Full txt cases

G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985

ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON
respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:\

In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set aside the Orders, dated September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984,
in Civil Case No. 1075-P, issued by respondent Judge, which denied her Motion to Dismiss said case, and her Motion for Reconsideration of the Dismissal
Order, respectively.
The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the United States; that they were
married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines; that they begot two children born on April 4,
1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married also in
Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating
that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to
render an accounting of that business, and that private respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss
the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent
had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the
mentioned case on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is
now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.
Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is interlocutory and is not subject to appeal. certiorari and Prohibition are neither the remedies
to question the propriety of an interlocutory order of the trial Court. However, when a grave abuse of discretion was patently committed, or the lower
Court acted capriciously and whimsically, then it devolves upon this Court in a certiorari proceeding to exercise its supervisory authority and to correct the
error committed which, in such a case, is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition would then lie since it would be useless and a waste of time to go
ahead with the proceedings. 2 Weconsider the petition filed in this case within the exception, and we have given it due course.
For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal property in the Philippines.
Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal property because of the representation he made in the divorce
proceedings before the American Court that they had no community of property; that the Galleon Shop was not established through conjugal funds, and
that respondent's claim is barred by prior judgment.
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its
declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts
of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.
For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property relations between petitioner and private respondent, after their
marriage, were upon absolute or relative community property, upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. The pivotal fact in this
case is the Nevada divorce of the parties.
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared in person before the Court during the trial
of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who, giving his address as No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco, California, authorized his
attorneys in the divorce case, Karp & Gradt Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the understanding that there were neither
community property nor community obligations. 3 As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he executed in favor of the law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD.,
336 W. Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent him in the divorce proceedings:

You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer, appear on my behalf and do an things necessary and proper to represent me,
without further contesting, subject to the following:
1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.
2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.
3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as
an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is
that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5 only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. 6 In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private
respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of
the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or
domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A
husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty. that the guilty party shall
not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as
petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over
the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a
wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She
should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court.
Without costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner,
vs.
REDERICK A. RECIO, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:

A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the
national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained
the divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment; hence, like any other facts,
both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to our law on evidence.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the January 7, 1999 Decision1 and the
March 24, 1999 Order2 of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 3026-AF. The assailed
Decision disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick A. Recio solemnized on January 12, 1994
at Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both parties can now remarry under existing and applicable laws to any and/or both
parties."3
The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.
The Facts
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987.4 They
lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989,5 a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage,
was issued by an Australian family court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of Australian Citizenship" issued by the
Australian government.6 Petitioner a Filipina and respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual
Help Church in Cabanatuan City.7 In their application for a marriage license, respondent was declared as "single" and
"Filipino."8
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage.
While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory
Declarations secured in Australia.9
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage10 in the court a quo, on the ground of
bigamy respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed
that she learned of respondent's marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his prior marriage and its
subsequent dissolution.11 He contended that his first marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce
decree obtained in Australian in 1989;12 thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.1wphi1.nt
On July 7, 1998 or about five years after the couple's wedding and while the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending
respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the "marriage ha[d]
irretrievably broken down."13
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complained be dismissed on the ground that it stated no cause of action.14 The
Office of the Solicitor General agreed with respondent.15 The court marked and admitted the documentary evidence of both
parties.16 After they submitted their respective memoranda, the case was submitted for resolution.17
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and recognized in
the Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but not on the basis of any defect in an essential element of the marriage; that
is, respondent's alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry. Rather, it based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained by
respondent. The Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no more martial union to nullify or annual.
Hence, this Petition.18
Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
"I - The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in Australia by the respondent ipso facto
terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson thereby capacitating him to contract a second marriage with the petitioner.
"2 - The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present a certificate of legal capacity to marry
constitutes absence of a substantial requisite voiding the petitioner' marriage to the respondent.
"3 - The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in this case.
"4 - The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and 53 of the Family Code as the
applicable provisions in this case.
"5 - The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce decree
obtained by the respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitated the parties to remarry, without first securing a recognition of
the judgment granting the divorce decree before our courts."19
The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall concentrate on two pivotal ones: (1) whether the
divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven, and (2) whether respondent was proven to be legally
capacitated to marry petitioner. Because of our ruling on these two, there is no more necessity to take up the rest.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson
Petitioner assails the trial court's recognition of the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong
Seng Gee,20 petitioner argues that the divorce decree, like any other foreign judgment, may be given recognition in this
jurisdiction only upon proof of the existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute divorce and (2) the alleged divorce decree
itself. She adds that respondent miserably failed to establish these elements.
Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, marriages solemnized abroad are governed
by the law of the place where they were celebrated (the lex loci celebrationist). In effect, the Code requires the presentation
of the foreign law to show the conformity of the marriage in question to the legal requirements of the place where the
marriage was performed.
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for our discussion. Philippine law does not
provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.21 A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even
by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 1522 and 1723 of the Civil Code.24 In mixed marriages involving a Filipino
and a foreigner, Article 2625 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is
"validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry."26 A divorce obtained abroad by a couple,
who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.27
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr.
decrees that "aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law."28 Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party
pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.29 Presentation
solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.
Divorce as a Question of Fact
Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must first comply with the registration
requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code. These articles read as follows:
"ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall file separately a sworn application for such
license with the proper local civil registrar which shall specify the following:
"(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved or annulled;
"ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant shall be required to furnish,
instead of the birth of baptismal certificate required in the last preceding article, the death certificate of the deceased spouse
or the judicial decree of annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her previous marriage. x x x.
"ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and distribution of the properties of
the spouses, and the delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and
registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect their persons."
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public document a written official act of an
Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no further proof of its authenticity and due execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must
first be presented and admitted in evidence.30 A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the
best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself.31 The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an officially
body or tribunal of a foreign country.32
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of
a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested33 by the officer having legal custody of the
document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and
(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.34
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family
court.35 However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforemetioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for
petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of
Cabanatuan City.36 The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioner's qualification.37 Hence, it was admitted
in evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree
admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.38
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer bound by
Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992.39 Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien
and clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen.40 Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak
of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed his
allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner, because she is the party
challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was satisfied with the original of the divorce decree
and was cognizant of the marital laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked in that country for quite a long time.
Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine courts: thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign laws
in the exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with "the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the
prosecution or defense of an action."41 In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of the
complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their
answer when they introduce new matters.42 Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the
pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.43 Like any other facts, they must
be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of
their judicial function.44 The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the
subject should be resolved in the negative.
Second Issue:
Respondent's Legal Capacity to Remarry
Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent was legally incapacitated to marry her in
1994.
Hence, she concludes that their marriage was void ab initio.
Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted in evidence, adequately established his
legal capacity to marry under Australian law.
Respondent's contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause
arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii
and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves
the bond in full force.45 There is no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was procured by respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree a conditional or provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect
the same as a separation from bed and board, although an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed
period during which no reconciliation is effected.46
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes and practices, still restrict remarriage.
Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was granted on
the ground of adultery may be prohibited from remarrying again. The court may allow a remarriage only after proof of good
behavior.47
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:
"1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party has died) commits
the offence of bigamy."48
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have been restricted. It did not absolutely
establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial court,
which erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondent's capacity to remarry despite the
paucity of evidence on this matter.
We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable presumption or presumptive evidence as to
his civil status based on Section 48, Rule 3949 of the Rules of Court, for the simple reason that no proof has been presented on
the legal effects of the divorce decree obtained under Australian laws.
Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity
Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the Family Code was not submitted together
with the application for a marriage license. According to her, its absence is proof that respondent did not have legal capacity to
remarry.
We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the party concerned. The
certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent,
had he duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to
marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license.50
As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner. A review of the
records before this Court shows that only the following exhibits were presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a)
Exhibit "A" Complaint;51 (b) Exhibit "B" Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recto (Filipino-Australian) and Grace J.
Garcia (Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija;52 (c) Exhibit "C" Certificate of Marriage Between
Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila;53 (d) Exhibit "D"
Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan City Certification that no information of annulment between Rederick A. Recto and
Editha D. Samson was in its records;54 and (e) Exhibit "E" Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recto;55 (2) for
respondent: (Exhibit "1" Amended Answer;56 (b) Exhibit "S" Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in
the Family Court of Australia;57 (c) Exhibit "3" Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recto;58 (d) Exhibit "4"
Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia Certificate;59 and Exhibit "5" Statutory Declaration of
the Legal Separation Between Rederick A. Recto and Grace J. Garcia Recio since October 22, 1995.60
Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian citizen, was legally
capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree with petitioner's contention that the court a quo erred in
finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to
adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal
capacity to contract the second marriage.
Neither can we grant petitioner's prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on the ground of bigamy. After
all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce
decree. Hence, we believe that the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any,
which show petitioner's legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the
parties' marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were both
obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated
January 12, 1994.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, we REMAND the case to the court a quo for the
purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of
declaring the parties' marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No costs.
SO ORDERED..

[G.R. No. 124371. November 23, 2000]

PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE, respondents
DECISION
PARDO, J.:

The Case
The case raises a conflict of laws issue.
What is before us is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals[1] modifying that of the Regional Trial Court,
Camarines Sur, Branch 35, Iriga City[2] declaring respondent Alicia F. Llorente (herinafter referred to as Alicia), as co-owners of
whatever property she and the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente (hereinafter referred to as Lorenzo) may have acquired during
the twenty-five (25) years that they lived together as husband and wife.
The Facts
The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United States Navy from March 10, 1927 to September
30, 1957.[3]
On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente (hereinafter referred to as Paula) were married before a parish
priest, Roman Catholic Church, in Nabua, Camarines Sur.[4]
Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula stayed in the conjugal home in barrio
Antipolo, Nabua, Camarines Sur.[5]
On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and Certificate of Naturalization No. 5579816 was
issued in his favor by the United States District Court, Southern District of New York.[6]
Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in 1945, Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave by the U. S. Navy,
to visit his wife and he visited the Philippines.[7] He discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and was living in and having
an adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente.[8]
On December 4, 1945, Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the Office of the Registrar of Nabua as Crisologo Llorente, with
the certificate stating that the child was not legitimate and the line for the fathers name was left blank.[9]
Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. In fact, on February 2, 1946, the couple drew a written agreement to the
effect that (1) all the family allowances allotted by the United States Navy as part of Lorenzos salary and all other obligations
for Paulas daily maintenance and support would be suspended; (2) they would dissolve their marital union in accordance with
judicial proceedings; (3) they would make a separate agreement regarding their conjugal property acquired during their
marital life; and (4) Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for her adulterous act since she voluntarily admitted her fault and
agreed to separate from Lorenzo peacefully. The agreement was signed by both Lorenzo and Paula and was witnessed by
Paulas father and stepmother. The agreement was notarized by Notary Public Pedro Osabel.[10]
Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951 filed for divorce with the Superior Court of the State of
California in and for the County of San Diego. Paula was represented by counsel, John Riley, and actively participated in the
proceedings. On November 27, 1951, the Superior Court of the State of California, for the County of San Diego found all
factual allegations to be true and issued an interlocutory judgment of divorce.[11]
On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final.[12]
In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines.
On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila.[13] Apparently, Alicia had no knowledge of the first
marriage even if they resided in the same town as Paula, who did not oppose the marriage or cohabitation.[14]
From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife.[15] Their twenty-five (25) year union produced
three children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente.[16]
On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The will was notarized by Notary Public Salvador M. Occiano,
duly signed by Lorenzo with attesting witnesses Francisco Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano. In the will, Lorenzo
bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their three children, to wit:
(1) I give and bequeath to my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO exclusively my residential house and lot, located at San Francisco,
Nabua, Camarines Sur, Philippines, including ALL the personal properties and other movables or belongings that may be found
or existing therein;
(2) I give and bequeath exclusively to my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and to my children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly
F. Llorente, in equal shares, all my real properties whatsoever and wheresoever located, specifically my real properties located
at Barangay Aro-Aldao, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Paloyon, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Baras, Sitio Puga, Nabua,
Camarines Sur; and Barangay Paloyon, Sitio Nalilidong, Nabua, Camarines Sur;
(3) I likewise give and bequeath exclusively unto my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and unto my children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F.
Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, my real properties located in Quezon City Philippines, and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 188652; and my lands in Antipolo, Rizal, Philippines, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos.
124196 and 165188, both of the Registry of Deeds of the province of Rizal, Philippines;
(4) That their respective shares in the above-mentioned properties, whether real or personal properties, shall not be disposed
of, ceded, sold and conveyed to any other persons, but could only be sold, ceded, conveyed and disposed of by and among
themselves;
(5) I designate my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO to be the sole executor of this my Last Will and Testament, and in her default or
incapacity of the latter to act, any of my children in the order of age, if of age;
(6) I hereby direct that the executor named herein or her lawful substitute should served (sic) without bond;
(7) I hereby revoke any and all my other wills, codicils, or testamentary dispositions heretofore executed, signed, or published,
by me;
(8) It is my final wish and desire that if I die, no relatives of mine in any degree in the Llorentes Side should ever bother and
disturb in any manner whatsoever my wife Alicia R. Fortunato and my children with respect to any real or personal properties I
gave and bequeathed respectively to each one of them by virtue of this Last Will and Testament.[17]
On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iriga, Camarines Sur, a petition for the probate and
allowance of his last will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be appointed Special Administratrix of his estate.
[18]
On January 18, 1984, the trial court denied the motion for the reason that the testator Lorenzo was still alive.[19]
On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was duly executed, the trial court admitted the will to probate.[20]
On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died.[21]
On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same court a petition[22] for letters of administration over Lorenzos estate in her
favor. Paula contended (1) that she was Lorenzos surviving spouse, (2) that the various property were acquired during their
marriage, (3) that Lorenzos will disposed of all his property in favor of Alicia and her children, encroaching on her legitime and
1/2 share in the conjugal property.[23]
On December 13, 1985, Alicia filed in the testate proceeding (Sp. Proc. No. IR-755), a petition for the issuance of letters
testamentary.[24]
On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate proceedings, the trial court gave due course to Paulas petition in Sp.
Proc. No. IR-888.[25]
On November 6, 13 and 20, 1985, the order was published in the newspaper Bicol Star.[26]
On May 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court issued a joint decision, thus:
Wherefore, considering that this court has so found that the divorce decree granted to the late Lorenzo Llorente is void and
inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the marriage he contracted with Alicia Fortunato on January 16, 1958 at Manila is
likewise void. This being so the petition of Alicia F. Llorente for the issuance of letters testamentary is denied. Likewise, she is
not entitled to receive any share from the estate even if the will especially said so her relationship with Lorenzo having gained
the status of paramour which is under Art. 739 (1).
On the other hand, the court finds the petition of Paula Titular Llorente, meritorious, and so declares the intrinsic disposition
of the will of Lorenzo Llorente dated March 13, 1981 as void and declares her entitled as conjugal partner and entitled to one-
half of their conjugal properties, and as primary compulsory heir, Paula T. Llorente is also entitled to one-third of the estate
and then one-third should go to the illegitimate children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surname (sic) Llorente, for them to partition
in equal shares and also entitled to the remaining free portion in equal shares.
Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal administrator of the estate of the deceased, Lorenzo Llorente. As such let the
corresponding letters of administration issue in her favor upon her filing a bond in the amount (sic) of P100,000.00
conditioned for her to make a return to the court within three (3) months a true and complete inventory of all goods, chattels,
rights, and credits, and estate which shall at any time come to her possession or to the possession of any other person for her,
and from the proceeds to pay and discharge all debts, legacies and charges on the same, or such dividends thereon as shall be
decreed or required by this court; to render a true and just account of her administration to the court within one (1) year, and
at any other time when required by the court and to perform all orders of this court by her to be performed.
On the other matters prayed for in respective petitions for want of evidence could not be granted.
SO ORDERED.[27]
In time, Alicia filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted decision.[28]
On September 14, 1987, the trial court denied Alicias motion for reconsideration but modified its earlier decision, stating that
Raul and Luz Llorente are not children legitimate or otherwise of Lorenzo since they were not legally adopted by him.[29]
Amending its decision of May 18, 1987, the trial court declared Beverly Llorente as the only illegitimate child of Lorenzo,
entitling her to one-third (1/3) of the estate and one-third (1/3) of the free portion of the estate.[30]
On September 28, 1987, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals.[31]
On July 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, affirming with modification the decision of the trial court in
this wise:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Alicia is declared as co-owner of
whatever properties she and the deceased may have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years of cohabitation.
SO ORDERED.[32]
On August 25, 1995, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration of the decision.[33]
On March 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals,[34] denied the motion for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.[35]
The Issue
Stripping the petition of its legalese and sorting through the various arguments raised,[36] the issue is simple. Who are
entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo N. Llorente?
We do not agree with the decision of the Court of Appeals. We remand the case to the trial court for ruling on the intrinsic
validity of the will of the deceased.
The Applicable Law
The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before and at the time of: (1) his divorce from
Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly established, admitted and undisputed.
Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by foreign law.
The Civil Code clearly provides:
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon
citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein
said property may be found. (emphasis ours)
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them.
Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.[37]
While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court of Appeals did not admit the foreign law. The Court of Appeals
and the trial court called to the fore the renvoi doctrine, where the case was referred back to the law of the decedents
domicile, in this case, Philippine law.
We note that while the trial court stated that the law of New York was not sufficiently proven, in the same breath it made the
categorical, albeit equally unproven statement that American law follows the domiciliary theory hence, Philippine law applies
when determining the validity of Lorenzos will.[38]
First, there is no such thing as one American law. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot possibly
apply to general American law. There is no such law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States.
Each State of the union has its own law applicable to its citizens and in force only within the State. It can therefore refer to no
other than the law of the State of which the decedent was a resident.[39] Second, there is no showing that the application of
the renvoi doctrine is called for or required by New York State law.
The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it contained dispositions in favor of Alice, who in the trial courts
opinion was a mere paramour. The trial court threw the will out, leaving Alice, and her two children, Raul and Luz, with
nothing.
The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice entitled to one half (1/2) of whatever property she and
Lorenzo acquired during their cohabitation, applying Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will, already probated as duly executed in
accordance with the formalities of Philippine law, is fatal, especially in light of the factual and legal circumstances here
obtaining.
Validity of the Foreign Divorce
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[40] we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of
public policy and morality. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid
according to their national law.
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals,[41] that once proven that respondent was no longer a
Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner
could very well lose her right to inherit from him.
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,[42] we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent in his country, the Federal Republic of
Germany. There, we stated that divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is
concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be reversed.[43] We hold that the divorce
obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity.
Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters best left to the determination
of the trial court.
Validity of the Will
The Civil Code provides:
Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the
country in which they are executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a
foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution. (underscoring ours)
The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and children by her is glaringly shown in the will he
executed. We do not wish to frustrate his wishes, since he was a foreigner, not covered by our laws on family rights and duties,
status, condition and legal capacity.[44]
Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved by foreign law which must be
pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed in accordance with the formalities required is answered by referring to
Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated.
As a guide however, the trial court should note that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of
legitimes, Congress did not intend to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. Congress specifically left the
amount of successional rights to the decedent's national law.[45]
Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the other issues raised.
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 17446 promulgated on July 31,
1995 is SET ASIDE.
In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Regional Trial Court and RECOGNIZES as VALID the decree of divorce
granted in favor of the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente by the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of
San Diego, made final on December 4, 1952.
Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo N. Llorentes
will and determination of the parties successional rights allowing proof of foreign law with instructions that the trial court shall
proceed with all deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of the deceased within the framework of the Rules of Court.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013

MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,
vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR
GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE, RESPONDENTS.

The Case

This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 107, Quezon City, through a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a pure question of law. The petition assails the Order1 dated 31
January 2011 of the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 and its Resolution dated 2 March 2011 denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity
of Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.

The Facts

Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the
Philippines2 on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioners parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to
Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.

In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and
Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay
allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.3

Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a
judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of
bigamy.4 On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of
Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous
marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the
Philippines;5 and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court
judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the
Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).6

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing the petition and withdrawing the
case from its active civil docket.7 The RTC cited the following provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):

Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.

(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the
wife.

xxxx

Sec. 4. Venue. The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner or the respondent
has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing, or in the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may
be found in the Philippines, at the election of the petitioner. x x x

The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross violation" of the above provisions. The trial court
based its dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which provides that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the preceding
requirements may be a ground for immediate dismissal of the petition."8 Apparently, the RTC took the view that only "the
husband or the wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage void, and not
Fujiki.

Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC contemplated ordinary civil actions for
declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A petition for recognition of
foreign judgment is a special proceeding, which "seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact,"9 and not a civil action
which is "for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong."10 In other words, the petition
in the RTC sought to establish (1) the status and concomitant rights of Fujiki and Marinay as husband and wife and (2) the fact
of the rendition of the Japanese Family Court judgment declaring the marriage between Marinay and Maekara as void on the
ground of bigamy. The petitioner contended that the Japanese judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code
of the Philippines11 on bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine courts.12

In any case, it was also Fujikis view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to void marriages under Article 36 of the Family
Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.13 Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages may be filed solely by the husband or the wife." To apply Section 2(a) in
bigamy would be absurd because only the guilty parties would be permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of
course, difficult to realize that the party interested in having a bigamous marriage declared a nullity would be the husband in
the prior, pre-existing marriage."14 Fujiki had material interest and therefore the personality to nullify a bigamous marriage.

Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court is applicable. Rule
108 is the "procedural implementation" of the Civil Register Law (Act No. 3753)15 in relation to Article 413 of the Civil Code.16
The Civil Register Law imposes a duty on the "successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to send a copy of the
final decree of the court to the local registrar of the municipality where the dissolved or annulled marriage was
solemnized."17 Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that entries in the civil registry relating to "marriages," "judgments of
annulments of marriage" and "judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning" are subject to cancellation or
correction.18 The petition in the RTC sought (among others) to annotate the judgment of the Japanese Family Court on the
certificate of marriage between Marinay and Maekara.

Fujikis motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial court "gravely erred" when, on its own, it dismissed
the petition based on improper venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC may be confusing the concept of venue with the concept of
jurisdiction, because it is lack of jurisdiction which allows a court to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v.
Intermediate Appellate Court19 which held that the "trial court cannot pre-empt the defendants prerogative to object to the
improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the case."20 Moreover, petitioner alleged that the trial court should
not have "immediately dismissed" the petition under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC because he substantially complied
with the provision.
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioners motion for reconsideration. In its Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the petitioner, in effect, prays for a decree of absolute nullity of marriage.21 The trial court
reiterated its two grounds for dismissal, i.e. lack of personality to sue and improper venue under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC considered Fujiki as a "third person"22 in the proceeding because he "is not the husband in the
decree of divorce issued by the Japanese Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially recognized, x x x."23 On the other
hand, the RTC did not explain its ground of impropriety of venue. It only said that "[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x
x as a ground for dismissal of this case[,] it should be taken together with the other ground cited by the Court x x x which is
Sec. 2(a) x x x."24

The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based on Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan
City, Negros Occidental.25 The Court in Braza ruled that "[i]n a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108
(Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages x x x."26
Braza emphasized that the "validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action
seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through a collateral attack such as [a] petition [for correction of entry] x x x."27

The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage between Marinay and Maekara. The trial
court held that this is a "jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the petition.28 Moreover, the verification and certification against
forum shopping of the petition was not authenticated as required under Section 529 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence, this also
warranted the "immediate dismissal" of the petition under the same provision.

The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and the Letters of Marinay and Maekara

On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the petition for review.30 The public respondents,
the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the NSO, participated through the
Office of the Solicitor General. Instead of a comment, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion.31

The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTCs "pronouncement that the petitioner failed to comply
with x x x A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC x x x be set aside" and that the case be reinstated in the trial court for further proceedings.32
The Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as the spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare the
bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor General cited Juliano-Llave v. Republic33 which held
that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this Court explained:

[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only discovered during the connubial period
that the marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent
marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it would not be expected that they would file an action to declare the marriage
void and thus, in such circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting
previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the
property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The
subsequent marriage will always be a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which
sanctity is protected by the Constitution.34

The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding.35 In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas,36 this Court held that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made
in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely
to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact."37 While Corpuz concerned a foreign divorce decree, in the
present case the Japanese Family Court judgment also affected the civil status of the parties, especially Marinay, who is a
Filipino citizen.

The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure to record "[a]cts, events and judicial
decrees concerning the civil status of persons" in the civil registry as required by Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other words,
"[t]he law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences upon a persons legal
capacity and status x x x."38 The Japanese Family Court judgment directly bears on the civil status of a Filipino citizen and
should therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void marriage under Rule 108,
citing De Castro v. De Castro39 and Nial v. Bayadog40 which declared that "[t]he validity of a void marriage may be
collaterally attacked."41

Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the directive for them to comment on the
petition.42 Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from him the fact that she was previously married to Fujiki.43 Maekara
also denied that he inflicted any form of violence on Marinay.44 On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason to
oppose the petition.45 She would like to maintain her silence for fear that anything she say might cause misunderstanding
between her and Fujiki.46

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following legal issues:

(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC) is applicable.

(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent
marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.

(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or correction of
entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

The Ruling of the Court

We grant the petition.

The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC)
does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a
citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic,47 this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that
only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason behind the
petition is bigamy."48

I.

For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen
of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more
specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25,
in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment
through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the
office which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office.50

To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment would mean that the trial court
and the parties should follow its provisions, including the form and contents of the petition,51 the service of summons,52 the
investigation of the public prosecutor,53 the setting of pre-trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of the trial court.56 This is
absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit
repetitive litigation on claims and issues."57 The interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits.
In Mijares v. Raada,58 this Court explained that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the
plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation."59

A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity of its parties.
However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines,
Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory
laws.60 Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the rule of lex
nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by
Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status,
condition and legal capacity of such citizen.

A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation under a Philippine court of
the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the
foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition
and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only
recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence.

Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order against a person creates a
"presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title." Moreover,
Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that "the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on
foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted
and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e. , "want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited review embodies the policy of
efficiency and the protection of party expectations,61 as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other states.62

Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts have recognized foreign divorce decrees between a Filipino and
a foreign citizen if they are successfully proven under the rules of evidence.64 Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage,
but the recognition of a foreign divorce decree does not involve the extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the
rules of ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a foreign
divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when
his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad.65

There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese
Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the
beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki
can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to
Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.

II.

Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding
for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules
of Court provides that "[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular
fact." Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a persons life which are recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register
Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such as birth, death or marriage,66 which the State has an interest
in recording. As noted by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that "[t]he recognition of the
foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule
108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact."67

Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons
which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating
thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)

Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the
same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and
Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he
contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry
of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from
the substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances68) his most intimate human relation,
but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts marriage.69 These property
interests in marriage include the right to be supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family"70 and preserving
the property regime of the marriage.71

Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution,72 but a spouses right in a marriage extends
further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family
Code.73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot "diminish, increase, or modify" the substantive right of the spouse to maintain the
integrity of his marriage.74 In any case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right by limiting the
personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the union recognized by law.

Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to question the validity of a
subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife"75it refers to the husband or the wife of the
subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties
in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting
marriage is the one who has the personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section
2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code,76 which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for
bigamy because any citizen has an interest in the prosecution and prevention of crimes.77 If anyone can file a criminal action
which leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage,78 there is more reason to confer personality to sue on the
husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the public interest of prosecuting and
preventing crimes, he is also personally interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his marriage.

When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an injured party and is therefore
interested in the judgment of the suit.79 Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is clearly the aggrieved party as the
bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it
causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse."80 Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to
declare a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the
bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once established, there
should be no more impediment to cancel the entry of the bigamous marriage in the civil registry.

III.

In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court held that a "trial court has no jurisdiction
to nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.81
Thus, the "validity of marriage[] x x x can be questioned only in a direct action" to nullify the marriage.82 The RTC relied on
Braza in dismissing the petition for recognition of foreign judgment as a collateral attack on the marriage between Marinay
and Maekara.

Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.

To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate
a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage
under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving
the limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage,83 support pendente lite of the spouses and children,84 the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses,85 and the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine
collusion.86 A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of
the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation
or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court "where the corresponding civil registry is
located."87 In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of
marriage in the civil registry.

However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry based on the recognition of a
foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. There is neither
circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family
Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for
Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried and
decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369
define the jurisdiction of the foreign court.

Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a
Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code provides that "[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated
and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." In Republic v. Orbecido,88 this Court recognized the legislative intent of
the second paragraph of Article 26 which is "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the
alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse"89 under the laws of his or her country.
The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign
divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits
because it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce.

The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the anomaly that results from a marriage between
a Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in the
Filipino spouse being tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. The
correction is made by extending in the Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce decree, which is already effective in the
country where it was rendered. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is based on this Courts decision in Van
Dorn v. Romillo90 which declared that the Filipino spouse "should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends
of justice are to be served."91

The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a
foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the
marriage void on the ground of bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies because
the foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or her
country. If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be discriminatedthe foreign
spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.

Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are empowered to correct a situation where
the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26
of the Family Code, Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to
the extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A critical difference between the case of a
foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of
marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him or her. Philippine courts have
jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for
bigamy.

In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a case was
decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity"
of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to
extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a
citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex
nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.

For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an overriding
public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign
judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is
neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default,
recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the
foreign judgment is already "presumptive evidence of a right between the parties." Upon recognition of the foreign judgment,
this right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil
registry. The recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new
status, right and fact92 that needs to be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency between the
recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public records in the Philippines.1wphi1

However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without prejudice to prosecution for bigamy
under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.93 The recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a
ground for extinction of criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of the
Revised Penal Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not run when the offender is absent from the
Philippine archipelago."

Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to address the questions on venue and the
contents and form of the petition under Sections 4 and 5, respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and the Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial
Court is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-22595 November 1, 1927

Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO, administrator, petitioner-appellee, vs. ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant.

ROMUALDEZ, J.:

The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in question in this case.

The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased,
opposed it. The court, however, approved it.

The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are:

(1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2) denial of his participation in the inheritance; (3) the denial of the motion for
reconsideration of the order approving the partition; (4) the approval of the purchase made by the Pietro Lana of the
deceased's business and the deed of transfer of said business; and (5) the declaration that the Turkish laws are impertinent to
this cause, and the failure not to postpone the approval of the scheme of partition and the delivery of the deceased's business
to Pietro Lanza until the receipt of the depositions requested in reference to the Turkish laws.

The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph G.
Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void as being in
violation or article 10 of the Civil Code which, among other things, provides the following:

Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to the amount of the
successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property or the country in which it may be situated.
But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testimentary dispositions are not in accordance with the Turkish laws,
inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the absence of evidence
on such laws, they are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. (Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil.,
472.)

It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are. He, himself, acknowledges it when he desires to be
given an opportunity to present evidence on this point; so much so that he assigns as an error of the court in not having
deferred the approval of the scheme of partition until the receipt of certain testimony requested regarding the Turkish laws on
the matter.

The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does not constitute an error. It is discretionary with
the trial court, and, taking into consideration that the oppositor was granted ample opportunity to introduce competent
evidence, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the court in this particular. There is, therefore, no evidence in the
record that the national law of the testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in the testamentary dispositions in question which,
not being contrary to our laws in force, must be complied with and executed. lawphil.net

Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was not erroneous.

In regard to the first assignment of error which deals with the exclusion of the herein appellant as a legatee, inasmuch as he is
one of the persons designated as such in will, it must be taken into consideration that such exclusion is based on the last part
of the second clause of the will, which says:

Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I am a Turkish citizen, this citizenship having been conferred upon me by
conquest and not by free choice, nor by nationality and, on the other hand, having resided for a considerable length of time in
the Philippine Islands where I succeeded in acquiring all of the property that I now possess, it is my wish that the distribution
of my property and everything in connection with this, my will, be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force
in the Philippine islands, requesting all of my relatives to respect this wish, otherwise, I annul and cancel beforehand whatever
disposition found in this will favorable to the person or persons who fail to comply with this request.

The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the instituted legatees must respect the testator's
will to distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws of his nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the
Philippines.

If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee who fails to comply with it, as the herein oppositor who, by
his attitude in these proceedings has not respected the will of the testator, as expressed, is prevented from receiving his
legacy.

The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for article 792 of the civil Code provides the
following:

Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the
heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide.

And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national law when, according to article 10 of
the civil Code above quoted, such national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary dispositions.

Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered unwritten, and the institution of legatees in
said will is unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the herein oppositor.

It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the law which shall govern it, and to the condition imposed
upon the legatees, is null and void, being contrary to law.

All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and requests are perfectly valid and effective it not appearing
that said clauses are contrary to the testator's national law.
Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the distribution of this estate be made in such a
manner as to include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees, and the scheme of partition submitted by the
judicial administrator is approved in all other respects, without any pronouncement as to costs.

So ordered.

G.R. No. L-23678 (June 6, 1967)

Bellis vs. Bellis

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated April
30, 1964, approving the project of partition filed by the executor in Civil Case No. 37089 therein.1wph1.t

The facts of the case are as follows:

Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen,
whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A.
Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate
children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr.,
Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.

On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes, obligations, and
expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the following order and manner:
(a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria
Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the
remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis,
Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.1wph1.t

Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate
in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.

The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein including the amount of
$240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria
Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective legacies, or
a total of P120,000.00, which it released from time to time according as the lower court approved and allowed the various
motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial advances on account of their respective legacies.

On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its "Executor's Final Account,
Report of Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E.
Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina
Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of P120,000.00. In the project of partition, the
executor pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and Testament divided the residuary estate into
seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven legitimate children by his first and second marriages.

On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the project of partition
on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the
deceased.

Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of which is evidenced by the registry receipt
submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor.1

After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued an
order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final account, report and administration and project of
partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law,
which did not provide for legitimes.

Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court on June 11, 1964, oppositors-appellants
appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which law must apply Texas law or Philippine law.

In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v.
Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one
country, and a domicile of another. In the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a
domicile thereof at the time of his death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the domiciliary
system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would
still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the
application of the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved
are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be
presumed different from ours.3 Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never
invoked nor even mentioned it in their arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the circumstances mentioned
in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.

Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or
testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the
intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein
said property may be found.

ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.

Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code, stating that

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy
and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country.

prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not correct. Precisely, Congress deleted the
phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil
Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old
Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision
in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As further indication of this legislative intent, Congress
added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the
decedent.

It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our System of legitimes, Congress has
not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the
amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.

Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills one to govern his Texas estate and the other his
Philippine estate arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was
the decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v.
Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with
Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those
matters that Article 10 now Article 16 of the Civil Code states said national law should govern.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of
Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount
of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of
Amos G. Bellis.

Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against appellants. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-19671 July 26, 1966

PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff and appellant, vs. VICENTA F. ESCAO, ET AL., defendants and appellees.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Not satisfied with the decision of this Court, promulgated on 29 November 1965, in the above-entitled case, plaintiff-appellant Pastor B. Tenchavez and
defendant-appellee Vicenta F. Escao, respectively, move for its reconsideration; in addition, Russell Leo Moran, whom said defendant married in the
United States, has filed, upon leave previously granted, a memorandum in intervention.

Movant Tenchavez poses the novel theory that Mamerto and Mina Escao are undeserving of an award for damages because they are guilty of
contributory negligence in failing to take up proper and timely measures to dissuade their daughter Vicenta from leaving her husband Tenchavez obtaining
a foreign divorce and marrying another man (Moran). This theory cannot be considered: first, because this was not raised in the court below; second,
there is no evidence to support it; third, it contradicts plaintiff's previous theory of alienation of affections in that contributory negligence involves an
omission to perform an act while alienation of affection involves the performance of a positive act.

The prayer of appellant Tenchavez in his motion for reconsideration to increase the damages against Vicenta (P25,000 for damages and attorney's fees
were awarded to Tenchavez in the decision) should, likewise, be denied, all factors and circumstances in the case having been duly considered in the main
decision.

In seeking a reexamination of the decision, defendant-appellee Vicenta Escao, in turn, urges a comparison between the two marriages, stating, in plainer
terms, that the Tenchavez-Escano marriage was no more than a ceremony, and a faulty one at that, while the Moran-Escao marriage fits the concept of a
marriage as a social institution because publicly contracted, recognized by both civil and ecclesiastical authorities, and blessed by three children. She
concludes that, since the second marriage is the better one, it deserves the laws recognition and protection over the other. This is a dangerous
proposition: it legalizes a continuing polygamy by permitting a spouse to just drop at pleasure her consort for another in as many jurisdictions as would
grant divorce on the excuse that the new marriage is better than the previous one; and, instead of fitting the concept of marriage as a social institution,
the proposition altogether does away with the social aspects of marriage in favor of its being a matter of private contract and personal adventure.

The said appellee claims that state recognition should be accorded the Church's disavowal of her marriage with Tenchavez. On this point, our main
decision limited itself to the statement, "On 10 September 1954, Vicenta sought papal dispensation of her marriage (Exh. P-2)", without stating that papal
dispensation was actually granted, the reason being that Vicenta's claim that dispensation was granted was not indubitable, and her counsel, during the
trial in the lower court, did not make good his promise to submit the document evidencing the papal dispensation; in fact, no such document appears on
record. The Church's disavowal of the marriage, not being sufficiently established, it cannot be considered. Vicenta's belated appeal to Canon law, after she
had sought and failed to obtain annulment in the civil courts, and after she had flaunted its principles by obtaining absolute divorce, does not, and can not,
sound convincing. Particularly when account is taken of the circumstances that she obtained the Nevada divorce in 1950 and only sought ecclesiastical
release from her marriage to Tenchavez in 1954.

The award of moral damages against Vicenta Escao is assailed on the ground that her refusal to perform her wifely duties, her denial of consortium and
desertion of her husband are not included in the enumeration of cases where moral damages may lie. The argument is untenable. The acts of Vicenta (up
to and including her divorce, for grounds not countenanced by our law, which was hers at the time) constitute a wilful infliction of injury upon plaintiff's
feelings in a manner "contrary to morals, good customs or public policy" (Civ. Code, Art. 21) for which Article 2219 (10) authorizes an award of moral
damages. Neither the case of Ventanilla vs. Centeno, L-14333, 28 January 1961 (which was a suit filed by a client against his lawyer for failure to perfect an
appeal on time), nor the case of Malonzo vs. Galang, L-13851, 27 July 1960 (wherein the precise ruling was that moral damages may not be recovered for a
clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding), now invoked by the said defendant-appellee, is in point.

It is also argued that, by the award of moral damages, an additional effect of legal separation has been added to Article 106. Appellee obviously mistakes
our grant of damages as an effect of legal separation. It was plain in the decision that the damages attached to her wrongful acts under the codal article
(Article 2176) expressly cited.

Appellee-movant commits a similar mistake by citing Arroyo vs. Arroyo, 42 Phil. 54, and Ramirez-Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno, L-20043, 28 November 1964, to
support her argument that moral damages did not attach to her failure to render consortium because the sanction therefor is spontaneous mutual
affection, and not any legal mandate or court order. The Arroyo case did rule that "it is not within the province of courts of this country to attempt to
compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other", but it referred to physically coercive means, the Court declaring that

We are disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible by process of contempt, may be entered to compel prostitution of the purely personal
right of consortism. (Cas cit., p. 60) (Emphasis supplied)
But economic sanctions are not held in our law to be incompatible with the respect accorded to individual liberty in civil cases. Thus, a consort who
unjustifiably deserts the conjugal abode can be denied support (Art. 178, Civil Code of the Phil.). And where the wealth of the deserting spouse renders
this remedy illusory, there is no cogent reason why the court may not award damage as it may in cases of breach of other obligations to do intuitu
personae even if in private relations physical coercion be barred under the old maxim "Nemo potest precise cogi and factum".

For analogous reasons, the arguments advanced against the award of attorney's fees must be rejected as devoid of merit.

Contrary to intervenor Moran's contention, the decision did not impair appellee's constitutional liberty of abode and freedom of locomotion, as, in fact,
Vicenta Escao did exercise these rights, and even abused them by stating in her application for a passport that she was "single", the better to facilitate her
flight from the wrongs she had committed against her husband. The right of a citizen to transfer to a foreign country and seek divorce in a diverse forum is
one thing, and the recognition to be accorded to the divorce decree thus obtained is quite another; and the two should not be confused.

Intervenor reiterates that recognition of Vicenta's divorce in Nevada is a more enlightened view. The argument should be addressed in the legislature. As
the case presently stands, the public policy of this forum is clearly adverse to such recognition, as was extensively discussed in the decision. The principle is
well-established, in private international law, that foreign decrees cannot be enforced or recognized if they contravene public policy (Nussbaum, Principles
of Private International Law, p. 232).

It is thoroughly established as a broad general rule that foreign law or rights based therein will not be given effect or enforced if opposed to the settled
public policy of the forum. (15 C.J.S. 853)

SEC. 6. Limitations. In the recognition and enforcement of foreign laws the Courts are slow to overrule the positive law of the forum, and they will never
give effect to a foreign law where to do so would prejudice the state's own rights or the rights of its citizens or where the enforcement of the foreign law
would contravene the positive policy of the law of the forum whether or not that policy is reflected in statutory enactments. (11 Am. Jur., 300-301).

A judgment affecting the status of persons, such as a decree confirming or dissolving a marriage, is recognized as valid in every country, unless contrary to
the policy of its own law. Cottington's Case, 2 Swan St. 326, note; Roach vs. Garvan, I Ves St. 157; Harvey vs. Farnie, LR 8 App. Cas. 43; Cheely vs. Clayton,
110 U.S. 701 [28:298]. (Hilton vs. Guyot 159 U.S. 113, 167; 40 L. Ed. 95, 110) (Emphasis supplied)

It is, therefore, error for the intervenor to ask that "private international law rather than Philippine civil law should decide the instant case", as if the
two branches of the law contradicted one another.

In a consolidated paper (intervenor's rejoinder and appellee Vicenta Escao's supplemental motion for reconsideration), the issue is raised that "the
Supreme Court cannot reverse the decision of the lower court dismissing the complaint nor sentence Vicenta Escao to pay damages, without resolving
the question of lack of jurisdiction over her person".

A resolution by the Supreme Court of the issue of jurisdiction over the person of appellee Vicenta Escao, and which was disallowed by the court below,
was unnecessary because the matter was not properly brought to us for resolution, either on appeal or by special remedy which could have been availed
of by the appellee when the lower court, on 1 June 1957, overruled her challenge to its jurisdiction. Neither was the alleged error of the lower court put in
issue in her brief as appellee, as it was incumbent upon her to do (Relativo vs. Castro, 76 Phil. 563; Lucero vs. De Guzman, 45 Phil. 852). Not affecting the
jurisdiction over the subject matter, the court properly ignored the point (Rev. Rule 51, section 7).

SEC. 7. Questions that may be decided. No error which does not affect the jurisdiction over the subject matter will be considered unless stated in the
assignment of errors and properly argued in the brief, save as the court, at its option, may notice plain errors not specified, and also clerical errors.

At any rate,

... .When, however, the action against the non-resident defendant affects the personal status of the plaintiff, as, for instance, an action for separation or for
annulment of marriage, ..., Philippine courts may validly try and decide the case, because, then, they have jurisdiction over the res, and in that event their
jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident defendant is not essential. The res is the personal status of the plaintiff domiciled in the Philippines, ... . (1
Moran 411, 1963 Ed., citing Mabanag vs. Gallemore, 81 Phil. 254)

The award of damages, in the present case, was merely incidental to the petition for legal separation. For all these reasons, and because she filed a
counterclaim against plaintiff (Rec. App. pp. 205-206), Vicenta should be deemed to have withdrawn the objection to the lower court's jurisdiction over
her person, even though she had stated in the counterclaim that she was not waiving her special defense of lack of jurisdiction.1wph1.t

It is urged that the actions for legal separation and for quasi-delict have prescribed: the first, because it was not filed within one year from and after the
date on which the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause; and, the second, because it was not filed within four years since the Tenchavez-Escao marriage
in 1948.

The argument on both points is untenable.

The action for legal separation was filed on 31 May 1956. Although in a letter, under date of 10 December 1954, the Department of Foreign Affairs
informed plaintiff Tenchavez that "According to information, she (appellee) secured a decree of divorce on October 21, 1950 ... and married an American
citizen, Russel Leo Moran, on September 13, 1954", there is no satisfactory and convincing evidence as to the time when plaintiff Tenchavez, received the
said letter; nor was she duty-bound to act immediately upon hearsay information. Since prescription is an affirmative defense, the burden lay on the
defendant to clearly prove it, and her proof on it was inadequate.
On the argument about the action on tort having prescribed, the basis thereof is erroneous: the marriage was not the cause of appellee's wrongful
conduct. Her denial of cohabitation, refusal to render consortium and desertion of her husband started right after their wedding but such wrongs have
continued ever since. She never stopped her wrongdoings to her husband, so that the period of limitation has never been completed.

Finally, we see no point in discussing the question of appellee Escao's criminal intent, since nothing in the main decision was designed or intended to
prejudge or rule on the criminal aspect of the case, if any, or any of its constituent elements. It is to be noted that in this civil case only a preponderance of
evidence is required, and not proof beyond reasonable doubt. While much could be said as to the circumstances surrounding the divorce of the appellee,
we prefer to abstain from so doing in order not to influence in any way the criminal case, should any be instituted.

For the reasons above cited, all motions for reconsideration are hereby denied.

Concepcion, C.J., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, J.P. Bengzon, Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.

R E S O L UT I O N

September 14, 1966

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Their first motion for reconsideration having been denied, Vicenta Escao and Russel Leo Moran, through counsel, have filed a second motion for
reconsideration.

It is first averred that this Court's decision contradicts the doctrine laid down in Banco Espaol Filipino vs. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921, that in proceedings in rem
or quasi in rem the relief must be confined to the res, and the Court cannot lawfully render a personal judgment.

Movant's own quotation from that decision demonstrates the diffirence in the facts between the case at bar and the authority cited. For their own excerpt
shows that the rule now invoked was laid down for instances where the defendant never submitted to the jurisdiction of our courts. We said then:

If, however, the defendant is a non-resident, and remaining beyond the range of the personal process of the court refuses to come in voluntarily, the court
never acquires jurisdiction over the person at all. ... (Cas. Cit. p. 930)

The defendant Palanca, in 37 Phil. 921, so much refused to come in voluntarily that he was declared in default. Was this the case of Vicenta Escao? The
records show on their face that it was not. While she objected to the jurisdiction of the Court over her person, she also filed an answer with a
counterclaim asking for an award of damages against plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez. Instead of "refusing to come in voluntarily", as Palanca did (in 37 Phil.
921), Escao took the offensive and asked the Court for a remedy, a judgment against her opponent; and this after the court below overruled her
objection that she was not within its jurisdiction. In asking the Court for affirmative relief, Escao submitted to its jurisdiction. In the United States, whence
our adjective law finds its sources, the Federal Supreme Court has rules (Merchant's Heat & Light Co. vs. Clow & Sons, 204 U.S. 286, 51 Law Ed. 488):

We assume that the defendant lost no rights by pleading to the merits, as required, after saving its rights. Harkness vs. Hyde, 98 U.S. 476, 25 L. ed. 237;
Southern P. Co. vs. Denton, 146 U.S. 202, 36 L. ed. 943, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 44. But by setting up its counterclaim the defendant became a plaintiff in its turn,
invoked the jurisdiction of the court in same action, and, by invoking, submitted to it. It is true that the counterclaim seems to have arisen wholly out of
the same transaction that the plaintiff sued upon, and so to have been in recoupment rather than in set-off proper. But, even at common law, since the
doctrine has been developed, a demand in recoupment is recognized as a cross demand, as distinguished from a defense. Therefore, although there has
been a difference of opinion as to whether a defendant, by pleading it, is concluded by the judgment from bringing a subsequent suit for the residue of his
claim a judgment in his favor being impossible at common law, the authorities agree that he is not concluded by the judgment if he does not plead his
cross demand, and that whether he shall do so or not is left wholly to his choice. Davis vs. Hedges, L.R. 6 Q.B. 687; Mondel vs. Steel, 8 Mees. & W. 858,
872; O'Connor vs. Varney, 10 Gray, 231. This single fact shows that the defendant, if he elects to sue upon his claim in the action against him, assumes the
position of an actor and must take the consequence. The right to do so is of modern growth, and is merely a convenience that saves bringing another suit,
not a necessity of the defense. (Emphasis supplied)

The reason for the rule is manifest. The courts can not look with favor upon a party adopting not merely inconsistent, but actually contradictory, positions
in one and the same suit, claiming that a court has no jurisdiction to render judgment against it, but has such jurisdiction to give to give a decision in its
favor (Dailey vs. Kennedy, 64 Mich. 208, 31 N.W. 125; Harvey vs. Bishop, 171 Okla. 497, 43 Pac. 2d, 48; Haverstick vs. Southern P. Co. (Calif.) 37 Pac. 2d,
146).

Another reason, equally valid, is that if such defendant shall ask for any relief other than that addressed to his plea, he is seeking to gain an
unconscionable advantage over his adversary, whereby, if the determination be in his favor, he may avail himself of it while if it be against him, he may fall
back upon his plea of lack of jurisdiction of the person. (Olcese vs. Justice's Court, 156 Calif. 82, 103 Pac. 318).

True, Escao made a reservation of her former plea when she fled her counterclaim; but such reservation did not remove the obnoxious contradictory
positions she assumed.

Secondly, appellee Vicente Escao not only adopted inconsistently positions in the court below but abandoned all pretense that court's lack of jurisdiction
over her person upon appeal to this Court. She made no reference whatever to that question in her brief as appellee. Coupled with her previous demand
for affirmative relief, Vicente's silence on appeal only confirms her waiver of the point. Her excuse it that, the lower court having ruled in her favor, she
could not very well assign as error the overruling of her plea of non-jurisdiction. That excuse is unserviceable; for this Court has repeatedly held (and it is
now well settled) that an appellee can make counter assignments of error for the purpose of sustaining the appealed judgement, altho it is not allowed to
ask that the same be reversed or modified (Bunge Corp. vs. Camenforte Co., 91 Phil. 861, and cases cited therein; Cabrera vs. Provincial Treasurer of
Tayabas, 75 Phil. 780; Pineda & Ampil vs. Bartolome, 95 Phil. 930; David vs. De la Cruz, L-11656, April 18, 1958). Having failed to do so, this Court had every
reason to consider the issue of jurisdiction abandoned, and appellee's belated attempts to resurrect it, by alleging an imaginary error on our part, are
pointless and vain. The same thing can be said of her effort to escape the jurisdiction she had invoked in her counterclaim by not appealing its rejection by
the trial court. At most, it amounts to equivocal conduct that can not revive the inconsistent claim of non-jurisdiction, abandoned by her seeking
affirmative relief.

Wherefore, the second motion for reconsideration is denied.

G.R. NO. 146322, DECEMBER 06, 2006

ERNESTO RAMAS UYPITCHING AND RAMAS UYPITCHING SONS, INC., PETITIONERS, VS. ERNESTO QUIAMCO, RESPONDENT .
CORONA, J.:

DECISION
CORONA, J.:

Honeste vivere, non alterum laedere et jus suum cuique tribuere. To live virtuously, not to injure others and to give everyone
his due. These supreme norms of justice are the underlying principles of law and order in society. We reaffirm them in this
petition for review on certiorari assailing the July 26, 2000 decision[1] and October 18, 2000 resolution of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 47571.

In 1982, respondent Ernesto C. Quiamco was approached by Juan Davalan,[2] Josefino Gabutero and Raul Generoso to
amicably settle the civil aspect of a criminal case for robbery[3] filed by Quiamco against them. They surrendered to him a red
Honda XL-100 motorcycle and a photocopy of its certificate of registration. Respondent asked for the original certificate of
registration but the three accused never came to see him again. Meanwhile, the motorcycle was parked in an open space
inside respondents business establishment, Avesco-AVNE Enterprises, where it was visible and accessible to the public.

It turned out that, in October 1981, the motorcycle had been sold on installment basis to Gabutero by petitioner Ramas
Uypitching Sons, Inc., a family-owned corporation managed by petitioner Atty. Ernesto Ramas Uypitching. To secure its
payment, the motorcycle was mortgaged to petitioner corporation.[4]

When Gabutero could no longer pay the installments, Davalan assumed the obligation and continued the payments. In
September 1982, however, Davalan stopped paying the remaining installments and told petitioner corporations collector,
Wilfredo Verao, that the motorcycle had allegedly been taken by respondents men.
Nine years later, on January 26, 1991, petitioner Uypitching, accompanied by policemen,[5] went to Avesco-AVNE Enterprises
to recover the motorcycle. The leader of the police team, P/Lt. Arturo Vendiola, talked to the clerk in charge and asked for
respondent. While P/Lt. Vendiola and the clerk were talking, petitioner Uypitching paced back and forth inside the
establishment uttering Quiamco is a thief of a motorcycle.

On learning that respondent was not in Avesco-AVNE Enterprises, the policemen left to look for respondent in his residence
while petitioner Uypitching stayed in the establishment to take photographs of the motorcycle. Unable to find respondent, the
policemen went back to Avesco-AVNE Enterprises and, on petitioner Uypitchings instruction and over the clerks objection,
took the motorcycle.

On February 18, 1991, petitioner Uypitching filed a criminal complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing
Law[6] against respondent in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dumaguete City.[7] Respondent moved for dismissal because
the complaint did not charge an offense as he had neither stolen nor bought the motorcycle. The Office of the City Prosecutor
dismissed the complaint[8] and denied petitioner Uypitchings subsequent motion for reconsideration.
Respondent filed an action for damages against petitioners in the RTC of Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental, Branch 37.[9] He
sought to hold the petitioners liable for the following: (1) unlawful taking of the motorcycle; (2) utterance of a defamatory
remark (that respondent was a thief) and (3) precipitate filing of a baseless and malicious complaint. These acts humiliated
and embarrassed the respondent and injured his reputation and integrity.

On July 30, 1994, the trial court rendered a decision[10] finding that petitioner Uypitching was motivated with malice and ill
will when he called respondent a thief, took the motorcycle in an abusive manner and filed a baseless complaint for qualified
theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law. Petitioners acts were found to be contrary to Articles 19[11] and 20[12] of the
Civil Code. Hence, the trial court held petitioners liable to respondent for P500,000 moral damages, P200,000 exemplary
damages and P50,000 attorneys fees plus costs.
Petitioners appealed the RTC decision but the CA affirmed the trial courts decision with modification, reducing the award of
moral and exemplary damages to P300,000 and P100,000, respectively.[13] Petitioners sought reconsideration but it was
denied. Thus, this petition.

In their petition and memorandum, petitioners submit that the sole (allegedly) issue to be resolved here is whether the filing
of a complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law in the Office of the City Prosecutor warranted the
award of moral damages, exemplary damages, attorneys fees and costs in favor of respondent.

Petitioners suggestion is misleading. They were held liable for damages not only for instituting a groundless complaint against
respondent but also for making a slanderous remark and for taking the motorcycle from respondents establishment in an
abusive manner.

CORRECTNESS OF THE FINDINGS OF THE RTC AND CA

As they never questioned the findings of the RTC and CA that malice and ill will attended not only the public imputation of a
crime to respondent[14] but also the taking of the motorcycle, petitioners were deemed to have accepted the correctness of
such findings. This alone was sufficient to hold petitioners liable for damages to respondent.

Nevertheless, to address petitioners concern, we also find that the trial and appellate courts correctly ruled that the filing of
the complaint was tainted with malice and bad faith. Petitioners themselves in fact described their action as a precipitate act.
[15] Petitioners were bent on portraying respondent as a thief. In this connection, we quote with approval the following
findings of the RTC, as adopted by the CA:

x x x There was malice or ill-will [in filing the complaint before the City Prosecutors Office] because Atty. Ernesto Ramas
Uypitching knew or ought to have known as he is a lawyer, that there was no probable cause at all for filing a criminal
complaint for qualified theft and fencing activity against [respondent]. Atty. Uypitching had no personal knowledge that
[respondent] stole the motorcycle in question. He was merely told by his bill collector ([i.e.] the bill collector of Ramas
Uypitching Sons, Inc.)[,] Wilfredo Verao[,] that Juan Dabalan will [no longer] pay the remaining installment(s) for the
motorcycle because the motorcycle was taken by the men of [respondent]. It must be noted that the term used by Wilfredo
Verao in informing Atty. Ernesto Ramas Uypitching of the refusal of Juan Dabalan to pay for the remaining installment was
[]taken[], not []unlawfully taken[] or stolen. Yet, despite the double hearsay, Atty. Ernesto Ramas Uypitching not only executed
the [complaint-affidavit] wherein he named [respondent] as the suspect of the stolen motorcycle but also charged
[respondent] of qualified theft and fencing activity before the City [Prosecutors] Office of Dumaguete. The absence of
probable cause necessarily signifies the presence of malice. What is deplorable in all these is that Juan Dabalan, the owner of
the motorcycle, did not accuse [respondent] or the latters men of stealing the motorcycle[,] much less bother[ed] to file a case
for qualified theft before the authorities. That Atty. Uypitchings act in charging [respondent] with qualified theft and fencing
activity is tainted with malice is also shown by his answer to the question of Cupid Gonzaga[16] [during one of their
conversations] - why should you still file a complaint? You have already recovered the motorcycle[:] Aron motagam ang
kawatan ug motor. (To teach a lesson to the thief of motorcycle.)[17]

Moreover, the existence of malice, ill will or bad faith is a factual matter. As a rule, findings of fact of the trial court, when
affirmed by the appellate court, are conclusive on this Court. We see no compelling reason to reverse the findings of the RTC
and the CA.

PETITIONERS ABUSED THEIR RIGHT OF RECOVERY AS MORTGAGEE(S)

Petitioners claim that they should not be held liable for petitioner corporations exercise of its right as seller-mortgagee to
recover the mortgaged vehicle preliminary to the enforcement of its right to foreclose on the mortgage in case of default. They
are clearly mistaken.
True, a mortgagee may take steps to recover the mortgaged property to enable it to enforce or protect its foreclosure right
thereon. There is, however, a well-defined procedure for the recovery of possession of mortgaged property: if a mortgagee is
unable to obtain possession of a mortgaged property for its sale on foreclosure, he must bring a civil action either to recover
such possession as a preliminary step to the sale, or to obtain judicial foreclosure.[18]

Petitioner corporation failed to bring the proper civil action necessary to acquire legal possession of the motorcycle. Instead,
petitioner Uypitching descended on respondents establishment with his policemen and ordered the seizure of the motorcycle
without a search warrant or court order. Worse, in the course of the illegal seizure of the motorcycle, petitioner Uypitching
even mouthed a slanderous statement.

No doubt, petitioner corporation, acting through its co-petitioner Uypitching, blatantly disregarded the lawful procedure for
the enforcement of its right, to the prejudice of respondent. Petitioners acts violated the law as well as public morals, and
transgressed the proper norms of human relations.

The basic principle of human relations, embodied in Article 19 of the Civil Code, provides:

Art. 19. Every person must in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give every one his
due, and observe honesty and good faith.

Article 19, also known as the principle of abuse of right, prescribes that a person should not use his right unjustly or contrary
to honesty and good faith, otherwise he opens himself to liability.[19] It seeks to preclude the use of, or the tendency to use, a
legal right (or duty) as a means to unjust ends.

There is an abuse of right when it is exercised solely to prejudice or injure another.[20] The exercise of a right must be in
accordance with the purpose for which it was established and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no
intention to harm another.[21] Otherwise, liability for damages to the injured party will attach.

In this case, the manner by which the motorcycle was taken at petitioners instance was not only attended by bad faith but also
contrary to the procedure laid down by law. Considered in conjunction with the defamatory statement, petitioners exercise of
the right to recover the mortgaged vehicle was utterly prejudicial and injurious to respondent. On the other hand, the
precipitate act of filing an unfounded complaint could not in any way be considered to be in accordance with the purpose for
which the right to prosecute a crime was established. Thus, the totality of petitioners actions showed a calculated design to
embarrass, humiliate and publicly ridicule respondent. Petitioners acted in an excessively harsh fashion to the prejudice of
respondent. Contrary to law, petitioners willfully caused damage to respondent. Hence, they should indemnify him.[22]

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The July 26, 2000 decision and October 18, 2000 resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 47571 are AFFIRMED.

Triple costs against petitioners, considering that petitioner Ernesto Ramas Uypitching is a lawyer and an officer of the court,
for his improper behavior.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 161188 June 13, 2008

Heirs of PURISIMA NALA, represented by their attorney-in-fact EFEGENIA DIGNA DUYAN, petitioners,
vs. ARTEMIO CABANSAG, respondent.

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated December
19, 2002 and Resolution2 dated October 28, 2003, dismissing petitioners' appeal and affirming with modification the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) Decision dated August 10, 1994 rendered in Civil Case No. Q-91-10541.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Artemio Cabansag (respondent) filed Civil Case No. Q-91-10541 for damages in October 1991. According to respondent, he
bought a 50-square meter property from spouses Eugenio Gomez, Jr. and Felisa Duyan Gomez on July 23, 1990. Said property
is part of a 400-square meter lot registered in the name of the Gomez spouses. In October 1991, he received a demand letter
from Atty. Alexander del Prado (Atty. Del Prado), in behalf of Purisima Nala (Nala), asking for the payment of rentals from 1987
to 1991 until he leaves the premises, as said property is owned by Nala, failing which criminal and civil actions will be filed
against him. Another demand letter was sent on May 14, 1991. Because of such demands, respondent suffered damages and
was constrained to file the case against Nala and Atty. Del Prado.3

Atty. Del Prado claimed that he sent the demand letters in good faith and that he was merely acting in behalf of his client,
Nala, who disputed respondent's claim of ownership. Nala alleged that said property is part of an 800-square meter property
owned by her late husband, Eulogio Duyan, which was subsequently divided into two parts. The 400-square meter property
was conveyed to spouses Gomez in a fictitious deed of sale, with the agreement that it will be merely held by them in trust for
the Duyan's children. Said property is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 281115 in the name of spouses Gomez.
Nala also claimed that respondent is only renting the property which he occupies.4

After trial, the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 93, rendered its Decision on August 10, 1994, in favor of respondent. The dispositive
portion of the Decision provides:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, by preponderance of evidence, the Court finds in favor of the plaintiff and hereby orders
the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff the following:

1. P150,000.00 by way of moral damages;

2. P30,000.00 by way of exemplary damages;

3. P20,000.00 as and for reasonable attorney's fees and other litigation expenses; and

4. to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.5

Nala and Atty. Del Prado appealed to the CA. The herein assailed CA Decision dated December 19, 2002 affirmed the RTC
Decision with modification, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 93, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-91-10541 is heretofore AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Defendants-appellants are
ordered to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiff-appellee the amount of P30,000.00 by way of moral damages. It is further
ordered to pay him exemplary damages in the amount of P10,000.00 and P10,000.00, attorney's fees.

SO ORDERED.6

In affirming the RTC Decision, the CA took note of the Decision dated September 5, 1994 rendered by the RTC of Quezon City,
Branch 80, dismissing Civil Case No. 91-8821, an action for reconveyance of real property and cancellation of TCT No. 281115
with damages, filed by Nala against spouses Gomez.7

Hence, herein petition by the heirs of Nala (petitioners)8 with the following assignment of errors:

a) Respondent Court of Appeals erred in not considering the right of Purisima Nala to assert her rights and interest over the
property.

b) Respondent Court of Appeals erred in not considering the Decision rendered by the Court of Appeals in the case for
reconveyance which upheld the rights and interest of Purisima Nala and her children over a certain parcel of land, a portion of
which is subject of the present case.
c) Respondent Court of Appeals erred in awarding damages and attorney's fees without any basis.9

Atty. Del Prado filed a motion for extension of time to file his separate petition but it was denied by the Court per its
Resolution dated January 19, 2004 issued in G.R. No. 160829.

Petitioners argue that their predecessor-in-interest had every right to protect and assert her interests over the property. Nala
had no knowledge that the property was sold by spouses Gomez to respondent when the demand letters were sent. What she
was aware of was the fact that spouses Gomez were managing the rentals on the property by virtue of the implied trust
created between them and Eulogio Duyan. When spouses Gomez failed to remit the rentals and claimed ownership of the
property, it was then that Nala decided to procure the services of legal counsel to protect their rights over the property.

Petitioners also contend that it was error for the CA to take note of the RTC Decision in Civil Case No. 91-8821 without further
noting that the CA had already reversed and set aside said RTC Decision and ordered reconveyance of the property to Nala and
her children in a Decision dated March 8, 2000 rendered in CA-G.R. CV No. 49163. Petitioners also argue that respondent did
not substantiate his claim for damages.

Preliminarily, the Court notes that both the RTC and the CA failed to indicate the particular provision of law under which it
held petitioners liable for damages. Nevertheless, based on the allegations in respondent's complaint, it may be gathered that
the basis for his claim for damages is Article 19 of the Civil Code, which provides:

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith.

The foregoing provision sets the standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the
performance of one's duties. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in
Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held
responsible. But a right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the
source of some illegality. A person should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right; that is, when
he acts with prudence and in good faith, but not when he acts with negligence or abuse. There is an abuse of right when it is
exercised only for the purpose of prejudicing or injuring another. The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the
purpose for which it was established, and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to injure another.
[10]

In order to be liable for damages under the abuse of rights principle, the following requisites must concur: (a) the existence of
a legal right or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.11

It should be stressed that malice or bad faith is at the core of Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good faith is presumed, and he who
alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same.12 Bad faith, on the other hand, does not simply connote bad judgment to
simple negligence, dishonest purpose or some moral obloquy and conscious doing of a wrong, or a breach of known duty due
to some motives or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud. Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in
response to duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm.13

In the present case, there is nothing on record which will prove that Nala and her counsel, Atty. Del Prado, acted in bad faith or
malice in sending the demand letters to respondent. In the first place, there was ground for Nala's actions since she believed
that the property was owned by her husband Eulogio Duyan and that respondent was illegally occupying the same. She had no
knowledge that spouses Gomez violated the trust imposed on them by Eulogio and surreptitiously sold a portion of the
property to respondent. It was only after respondent filed the case for damages against Nala that she learned of such sale. The
bare fact that respondent claims ownership over the property does not give rise to the conclusion that the sending of the
demand letters by Nala was done in bad faith. Absent any evidence presented by respondent, bad faith or malice could not be
attributed to petitioner since Nala was only trying to protect their interests over the property.

Moreover, respondent failed to show that Nala and Atty. Del Prado's acts were done with the sole intention of prejudicing and
injuring him. It may be true that respondent suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety and sleepless nights when he received
the demand letters; however, there is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the legal invasion of a legal
right while damage is the hurt, loss or harm which results from the injury.14 Thus, there can be damage without injury in
those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the consequences
must be borne by the injured person alone; the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not
amount to a legal injury or wrong. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria.15

Nala was acting well within her rights when she instructed Atty. Del Prado to send the demand letters. She had to take all the
necessary legal steps to enforce her legal/equitable rights over the property occupied by respondent. One who makes use of
his own legal right does no injury.16 Thus, whatever damages are suffered by respondent should be borne solely by him.

Nala's acts in protecting her rights over the property find further solid ground in the fact that the property has already been
ordered reconveyed to her and her heirs. In its Decision dated March 8, 2000 in CA-G.R. CV No. 49163, the CA reversed and set
aside the RTC's Decision and ordered the reconveyance of the property to petitioners, and TCT No. 281115 was declared
canceled. Said CA Decision was affirmed by this Court in its Decision dated March 18, 2005 in G.R. No. 144148, which became
final and executory on July 27, 2005.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated December 19, 2002 and Resolution dated October 28, 2003
rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 48580 are NULLIFIED. Civil Case No. Q-91-10541 is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.

Costs against respondent.

SO ORDERED.

ASJ Corp. vs Evangelista G.R. No. 158086 (2008)

G.R. No. 158086 Feb. 14, 2008
ASJ Corporation and Antonio San Juan vs Spouses Efren and Maura Evangelista

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari is the Decision[1] dated April 30, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 56082, which had
affirmed the Decision[2] dated July 8, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 9 in Civil Case No.
745-M-93. The Court of Appeals, after applying the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction, held petitioners ASJ
Corporation (ASJ Corp.) and Antonio San Juan solidarily liable to respondents Efren and Maura Evangelista for the unjustified
retention of the chicks and egg by-products covered by Setting Report Nos. 108 to 113.[3]
The pertinent facts, as found by the RTC and the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
Respondents, under the name and style of R.M. Sy Chicks, are engaged in the large-scale business of buying broiler eggs,
hatching them, and selling their hatchlings (chicks) and egg by-products[4] in Bulacan and Nueva Ecija. For the incubation and
hatching of these eggs, respondents availed of the hatchery services of ASJ Corp., a corporation duly registered in the name of
San Juan and his family.
Sometime in 1991, respondents delivered to petitioners various quantities of eggs at an agreed service fee of 80 centavos per
egg, whether successfully hatched or not. Each delivery was reflected in a Setting Report indicating the following: the number
of eggs delivered; the date of setting or the date the eggs were delivered and laid out in the incubators; the date of candling or
the date the eggs, through a lighting system, were inspected and determined if viable or capable of being hatched into chicks;
and the date of hatching, which is also the date respondents would pick-up the chicks and by-products. Initially, the service
fees were paid upon release of the eggs and by-products to respondents. But as their business went along, respondents delays
on their payments were tolerated by San Juan, who just carried over the balance, as there may be, into the next delivery, out
of keeping goodwill with respondents.
From January 13 to February 3, 1993, respondents had delivered to San Juan a total of 101,3[50][5] eggs, detailed as follows:
[6]
Date Set SR Number No. of eggs delivered Date hatched/Pick-up date
1/13/1993 SR 108 32,566 eggs February 3, 1993
1/20/1993 SR 109 21,485 eggs February 10, 1993
1/22/1993 SR 110 7,213 eggs February 12, 1993
1/28/1993 SR 111 14,495 eggs February 18, 1993
1/30/1993 SR 112 15,346 eggs February 20, 1993
2/3/1993 SR 113 10,24[5][7] eggs February 24, 1993
TOTAL 101,350 eggs
On February 3, 1993, respondent Efren went to the hatchery to pick up the chicks and by-products covered by Setting Report
No. 108, but San Juan refused to release the same due to respondents failure to settle accrued service fees on several setting
reports starting from Setting Report No. 90. Nevertheless, San Juan accepted from Efren 10,245 eggs covered by Setting
Report No. 113 and P15,000.00[8] in cash as partial payment for the accrued service fees.
On February 10, 1993, Efren returned to the hatchery to pick up the chicks and by-products covered by Setting Report No. 109,
but San Juan again refused to release the same unless respondents fully settle their accounts. In the afternoon of the same
day, respondent Maura, with her son Anselmo, tendered P15,000.00[9] to San Juan, and tried to claim the chicks and by-
products. She explained that she was unable to pay their balance because she was hospitalized for an undisclosed ailment. San
Juan accepted the P15,000.00, but insisted on the full settlement of respondents accounts before releasing the chicks and by-
products. Believing firmly that the total value of the eggs delivered was more than sufficient to cover the outstanding balance,
Maura promised to settle their accounts only upon proper accounting by San Juan. San Juan disliked the idea and threatened
to impound their vehicle and detain them at the hatchery compound if they should come back unprepared to fully settle their
accounts with him.
On February 11, 1993, respondents directed their errand boy, Allan Blanco, to pick up the chicks and by-products covered by
Setting Report No. 110 and also to ascertain if San Juan was still willing to settle amicably their differences. Unfortunately, San
Juan was firm in his refusal and reiterated his threats on respondents. Fearing San Juans threats, respondents never went back
to the hatchery.
The parties tried to settle amicably their differences before police authorities, but to no avail. Thus, respondents filed with the
RTC an action for damages based on petitioners retention of the chicks and by-products covered by Setting Report Nos. 108 to
113.
On July 8, 1996, the RTC ruled in favor of respondents and made the following findings: (1) as of Setting Report No. 107,
respondents owed petitioners P102,336.80;[10] (2) petitioners withheld the release of the chicks and by-products covered by
Setting Report Nos. 108-113;[11] and (3) the retention of the chicks and by-products was unjustified and accompanied by
threats and intimidations on respondents.[12] The RTC disregarded the corporate fiction of ASJ Corp.,[13] and held it and San
Juan solidarily liable to respondents for P529,644.80 as actual damages, P100,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00 as
attorneys fees, plus interests and costs of suit. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, based on the evidence on record and the laws/jurisprudence applicable thereon, judgment is hereby rendered
ordering the defendants to pay, jointly and severally, unto the plaintiffs the amounts of P529,644.80, representing the value of
the hatched chicks and by-products which the plaintiffs on the average expected to derive under Setting Reports Nos. 108 to
113, inclusive, with legal interest thereon from the date of this judgment until the same shall have been fully paid,
P100,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as attorneys fees, plus the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[14]
Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. Respondents prayed for an additional award of P76,139.00 as actual damages
for the cost of other unreturned by-products and P1,727,687.52 as unrealized profits, while petitioners prayed for the reversal
of the trial courts entire decision.
On April 30, 2003, the Court of Appeals denied both appeals for lack of merit and affirmed the trial courts decision, with the
slight modification of including an award of exemplary damages of P10,000.00 in favor of respondents. The Court of Appeals,
applying the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction, considered ASJ Corp. and San Juan as one entity, after finding
that there was no bona fide intention to treat the corporation as separate and distinct from San Juan and his wife Iluminada.
The fallo of the Court of Appeals decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with the slight modification that
exemplary damages in the amount of P10,000.00 are awarded to plaintiffs.
Costs against defendants.
SO ORDERED.[15]
Hence, the instant petition, assigning the following errors:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING, AS DID THE COURT A QUO, THAT PETITIONERS
WITHHELD/OR FAILED TO RELEASE THE CHICKS AND BY-PRODUCTS COVERED BY SETTING REPORT NOS. 108 AND 109.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ADMITTING THE HEARSAY TESTIMONY OF MAURA EVANGELISTA SUPPORTIVE
OF ITS FINDINGS THAT PETITIONERS WITHHELD/OR FAILED TO RELEASE THE CHICKS AND BY-PRODUCTS COVERED BY SETTING
REPORT NOS. 108 AND 109.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, AS DID THE COURT A QUO, ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS FAILED TO
RETURN TO THE PLANT TO GET THE CHICKS AND BY-PRODUCTS COVERED BY SETTING REPORT NOS. 110, 111, 112 AND 113.
IV.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING, AS DID THE COURT A QUO, THAT THE PIERCING OF THE VEIL OF
CORPORATE ENTITY IS JUSTIFIED, AND CONSEQUENTLY HOLDING PETITIONERS JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE TO PAY
RESPONDENTS THE SUM OF P529,644.[80].
V.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS HAVE VIOLATED THE PRINCIPLES ENUNCIATED IN
ART. 19 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE AND CONSEQUENTLY IN AWARDING MORAL DAMAGES, EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND
ATTORNEYS FEES.
VI.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT AWARDING PETITIONERS COUNTERCLAIM.[16]
Plainly, the issues submitted for resolution are: First, did the Court of Appeals err when (a) it ruled that petitioners withheld or
failed to release the chicks and by-products covered by Setting Report Nos. 108 and 109; (b) it admitted the testimony of
Maura; (c) it did not find that it was respondents who failed to return to the hatchery to pick up the chicks and by-products
covered by Setting Report Nos. 110 to 113; and (d) it pierced the veil of corporate fiction and held ASJ Corp. and Antonio San
Juan as one entity? Second, was it proper to hold petitioners solidarily liable to respondents for the payment of P529,644.80
and other damages?
In our view, there are two sets of issues that the petitioners have raised.
The first set is factual. Petitioners seek to establish a set of facts contrary to the factual findings of the trial and appellate
courts. However, as well established in our jurisprudence, only errors of law are reviewable by this Court in a petition for
review under Rule 45.[17] The trial court, having had the opportunity to personally observe and analyze the demeanor of the
witnesses while testifying, is in a better position to pass judgment on their credibility.[18] More importantly, factual findings of
the trial court, when amply supported by evidence on record and affirmed by the appellate court, are binding upon this Court
and will not be disturbed on appeal.[19] While there are exceptional circumstances[20] when these findings may be set aside,
none of them is present in this case.
Based on the records, as well as the parties own admissions, the following facts were uncontroverted: (1) As of Setting Report
No. 107, respondents were indebted to petitioners for P102,336.80 as accrued service fees for Setting Report Nos. 90 to 107;
[21] (2) Petitioners, based on San Juans own admission,[22] did not release the chicks and by-products covered by Setting
Report Nos. 108 and 109 for failure of respondents to fully settle their previous accounts; and (3) Due to San Juans threats,
respondents never returned to the hatchery to pick up those covered by Setting Report Nos. 110 to 113.[23]
Furthermore, although no hard and fast rule can be accurately laid down under which the juridical personality of a corporate
entity may be disregarded, the following probative factors of identity justify the application of the doctrine of piercing the veil
of corporate fiction[24] in this case: (1) San Juan and his wife own the bulk of shares of ASJ Corp.; (2) The lot where the
hatchery plant is located is owned by the San Juan spouses; (3) ASJ Corp. had no other properties or assets, except for the
hatchery plant and the lot where it is located; (4) San Juan is in complete control of the corporation; (5) There is no bona fide
intention to treat ASJ Corp. as a different entity from San Juan; and (6) The corporate fiction of ASJ Corp. was used by San Juan
to insulate himself from the legitimate claims of respondents, defeat public convenience, justify wrong, defend crime, and
evade a corporations subsidiary liability for damages.[25] These findings, being purely one of fact,[26] should be respected.
We need not assess and evaluate the evidence all over again where the findings of both courts on these matters coincide.
On the second set of issues, petitioners contend that the retention was justified and did not constitute an abuse of rights since
it was respondents who failed to comply with their obligation. Respondents, for their part, aver that all the elements on abuse
of rights were present. They further state that despite their offer to partially satisfy the accrued service fees, and the fact that
the value of the chicks and by-products was more than sufficient to cover their unpaid obligations, petitioners still chose to
withhold the delivery.
The crux of the controversy, in our considered view, is simple enough. Was petitioners retention of the chicks and by-products
on account of respondents failure to pay the corresponding service fees unjustified? While the trial and appellate courts had
the same decisions on the matter, suffice it to say that a modification is proper. Worth stressing, petitioners act of withholding
the chicks and by-products is entirely different from petitioners unjustifiable acts of threatening respondents. The retention
had legal basis; the threats had none.
To begin with, petitioners obligation to deliver the chicks and by-products corresponds to three dates: the date of hatching,
the delivery/pick-up date and the date of respondents payment. On several setting reports, respondents made delays on their
payments, but petitioners tolerated such delay. When respondents accounts accumulated because of their successive failure
to pay on several setting reports, petitioners opted to demand the full settlement of respondents accounts as a condition
precedent to the delivery. However, respondents were unable to fully settle their accounts.
Respondents offer to partially satisfy their accounts is not enough to extinguish their obligation. Under Article 1248[27] of the
Civil Code, the creditor cannot be compelled to accept partial payments from the debtor, unless there is an express stipulation
to that effect. More so, respondents cannot substitute or apply as their payment the value of the chicks and by-products they
expect to derive because it is necessary that all the debts be for the same kind, generally of a monetary character. Needless to
say, there was no valid application of payment in this case.
Furthermore, it was respondents who violated the very essence of reciprocity in contracts, consequently giving rise to
petitioners right of retention. This case is clearly one among the species of non-performance of a reciprocal obligation.
Reciprocal obligations are those which arise from the same cause, wherein each party is a debtor and a creditor of the other,
such that the performance of one is conditioned upon the simultaneous fulfillment of the other.[28] From the moment one of
the parties fulfills his obligation, delay by the other party begins.[29]
Since respondents are guilty of delay in the performance of their obligations, they are liable to pay petitioners actual damages
of P183,416.80, computed as follows: From respondents outstanding balance of P102,336.80, as of Setting Report No. 107, we
add the corresponding services fees of P81,080.00[30] for Setting Report Nos. 108 to 113 which had remain unpaid.
Nonetheless, San Juans subsequent acts of threatening respondents should not remain among those treated with impunity.
Under Article 19[31] of the Civil Code, an act constitutes an abuse of right if the following elements are present: (a) the
existence of a legal right or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
another.[32] Here, while petitioners had the right to withhold delivery, the high-handed and oppressive acts of petitioners, as
aptly found by the two courts below, had no legal leg to stand on. We need not weigh the corresponding pieces of evidence all
over again because factual findings of the trial court, when adopted and confirmed by the appellate court, are binding and
conclusive and will not be disturbed on appeal.[33]
Since it was established that respondents suffered some pecuniary loss anchored on petitioners abuse of rights, although the
exact amount of actual damages cannot be ascertained, temperate damages are recoverable. In arriving at a reasonable level
of temperate damages of P408,852.10, which is equivalent to the value of the chicks and by-products, which respondents, on
the average, are expected to derive, this Court was guided by the following factors: (a) award of temperate damages will cover
only Setting Report Nos. 109 to 113 since the threats started only on February 10 and 11, 1993, which are the pick-up dates for
Setting Report Nos. 109 and 110; the rates of (b) 41% and (c) 17%, representing the average rates of conversion of broiler eggs
into hatched chicks and egg by-products as tabulated by the trial court based on available statistical data which was
unrebutted by petitioners; (d) 68,784 eggs,[34] or the total number of broiler eggs under Setting Report Nos. 109 to 113; and
(e) P14.00 and (f) P1.20, or the then unit market price of the chicks and by-products, respectively.
Thus, the temperate damages of P408,852.10 is computed as follows:
[b X (d X e) + c X (d X f)] = Temperate Damages
41% X (68,784 eggs X P14) = P394,820.16
17% X (68,784 eggs X P1.20) = P 14,031.94
[P394,820.16 + P14,031.94] = P408,852.10
At bottom, we agree that petitioners conduct flouts the norms of civil society and justifies the award of moral and exemplary
damages. As enshrined in civil law jurisprudence: Honeste vivere, non alterum laedere et jus suum cuique tribuere. To live
virtuously, not to injure others and to give everyone his due.[35] Since exemplary damages are awarded, attorneys fees are
also proper. Article 2208 of the Civil Code provides that:
In the absence of stipulation, attorneys fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:
(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;
xxxx
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated April 30, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
56082 is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
a. Respondents are ORDERED to pay petitioners P183,416.80 as actual damages, with interest of 6% from the date of filing
of the complaint until fully paid, plus legal interest of 12% from the finality of this decision until fully paid.
b. The award of actual damages of P529,644.80 in favor of respondents is hereby REDUCED to P408,852.10, with legal
interest of 12% from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.
c. The award of moral damages, exemplary damages and attorneys fees of P100,000.00, P10,000.00, P50,000.00,
respectively, in favor of respondents is hereby AFFIRMED.
d. All other claims are hereby DENIED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 100755. February 10, 1994.]

CRISTETA BAUTISTA, REMEDIOS MEJIA-BADUA, CATALINA MEJIA, LAURETA MEJIA, ROSITA MEJIA, MILAGROS
MEJIA, JUAN MEJIA, CANDIDA MEJIA, ADRIANA MEJIA, and FAUSTO MEJIA, Petitioners, v. MANGALDAN RURAL
BANK, INC., THRU ITS PRESIDENT, DR. VICENTE JIMENEZ, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF PANGASINAN, EFREN
RODRIGUEZ: and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.

DECISION

PADILLA, J.:

Petition for review on certiorari, praying that respondent courts decision 1 dated 29 January 1991, reversing the lower courts
decision, and its resolution dated 13 May 1991 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration, be set aside and the lower courts
decision dated 3 March 1986 be confirmed.

The facts, as narrated in the decision under review, are as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . Plaintiff Cristeta Bautista mortgaged her conjugal share of 1/2 of the land covered by TCT No. 1507 for P2,000.00 to
defendant Mangaldan Rural Bank on December 1975.

The inscription at the back of the title specifically states that only 1/2 portion of the subject land is mortgaged (Exh.B-1-A).

The said mortgage was foreclosed extra-judicially, on 18 April 1978, for failure of plaintiff to pay the principal obligation and the
other charges with the defendant as the highest bidder.

After the plaintiff failed to redeem the mortgaged property within the reglementary period, ownership over the whole parcel of land
instead of the 1/2 portion which was mortgaged, was consolidated in the name of defendant bank (Exh.D).

Consequently, OCT No. 1507 was cancelled and TCT No. 130847 was issued in the name of the defendant Bank.

Defendant bank, on 18 December 1979, sold for and in consideration of the sum of P3,385.00 (Exh.F) and executed a deed of
absolute sale over the whole property covered by TCT No. 130847 in favor of its co-defendant Fred Rodriguez.

Plaintiffs filed a complaint on 23 June 1980 and amended it on 20 September 1980 against herein defendants for the annulment
and/or cancellation of the following: 1) deed of absolute sale dated 18 July 1979; 2) entry no. 492278 on OCT No. 1507; 3)
consolidation of ownership dated 18 July 1979; 4) entry no. 592279 on OCT No. 592279 on OCT No. 1507; 5) TCT No. 130847;
and 6) deed of sale dated 18 December 1979.

After trial, the court a quo ruled in favor of plaintiffs against defendants and annulled the following documents to the extent of
one-half pro-indiviso of the land subject thereof: a) deed of absolute sale dated 18 July 1979 (Exh.C); b) Consolidation of
Ownership dated 18 July 1979; c) TCT No. 130847 issued on 25 July 1979 (Exh.E); d) deed of absolute sale dated 18 December
1979 (Exh.F); and e) TCT No. 132467 issued on 27 December 1979 (Exh.G).

Defendants were also ordered to jointly and severally place plaintiffs in possession of one-half pro-indiviso of the parcel of land
subject of the complaint.

Defendants were, likewise, ordered to pay plaintiffs damages in the sum of P5,000.00; attorneys fees in the sum of P11,750.00
and the litigation expenses in the sum of P5,000.00 and to pay double costs." 2

Private respondents appealed the lower courts decision to respondent appellate court. As earlier stated, the respondent court
reversed the lower courts decision in regard to its awards, decreeing as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the awards of damages in favor of plaintiffs-appellees in the amount of P5,000.00;
attorneys fees of P11,750.00 and litigation expenses in the sum of P5,000.00 are hereby SET ASIDE.

IT IS SO ORDERED." cralaw virtua1aw library

Hence, this petition for review.

The sole issue to be resolved in this petition is whether or not the petitioners are entitled to recover damages as well as attorneys
fees as a result of the admitted mistake of respondent bank in selling the entire lot, instead of only-half thereof, to respondent
Efren Rodriguez.

Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be reviewed by this Court in decision rendered by the Court of
Appeals. There are instances, however, where the Court departs from this rule and reviews findings of fact of the Court of Appeals
so that substantial justice may be served.

The exceptional instances are where: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the inference made is manifestly
mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact
are conflicting; (6) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellees; (7) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) said findings of
facts are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) the facts set forth in the petition as well as
in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals
are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record." 3

In the present case, we find that the respondent court not only gravely abused its discretion but also misapprehended the facts
when it set aside the lower courts awards for damages and attorneys fees in favor of petitioners.

There is merit in petitioners contention that respondent rural bank and its manager, Dr. Vicente Jimenez, committed gross
negligence when they allowed the consolidation in the banks name of the entire property in question and later on sold the entire
property to respondent Efren Rodriguez. All the documents involved starting with the deed of mortgage, the foreclosure of the
mortgage, the consolidation of ownership in the banks name, and finally the sale of the property to Rodriguez, were authored by
the banks personnel and signed by Dr. Jimenez.

Prudence dictates that a person signing a document in his official capacity (as bank manager in this case) must closely read and
meticulously study the contents of the said document affixing his signature thereon. A bank is not without a legal staff or lawyer
who prepares documents concerning its business. The mistake committed by the banks staff, which was admitted by respondent
Jimenez, was not a slight or minor infraction. It deprived petitioners of their property which could ultimately result in their
ejectment therefrom. Moreover, the banks manager, Dr. Jimenez, could not even explain why the mistake occurred.

Respondent manager of the bank tries to extricate himself from the wrong done to the petitioners by claiming that respondent
Rodriguez refused to give up the one-half portion of the lot despite being informed by the bank of the mistake. And because
Rodriguez refused to return one-half of the lot, the bank just left the matter at that. This exculpatory explanation of respondent
Jimenez only showed respondent banks marked apathy to the claim of petitioners. It should have helped, if not taken the proper
legal remedies, so that the petitioners could recover their property. The injury to petitioners was exacerbated by the banks
"temerity of putting up a counter-claim for damages and attorneys fees against the plaintiff." 4 This callous treatment of the
petitioners by the respondent bank is reprehensible.

The banking system has become an indispensable institution in the modern world and plays a vital in the economic life of every
civilized society. Whether as mere passive entities for the safe-keeping and saving of money or as active instruments of business
and commerce, banks have attained a ubiquitous presence among the people, who have come to regard them with respect and
even gratitude and most of all, confidence. (Simex International [Manila], Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88013, March 19,
1990, 183 SCRA 360).

Moral damages are not awarded to penalize the defendant but to compensate the plaintiff for the injuries he may have suffered. 5
In the present case, we believe that moral damages are proper for there can be no doubt that petitioners must have suffered
sleepless nights, serious anxiety and wounded feelings upon learning that they had lost the remaining one-half of their property on
which their house is built due to the negligence of respondent bank.

For his part, respondent Rodriguez contends that he was a purchaser for value and in good faith. The records show otherwise. In
the words of the lower court: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . At the time of the sale the manager gave him the folder containing the records of the loan as well as the land he wanted to
buy from the bank. Among the documents he saw was Original Certificate of Title No. 1507 (Exh.B) covering the land. When he
saw the title he verified it and he noticed that the land was titled in the name of spouses Saturnino Mejia and Cristeta Bautista. He
knew that at the time the land was mortgaged to the rural bank the husband already died.

Had defendant Efren or Fred Rodriguez examined the annotations at the back of the title, Original Certificate of Title No. 1507, he
could have found that under Entry No. 42590 (Exh.B-1-A) only half portion of the land was mortgaged to the rural bank for
P2,000.00. 6

Thus, the lower court found him not an innocent purchaser albeit for value.

Be that as it may, what we are concerned with here is the question of damages.

The respondent appellate court, after its recital of the circumstances leading to the filing of the complaint oddly found that
respondent rural bank did not commit negligence, and declared that Article 20 of the Civil Code, providing that:" (E)very person
who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same," is not applicable in
the present case because the causes of action of the plaintiffs (petitioners) are contractual in nature.

It is evident that the complaint in this case was not for breach of contract between petitioners and private respondents. It was for
the annulment and cancellation of titles and/or documents where petitioners are not parties therein.

The crux of the complaint is that due to the gross negligence and bad faith of private respondents, petitioners suffered loss or
injury. Clearly, therefore, the cause of action therein is not contractual.

Article 20 of the Civil Code is a cannon of conduct which every person must observe in his relation with another.
The initial carelessness of the rural bank in consolidating the ownership of the entire property instead of only one-half thereof in its
name, its sale of the entire property to respondent Efren Rodriguez, and the lack of promptness to rectify the mistake after its
discovery, constitute gross negligence and bad faith. These were sufficiently established by the evidence. Indeed, the bank and its
manager were grossly negligent in handling the business transaction involved herein and later showing bad faith by refusing to
rectify the wrong done to petitioners.

As for respondent Efren Rodriguez, his adamant refusal to return one-half of the land to the lawful owner after having been
informed of the error committed by the bank showed bad faith and served to aggravate the sorry plight of the petitioners. It is,
however, the Courts view that he was himself a victim of the banks gross negligence before he was apprised of the mistake. From
this viewpoint, the Court believes that he should not be imposed exemplary damages.

For the mental anguish, sleepless nights and serious anxiety suffered by the petitioners, respondent are liable jointly and severally
for moral damages which the Court believes should be raised to P10,000.00. To serve as deterrent for respondent bank from
repeating similar acts, this Court likewise awards exemplary damages against it in the sum of P10,000.00.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial courts decision is reinstated with the above-
mentioned modifications. Costs against private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

TITUS B. VILLANUEVA, G.R. No. 180764Petitioner,Present:

Carpio, J., Chairperson,- versus - Brion, Del Castillo, Abad, and Perez, JJ. EMMA M. ROSQUETA, Respondent. Promulgated:
January 19, 2010

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case is about the right to recover damages for alleged abuse of right committed by a superior public officer in preventing
a subordinate from doing her assigned task and being officially recognized for it.

The Facts and the Case

Respondent Emma M. Rosqueta (Rosqueta), formerly Deputy Commissioner of the Revenue Collection and Monitoring Group
of the Bureau of Customs (the Bureau), tendered her courtesy resignation from that post on January 23, 2001, shortly after
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed office. But five months later on June 5, 2001, she withdrew her resignation,
claiming that she enjoyed security of tenure and that she had resigned against her will on orders of her superior.[1]
Meantime, on July 13, 2001 President Arroyo appointed Gil Valera (Valera) to respondent Rosquetas position. Challenging such
appointment, Rosqueta filed a petition for prohibition, quo warranto, and injunction against petitioner Titus B. Villanueva
(Villanueva), then Commissioner of Customs, the Secretary of Finance, and Valera with the Regional Trial Court[2] (RTC) of
Manila in Civil Case 01-101539. On August 27, 2001 the RTC issued a temporary restraining order (TRO), enjoining Villanueva
and the Finance Secretary[3] from implementing Valeras appointment. On August 28, 2001 the trial court superseded the TRO
with a writ of preliminary injunction.[4]

Petitioner Villanueva, Valera, and the Secretary of Finance challenged the injunction order before the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP 66070. On September 14, 2001 the CA issued its own TRO, enjoining the implementation of the RTCs injunction
order. But the TRO lapsed after 60 days and the CA eventually dismissed the petition before it.

On November 22, 2001 while the preliminary injunction in the quo warranto case was again in force, petitioner Villanueva
issued Customs Memorandum Order 40-2001, authorizing Valera to exercise the powers and functions of the Deputy
Commissioner.

During the Bureaus celebration of its centennial anniversary in February 2002, its special Panorama magazine edition featured
all the customs deputy commissioners, except respondent Rosqueta. The souvenir program, authorized by the Bureaus
Steering Committee headed by petitioner Villanueva to be issued on the occasion, had a space where Rosquetas picture was
supposed to be but it instead stated that her position was under litigation. Meanwhile, the commemorative billboard
displayed at the Bureaus main gate included Valeras picture but not Rosquetas.
On February 28, 2002 respondent Rosqueta filed a complaint[5] for damages before the RTC of Quezon City against petitioner
Villanueva in Civil Case Q-02-46256, alleging that the latter maliciously excluded her from the centennial anniversary
memorabilia. Further, she claimed that he prevented her from performing her duties as Deputy Commissioner, withheld her
salaries, and refused to act on her leave applications. Thus, she asked the RTC to award her P1,000,000.00 in moral damages,
P500,000.00 in exemplary damages, and P300,000.00 in attorneys fees and costs of suit.

But the RTC dismissed[6] respondent Rosquetas complaint, stating that petitioner Villanueva committed no wrong and
incurred no omission that entitled her to damages. The RTC found that Villanueva had validly and legally replaced her as
Deputy Commissioner seven months before the Bureaus centennial anniversary.

But the CA reversed the RTCs decision,[7] holding instead that petitioner Villanuevas refusal to comply with the preliminary
injunction order issued in the quo warranto case earned for Rosqueta the right to recover moral damages from him.[8] Citing
the abuse of right principle, the RTC said that Villanueva acted maliciously when he prevented Rosqueta from performing her
duties, deprived her of salaries and leaves, and denied her official recognition as Deputy Commissioner by excluding her from
the centennial anniversary memorabilia. Thus, the appellate court ordered Villanueva to pay P500,000.00 in moral damages,
P200,000.00 in exemplary damages and P100,000.00 in attorneys fees and litigation expenses. With the denial of his motion
for reconsideration, Villanueva filed this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

The Issue Presented

The key issue presented in this case is whether or not the CA erred in holding petitioner Villanueva liable in damages to
respondent Rosqueta for ignoring the preliminary injunction order that the RTC issued in the quo warranto case (Civil Case 01-
101539), thus denying her of the right to do her job as Deputy Commissioner of the Bureau and to be officially recognized as
such public officer.

The Courts Ruling

Under the abuse of right principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code,[9] a person must, in the exercise of his legal right or
duty, act in good faith. He would be liable if he instead acts in bad faith, with intent to prejudice another. Complementing this
principle are Articles 20[10] and 21[11] of the Civil Code which grant the latter indemnity for the injury he suffers because of
such abuse of right or duty.[12]

Petitioner Villanueva claims that he merely acted on advice of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) when he allowed Valera
to assume the office as Deputy Commissioner since respondent Rosqueta held the position merely in a temporary capacity
and since she lacked the Career Executive Service eligibility required for the job.

But petitioner Villanueva cannot seek shelter in the alleged advice that the OSG gave him. Surely, a government official of his
rank must know that a preliminary injunction order issued by a court of law had to be obeyed, especially since the question of
Valeras right to replace respondent Rosqueta had not yet been properly resolved.

That petitioner Villanueva ignored the injunction shows bad faith and intent to spite Rosqueta who remained in the eyes of
the law the Deputy Commissioner. His exclusion of her from the centennial anniversary memorabilia was not an honest
mistake by any reckoning. Indeed, he withheld her salary and prevented her from assuming the duties of the position. As the
Court said in Amonoy v. Spouses Gutierrez,[13] a partys refusal to abide by a court order enjoining him from doing an act,
otherwise lawful, constitutes an abuse and an unlawful exercise of right.

That respondent Rosqueta was later appointed Deputy Commissioner for another division of the Bureau is immaterial. While
such appointment, when accepted, rendered the quo warranto case moot and academic, it did not have the effect of wiping
out the injuries she suffered on account of petitioner Villanuevas treatment of her. The damage suit is an independent action.

The CA correctly awarded moral damages to respondent Rosqueta. Such damages may be awarded when the defendants
transgression is the immediate cause of the plaintiffs anguish[14] in the cases specified in Article 2219[15] of the Civil Code.
[16]
Here, respondent Rosquetas colleagues and friends testified that she suffered severe anxiety on account of the speculation
over her employment status.[17] She had to endure being referred to as a squatter in her workplace. She had to face inquiries
from family and friends about her exclusion from the Bureaus centennial anniversary memorabilia. She did not have to endure
all these affronts and the angst and depression they produced had Villanueva abided in good faith by the courts order in her
favor. Clearly, she is entitled to moral damages.

The Court, however, finds the award of P500,000.00 excessive. As it held in Philippine Commercial International Bank v.
Alejandro,[18] moral damages are not a bonanza. They are given to ease the defendants grief and suffering. Moral damages
should reasonably approximate the extent of hurt caused and the gravity of the wrong done. Here, that would be
P200,000.00.

The Court affirms the grant of exemplary damages by way of example or correction for the public good but, in line with the
same reasoning, reduces it to P50,000.00. Finally, the Court affirms the award of attorneys fees and litigation expenses but
reduces it to P50,000.00.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 30, 2007 in CA-G.R.
CV 85931 with MODIFICATION in that petitioner Titus B. Villanueva is ORDERED to pay respondent Emma M. Rosqueta the
sum of P200,000.00 in moral damages, P50,000.00 in exemplary damages, and P50,000.00 in attorneys fees and litigation
expenses.

SO ORDERED.