of the
Norte 10 which held that the sale of Lot 564 to Eda Jimenez and its residential/commercial building in 1958.
subsequent transfers to Marcos Salimbagat and Pacifico Cimafranca,
who were declared buyers in bad faith, were void and of no effect.
More specifically, the judgment (a) declared Exhs. "D," "G" and "H" as Lucia claims that she was misled by her daughter and son-in-law into
well as TCT No. 17103 null and void and of no force and effect; (b) signing a deed of absolute sale in their favor thinking that she would be
ordered defendants jointly and severally to pay plaintiffs the sum of helping them obtain a loan from a bank if they could mortgage the
P2,000.00 as actual damages and P1,500.00 for attorneys fees; (c) property as security for their loan; that although she signed the deed of
ordered the Register of Deeds of Dipolog City to cancel TCT No. sale, she did not consent to the sale nor did she intend to convey or
17103 in the name of Eda Jimenez and issue another one in favor of transfer her title to Eda Jimenez; and, that she never received the
plaintiff Lucia Embrado, married to Oreste Torregiani, and to cancel all alleged amount of P1,000.00 as consideration for the sale of the
the annotations thereon emanating from the void transfers in favor of property.
Marcos Salimbagat and Pacifico Cimafranca; (d) ordered defendants
Eda and Santiago Jimenez to return to defendant Pacifico Cimafranca
While it is true that a notarized document is admissible in evidence
the sum of P30,000.00 paid by him for the 301 square meters and the
without proof of its due execution and is conclusive as to the
house in question, and to defendant Marcos Salimbagat the P6,500.00
truthfulness of its contents, this rule is not absolute and may be
paid by him for the 65 square meters occupied by Comendador Clinic
rebutted by evidence to the contrary. 19 In this case, it was clearly
with legal interest of six percent (6%) until fully paid; and, (e) ordered
shown that Eda and Santiago Jimenez had no sufficient means of
defendant Cimafranca to pay plaintiffs all the rents he has been
livelihood and that they were totally dependent on their mother Lucia
collecting from the lessees of the first floor of the house with legal
for the support of their family. This fact strengthens the claim of Lucia
interest thereon from the time he started collecting them until fully paid,
that the price of the property was fictitious and that Eda Jimenez could
with costs against defendants. 11
not have paid the price of the property as she was financially incapable
to do so. In fact, Eda Jimenez did not prove as to how she obtained the
money to pay for the property she supposedly bought from Lucia. sale to Salimbagat and Cimafranca, petitioners had already been in
When the source of the purchase price is "intriguing" and is not continuous possession of the property for fourteen (14) years, or since
convincingly shown to have been given by the "buyer" to the "seller," 1958. Santiago Jimenez admitted that after his marriage he and his
the claim of the latter that she signed the deed of sale without her wife Eda lived and stayed with her parents, herein petitioners, and
consent may be upheld. 20 dependent on them for support. 31
Even assuming in gratia argumenti that Lucia signed the document Before buying the property, Salimbagat and Cimafranca allegedly
knowing that it was a deed of sale of the property, the sale thereof by inquired from the office of the Register of Deeds concerning the
Lucia to Eda Jimenez without her husbands conformity should be genuineness of the certificate of title of Eda Jimenez, and from the
considered void ab initio being contrary to law. 21 Since "(t)he wife Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance of Dipolog City as to
cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husbands consent, whether the property was involved in any litigation. 32 However, they
except in cases provided by law," 22 it follows that Lucia Embrado failed to inquire from petitioners as to why they were the ones in actual
Torregiani could not, by herself, validly dispose of Lot 564 without her possession of the property.
husbands consent. Consequently, Eda Jimenez likewise could not
have acquired ownership over the land. The issuance of a certificate of
The rule is settled that a buyer of real property which is in the
title in favor of Eda Jimenez did not vest upon her ownership over the
possession of persons other than the seller must be wary and should
property. Neither did it validate the alleged purchase thereof which is
investigate the rights of those in possession. Otherwise, without such
null and void. Registration does not vest title. It is merely evidence of
inquiry, the buyer can hardly be regarded as a buyer in good
such title. Our land registration laws do not give the holder any better
faith. 33 When a man proposes to buy or deal with realty, his first duty is
title than what he actually has. 23 Being null and void, the sale to Eda
to read the public manuscript, i.e., to look and see who is there upon it,
Jimenez and the transfer of the property she made to Salimbagat and
and what are his rights. A want of caution and diligence which an
Cimafranca produced no legal effects whatsoever. Quod nullum est,
honest man of ordinary prudence is accustomed to exercise in making
nullum producit effectum. There being no valid title to the land that Eda
purchases is, in contemplation of law, a want of good faith. The buyer
Jimenez acquired from Lucia, it follows that no title to the same land
who has failed to know or discover that the land sold to him is in the
could be conveyed by the former to Salimbagat and
adverse possession of another, is a buyer in bad faith. 34
Cimafranca. 24
The fact that Lucia Embrado resides in the premises, coupled with the
It is worthy to note that Salimbagat and Cimafranca, as buyers of Eda
relatively young age and meager financial standing of the Jimenez
Jimenez, have not proved their status as purchasers in good faith and
spouses, should have been sufficient for Cimafranca to hesitate
for value of the land which, in the first place, Eda Jimenez had no right
accepting Edas transfer certificate of title at its face value. Cimafranca,
to sell. The burden of proving the status of a purchaser in good faith
after deliberately closing his eyes to such a vital information, is now
and for value lies upon him who asserts that status. In discharging the
claiming good faith. For obvious reasons, we cannot accept his
burden, it is not enough to invoke the ordinary presumption of good
contention. We thus declare him, together with Marcos Salimbagat, to
faith, i.e., that everyone is presumed to act in good faith. The good
be purchasers in bad faith hence not entitled to protection under the
faith that is here essential is integral with the very status which must be
Torrens system of registration.
proved. 25
On June 21, 1974, the trial court rendered a decision in Civil Case No.
As found by respondent court and disclosed by the records, the land
U-2286, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
subject matter of this case was originally covered by Free Patent No.
23263 issued on April 17, 1937 in the name of Herminigildo Agpoon.
On May 21, 1937, pursuant to the said patent, the Register of Deeds of WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court
Pangasinan issued to said Herminigildo Agpoon Original Certificate of renders judgment:
Title No. 2370. 3 Presentacion Agpoon Gascon inherited the said
parcel of land upon the death of her father, Herminigildo, and was
1. Ordering the defendants to surrender to the plaintiffs the physical
issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. 32209 on April 6,1960.
possession of the land in question described in paragraph 3 of the
Respondent Presentacion declared the said land for taxation purposes
amended complaint;
in her name under Tax Declaration No. 11506 and taxes were paid
thereon in her name. 4
2. Ordering the defendants to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiff
the produce of the land in question in the total sum of P5,000.00 per
On April 13, 1971, private respondent spouses filed Civil Case No. U-
year from the date of the filing of the present action at the rate of 6%
2286 in the then Court of First Instance of Pangasinan for recovery of
interest per annum until fully paid;
possession and damages against petitioners. Their complaint states
that they are the registered owners under the aforesaid Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 32209 of the parcel of land situated in Barrio 3. Ordering the defendants to pay jointly and severally the amount of
Bantog, Asingan, Pangasinan which is now in the possession of P800.00 representing attorney's fees;
petitioners; that during the Japanese occupation, petitioners, taking
advantage of the abnormal conditions then obtaining, took possession
of said land by means of fraud, stealth, strategy and intimidation; that 4. And to pay the costs.
private respondents repeatedly demanded the surrender of the
physical possession of said property but the latter refused. 5 SO ORDERED. 9
Petitioners, in answer to said complaint, alleged that the land in Not satisfied with said decision, petitioners appealed to respondent
question was formerly a part of the river bed of the Agno-Chico River; court. As earlier stated, on January 30, 1985 the former Intermediate
that in the year 1920, a big flood occurred which caused the said river Appellate Court affirmed in toto in AC-G.R. CV No. 60388-R the said
to change its course and abandon its original bed; that by virtue of the decision of the court a quo, 10 and with the denial of petitioner's motion
provisions of Article 370 of the Spanish Civil Code which was then the for reconsideration, 11 the case came up to us as G.R. No. 72255.
law in force, petitioners, by operation of law, became the owners by
accession or accretion of the respective aliquot parts of said river bed
bordering their properties; that since 1920, they and their predecessors On June 24, 1974, the aforesaid Court of First Instance of Pangasinan,
in interest occupied and exercised dominion openly and adversely over acting on the motion to dismiss filed by respondents Director of Lands
said portion of the abandoned river bed in question abutting their and spouses Agpoon, issued an order dismissing Civil Case No. U-
respective riparian lands continuously up to the present to the 2649 for annulment of title by merely citing the statement in the case
exclusion of all other persons, particularly Herminigildo Agpoon; that of Antonio, et al. vs. Barroga, et al. 12 that an action to annul a free
they have introduced improvements thereon by constructing irrigation patent many years after it had become final and indefeasible states no
canals and planting trees and agricultural crops thereon 6 and cause of action . 13 Petitioners' motion for the reconsideration of said
converted the land into a productive area. order was denied on September 11, 1974, 14 hence the recourse to us
in G.R. No. L-40399.
1. That the parties admit the identity and area of the land in question,
which forms part of the river bed of the Agno-Chico River, and further 1. Whether or not the lower court is justified in dismissing the complaint
admit that the said river bed was abandoned as a result of a flood in by simply invoking the ruling in the aforestated case
1920 and opened a new bed. The location and course of the aforesaid of Antonio although the facts and circumstances set forth in the
abandoned river bed as well as the relative position of the lands complaint show that the land in question was private land under Article
bordering the same can be gleaned from Cadastral Survey Plan of 370 of the old Civil Code and that the subsequent derivative
Asingan, Pangasinan, Street No. 49 thereof, as approved by the certificates of title in question were null and void ab initio because the
Director of Lands on October 12, 1912, a photostat copy of which is said land was not within the authority of the government to dispose of
hereto attached and made an integral part hereof a Annex "A".
in favor of any party and must be ordered annulled, cancelled or If the said averments are true, and the factual recitals thereon have
rescinded; 15 been admitted in the stipulation of facts hereinbefore quoted, then the
land in question was and is of private ownership and, therefore,
beyond the jurisdiction of the Director of Lands. The free patent and
2. Whether or not the trial court and the former Intermediate Appellate
subsequent title issued pursuant thereto are null and void. The
Court were justified in not basing their judgments on the judicial
indefeasibility and imprescriptibility of a Torrens title issued pursuant to
admissions of private respondents in the stipulation of facts of the
a patent may be invoked only when the land involved originally formed
parties, since such admissions have the legal force and effect of
part of the public domain. If it was a private land, the patent and
precluding private respondents from disputing such admission;
certificate of title issued upon the patent are a nullity. 17
It is true that by filing the application for a free patent Barroga impliedly
The claim of ownership of herein petitioners is based on the old Civil
admitted either the invalidity or insufficiency of Titulo Real No. 12479 Code, the law then in force, which provides:
issued in the name of his predecessor in interest on July 22, 1894, but
neither the allegation made in his answer that his aforesaid
predecessor in interest was the absolute owner of the property covered The beds of rivers which remain abandoned because the course of the
by said Titulo Real nor his implied admission of the latter's invalidity or water has naturally changed belong to the owners of the riparian lands
insufficiency are grounds for the annulment of the free patent and throughout their respective lengths. If the abandoned bed divided
original certificate of title in question. Evidently, it was Barroga's estates belonging to different owners, the new dividing line shall run at
privilege to rely or not to rely upon his claim of private ownership in equal distance therefrom. 24
favor of his predecessor in interest and of whatever the latter's Titulo
Real was worth. He decided not to rely upon them and to consider that
It is thus clear under this provision that once the river bed has been
the property covered by the Titulo Real was still part of the public
abandoned, the riparian owners become the owners of the abandoned
domain. Acting accordingly he applied for a free patent and was
bed to the extent provided by this article. The acquisition of ownership
successful. It must be borne in mind that the Titulo Real was not an
is automatic. 25There need be no act on the part of the riparian owners
indefeasible title and that its holder still had to prove that he had
to subject the accession to their ownership, as it is subject thereto ipso
possessed the land covered by it without interruption during a period of
jure from the moment the mode of acquisition becomes evident,
ten years by virtue of a good title and in good faith (Royal Decree of
without the need of any formal act of acquisition. 26 Such abandoned
June 25,1880). We may well presume that Barroga felt that he had no
river bed had fallen to the private ownership of the owner of the
sufficient evidence to prove this, for which reason he decided to
riparian land even without any formal act of his will and any
acquire the land as part of the public domain.
unauthorized occupant thereof will be considered as a trespasser. The
right in re to the principal is likewise a right in re to the accessory, as it
In the case at bar, the facts alleged in the complaint, which are is a mode of acquisition provided by law, as the result of the right of
deemed hypothetically admitted upon the filing of the motion to accretion. Since the accessory follows the nature of the principal, there
dismiss, constitute a sufficient cause of action against private need not be any tendency to the thing or manifestation of the purpose
respondents. Petitioners in their complaint in Civil Case No. U-2649 to subject it to our ownership, as it is subject thereto ipso jurefrom the
alleged, among others, that the disputed area was formerly an moment the mode of acquisition becomes evident. 27
abandoned river bed formed due to natural causes in 1920; that the
riparian owners of the lands abutting said abandoned river bed were
The right of the owner of land to additions thereto by accretion has
the plaintiffs and/or their predecessors in interest; that since then and
been said to rest in the law of nature, and to be analogous to the right
up to the present, they have been occupying and cultivating aliquot
of the owner of a tree to its fruits, and the owner of flocks and herds to
portions of the said land proportionate to the respective lengths of their
their natural increase. 28 Petitioners herein became owners of aliquot
riparian lands; that they are the real and lawful owners of the said land
portions of said abandoned river bed as early as 1920, when the Agno
as decreed by Article 370 of the old Civil Code, the law then in force;
River changed its course, without the necessity of any action or
that since the said area was a private land, the same could not have
exercise of possession on their part, it being an admitted fact that the
been the subject matter of an application for free patent; and that all
land in dispute, prior to its registration, was an abandoned bed of the
these facts were known to the private respondents and their
Agno River and that petitioners are the riparian owners of the lands
predecessor in interest.
adjoining the said bed.
The failure of herein petitioners to register the accretion in their names the expense of another. Stated elsewise, the Torrens system was not
and declare it for purposes of taxation did not divest it of its character established as a means for the acquisition of title to private land. It is
as a private property. Although we take cognizance of the rule that an intended merely to confirm and register the title which one may already
accretion to registered land is not automatically registered and have on the land. Where the applicant possesses no title or ownership
therefore not entitled or subject to the protection of imprescriptibility over the parcel of land, he cannot acquire one under the Torrens
enjoyed by registered property under the Torrens system. 29 The said system of registration. 41 Resort to the provisions of the Land
rule is not applicable to this case since the title claimed by private Registration Act does not give one a better title than he really and
respondents is not based on acquisitive prescription but is anchored on lawfully has. 42 Registration does not vest title. It is not a mode of
a public grant from the Government, which presupposes that it was acquiring property. It is merely evidence of such title over a particular
inceptively a public land. Ownership over the accession is governed by property. It does not give the holder any better title than what he
the Civil Code. Imprescriptibility of registered land is a concern of the actually has, especially if the registration was done in bad faith. The
Land Registration Act. effect is that it is as if no registration was made at all. 43
Under the provisions of Act No. 2874 pursuant to which the title of Moreover, the failure of herein private respondents to assert their claim
private respondents' predecessor in interest was issued, the President over the disputed property for almost thirty 30 years constitute
of the Philippines or his alter ego, the Director of Lands, has no laches 44 and bars an action to recover the same. 45 The registered
authority to grant a free patent for land that has ceased to be a public owners' right to recover possession of the property and title thereto
land and has passed to private ownership, and a title so issued is null from petitioners has, by long inaction or inexcusable neglect, been
and void. 30 The nullity arises, not from the fraud or deceit, but from the converted into a stale demand. 46
fact that the land is not under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Lands. 31 The jurisdiction of the Director of Lands is limited only to
Considering that petitioners were well within their rights in taking
public lands and does not cover lands privately owned. 32 The purpose
possession of the lot in question, the findings of respondent court that
of the Legislature in adopting the former Public Land Act, Act No.
herein petitioners took advantage of the infirmities and weakness of
2874, was and is to limit its application to lands of the public domain,
the preceding claimant, Herminigildo Agpoon, in taking possession of
and lands held in private ownership are not included therein and are
said land during the Japanese occupation is neither tenable in law nor
not affected in any manner whatsoever thereby. Land held in freehold
sustained by preponderant evidence in fact.
or fee title, or of private ownership, constitute no part of the public
domain and cannot possibly come within the purview of said Act No.
2874, inasmuch as the "subject" of such freehold or private land is not Where the evidence show that the plaintiff is the true owner of the land
embraced in any manner in the title of the Act 33 and the same are subject of the free patent and title granted to another and that the
excluded from the provisions or text thereof. defendant and his predecessor in interest were never in possession
thereof, the Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction and without
ordering the cancellation of said title issued upon the patent, may
We reiterate that private ownership of land is not affected by the
direct the defendant registered owner to reconvey the property to the
issuance of a free patent over the same land because the Public Land
plaintiff. 47 Further, if the determinative facts are before the Court and it
Act applies only to lands of the public domain. 34 Only public land may
is in a position to finally resolve the dispute, the expeditious
be disposed of by the Director of Lands. 35 Since as early as 1920, the
administration of justice will be subserved by such a resolution and
land in dispute was already under the private ownership of herein
thereby obviate the needless protracted proceedings consequent to
petitioners and no longer a part of the lands of the public domain, the
the remand of the case of the trial court. 48 On these considerations, as
same could not have been the subject matter of a free patent. The
well as the fact that these cases have been pending for a long period
patentee and his successors in interest acquired no right or title to the
of time, we see no need for remanding Civil Case No. 2649 for further
said land. Necessarily, Free Patent No. 23263 issued to Herminigildo
proceedings, and we hold that the facts and the ends of justice in this
Agpoon is null and void and the subsequent titles issued pursuant
case require the reconveyance by private respondents to petitioners of
thereto cannot become final and indefeasible. Hence, we ruled
the disputed lot.
in Director of Lands vs. Sisican, et al. 36that if at the time the free
patents were issued in 1953 the land covered therein were already
private property of another and, therefore, not part of the disposable WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of respondent court in its AC-
land of the public domain, then applicants patentees acquired no right G.R. CV No. 60388-R and the questioned order of dismissal of the trial
or title to the land. court in its Civil Case No. 2649 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and judgment is hereby rendered ORDERING private
respondents to reconvey the aforesaid parcel of land to petitioners.
Now, a certificate of title fraudulently secured is null and void ab initio if
the fraud consisted in misrepresenting that the land is part of the public
domain, although it is not. As earlier stated, the nullity arises, not from SO ORDERED.
the fraud or deceit but, from the fact that the land is not under the
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands. 37 Being null and void, the free
patent granted and the subsequent titles produce no legal effects
whatsoever. Quod nullum est, nullum producit effectum. 38
GALICANO GOLLOY, petitioner, Petitioner, after his motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial
vs. court, appealed the said decision, which was affirmed by the Court of
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE VALDEZ, JR., Appeals, in a Decision promulgated on September 29, 1977 (Rollo, pp.
CONSOLACION VALDEZ, LOURDES VALDEZ, SOLEDAD VALDEZ 22-29). A motion for reconsideration was filed, but the same was
and BENNY MADRIAGA, respondents. denied in a Resolution promulgated on November 29, 1977 (Ibid., pp.
30-32). Hence, the instant petition. .
PARAS, J.:
The Second Division of this Court, in a Resolution dated January 4,
1978, resolved to require the respondents to comment (lbid., p. 36);
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the September 29, 1977
which comment was filed on February 14, 1978 (Ibid., pp. 41-42).
Decision ** of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. L-43359R, entitled,
Petitioners filed a reply thereto on March 27, 1978 (lbid., p. 47) in
Galicano Golloy vs. Jose J. Valdez Jr., et. al., affirming the judgment of
compliance with the resolution of February 14, 1978 (Ibid., p. 44). .
the then Court of First Instance of Tarlac; and the November 29,1977
Resolution of the same court denying the motion for reconsideration. .
In a Resolution dated April 5, 1978 the Court gave due course to the
petition (Ibid., p. 52). Petitioner filed his Brief on January 10, 1981
Herein petitioner, for more than twenty (20) years, has been the
(Ibid., p. 60). Private respondents having failed to file their brief within
registered owner and in possession of a 41,545-square meter parcel of
the required period, the case was considered submitted for decision
land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 45764. The Southwest
without private respondents' brief in the resolution of February 8, 1981
portion of this land is bounded by herein private respondents' land
(Ibid., p. 66). .
which is covered by Certificate of Title No. 8565. Sometime in
February, 1966, private respondents subdivided their land among
themselves. In the course of the subdivision, private respondents The sole issue in this case is who between the two title holders is
caused to be placed two (2) monuments inside the Southwest, portion entitled to the land in dispute? .
of petitioner's land. Hence, petitioner filed with the then Court of First
Instance of Tarlac, presided over by Judge Arturo B. Santos an action
The instant petition is impressed with merit. .
to quiet title. The same was docketed therein as Civil Case No. 4312. .
On July 8, 1968, petitioner filed a Memorandum (Record on Appeal, Of significance is the fact, as disclosed by the evidence, that for twenty
pp. 28-35). . (20) years from the date of registration of title in 1947 up to 1967 when
this suit for recovery of possession was instituted, neither the
deceased DE VERA up to the time of his death in 1951, nor his
On October 21, 1968, the trial court ruled in favor of private
successors-in-interest, had taken steps to possess or lay adverse
respondents. The decretal portion of the decision, reads: .
claim to the disputed portion. They may, therefore be said to be guilty
of laches as would effectively derail their cause of action. Administrator
WHEREFORE, conformably to the agreement of the parties during the ESTRADA took interest in recovering the said portion only when he
pre-trial on December 12, 1967, this Court renders judgment in noticed the discrepancy in areas in the Inventory of Property and in the
accordance with the aforesaid surveyor's Report and Relocation Plan; title. .
and the plaintiff and the defendants are accordingly directed to abide
by and respect the boundaries indicated on the relocation plan of
The foregoing conclusion does not necessarily wreak havoc on the
Surveyor Dauz which he found to be the true and correct boundaries of
indefeasibility of a Torrens title. For, mere possession of certificate of
the properties covered by TCT Nos. 8567 and 45764 of the land
title under the Torrens System is not conclusive as to the holder's true
records of Tarlac. .
ownership of all the property described therein for he does not by
virtue of said certificate alone become the owner of the land illegally
For lack of proof, the claim for damages by plaintiff and the defendants included. In a more recent case, the case of Lola vs. Court of Appeals
are both denied. . (145 SCRA 439, 449 [1986]), this Court ruled: .
No pronouncement on costs. . We also agree with the petitioners that laches effectively bars the
respondent from recovering the lot in dispute. .
Although the defense of prescription is unavailing to the petitioners
because, admittedly, the title to Lot No. 5517 is still registered in the
name of respondent, still the petitioners have acquired title to it by
virtue of the equitable principle of laches due to respondent's failure to
assert her claims and ownership for thirty two (32) years. .
There are precedents for this ruling. In the following cases, we upheld
the equitable defense of laches and ruled that the long inaction and
delay of the title holder in assertings right over the disputed lot bars
him from recovering the same. .
SO ORDERED. .
G.R. No. L-52064 December 26, 1984 2298 in 1951 (Exhibit "2-B"). Upon the demise of her father in 1914,
JULIANA adjudicated the property to herself as his sole heir in 1958
(Exhibit "4"), and declared it in her name under Tax Declaration No.
JULIANA CARAGAY-LAYNO, Assisted by Her Husband, BENITO
22522 beginning with the year 1959 (Exhibit "2-A"), later cancelled by
LAYNO, petitioner,
TD No. 3539 in 1966 (Exhibit "2"). Realty taxes were also religiously
vs.
paid from 1938 to 1972 (Exhibits "3-A" to "3-H"). Tacking the previous
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and SALVADOR ESTRADA as
possession of her father to her own, they had been in actual open,
Administrator of the Estate of the Deceased, MARIANO DE
continuous and uninterrupted possession in the concept of owner for
VERA, respondents.
about forty five (45) years, until said possession was disturbed in 1966
when ESTRADA informed JULIANA that the Disputed Portion was
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: registered in Mariano DE VERA's name.
Respondent Appellate Court, then the Court of Appeal, affirmed in To substantiate her claim of fraud in the inclusion of the Disputed
toto the judgment of the former Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Portion in OCT No. 63, JULIANA, an unlettered woman, declared that
Branch III, at Dagupan adjudging private respondent entitled to recover during his lifetime, DE VERA, her first cousin, and whom she regarded
possession of a parcel of land and ordering petitioners, as defendants as a father as he was much older, borrowed from her the Tax
below, to vacate the premises. Petitioners, as paupers, now seek a Declaration of her land purportedly to be used as collateral for his loan
reversal of that judgment. and sugar quota application; that relying on her cousin's assurances,
she acceded to his request and was made to sign some documents
the contents of which she did not even know because of her ignorance;
It was established by a relocation survey that the Disputed Portion is a that she discovered the fraudulent inclusion of the Disputed Portion in
3,732 square-meter-area of a bigger parcel of sugar and coconut land OCT No. 63 only in 1966 when ESTRADA so informed her and sought
(Lot No. 1, Psu-24206 [Case No. 44, GLRO Rec. No. 117]), with a total
to eject them.
area of 8,752 square meters, situated at Calasiao, Pangasinan. The
entire parcel is covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 63, and
includes the adjoining Lots 2 and 3, issued on 11 September 1947 in Of significance is the fact, as disclosed by the evidence, that for twenty
the name of Mariano M. DE VERA, who died in 1951 without issue. His (20) years from the date of registration of title in 1947 up to 1967 when
intestate estate was administered first by his widow and later by her this suit for recovery of possession was instituted, neither the
nephew, respondent Salvador Estrada. deceased DE VERA up to the time of his death in 1951, nor his
successors-in-interest, had taken steps to possess or lay adverse
claim to the Disputed Portion. They may, therefore be said to be guilty
Petitioner, JULIANA Caragay, and the decedent, Mariano DE VERA, of laches as would effectively derail their cause of action. Administrator
were first cousins, "both orphans, who lived together under one roof in ESTRADA took interest in recovering the said portion only when he
the care of a common aunt." noticed the discrepancy in areas in the Inventory of Property and in the
title.
As Administratrix, DE VERA's widow filed in Special Proceedings No.
4058 of the former Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch III, an Inasmuch as DE VERA had failed to assert any rights over the
Inventory of all properties of the deceased, which included "a parcel of
Disputed Portion during his lifetime, nor did he nor his successors-in-
land in the poblacion of Calasiao, Pangasinan, containing an area of interest possess it for a single moment: but that, JULIANA had been in
5,417 square meters, more or less, and covered by Tax Declaration actual, continuous and open possession thereof to the exclusion of all
No. 12664."
and sundry, the inescapable inference is, fraud having been
unsubstantiated, that it had been erroneously included in OCT No. 63.
Because of the discrepancy in area mentioned in the Inventory as The mistake is confirmed by the fact that deducting 3,732 sq. ms., the
5,147 square meters (as filed by the widow), and that in the title as area of the Disputed Portion from 8,752 sq. ms., the area of Lot 1 in
8,752 square meters, ESTRADA repaired to the Disputed Property and OCT No. 63, the difference is 5,020 sq. ms., which closely
found that the northwestern portion, subsequently surveyed to be approximates the area of 5,147 sq. ms., indicated in the Inventory of
3,732 square meters, was occupied by petitioner-spouses Juliana Property of DE VERA. In fact, the widow by limiting the area in said
Caragay Layno and Benito Layno. ESTRADA demanded that they Inventory to only 5,147 sq. ms., in effect, recognized and admitted that
vacate the Disputed Portion since it was titled in the name of the the Disputed Portion of 3,132 sq. ms., did not form part of the
deceased DE VERA, but petitioners refused claiming that the land decedent's estate.
belonged to them and, before them, to JULIANA's father Juan
Caragay. The foregoing conclusion does not necessarily wreak havoc on the
indefeasibility of a Torrens title. For, mere possession of a certificate of
ESTRADA then instituted suit against JULIANA for the recovery of the title under the Torrens System is not conclusive as to the holder's true
Disputed Portion (Civil Case No. D-2007), which she resisted, mainly ownership of all the property described therein for he does not by
on the ground that the Disputed Portion had been fraudulently or virtue of said certificate alone become the owner of the land illegally
mistakenly included in OCT No. 63, so that an implied or constructive included. 2 A Land Registration Court has no jurisdiction to decree a lot
trust existed in her favor. She then counterclaimed for reconveyance of to persons who have never asserted any right of ownership over it.
property in the sense that title be issued in her favor.
... Obviously then, the inclusion of said area in the title of Lot No. 8151
After hearing, the Trial Court rendered judgment ordering JULIANA to is void and of no effect for a land registration Court has no jurisdiction
vacate the Disputed Portion. to decree a lot to persons who have put no claim in it and who have
never asserted any right of ownership over it. The Land Registration
Act as well as the Cadastral Act protects only the holders of a title in
On appeal respondent Appellate Court affirmed the Decision in toto. good faith and does not permit its provisions to be used as a shield for
the commission of fraud, or that one should enrich himself at the
Before us, JULIANA takes issue with the following finding of expense of another. 3
respondent Court:
JULIANA, whose property had been wrongfully registered in the name
Although Section 102 of Act 496 allows a Petition to compel a Trustee of another, but which had not yet passed into the hands of third parties,
to reconvey a registered land to the cestui que trust (Severino vs. can properly seek its reconveyance.
Severino, 44 Phil 343; Escobar vs. Locsin, 74 PhiL 86) this remedy is
no longer available to Juliana Caragay. Mariano de Vera's land, Lot 1, The remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or
Psu-24206, was registered on September 11, 1947 (Exhibit"C") and it erroneously registered in another's name is, after one year from the
was only on March 28, 1967 when the defendants filed their original date of the decree, not to set aside the decree, but, respecting the
answer that Caragay sought the reconveyance to her of the 3,732 decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, to bring an
square meters. Thus, her claim for reconveyance based on implied or ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for reconveyance or, if
constructive trust has prescribed after 10 years (Banaga vs. Soler, L- the property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for
15717, June 30,1961; J.M. Tuason & Co. vs. Magdangal, L-15539, value, for damages. 4
Jan. 30, 1962; Alzona vs. Capunitan, 4 SCRA 450). In other words,
Mariano de Vera's Original Certificate of Title No. 63 (Exhibit "C") has
become indefeasible. 1 Prescription cannot be invoked against JULIANA for the reason that as
lawful possessor and owner of the Disputed Portion, her cause of
action for reconveyance which, in effect, seeks to quiet title to the
We are constrained to reverse. property, falls within settled jurisprudence that an action to quiet title to
property in one's possession is imprescriptible. 5 Her undisturbed
The evidence discloses that the Disputed Portion was originally possession over a period of fifty two (52) years gave her a continuing
possessed openly, continuously and uninterruptedly in the concept of right to seek the aid of a Court of equity to determine the nature of the
an owner by Juan Caragay, the deceased father of JULIANA, and had adverse claim of a third party and the effect on her own title. 6
been declared in his name under Tax Declaration No. 28694 beginning
with the year 1921 (Exhibit "2-C"), later revised by Tax Declaration No.
Besides, under the circumstances, JULIANA's right to quiet title, to
seek reconveyance, and to annul OCT. No. 63 accrued only in 1966
when she was made aware of a claim adverse to her own. It was only
then that the statutory period of prescription may be said to have
commenced to run against her, following the pronouncement in Faja
vs. Court of Appeals, supra, a case almost Identical to this one.
SO ORDERED
G.R. No. L-26083 May 31, 1977 from Matias Amurao while the latter purchased the same from Atty.
Ponciano Hernandez. Atty. Hernandez disclosed that the area he
acquired from his predecessor-in-interest was only that parcel north of
CONSUELO MALALUAN VDA. DE RECINTO, petitioner,
the disputed area separated by the fence (Exhibit I) and that he never
vs.
exercised nor claimed any right over the land in question. Said land
RUPERTO INCIONG and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
was the same piece of land that he sold to Matias Amurao who also
had only occupied the same area and did not go over the dividing line.
MARTIN, J.: The only boundary that Matias Amurao could point to the private
respondent as separating the land that he was then selling from that
owned by petitioner was the fence (Exhibit I). It was also the same
Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals
parcel of land which Matias Amurao conveyed to private respondent in
which reversed the decision of the trial court in a suit for recovery of 1946. During the ocular inspection conducted by the trial court it was
possession of a parcel of land. found out that the disputed portion and the land adjoining it on the
north (private respondent's) are separated by a long fence consisting
Ruperto Inciong (hereinafter referred to as private respondent) is the of morado, madre cacao, antipolo and other kinds of trees which could
registered owner of a parcel of land located in Barrio Santol, not be less than 25 years old, with a single line of a rusty barbed wire.
Mataasnakahoy, Batangas, with an area of 34,263 square meters Inside the disputed area were coconut trees and other plants similar to
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. Rt-379 (T-211) of the those found in the land of the petitioner but different from those
Register of Deeds of Batangas. The land was formerly Identified as Lot improvements in the land of the private respondent.
No. 8151 of the Cadastral Survey in the area during the cadastral
proceedings from 1936 to 1940. Private respondent acquired this land As found by the trial court the preponderance of evidence shows that
in 1946 by purchase from Matias Amurao. In 1961, after a relocation the area in question has been erroneously included in the cadastral
survey of the land was effected it was discovered that its southern
survey of Lot No. 8151 and in the original certificate of title without the
boundary covering an area of 8,591 square meters was in the knowledge of the, parties concerned. As a result, the same description
possession of petitioner, Consuelo Malaluan Vda. de Recinto. In due in the original certificate of title was carried over into the succeeding
time private respondent filed an action for recovery of possession of
transfer certificates of title of the subsequent owners covering the
the portion held by the petitioner. In her answer to private respondent's same parcel of land. This is confirmed by the fact that private
complaint, petitioner claimed to be the owner of the area in question respondent's predecessors-in-interest and later, private respondent
and as counter-claim demanded its reconveyance from the private himself, have all along treated the area in question as belonging to the
respondent. petitioner. What seemed to have prompted private respondent to get
interested over the disputed area was when he came to learn after the
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment declaring the petitioner to relocation survey in 1961 that said disputed area was included in his
be the lawful owner of the land in question and ordering private title. Obviously then, the inclusion of said area in the title of Lot No.
respondent to execute a deed of reconveyance over the same in favor 8151 is void and of no effect for a land registration Court has no
of petitioner. However, on appeal said judgment was reversed by the jurisdiction to decree a lot to persons who have put no claim in it and
Court of Appeals in a decision the dispositive portion of which, reads: who have never asserted any right of ownership over it. 1 the Land
Registration Act as well as the Cadastral Act protects only the holders
of a title in good faith and does not permit its provisions to be used as
WHEREFORE, the judgment rendered by the trial court is hereby a shield for the commission of fraud, or that one should enrich himself
ordered reversed, and another one entered, by ordering defendant- at the expense of another.
appellee to return that portion of 8,591 square meters of the land in
question to plaintiff-appellant; to pay damages in the sum of P100.00 a
month from the time of the filing of the action until the property is Resort to the provisions of said Acts do not give one a better title than
returned; to pay further the sum of P1,000.00 for attorney's fees; and he really and lawfully has. 2 In the case at bar, private respondent
for defendant to pay the costs in both instances. could not have acquired an area more than what was actually
conveyed to him by Matias Amurao which extended only as far as the
dividing fence on the south thereof (Exhibit I). The mere possession of
A motion to reconsider said decision proved unavailing. Hence, this a certificate of title under the Torrens system does not necessarily
petition for review, petitioner faulting the Court of Appeals make the possessor a true owner of all the property described therein
for he does not by virtue of said certificate alone become the owner of
I. IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT IT WAS THRU ERROR THAT THE the land illegally included. 3It is evident from the records that the
AREA IN DISPUTE WAS INCLUDED IN THE TITLE OF petitioner owns the portion in question and therefore the area should
RESPONDENT RUPERTO INCIONG AND HIS PREDECESSORS, be conveyed to her.
AND THAT THE DECREE OF REGISTRATION WAS NULL AND
VOID AB INITIO WITH RESPECT TO SAID AREA; The remedy of the land owner whose property has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in another's name is, after one year from the
II. IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE LAND IN QUESTION WAS date of the decree, not to set aside the decree, but, respecting the
NOT INCLUDED IN THE SALE BY MATIAS AMURAO TO decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, to bring an
RESPONDENT RUPERTO INCIONG, AND THAT IT HAS NOT YET ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for reconveyance or, if
PASSED INTO THE HANDS OF AN "INNOCENT PURCHASER FOR the property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for
VALUE"; value, for damages. 4 This was what petitioner did. But was private
respondent an innocent purchaser for value? We can hardly consider
private respondent one because at the time he purchased the land
III. IN NOT SEEING THAT RESPONDENT RUPERTO INCIONG, IN covered by the certificate of title now in his hands he was aware that
CLAIMING THE LAND IN QUESTION, IS ACTING IN BAD FAITH the disputed portion was not included in the area conveyed to him by
AND TRYING TO ENRICH HIMSELF AT THE EXPENSE OF Matias Amurao. This is clearly evident when he acknowledged as the
PETITIONER; true boundary the one (Exhibit I) pointed to him by Matias Amurao.
between his land and the disputed portion by not raising any question
IV. IN DECLARING IN EFFECT THAT PETITIONER'S EXHIBIT "4", about it and not disturbing the possession of the petitioner over the
DEED OF DONATION PROPTER NUPTIAS AND EXHIBIT "3-A", area in dispute for almost 15 years. A purchaser in good faith is one
DEED OF SALE, ARE INVALID AND WITHOUT LEGAL FORCE AND who buys the property of another without notice that some other
EFFECT; person has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays a full and
fair price for the same, at the time of such purchase, or before he has
notice of the claim or interest of some other person in the property. 5
V. IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-30240 March 25, 1988 It may seem incredible that execution of such 1965 final judgment in
favor of the Republic no less could have been thwarted for twenty-
three years now. But the Republic's odyssey and travails since 1965
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES as Lessor, ZOILA DE CHAVEZ,
through the martial law regime to now are recorded in the annals of our
assisted by her husband Col. Isaac Chavez, DEOGRACIAS
jurisprudence. Suffice it to point out that upon petition of the Republic
MERCADO, ROSENDO IBANEZ and GUILLERMO MERCADO, as
and its co- petitioners (as permittees and/or lessees of the Republic),
permittees and/or Lessees of public fishponds, petitioners,
mandamus was issued on June 30, 1967 by unanimous decision with
vs.
one abstention in Republic vs. De los Angeles, 6 overruling the therein
HON. JUDGE JAIME DE LOS ANGELES of the court of First
respondent-judge's refusal to issue a writ of execution of the aforesaid
Instance of Batangas, (BR. III, Balayan) [later replaced by JUDGE
1965 final judgment and ordering him to issue such writ. The Court
JESUS ARLEGUI] SHERIFF OF BATANGAS, ENRIQUE ZOBEL and
denied reconsideration on September 19, 1967, but on a second and
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS AT BALAYAN,
supplemental motion for reconsideration, it set aside the original
BATANGAS, respondents.
decision of Jane 30, 1967 and dismissed the petition for mandamus
and denied execution, per its Resolution of October 4, 1971 by a split
TEEHANKEE, C.J.: 6-3-2 vote. 7 The court denied the Republic, et al motions for
reconsideration by the same split 6-3-2 vote per its Resolution of April
11, 1972. 8 An undermanned Court subsequently denied the Republic's
The moment of truth is finally at hand. It is about time to cause the co-petitioner Tolentino's second motion for reconsideration for lack of
execution in favor of the Republic of the Philippines of the 1965 final necessary votes per its Resolution of April 27, 1973.9
and executory judgment of this Court (Republic vs. Ayala y Cia
) 1affirming that of the CFI of Batangas in Civil Case No. 373 thereof
and to recover for the Republic what "Ayala y Cia Hacienda de Parenthetically, the complexity magnitude and persistence of
Calatagan and/or Alfonso Zobel had illegally expanded [in] the original respondents' maneuvers are set forth in the series of decisions and
area of their TCT No. 722 (derived from OCT No. 20) from 9,652.583 extended resolutions and majority and dissenting opinions reported in
hectares to about 12,000 hectares thereby usurping about 2,000 the Supreme Court Reports Annotated as per the citations
hectares consisting of portions of the territorial sea, the foreshore, the hereinabove given. A reading of said reports together with the
beach and navigable waters properly belong(ing) to the public Memorandum for Granting of the Petition at bar (and giving the case's
domain."2 backgrounder) which I had circulated in the Court as against the
proposed contrary draft of Justice Estanislao A. Fernandez (which did
not gain the concurrence of the majority of the Court during his
The Court's decision in said case found that seventeen-month incumbency from October 20, 1973 to March 28,
1975) shows the full extent background and scope of these
We have gone over the evidence presented in this case and found no maneuvers, particularly those in the present case. For the sake of
reason to disturb the factual findings of the trial court. It has been brevity and conciseness, I attach the said Memorandum as Annex A
established that certain areas originally portions of the navigable water hereof and make the same an integral part of this decision, instead of
or of the foreshores of the bay were converted into fishponds or sold reproducing the same in the body of this opinion.
by defendant company to third persons. There is also no controversy
as to the fact that the said defendant was able to effect these
Pending respondents' maneuvers in this Court for thwarting the
sales after it has obtained a certificate of title (TCT No. 722) and issuance of a writ for execution of the aforesaid 1965 final judgment for
prepared a "composite plan" wherein the aforesaid foreshore areas the Republic's recovery of land and waters of the public domain in the
appeared to be parts of Hacienda Calatagan. Defendants- appellants
1967 mandamus case brought by the Republic, supra, they intensified
do not deny that there is an excess in area between those delimited as their maneuvers to defeat the Republic's judgment for recovery of the
boundaries of the hacienda in TCT No. 722 and the plan prepared by public lands and waters when they got the trial judge, notwithstanding
its surveyor. This, however, was justified by claiming that it could have
this Court's final 1965 judgment for reversion of the public lands, to
been caused by the system (magnetic survey) used in the preparation uphold their refusal to recognize the rights of the Republic's public
of the original titles, and, anyway, the excess in area (536 hectares, fishponds permittees and/or lessees to the lands leased by the
according to defendants) is within the allowable margin given to a
Republic to them. Thus, the Republic as lessor and said
magnetic survey. permittees/lessees as co-petitioners filed through then Solicitor
General Antonio P. Barredo their Amended Complaint of August 2,
But even assuming for the sake of argument that this contention is 1967 in Civil Case No. 653 against herein respondent Enrique Zobel
correct, the fact remains that the areas in dispute (those covered by as defendant and the Register of Deeds of Batangas. As summarized
permits issued by the Bureau of Fisheries), were found to be portions by the Solicitor General in his Memorandum of June 1, 1984:
of the foreshore, beach, or of the navigable water itself And, it is an
elementary principle of law that said areas not being capable of Respondent Zobel had ousted Zoila de Chavez, a government's
registration, their inclusion in a certificate of title does not convert the fishpond permittee from a portion of the subject fishpond lot described
same into properties of private ownership or confer title on the
as Lot 33 of Plan Swo-30999 (also known as Lots 55 and 66 of
registrant. 3 subdivision TCT No. 3699) by bulldozing the same, and threatened to
eject fishpond permittees Zoila de Chavez, Guillermo Mercado,
The Solicitor General's Memorandum 4 further points out Deogracias Mercado and Rosendo Ibaez from their respective
fishpond lots described as Lots 4, 5, 6 and 7 and Lots 55 and 56, of
Plan Swo-30999, embraced in the void subdivision titles TCT No. 3699
... that the modus operandi in said usurpation, i.e. grabbing lands of and TCT No. 9262 claimed by said respondent. Thus, on August 2,
the public domain, was expressly made of record in the case of Dizon 1967, the Republic filed an Amended Complaint captioned Accion
v. Rodriguez, 13 SCRA 704 (April 30, 1965), where it was recounted Reinvidicatoria with Preliminary Injunction" against respondent Zobel
that Hacienda de Calatagan, owned by Alfonso and Jacobo Zobel, was and the Register of Deeds of Batangas, docketed as Civil Case No.
originally covered by TCT No. 722, and that in 1948, upon the 653, for cancellation of Zobel's void subdivision titles TCT No. 3699
cessation of their sugar mill operations, the hacienda owners and TCT No. 9262, and the reconveyance of the same to the
converted the pier (used by vessels loading sugar) which stretched to government; to place aforenamed fishpond permittees in peaceful and
about 600 meters off the shore into the navigable waters of the adequate possession thereof; to require respondent Zobel to pay back
Pagaspas Bay" into a fishpond dike by enclosing 30 and 37 hectares of rentals to the Republic; and to enjoin said respondent from usurping
the bay on both sides of the pier in the process. and exercising further acts of dominion and ownership over the subject
land of public domain;
Subsequently, in 1949, the owners of the hacienda ordered its
subdivision which enabled them to acquire titles to the subdivided lots Respondent Zobel, however, filed a Motion to Dismiss Amended
which were outside the hacienda's perimeter. Thus, these subdivided Complaint, dated August 16, 1967, contendinginter alia that said
lots, which were converted into fishponds were illegally absorbed as Amended Complaint (Civil Case No. 653) is barred by prior judgment
part of the hacienda and titled in the name of Jacobo Zobel which were in Civil Case No. 373 (G.R. No. 20950, the 1965 final judgment in favor
subsequently sold and transferred to the Dizons, Gocos and others. In of the Republic), and arguing that "if TCT Nos. T-3699 and T-9262 had
said Dizon case, "this Honorable Court affirmed the court a quo's been declared null and void in Civil Case No. 373, the proper
findings that the subdivision plan was prepared not in accordance with procedure would be to secure the proper execution of the decision in
the technical description in TCT No. 722 but in disregard of it." And that the same proceedings and not thru the filing of a new case." He further
the appropriated fishpond lots "are actually part of the territorial waters contended "that there is another action pending between the same
and belong to the State. parties for the same cause," and points to the abovementioned
mandamus case, G.R. No. 26112 anent execution of Civil Case No.
But all through the years, as stressed in the Republic's memorandum, 373 as the said pending case. His aforesaid motion, however, was
"the technical maneuvers employed by Ayala and Zobel [of which the denied by the trial court in its order of December 13, 1967, and
instant petition is an off-shoot] .... undercut the Republic's efforts to accordingly he was required to file his answer.
execute the aforesaid 1965 final judgment" 5 to recover the estimated
2,000 hectares of territorial sea, foreshore, beach and navigable But in his answer with counterclaim, respondent Zobel averred, among
waters and marshy land of the public domain. others, that the subject TCT Nos. 3699 and 9262 registered in his
name are valid and subsisting since in the decision under G. R. No. L-
20950 "only TCT No. T-9550 was specifically declared as null and void
and no other;" and that when Civil Case No. 373 was docketed, recover possession of all usurped areas of the public domain "outside
respondent Enrique Zobel "was and still is at present one of the (Ayala's) private land covered by TCT No. 722, which including the lots
members and managing .ng partners of Ayala y Cia one of the in T-9550 (Lots 360, 362, 363 and 182) are hereby reverted to public
defendants in the 91 said civil case, and, therefore, privy thereto." He dominion." (Paragraph [al of 1965 judgment). 10
then prayed for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction restoring to
him possession of the subject land, and further prayed for judgment
After said G.R. No. L-26112 was finally disposed of, herein petitioner
ordering Zoila de Chavez and Guillermo Mercado to vacate the
filed in Civil Case No. 373, a "Motion to Re-survey." This was granted
premises in question and to surrender possession thereof to defendant
in an Order dated August 21, 1973, as well as in the Orders of
Zobel. This was unfortunately granted by respondent Judge De los
December 27, 1973 and February 26, 1974, respectively. About three
Angeles per the impugned order at bar of October 1, 1968. (Annex D,
(3) years later, a Report on the Re-survey dated August 5, 1977
petition). Hence, the filing of the instant petition.
(Annex "A" to Republic's Comment dated March 30, 1981), as well as
the "Final Report" thereon dated September 2, 1977 and the
On March 7, 1969, the Court issued a restraining order in the case at "Resurvey Plan" (Annexes "B" and "C", Ibid.) were approved by the
bar, enjoining respondent judge from enforcing the writ of preliminary Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
mandatory injunction until further orders. Resources. The Re-survey further confirmed the uncontroverted fact
that the disputed areas in the case at bar form part of the expanded
area already reverted to public dominion.
While G.R. No. L-26112 re: execution) and G.R. No. L-30240 (the case
at bar) were pending, the Republic filed its motion of July 8, 1970 in
Civil Case No. 373, for authority to conduct the necessary resurvey of Upon approval of said Re-survey Plan and Report, petitioner submitted
the lands affected so as to properly segregate from Ayala and Zobel's the same to the trial court in Civil Case No. 373. However,
private land originally covered by TCT No. 722 the areas outside notwithstanding its approval by the Director of Lands, and the
thereof comprising about 2,000 hectares of public land, beach, Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Judge Jesus P.
foreshore and territorial sea. Ayala and Zobel vigorously opposed the Arlegui [who had been assigned to respondent Judge De los Angeles"
same, contending again that the proper step for the government was to court in Batangas upon the latter's retirement] arrogating unto himself
ask for a writ of execution; that no other subdivision titles, besides TCT the function which properly belongs to the Director of
No. T- 9550 were really declared null and void in the 1965 judgment; Lands, disapproved the said Report and Re-survey Plan, thereby
and that the lower court could not make a ruling on the motion for preventing execution of the subdivision (a) of the decision in Civil Case
resurvey "without requiring the presentation of additional evidence, and No. 373. In effect, such disapproval by Judge Arlegui was intended to
that, in effect, would be tantamount to reopening a case where the negate the earlier resolution in G.R. No. L-26112 (44 SCRA 255, 263)
judgment is already final and executory and that the Government's that as soon as resurvey "is completed the proper writ of execution for
failure to seek a "clarification of the decision to find out what other titles the delivery of possession of the portions found to be public land
should have been declared null and void" precludes it from doing so should issue;"
now, I since the decision is now final and executory." The respondent
judge, having earlier denied execution of the 1965 final judgment,
Earlier, in Civil Case No. 653, respondent Zobel filed on July 10, 1969
issued his order of October 27, 1970 denying the Government's motion
a Motion to Suspend Further Hearing, etc., praying that the hearings in
for authority to conduct such prerequisite re-survey;
said Civil Case be indefinitely suspended until the case at bar is
resolved by this Honorable Court. He contended that the issues raised
Ayala and Zobel's technical maneuvers to impede execution of the in the case at bar are the very issues pending in the case below, Civil
1965 final judgment again bore fruit, as above indicated, when their Case No. 653, and that the decision that the Court renders here "would
second motion for reconsideration in G.R. No. L26112 was granted by greatly affect the respective claims of said parties in (said) case." (G.R.
a split Court in a Resolution dated October 4, 1971 (41 SCRA 422). As No. 1, 46396, Record, pp. 128-130)
a result, the earlier decision of June 30, 1967 directing the issuance of
the writ of execution was set aside and the Republic's petition for
The aforesaid motion was followed by respondent Zobel's Motion for
certiorari and mandamus impugning the lower court's quashal and
Immediate Resolution of Defendant-Movant's Motion to Suspend, etc.,
denial of the writ of execution was dismissed.
dated August 20, 1969. An opposition thereto was filed by plaintiff
therein and a reply was filed in turn by respondent Zobel on July 30, 1
While the Court's new majority denied the Republic's motion for 969. Acting on the said motions, the trial court issued an order on
reconsideration of aforesaid resolution, per its resolution of April 11, September 2, 1969 giving the parties certain periods to file their
1972, it, however, made the important modification that said denial pleadings and cancelling a scheduled hearing until it shall have
"does not constitute a denial of the right of the Republic to the resolved the motion to suspend.
cancellation of the titles nullified by the decision of Judge Tengco (in
Civil Case No. 373) affirmed by this Court (in G.R. No. L-20950)." It
Since that time, however, the trial court chose not, or failed, to act
also stated that: "(E)ven the (trial court's) order of October 27, 1970
formally on the aforesaid motion to suspend hearings. Then after five
about the resurvey merely held the remedy to be premature until the
(5) years, with the trial court now presided by Judge Arlegui,
decision in this case has become final. Of course, it is understood that
respondent Zobel flip-flopped and filed a Motion to Dismiss the case
in such eventuality, the resurvey requested by the Provincial
below dated January 14, 1976, claiming alleged failure to prosecute
Fiscal would be in order and as soon as the same is completed, the
and res judicata, which was vigorously opposed by herein petitioner.
proper writ of execution for the delivery of possession of the portions
Judge Arlegui, robot-like, nonetheless dismissed the Republic's
found to be public land should issue." (G.R. No. I, 26112, 44 SCRA
complaint for Zobel's alleged grounds of failure to prosecute for an
255, 262 [19721) Thus, the majority's denial of the motions for
unreasonable length of time and res judicata per his order of January
reconsideration was made expressly "with the clarification aforemade
12, 1977.
of the rights of the Republic."
Soon after the dismissal of the petition in G.R. No. 46396, respondent
1. On the original issue at bar brought against respondent Judge
Zobel filed in this case a "Motion to Dismiss Petition" and
Angeles" issuance of preliminary mandatory injunction per the
"Manifestation and Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining Order" issued
questioned Order of October 1, 1968, petitioner Republic and its co-
on March 7, 1969, and another supplemental motion, on the ground
petitioner licensees are manifestly entitled to the restraining orders
that the instant case has become moot and academic by the dismissal
issued by the Court on March 7, 1969 enjoining respondent judge from
of the complaint in Civil Case No. 653 in the court below. This was
enforcing the preliminary mandatory injunction that he had issued that
refuted by the herein petitioner in its Comment dated March 30, 1981.
would oust the Republic and its licensees from the public lands in
question and transfer possession thereof to respondent Zobel; that
On December 15, 1981, Judge Arlegui precipitately rendered in Civil issued on June 17, 1982 enjoining enforcement of respondent Judge
Case No. 653 a decision on the Counterclaim of herein respondent Arlegui's writ of execution issued on March 9, 1982 declaring without
Zobel, declaring him the true, absolute and registered owner of the trial respondent Zobel (on his counterclaim to the dismissed complaint)
lands covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 3699, T-7702 and as the true and registered owner of the lands covered by TCT Nos.
9262 (now No. 10031) and directing the Government's licensees and 3699, 7702 and 9262 (now 10031) and directing the Republic's
permittees occupying the same to vacate the lands held by them. licensees to vacate the same; and that issued on December 6, 1983
after the hearing on the merits, "enjoining respondent Enrique Zobel
and his agents, representatives and/ or any other person or persons
Subsequently, on March 9, 1982, Judge Arlegui issued a writ of
acting on his behalf to desist from cutting off or removing any tree in
execution in Civil Case No. 653, prompting the heirs of Guillermo
the questioned areas which were declared reverted to the public
Mercado to file in this case an Urgent Motion dated March 22,1982 to
domain and which are claimed by the Republic."
stay the same. Acting on the Urgent Motion, the "Court issued another
restraining order dated June 17, 1982, emphasizing the necessity
therefor in this wise: Respondent Judge Arlegui, after he succeeded Judge Angeles as
presiding judge, committed the gravest abuse of discretion, when,
instead of granting the preliminary injunction sought by the Republic
... the issuance of the restraining order now prayed for by movants-
and its co-petitioners to enjoin respondent Zobel from usurping lands
heirs of Guillermo Mercado is necessary to retain the status quo since
of the public domain covered by his voided expanded subdivision titles,
whatever rights they have are only in representation of the petitioner
he dismissed the complaint on January 12, 1977 and almost four years
Republic who claims the said lands by virtue of their reversion to the
later on December 15, 1981, without any trial, granted said
public dominion as specifically adjudged by this court in G.R. No. L-
respondent's counter prayer in his Answer to the complaint in Civil
26112.,
Case No. 653 for the issuance of a mandatory injunction upon a
P10,000.00 bond to oust petitioner Republic and its permittees and/or
Respondent Zobel then moved for a reconsideration and lifting of lessees from the property and to deliver possession thereof to
aforesaid restraining order. The heirs of intervenor Zoila de Chavez on respondent Zobel. It is settled doctrine that as a preliminary mandatory
the other hand, moved for a preliminary mandatory injunction to restore injunction usually tends to do more than to maintain the status quo, it is
them in possession of a Portion of the land in dispute from where they generally improper to issue such an injunction prior to the final hearing
had been ousted by virtue of the writ of execution issued in Civil Case and that it may issue only in cases of extreme urgency, where the right
No. 653. is very clear. 12
In a Consolidated Comment dated September 30, 1982, petitioner Contrary to respondent Zobel's assertion, the 1965 final judgment in
Republic opposed the said motion of respondent Zobel, and at the favor of the Republic declared as null and void, not only TCT No. 9550,
same time concurred with the motion filed by the heirs of Zoila de but also "other subdivision titles" issued over the expanded areas
Chavez for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. outside the private land of Hacienda Calatagan covered by TCT No.
722. As shown at the outset,13 after respondents ordered subdivision of
the Hacienda Calatagan which enabled them to acquire titles to
On or about November 8, 1983, the heirs of intervenor Guillermo and "illegally absorb" the subdivided lots which were outside the
Mercado filed an "Urgent Motion for Contempt and Issuance of a
hacienda's perimeter, they converted the same into fishponds and sold
Temporary Restraining Order, etc.," as respondent Zobel's them to third parties, But as the Court stressed in the 1965 judgment
representative, in spite of the restraining order enjoining them from and time and again in other cases, 'it is an elementary principle of law
enforcing the writ of execution, had begun to acquire possession of the
that said areas not being capable of registration, their inclusion in a
land in question by cutting off trees in the undeveloped fishpond being certificate of title does not convert the same into properties of private
leased by Mercado from the 7 government. ownership or confer title on the registrant." 14 This is crystal clear from
the dispositive portion or judgment which reads:
On November 10, 1983, the Court issued the corresponding restraining
order prayed for "enjoining respondent Enrique Zobel or his duly WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
authorized representative from further cutting off the trees in the
undeveloped fishpond of Guillermo Mercado having an area of two (2)
hectares, more or less, and from hauling the big trees already cut off (a) Declaring as null and void Transfer Certificate of Title No. T 550 (or
costing P10,000.00 "Resolution dated November 13, 1983). Exhibit "24") of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Batangas
and other subdivision titles issued in favor of Ayala y Cia and/or
Hacienda de Calatagan over the areas outside its private land covered
On or about November 23, 1983, the heirs of Guillermo Mercado filed by TCT No. 722, which including the lots in T-9550 (lots 360, 362, 363
a "Second Urgent Motion for Contempt and a Second Restraining
and 182) are hereby reverted to public dominion."
Order, etc." since, in spite of the foregoing restraining order issued by
this Court, respondent Zobel and his agent were still cutting off the
trees in the disputed areas. This final 1965 judgment reverting to public dominion all public lands
unlawfully titled by respondent Zobel and Ayala and/or Hacienda
Calatagan is now beyond question, review or reversal by any court,
On December 6, 1983, after the hearing en banc of this case on the although as sadly shown hereinabove, respondents' tactics and
merits, a resolution was rendered by this Court "to ISSUE a second
technical maneuvers have all these 23 long years thwarted its
temporary restraining order enjoining respondent Enrique Zobel and execution petition and the Republic's recovery of the lands and waters
his agents, representatives and/or any other person or persons acting of the public domain.
on his behalf to desist from cutting off or removing any tree in the
questioned areas which were declared reverted to the public domain
and which are claimed by the Republic, effective immediately and until Respondent Zobel is bound by his admission in his Answer to the
further orders by the Court. Complaint below that when Civil Case No. 373 was docketed, he "was
and still is at present one of the members and managing partners of
Ayala y Cia one of the defendants in the said civil case, and, therefore.
Against this background, respondent Zobel now contends that his TCT privy thereto."
No. 3699 and TCT No. 9262 (now T-10031) are valid and subsisting as
said titles "cannot be considered automatically annulled" by the
decision in G.R. No. L-20950; that the decision in G.R. No. L-20950 Clearly, the burden of proof lies on respondent Zobel and other
annulled only TCT No. 9550 and no other; that he cannot be bound by transferees to show that his subdivision titles are not among the
the decision in said G.R. No. L-20950 since he was not a party thereto; unlawful expanded subdivision titles declared null and void by the said
that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 653 and of the appeal therefrom by 1965 judgment. Respondent Zobel not only -did not controvert the
the Republic has quieted his questioned titles and has rendered the Republic's assertion that his titles are embraced within the phrase
instant petition moot and academic; that the decision on his "other subdivision titles" ordered cancelled but failed to show that the
counterclaim in Civil Case No. 653 declaring him to be the true and sub division titles in his name cover lands within the original area
covered by Ayala's TCT No. 722 (derived from OCT No. 20) and not cancellation of the subdivision titles covering the expanded areas
part of the beach, foreshore and territorial sea belonging and ordered outside the private lands of Hacienda Calatagan, is being frustrated by
reverted to public dominion in the aforesaid 1965 judgment. respondent Zobel, the Ayala and/or Hacienda Calatagan. As a
consequence, the mass usurpation of lands of public domain
consisting of portions of the territorial sea, the foreshore, beach and
2. The issues at bar have been expanded by the parties, as shown by
navigable water bordering Balayan Bay, Pagaspas Bay and the China
the voluminous records of the case (which have expanded to 2,690
Sea, still remain unabated . ... (T)he efforts of Ayala and Zobel to
pages in three volumes), to cover the questioned actions of respondent
prevent execution of said final judgment are evident from the
Judge Arlegui (a) in dismissing the Republic's complaint in Civil Case
heretofore-mentioned technical maneuvers they have resorted to. In
No. 653 of his court per his Order of January 12, 1977 (subject of the
brief, they moved to quash and secured the quashal of the writ of
Court's Second Division's Resolution of December 17, 1979 dismissing
execution, succeeded in opposing the issuance of another writ of
the Republic's petition for review in Case G.R. No. L,46396); and (b)
execution, opposed the motion to conduct re-survey, opposed the
his decision of December 15, 1981, after almost four years, on
approval and secured a disapproval of resurvey plan, moved to
respondent Zobel's counterclaim in the same case, declaring him the
dismiss and got a dismissal of Civil Case No. 653, ousted government
true and registered owner of the lands covered by some three
fishpond permittees from the subject lands and threatened to eject the
subdivision titles in his name, 15 as well as (c) the resurvey of the lands
other permittees therefrom, and secured from the lower court a
affected so as to properly segregate from Ayala's expanded TCT No.
declaration of validity of their void titles. Also, in this case, respondent
722 the estimated 2,000 hectares of territorial sea, foreshore, and
Zobel is trying to prevent the cancellation of his void titles by resorting
navigable waters, etc., of the public domain and enforcement and
to frivolous technicalities thus flouting this Honorable Court's decision
execution of the 1965 final judgment reverting these usurped public
in G.R. No. L-20950 . " 21
areas to public dominion. 16
As may be seen, Maria Concepcion Vidal was one of the original co-
We note on the face of TCT No. C-26086 that the same is a transfer
owners of the properties registered under the Original Certificate of
from Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994 which was registered
Title No. 994, issued by the Land Registration Court in Land
on April 19, 1917 pursuant to Decree No. 36455. The court a
Registration Case No. 4429, pursuant to Decree No. 36455 . . .
quo made the following findings of fact as regards the circumstances of
that transfer, as follows:
Thus, in said Decision . . . dated December 29, 1965, it ordered a
partition of the subject properties among the plaintiffs being the
. . . plaintiff [private respondent] purchased the two lots described as
successors-in-interest of Maria Concepcion Vidal.
Lots No. 65 and 66 from Felicidad Rivera, Benito Rivera and Victoria
Rivera, the legal heirs of Bartolome Rivera, as evidenced by a deed of
absolute sale . . . which was registered on August 2, 1979, under It bears emphasis that in said Decision of December 29, 1965 . . . it
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 26086 . . . states, in part, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx . . . This undivided share of Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, consisting of
1-189/1000 per cent of the properties described in Original Certificates
of Title Nos. 982, 983, 984, 985 and 994, has never been sold or
Bartolome Rivera and his co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. C-424 are the
disposed of by said Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, and therefore, her
successors-in-interests of Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, and in a
said share now belongs to the herein plaintiffs who are the surviving
Decision, dated December 29, 1965, rendered by the Court of First
heirs of the said Maria de la Concepcion Vidal and entitled to said
Instance of Rizal in Civil Case No. C-424, an action for partition and
undivided share in the following proportions: Bartolome Rivera, 1/3 of
accounting . . . it ordered the partition for the plaintiffs of the properties
1-89/1000 per
described under Original Certificates of Titles Nos. 982, 983, 984, 985
cent . . . These plaintiffs, therefore, are now co-owners of the parcels
and 994. [emphasis supplied]
of land described in Original Certificates of Title Nos. 982, 983, 984,
985 and 994, in the aforestated proportions and entitled to demand the
In Civil Case No. 4557, the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, under partition of said properties. (emphasis supplied)
Presiding Judge Cecilia Munoz-Palma, ordered the Register of Deeds
of Rizal to cancel the name of Maria de la Concepcion Vidal from
Evidently, the sale of the property by Jose Eugenio to defendant Luis
Original Certificate of Title No. 994 and substitute in lieu thereof the
Gonzaga on November 29, 1960 has no valid basis.
name of Bartolome Rivera and his co-plaintiffs.
In final focus is the Court Order issued by the Court of First Instance of
Evidently, Bartolome Rivera, the predecessor-in-interest of herein
Rizal . . . in Civil Case No. C-1796 ordering the issuance of a transfer
plaintiffs appears as co-owner in the Original Certificate of Title No.
certificate of title in favor of plaintiffs [private respondents] over several
994 . . . .11
parcels of land including the two lots in questions.
It is the contention of petitioner MWSS that since its TCT No. 41028
was issued in 1940 while the TCT No. 15167 of private respondents
was issued only in 1978, petitioner's title prevails over that of private
respondents' in point of priority of issuance.
We do not agree.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-67451 September 28, 1987 In its answer to the third-party complaint, QCDFC asserted the validity
of its own title alleging that it is the title in the name of Realty which is
null and void. QCDFC also filed a fourth-party complaint against
REALTY SALES ENTERPRISE, INC. and MACONDRAY FARMS,
Carmelino Alvendia, Esperanza Alvendia, Felicisimo Alvendia,
INC., petitioners,
Josefina Alvendia, Jacinto G. Miranda, Rosa G. Miranda, Isabel G.
vs.
Miranda, and Feliciano G. Miranda, alleging that it bought said parcels
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Special Third Civil Cases
of land from them. It prayed that in the event of an unfavorable
Division), HON. RIZALINA BONIFACIO VERA, as Judge, Court of
judgment against it, fourth-party defendants be ordered to reimburse
First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXIII, MORRIS G. CARPO, QUEZON
the purchase price which the corporation paid to them. However,
CITY DEVELOPMENT AND FINANCING CORPORATION, and
QCDFC failed to prosecute its case, and the fourth-party complaint
COMMISSIONER OF LAND REGISTRATION, respondents.
was dismissed for lack of interest.
CORTES, J.:
After hearing, the Vera Court rendered judgment on January 20, 1981,
sustaining the title of Morris G. Carpo to the two (2) lots in question
The litigation over the ownership of the parcels of land which are the and declaring the titles of Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc. and QCDFC
subject of this petition started in 1927 when an application for their null and void.
registration under the Torrens System was first filed. In the present
petition for review Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc. (hereafter referred to
On March 20, 1981, Realty filed a Petition for certiorari with this Court
as Realty) and Macondray Farms, Inc. (hereafter referred to as
docketed as G.R. No. L-56471 questioning the decision of the lower
Macondray) seek a reversal of the Resolution of May 2, 1984 of the
court. It also asked that it be allowed to appear directly to this Court as
Intermediate Appellate Court, and an affirmance of the Court of
it was raising only questions of law. After respondents filed their
Appeals Decision of December 29, 1982.
comments to said petition, this Court passed a resolution dated
October 19, 1981 referring the case to the Court of Appeals "in aid of
Two (2) adjacent parcels of land located in Almanza, Las Pias, Metro its appellate jurisdiction for proper determination on the merits of the
Manila, having an aggregate area of 373,868 sq. m., situated in the appeal."
vicinity of the Ayala Alabang Project and BF Homes Paraaque are
covered by three (3) distinct sets of Torrens titles to wit:
In its decision dated December 29, 1982, the Court of Appeals,
through its Ninth Division, with Justice Patajo asponente, concurred in
1) TCT No. 20408 issued on May 29, 1975 in the name of Realty Sales by Justices Gopengco and Kapunan, set aside the decision of the trial
Enterprise, Inc., which was derived from OCT No. 1609, issued on May court and rendered a new one upholding the validity of the title in the
21, 1958, pursuant to Decree No. N-63394 in LRC Cases Nos. 657, name of Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc. and declaring null and void the
758 and 976, GLRO Record Nos. N-29882, N-33721 and N-43516, titles in the name of Carpo and QCDFC.
respectively.
Carpo filed a motion for reconsideration with the appellate court. In the
2) TCT No. 303961 issued on October 13, 1970 in the name of Morris meantime, by virtue and pursuant to Batas Pambansa Bldg. 129, or the
G. Carpo, which was derived from OCT No. 8629, issued on October Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, the Court of Appeals was
13, 1970 pursuant to decree No. N-131349 in LRC Case No. N-11-M reorganized into the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC). As a
(N-6217), GLRO Record No. N-32166. consequence, there was a re-raffling of cases and the case was
assigned to the Second Special Cases Division which, however,
returned the records of the case for another re-raffling to the Civil
3) TCTs Nos. 333982 and 333985, issued on July 27, 1971 in the Cases Divisions as it deemed itself without authority to act on
name of Quezon City Development and Financing Corporation, derived a civil case in view of the allocation of cases to the different divisions of
from OCT No. 8931 which was issued on July 27, 1971 pursuant to
the IAC under Section 8 of BP 129. The case was then assigned to the
LRC Case No. P-206 GLRO Record No. N-31777. Third Civil Cases Division, composed of Justices de la Fuente, Coquia,
Zosa and Bartolome.
On December 29, 1977, Morris Carpo filed a complaint with the Court
of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXIII, presided over by Judge Justices Coquia and Bartolome inhibited themselves, and Justices
Rizalina Bonifacio Vera (hereafter referred to as Vera Court), for Camilon and Bidin were assigned to the Third Civil Cases Division.
"declaration of nullity of Decree No. N-63394 and TCT No. 20408."
Named defendants were Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc., Macondray
Farms, Inc. and the Commissioner of Land Registration. Subsequently, On May 2, 1984, the IAC, through its Special Third Civil Cases
however, Carpo withdrew his complaint as against the last named Division, with Justice Zosa as ponente; concurred in by Justices
defendant, and the answer filed on behalf of said government official Camilon and Bidin, promulgated its Resolution granting Carpo's motion
was ordered stricken off the record. The complaint alleged that TCT for reconsideration, reversing and setting aside the decision of
No. 20408 as well as OCT No. 1609 from which it was derived, is a December 29, 1982, and affirming the decision of the trial court.
nullity as the CFI of Rizal, Branch VI, then presided over by Judge Hence, this petition docketed as G.R. No. 67451.
Andres Reyes (hereafter referred to as the Reyes Court) which issued
the order dated May 21, 1958 directing the issuance of a decree of
Petitioners assign the following errors:
registration, was not sitting as a land registration court, but as a court
of ordinary jurisdiction. It was further alleged that the original records of
LRC Case No. 657, GLRO Record No. 29882 which was the basis for I
the issuance of said order of May 21, 1958, were lost and/or destroyed
during World War II and were still pending reconstitution; hence, the
The SPECIAL THIRD CIVIL CASES DIVISION of the Intermediate
Reyes Court had no authority to order the issuance of a certificate of
Appellate Court (for brevity, referred to herein as SPECIAL DIVISION)
title.
which promulgated the disputed RESOLUTION of May 2, 1984 had no
legal standing under the provisions of Batas Pambansa Bldg. 129 and,
Realty and Macondray alleged in their answer that the Reyes Court as such, not vested with jurisdiction and adjudicatory power to
was acting as a court of land registration and in issuing the order of pronounce any decision of final resolution for the Court.
May 21, 1958, was actually performing a purely ministerial duty for the
registration court in Case No. 657, GLRO Record No. 29882 (and the
II
two other cases, Cases Nos. 758 and 976, with which said case had
been jointly tried and decided) which on August 19, 1935 had rendered
a decision adjudicating the two (2) lots in question to Estanislao On the assumption that the SPECIAL DIVISION is legally vested with
Mayuga (father of Dominador Mayuga, predecessor-in-interest of jurisdiction and adjudicatory powers under the provisions of BP 129, it
Realty and Macondray), which decision was upheld by the Court of decided questions of substance contrary to law and the applicable
Appeals. It was alleged that it is the title of Carpo which is null and decisions of the Supreme Court because:
void, having been issued over a parcel of land previously registered
under the Torrens System in favor of another.
(a) The SPECIAL DIVISION'S Resolution of May 2, 1984 amounted to
a denial to the Petitioners of their right to appeal and judicial review
With leave of court, Realty and Macondray filed a third-party complaint over fundamental issues of law duly raised by them in their Petition for
against the Quezon City Development and Financing Corporation Review on certiorari (G.R. No. 56471), as authorized by the
(hereafter referred to as QCDFC) and the Commissioner of Land Constitution (Art. X, sec. 5 (2) (e), the provisions of the Judiciary Act of
Registration alleging that TCTs Nos. 333982 and 333985 in the name 1948 and Rule 42, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court; and
of QCDFC also covered the same parcels of land subject of the
dispute between Carpo and the two corporations, Realty and
Macondray. They thus prayed that Decree No. N-135938 issued on (b) By its RESOLUTION of May 2, 1984, it ruled that the decision of
the Court of Appeals could not have gained the nature of a proper and
July 22, 1971, OCT No. 8931 issued on July 27, 1971, as well as TCTs
Nos. 333982 and 333985 derived from OCT No. 8931 be declared null valid judgment as the latter had no power to pass upon the appealed
and void. judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (the Vera Court), as
appeal and not certiorari was the proper remedy;
Furthermore, the said SPECIAL DIVISION grossly departed from the Thus, the reassignment of Justices Bidin and Camilon to form the
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings by giving a Special Third Civil Cases Division in view of the voluntary inhibition of
perverted and obviously unjustified and illogical interpretation of the two (2) "regular" members, is still within legal bounds. Otherwise, a
RESOLUTION of July 25, 1983, of the Ninth Division of the Court of situation would have arisen where a regular division could not decide a
Appeals, holding and declaring that "it has in effect erased or cancelled particular case because some members thereof inhibited themselves
the validity of (the DECISION of December 29, 1982), when the said from participating in said case.
RESOLUTION merely "RESOLVED to return the records of the case ...
for re-raffling and reassignment ... in view of the allocation of cases to
2. The second assigned error involves a determination of the
the different Divisions of the Intermediate Appellate Court under
correctness of the ruling of the IAC that the CA Decision of December
Section 8 of BP 129.
29, 1982 could not have gained the nature of a proper and valid
judgment (since appeal and not certiorari was the proper remedy) and
III that the Resolution of July 25, 1983 had in effect erased or cancelled
the validity of said Decision.
The SPECIAL DIVISION by confirming the appealed judgment of the
lower court in effect sanctioned the contemptible disregard of law and The IAC said in its Resolution of May 2,1984:
jurisprudence committed by Judge Vera, which call for an exercise of
the power of supervision;
Said resolution of July 25, 1983, to Our view, was effectively an
acknowledgment by the Division that promulgated it that the earlier
IV Decision dated December 29, 1983 rendered in a Special Civil Action
case for certiorari, CA-G.R. No. SP-13530, was not appropriate and
beyond the authority of the Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals to
The SPECIAL DIVISION did state in its RESOLUTION of May 2, 1984
promulgate. The said Resolution was actually a statement that the
a deliberate falsehood, namely, that Morris G. Carpo is a purchaser in
Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals had over-stepped its bounds by
good faith and for value when there is absolutely no evidence, whether
reviewing in certiorari proceedings a decision in a purely civil case that
written or testimonial, that was presented by Carpo, or by anyone else
should have passed through the processes of an ordinary appeal. We
that he was, in fact, a purchaser for value and in good faith a
are not aware of any legal doctrine that permits an appellate court to
material matter which was neither alleged nor referred to in the
treat a petition for review on certiorari upon purely questions of law,
complaint and in all the pleadings, nor covered by any of the exhibits
such as that filed by petitioners herein, as an ordinary appeal. Neither
presented by all of the parties herein and solely on the bases of which
can we find any legal basis or justification for the election by the
the case at bar was submitted by the parties for consideration and
appellate court of the essential requisites then prescribed for the
decision.
validity of an appeal, such as the submission of a formal notice of
appeal, an appeal bond and approved record on appeal. Without any
1. To support their contention that the Special Third Civil Cases of these mandatory requisites, the appeal could not have been
Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court which promulgated the deemed perfected and ought to have been dismissed outright.
Resolution of May 2, 1984 had no legal standing under the provisions
of BP 129 and, as such, not vested with jurisdiction and adjudicatory
The Court does not agree.
power, petitioners cite Sections 4 and 8 of BP 129, to wit:
There are two modes by which cases decided by the then Courts of
Sec. 4. Exercise of powers and functions.The Intermediate Appellate
First Instance in their original jurisdiction may be reviewed: (1) an
Court shall exercise its powers, functions and duties, through ten (10)
ordinary appeal either to the Supreme Court or to the Court of Appeals,
divisions, each composed of five members. The Court may sit en
or (2) an appeal on certiorari to the Supreme Court. To the latter
banc only for the purpose of exercise administrative, ceremonial or
category belong cases in which only errors or questions of law are
other non-adjudicatory functions.
involved. Each of these modes have different procedural requirements.
Petitioners argue that the so-called Special Third Civil Cases Division,
Similarly, the IAC Special Civil Cases Division erred in interpreting the
not being one of the ten (10) Divisions of the Court duly vested with
Resolution dated July 25, 1983 of the Second Special Cases Division
jurisdiction, had no adjudicatory powers. It is also alleged that the
(to which the case was assigned after the reorganization under BP
reassignment of Justices Bidin and Camilon is violative of the
129) as having "erased or cancellation" the validity of the Decision of
injunction against appointment of an appellate Justice to a class of
the Ninth Division. A perusal of said Resolution shows that it merely
divisions other than that to which he is appointed. (Petition, pp. 21-26.)
made clarification about the nature of the case and why it should be
reassigned to the Civil Cases Division of the IAC. There was not the
This contention has no merit. A reading of the law will readily show that slightest implication that it "erased or cancelled" the validity of the
what BP 129 prohibits is appointment from one class of divisions to Decision of the Ninth Division.
another class. For instance, a Justice appointed to the Criminal Cases
Divisions cannot be assigned to the Civil Cases Divisions.
Even the IAC Special Third Civil Cases Division impliedly admitted the
validity of the Decision of the Ninth Division when it granted Carpo's
Justice Bidin was reassigned from the Fourth Civil Cases Division, motion for reconsideration. It would have been incongruous to grant a
while Justice Camilon was reassigned from the Second Civil Cases motion to reconsider a decision, reverse and set it aside, if in the first
Division. The two therefore come from the same class of divisions to place it did not have any validity. It would have been necessary only to
which they were appointed. decide its invalidity.
3. In the third assigned error, Petitioners contend that the Vera Court, Respondent Carpo, however, contends, that since the records of LRC
and the IAC Special Third Civil Cases Division, erred in upholding the Case No. 657 were not properly reconstituted, then there was no
validity of the title in the name of Carpo and declaring null and void the pending land registration case. And since the Reyes Court was acting
titles in the names of Realty and of QCDFC. without a pending case, it was acting without jurisdiction. (Respondent
Carpo's Memorandum, pp, 2-8.)
The basis of the complaint fired by Carpo, which was the same basis
for the of the Vera Court and the IAC Special Division, is that the He cites the case of Villegas v. Fernando (L-27347, April 29, 1969, 27
Reyes Court had no authority to issue the order of May 21, 1958 SCRA 1119) where this Court said that upon failure to reconstitute
directing the issuance of a decree of registration in favor of Mayuga, pursuant to law, "the parties are deemed to have waived the effects of
predecessor-in-interest of Realty, as it was not sitting as a land the decision rendered in their favor and their only alternative is to file
registration court and also because the original records of LRC Case an action anew for the registration in their names of the lots in
No. 657, Record No. N-29882 were lost and/or destroyed during World question," citing the case of Ambat v. Director of Lands, (92) Phil. 567
War II and were still pending reconstitution. [1953]) and other cases. The basis of said ruling is Section 29 of Act
No. 3110, an Act to provide an adequate procedure for the
reconstitution of the records of pending judicial proceedings and
Under Act No. 496, Land Registration Act, (1902) as amended by Act
books, documents, and files of the office of the register of deeds,
No. 2347 (1914), jurisdiction over all applications for registration of title
destroyed by fire or other public calamities, and for other purposes.
to and was conferred upon the Courts of First Instance of the
respective provinces in which the land sought to be registered is
situated. However, the Ambat case, in so far as it ruled on the effect of failure to
reconstitute records on the status of the case in its entirety, was
modified in the case of Nacua v. de Beltran, (93) Phil. 595 [1953]).
Jurisdiction over land registration cases, as in ordinary actions, is
where this Court said:
acquired upon the filing in court of the application for registration, and
is retained up to the end of the litigation. The issuance of a decree of
registration is but a step in the entire land registration process; and as (W)e are inclined to modify the ruling (in the Ambat case) in the sense
such, does not constitute a separate proceeding. that Section 29 of Act No. 3110 should be applied only where the
records in the Court of First Instance as well as in the appellate court
were destroyed or lost and were not reconstituted, but not where the
In the case at bar, it appears that it was Estanislao Mayuga, father of
records of the Court of First Instance are intact and complete, and only
Dominador Mayuga, predecessor-in-interest of Realty, who originally
the records in the appellate court were lost or destroyed, and were not
filed on June 24, 1927 a registration proceeding docketed as LRC
reconstituted. One reason for this view is that section 29 of Act 3110 is
Case No. 657, GLRO Record No. N-29882 in the Court of First
found among the sections and provisions dealing with the
Instance of Rizal to confirm his title over parcels of land described as
reconstitution of records in the Court of First Instance in pending civil
Lots 1, 2 and 3, Plan Psu-47035. (Lots 2 and 3 the subject of the
cases, special proceedings, cadastral cases and criminal cases. A
instant litigation among Carpo, RRealty and QCDFC.) Case No. 657
study of Act (No.) 3110 ... who show that there are separate
was jointly tried with two other cases, LRC Case No. 976, GLRO
procedures for the reconstitution of records in the Justice of the Peace
Record No. 43516 filed by Eduardo Guico and LRC Case No. 758,
Courts, from Sec. 48 to Sec. 53; for the reconstitution of records in the
GLRO Record No. 33721 filed by Florentino Baltazar, as the three
Supreme Court, now including the Court of Appeals, from Sec. 54 to
cases involved Identical parcels of land, and Identical
Sec. 74; for the reconstitution of records in the office of the Register of
applicants/oppositors.
Deeds, from Sec. 75 to Sec. 90 and for the reconstitution of destroyed
records in the Courts of First Instance, from Sec. 1 to Sec. 47, under
On August 19, 1935 the CFI-Rizal acting as a land registration court which sections, Sec. 29 is obviously comprehended.
issued a consolidated decision on the three cases, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
The whole theory of reconstitution is to reproduce or replace records
lost or destroyed so that said records may be complete and court
En meritos de to do lo expuesto, se ordena el registro de los lotes, 1, 2 proceedings may continue from the point or stage where said
y 3 del plans PSU-47035 a nombre de Estanislao Mayuga, desist proceedings stopped due to the loss of the records. The law
oposicion de Florentino Baltazar y Eduardo Guico con respects a contemplates different stages for purposes of reconstitution. . . .
dichos lotes....
. . . (S)ection 4 covers the stage were a civil case was pending trial in
On appeal, the above decision of the CFI was affirmed by the Court of the Court of First Instance at the time the record was destroyed or lost;
Appeals in its decision dated November 17, 1939. the dispositive section 6 evidently refers to the stage where the case had been tried
portion of which reads: and decided but was still pending in the Court of First Instance at the
time the record was destroyed or lost; section 6 covers the stage
where the case was pending in the Supreme Court (or Court of
Por todas last consideraciones expuestas confirmamos la decision Appeals) at the time the record was destroyed or lost. *
apelada en cuanto adjudica a Estanislao Mayuga los lotes, 1, 2 y 3 de
such piano y que equivalent a lost lotes, 4, 5 y 6 del plano de Baltazar
y 4 y 5 del plans de Guico. If the records up to a certain point or stage are lost and they are not
reconstituted, the parties and the court should go back to the next
preceding age where records are available, but not beyond that;
xxx xxx xxx otherwise to ignore and go beyond the stage next preceding would be
voiding and unnecessarily ignoring proceedings which are duly
Guico filed a petition for review on certiorari before this Court, but the recorded and documented, to the great prejudice not only of the parties
petition was dismissed and the Court of Appeals decision was affirmed and their witnesses, but also of the court which must again perforce
(See Guico v. San Pedro, 72 Phil. 415 [1941]). admit pleadings, rule upon them and then try the case and decide it
anew,-all of these, when the records up to said point or stage are intact
and complete, and uncontroverted.
Before he could secure a decree of registration in his name, Estanislao
died.
xxx xxx xxx
On May 13, 1958 Dominador Mayuga, son of Estanislao, filed a
petition with the Reyes Court docketed as Case No. 2689 alleging that . . . (T)o require the parties to file their action anew and incur the
he was the only heir of the deceased Estanislao Mayuga and praying expenses and (suffer) the annoyance and vexation incident to the filing
for the issuance of a decree of registration over the property of pleadings and the conduct of hearings, aside from the possibility that
adjudicated in favor of Estanislao. At this point, it cannot be some of the witnesses may have died or left the jurisdiction, and also
overemphasized that the petition filed by Dominador is NOT a distinct to require the court to again rule on the pleadings and hear the
and separate proceeding from, but a continuation of, the original land witnesses and then decide the case, when an along and all the time
registration proceedings initiated by Estanislao Mayuga, Florentino the record of the former pleadings of the trial and evidence and
Baltazar and Eduardo Guico. In the same vein, the Reyes Court, as decision are there and are not disputed, all this would appear to be not
Branch VI of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, was continuing in the exactly logical or reasonable, or fair and just to the parties, including
exercise of jurisdiction over the case, which jurisdiction was vested in the trial court which has not committed any negligence or fault at all.
the CFI-Rizal upon filing of the original applications.
The ruling in Nacua is more in keeping with the spirit and intention of
On May 21, 1958 the Reyes Court issued an order granting the petition the reconstitution law. As stated therein, "Act 3110 was not
of Dominador Mayuga and directing the Commissioner of Land promulgated to penalize people for failure to observe or invoke its
Registration to issue a decree of registration over Lots 1, 2 and 3 of provisions. It contains no penal sanction. It was enacted rather to aid
Plan Psu-47035, substituting therein as registered owner Dominador and benefit litigants, so that when court records are destroyed at any
Mayuga in liue of Estanislao. stage of judicial proceedings, instead of instituting a new case and
starting all over again, they may reconstitute the records lost and
continue the case. If they fail to ask for reconstitution, the worst that
can happen to them is that they lose the advantages provided by the
reconstitution law" (e.g. having the case at the stage when the records In this jurisdiction, it is settled that "(t)he general rule is that in the case
were destroyed). of two certificates of title, purporting to include the same land, the
earlier in date prevails . . . . In successive registrations, where more
than one certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate or interest
Applying the doctrine in the Nacua decision to LRC Case No. 657, the
in land, the person claiming under the prior certificate is entitled to the
parties thereto did not have to commence a new action but only had to
estate or interest; and that person is deemed to hold under the prior
go back to the preceding stage where records are available. The land
certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived directly or
registration case itself re. mained pending and the Court of First
indirectly from the person who was the holder of the earliest certificate
Instance of Rizal continued to have jurisdiction over it.
issued in respect thereof . . . ." (Legarda and Prieto v. Saleeby, 31 Phil.
590 [1915] at 595-596; Garcia V. CA, Nos. L-48971 and 49011,
The records were destroyed at that stage of the case when an that January 22, 1980, 95 SCRA 380.)
remained to be done was the ministerial duty of the Land Registration
Office to issue a decree of registration (which would be the basis for
TCT No. 20408 derived from OCT 1609, is therefore superior to TCT
the issuance of an Original Certificate of Title) to implement a judgment
No. 303961 derived from OCT 8629.
which had become final (See Government v. Abural, 39 Phil. 996
[1919] at 1002; Sta. Ana v. Menla, 111 Phil. 947 [1961], 1 SCRA 1294;
Heirs of Cristobal Marcos v. De Banuvar, 134 Phil. 257 [1968], 26 5. For its part, respondent Quezon City Development and Financing
SCRA 316). There are however authentic copies of the decisions of Corporation (QCDFC) alleges that it has been improperly impleaded as
the CFI and the Court of Appeals adjudicating Lots 1, 2 and 3 of Plan thirty-party defendant inasmuch as Realty's alleged cause of action
Psu-47035 to Estanislao Mayuga. Moreover, there is an official report against it is neither for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other
of the decision of this Court affirming both the CFI and the CA relief in respect of Carpo's claim against Realty. It likewise alleges that
decisions. A final order of adjudication forms the basis for the issuance Realty had no cause of action against it since the third party complaint
of a decree of registration. did not allege that QCDFC violated any legal right of Realty, QCDFC
also assails the Vera Court decision in that it declares QCDFC directly
liable to Carpo and not to Realty.
Considering that the Reyes court was actually in the exercise of its
jurisdiction as a land registration court when it issued the order
directing the issuance of a decree of registration, "substituting therein In the first place, QCDFC did not appeal from the decision of the Vera
as registered owner Dominador Mayuga, in hue of the original Court, nor from the decision of the Court of Appeals dated December
adjudicates, Estanislao Mayuga, based on the affidavit of self- 29, 1982, nor from the resolution of the IAC Special Third Civil Cases
adjudication, subject to the provisions of Sec. 4, Rule 74 of the Rules Division dated May 2, 1984 all of which voided QCDFCs title to the
of Court," which order is in consonance with the ruling of this Court in disputed property. Hence, said decisions/resolution have become final
the Guico decision, and the decisions of the CFI-Rizal and the CA and executory as regards QCDFC.
dated August 19, 1935 and November 17, 1939, respectively, We
uphold the validity of said order and rule that Judge Vera was without
Moreover, even as this Court agrees with QCDFC that the third-party
jurisdiction to set it aside.
complaint filed against it by Realty was procedurally defective in that
the relief being sought by the latter from the former is not in respect of
4. In upholding the title of Carpo as against those of Realty and Carpo's claim, policy considerations and the factual circumstances of
QCDFC, the Special Division also relied on Carpo's being an innocent the case compel this Court now to rule as well on QCDFC's claim to
purchaser for value. the disputed property. ** To rule on QCDFC's claim now is to avoid
multiplicity of suits and to put to rest these conflicting claims over the
property. After an, QCDFC was afforded fun opportunity, and
Whether or not Carpo is an innocent purchaser for value was never
exercised its right, to prove its claim over the land. It presented
raised as an issue in the trial court. A perusal of the records of the
documentary as well as testimonial evidence. It was even permitted to
case reveals that no factual basis exists to support such a conclusion.
file a fourth-party complaint which, however, was dismissed since it
Even Carpo himself cites no factual proof of his being an innocent
failed to prosecute its case.
purchaser for value. He merely relies on the presumption of good faith
under Article 527 of the Civil Code.
QCDFC derived its title from Carmelino Alvendia et. al., the original
registered owners. Original Certificate of Title No. 8931 in the name of
It is settled that one is considered an innocent purchaser for value only
Spouses Carmelino Alvendia, et. al. was issued on July 27, 1971, or
if, relying on the certificate of title, he bought the property from the
thirteen (13) years after the issuance of Mayuga's title in 1958.
registered owner, "without notice that some other person has a right to,
or interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for the same,
at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or Since Realty is claiming under TCT No. 1609 which was issued earlier
interest of some other persons in the property." (Cui v. Henson, 51 than OCT No. 8931 from which QCDFC's title was derived, Realty's
Phil. 606 [1928], Fule v. De Legare, 117 Phil. 367 [1963], 7 SCRA title must prevail over that of QCDFC.
351.) He is not required to explore farther than what the Torrens title
upon its face indicates. (Fule v. De Legare supra.)
6. During the pendency of this case, Petitioners filed a manifestation
alleging that the case at bar is closely connected with G.R. No. L-
Carpo bought the disputed property from the Baltazars, the original 469953, Jose N. Mayuga et. al. v. The Court of Appeals, Macondray
registered owners, by virtue of a deed executed before Iluminada Farms, Inc., Realty Sales Enterprise, inc., et. al. and moved for
Figueroa, Notary Public of Manila dated October 9, 1970. However, it consolidation of the two cases involving as they do the same property.
was only later, on October 13, 1970, that the decree of registration in By Resolution of August 29, 1984, this Court denied the motion for
favor of the Baltazars was transcribed in the Registration Book for the consolidation.
Province of Rizal and that an Original Certificate of Title was issued. It
was on the same day, October 13, 1970, that the deed evidencing the
In this connection, it must be emphasized that the action filed by Carpo
sale between the Baltazars and Carpo was inscribed in the Registry of
against Realty is in the nature of an action to remove clouds from title
Property, and the Original Certificate of Title was cancelled as Transfer
to real property. By asserting its own title to the property in question
Certificate of Title No. 303961 in the name of Carpo was issued.
and asking that Carpo's title be declared null and void instead, and by
(Exhibit 12, Rollo pp. 270-273.)
filing the third-party complaint against QCDFC, Realty was similarly
asking the court to remove clouds from its own title. Actions of such
Thus, at the time of sale there was as yet no Torrens title which Carpo nature are governed by Articles 476 to 481, Quieting of Title, Civil
could have relied upon so that he may qualify as an innocent Code (Republic Act No. 386), and Rule 64, Declaratory Relief and
purchaser for value. Not being a purchaser for value and in good faith, Similar Remedies, Rules of Court.
he is in no better position than his predecessors-in-interest.
Suits to quiet title are not technically suits in rem, nor are they, strictly
The Baltazars, predecessors-in-interest of Carpo are heirs of speaking, in personam, but being against the person in respect of
Florentino Baltazar, an oppositor in the original application filed by the res, these proceedings are characterized as quasi in
Estanislao Mayuga in 1927. As stated earlier, the CFI-Rizal confirmed rem. (McDaniel v. McElvy, 108 So. 820 [1926].) The judgment in such
the title of Estanislao to Lots 1, 2 and 3 of Plan Psu-47035 proceedings is conclusive only between the parties. (Sandejas v.
"desestimando oposicion de Florentino Baltazar . . . con respeto a Robles, 81 Phil. 421 [1948]).
dichos lotes . . ." As such successors of Florentino, they could not
pretend ignorance of the land registration proceedings over the
The ruling in this case is therefore without any prejudice to this Court's
disputed parcels of land earlier initiated by Eduardo Guico, Florentino
final determination of G.R. No. L-46953.
Baltazar and Estanislao Mayuga, as when as the decisions rendered
therein.
WHEREFORE, the Resolution of May 2,1984 of the Intermediate
Appellate Court and the Decision of January 20, 1981 of the CFI-Rizal
Moreover, it is not disputed that the title in the name of Dominador
Branch XXIII, are SET ASIDE and the Decision of December 29, 1982
Mayuga, from whom Realty derived its title, was issued in 1958, or
of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
twelve years before the issuance of the title in the name of the
Baltazars in 1970.
G.R. No. L-43679 October 28, 1980 Later, the disputed property was subdivided and the appellees herein
secured for themselves Transfer Certificates of Title in their names as
previously mentioned. Appellees also secured the corresponding Tax
LEONARDO N. AZARCON and ROSA CAJUCOM
Declarations in their names 11 and paid real estate taxes on the
AZARCON, plaintiffs-appellants,
property 12 from 1966-1969, as well as irrigation fees from 1956-1963
vs.
fully and partially for the years 1964-1968. 13
LEOPOLDO VALLARTA, LUIS T. VALLARTA, JULIAN T.
VALLARTA, CORAZON VALLARTA and EMILIO LORENZO
(Husband), defendants- appellees. The resultant situation then is a 10-hectare irrigated riceland sold
successively by its previous owner to the two sets of opposing parties
herein, and covered by two distinct original certificates of title in their
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:,
respective favor.
The controversy centers around a parcel of irrigated riceland situated Thus, on May 6, 1968, the Azarcons filed the instant Complaint for
at Sitio Bagnoy, San Juan de Dios, Aliaga, Nueva Ecija, of Cancellation and Annulment of Titles with the Court a quo, which the
approximately ten hectares, previously owned by Dr. Jose V. Cajucom, Vallartas traversed and controverted, and with each set of litigants
father of appellant ROSA Cajucom-Azarcon. It used to be covered by asserting the validity, superiority, and indefeasibility of their respective
two titles, namely, Original Certificate of Title No. P-28151 in the name titles. Without trial and only on the basis of memoranda and
of appellants Azarcons, and Original Certificate of Title No. L- documentary evidence submitted the lower Court rendered a Decision
3093 2 previously in the names of the appellees Vallartas, but now in favor of the Vallartas on December 27, 1969, the dispositive portion
covered by several Transfer Certificates of Title in their individual of which reads:
names. 3
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendants
Evidence for the appellees Vallartas shows that on March .14, 1932, and against the plaintiffs, and declaring plaintiff's Free Patent No.
Dr. Jose V. Cajucom sold to Julian Vallarta Sr., and his first wife 167650 and/or OCT No. P-2815 of the Land Records of Nueva Ecija
Francisca Trinidad, parents of the Vallartas, a parcel of agricultural null and void, and ordering the Register of Deeds of this Province to
land of nine hectares situated in Sitio Bagnoy, San Juan de Dios, cancel the same, at plaintiff's expense.
Aliaga, Nueva Ecija. The Vallartas claim that in a resurvey made on
September 6, 1959, their parents discovered that the land sold,
Dissatisfied with the judgment and with the denial of their Motion for
believed to be only nine hectares, was actually nineteen hectares.
Reconsideration, the Azarcons elevated the case to the Court of
Consequently, on October 7, 1960, Dr. Cajucom executed, in favor of
Appeals which certified the same to this Court.
Julian Vallarta, Sr., a "Waiver and Quit claim" over the excess ten
hectares, now in dispute, in consideration of the amount of P5,
000.00. 4 The land referred to in said document was that described in The Azarcons ascribe the following errors to the lower Court:
Psu-171661, a survey plan prepared for Dr. Cajucom on November 7,
1958, with an area of 106,632 square meters. A subsequent survey on
1. ... in holding that the land covered by the Free Patent Title of the
September 6, 1959 (psu-177178) disclosed an actual area of 102,704
plaintiffs-appellants is the private property of Jose V. Cajucom, Sr. and
sq. m. after deducting the areas covered by irrigation canals.
not a part of the public domain;
On the other hand, evidence for the appellants Azarcons also show
II. ... in holding that Free Patent No.16750 issued on May 8, 1961 and
that on October 20, 1959, a year before the aforementioned waiver, Dr.
registered in the Registry of Deeds of Nueva Ecija on July 18, 1961
Cajucom executed a "Deed of Absolut0e Sale" of the same land in
under Original Certificate of Title No. P-2815 is under section 91 of CA
favor of the Azarcons, in the amount of P20,000.00. The document
141, ipso facto cancelled is null and void;
also referred to the same plan Psu-171661 and recited that the
property was unregistered land and that it was the "paraphernal"
property of Dr. Cajucom having been inherited by him from his father III. ... in holding that the defendants are the owners and in actual
Nicolas Sarenas Cajucom.5 possession of the land in question since March 14, 1932, the same
having been sold by Jose V. Cajucom in favor of Julian Vallarta;
In 1961, appellant ROSA filed a Free Patent Application over the
disputed property. 6 In support of her application, ROSA presented the IV. ... in considering that the Land Title no. 3093 of the defendants is
affidavits of Antonio Puno, Antonio de la Cruz, Bruno Santos and superior to the Free Patent Title of the plaintiff-appellants
Emilio Sanguesa attesting to the actual occupation and cultivation of
the land in dispute since 1934 by herself and/or her predecessors-in-
interest. 7 The Free Patent Application was approved on February 26, V. ... in not considering the counterclaim filed by defendants for which
they paid no docket fee to the clerk of court a collateral attack to the
1961 and Free Patent Entry No. 18504 was thereafter issued by the
Director of Lands. 8 title of the plaintiffs-appellants.
The foregoing take issue with the following findings of the trial Court:
On May 8, 1961, the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija issued Original
Certificate of Title No. P-2815 in the name of the Azarcons.
In view of the existence of two distinct titles over the same property it is
thus clear that the only issue to be resolved by this Court is: which of
Going back to the Vallartas, their evidence further discloses that on
May 12, 1964, Julian Vallarta, Sr. sold his one half portion of the the two titles must prevail, is it Free Patent No. 167690 of the plaintiffs
disputed property to his children by his first wife who died in 1959, or Original Certificate of Title No. L-3093 (now Transfer Certificate of
Titles Nos. 67396, 67397, 80934 and 80936) of the defendants?
namely, Jaime, Julian, Jr., Francisca, Luis, Corazon, Librada, Cesar,
Roberto, Mariano and Leopoldo, all surnamed Vallarta, in the amount
of P10,000.00. 9 Upon consideration of the applicable laws and jurisprudence, the Court
decides the foregoing issues in favor of the defendants.
Sometime in 1965, the Vallarta heirs, including appellees, filed with the
Court of First Instance, Branch III, Nueva Ecija, an application for A free patent which purports to convey land to which the government
registration of the disputed property (LRC Rec. No. L-26618). The did not have any title at the time of its issuance does not vest any title
opposition of the Director of Lands and the Director of Forestry having in the patentee as against the true owner (Suva vs. Ventura, 40 Off.
been withdrawn, decision was rendered on April 18, 1966 affirming the Gaz., pp. 47-48, 4th Supp., Aug. 2341, Ct. App; Ramoso vs. Obligado,
title of the Vallarta heirs and ordering registration in their 70 Phil. 86; Director of Lands vs. Reyes, 69 Phil. 497: Vital vs. Anora,
names, 10 Conformably thereto, on July 18, 1966, the Register of G. R. No. L-4176, February 29, 1952). Plaintiffs were fully aware that
Deeds of Nueva Ecija issued Original Certificate of Title No. L-3093 in on February 26, 1961 when their application was approved, the land in
the name of the aforementioned Vallarta heirs. question was not a part of the public domain as to be disposable by the
Director of Lands, because as early as October 20, 1959 by virtue of
their Exh. 'A' they knew too well that the land of the private ownership
of the patentees' father Jose V. Cajucom from when they allegedly
bought the same for P 2,000.00. That said land was no longer a part of Costs against plaintiffs-appellants.
the public domain but of the private ownership of Jose V. Cajucom
even before the Second World War is further attested by the fact that
SO ORDERED.
as early as March 14, 1932 the Same owner had disposed of his
private property to defendant's predecessors and reaffirmed by him on
October 7, 1960 (Exh. '3'). Pursuant to the abovecited cases, where a
person, who obtained free patent, knowingly made a false statement of
material and essential facts in his application, by stating that the land
applied for was part of the public domain not occupied or claimed by
any other person, when in fact, the same had formally belonged to
another as his private property from whom he alleged to have acquired
it, it was held that in accordance with Section 91 of Com Act No. 141
his title ipso facto cancelled, and consequently, rendered null and void.
We find the foregoing conclusions drawn by the trial Court from the
documentary evidence submitted by the parties to be in order. The
document of sale in favor of he Azarcons executed on October 20,
1959 explicitly recites that the land sold was the exclusive property of
the vendor, Dr. Jose Cajucom, who had inherited it from his father.
Indeed, if were private property but still public land, he could not have
disposed of it in favor of Julian Vallarta, Sr. as early as 1932. That was
obviously the reason why both the Director of Lands and the Director
of Forestry withdrew their respective oppositions to the application for
registration filed by the Vallartas. Not having been part of the public
domain, the Government was bereft of title to convey to any applicant.
Again, ROSA's allegation in support of her application for Free Patent
regarding her possession was, in fact, a misrepresentation, because
the Vallartas had been in possession since the sale in 1932 and had
continued in such occupancy, as shown by the demand by the
Azarcons in 1968, reiterated in their Complaint, that the Vallartas
vacate the disputed property.
On November 24, 1941, Amposta sold the land to Santos Camacho WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. We hereby
surrendering to him Original Certificate of Title No. 100, and because declare appellant owner of Lot No. 1633 of the Balanga cadastre and
of this transfer said title was cancelled and transfer Certificate of Title uphold the validity of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6961 issued in its
No. 5506 was issued in the name of Camacho. On November 18, favor. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1098 issued in the name of
1946, Santos-Camacho sold the land to Bonifacio Camacho as a result appellees is hereby ordered cancelled. No pronouncement as to costs.
of which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 248 was issued to the latter.
On April 28, 1948, Bonifacio Camacho mortgaged the land to the
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (now Development Bank of the
Philippines), and having failed to pay the loan as agreed upon the land
was sold at public auction to said bank as the highest bidder. The
period of redemption having elapsed without Camacho being able to
redeem the property, a final deed of sale was executed in favor of the
bank, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6961 was issued in its name
on June 29, 1957.
Meanwhile, or on June 11, 1947, Gavino Amposta again sold the same
property to Lazaro and Arsenio Mangawang for the sum of P2,000.00,
the vendees executing a mortgage on the land to secure the payment
of the balance. On March 17, 1948, the vendees paid the balance of
the purchase price, and an absolute deed of sale was executed in their
favor. In connection with this transaction, Amposta surrendered to the
vendees the title that was issued to him in the cadastral case, which
was later substituted by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1098 issued in
the name of the vendees.
Appellees contend that their right over the property in litigation should
be restored because the certificate of title they are holding is derived
from that issued pursuant to a decision rendered by a cadastral court,
while the title being held by appellant was merely based on the title
issued in an administrative proceeding, upon the theory that a judicial
title is deemed preferred to one issued administratively. They further
contend that since the decision which gave rise to their title was
rendered on March 8, 1920, which became final thirty days thereafter,
their right over the land must be deemed vested on said date, whereas
the title of appellant is merely a deprivation of the one issued to
Amposta on November 29, 1920, or seven months after the decision
rendered in the cadastral case.
There is no doubt that if the two original certificates of title were issued
on different occasions to two different persons the contention of
appellees would be correct it being in line with the several decisions
rendered by this Court.1 But the case at bar is different. Here two
certificates of title were issued to Gavino Amposta over the same
parcel of land, one under the Homestead Law and another under the
G.R. No. L-17955 May 31, 1962 so the original certificate of title was cancelled and TCT No. 583 was
issued.1wph1.t
PILAR LAZARO VDA. DE JACINTO, ET AL., petitioners,
vs. From all the evidence of record the Court of Appeals found that Pilar
SALUD DEL ROSARIO VDA. DE JACINTO, ET AL., respondents. Lazaro and her son "were always of the belief, until the latter part of
1953, that he (Pedro) delivered to them all that which were rightfully
theirs"; that they discovered the shortage only when Pilar less than
G.R. No. L-17957 May 31, 1962
one year before the action was filed decided to sell the parcel of
more than 11 hectares that she was supposed to have received from
SALUD DEL ROSARIO VDA. DE JACINTO, ET AL., petitioners, her brother-in-law; that it was only then that she realized for the first
vs. time that the parcel delivered to her had only an area of 5.8829
PILAR LAZARO VDA. DE JACINTO, ET AL., respondents. hectares. The Court further found that the land in question was not the
same parcel allotted to Pedro Jacinto, and located in the same barrio,
which had an area of a little over three hectares only.
DIZON, J.:
On the basis of the facts stated above which are now final and
The present action filed in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan by
beyond review the Court of Appeals made the following
Pilar Lazaro Vda. de Jacinto and her son, Melchor Jacinto, Jr., against considerations:
Salud del Rosario Vda. de Jacinto and her children, is for the
reconveyance to them of a parcel of land located in barrio Sto.
Rosario, Paombong, Bulacan, with an area of 5.4574 hectares, It is not also controverted that upon a survey of the property (item No.
covered originally by OCT No. 12515 and at present by TCT No. 5380 1 of Exhibit "A", which should have an area of 11.3403 hectares), when
issued by the Register of Deeds of Bulacan in the name of the now appellant Pilar Lazaro Vda. de Jacinto decided to sell four (4) hectares
deceased Pedro Jacinto. of the supposed 11.3403 hectares, there was lacking 54,574 square
meters therefrom which incidentally corresponded exactly to Lot No. 5,
item No. 2 of TCT No. 5830, in the name of Pedro Jacinto. Appellees
Their complaint alleged, in substance that the land subject matter
claim, however, that the supposed 11,3403 hectares appearing in
thereof was a portion of a bigger parcel allotted to their predecessor-in- Exhibit "A", could have been short of 54,574 square meters and that
interest, Melchor Jacinto, Sr., when the estate of the deceased the 3.5769 hectares appearing in the receipt Exhibit "1", item No. 3
spouses Andres Jacinto and Maria C. Santos was partitioned, and that
thereof, could have been really 5.5474 hectares, which is not the lot in
Melchor's surviving brother, Pedro, predecessor-in-interest of the question.
defendants, had succeeded in registering it in his name through fraud
and with breach of trust, to their prejudice.
The striking coincidence in the area disputed and that registered in the
name of appellees' predecessor-in-interest, more than catches the eye.
The defendants denied the allegations of the complaint and further Under the partition, the appellants were to receive as one of the
alleged that their predecessor-in-interest had acquired ownership of properties, 11.3403 hectares of riceland. This being the case, there are
the property in litigation by virtue of the provisions of Act 496 and/or by no reasons discernible in the records why, after an actual survey of the
prescription.
said property, 54,574 meters should be lacking therefrom. It could not
be said that the area was just a product of a calculation. When Exhibit
After due trial the action was dismissed. On appeal to the Court of "A" was executed, the boundaries were plainly indicated thereon. As a
Appeals, however, the latter reversed the decision and rendered matter of fact, Exhibit "A" designated the number of hectares, ares and
judgment as follows: centiares, which is indicative of the preciseness of the area to be
delivered to the respective heirs. The fact that the lacking
measurement fits exactly with Lot No. 5 of Pedro Jacinto under TCT
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find that the errors assigned No. 5830, warrants the conclusion that Pedro Jacinto to had deprived
are well taken. The decision appealed from, not being in conformity the appellants herein of their just share. . . .
with the evidence and the law on the matter, should be, as it is hereby
reversed and another entered declaring the plaintiffs-appellants
owners of the land described in their complaint and designated as Lot There are sufficient proofs to show that fraud was practiced by Pedro
No. 5, plan S.C. No. 11075 (under TCT No. 5830) of the Register of Jacinto against the appellants herein. When Pedro supposedly
Deeds of Bulacan, and ordering the defendants-appellees, upon finality delivered the property, he did it only in paper, without bringing plaintiff
of this decision, to reconvey the same to said plaintiffs-appellants. We Pilar Lazaro to the premises, although he told her that there were
find that appellants' claim for damages are abandoned by them in their "kasamas" working for her. On December 15, 1927, Pedro Jacinto
appeal, and that appellees' counterclaim, is unmeritorious. Costs is caused that the properties be resurveyed, which resulted in the
taxed against the defendant-appellees, proportionately. drawing of Exhibit "C", which in effect amended Exhibit "B". Part of Lot
2 was segregated and had been designed as lot 5 in Exhibits "C". And
this Lot 5 has an area exactly equal to the area which was found
From the above decision both parties appealed by certiorari. The lacking in the 11.3403 hectares belonging to the plaintiffs-appellants.
appeal of Pilar Lazaro and her son is now G.R. No. L-17955, and that (pp. 6-7 & 9, decision)
Salud del Rosario and children is G.R. No. L-17957.
The heirs of Pedro Jacinto now contend that the Court of Appeals
erred in applying to this case the law of implied or constructive trusts,
and, in holding that, under the facts of the case, the right of the heirs of
Melchor Jacinto to recover the property in question is imprescriptible.
We find these contentions to be without merit.
Lastly, the claim of the heirs of Pedro Jacinto that the latter had
acquired ownership of the property in litigation by prescription, is
likewise untenable. As we have recently held in Juan, et al. vs. Zuiga,
G.R. No. L-17044, April 28, 1962, an action to enforce a trust is
imprescriptible. Consequently, a cohier who, through fraud, succeeds
in obtaining a certificate of title in his name to the prejudice of his co-
heirs, is deemed to hold the land in trust for the latter, and the action
by them to recover the property does not prescribe.
On the other hand, in their appeal Pilar Lazaro and her son contend
that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that they had abandoned
their claim for damages. We also find this to be without merit.