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SOUTH ASIA

RESEARCH
www.sagepublications.com
DOI: 10.1177/0262728005058762
VOL 25 NO 2 NOVEMBER 2005
Vol. 25(2): 183200; 058762
Copyright 2005
SAGE Publications
New Delhi,
Thousand Oaks,
London
INNER SELF, OUTER INDIVIDUAL: A
BENGALI BAUL PERSPECTIVE
Jeanne Openshaw
EDINBURGH UNIVERSITY, UK

ABSTRACT Dumonts denial of individuality to Hindus, with the


exception of renouncers of the world, has provoked a fascinat-
ing, but in many ways confusing debate on the subject of the
individual and the self. The present article uses oral historical
information and writings by Raj Khyapa, a Bengali Baul guru,
and his followers, to highlight one of many indigenous debates
about the self and the individual. Raj and other Bauls use the
high Hindu (or unorthodox Islamic) notions of identity
between individual selves and supreme being to legitimize a
radical agenda, whereby the authority of alleged superiors
(divine or human) is denied in favour of the affirmation of each
persons agency and autonomy. The discussion is framed in
terms of the indigenous South Asian distinction between inner
versus outer perspectives or realities. This, it is argued, avoids
some pitfalls of the Dumontian approaches, such as the
exaggeration of discontinuities between householder and re-
nouncer, Hindu and Muslim, as well as traditional and modern
South Asian culture.1
KEYWORDS: Baul, Bengal, Dumont, individual, inner and outer
perspectives, Orientalism, self

Introduction
Writing of India in 1960, an India from which Muslims and others are excluded,
Louis Dumont (1960: 47) infamously contrasted the man-in-the-world, who is
not an individual with the renouncer, who is an individual-outside-the-world.
The latter thinks as an individual and this is the distinctive trait which opposes
him to the man-in-the-world and brings him closer to the western thinker (1960:
46). In his corollary that the agent of development in Indian religion and
speculation, the creator of values has been the renouncer, Dumont (1960: 47)
restricts sub-continental agency to non-worldly, spiritual realms, and thus joins
the ranks of those who implicitly condone interventionist imperial agendas.
Dumonts arguments triggered off a decades-long labyrinthine debate on the
individual and, by extension, the self in the South Asian context. Notable
184 South Asia Research Vol. 25 (2)

contributors have been Marriott (1976), who broadly supported Dumont with his
notion of the dividual, a concept subsequently deployed beyond the subcontinent
by Marilyn Strathern (1988, 1994). Against or at least qualifying Dumonts
arguments, we find a whole array of scholars, such as Beteille (1986), Burghart
(1983a, 1983b), Thapar (1978, 1979, 1982), Das (1982), Khare (1984) and
Mines (1988, 1994, 1999).
Such are the siren attractions of this body of material that subsequent
contributors to these topics have tended to be lured on to the rocks of the
original, arguably misleading, terms of the debate. Not only does this framing of
the subject inevitably dwarf any new material brought to bear on it, simply
because of the sheer volume of the collected contributions; it also inevitably
subordinates it to its own terms.
In this article I propose to consider the concept of the I or the self as
interpreted by a Bengali Baul guru, Raj Khyapa (18691946) and one of his
disciples, commonly known as Sats Das (1885c.1965),2 in their songs and other
writings. Oral historical accounts from other descendants by initiation, as well as
non-initiates, are also brought to bear on the subject.
My aim is to consider the subject in the context of Bengali theories of various
provenances, Hindu and Muslim, householder and renouncer, rather than
highlighting its distinctiveness in relation to presumed western assumptions and
models, as Dumont and others tend to do (Searle-Chatterjee and Sharma, 1994:
56). This is conducive to a less essentialized and homogenized perspective on
what in fact is the subject of overt debate and dispute concerning the status and
identity of the self.
An especially valuable source in this respect is a unique prose manuscript
(Text X) by Sats. In contrast to typical univocal bartaman-panth verse texts
which aspire to polished, closed ideological positions, Satss text follows a
question-answer rubric based on dialogue between guru and disciple. It thus
reflects the frankness typical of such oral interchanges. Alternative and even
opposing views are placed in the mouth of a sometimes reluctant disciple, to be
countered by a barrage of rational argument, analogy and textual legitimization
from the guru (Sats). This format serves to contextualize the teachings of Raj
(and Sats) against a background of various local and pan-Indian traditions.
Emphasis is therefore on active deployment, manipulation and creation of ideas by
actors, as opposed to the Dumontian portrayal of them as passive and un-
comprehending recipients of their culture.
First some background. In the early 1980s, I began what was to be lengthy
fieldwork on the so-called Bauls in West Bengal, India. It soon dawned on me
that one of my few advantages was that, in contrast to almost every Bengali, and
not a few foreigners, who knew exactly what Bauls are, I knew I did not know.
Eventually, I decided to abandon the word Baul itself in favour of another, rather
clumsy, term: bartaman-panth (followers of bartaman). The reasons for this have
been discussed at length elsewhere (Openshaw, 2002: 11317). Here, suffice it to
say that, especially in the case of the community of initiates who became the focus
of my work, that of Raj Khyapa and his followers, the word Baul, unlike
bartaman, is rarely used as an actors category. Moreover, a primary referent of the
Openshaw: Inner Self, Outer Individual 185

word Baul among the influential, educated classes, who are unambiguously not
Baul in any sense, is to otherworldly, itinerant, male mystics and singers, a notion
which not only over-homogenizes an immensely complex field, but in effect masks
a powerful critique of traditional socio-religious theory and practice, concerning,
inter alia, householder, renouncer and even gender hierarchies.
For present purposes, the word bartaman may loosely be rendered the here-
now (more precisely the existent or the living). Specific bartaman-panth
connotations include what is ascertainable by the senses, and therefore based on
ones own judgement. Bartaman is defined, by its followers, in opposition to
another category, anuman, by which they mean: guesswork, hearsay, or even
delusion (Openshaw, 1997b). For bartaman-panths, anuman in effect means
orthodoxy/orthopraxy (Hindu and Muslim), and therefore connotes a wide
variety of practices legitimized with reference to authorized scripture: smarta and
sariyati rituals, as well as social and religious divisions, such as those of caste or
religious community.3 Bartaman-panths recruit adults, largely from the rural poor,
and from both Hindu and Muslim communities. As such they may also be
considered unorthodox Vaishnavas and Fakirs respectively. Technically they may
be householders or renouncers. In contrast to lite Bengali perceptions of the lone,
male Baul, there are necessarily as many women as men, for esoteric practice
(sadhana) involves a partner of the opposite sex.
Bauls (and bartaman-panths) are primarily known to others through their
compelling and often cryptic songs, which thus form an inevitable part of research
on this topic. Songs were never my primary focus, but those of Raj Khyapa,
which I began to encounter after a couple of years work, impressed me for their
uncompromising critique of the guru (see below). This in turn is related to their
high valuation of the female partner in esoteric practice, and by extension to
women in general.
Some of the songs by Raj that I had been hearing concerned the self, or
.
rather, in Bengali: ami, atma, atma, ahan. In standard colloquial Bengali, these
terms have differing yet overlapping parameters, and may roughly be rendered
respectively as I, the self , the Self and the ego. As a concept which shares
meanings with atma (self ), and even atma (Self ), the I (ami) lends itself, in
Bengali, to fruitful ambiguities, creatively drawn on by Raj and others.4 Of
particular importance in the present context is the identity of each individual I
with the high Hindu notion of the Self, uncontroversial, indeed entirely
conventional, at first sight, but in practice developed by bartaman-panths in
extremely radical ways. Replying to his putative disciple as to what is self-
knowledge (atma-jnan), Sats, as the guru, replies: Self-knowledge is to realize that
I am that supreme god (ami-i sei paramesvar, Text X: 39). In fact, Raj and other
bartaman-panths tend to equate all these various terms. Sats is typically
unambiguous in asserting that the I, the self , the Self , and the ego are simply
different words for the same thing (Text X: 149; Text Y: 12).
Ami is the Bengali word for the first person pronoun, I. As such it is clearly
rooted in the experience and action of particular individuals. It thus forms a set
with second and third person pronouns. Of the three grades of second person
(singular) pronoun, the tumi form is traditionally paired with ami in the various
186 South Asia Research Vol. 25 (2)

debates, considered below, concerning the meaning and relative value of I versus
you. Significantly in the present context, this is the second person form typically
used between lovers, and by devotees of their deity. However, ami also means the
I, in the sense of the self/Self .5 Thus one of Rajs more infamous statements,
ami sab can be translated I am everything or the I/self is everything, an
ambiguity exploited both by bartaman-panths such as Raj, as well as their
opponents. Raj and his followers invoke the latter meaning to deny the
egocentricity and wilfulness which their adversaries attribute to them using the
former meaning.
Raj opens one of his songs (No. 94) with the familiar question: Who am I? [or
who is the I?], Ke ami . . . ?, to which we will return below.6 This and similar
inner-oriented queries are common approaches to metaphysical realities, both in
Bengali and wider sub-continental culture from at least the Upanishadic era. Another
song begins: O bird of my mind, let me see you consider the truth (or the theory) of
the self. (Atmatattva bicar kara dekhi ore man pakhi . . .) (Song 93).
At the same time as hearing and reading such songs, I was collecting oral
histories on Raj himself and was eventually to find Rajs own handwritten verse
autobiography, his Jban-carit. In conversations about Raj, particularly with non-
disciples, two subjects constantly recurred. One was his scandalous love affair and
elopement with a lower caste woman and disciple (Raj was born Brahmin and by
then was a renouncer of otherwise indeterminate status). The other was his notion
of the self (the ami), a clearly problematic issue, even for his disciples, connected
as it is with a perceived iconoclasm, specifically a destruction of the hierarchies of
both householder and renouncer life.
Eventually, I realized that these two topics were connected in interesting ways.
These links became clear from Rajs manuscript, not only in the connections
between the autobiography and the songs, but especially in texts intermediate to,
and more personal than these public compositions. It seems likely that it was, at
least in part, Rajs love for Rajesvar (literally Lord of Raj a male name
apparently given to her by Raj) which propelled him from a position of Vedantic/
Tantric eclecticism as a guru, to an unambiguous commitment to the path of
bartaman. His new Vais.n.ava/bartaman milieu was particularly favourable to the
identification of their love affair with the legendary illicit relationship of the
Brahmin Can.d.das and the low caste washerwoman Ram, or even with the
adulterous affair of the divine lovers, Kr.s.n.a and Radha. This kind of extra-social
love, free from the constraints governing householder conjugal relationships, gains
legitimacy precisely to the extent that it transcends and violates social structures,
another integral feature of the path of bartaman.
However this did not solve all of Rajs problems, because not all bartaman-
panths accepted this equation. After all, he and his lover had transgressed the
boundaries not only of householder society, but also of renouncer society; for
Rajesvar was commonly seen as Rajs disciple. Attack from this latter quarter was
no doubt conducive to the extension and sharpening of Rajs critique, which
began to encompass the structures of renouncer and even bartaman-panth society,
along with those of householder society. I have previously argued (Openshaw,
1998) that, of the three gurus taken by Hindu bartaman-panths in particular, the
Openshaw: Inner Self, Outer Individual 187

separate bartaman-panth training (siks.a) guru constitutes an attempt to evade the


structures of both householder society (represented by the initiation dks.a
guru), and that of renouncers (generated by sannyas or bhek gurus). However, Raj,
his followers and some other bartaman-panths extend this logic and denounce
even the specifically bartaman-panth guru himself.
As many had done before him, Raj sharpened ideological weapons of great
power from the raw materials of Hindu and Muslim religiosity, turning them
against prevailing hierarchies of both householder and renouncer societies, in
perpetuation of an ancient battle, waged to various degrees by many segments of
the populace. For while the number of extra-social affairs is far from small, a far
wider constituency is receptive to challenges to social and religious hierarchies for
reasons of perceived discrimination.
One of the weapons used by Raj in this battle was the notion of the I. This
I was a way of asserting autonomy, of resisting and opposing authority, while
appealing directly or indirectly (through nuances and resonances) to high Hindu
(usually renouncer) theory as well as an unorthodox strand of Islamic theory. Such
uncompromising appeals for total autonomy and independence from tradition
and structure of any kind are particularly pronounced in bartaman-panths such as
Raj, but are by no means exclusive to them. From a different part of the sub-
continent, and a much earlier period, there is the inspiring verse of Kabir (Hess,
1986: 5):
Ive burned my own house down.
The torch is in my hand.
Now Ill burn the house of anyone
who wants to follow me.

In this connection it is interesting that in Rajs autobiography, those now


considered his most loyal disciples are never called disciples by Raj. Instead, he
simply says they were mine (amar), which in this case means on my side. Raj
was also apparently very reluctant to take anyone as a disciple. If anyone persisted,
he would challenge them by asking: If we were to disagree, whom would you
believe?. If the would-be disciple replied: I would believe you, as my guru, Raj
would dismiss him with the words: If you cant be my equal, how can you be my
disciple?. It is hardly surprising that lineages (if they merit the name) of
bartaman-panth gurus such as Raj tend to run into the sand, for to replicate Rajs
own teachings is to be against lineages as such (Openshaw, 2002: 1557).
Of course, not all bartaman-panths carry this burning torch to their own
house, in addition to that of others (that is, householder society and/or orthodox
renouncer society). Or to change the metaphor, not all of them wish to saw off
the branch of gurudom on which they sit. At the same time, it is important to
emphasize that a condemned love affair is not a necessary prerequisite for the
development of this extreme position. For example, there is no suggestion that
this was the case with Kabir. Where the bartaman-panth guru is concerned, many
factors undermine his authority, for example, contamination from the critique of
other kinds of gurus, the crucial importance of the disciples efforts and by
extension his/her autonomy and self-realization, and the vital role of the partner
188 South Asia Research Vol. 25 (2)

in esoteric practice, irrespective of whether s/he is a legal spouse (Openshaw,


2002: 14550).

Outer and Inner Perspectives


Rather than locate the discussion of the I in the Dumontian contexts of West
versus East, or modern versus traditional, I propose to situate it in the context
of an indigenous opposition between outer perspective or reality (bahiranga) and
inner perspective or reality (antaranga).7
Rajs notion of the I clearly involves a focus on inner reality, on what is
called antaranga. The emphasis on inwardness is not confined to bartaman-
panths. It is shared by the wider Vais.n.ava community, by renouncers in general,
by Sufis and Fakirs, and by innumerable householder initiates. In addition to his
songs and other verse texts, the importance of inner reality is already discernible in
several ways in Rajs autobiography, one of his earliest works. For example,
throughout his autobiography, Raj is more concerned with his reactions to events
than with the events themselves. Indeed the emphasis on emotions in the
autobiography, as well as the subtle distinctions which characterize their descrip-
tion, are traits Raj already shared, even at that time, with wider Vais.n.ava culture.
For Raj, the inner perspective is also that from which there is no discrimina-
tion (dvaita), between high and low, self and other, pure and impure. The outer
perspective (bahiranga), conversely, is related to anuman (inference, hear-say), that
is, to multiplicity, discrimination, hierarchy and also superficiality. The word
bahiranga may be etymologized, by insiders, not only as relating to the outside
(bahir), but also to bahu, which means many. Whereas, antaranga is the sphere
of the non-dual, in which being is one and limitless; bahiranga is that of dualism
and, by extension, many different forms and rankings.
Although, it is important not to push the parallels too far, the outer
perspective on a person bears some relation to the Euro-American notion of the
individual (the individual body is perceived or judged from the outside, from a
relative distance), whereas the inner perspective is connected with the self , an
experienced, intimate reality, which is, therefore, in bartaman-panth terms, more
bartaman. We should note here that antaranga also means intimate.
However, in the theory of Raj and others, the self (ami) transcends the
individual person, and this is consonant with certain high Hindu notions (and
also with a particular strand of Islamic thinking). Indeed, for Raj, the most
subjective, the most inner, is the least individual in the sense of a unique,
bounded entity, and this too is a position which is conventional in Hindu
philosophy (Heimann, 1964: 51). The individual in this sense is therefore a
delusion, at least as seen from the perspective of antaranga, the realm of the self.
A classical Hindu notion familiar to bartaman panths is that of the creative,
or rather emanative process consisting of the one becoming manifold. In Satss
words: The one I (self ) shall become many for the sake of divine play (Ek ami
bahu haba llar karan, Text Y: 12, 21).8 The notion that the many were or are
identical with the one, has the potential to invalidate individual forms, indicating
as it does the relative weakness, contingency or meaninglessness of individual
Openshaw: Inner Self, Outer Individual 189

boundaries (see also Marriott, 1976). For Raj, Sats and others, on the contrary, it
is deployed in such a way as to valorize individual selves and indeed to legitimize
their self-determination. After all, according to them, each human being is that
one self , if only s/he could realize it.
As a corollary of turning inwards, Raj and other Bauls therefore emphasize
interiority and subjectivity (the I) in the sense of relying on ones own experience
and judgement as opposed to that of others. A corollary of this interpretation is
that control of ones destiny is thereby withdrawn from powerful beings such as
God/deities and the religious and social lite and restored to oneself. So while in
one sense this assimilation of everything to oneself is consonant with the
Vaishnava culture of interiority, the affective tone of the I concept is not at all
consonant with orthodox Vaishnavism, which recommends devotees to be
humble as grass and patient as a tree (Dimock, 1966: 111). These are qualities
diametrically opposite to those implied by the ami concept, at least as interpreted
by the more conventional. On a common sense level, Raj in particular can hardly
be said to have been humble or patient. Outside the realm of certain strands of
lite and folk philosophical theory, as is evident from the material considered
below, this kind of inner-directedness can at times be interpreted by others as
egotism or arrogance. Thus, in realizing and affirming the self, those in bartaman
can at times appear to others to be very individualistic.
Rajs treatment of the I relates specifically to the bartaman-panth esteem for
the human being as opposed to invisible, transcendent deities on the one hand,
and to icons on the other. Thus, instead of worshipping Kr.s.n.a, the idea is that, in
the local Vais.hn.ava idiom, every man is Kr.s.n.a and every woman Radha, or
alternatively, every person is both together.
Since the tendency is for bartaman-panths of Hindu origin to orient their
critique to Hindu practices, and for those of Muslim origin to focus on Islamic
practices, the brunt of Rajs attack was on icons. Faced with conventional
religiosity, he was wont to throw down the gauntlet: Who [the hell] is your Kal?
Who is your Siva? (Ke tor Kal? Ke tor Sib?). I am Kal! [The I is Kal!] (Ami
Kal). Not unexpectedly, local Hindus often disliked this in-your-face iconoclasm.
Such statements apparently led to at least one of his ashrams being razed to the
ground, and contributed to his lack of acceptance in the Birbhum village he
settled in with his lover. I was told by a local deed writer, not unsympathetic to
Raj: He didnt respect images and deities. He would challenge people: Show me
where your deity is! [The implication here is of course that what is not
perceptible to the senses, or living that is, bartaman is worthless]. He would
add: I am Brahma, I am everything (or, The I is Brahma. The I is
everything). People here are of the opposite path, continued the deed-writer.
We didnt agree with him (Openshaw 2002: 121).
Rajs opponents in this case were householders, but many renouncers would
have reacted in the same way. The Vaishnava espousal of modesty, described
above, is consonant with an orientation to authority figures such as (male) gurus,
as well as deities, and the power of their grace or at least their ability to raise the
disciple to their own elevated state. The total rejection of hierarchy implied in the
I am everything/ the I is everything (ami sab) stance of Raj and some other
190 South Asia Research Vol. 25 (2)

bartaman-panths would not be favoured by many non-Vaishnava renouncers


either. After all, hierarchical structures inform the society of renouncers as much
as that of householders, the latter being generated from the core father-son dyad,
the former from the guru-disciple equivalent. Of course, the self-dependence
insisted on by Raj, that is dependence on ones own experience, knowledge and
judgement, as opposed to that of authoritative others, is a feature of renouncer
ideology also. However, routinization of renunciation tends to narrow the range of
this critique to the structures of householder life, leaving those of the society of
renouncers intact. Raj used to be denounced from all quarters on the grounds that
he had no respect for anything, in the words of the deed-writer quoted earlier.
What was significant, however, was the degree of support he managed to
command from those same sectors of society.
The stories about Raj reported above, along with a host of others, are almost
part of folklore, operating on a purely oral level. If we turn to the writings, we
find a series of songs analysing and placing high valuation on the I (ami).
Songs about the I are usually sung within the format of the debate a
traditional sub-continental form with both high philosophical as well as folk
manifestations. Debate is commonplace in both Hindu and Muslim communities,
as well as within and between written and oral, urban and rural, lite and
.
subaltern cultures. To this day, poetic contests (kabir-larai) are popular in Bengal;
and Baul songs (whether sung within the Vais.hn.ava, the Fakir, or mixed
traditions, as conventionally judged) are traditionally sung in the form of a debate
between two opposing points of view.9 Strands of such interchanges may also be
elaborated in apparent isolation from the original debate (see Openshaw [1997a:
23] for an example of a Baul song overlaid by Tagores notions of the self ).
In this case, the other side of the debate about the I usually concerns the
worshipful you (tumi usually referring to the deity or guru; but which may also
mean the partner in esoteric practice). Issues raised in the debate focus on the
meaning of the I and the you (Who am I? [What is the I?] etc.) and, by
extension, the comparative value of each. Composers, Baul or otherwise, typically
write both sides of the debate.
This is the case with the tournament songs (kabigan) of Isvar Candra Gupta
(18121859), a prolific journalist and writer of Calcutta. He wrote songs entitled
Who am I? (Ami ke) alongside others enquiring Who are you? (Tumi ke). As
with many Baul songs, the general conclusion is that, in the final analysis, these
are identical. In common with the great Baul Lalan, Isvar Candra is of the view
that the I and the you dwell in the same place, that is, within the person. The
latter writes: The two of us, you and I, dwell in one house (Tumi ami ek ghare
thaki dui jan. . .) (Hai and Pasa, 1969: 39). Lalan, using the third person, puts
this far more poetically: He and Lalan dwell in one place, yet a thousand leagues
apart. (Seyar nalan eks.ane ray thake laks.a jojon phak re) (Jha, 1995: 72, Song 252
kha, with spelling of the original manuscript).
However, Isvar Candra seems invariably to subordinate the I to the you. For
example, he writes: You are the I-ness of the I. It is not mine. I say I all the
time, because you cause me to do so (Amir amitva tumi se nahe amar // Tumi-i
balao ami bali bar bar) (Hai and Pasa, 1969: 45). On the other hand, Hasan
Openshaw: Inner Self, Outer Individual 191

Raja, a popular Muslim composer of Baul songs from Sylhet, was more even-
handed. Although his preference seems to lie with the I (see below), he
nevertheless included some songs extolling the superiority of the you (tumi). For
example (Cakrabart 1992: 73):
Hasan Raja says, I am nothing [or the I is nothing] . . .
I look without and within and see only the merciful one . . ..
Hasan rajay kay, ami kichu nayre, ami kichu nay
Antare baire dekhi, (kebal) dayamay . . .
Interestingly, in Rajs case, there are no songs extolling the you (tumi) position.
The complexities of Lalans position on the I, which differ from Rajs, cannot be
dealt with here. Suffice it to say that for both composers, the essential question in
life is Who am I? [Who is the I?]. However Lalan tends either to
discriminate between different kinds or levels of the I (or to shroud the answer
in mystery), while Raj and Sats clearly state the unity (or rather non-duality) of
the I.
The concept of I (ami) is used by Raj to dissolve distinctions between
human and divine, and between person and person and also between I and thou
(here man and woman respectively). Song 94 concerning Knowledge of the self
(Atmatattva) opens with the traditional question Who am I? (Ke ami?). Raj
immediately establishes his credentials by evoking authoritative texts and ideas:
Who am I? I roam the universe, wandering in the form of the inner Self
[conventionally God antaryyam].
[The I] is everywhere in the three worlds, and within everyone in the form of the
Self (atma).
Ke ami jagate bhrami, antaryyam rupe phere,
Trijagatmay sarbbatre ray atma rupe sarbbantare.
Gradually, however, the tone changes. Rajs own arguments take over, and the
focus shifts to socio-religious structures and hierarchies:
. . . You, s/he, this person, that person, we hear many names [terms of address and
reference];
We know it is the same supreme self which has taken many forms.
Everyone whom I approach and ask says I, I.
There is nothing else apart from I, the one I is everywhere.
Go and ask Hindu, Muslim and Christian one by one,
In reply you will get nothing but I.
Father son, guru disciple, Brahmin Kshatriya Vaisya,
All are merged in the I. The pure and the impure, all will be one . . .
Tumi tini ini uni bahu nam hayeche suni,
Eki paramatma jani bahu rupe dharan kare.
Ami yar kache yai yare sudhai ami ami bale sabai
Ami bhinna ar anya nai, ek ami ache sarbbatre.
Hindu musalman khr.s.t.ane jijnas yao jane jane
Tar pratyuttare ami bine ar anya kichu pabe nare.
Pita putra guru sis.ya brahman ks.atriya baisya
Amite mise sarbbasya suci muci sab ek habe re.
192 South Asia Research Vol. 25 (2)

The song concludes with an attack not just on the gurus of householder and
renouncer worlds, but clearly on the specifically bartaman-panth training guru
also, an example of Raj burning the house of anyone who wants to follow him:
. . . Whoever says that the guru pervades the world is lost in delusion.
Why does your guru refer to himself as I, just as you do?
If truly there is no one in the three worlds apart from the guru,
then why do you wish to be delivered from this earthly life?
Guru, guru is forever on your lips, but tell me, who labours [in esoteric practice]
for the guru?
The I predominates in everyone. One always thinks what will become of me?
Whats the use of practice (sadhana) to one who is ignorant of the theory of the
.
self (ahan)?
Raj exhorts himself: Get to know the reality of the self (atma tattva).
Guru jagat may ye bale, se ache bhrantite bhule
Tumar guru kena ami bale (ar) tumio ami bala re.
Yadi satya guru bine ar keha nai tribhubane
Tabe kena bhaba mane ami kise yai bhabapare.
Mukhe guru guru kebal, gurur janye ke sadhe bala
(Sabar) antare amit.a prabal, sada bhabe amar ki habe re.
.
Ahan tattva ye na jane tar ki prayojan sadhane (ache)
Raj bale ekatra mane atma tattva jene nere.

With these notions of the supreme self, and of all being merged in the I etc.,
bartaman-panths draw on folk versions of high Hindu (Vedantic) philosophy, and
indeed such views are identified by bartaman-panths and non-initiates as non-
dualism. Equally this philosophy of non-dualism is brought to bear on social and
economic as well as religious and metaphysical spheres, and can thus be used to
legitimate a highly radical agenda. I have often heard even uninitiated rural
Bengalis, Muslims as well as Hindus, explain non-dualism as non-differentiation
and non-discrimination in a highly radical sense, for example, in terms of lack of
possessiveness (for example, of land, wealth and women).
The more conventionally religious would rarely draw such radical corollaries of
course. Even where theoretical or ultimate identity between cosmic and individual
being is affirmed, they prefer to maintain some kind of distinction. They talk about
the small versus the big I, or (partly in order to differentiate disciple from guru) the
undeveloped self versus the developed (guru) self (ka ca ami versus paka ami), a
distinction affirmed by the Bengali sage Ramakrishna. A fundamental mistrust of
ones own judgement, at least for the present, is therefore retained.
Sats, on the other hand, stridently rejects incipient hierarchies reintroduced
into a basically non-dual framework (Text X: 150). In this he was clearly reflecting
the ideas of his guru, Raj. He tells his hypothetical disciple: All Is are one and
. .
the same. Many say that the I which is the sohahan [sohan] is not this I.10
This is an error. The I is always the same. This I and that I are never two.
And he also firmly denies any distinction between the undeveloped and developed
self (ka ca ami and paka ami).
The lack of differentiation between selves (even human and cosmic) the ami
sab, ami svar position allows one to validate ones own experience and agency,
Openshaw: Inner Self, Outer Individual 193

and formed part of Rajs argument (with himself and others) for his eventual
elopement with his lover. This also connects with an emphasis on the here-now
(bartaman): here, in the sense of ones own body and its experiences; now, in that
it is present experience and agency which is validated, rather than an anticipated
perfection attained through esoteric practice.
As pointed out earlier, this philosophy of the I is not confined to Bauls of
Hindu origin. To cite a recent incident, a member of the CPI-ML (Communist
Party of India Marxist-Leninist) was extolling the virtues of Mao Tse Tung to a
group of villagers a couple of years ago. A Muslim Baul who happened to be in
the audience retorted, in words exactly like those reported of Raj: Who [the hell]
is your Mao Tse Tung? (ke tomar Mao Tse Tung). I am Mao Tse Tung (ami Mao
Tse Tung!). Here again there is a creative ambiguity between I am Mao Tse Tung
and The I is Mao Tse Tung. Although either way the import is to bring to
earth a revered figure, the first interpretation (I am . . . rather than The I
is . . .) has a different affective tone of challenge, and, to others, of an
inappropriate lack of humility. The crucial issue in all this, concerning autonomy,
emerges clearly in a verse by Sats (Text Y: 30):
I shall believe in my own knowledge, my own wisdom. I shall never follow
hearsay (suna katha) and guesswork/inference (anuman). . . . Because of delusion
(maya), I forget that I am the lord (bhagaban). I think I am a wretched being
(ks.udra jb) and that god is invisible and far away in the sky. I imagine god in the
void, raise my hands to heaven and ask him to save me. The one who can save me
is not far away. It is only I (ami-i) who can save myself.
As in the case of the Muslim Baul, here is the same resistance to authority, divine
or otherwise. The anti-deferential sentiment, the strident affirmation of autonomy
is exactly the same.
These attitudes are and were widely known through instruction, discussion
and debate, including songs. Unsurprisingly, they are contested by more conven-
tional opponents. In the 1980s, a Vaishnava tract called Sahajiya Dalan, claiming
to draw on much older works, attacks those, such as Sahajiyas and Bauls, who
refuse to worship Lord Kr.s.n.a, but claim to be God themselves (nijerai svar sajiye
basibe, SD II: 51). It continues: They do not wish to admit that Srsr Caitanya
Mahaprabhu is lord (bhagaban). Instead, in order to establish their own opinion
(mat), they assert I am that lord . . . I am that god, I am that revered Krishna-
Caitanya (Das Brahmacar,1389 B.S., II: 59).
Hasan Raja, a Baul of Muslim origin mentioned earlier, reveals that the
reaction of orthodox Muslims and Hindus to such ideas tended to be alike. He
writes in a song (Cakrabart, 1992: 72, Song no. 23):
After due thought, I see clearly that all is I . . .
[For this] people speak ill of me.
From I Allah and his prophet come; . . .
From I come the heavens and earth; everything comes from I; . . .
I shall surely be killed if my countrymen take me at my word; . . .
See, whoever knows ones self knows God.
Bicar kari caiya dekhi sakale-i ami . . .
Amare karilay bad-nami.
194 South Asia Research Vol. 25 (2)

Ami haite alla rachul, . . .


Ama haite asman jamin ami haite sab . . .
Marba marba deser lok mor katha yadi lay . . .
Apan cinile dekha khoda cina yay.
Songs such as these have been identified with the theory of infusion by
authorities such as Md. Enamul Haq (1975). This theory is particularly associated
with Mansur-ul-Hallaj, a Persian saint and Sufi, who was persecuted for
proclaiming it, and finally executed in 922 C.E. Despite this, the notion that a
person could become transformed into God through divine infusion gained
currency among Sufis of many countries, and especially India (Haq, 1975:
8992), where it possibly resonated with indigenous ideas of emanation (avatar).
It was certainly known among Bauls apart from Hasan Raja. For example, Lalan
names Mansur in connection with the question Who am I?, and with the idea
that the I is the truth (Jha, 1995: 30, Song no. 74/76).
A person thus transformed states: I am the real (ana-l-h.aqq), an assertion
regarded as blasphemous in orthodox Islam. Many Indian Sufis made similar
statements: I am the essence and in a song, But I am God and I am God and I
am God. The fact that, despite this, they were not executed suggests to Haq
(1975) that such ideas were not regarded by Indian Muslims as incompatible with
Islam. Arguments were mounted to the effect that a person who can say such
things is obviously in an elevated spiritual state. The statement is not blasphemous
because it is the infinite speaking through the finite; the Real speaking through
the human being. Nevertheless, as with Hasan Raja, there was no lack of
awareness of the danger of openly expressing such sentiments. Haq (1975: 90f.)
quotes and translates a song by Khwajah Munu-d Dn Chisht:
I do not declare, I am the Real but my comrade dictates Declare. . . .
I do not know why thou art telling me . . . to divulge it.
What cannot be communicated to the ascetics even in their monasteries
Thou orderest me to declare fearlessly in the midst of a market.
To keep concealed the secret of Mansur is out of the limit of a man like me;
When I do that the guillotine and gallows say Divulge.
I told him, To whom I should communicate in the world the secret I possess;
(Then) he says: Say to the gate and wall as there is no confidante.
Raj, too, had to face similar opposition to his radical notion of the I. His
reaction (for example Song no. 95) was to assume an air of puzzled innocence:
Why does everyone get angry when the I is talked of?
Nobody notices that the I is in every container (body/person).
However much you think (in terms of ) you and him, it all becomes I . . .
Where shall I seek and find one who is not here? . . .
Ami balte kena cat.e ut.he
Laks.a kare dekhe na keu ami bale prati ghat.e.
Tumi tini bhaba yata, ek amite parinata . . .
Tini yini nai re hetha, khoja tare pabe kotha . . .
Needless to say, the fact that South Asians of both Hindu and Muslim origin
adopt an identical use of the I concept to challenge social, economic and
Openshaw: Inner Self, Outer Individual 195

religious hierarchies, as well as their parallel experiences of opposition from the


religious community of their birth, poses a challenge to the world religions
paradigm with its exaggeration of identity within and difference between each
named religion (here Hinduism and Islam). Of course, this is even more true of
the bartaman-panth phenomenon as a whole. Not only are bartaman-panths
overtly critical of what they see as the divisiveness of world religious identities,
they are usually disinclined to legitimize their ideas with reference to any kind of
pure, exclusive ideological lineage. Instead they prefer to confer authority on
concepts, such as their interpretation of the I, through a wide range of
resonances, both Hindu and Muslim.

Individuality and Householder Life


As stated at the beginning of this article, there is now a mass of evidence
challenging Dumonts original contention of the lack of individuality in Indian
householder society. One of the most interesting contributions where the present
article is concerned is that of Khare (1984), who also considers the cross-
fertilization of renouncer and householder realms. In the case of the north Indian
(untouchable) leather-workers with whom Khare worked, the ideal of the
egalitarian renouncer forms the basis for an individualistic challenge to the
structures of householder life. Untouchable ideologues extol the renouncer in
contrast to the hierarchical Brahmin figure at the apex of a hierarchy of castes. In
this way, high Hindu renouncer concepts can become a model for the moral
individual in society. Emphasizing the relatively self-sufficient individual (as
opposed to the dividual who is merely part of a larger entity) potentially
constitutes an alternative, non-communal strategy for sabotaging discrimination,
and especially in counteracting caste order and its collectivism (Khare, 1984: 62).
In contrast to the common perception of South Asian passivity in the face of
religion, Khares work supports the finding in the present article that notions of
the self may be intentionally inflected and manipulated, in order to confer
autonomy and dignity on individuals.
Khares work on the influence of the renouncer on householder constructions
of the individual also supports the more general contention that the renunciatory
model plays a far more important role in subaltern protest movements than
previously thought (Sarkar, 1984: 314). Interaction and cross-fertilization between
the societies of renouncers and householders has all too often been ignored, partly
through exaggeration of the gulf between the worlds of householders and
renouncers on the part of scholars, including Dumont.
Khare is one of many scholars to demonstrate that, alongside the dividual,
differing and fluctuating notions of individuality are found among Hindu
householders. This parallels similar contentions that the stereotypical western
individual, characterized by Geertz as a bounded, unique, more or less integrated
motivational and cognitive universe . . . organized into a distinctive whole and set
contrastively both against other such wholes and against its social and natural
background (Geertz, 2000: 59) also requires modification and qualification
(Lamb, 2002: 40f; Spiro, 1993). In both cases, a multitude of factors affecting the
196 South Asia Research Vol. 25 (2)

conception, experience and value of the self for example gender, age, class,
caste and education have usually been subordinated or ignored in favour of
over-homogenized, oppositional models of East and West.
Proponents of such models (for example Dumont and, to a lesser extent,
Marriott) have generally dismissed evidence of individualism in South Asian
householder society as the product of modernity. While there is little doubt of the
association with modernity of individualism of certain kinds, the material in this
article supplements a mass of evidence from South Asian philosophic traditions,
generally ignored by social scientists, that many of its roots are more traditional,
more diverse and far older. The debates outlined above are in fact relatively recent,
popular or folk-philosophical Bengali equivalents of a long-standing concern with
the person, the self and the individual on the part of Indian philosophy.
Of course there is another reason for the apparent modernity of individualism
in South Asia, namely the limitations of our sources. Any constructions of the
individual of the anti-structural sort outlined above, more usually transmitted
through oral rather than written traditions, would clearly be vulnerable to the
typical evanescence of sources of this kind and provenance. Where written
materials are concerned, the manuscripts used in this article were discovered
through sheer serendipity. Even Sats, who laboured to produce a finished bound
volume, lamented his inability to publish the work owing to penury (Text X:
introduction). The fate of heterodox South Asian schools of materialism
(Lokayata), now known almost entirely through the work of their opponents, is
probably not untypical of many other radical ideologies and interpretations, of
which there is no trace at all.

Conclusion
Finally, a return to notions of the I and the self. As shown above, from the
perspective of antaranga (inner reality), Raj and others articulate an all-
encompassing self without limits or boundaries. However, those who looked at
him from the perspective of bahiranga (outer reality) saw him as an obdurate
individual whose will opposed that of others. For them, he was a self, isolated
from, and ranged against, other selves, and, more importantly, against social
entities such as caste and lineage.
At first sight, the association of bahiranga with householders or rather non-
initiates, presents an interesting contradiction with Dumonts denial of in-
dividuality to precisely these sections of society, in contrast with his parallel
attribution of individuality to renouncers of the world. The sense of contradiction
is diminished if one recalls Dumonts defence against critics: that the term
individuality should only be applied to the individual as a value (rather than as
experienced, for example) a prescription that Dumont himself conspicuously
failed to follow, as the quotes at the beginning of this article reveal. On the other
side of the equation, Dumonts characterization of the renouncer is more
problematic for, from the emic point of view, the ideal renouncer represents or
even is the supreme self. In this respect, contra Dumont, he is not valued as an
Openshaw: Inner Self, Outer Individual 197

individual at all, but as one who recognizes the delusion involved in the very
notion of individuality.
Interestingly Rajs opponents share much in common with him as he portrays
himself in the first, householder section of his autobiography. As a conventional
householder, he too was against anything that caused separation or division within
the we unit of householder life. The anguish felt by Raj at the flight of his
younger uncle to become a renouncer, at the departure of his older uncle to set up
a separate household, along with his attempts to rectify this situation, form the
bulk of the autobiography. The other main theme, the death of various members
of the we group, is simply another kind of separation. The same logic lay behind
the opposition of Rajs critics to his role in the separation of a woman from her
husband and young children.
The difference between this early Raj and the later Raj of the songs is that
whereas the concern of the former was for the conventional kin unit, the latter
Raj had expanded his horizons to include, in some sense, the entire macrocosm.
In this sense therefore, Raj was consistent throughout in opposing division, and
.
discrimination (hinsa), whether in householder or renouncer society. For this
reason, the later Raj opposes precisely the householder structures he was
previously so bound to for it is these, which, viewed from this new perspective,
divide person and person.
For bartaman-panths, the totality or the macrocosm may be replicated at
various levels, including the individual and the malefemale pair, in this case Raj
and his lover, Rajesvar. Significantly, of course, it excludes conventional units such
as caste, lineage and religious community. Raj opposes all those who separate him
from Rajesvar; unlike him, they are restricted by householder/renouncer hier-
archies and conventions.
Scholars, such as Dumont, are compelled by their theory to identify
renunciation with a total transformation of the person (from non-individual to
individual), and indeed, this reflects indigenous ideas of the death of the social
being at this juncture. However, this model is commonly acknowledged, by
participants and outsiders, to be an ideal (that is, something to be worked at,
through change of name and abode, separation from kith and kin, etc.) rather
than a ready-made reality. The argument here is that consideration of the notions
of I and the self from the perspective of outer and inner realities reflects the
continuity of experience between householders and renouncers. For in both
statuses the value is the same: against division, or alienation within the unit. The
difference is in the constitution of the unit, from the social kin/group, to the
individual or paired body or the totality of being. This continuity between
householder and renouncer is, in my view, more plausible than the radical
discontinuity envisaged by Dumont. For the same reason, there is no need to
posit a new development, or a disruption of a primordial culture, along with
modernity, in order to explain cases of apparently increasing degrees of in-
dividualism among householders. Finally, the perspective of inner and outer
realities also enables consideration of commonalities in Hindu and Muslim theory
and practice, whereas Dumonts focus on the renouncer as the essence of
Hinduism precludes Muslims from the analysis.
198 South Asia Research Vol. 25 (2)

Notes
1 Except where otherwise stated, quotations are from my field notes, or from various
unpublished manuscripts written by Raj Khyapa and his followers. Quotations from
these sources retain the spelling of the original. Where secondary sources are cited, the
diacritical mark system (or lack of it) of these sources is reproduced. The standard
system of transliteration (as exemplified by Anderson, 1962) has otherwise been
followed, with minor modifications.
2 Sats was technically of Jat-Vais.n.ava caste (where Vais.n.ava functions as a caste
identity). He preferred the name Sats Majumdar (his fathers surname) or (Svam)
Saccidananda, the name given him by Raj along with the robes of renunciation.
3 Anuman is a term in Hindu philosophy meaning inference, one of the means to valid
knowledge (praman.a). For more on anuman-bartaman, see Openshaw (2002: 1147,
192200).
4 In standard colloquial Bengali, all these different terms have a wide range of meanings,
many of which overlap. However, each tends to have certain semantic emphases, which
cannot be reflected here in translation. My main concern in what follows is with the
ways in which Raj and his followers use these terms.
5 The phrase self/Self is dualistic in a way which Raj and others would have rejected.
Where self is used below, this should be understood as also encompassing Self .
6 There is of course an ambiguity in this phrase, which is destroyed in translation, for it
means either, or both, who am I? or who is the I (the self )?.
7 Mines (1994: 1213) has also used a similar contrast in connection with individuality,
but the connotations are different. For example, he associates the distinction with Tamil
culture in general, whereas that invoked by Raj is largely confined to initiates and
renouncers. For Mines, both perspectives are available simultaneously to all persons,
where for Raj and others a presumably permanent shift in perspective is involved,
although those aware of antaranga, such as Raj, clearly recall the bahiranga perspective.
In his discussion of the Hindu concept of the self, Morris (1994: 79) also draws a
distinction between a material or phenomenal self, and an inner self . . ..
8 The Kat.ha Upanishad speaks of the inner self (antaratman) . . . who makes his one
form manifold, and according to the Taittirya Upanishad: He desired: Would that I
were many . . . (Radhakrishnan and Moore, 1957: 48, 60).
9 Muslim Bauls tend to be poor (as their alternative name, Fakir, suggests) and with
little formal education, especially in the classical Islamic languages, Arabic and Persian.
However, they sing both sides of the debate between the merits of these classical
languages versus the vernacular with remarkable impartiality and conviction (the
audience decides who wins) even though all singers are in fact on the side of the
vernacular (Isherwood, 1990).
.
10 Sohan I am that is a famous maxim (mahabakya), indicating non-dual, ultimate
reality.

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Jeanne Openshaw is a senior lecturer in Religious Studies, School of Divinity,


University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK. Her major recent publication is a
monograph, Seeking Bauls of Bengal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
2002; Paperback South Asian edition, 2004).
Address: New College, Mound Place, Edinburgh EH1 2LX, UK. [email:
j.openshaw@ed.ac.uk]

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