The problem of interpretation is the problem of meaning of words and their

effectiveness as a medium of expression to communicate a particular thought.

Words and phrases are symbols (not scientific symbols) that stimulate mental

references to referents and are capable of referring to different referents in different

contexts and times.

Chabootra- Allahabad HC (Malhoo Mian Abdul Ghani v. State through Municipal

Board)- Statutory definition of the term 'building' in Municipalities Act, Whether

Chabootra could be considered as the part of the house, Contextual interpretation

from facts & circumstances.

Fringe meaning of words/ the penumbra in addition to the core meaning of the words

(Borderline cases).

Seeking 'intention of the maker'? or the 'legislative intent of the text itself'?

Practical difficulty in gathering intention of the maker. How to interpret then?

Giving regard to the authorial intention is also significant.

Two authors A&B- A says something, B says something else when asked about

interpretation of a particular thing. Similarly, legislature is a collective body of

legislators, then how can we ensure about the particular intention behind a legal text?

The courts cannot ask the Parliament as to meaning or interpretation of a particular

text. Secondly, that Parliament becomes functus officio after they have passed that

Bill.

Watch Dworkin's "Is there truth in Interpretation"?

Dworkin- It is my opinion but there are other interpretations possible which are

equally good. We would want that judge to be sent to jail. And yet, when we look

back, intractable, pervasive and endless. Tribes of interpreters, a judge in one set of

facts gives a particular decision, and the same judge in similar fact scenario in another
 case might give a different decision. Is there no right answer and only different

answers? It is appealing, the sceptical view, but it is incoherent and self-contradictory

and therefore, not acceptable. By falsifying other interpretations, you bring down your

own interpretation. There is truth in interpretation; the question is, where does it lie?

General Theory of Interpretation- Dworkin calls this "responsibility theory of

interpretation". He gives a skeletal description saying that interpretation is a collective

activity. We may interpret statutes because it has been done in the past. The practice

of interpretation has some point and it embodies some values and interpretative

responsibility. People who join an interpretative tradition understand their beliefs,

values, etc. and generally agree at a very high level of abstraction. At a lesser level of

abstraction however, disagreements emerge. For ex. majority and minority opinions.

The true interpretation of the object is the reading of that which best acquits the

responsibility of interpreter given their best interpretation on basis of practice which

they have joined. Theory of excellence emerges.

Collaborative, explanatory, conceptual- Types of interpretation. Collaborative- By

being in partnership with those who were there before you. So a judge is in

partnership with the creator of the law. Explanatory- Like in History.

Felix:-

Difficulties in construing legislations, words have contradictory meanings.

Various ambiguities can be there. Ambiguity means when a term is capable of having

two or more meanings. He says ambiguities are useful to interpret in harmony.

Judicial construction is required due to intrinsic difficulties of language and

emergence of unanticipated situations after enactment. The purpose of statutory

interpretation is to ascertain meanings.

Book- Bennion on Statutory Interpretation. Mentions a term called "legal meaning".

 Sympathetic detachment is required. He warns judges against rewriting the statutes.

Doctrine of separation of powers, but overlaps will be there. You cannot say that there

is no difference between judiciary and legislature.

Standard Chartered Bank v. Directorate of Enforcement- Corporate Criminal Liability

case. It is a good illustration where Justice Srikrishna fell in minority in this case was

in majority in a previous 3-judge bench case in Veriappa Textiles Case wherein there

was a similar issue. It was an Income Tax case and he took a view that if we hold this

interpretation, then we will be jumping into the field of legislation and usurping its

power, therefore we cannot interpret it like this. Let the gap be filled by legislature but

we cannot fill.

He doesn't say that judges cannot make law, but where judges have to directly make

law. In a scheme of constitutional law, there are examples like Vishakha v. State of

Rajasthan. You can call it judicial activism.

S.19(1), Bennion- Only a court has the power to authoritatively determine what the

law is. The term court has to be widely construed. Any Body, any authority which

exercising sovereign judicial functions of the state would be included in the ambit of

courts. Authoritative interpretation function of courts.

Legislation is what the legislator says it is.

HLA Hart- A supreme tribunal has the last word in saying what the law is and when it

has said it, the statement that it was wrong has no consequences within the system.

Bennion says that the interpreter's duty is to arrive at the legal meaning of the

enactment which is not necessarily the same as its grammatical meaning. This must be

done in accordance with the rules, principles, presumptions and canons which govern

statutory interpretation (In this code, referred to as the interpretative criteria or guides

to legislative intention).
 Enactment is the unit of inquiry. S.138(1), Bennion- As the term is generally used, an

enactment is a legal proposition laid down in an act or other legislative text with the

effect that when facts fall within an indicated area called the "factual outline",

specified legal consequences called the "legal thrust" are called forth.

Factual outline- S.143- Enactment lays down a legal rule triggered by existence of

certain facts, indicated in the outline form. This is the statutory factual outline; court

may narrow or widen it. When the literal meaning is wider or narrower than

parliament's intention, the court arrives at two outlines and this is a judicial factual

outline. This shows the facts which will trigger operation of the enactment in future

cases.

S.183- Nature of an interpretative factor- In relation to an enactment, the term is used

to denote a legal consideration (specific) which:-

a.) Derives from the way a general interpretative criterion applies to the text of the

enactment and the facts of the instant case (and to other factual situations within the

relevant factual outline) and,

b.) Serves as a guide to the construction of the enactment in its application to those

facts.

Positive and Negative Interpretation factors (S.180, 184)- An interpretative factor

either may be positive (tending in favour of that construction) or negative (tending

away from it).

S.185- Interpretative factors all pointing one way- Whereupon investigating a

grammatically ambiguous enactment, it appears that the interpretative factors all point

in favour of one of the opposing constructions and against the other, the doubt is to be

resolved in favour of the first construction.

 S.186- Nature of weighing operation- Where code S.185 does not apply to the

construction of a doubtful enactment, it is necessary for the interpreter to assess the

respective weights of the relevant interpretative factors and determine which of the

opposing constructions they favour or balance. Unless, in the light of the factors, the

court prefers a third construction, it will adopt this favoured construction.

In S.204, he discusses two-staged approach to statutory interpretation. It is not simply

a matter of deciding what doubtful words mean. It must first be decided, on an

informed basis whether or not there is real doubt about the legal meaning of the

enactment. If there is, the interpreter moves on to the second stage of resolving the

doubt. (The experienced interpreter combines the stages but notionally they are

separate).

S.202- Context of an enactment- Comprises, in addition to the other provisions of the

act containing it, the legislative history of that act, the provisions of other acts and

pari-materia and all facts constituting and concerning the subject matter of the act.

Informed interpretation rule- S.201, it is a rule of law in this code that the person who

construes an enactment must infer that the legislator when settling his wording,

intended it to be given a fully informed, rather than purely literal interpretation though

the two produce usually the same results.

Accordingly, the court does not decide whether or not a real doubt exists as to the

meaning of an enactment (and if so, how to resolve it) until the court has first

discerned and considered, in the light of the guides to legislative intention, the context

of the enactment, including all such matters as may illumine the text and make clear

the meaning intended by the legislator in the factual situation of the instant case.

Stages:- Enactment- Informed Interpretation- If a real or substantial doubt exists as to

the legal meaning of the enactment- Resolve it by interpretative criteria.

 S.164- He added the concept of legislative intention shows the relationship between

the judiciary and the legislature. This is on the basis of separation of powers doctrine.

The courts have to be conscious of where is the separation line between adjudication

and legislation. You cannot usurp the legislative function by performing adjudication.

Lord Herschell's Rule as laid down in Bank of England v. Vagliano Bros.- "I think the

proper course is, in the first instance to examine the language of the statute, and to ask

what is its natural meaning, uninfluenced by any considerations, derived from the

previous state of the law, and not to start with enquiring how the law previously

stood, and then, assuming that it was intended to leave it unaltered, to see if the words

of the enactment will bear an interpretation in conformity with the dispute. If treated

in this fashion it appears to me that its utility will be almost entirely destroyed and the

very object with which it was enacted will be frustrated. The purpose of such a statute

surely was that on any point specifically dealt with by it, the law should be

ascertained by interpreting the language used, instead of, as before, by roaming over a

vast number of authorities".

S.150 of Bennion is titled "Nature of the Legal Meaning"- As stated in code S.2, the

interpreter is required to determine and apply the legal meaning of the enactment, that

is the meaning that correctly conveys legislative intention. This usually corresponds to

the grammatical meaning of the verbal formula that constitutes the enactment. If

however the verbal formula, in its application to the facts of the instant case, is

ambiguous, the legal meaning will be in doubt. Even where the verbal formula is not

ambiguous, there may be real doubt as to the legal meaning because the relevant

factors (interpretative factors) drawn from the criteria laid down by law as guides to

the legislative intention tend in different directions.

 The distinction between the literal and legal meaning lies at the heart of statutory

interpretation.

Grammatical meaning is the starting meaning which usually does but sometimes does

not correspond to the legal meaning.

S.151 (4 sub-sections)

i.) Grammatical meaning of an enactment is its linguistic meaning taken in isolation

from legal considerations. It is construed according to rules and usages of grammar,

syntax and punctuation, and the accepted linguistic canons of construction.

ii.) The grammatical meaning of an enactment is clear when, apart from legal

considerations, there is no real doubt as to its meaning.

iii.) Even though the grammatical meaning of enactment is clear, it may not be

possible to predict with certainty how it will apply to particular facts. This arises

where the enactment uses a broad term, or confers authority on some persons to

exercise judgment or discretion in relation to those facts. In such a case, the enactment

cannot for that reason justly be called grammatically ambiguous.

An enactment is grammatically ambiguous where, except as mentioned Ss.3, it is

grammatically capable of more than one meaning.

If you depart from the grammatical meaning in order to derive legal meaning which is

different, then it is called strained construction.

Grammatical meaning is semantically obscure.

When the grammatical meaning is ambiguous. There are various types of ambiguities.

General as well as relative ambiguity.

The ambiguity has to be resolved and semantic obscurity has to be removed, there is a

two-stage process to remove it. The objective is not to arrive at grammatical meaning

but it is only the starting point.

 S.152- Where, in relation to the facts of the instant case, the enactment is

grammatically ambiguous, the legal meaning is the one to which on balance the

factors arising from the relevant interpretative criteria accord the greater weight. The

meaning has to be determined in context and not the dictionary meaning of a

particular word and whether it is equivocal.

3 types of Ambiguities:-

Semantic Ambiguity- It is caused by the fact that one word may in itself have several

meanings. Obscurity is not the same as ambiguity.

Syntactic Ambiguity- It arises from the grammatical relationship of words as they

are chosen and arranged by the drafter.

Contextual Ambiguity- Where there is conflict between the enactment and its

internal or external context.

Semantic Obscurity- S.155- Where, in relation to the facts of the instant case, the

wording of the enactment is disorganized, garbled, or otherwise semantically obscure,

it is first necessary to determine what is the intended grammatical meaning. The

version of the enactment thus arrived at, is referred to as the "corrected version". The

corrected version is then dealt with as if it had been the actual wording of the

enactment. Removal of semantic obscurity does not mean that there is no ambiguity.

Stage 1- Having arrived at a corrected version- If grammatical meaning is adapted as

literal meaning, it refers to literal construction.

S.287- Presumption that rectifying construction to be given-It is presumed that the

legislators intend the court to apply a construction which rectifies any error in the

drafting of the enactment, where it is required in order to give effect to the legislator's

intention. This may be referred to as a rectifying construction.

 Case of House of Lords on basic test as to when rectifying construction can be done-

Inco Europe v. First Choice- The court must be abundantly sure of before adding,

omitting or substituting words- i.) The intended purpose of the statute or provision in

question. ii.) That by inadvertence, the draftsmen and parliament failed to give effect

to that purpose in the provision in question, iii.) The substance of the provision

parliament would have made, although not necessarily the precise words parliament

would have used, had the error in the Bill been noticed. The third of these conditions

is of crucial importance. Otherwise, any attempt to determine the meaning would

cross the boundary between construction and legislation. Sometimes, even when these

conditions are met, the court may find itself inhibited from what is alteration in

language may be too far reaching and therefore the court may restrict itself from

making that alteration.

Overlapping cases where rectifying construction is required to be done- i.) The

garbled text- A text may be garbled by the omission of words, the inclusion of

unwanted words, the inclusion of wrong words, typographical errors or punctuation

mistakes. The duty of the court is to find out the intended grammatical meaning.

ii.) The text containing an "error of meaning". The meaning is vitiated by some

error on the part of the drafter which is not apparent within "as being an error" on the

face of the text. Possible causes- The drafter may have misconceived the legislative

project or based the text on a mistake of fact or made an error in the applicable law or

mishandled a legal concept.

iii.) A text containing a casus omissus- Where the literal meaning of the enactment

goes narrower than the object of the legislator, the court may be required to apply a

rectifying construction. Nowadays, it is regarded as not in accordance with the public

policy to allow a drafter's inaptitude to prevent justice being done.

 iv.) A text containing casus male inclusus- In this case, meaning is wider than the

object. The intention of the Parliament is to remedy a mischief. Since an act is a

coercive instrument, backed by the physical forces of the state, it is presumed that

Parliament does not intend the enactment to go wider in its operation than is necessary

to remedy the mischief in question. Ex.- S.32 of the Sexual Offences Act, 1956 made

it an offence for a man "persistently to solicit, or importune in a public place for

immoral purposes." Immoral purposes can be various. The purposes are not very

clear. The court said that it is only applicable to immoral purpose of sexual nature and

not to others.

v.) The case where there is textual conflict (conflicting texts)- Can be within the same

Act or between different Acts. Related to Rule of Harmonious Construction.

Literal Meaning- S.156 gives us a Universal Definition, the literal meaning of an

enactment in relation to the facts of the instant case "taking the enactment in isolation

from any other enactment"- a. where the enactment is clear, i.e. one grammatical

meaning only", is the grammatical meaning; b. where the enactment is ambiguous, is

any of the grammatical meanings; c. where the enactment is semantically obscure

"i.e., without any straightforward grammatical meaning", is the grammatical meaning

of the corrected version.

Objections to Model of Dynamic Statutory Interpretation-

The first argument is the formalist argument- Based on the separation of powers-

Creation of judgment made law trenches upon the law making power of the Congress.

But, entire law making power is not vested with Congress alone.

Second possible argument is what is termed as an economic argument- It is based on

analogy. The basic essence of it is that they treat statutes as private deals or contracts.

They are public contracts between interest groups and legislatures. Judges here are
 merely agents who enforce these public contracts, and as agents, they cannot change

the terms of the contract. The author disagrees and says that judges even when they

interpret contracts, they can update the deals as per changed circumstances. It is very

difficult to say that there is only one party versus the other.

Third argument is called the counter-majoritarian difficulty- Bickle's objection is that

judges may substitute their own personal values for legislatively determined values.

This is inconsistent with society's fundamental command of democracy. Counters this

by dealing with it by being responsive to people's choices and commands. Lot of

people's aspirations and needs cannot be met by the elected legislature and appointed

executive. Judiciary's job is when the discontent is built towards government, so the

overall legitimacy of it gets decreased and it might lead to vehement opposition and

the courts therefore contribute to the overall legitimacy of the government itself by

responding to the contemporary needs of the people.

Imaginative Reconstruction (Richard Posner)- "I suggest that the task for the judge

called upon to interpret a statute is best described as one of imaginative

reconstruction. The judge should try to think his way as best as he can into the minds

of the enacting legislators and imagine how they would have wanted the statute

applied to the case at bar."

Federal Judge Ruggero J. Aldisert- When it comes to IoS, the cumulative experience

of judiciary formulates no absolute rule guidance, some judges choose some

techniques, other judges choose others suitable to them. Judge Learned Hand- "I have

often said to myself, what do you mean by interpreting, there are a lot of fringes,

terms are equivocal and ambiguous, what do you mean by what they meant?"