BACKGROUND STUDY on the ANTI-EPAL ORDINANCE

In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr. the Court restates the tests of a valid ordinance
thusly:

The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of

decisions has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be
within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and
must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also
conform to the following substantive requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy;
and (6) must not be unreasonable.

As jurisprudence indicates, the tests are divided into the formal (i.e.,
whether the ordinance was enacted within the corporate powers of the LGU, and
whether it was passed in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law), and
the substantive (i.e., involving inherent merit, like the conformity of the
ordinance with the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as
with the requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency with public
policy).

It is our position that the proposed ordinance of Kons Irene Del Rosario is
CONTRARY TO THE CONSTITUTION, ULTRA VIRES, a form of CLASS LEGISLATION
and did not pass the requirements of a valid ordinance for being unfair or
oppressive, partial, discriminatory and unreasonable.

CLASS LEGISLATION hence PARTIAL and DISCRIMINATORY

 Class legislation discriminating against some and favoring others is
prohibited. (PP vs. Remegio Chan)

The true governing classification are briefly as follows: The classification

must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be
germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions
only, and must apply equally to each member of the class. (Malcolm, Philippine
Constitutional law, 2d ed., page 343.)

Class legislation is such legislation which denies rights to one which are
accorded to others, or inflicts upon one individual a more severe penalty than is
imposed upon another in like case offending. (PP Vs. Nazario)

The proposed ordinance being a form of class legislation therefore is in

contrary to the mandate of the Constitution under the Equal Protection clause
wherein it is stated that All persons subject to legislation should be treated alike,
under like circumstances and conditions both in the privileges conferred and
liabilities impose.

Section 10 of the Proposed Ordinance provides for the Penalties for

Violation which reads as follows, Any elected official, appointed employees of
the city government and baranggay committing any of the prohibited acts in
Section 4 shall be punished with imprisonment for not less than six (6) months
and shall be fined One hundred Thousand Pesos (P 100,000.00) to One Million
Pesos (P1,000,000.00)

Aside from the fact that the penalty is unconscionable and excessive hence
unreasonable and oppressive, we would like to point out that the ordinance aims
to penalize any elected official, appointed employees of the city government
and baranggay. The question remains that what if an elected official or
appointed employee of another city or province have committed any of the
prohibited acts will he be penalized or not? What is the substantial distinction
between an elected official of the city and those that are not from the city?

We will be facing the dilemma that we might be encountering huge

problems once a provincial project with a tarpaulin of an elected provincial officer
is implemented in the city. Are we going to sue the elected officer of the
Province? Are we going to destroy the tarpaulin with the provincial officers name
as displayed therein? We must take note that these tarpaulins forms part of the
project as public funds are used to produce them. The implementing officers of
this ordinance may face counter-suits as well for destroying government property
or Malicious mischief under Article 327 of the Revised Penal Code. We might end
up suing each other in the process.

Although equal protection clause does not prohibit classification, it is

imperative that the classification should be based on real and substantial
differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular
legislation. (Villegas Vs. Tsai Pao Ho) The ordinance in question fails to consider
valid substantial differences.

A valid ordinance should not be partial and discriminatory as it is based on

a valid classification. The requirements for a valid and reasonable classification
are; (1) it must be substantial distinction.

(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law,

(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only and;

(4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class. (Social Justice
Society Vs. Atienza)

The exercise of Police Power by the local government is valid unless it

contravenes the fundamental law of the land, or an act of legislature, or unless it
is against public policy or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating or in
derogation of a common right. (City of Manila Vs. Laguio)

Basing from all the legal basis discussed it is our position that the
questioned ordinance is unconstitutional for the reason that it violates the equal
protection clause wherein it only targeted specific individuals for prosecution as it
excludes those of the other administrations, past and present, who may be
indictable.